AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL

THE MAGAZINE FOR INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS

Intelligence Education and Training

NMIA

Vol. 31, No. 2, 2013

American Intelligence Journal

THE MAGAZINE FOR INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS

Vol. 31, No. 2 *2013* ISSN 0883-072X

The *American Intelligence Journal* (*AIJ*) is published by the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA), a non-profit, non-political, professional association supporting American intelligence professionals and the U.S. Intelligence Community, primarily through educational means. The Board of Directors is headed by Lieutenant General James A. Williams (USA, Ret), and the president of NMIA is Colonel Joe Keefe (USAF, Ret). NMIA membership includes active duty, retired, former military, and civil service intelligence personnel and U.S. citizens in industry, academia, or other civil pursuits who are interested in being informed on aspects of intelligence. For a membership application, see the back page of this *Journal*.

Authors interested in submitting an article to the *Journal* are encouraged to send an inquiry – with a short abstract of the text – to the Editor by e-mail at <aijeditor@nmia.org>. Articles and inquiries may also be submitted in hard copy to Editor, c/o NMIA, 256 Morris Creek Road, Cullen, Virginia 23934. Comments, suggestions, and observations on the editorial content of the *Journal* are also welcomed. Questions concerning subscriptions, advertising, and distribution should be directed to the Production Manager at <admin@nmia.org>.

The *American Intelligence Journal* is published semi-annually. Each issue runs 100-200 pages and is distributed to key government officials, members of Congress and their staffs, and university professors and libraries, as well as to NMIA members, *Journal* subscribers, and contributors. Contributors include Intelligence Community leaders and professionals as well as academicians and others with interesting and informative perspectives.

NMIA CORPORATE MEMBERS

Accenture

American Military University

ANSER, Analytic Services, Inc.

CACI

CGI

DynCorp International

General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems

General Dynamics Information Technology

Henley-Putnam University

Integrity Applications, Inc.

Intelligent Waves, LLC

Johns Hopkins University Advanced Academic Programs

L-3 Communications

Leidos

MCR Federal, LLC

Northrop Grumman Information Systems

PARSONS

Pluribus International Corporation

Point Park University

Riverside Research Institute

SOS International, Ltd.

Sytera, LLC

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL

Table of Contents

Table of Contents *(Continued)*

The opinions expressed in these articles are those of the authors alone. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government, nor that of the National Military Intelligence Association, nor that of the organizations where the authors are employed.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

Welcome to the latest edition of NMIA's *American Intelligence Journal* (*AIJ*), where you will find leading-edge dialogue on timely Intelligence Community (IC) issues in plain language from a diverse mixture of scholars and intelligence practitioners.

First, an update from NMIA is in order. The National Military Intelligence Association and Foundation held our annual National Military Intelligence Awards Banquet in May with several hundred attendees honoring the best in Military Intelligence. Nineteen of our nation's finest intelligence professionals were recognized by NMIA/NMIF and their parent organizations. Awards were given to personnel from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, the National Guard and Reserves, and the national intelligence agencies. Attending to make the award presentations were the directors or deputies of these intelligence organizations/units. It was interesting to look at the awards in terms of the theater focus. Nine of the awards had South Asia and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM as a major focus of recognition. Six awards were focused elsewhere—elsewhere being support to military operations, intelligence collection, or peacekeeping efforts in Iran, the Arabian Gulf, Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Bahrain, Africa, Nigeria, and Uganda. You will find that broader focus of the IC in this issue of *AIJ*. The accomplishments of these intelligence professionals and heroes have had an obvious and measurable impact on our nation's security. We are proud to be a part of that recognition process. Our next Awards Banquet will be on 17 May 2015; be sure to sign up on our website early at www.nmia.org.

This year NMIA presented a new award, the Dr. Forrest Frank Award, which will be presented each year to recognize outstanding support to NMIA. This award was created earlier this year and presented to an individual who has done so much for NMIA and its activities over the years that the selection was easy. It was to an individual with over 40 years in intelligence and national security and 15 years in NMIA leadership positions. He was an officer in our local Potomac Chapter, was an officer on the NMIA Board of Directors who helped develop the Association's By-Laws and Vision Statement, singularly established our National Military Intelligence Foundation and Scholarship Program, and acted as our chaplain and spiritual director. That would be Dr. Forrest Frank. Forrest will shortly be turning over all of his active NMIA/NMIF duties and will be sorely missed both professionally and personally. The Board of Directors wishes Forrest fair winds and smooth seas as he moves on to new endeavors.

This issue of *AIJ* emphasizes intelligence education and training, the often overlooked foundation of intelligence success. Be sure to read the Editor's Desk before you delve into an outstanding array of articles. The mission of the U.S. Intelligence Community has perhaps never been more changing or more challenging than it is today. The depth, breadth, difficulty, and dynamic nature of the intelligence challenge is significant, while our military and national security tools to counter these threats are shrinking, making the criticality of the IC providing decision advantage more important than ever. As our illustrious *American Intelligence Journal* editor Bill Spracher outlined, it requires us to educate (and train) our intelligence professionals for the unknown.

I recently had the pleasure of attending the National Intelligence University commencement ceremony for our most recent bachelor's and master's degree recipients in intelligence studies. Once again I was highly impressed with the quality of our future intelligence leaders, and with the broad, complex, and diverse array of topics of their graduate theses. General Keith Alexander (USA, Ret) was the commencement speaker and his address drew from YouTube's *Did You Know 2014* (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XrJjfDUzD7M).

Did you know: The top ten in-demand jobs of 2013 did not exist in 2004?

- We are currently preparing students for jobs that don't yet exist;
- Using technologies that have not yet been invented;
- In order to solve problems we don't know as problems yet.

Did you know: That 3.5 zetabytes of unique new information will be created this year?

- That is 3.5 times 10 to the 21st power.
- That is more data than in the last 5,000 years combined.
- That the amount of new technical data doubles every two years.
- That means, for new college students, half of what they learn in their first year of study will be outdated by their third year of study.

Did you know: That in 2012 there were 8,500 terrorist attacks that killed 15,500 people? (per University of Maryland Global Terrorist database, or Start DataBase)

- That is a 69% increase in the number of attacks and an 89% increase in the number of casualties over the previous year (2011).

While *Did You Know* is looking at a timeline of rapid technological change and the very near-term impact on individuals and societies, it also concludes by saying that technical predictions further out than 15 years are hard to make. I recommend to you the National Intelligence Council's *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, which is a forward-looking IC document for long-term planning (http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends). While much of the IC effort is focused on today's threat and tonight's operations, longer-term forecasting remains a tough and critical mission.

The U.S. military is in the final stages of ending over 10 years of continual wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and significant military force deployments. Are we any safer now and is the world more stable, requiring less of a military force and presence to support key national security objectives, deter conflict, or defeat adversaries if required? Most would say not. The consensus is that national security threats and intelligence challenges have become more diverse, more dynamic, and just plain harder.

In fact, the intelligence mission is focused on a worldwide stage of potential threats that has become even more unpredictable. Recent developments include the crisis in Ukraine and related Russian actions; the transition of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), becoming the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), becoming the Islamic State (IS) (or Caliphate); and the U.S. now facing a previously minimalized adversary—with 20-30,000 fighters controlling large swaths of both Syria and Iraq. All this, complicated by this "new" national security threat also being the adversary of other U.S. adversaries, Syria's Assad regime and Iran. From the Korean peninsula to the South China Sea, to threats in Africa from Boko Haram and the Ebola outbreak, to the counternarcotics mission, the intelligence portfolio has expanded exponentially. DNI Clapper's "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community" provides an extensive catalogue of threats (http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/140129/clapper.pdf), with global threats (cyber, counterintelligence, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and proliferation, counterspace, transnational organized crime, economic trends, natural resources, health risks, and mass atrocities) and seven regional areas of concern offering 30 identified state and non-state players to be tracked.

"When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements," former Defense Secretary Robert Gates has noted, "our record [since Vietnam] has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right."

To compound the IC challenge, while our intelligence mission is diversifying our national security tools are decreasing. And the investment in the military component of that toolset is decreasing the most as the drawdown from the Middle East is completed. I recommend to you Robert Samuelson's article "Defunding Defense," 9 March 2014, in *The Washington Post*, which the following partially draws upon (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/robert-samuelson-defunding-defense/2014/03/09/80ee0dda-a7bc-11e3-b61e-8051b8b52d06_story.html).

The basis of the reduced U.S. defense posture is the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (QDR), which includes a summary of the strategic environment, a realization of the fiscal environment, and a statement of the resulting defense strategic guidance. The QDR discusses the "tough choices" that have to be made in the face of a rapidly changing security environment (http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf). The 2015 DOD budget reflects the decreased investment in defense capabilities as well as a decreased emphasis on military capabilities overall. Likewise, the 2015 intelligence budget reflects the requirement to operate in a constrained fiscal environment, making difficult cuts and reforms, rightsizing and reducing the workforce, and reducing lower-priority programs (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/intelligence.pdf).

The major theme of the QDR is a reduced and rebalanced force structure, and more reliance on U.S. comparative advantage—a strong economy, a network of alliances and partnerships, and our human capital and technological edge. The QDR is no longer based on the past assumption that the U.S. could fight two major wars simultaneously. It also disavows any long-lasting counterinsurgency mission. "Our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations."

The administration's new 2015 budget projections show sharp Pentagon reductions. In nominal dollars (not adjusted for inflation), defense spending stays flat between 2013 and 2024. It is $626 billion in 2013 and $630 billion in 2024. Adjusted for inflation and population growth, it drops by a quarter. As a share of the federal budget, it falls from 18 percent in 2013 to 11 percent in 2024.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has outlined some program cuts behind the spending declines. The Army drops from a recent peak of 570,000 to 450,000—the lowest since before World War II—and possibly to 420,000. The Marine Corps falls 10 percent from its peak to 182,000. The Air Force retires all its A-10 "Warthog" ground-support fighters, as well as its U-2 spy planes. The Navy halts purchases of its Littoral Combat Ships at 32 instead of the planned 52. Meanwhile, China plans a 12 percent increase in military spending for 2014; at that pace, Chinese military spending would double in six years.

This is the environment facing today's intelligence professionals. This is the environment in which intelligence education and training play such a critical role. This is the environment in which the entire IC enterprise and the larger national security enterprise must be more innovative and more agile. It is not only find, fix, track, target, engage, and access (or the variations thereof). It will also be achieved with coalition aircraft, with non-U.S. boots on the ground, supporting non-kinetic tools (diplomatic, economic), employing crowdsourcing and cultural intelligence techniques, and other non-traditional challenges. None of this is new and the environment continues to evolve. Nevertheless, it does highlight the requirement for a highly educated and exquisitely trained U.S. intelligence workforce. We hope this issue of *AIJ* will provide insights into how that is being accomplished.

NMIA would like to have you more active in the Association, and if you live in the DC area you have the opportunity to participate in the NMIA National Capital Region Chapter. Our NMIA Chapters Chair, Cal Carnes (callandcarnes@cs.com), is one of those leading an effort to get the Chapter moving again and to offer a series of events of interest to our membership. Please contact Cal if you have creative suggestions and a bit of spare time.

Our Fall 2014 NMIA Symposium (5-6 November 2014) will provide a related overview of "Intelligence Analysis in the 21st Century: Tools, Tradecraft, and Challenges." The Symposium will examine current analytical initiatives within the Intelligence Community and look into related advances in academia, business, and other fields. Our expert speakers and panelists will provide their perspectives on the challenges and opportunities for analysis in the 21st century. Key questions we seek to address include:

1. How do we acquire and sustain the workforce, technologies, and methodologies that will enable our success in the decades to come?
2. What are the challenges in realizing the potential of object-based production (OBP), activity-based intelligence (ABI), and the Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment (IC ITE)?
3. How can our acquisition systems be improved to deliver relevant solutions as the pace of technological change accelerates?

Please join us and register early at www.nmia.org. Moreover, be on the lookout for the next issue of *AIJ*, which examines in part the same theme as the upcoming Symposium, "New Paradigms in Intelligence Analysis."

As always, we welcome your feedback.

Joe Keefe

We welcome you to the second issue of *American Intelligence Journal* in the last five years dedicated to "Intelligence Education and Training." We at NMIA consider lifelong learning critical for intelligence professionals and promote continuing education as a vital part of our organizational mission. Consequently, in addition to hosting one of our biannual symposia in 2009 with this topic as its theme, which generated considerable interest, President Keefe asked me to organize a special one-day workshop on that same theme in November 2012. For this occasion, the National Capital Region Chapter of NMIA partnered with a close counterpart, the Washington Area Chapter of IAFIE (International Association for Intelligence Education), in organizing the event, which drew approximately 115 attendees from the U.S. government, both military and civilian academia, and the defense contractor community. The final agenda for the workshop, dubbed "Intelligence Education & Training Day," was published in the *Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2012. You're urged to refer to that detailed listing to see what a diverse lineup of academicians and trainers discussed their programs, their learning objectives, and the challenges they faced, in particular as the federal government was entering a period of severe budget cuts where training often takes a bigger hit than operations.

In a December 2013 editorial in *The Washington Post*, titled "To Improve the U.S. Military, Shrink It," noted defense authority (and often provocative critic) Tom Ricks commented about the role of education and training: "The best form of preparedness is to develop a military that is most able to adapt. It should be small and nimble. Its officers should be educated as well as trained because **one trains for the known but educates for the unknown**—that is, prepares officers to think critically as they go into chaotic, difficult and new situations" [emphasis added]. That's one way of defining the difference between the two concepts, which often get blurred together. Ricks goes on to insist that "the United States still has an Industrial Age military in an Information Age world." Of course, one of the primary missions of the Intelligence Community is to take the raw information—huge piles of it generated by Information Age technology—and convert it into actionable intelligence that can inform the high-level policymaker and the low-level military decision-maker alike.

For the one-day workshop, the keynote address was offered by the inimitable Mark Lowenthal, who now presides over his own intelligence training academy and also serves as IAFIE Executive Director. For those who have heard him speak before, it's clear Dr. Lowenthal has a way with words, along with a razor-sharp sense of humor. He ably clarified the difference in intelligence education and training by using a witty comparison: "Most parents want their young child to receive sex education in school, but few are in favor of sex

training." I asked our keynoter to turn his introductory address into an article for this issue of the *Journal*, and he gladly obliged. I knew he possessed much wisdom in this field—along with years of experience teaching as an adjunct professor at such bastions of educational excellence as Columbia and Johns Hopkins—and for that reason I selected him as one of six subject matter experts I interviewed for my 2009 doctoral dissertation. The product of many years of passionate interest and research in this field, that paper was titled "National Security Intelligence Professional Education: A Map of U.S. Civilian University Programs and Competencies." I wanted to continue my exploration of that topic in part through organizing the workshop and following up with an issue of *AIJ* that could capitalize on a sampling of the many subjects discussed in detail that day. Some of the articles herein are by panelists and other participants from the workshop, while the bulk came in from other training and educational entities in the field.

Nine articles represent contributions by repeat authors in the pages of the *Journal*. Dr. Lowenthal's "Intelligence Education: *Quo Vadimus*?" follows up a previous kick-off piece he wrote in 2011 for the issue exploring "Intelligence Reform and Transformation." Dr. David Keithly, who last helped us commemorate the Berlin Wall crisis in a previous issue, insists in his new article that education makes us what we are. Dr. Michael Landon-Murray, who earlier as a graduate student wrote about intelligence studies programs in the U.S., has now successfully matriculated from the University at Albany and has broadened his lens on intelligence education to examine in comparative fashion programs in five countries on two continents. CDR Toni Gay, who formerly headed the intelligence program at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, previously wrote about the effort she oversaw there and now ruminates on how to professionalize intelligence studies in general by focusing on those officials in charge of teaching them. Toni will soon retire from the service and pursue a doctorate in higher education administration at William & Mary. NGA analyst Dan Opstal, who has written book reviews in the past for *AIJ*, relates intelligence education to the currently sexy topic of crowdsourcing. Dr. James McGinley of the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity and a team of fellow authors led by Maj Bill DeLeal, all deployed together to Afghanistan, examine the importance of cultural intelligence in the wake of the last decade's fascination with counterinsurgency. This article is a nice follow-up to *AIJ*'s Volume 30, No. 1, 2012, which had the theme "Cultural Intelligence and Regional Issues." Dr. Gordon Middleton of Patrick Henry College offers another piece regarding high technology, his specialty, this time leaving avatars and robots behind while studying the use of smart phones as sensors. NIU faculty member Chris Bailey, one of our resident legal experts and frequent book reviewer, explains the "RTP" Doctrine as it applies to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. Finally, the most prolific of our repeat performers, Dr. Ken Campbell, takes a religious icon revered for his courage during the World War II era, the Rev. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and profiles him through the prism of espionage.

Despite the amazing group of loyal old-timers listed above, with this edition we are delighted to welcome a host of first-time contributors. Sticking to the cultural intelligence topic, Dr. Louise Rasmussen and two co-authors from the consultant community expound about the need for intelligence analysts to apply cultural knowledge and "sensemaking." Walter Andrusyszyn of the University of South Florida touches upon the same idea as CDR Gay in seeking better intelligence through developing better officers. This new *AIJ* author, a distinguished former Foreign Service Officer focused primarily on Europe, has collaborated closely with the relatively new Southern Academic Center of National Intelligence University in Tampa, FL, which opens up NIU programs to personnel from CENTCOM, SOCOM, and SOUTHCOM. Speaking of NIU, where I have hung my academic shingle for the last ten years, LTC Toby Vogt of the University's School of S&T Intelligence, which is fairly new itself, wrestles with the definition of "intelligence studies" as a discipline, something another professional organization to which I belong—IAFIE—has been doing for practically the entire decade of its existence. One of IAFIE's newest and most promising projects, which has the potential to add credibility to the field of intelligence education—certification—is introduced briefly by Dr. Jonathan Smith of Coastal Carolina University. Jon volunteered to honcho IAFIE's nascent certification program under the oversight of the Educational Practices Committee, to which we both belong. Like myself, Dr. Smith is a veteran of SOUTHCOM, but he experienced that co-called "economy-of-force theater" through the perspective of the Navy. Another NIU faculty member, MAJ Eric Miller, formerly full-time but now adjunct after moving to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, explains the IC's Joint Duty Program, which along with education and training is designed to enhance professional development. Yet another idea to improve collaboration within the IC is proposed by NGA analyst Matthew Wilder, who advocates the establishment of a National Intelligence Academy.

At the younger end of the spectrum from joint duty assignments is a vehicle those aspiring to IC careers always seek—internships. College students nowadays almost always have one or more internships listed on their resumes as a discriminator when it comes to getting hired

or being awarded scholarships, and if the stint as an intern brings with it pay and a security clearance so much the better. A team of instructors from the Advanced Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) discusses the lessons it learned from intelligence internships arranged with several universities in the Midwest U.S. Many university intelligence studies programs focus heavily on analysis, as can be expected given the large population of analysts throughout the IC. In fact, the next issue of the *Journal* will explore the theme "New Paradigms in Intelligence Analysis." Getting a jump on that theme, Laura Sappelsa and her team of co-authors from Analytic Services, Inc., talk about some Space Age tools of analysis in their seminal article. Dr. Noel Hendrickson of James Madison University introduces the rapidly growing intelligence program at JMU and promotes intelligence analysis as an academic discipline. Dr. Rasheed Hosein of the U.S. Military Academy's History Department delves into an area I had not thought of before, the use of Islamic law in the educational systems of the U.S. military and law enforcement communities. Hosein joins another group of West Point professors from the Department of Geography & Environmental Engineering who made solid contributions to *AIJ* in the recent past, especially in the field of cultural intelligence. While on the captivating theme of Islam, Cheryl Young of HQ, Marine Corps, examines the turmoil that Egypt, and in particular the Sinai, has experienced since the Arab Spring with the ill-fated election of the Muslim Brotherhood to lead its government.

Finally, moving to education/knowledge-driven operations, USCYBERCOM's Lou Anne DeMattei, who also happens to be Program Chair for NMIA's NCR Chapter, explains how knowledge management is critical for Joint Intelligence Operations Centers. Yale University student John Masko discusses the intelligence-policy relationship by looking historically at CIA operations in Tibet, an intriguing corner of the world under the thumb of Chinese martial law which I was privileged to visit in 2007. The last essay, penned jointly by former AIJ editor Dr. Mark Kramar and myself, commemorates one of the best intelligence training success stories of all time—that of the heralded "Ritchie Boys" of World War II fame, based on an inspiring 2-day reunion in 2012 to which we were invited. That war spawned a rapidly dwindling group of U.S. Army heroes, most of them European immigrants, whose name derives from their main training base, then-Camp Ritchie, MD, later Fort Ritchie, and now the victim of a BRAC closure. In a 2-part series, we profile some of these highly accomplished and dedicated veterans, most of whom ended up as interrogators, analysts, and translators in the struggle to rid Europe of the Nazi scourge. With so much of this issue of the *Journal* focused on intelligence education, we thought training ought to get its due and in this way wrap up a group of comprehensive essays on the importance of learning for our intelligence enterprise. I would also like to highlight two provocative inputs to our occasional "In My View" section of opinion pieces. Special Agent Corey O'Connor talks about the moral aspects of his specialty, counterintelligence, and repeat *AIJ* author/Russian academic at the London School of Economics and Political Science Dr. Boris Volodarsky gives his opinions about a man now in the international spotlight more than ever before, Vladimir Putin.

As always, this issue offers a number of interesting book reviews, the first one discussing a new biography of a man noted for his military and academic exploits, "General Sam" Wilson, former OSS/Merrill's Marauders operative, DATT to Moscow, DIA Director, and President of Hampden-Sydney College in southern VA, one of the last all-male liberal arts institutions in the country. Three other former DIA Directors recently visited the almost 91-year-old LTG Wilson at his farm, and we're delighted to be able to share a photo of the quartet of intelligence scions over lunch.

I've already mentioned our deep dive into analysis with the next issue, which will be complemented by the topic of the Fall 2014 symposium. The issue after that will examine "Denial & Deception." I appreciate all the inputs received in the past from full-length articles to opinion pieces to book reviews to positive verbal feedback about our diverse offerings. We request your continued support and would like to see your name in lights in this publication. Those interested in writing an article about any topic whatsoever, as long as it's related to intelligence, national security, or homeland security, should contact me at AIJEditor@nmia.org or my colleague Kel McClanahan at AIJ.Associate.Editor@nmia.org. Kel also serves as our book review editor and welcomes your reviews of recent books on intelligence or suggestions for reviewing books in the works that you might hear about before we do.

Bill Spracher

You are Invited to NMIA's Fall Intelligence Symposium

Intelligence Analysis in the 21st Century: Tools, Tradecraft, and Challenges

November 5-6, 2014 at 12900 Federal Systems Park Drive, Fairfax, Virginia

Register at www.nmia.org

The symposium will examine current analytical initiatives within the Intelligence Community and look into related advances in academia, business, and other fields. Our expert speakers and panelists will provide their perspectives on the challenges and opportunities for analysis in the 21st century. Key questions we seek to address include:

- How do we acquire and sustain the workforce, technologies, and methodologies that will enable our success in the decades to come?
- What are the challenges in realizing the potential of object-based production (OBP), activity-based intelligence (ABI), and the Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment (IC ITE)?
- How can our acquisition systems be improved to deliver relevant solutions as the pace of technological change accelerates?

*Symposium Agenda **

November 5: Unclassified

- Keynote Speaker
- Big Data and the Next 20 Years
- Panel: Big Data Benchmarks outside the Intelligence Community (IC)
- Panel: Policy and Privacy Implications
- Big Data and the Need for Information Environments
- Panel: IC Acquisition in an Era of Rapid technological Change

November 6: Classified SECRET

- Panel: Open Source Intelligence
- Panel: Novel Approaches to Intelligence Analysis
- Panel: The Path Forward for Object-Based Production (OBP) and Activity-Based Intelligence (ABI)
- Keynote Speaker
- Panel: Service Perspectives of Big Data
- Panel: Developing a 21st Century Analytical Workforce

* The most current list of speakers and panelists can be found at www.nmia.org.

Intelligence Education: *Quo Vadimus?*

by Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal

One of the more fascinating anomalies about the practice of intelligence in the U.S. government is how matter-of-factly and how anti-intellectually it is treated. These are two separate issues but they result in the same outcome, or reinforce one another to produce the same outcome. The matter-of-fact treatment is, at some level, a good thing. After nearly 170 years of being either ignored, dismissed, or treated as an occasionally useful activity, intelligence is now generally accepted as something that governments do. It is no longer seen as exceptional or extraordinary. That is not to say that there is general acceptance of all the things that occur within intelligence, but its role in the national security process is accepted. However, except when there are perceived shortcomings in intelligence, not much thought is given to how we actually create intelligence. It is taken as a given and very little thought is given to what might be necessary to sustain or to improve the process.

The anti-intellectual treatment is much more problematic. I believe that intelligence is, at its core, an intellectual activity, based on the view that our ultimate purpose is to provide analysis in support of policymakers. "Intellectual" is commonly defined as "of or relating to the intellect." "Intellect" is defined as:

a. "The ability to learn and reason; the capacity for knowledge and understanding.
b. The ability to think abstractly or profoundly."

These, it seems to me, define what we do in intelligence analysis. However, the Intelligence Community does very little to foster these activities once it has enlisted analysts—and therein lies the problem.

Taken together, these two trends—matter-of-fact and anti-intellectual—means that there is very little support for what should be a bedrock activity: intelligence education. It is either taken for granted or seen as a distraction.

THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSION

I once had a lawyer tell me, in a moment of high dudgeon, that intelligence was not a profession. "Law," he said, "is a profession. Intelligence is not." As I have written elsewhere, intelligence *is* a profession. The accepted hallmarks of a profession are specialized knowledge and (usually) specified and often intense training. It may also include issues of ethos and standards. Intelligence meets most of those hallmarks—with the possible exception of specific and intense training. Therein, again, lies the problem.

One of the oddest aspects of the intelligence profession is the random and accidental way that most intelligence officers come into it. Very few give very much thought—if any—to being an intelligence officer until some opportunity arises. A recruiter comes to the campus or a friend or a professor makes a suggestion—and there you are, talking to a recruiter and conversing about a job that you had never really thought about before.

This random or accidental recruitment has a number of important implications, some of which are strengths and some of which are weaknesses. First, this is a volunteer force. The Intelligence Community (IC) can only recruit and hire the people who come forward. This means, in turn, that the IC ends up with a very heterogeneous workforce. This is a good thing, as it allows for more breadth across the many issues for which intelligence is responsible. It is also problematic, as it means that it should be necessary to educate and train this heterogeneous population toward some common goals, standards, etc., because of the very fact that they are coming to the IC from such diverse and disparate backgrounds. Here we find an important distinction between intelligence and professions such as medicine or engineering. For these latter professions, you have to commit by your junior year in college in order to take the necessary undergraduate courses before going on to graduate school. The same is true for liberal arts majors who plan to go on to graduate work in their chosen area of study. (Ironically, there are very few, if any, undergraduate prerequisites for people who plan to become lawyers. As the American Bar Association notes on its website: "There is no single path that will prepare you for a legal education.")

Yet, even as we recognize that there are not many educational prerequisites to become an intelligence officer, we have witnessed a proliferation of college-level programs devoted to intelligence. However, these have been about, of necessity, what we call "tradecraft." Tradecraft—the nuts and bolts of how to do your job—is important. In

intelligence analysis, tradecraft can include critical thinking, writing skills, analytic tools, etc. These are important but they are not education. These various courses are training.

Education and training are different. Education is about bodies of knowledge; training is about skills. (The joke used to differentiate between the two is: "You want your children to have sex education; you do *not* want them to have sex training.")

WHAT SHOULD WE BE TEACHING?

Consequently, we are still left with the question of what intelligence education is or what it should be about. To answer this, we need to go back to how the Intelligence Community hires its analysts. They are mostly hired by subject matter expertise. An agency or an office needs someone who has a basic working knowledge of nuclear engineering, Farsi, economics, Chinese politics, etc. In other words, the IC wants someone who already has education in a given area, preliminary expertise.

The IC expects that new analysts arrive on the job with some level of subject matter expertise in a given area. They are being hired against an agreed need. This is crucial as none of the IC's schoolhouses is equipped to provide this academic foundation—nor should they be. The Community schoolhouses can shape and focus the incoming expertise but they cannot provide it in the same depth that one would get as an undergraduate.

If we follow this logic, the IC schoolhouses should provide intelligence training but in a very broad sense and beyond the nuts and bolts of how to do your job. Here are some suggested topics, some of which are touched on in one agency or another and very few of which are taught to a general degree of uniformity across the Community:

- What does it mean to be an analyst? What is your job about? What are you expected to know, to do? Where do you fit in the larger intelligence process and the larger national security process?
- Who does what in the Intelligence Community? Why do we have all of these different agencies and what do they do? What are the different roles and missions of each agency and of the Community as a whole? How do they work together? What are the procedural, managerial, and cultural problems encountered in such a large entity?
- What are the nature, strengths, and weaknesses of different types of collection? Which types of collection are most or least useful for which types of issues? It is difficult to imagine how one can be an effective analyst without knowing this and yet this remains a shortfall in the development of analysts.
- How do I task collection effectively? Closely related to the previous point, an analyst needs to know how to get the collection system to respond to his or her requirements.
- What are the nature, opportunities, and risks of dealing with policymakers? The policymaker-intelligence relationship is central to all of intelligence and it should be explored in some depth to prepare the analysts.
- Moral and ethical issues. Intelligence analysis, like most professions, encounters interesting and perhaps unique moral and ethical issues. Analysts should be given some advance preparation and guidelines for dealing with them.
- Career mentoring. This has been one of the major shortfalls across all agencies but it presupposes that there is some sense of what analytic career development should look like in terms of skills to be attained, time required, paths for promotion, etc.
- And actual tradecraft: how to write, how to think, how to brief, how to collaborate and compete simultaneously—as an effective intelligence officer.
- Finally, the history of our profession. As the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper, says: "The history of rock & roll did not begin the day you turned on the radio." It is important to understand what went before, i.e., what events helped shape the profession you are in today.

I would argue that these should be taught across the Intelligence Community to all analysts—regardless of whether they are all-source, multi-INT, or single-source, with several goals in mind. First, it would create some level of uniformity regarding skills and expectations. Second, it would allow analysts to meet other analysts from other agencies at the beginning of their careers, helping break down stovepipes and creating professional networks.

SOME OTHER GAPS AND NEEDS

Describing a course of education or training for intelligence analysts is far from sufficient. The Intelligence Community has to get serious—or more serious—about actually providing education and training than it has been to date.

One of the easiest ways to determine the relative importance of a government activity is to look at the share of the budget

it receives. It has been estimated that analysis gets some 2-4 percent of the National Intelligence Program (NIP: just over $52 billion in fiscal year 2013), depending on how you count and how you allocate certain activities and staff. Now, a budget of between $1 billion and $3 billion would send most academics' hearts atwitter but it is not an overly large commitment of resources in the context of U.S. intelligence, especially if we accept that analysis is our main product. Education within the NIP may come to 0.0001%—or one ten-thousandth of a percent—a minuscule amount.

It is instructive to compare how the Intelligence Community treats education with the practice in the U.S. military. Although there are differences from service to service, it is generally assumed that officers will continue to pursue education, either within the military or in civilian institutions, throughout their career. For example, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1976. He subsequently earned an MS in Nuclear Effects Engineering from North Carolina State University, an MS in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, and is also a graduate of the Army War College. General Odierno's somewhat extensive academic record is not atypical in the U.S. military but it would be in the U.S. Intelligence Community. The reason for the difference is rather simple: the military has an ethos of ongoing professional development. U.S. intelligence has an ethos of ongoing intelligence production. It is far more important to keep analysts at their desks reading the incoming current intelligence and preparing to write that next brief for tomorrow's output than to spare them for several months—let alone a few years—of continuing education. Yes, intelligence analysts do get Masters or even PhDs—on their own time, and some do attend the various advanced service schools. Yet, these remain exceptional tours rather than standard professional development.

These problems become exacerbated during periods of declining budgets. Education is one of the easiest activities to cut if budget reductions are necessary because it seems so painless and without consequence. One can easily sympathize with a manager facing the choice between not hiring a new analyst or letting an analyst go and cutting educational opportunities instead. What could be easier, at least in the short term? There are inevitably long-term consequences but in a system that lives on year-to-year budgets and does not give much thought to career development this is not an issue. DNI Clapper, having lived through the "peace dividend" cuts of the 1990s, has said repeatedly that the lessons learned during that period will be heeded: emphasizing people, this time, over programs; not doing "salami cuts" across the board but picking winners and losers—among the winners being education and training. In a budget environment constrained by sequestration, however, many of these objectives are quickly lost.

At some point the Office of the DNI (ODNI) and the Intelligence Community have to get serious about the National Intelligence University (NIU). The NIU has gotten a lot of lip service but not much real backing. Part of this stems from the budget, as discussed above. Part stems from uncertainty of purpose. In my view, the NIU should function for the IC just as the National War College functions for the broader national security establishment—a brick-and-mortar location (there was a long debate early on about whether the NIU should be virtual or real—real won out, fortunately) where people from many different agencies come together, learn about one another, and establish relationships that will be of use as they continue their careers. The NIU should be a true Community location dedicated to educating and training Community officers—people who can transcend their home agency and think and behave more broadly when necessary. Indeed, such a goal is entirely consonant with DNI Clapper's vision of a truly integrated IC. Again, take a leaf from the military: train the way you fight or, in the case of U.S. intelligence, the way you would prefer to operate. We cannot just talk integration; we have to practice it.

The NIU should be the locus for a range of courses that should be mandatory across the IC such as Intelligence Community 101—and 201, 301, and 401; or Analysis 101, etc. This would mean, of course, that the IC would have to give some serious thought to what an analyst's career actually looked like, which it has gently danced around but never made conclusive progress. Many of the courses noted above would also be well-off housed at NIU. Beyond this, the NIU should look at the issue of intelligence certification for certain roles and areas of learning as well as continuing education units—like many other professions. Doctors, lawyers, psychotherapists—all have to complete a certain number of courses or educational conference time each year in order to remain certified in their profession. Intelligence analysts would profit from a similar arrangement.

Intellectually, the Intelligence Community also has to get back to basics. Serious thought should be given to the issue of knowledge. What is knowledge, how do we create it, how do we transmit it, how do we continue to challenge it? For certain issues the IC was, once upon a time, one of the founts of knowledge. This has largely passed, much to the detriment of U.S. intelligence. To some degree this is a result of the issues we have faced. Terrorism, which has been our most serious area of concentration, is essentially a tactical issue. There are knowledge sets to be created to deal with terrorism but, as former Director of the CIA General Mike Hayden complained, we now have targeteers, not analysts.

The IC should take a serious look at the writing skills of incoming analysts. My sense is that they are less well-developed than was the case some years ago owing to a

decline in education as well as the proliferation of various social communications networks (Twitter, texting, et al.) that prize Tonto-like compactness ("Me here. Where U? Eat soon.") over a fully formed sentence. Beyond the basic ability to write in successive, complete, coherent sentences, it is important to teach analysts to write a compelling narrative. By "compelling" I mean something that is well-written so that the reader finds it easy—if not pleasurable—to read, rather than something that is hyped so as to force attention. Good intelligence writing should be a good narrative.

The Intelligence Community should stop chasing intellectual fads that have little substantive basis and are of little relevance to the business of intelligence analysis. "Crowds" do not produce wisdom; they produce riots. We look at "white swans" in part because there are more of them and they are more often the source of our problems. "Black swans" may be important but they are rare and therefore only of passing interest. And so on. In a moment of whimsy, I bundled several of the recent intellectual fads into a single sentence: "I saw a crowd of wise black swans blinking at the tipping point."

The most dangerous and prevalent fad is "big data." What is big data and what do you do with it? Big data advocates tend to be IT folks, not intelligence analysts. They are selling their wares, not even analytical tools. Big data suffers from what I call the *X Files* fallacy: "The truth is out there." The big data advocates are certain that, if you play with the data long enough, something good will emerge. Most likely, more data, but big data will not get at the questions that most bedevil policymakers and analysts—intentions. No amount of big data, or small data, will tell us what Kim Jung Un will do next or what Vladimir Putin is planning. Moreover, policymakers will tell you that they do not want data; they want knowledge and expertise. Hence, we circle back to knowledge building.

The Intelligence Community should train analysts in how to avoid or to compensate for linear thinking. Yogi Berra captured this when he said, "The future will be like the past, only different." Analysts need to look for discontinuities, if only as an intellectual exercise. They need constantly to be asking "What if?" questions so they can be alert to the non-linear event when it happens, or so they can ask why it does not happen. The Arab Spring is the most recent example. What about "China stumbles" – instead of "China rising"? If nothing else, it is an elegant mind-stretching exercise.

Analysts should be encouraged to take more risks. It is difficult to tell analysts: be bold, be creative, think out of the box – just don't make any mistakes. Intelligence analysis is a very difficult activity. It is not improved by timidity. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of 9/11 and Iraqi WMD there is little tolerance for missed calls. As I once told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI): if you want analysts to be bold and to take risks, you have to give them the right to be wrong some of the time.

The Intelligence Community needs to spend more time on the meaning and practice of analytic leadership. The IC has made some progress here but there is more to be done. Leadership is more than being a senior analyst who gets promoted for time served, but we tend not to associate good leadership skills with analysis. Instead, senior positions are seen as editing and managing slots. They should be more.

This is, I admit, a robust agenda but it is within the realm of the possible. It is more about commitment to improved analysis than about massive new programs or even large budget reallocations.

INTELLIGENCE IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM

I will return to the issue of teaching intelligence in higher education. As I said earlier, I have some doubts about many of these programs that have proliferated since 2001. I do not believe it is enough to teach intelligence tradecraft. Students need to have substantive majors for the reasons noted above. Knowledge in some field is how most intelligence analysts get hired. Intelligence can be a minor but it cannot be a major. Think about college, again. You can be pre-med, which predicates certain courses but you cannot major in medicine (or law) as an undergraduate. Intelligence should be the same: a pre-, not a major. Also, to be frank, not all of these programs are of equal value or validity. Too many were thrown together so that schools could be on the cusp of the intelligence wave and are taught by refugees from other departments. That is why I have long advocated that the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) should undertake certification of those programs seeking its seal of approval. There should be some set of standards for intelligence programs. [Editor's Note: See separate article in this issue by Dr. Jonathan Smith on this very topic—the new certification program instituted by IAFIE.]

SOME CLOSING THOUGHTS

This is not intended to be a jeremiad. We have, in some aspects, come a long way. There is an NIU; there is an IAFIE. We have much improved intelligence literature from which to develop courses. We also have some good foundational material to help us move in some of the directions I have advocated. David Moore and Liza Krizan's *Core Competencies of Intelligence Analysis* should be the template for defining analytic skills: what is expected,

what can be taught, and what, for better or worse, is innate. The Kent School's Analytic Tradecraft Standards are a vast improvement over the ODNI set, but they have to be shared and taught across the IC.

Like true academics, however, we may be spending too much time admiring the problem. There are plenty of areas where we can take action to the overall betterment of our profession. We have developed a literature. We still need to develop a serious approach to professional education and training.



Mark M. Lowenthal is the President and CEO of the Intelligence & Security Academy. Dr. Lowenthal has served as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, and as the Vice Chairman for Evaluation on the National Intelligence Council. He was the Staff Director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the 104th Congress (1995-97), where he directed the committee's study on the future of the Intelligence Community, IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. *He has also served in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), as both an office director and as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. He was also the Senior Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. In 2011-12, he led the Defense Intelligence Analysis Review for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). Dr. Lowenthal has written extensively on intelligence and national security issues. His most recent book,* Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy *(Sage/CQ Press, 5th ed., 2011), has become the standard college and graduate school textbook on the subject. Two of his books are novels:* Crispan Magicker *(1979); and* The Great God Pan *(a Kindle e-book). Dr. Lowenthal received his BA from Brooklyn College and his PhD in history from Harvard University. He is an adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins University; he was an adjunct at Columbia University from 1993 to 2007. In 2005 he was awarded the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal. In 1988 Dr. Lowenthal was the Grand Champion on Jeopardy!, the television quiz show. He is also the first, and so far only, Executive Director of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE).*

Building an International and Comparative View of Academic Intelligence Education:
A Look at Graduate Programs in Indonesia, South Africa, India, Israel, and South Korea

by Dr. Michael Landon-Murray

SUMMARY

Research on intelligence education in colleges and universities has been comprised largely of descriptive studies of programs in North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia. There has been some work done that is comparative, inferential, or evaluative in nature. This article extends these efforts by profiling and examining five intelligence and related graduate programs in nations thus far excluded from the literature: Indonesia, South Africa, India, Israel, and South Korea. Not all of the programs selected are explicitly labeled "intelligence." This is indicative of the fact that academic intelligence programs are still largely an Anglo phenomenon. However, many intelligence practitioners come from other kinds of academic programs, such as international relations and security studies, making them pertinent to the study of higher education's human capital role vis-à-vis intelligence organizations. This study looks at two intelligence degrees, an intelligence concentration within an international relations degree, and two security studies degrees that offer intelligence coursework or instruction. Keeping in mind the sample is not scientific or perfectly comparable, program content, commonalities, and divergences will be assessed and also examined in the context of the existing literature. Potential explanatory factors for curricular designs will be explored, including departmental location, international curricular diffusion, and specific security circumstances.

INTRODUCTION

The relatively nascent but growing scholarly literature on higher education's role in the production of intelligence practitioners has yet to extend beyond a small number of Anglo nations. The focus has remained chiefly on programs in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. This is not altogether surprising, given that so many new intelligence curricula have emerged in those countries. Researchers simply have a better handle to grab on to, so to speak. Nonetheless, it might be viewed as an "intelligence failure" on the part of scholars and practitioners to have waited so long to study closely the design and implications of pertinent higher education programs. Even with this new set of programs, it is probably still the case that a majority of new intelligence hires have completed degrees not explicitly labeled "intelligence." Thus, to exclude such programs from study is to forego understanding the educational backgrounds and preparation of a great number of intelligence practitioners. More generally, to limit study only to intelligence programs would yield a literature that, for the time being, excludes most nations. Discounting those nations would constrain not only the literature on intelligence education, but the literature on intelligence theory and practice more broadly.

This study demonstrates that academic intelligence curricula are in fact being established in other parts of the world, though in seemingly small numbers.

This study demonstrates that academic intelligence curricula are in fact being established in other parts of the world, though in seemingly small numbers. The programs selected for this study include two stand-alone intelligence degrees (in Indonesia and India), one intelligence concentration within an international relations degree (in South Korea), and two programs that have courses or instruction on intelligence within security studies degrees (in South Africa and Israel). This study will profile each of these programs, consider them—as is practicable—in the context of the existing literature, and offer potential explanatory factors pertaining to program design. Expanding the literature in this way will allow for a broader and more comparative—albeit it tentative—understanding of program content and variation. While this study examines only five (not perfectly comparable) programs, it offers a regionally diverse sample of countries. Again, perhaps the best and most interesting basis for comparison is to look at those programs most likely to prepare intelligence practitioners.

This research also fits into more general theoretical and empirical inquiry in the field of intelligence studies. For example, Loch Johnson has hypothesized, "The more affluent the nation and the more extensive its global interests, the greater its pool of potential intelligence recruits with advanced training in world affairs."[1] Similarly, Kevin O'Connell notes that intelligence production methods vary from nation to nation.[2] While the methods and models applied in intelligence analysis have a range of determining factors, training and education are certainly among them.

Another theoretical supposition extended from Dr. Johnson partly informed the sampling for this study, which sought out nations with particularly exigent security circumstances and/or a prominent or growing international role. Johnson has hypothesized that as a nation's interests grow and globalize so too will its intelligence apparatus.[3] It can also be expected that as intelligence systems become larger and more complex, they will have greater human capital needs. Thus, higher education in such nations will have a greater demand to meet. Hence, while suspicion of this dynamic informed sampling is justified, the findings in the study offer at least partial evidence of just such a dynamic.

In a small way, this article will help build more complete empirical and theoretical foundations. As our map and understanding of academic intelligence programs internationalizes, we will be in a better position to make connections between various national factors and academic programs, as well as between those programs and actual intelligence practice. While this article offers some analysis of this kind, the focus is chiefly on descriptive facets. For the time being, the limits of the data preclude more ambitious causal analysis. Hopefully others will add to this empirical base and our understanding can continue to become more precise and intricate.

Before moving to the core sections, which present program profiles and then look at potential causal and comparative dynamics, a short review of the existing literature is offered. Sampling is then discussed. The article concludes with a summary of key findings and suggestions for further research in intelligence education and intelligence studies more broadly.

A SHORT REVIEW OF THE CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE

A number of intelligence studies programs have emerged in mostly Western colleges and universities since September 11, 2001. Previously, the teaching of intelligence had been largely couched in security studies, political science, and international relations programs (still true to a degree) and the literature on academic intelligence education was quite small. Following the advent of these new programs, the intelligence literature increasingly looked at intelligence studies programs. Much of this work has been descriptive or broadly normative in nature, not surprising given the nascent state of the programs themselves. Some has been more evaluative and even inferential. Virtually all the studies to date have pertained to programs in the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and Australia. The United States has been at the forefront of this research, a function of its comparatively large set of academic intelligence programs. In this section, the broad empirical and then normative contours of this literature are presented to situate the analysis that follows.

Cognate courses are those "outside the immediate sphere of intelligence, while contributing to a fuller understanding of intelligence and security issues,"[1] and can include area studies, conflict analysis, and the philosophy of law.

Stephen Campbell has, in broad terms, mapped the full U.S. intelligence education infrastructure, looking at pre-professional and professional education in the civilian and military sectors. He highlights the programs at Georgetown University and Mercyhurst University as exemplars of liberal arts and stand-alone intelligence degrees, respectively.[4] Martin Rudner, a Canadian, profiled six graduate programs from different Anglo countries: two in the United States (Georgetown and Mercyhurst, also), two in the UK (Brunel University and University of Wales, Aberystwyth), one from Canada (Carleton University, where Rudner taught for many years), and one from Australia (Macquarie University). From these profiles, Rudner forms a descriptive (and prescriptive) cross-national model of graduate intelligence education. This model has three main curricular facets: core, cognate, and optional courses. Core courses include studying intelligence comparatively, in the context of statecraft, and from strategic and legal perspectives. Cognate courses are those "outside the immediate sphere of intelligence, while contributing to a fuller understanding of intelligence and security issues,"[5] and can include area studies, conflict analysis, and the philosophy of law. Optional courses are very broad, and can include special issues like the ethics of intelligence and financial intelligence.[6]

William Spracher has looked at academic intelligence resources in the United States, the UK, and Canada in one study, and profiled and examined dozens of U.S. intelligence studies programs in another.[7] Michael Goodman profiled five programs in the UK (King's College, Brunel University, University of Birmingham, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and the University of Salford). Goodman

demonstrates how the different departmental locations of these programs (e.g., business, war, and American and Canadian studies departments) influence the pedagogical and substantive approach taken in each.[8] Philip Davies, of the UK, presented a detailed overview of the Brunel Analytical Simulation Exercise (BASE) at Brunel University. BASE tasks students to build open-source (OSINT) intelligence products in an organizational context that simulates real-world characteristics of intelligence process.[9] Others have endorsed such an approach, and a similar exercise can be found at Mercyhurst University in the U.S.[10] These approaches allow students to work toward an analytic end that is not predetermined while experiencing the various factors and forces that influence the analytic process.

Goodman also highlights how programs in the UK are more likely to take the historical approach to intelligence education, whereas American counterparts more commonly embed the teaching of intelligence in a political science framework.[11] Campbell points to the functional approach as also typical of American programs.[12] This approach takes a mechanistic and mechanical view of intelligence functions and operations**.** The historical approach is sort of self-evident, often utilizing case studies to examine past episodes and events. The political science approach, labeled also "political-policymaking," generally embeds intelligence in political and policy decision-making processes. The fourth broad approach recognized in the literature is "structural-organizational," examining intelligence as a tool and feature of international relations and the conduct of foreign policy. These approaches, of course, are not always mutually exclusive.

Others have looked to make connections between intelligence education and intelligence practice. Spracher, for example, "crosswalked" course content in academic intelligence programs of U.S. institutions with the general core competencies stipulated by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). He found that such programs teach well to these competencies.[13] Similarly, Michael Collier has suggested that research methods and modeling deficiencies in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) have their root in academic programs—specifically at the graduate level—that place little emphasis on such skill sets.[14] Consistent with Collier's expectations, Michael Landon-Murray examined 19 U.S. graduate programs for that kind of content and instruction, and found it generally lacking.[15] Gordon Middleton has similarly commented that, in the United States, "historical approaches to intelligence education are not aligned to address underlying causes of recent intelligence failures."[16] He points to a lack of emphasis on the study of culture, managing change, and adapting to dynamic environments and enemies. Middleton arrives at this conclusion through the application of a "maturity model" of intelligence competencies borrowed from human resources theory. He uses this model—and its five competency areas—to test (or crosswalk) curricular content in relevant academic programs.[17] Jeffrey Cooper and Bowman Miller have also connected analytic weaknesses and failures in the U.S. Intelligence Community to shortcomings in feeder academic programs.[18] However, the views of the latter two scholars can be described more as broad assessments than as following from detailed empirical inquiry.

The literature on academic intelligence programs also has some important normative dimensions and debates, which have sometimes informed the empirical work that has been done.

The literature on academic intelligence programs also has some important normative dimensions and debates, which have sometimes informed the empirical work that has been done. Chief among them is the issue of how programs should integrate training and tradecraft instruction with conventional education. Spracher's work to evaluate these programs in the context of ODNI core competencies endorses the inclusion of applied, professional competencies (including "technical expertise" and, to a degree, "tradecraft").[19] Similarly, Carl Jensen has suggested the use of a collegiate Intelligence Officer Training Corps (akin to American ROTC programs) that trains participating students to meet ODNI core competencies.[20] Similarly, James Breckenridge has written, "The IC looks to academic institutions to assist with the preliminary preparation of aspiring analysts. If these institutions are to be effective, evaluation standards and measures of effectiveness, as established by the IC, should be fully integrated into academic curricula."[21]

Martin Rudner and Jennifer Sims have said that it is simply not the role of academic programs to teach to tradecraft and professional practice.[22] Suffice it to say, there is a spectrum of perspectives on this issue, and they have not been particularly well engaged with one another.[23] Regardless, the blurring of training and education in academic programs is a reality.[24]

Another key—and closely related—discussion is whether intelligence should be taught within a liberal arts degree, either as a concentration or through individual classes, or as a stand-alone degree. Some have voiced skepticism about overly specialized academic intelligence programs, stressing

the importance of embedding intelligence studies in broader social science and liberal arts foundations. Mercyhurst University's Robert Heibel has suggested that his institution's intelligence studies programs are in fact liberal arts, rejecting the distinction made by others.[25] Furthermore, in Spracher's 2009 dissertation, study participants Arthur Hulnick and Carmen Medina commented that intelligence organizations do not want graduates who have been educated to be "intelligence specialists."[26] Ultimately, Stephen Marrin believes that, while academic intelligence programs have in fact been attractive to intelligence organizations, it remains important that the value-added of intelligence degrees be continually demonstrated.[27] Marrin has also begun to make a distinction between intelligence studies programs and "intelligence schools," the latter taking a more practical orientation.[28]

A small number of scholars have focused on how to most effectively transfer knowledge in the classroom. Patrick Walsh, an Australian, reminds us that good content does not necessarily mean courses and instruction will ensure deep learning and real student advancement.[29] Middleton explores the possibility that different content areas should be taught in differing fashions.[30] Breckenridge, like Heibel on the faculty at Mercyhurst, highlights the use of new educational technologies and educational psychology insights to maximize learning among different kinds of learners.[31]

Just as important as what and how intelligence studies are taught is who is doing the teaching. Today, most agree that a combination of academics, practitioners, and practitioner-academics is necessary to promote quality and practical instruction as well as advanced scholarship. Some have expressed concern that there is not a sufficient number of qualified intelligence faculty, citing the potential for "amateurism."[32] There is certainly important value-added to each of the faculty types noted. Efforts like the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Officer in Residence Program (the path taken by Hulnick to the permanent faculty at Boston University) not only bring experienced viewpoints to academe, but also serve as mechanisms to encourage practitioners to pursue scholarship and become permanent faculty members.[33]

Speaking to the importance of a qualified mixed faculty, Spracher has suggested that "at times the old-line practitioners who end up in academe are not necessarily the best teachers. A balance between deep experience, solid academic credentials, and teaching ability must be struck."[34] Rudner and Sims have added, respectively,

> …reliance on ex-practitioners and myriad others can perhaps add valuable exogenous perspectives to these burgeoning programs, yet the absence of a critical mass of dedicated Intelligence Studies scholars might make it difficult, if not impossible, to uphold the teaching and research standards expected of graduate schools. Already, paranoia prevails in certain academic circles about the bona fides of Intelligence and Security Studies.[35]

> …there is a real role for scholars here. They can challenge theoretical assumptions. Most practitioners are very defensive. They tend to be focused on one case or one point in time. Scholars are better at generalizing…[36]

This article builds on and extends the descriptive and inferential work that has been undertaken regarding academic intelligence programs in the United States, the UK, Canada, and Australia. It follows largely in the mold of what has already been done, growing and diversifying our empirical base and providing greater possibilities for comparative and causal analysis.

SAMPLING AND STUDY PARAMETERS

The national sampling for this study was not done on a scientific or random basis, but rather through a purposive and convenience approach. The first objective was to select nations that have thus far been excluded from the literature, while also achieving regional variation. As noted, the author also had an eye to choosing nations with unique or particularly exigent international and security dynamics, where there is likely more market demand for graduates ready to enter intelligence organizations. However, care was taken to identify programs in all parts of the world through broad web searches rather than the time-consuming examination of the websites of individual universities (as was done for the study's sample programs from India, South Korea, Israel, and South Africa).

The search for programs was centered on identifying relevant master's programs. It is at this level of study more career-specific education is likely to be found. While the search for and selection of programs was carefully undertaken, readers should not infer that those selected are necessarily representative of others from their home country.

The data for this study were gathered in the spring and summer of 2012, represent a snapshot of the programs selected, and were not always equivalent across programs. Individual course syllabi were often not available, and therefore the analysis generally hinges on broader program designs. Course offerings—both required and elective—are reviewed, to be sure, but without syllabi it is difficult to examine the particular approaches, exercises, and assignments used in the classroom. Similarly, detailed

information on faculty members was not always attainable. In one case (the University of Indonesia), Google Translate was used to understand program literature.

PROGRAM PROFILES

University of Indonesia, Master of Strategic Intelligence Studies

Indonesia, in Southeast Asia, is home to the largest national Muslim population and is the fourth most populous nation in the world at 249 million. The archipelago is situated between Australia and Malaysia and has experienced comparatively impressive economic growth in recent years.

The University of Indonesia (UI) is one of the premier institutions of higher learning in the country and offers a master's degree in Strategic Intelligence Studies. The degree is considered one of the University's interdisciplinary programs and is offered as part of a National Security Studies program. Students complete the degree over four semesters and in a very structured way, leaving little room for electives or specialization outside stipulated courses. The first three semesters each have five classes, and the final semester consists only of a thesis requirement. In the second and third semesters, students are given a small degree of choice among classes, and the third semester offers Special Topics and Seminars. The first three semesters at UI look as follows:

> **First Semester:** Fundamentals of Intelligence (Intelligence Theory and Application), History of Intelligence, Managing Intelligence Analysis, Intelligence Communication, Research Methods in Strategic Intelligence Studies
>
> **Second Semester:** Strategic Intelligence Thinking and Analysis, Intelligence Success and Failure Case Studies, Intelligence Production, Intelligence and National Security *or* Strategic Business Intelligence, Transnational Crime *or* Globalization/International Political Economy
>
> **Third Semester:** Terrorism and Counterterrorism *or* Financial Crime Analysis, Judicial Intelligence *or* Competitive Intelligence, Intelligence and International Affairs *or* International Business Competition, Policy Analysis and Decision Making, Special Topics and Seminars

This degree is very intelligence-centric—perhaps not surprising given that it is a stand-alone degree. There are specific intelligence courses for history, case studies, management, communication, and analysis and production. Additionally, business and competitive intelligence are offered, though not required.

More specifically, intelligence analysis—its management, underlying social science, production, and communication—could be said to sit at the center of this program. Analysis is treated in virtually comprehensive fashion. Students can take no less than four classes expressly focused on some facet of intelligence analysis (Managing Intelligence Analysis, Research Methods in Strategic Intelligence Studies, Strategic Intelligence Thinking and Analysis, and Intelligence Production). The program thus gives great emphasis to specific methods and mechanics of intelligence analysis with a broader research methods foundation.

Given the heavy emphasis on specific facets of intelligence and the somewhat rigid course requirements, little space is left for other areas such as regional and functional studies. Students can take national security, transnational crime, and terrorism courses, but outside of these the options are essentially limited to political economy, finance, and commerce. The special topics and thesis options do afford students some additional variation and choice. The faculty at UI is comprised of a mix of scholars and retired military officers.

Looking at the course components of the Master of Strategic Intelligence Studies degree at UI, a fairly pretty striking resemblance to Mercyhurst University's Master of Science in Applied Intelligence is noticed. Some have labeled Mercyhurst the "gold standard" of academic intelligence programs in the U.S.[37] It was certainly the earliest innovator in the country, having been introduced in the 1990s. When compared with UI, Mercyhurst's program has a smaller number of required courses, giving students more latitude in coursework. Looking at Mercyhurst's 7-course core, five of the courses have virtually exact counterparts in the program at UI. These include courses in intelligence theory and application, intelligence management, intelligence communication, competitive intelligence, and intelligence research methods. Looking then at Mercyhurst's electives, we see more courses reflected in UI's program: intelligence history, strategic business intelligence, and financial crimes analysis. Thus, across these two programs, virtually exact course counterparts are found in at least eight areas. It seems highly probable that curricular diffusion is at work here, or what is called isomorphism in the organization theory literature.

University of Pretoria, Master of Security Studies (South Africa)

South Africa is a major player and power on the African continent and, increasingly, outside of Africa. The country has experienced severe political and social change in recent

decades, transitioning out of apartheid. It continues to balance its important international position with internal social and political instability.

The University of Pretoria offers a Master of Security Studies (MSS) degree, embedded in a Department of Political Science. The program seems to have experienced some turbulence in recent years, with changes in program design and new admissions temporarily suspended. Nonetheless, the degree remains in place and requirements and course offerings are listed in the University's 2012 academic catalogue.

The MSS is divided equally between research and core course credits (each comprising 90 credits, for a total of 180). The research component includes a "mini-dissertation" (60 credits) completed as a guided independent study on a selected security topic. The other research requirement is completion of a course titled Methodology of Security Studies (30 credits), which focuses on research methodologies and the production of reports. The core courses include National Security, Security and Strategic Theory, and Strategic Intelligence and Forecasting (30 credits each).

According to program literature, the strategic intelligence and forecasting course focuses on both the theory and practice of strategic intelligence, connecting sound intelligence to effective threat analysis and, in turn, national security. Intelligence policy, organizations, and oversight also form key aspects of the course, which is rounded out with a focus on the various methods and applications of strategic forecasting (including risk analysis and scenario construction). Thus, this course takes more than one approach (i.e., functional and policymaking) to the teaching of intelligence. In prior years, two different intelligence-related courses had been part of the core coursework: Strategic Intelligence & Threat Perception and Strategic Forecasting & Risk Analysis. The current intelligence course had not been offered, and seems likely to be a melding of the two older courses.

The above courses and requirements comprise the MSS program in its entirety, and students seem relatively limited in the electives they can take. However, the degree is housed in the Political Science Department, which does offer other security and intelligence-related courses (e.g., foreign policy).

Sharda University, Master in Security and Counter Intelligence (India)

India is the world's second most populous nation, has a large and growing national economy, and in turn has a large and growing role in the international system. India also has an extended history of tension and conflict with neighboring countries China and Pakistan, both nuclear powers.

Sharda University is one of seven schools that comprise the Sharda Group of Institutions, which has a total of 25,000 students. Sharda University is a relatively new institution, established in 2009 and certified as a private university by India's University Grants Commission (UGC), the national educational standards organization. Its website boasts:

> The entire curriculum in the University has been planned in a highly flexible credit based system approach by studying the best practices adopted in India, US and UK. We have devised a term based system in which an academic year is broken into two 16 week terms and a summer term of 9 weeks.[38]

The intelligence studies master's degree at Sharda is something of a programmatic outlier and innovator in India. Master's degrees in Strategic and Defense Studies have been very common there, and probably the most concentrated graduate-level source of intelligence practitioners. Under the auspices of the UGC, a number of top Indian universities have recently transitioned those programs to broader National Security Studies graduate programs.[39] The program at Sharda differs from its strategic and security studies counterparts by putting intelligence front and center, though certainly in the context of security and interdisciplinary studies. It is a degree "dedicated to intelligence studies and policy analysis," borrowing some of its faculty from areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and law.[40]

The University's School of Investigations, Security, and Intelligence is one of 11 educational divisions at Sharda. In addition to the 2-year master's program, the School also offers a 6-month executive diploma and a 1-year postgraduate degree. While the different intelligence programs take between six and 24 months, the core structure and material are essentially the same for each (according to available program literature). Core coursework includes Intelligence Concepts: Theory and Policy, Intelligence Analysis, Contemporary Issues in Safety and Security, and Case Studies in Intelligence Failure and Success. Electives include Technology and Security, National and International Financial Security, Crime and Security, and Organization and Management. The program literature makes unclear what additional coursework it is built on top of—or offered in addition to—the small number of core and elective courses.

Additionally, "A distinctive feature of the courses lies in the combination of the rigorous study of intelligence and security policy studies with practical opportunities to develop intelligence skills through…simulation

exercises."[41] Former Indian security and intelligence practitioners support students in these exercises and in coursework generally. The degree programs are concluded with the supervised research and writing of a dissertation, helping fulfill the program's dual objectives of preparing intelligence and security practitioners as well as future academic researchers.

Tel-Aviv University, Master of Arts in Security and Diplomacy Studies (Israel)

> ***Israel has a security environment as constantly threatening as perhaps any nation in the world today.***

Israel has a security environment as constantly threatening as perhaps any nation in the world today. Tensions with Arab neighbors, Iran, and multiple terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas result in a complex and highly pressurized security milieu. This has recently been exacerbated by the Syrian civil war and unrest in Egypt. In turn, Israel places a premium on dynamic, effective security intelligence capacities. The Mossad, for example, is generally viewed as one of the best intelligence organizations in the world.

Tel-Aviv University has two master's programs relevant to the study: an MA in Security Studies and an MA in Security and Diplomacy Studies. The two programs share much of the same faculty. The Security Studies program is a joint effort of the Department of Political Science and School of History, while the Security and Diplomacy Studies program is housed in the Department of Political Science. The Security Studies program is geared largely toward mid- and upper-level security practitioners, while the Security and Diplomacy Studies program has a more conventional student body. This article will examine the latter program, given its broader student body and better data availability.

The Security and Diplomacy Studies program consists of three semesters over the course of one year. A total of 12 courses must be completed, eight of which are stipulated. The remaining four are selected from an approved course list. The core courses deal with the international system, modern strategic thought, modern diplomacy, political economy, international law and Middle East conflict, Israeli's strategic doctrine, and the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The final required course is a workshop consisting of security field trips (to places including Israeli Defense Force bases) and an ambassador forum (where students meet with ambassadors and other high-level officials). Of the four elective courses, three must be selected from among Jewish International Politics, The Future of War, National Security Concepts of the Arab States and Iran, Terror and Moral Dilemmas, Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, Nationalism and International Relations, Medicine and War, and China's Foreign Policy and National Security.

A research methods course is mandatory for those students pursuing the thesis track. It is optional for those in the non-thesis track. For those not completing a thesis, a Middle East Crisis simulation is required, and this is voluntary for thesis track students. The faculty and administration encourage, but do not require, internships.

The faculty is comprised largely of political science scholars, but also has multiple former intelligence practitioners—from both analytical and operational sectors. Major General (Ret) and Professor Isaac Ben-Israel is the former head of the Israeli Air Force's Intelligence Analysis and Assessment Division, and has authored numerous books on military intelligence. Professor Ben-Israel teaches intelligence as a module in the Israel's Strategic Doctrine course. Brigadier General (Ret) Shalom Harari brings extensive collection experience—both in signals and human intelligence—to the classroom. His former posts include Syria and Iraq.

As the above review makes clear, the Security and Diplomacy Studies degree places a special and multifaceted emphasis on Israel and the Middle East. Simply, this can be interpreted as a response to Israeli security conditions. At Tel-Aviv University, intelligence is taught through a regional security lens, including by those who have worked at high levels in Israeli intelligence.

Sogang University, Master of International Relations, National Intelligence and Security Track (South Korea)

South Korea has existed as a democratic state and society for more than two decades now. It boasts an advanced economy and a strong higher education system. It also manages tense relations with its neighbor, North Korea. Only miles from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), Seoul, South Korea's capital and most populous city, is perhaps the chief vulnerability in the context of North Korean nuclear and military capacity.

At Sogang University, the National Intelligence and Security graduate track is the newest program in the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS). Students complete this track as part of a master's degree in international relations. The 2-year program may be completed through 15 courses, for a total of 45 credits, or with 13 courses and a 6-credit thesis option.

All National Intelligence and Security students take Economic Analysis and Introduction to International Relations. Additionally, fulfilling track requirements entails the completion of a mostly stipulated set of six courses. International Security and Peace, Theories of National Intelligence, and Theory of Area Studies must be among them. The following is the course description for Theories of National Intelligence:

> The course will cover the life cycle of strategic intelligence from the collection of data to the formulation of analytic judgments. It will focus on the impact of the intelligence process and the products of intelligence on security policy-making, and hence upon a global environment in an information age. The emphases will be on contemporary intelligence issues and processes, but will include the greater use of the analytic skills at the corporate and government levels.[42]

The remaining three track-specific courses can be drawn from Theories of International Relations, International Political Economy, Globalization and Regional Integration, International Organizations, and Contemporary World Politics. Rounding out the degree requirements are two area studies courses and three to five electives (three electives for students who choose the thesis option). With these remaining electives, National Intelligence and Security students may choose to enroll in the following:

- National Intelligence System and Policies
- National Security and Intelligence Policy
- Comparative National Intelligence Systems
- Industrial Security
- National Cyber-Security
- E-Government
- Space and Information Warfare
- Studies on Security Issues
- International Terrorism
- Cyberwar and Intelligence
- Economic Intelligence
- International Crime and Intelligence Cooperation
- Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action
- Topical Seminars on National Intelligence I, II, and II

In addition to security intelligence and intelligence systems and process, these classes take up intelligence studies in the context of economics, criminal organizations, cyber warfare, and special functions (counterintelligence and covert operations). Another examines intelligence in a comparative framework. Thus, students have the opportunity to take a rather multifaceted approach to the study of intelligence. At the same time, all students are required to complete multiple courses in economics, area studies, and international studies.

Sogang's GSIS offers a range of other courses and study areas, spanning international trade, international law, and international finance. Language courses are also provided (all other classes are delivered in English). Special lectures and independent studies are available, and students are encouraged to complete an internship. The GSIS faculty is comprised mostly of academics, with some former practitioners. For example, a former Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Senior Secretary to the President for National Security is an adjunct faculty member.

LOOKING ACROSS PROGRAMS

This study has demonstrated that intelligence studies programs are emerging beyond Anglo nations, but it seems in rather small numbers. Taken together, the programs identified mirror the various approaches to intelligence education found in nations already examined in the literature. Some offer stand-alone degrees, others intelligence concentrations, and yet others intelligence coursework within security studies degrees. While we cannot definitively label the three expressly intelligence programs identified for this study the very first of their kind (outside the UK, North America, and Australia), they are certainly among the early adopters. Each is also in a nation experiencing a growing international role and/or exigent national security matters. This fits into the narrative that, as intelligence requirements grow, higher education will respond to such demand in the form of academic programs. We can also observe such dynamics in programs not expressly intelligence-related. For example, the curricular design at Tel-Aviv University is built hugely around Israel's unique and severe security environment. The limited nature of this study makes the delineation of other, more fine-grained causal national factors difficult (as they relate to program design and content). Still, the descriptive empirics found in this study will hopefully encourage and enable continued research on both academic intelligence education and comparative and theoretical inquiry more broadly.

In addition to the noted national explanatory factors, there seems to be some transfer or replication of program design from more established programs. For example, the degree found at the University of Indonesia bears a strong resemblance to the one at Mercyhurst University. While some overlap is to be expected in any given field, the commonalities between these two programs suggest that administrators and educators at UI looked directly at Mercyhurst for guidance. The UI program also fits pretty well into the graduate curricular model identified and

endorsed by Rudner.[43] Similarly, the program literature for Sharda University states explicitly that the institution looked to the United States and the United Kingdom in the design of its various curricula.

Looking across programs, course titles suggest that the policymaking-political and functional approaches are the most common. This could point to the influential nature of academic programs in the U.S., where intelligence education is more frequently approached from policymaking and functional angles.

The four general approaches to the teaching of intelligence outlined in the literature can be found in the programs selected for this study. For example, the program at the University of Indonesia offers a separate course for each of the four approaches: Intelligence and National Security (policymaking), Intelligence and International Affairs (structural), History of Intelligence (historical), and Intelligence Production (functional). That individual courses are built around these frames is not that surprising in a stand-alone intelligence degree. Conversely, in other programs, individual courses incorporate more than one approach. Looking across programs, course titles suggest that the policymaking-political and functional approaches are the most common. This could point to the influential nature of academic programs in the U.S., where intelligence education is more frequently approached from policymaking and functional angles.

In addition to diffusion—and not wholly separate from that dynamic—we might look to broader developments, such as the increasing program specialization found in higher education.[44] A greater number, and more diverse, programs are being established in higher education, driven in part by specific national circumstances and labor market needs. In the United States, it was 9/11 and subsequent IC human capital needs that triggered the emergence of many new academic intelligence programs. Even in a country with an advanced economy and higher education system—not to mention an immensely prominent international role—it was a single major event that resulted in increased specialization in the realm of security and intelligence education.

The variations observed in program location and content speak to some key debates found in the literature. Some have promoted stand-alone intelligence degrees and others urge that intelligence be taught in the context of the social sciences—for example, international studies. The stand-alone degrees and concentrations identified in this study—which are found in international and security studies departments—tend to take a more applied, professional approach, one that demonstrates the blurring of training and education Marrin has noted.[45]

In the program at the University of Indonesia, for example, separate courses cover analytic methods for intelligence, intelligence communication, and intelligence management. Economic and competitive intelligence and analysis can also be found across programs. While most students do have the opportunity for some multidisciplinary studies, advanced social science methods are not a common facet of the selected programs (which is not to say students cannot look to other departments for instruction of this kind).

Some unique or especially interesting facets that were identified include the use of simulations (Sharda University, Tel-Aviv University), course offerings in intelligence failure and success case studies (University of Indonesia, Sharda University), and a course in comparative intelligence (Sogang University). While these are not fundamentally new offerings or approaches in academic intelligence education, they do stand out among the programs selected for this study.

Lastly, virtually all of the programs (at least four out of five) selected for this study have a faculty with both scholars and former practitioners. Some faculties have more former practitioner representation than others, and scholars certainly predominate across the board. Former intelligence, defense, military, and diplomatic officers can be found teaching in these programs, including some very high-level officials. The composition of these faculties jibes well with the views already registered in the intelligence education literature.

CONCLUSION

This study sought to add to the intelligence education literature in a number of ways. First, it expands the empirical base beyond the small number of nations examined in the literature to include those from other regions. By its comparative nature, it also helps look across programs and grow our understanding of program commonalities and divergences, and potential explanations for them. It offers a means to test existing empirics and normative observations in new and different contexts, giving a sense of the developmental stages found in countries that have thus far evaded study.

The programs identified for this study take different approaches to intelligence education. We see intelligence studies as stand-alone degrees, concentrations, courses, and instruction. Intelligence is taught using the

policymaking, functional, structural and historical approaches. Somewhat obviously, the more central the study of intelligence is to a given degree, the greater number of these approaches is likely to be found. The policymaking and functional frameworks were most common. The article also found evidence of curricular diffusion, the influence of national factors, and blurring between intelligence training and education.

The relative difficulty identifying academic intelligence programs to include in this study suggests these programs remain a largely Anglo phenomenon. However, by looking at what exists in other regions and nations—and indirectly at what is not there—we begin to understand the emergence and content of new programs and have a foundation from which we can follow developments in this arena. This research can also inform and support theoretical and comparative inquiry in the broader intelligence literature. As in this study, research going forward should take into account the academic programs most likely to produce intelligence practitioners, not just expressly intelligence programs. Professional training and education can and should be a part of this study, as well as government relations and programs vis-à-vis higher education (such as the U.S. CIA's Officer in Residence Program).

NOTES

[1] Loch K. Johnson, "Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence," *Comparative Strategy*, 2003, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 10.
[2] Kevin M. O'Connell, "Thinking About Intelligence Comparatively," *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 2004, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 189-199.
[3] Johnson, "Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence."
[4] Stephen H. Campbell, "A Survey of the U.S. Market for Intelligence Education," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 2011, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 307-337.
[5] Martin Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 2009, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 121.
[6] Ibid.
[7] William C. Spracher, "National Security Intelligence Professional Education: A Map of U.S. Civilian University Programs and Competencies," Ed.D. diss., George Washington University, 2009; William C. Spracher, "Teaching Intelligence in the United States, The United Kingdom, and Canada," in *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert A. Denemark, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 6779-6800.
[8] Michael S. Goodman, "Studying and Teaching About Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdom," *Studies in Intelligence*, 2006, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 57-65.
[9] Philip H.J. Davies. "Assessment BASE: Simulating National Intelligence Assessment in a Graduate Course," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 2006, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 721-736.
[10] Christopher A. Corpora, "The Stone and Quarry: Intelligence Studies in a Dynamic Global Environment," *American Intelligence Journal*, Winter 2007/2008, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 12-23; Kristan J. Wheaton, "Teaching Strategic Intelligence Through Games," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 2011, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 367-382.
[11] Goodman, "Studying and Teaching About Intelligence."
[12] Campbell, "A Survey of the U.S. Market for Intelligence Education."
[13] Spracher, "National Security Intelligence Professional Education."
[14] Michael W. Collier, "A Pragmatic Approach to Developing Intelligence Analysts," *Defense Intelligence Journal*, 2005, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 17-35.
[15] Michael Landon-Murray, "Social Science and Intelligence Analysis: The Role of Intelligence Education," *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 2011, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 491-528.
[16] Gordon R. Middleton, "A Maturity Model for Intelligence Training and Education," *American Intelligence Journal*, Winter 2007/2008, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 33.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Jeffrey R. Cooper, *Curing Analytic Pathologies* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005); Bowman H. Miller, "Improving All-Source Intelligence Analysis: Elevate Knowledge in the Equation," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 2008, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 337-354.
[19] Spracher, "National Security Intelligence Professional Education."
[20] Carl J. Jensen, "The Intelligence Officer Training Corps: An ROTC-Style Program for the IC," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 2011, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 733-746.
[21] James G. Breckenridge, "Designing Effective Training and Learning Environments for a New Generation of Analysts," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 2010, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 320.
[22] Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education"; Spracher, "National Security Intelligence Professional Education."
[23] Michael Landon-Murray, "Moving U.S. Academic Intelligence Education Forward: A Literature Inventory and Agenda," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, forthcoming.
[24] "Stephen Marrin, "Training and Educating U.S. Intelligence Analysts," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 2008, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 131-146.
[25] Spracher, "National Security Intelligence Professional Education."
[26] Ibid.
[27] Marrin, *Improving Intelligence Analysis*.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Patrick F. Walsh, *Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis*, London: Routledge, 2011.
[30] Middleton, "A Maturity Model for Intelligence Training and Education."
[31] Breckenridge, "Designing Effective Training and Learning Environments for a New Generation of Analysts."
[32] Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education"; Spracher, "National Security Intelligence Professional Education."
[33] John Hollister Hedley, "Twenty Years of Officers in Residence," *Studies in Intelligence*, 2005, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 31-39.
[34] Spracher, "Teaching Intelligence in the United States, The United Kingdom, and Canada," p. 6789.
[35] Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education," p. 124.

[36] Spracher, "National Security Intelligence Professional Education," p. 117.
[37] Campbell, "A Survey of the U.S. Market for Intelligence Education."
[38] Sharda University, "How Does It Work," accessed June 8, 2013, available at: http://www.sharda.ac.in/whysharda.aspx?mpgid=68&pgid=58&spgid=33&spgid1=35.
[39] Rajiv Mani, "University Gets UCD Nod for Think Tank," *Times of India*, June, 20, 2012, accessed June 8, available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-06-20/allahabad/32335218_1_national-security-studies-upgradation.
[40] Sharda University, "School of Studies of Investigation, Intelligence and Security," accessed June 8, 2013, available at: http://www.sharda.ac.in/Schools/SchoolofStudiesofInvestigation,IntelligenceandSecurity.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Sogang University, "Course Descriptions," accessed June 8, 2013, available at: http://gsis.sogang.ac.kr/.
[43] Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education."
[44] Michael O'Neill, "Developmental Contexts of Nonprofit Management Education," *Nonprofit Management & Leadership*, 2005, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 5-17.
[45] Marrin, "Training and Educating U.S. Intelligence Analysts."

Michael Landon-Murray works for the New York State government as a special assistant to the Governor's local government policy advisor. He is a recent graduate of the Public Policy and Administration PhD program at the University at Albany's Rockefeller College. His areas of focus have included intelligence oversight and intelligence education, and he spent the last several years as a Research Associate in Rockefeller College. In 2014 he will be teaching a homeland security intelligence course at the College. Mike received a Master's in Public and International Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh, where his concentration was Security and Intelligence Studies. For questions and comments, he can be contacted at MLandon-Murray@albany.edu.

Intelligence Analysis as an Academic Discipline:

A National Security Education and Recruitment Strategy for a Long-Term Environment of Limited Resources

by Dr. Noel Hendrickson

Imagine the year 1913. Imagine further that there was (counter to history) a robust American national security community in 1913. You are in charge of preparing new analysts to serve in this community. However, you are only aware of the world as it is in 1913, and not of what is to follow. Who would you have recruited? How would you have educated them? There would certainly have been a strong temptation to prepare these analysts for the popular issues of the day. Consider that world for a moment, which was full of competing imperialist powers, and world leaders such as Kaiser Wilhelm and Czar Nicholas, and America's most recent challenge of the aftermath of the Spanish-American War and the "insurgency" within the newly acquired Philippine Islands. Because of this, many would likely be focused upon the lack of Spanish language speakers, and the importance of being able to counter Spain in the future. Consequently, you would likely be inclined to recruit people with expertise in these areas or to educate new analysts to have expertise in these areas. Now, however, imagine that those you prepared would serve (unbeknownst to you) all the way through to the 1960s. They would have to face not only your imagined challenges but also those you had not conceived of such as World War I, the many internal domestic conflicts that followed, World War II, the start of the Cold War, the Korean War, a divided Germany, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Furthermore, they would face all of these *with the methods and views you gave them (or recruited them with) in 1913.*

This is the same challenge we face today in preparing the next generation of intelligence analysts in 2013. Current and widely acknowledged demographic trends in both life expectancy and economic stability strongly suggest that those entering the national security community (construed broadly to include both government agencies and private contractors) can be expected to remain within it for the next 50 years. Thus, whether we are educating them or recruiting them, in our choices we are committing to a particular set of methods and views to guide us through to the 2060s. And as much as we may think that we know what our challenges will be for the next 50 years, we cannot ignore the reality that we also will be caught off-guard by what is to follow (just as we would have been if we had taken on the same task in 1913). To address this uncertainty, I propose that we conceive of intelligence analysis as an academic discipline and then educate (and recruit) future analysts from within this discipline to counter our inevitable lack of knowledge of what the next 50 years may hold. In support of this proposal, I first explore the motivation for taking intelligence to be an academic discipline. Second, I explain a model that could address this challenge: intelligence as an academic discipline.

EXPLORING THE MOTIVATION FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE

The one thing that is arguably the most constant throughout the history of national security issues is that (most) everyone is continually surprised by them when they first emerge. Apart from a handful of exceptions, most new national security issues arise unexpectedly. We typically do not foresee them. The world of 1913 did not foresee even the First World War, let alone the revolutions and internal changes within so many countries that followed. It further had little conception of the Second World War, or the long Cold War following or the various conflicts or controversies that ensued such as Korea, Berlin, and Cuba. The political, economic, social, and technological changes that undergird these transformations were equally unforeseen in 1913. Moreover, we fared little better with the latter half of the century. For example, from the perspective of the 1950s, the future through to the 2000s was equally difficult to see whether it was the improved relations with the Soviet Union, its fall, the transformation of Eastern Europe, the rise of China, or the emergence of Islamic radicalism and the resulting terrorist movements. It seems pretty clear that if we think we can successfully anticipate anything…it ought to be that we will probably fail to anticipate most of what we need to anticipate.

Because we frequently fail to anticipate the next major national security issue, once the issue is widely recognized there is a corresponding deficit within the analyst population for expertise. As a result, recruiting is inevitably playing "catch-up" to identify, attract, or create analysts whose specialties match the current challenge. A second-order

effect of this is that, once the current focus changes, there ends up being an equal need to change the analysts who were previously hired to address the prior challenge. Hence, it is inevitable that people brought in for their expertise in one area are going to have to acquire a new expertise (somehow) while still on the job. This is no easy task, and thus it is not only recruiting, but also education, that is perpetually playing catch-up.

One may object that we can avoid this by the natural cycle of replacement. For example, we avoided the brunt of this problem in the shift to the "War on Terrorism" as those recruited primarily for their Russia expertise during the Cold War were (at least as a generation) already well on their way to retirement and so they did not (as a group) have to be completely repurposed. Thus, perhaps we will be able to do this also in the future. However, what happens if there is a major change of focus faster than a generation? There is no reason to assume that each challenge will last long enough for the group hired to address it to leave by retirement. Even as the focus on the Arabic-speaking Middle East seemed intractable in 2003, the community is already beginning a planned "pivot to Asia" only 10 years later. How many more changes are possible? There is simply no reason whatsoever to assume that there will be only one new challenge each generation. What is further, the interconnectedness of the world suggests that it is not merely the handful of potential "superpowers" that are possible threats. Virtually anything done by anyone anywhere could prove to be a significant issue for national security. This cannot reasonably be addressed with the assumption of one challenge per generation. Recruiting and education will continually have to battle the problem of needing to catch up to the current challenges.

Another objection might point to the greater intellectual developments within forecasting, scenario building, and futures analysis in general. Perhaps these developments, if fully implemented within the practice of intelligence analysts, could decrease the degree of surprise felt from new emerging challenges. While this is certainly possible, and something I, as one who has helped to develop some of these methods, would long to see, it still would not get us out of this problem. For even if analysts did anticipate the next major challenge, that does not mean policymakers would be prepared to implement that assessment on a large enough scale to impact recruiting and education. Even if a few measures were taken, they would (likely) not be anywhere near widespread enough to avoid recruiters and educators having a large deficit and having to recover (once the issue came into full form).

A further complication exacerbates this difficulty. Not only does our typical approach leave education and recruiting perpetually playing catch-up, it further commits us to very heavy use of resources to do so. Massive recruitment campaigns are costly not only in themselves but also in terms of the salaries of the existing analysts that (in principle) could be taking on the new challenge but cannot due to their own (now outdated) expertise. Progressively accumulating more and more analysts for more and more problems is a very significant resource expenditure. It is not only the new and old analysts who end up costing us, but also the contractors paid to cover the gaps "in the meantime" until the issues are addressed. It is not at all clear we will be able to afford this cost in the longer term. Furthermore, reeducation is also a substantial cost both in terms of time and resources. Then again, it is not entirely clear how successful it is (on the larger scale). To take a large group whose primary focus and education are one issue and then try to transform them into another carries a very high risk that their methods and views will still remain the same (despite the effort). Thus, completely apart from the problem of being continually surprised, there is also a financial reason to try to address this problem another way.

Instead of educating and recruiting for the "last war," they need to do so for the many wars that are to come in the next 50 years.

Therefore, it would seem that there is a lack of longer-term thinking not merely by analysts but by policymakers. Specifically, it is the absence of a long-term strategy among educators and recruiters of analysts. Instead of educating and recruiting for the "last war," they need to do so for the many wars that are to come in the next 50 years. How is this done, though, given the inherent difficulty in predicting future national security challenges? How can one successfully identify the types of subject expertise that will be needed to address that challenge? The answer is simple: "Don't try." The real problem is not the difficulty in locating what subject area will be most relevant in the future; instead, *the problem is the idea that one should be focused on subject areas in the first place.* To target *any* single subject (or set of subjects) as a goal for education or recruitment commits us perpetually to "fight the last war" since we cannot realistically anticipate what will be most useful next. We will inevitably pick wrongly if we focus on "areas" for recruitment or education.

What we ultimately need are analysts whose fundamental orientation is not toward any subject, but rather toward methods that will be *useful no matter what subject they have to consider*. If analysts could assess all subjects equally well (or equally well with a short run-up time for study), then the problem could be addressed. Most analysts would be versatile in their core orientation, with no fundamental focus on a subject, and therefore could adjust as needed to the topic at hand. There would remain a handful of permanent

subject matter experts for specialized topics that could not be assessed without a very long lead-up time (e.g., nuclear physics, advanced linguistics, etc.). Thus, the only way to transcend the problem is to change the paradigm for education and recruitment away from an overall focus on "subject expertise" (beyond certain niches) to instead focus on a set of proficiencies that could be applied equally well to any subject. We might call that "analytic versatility." To do that, as the next section explains, requires developing intelligence analysis as an academic discipline.

EXPLAINING THE MODEL OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE

To propose that we educate and recruit for "analytic versatility" is not to say that we should prefer generalists to specialists. It is not that we need analysts who know a little about a lot (generalists) rather than a lot about a little (specialists). The issue is not breadth versus depth. The issue is equally not a matter of preferring methodologists to subject matter experts. It is not about having people without any subject area focus but who have methodological sophistication. Both of these traditional dichotomies do not get at the suggestion I am making here. Our problem is that we need analysts who can assess particular challenges in detail, but we cannot know ahead of time what those subjects will be. Moreover, we cannot afford to continue to have to play catch-up when a new topic emerges. Doing so wastes both valuable time and resources (which are getting harder and harder to come by).

To capture the ideal analyst who would be able to address this problem, we have to go beyond the usual dichotomies of generalist/specialist or methodologist/subject matter expert and characterize analysts both in terms of their *function* (what they do) and their *form* (how they do it). Alternatively, we can conceive of them in terms of their work *at a particular moment* in time or *over a range of moments* in time. In terms of the function of these analysts, they serve as analysts of a specific subject (region, topic, etc.). They are not roving methodological consultants (although there is certainly a need for those also). They are located in a particular office with a specific targeted subject for their analysis. However, the way that they do this analysis is not in itself linked to that area. That is, they do not necessarily assume the viewpoints or methods of other lifelong experts in this area. If they are economic analysts, then they do not merely use the methods of an economist. If they are cyber analysts, they do not merely come from computer science. If they are counterproliferation analysts, they do not have only the tools of the natural sciences at their disposal. They have a dual identify: their function is a subject, but their form goes far beyond it to something that would be common across all possible subjects. They are neither a subject matter expert nor a methodologist in the usual senses. In effect, they are both and neither at the same time. In a similar way, if you look at their career at a particular moment in time, they are an analyst of a specific issue. However, if you look at their career over time, they are analysts of many different subjects that could be completely unrelated to each other. From that point of view, what unites their career into a single unit is the way they go about their work.

Imagine someone whose identity was defined by five different skill areas: cognitive, computational, contextual, communicative, and content-integrated. Cognitively, they can think and reason effectively both "critically" and "creatively." They formulate and evaluate different possible solutions and assess them in terms of incomplete and uncertain information. They identify critical causal forces that are affecting a topic as well as the unexpected relationships that can emerge over time. They identify factors that will influence the future, develop multiple scenarios for how these trends might evolve, and locate the most plausible characteristics and consequences of possible future events. They explore possible courses of action and can assess which most advance their consumer's goals. Throughout, they are aware of how they think and strive to improve their thinking through more rigorous and reliable approaches.

With or without preparation, long or short, detailed or high-level, verbal or written, this person communicates with power and credibility.

This person is equally adept using technology. Computationally, they understand the fundamentals of how computers and programs are structured. They understand what they *are* and *are not* capable of doing. They never treat technology as a "magic black box," but instead know when to use it, and when not to use it. They know how to organize large amounts of data into structures from which they can readily extract what they need when they need it. They can represent relevant data as information in visuals that enhance and encourage their analysis. They can also build basic models of real-world problems and explore the different ways those problems could evolve over time. They know how to use particular technologies, but more basically have an ability with different types of technology. They know what one wants from technology and can use it to organize, represent, and simulate the data, information, and knowledge they acquire from the world around them.

Nevertheless, it is not only reason and technology that matter; this person also has a profound situational understanding. Contextually, they understand the effect that

different types of circumstances have on problems whether political, economic, social, religious/ideological, or regional. They can step out of their own perspective for the purpose of "seeing the world through someone else's eyes." They know the kinds of things that influence how people actually think, and take those into consideration as they assess different cultures and contexts. They also know the effect that their situation has on them, and that their consumer's situation has an effect on their consumer as well. They strive to bring everyone's understanding to match what is true from the perspective of the person being evaluated.

Thinking, using technology, and understanding situations matter little in intelligence without the fourth aspect of this person: his/her ability to explain conclusions clearly and compellingly. Communicatively, this person both writes and speaks precisely and concisely. They are equally comfortable writing short "bottom-line up front" briefs as they are longer, more detailed reports. They can explain the subtle nuances of a subject verbally, or just give a one-minute summary of what is happening, why it is happening, what might follow, and what can be done about it. With or without preparation, long or short, detailed or high-level, verbal or written, this person communicates with power and credibility.

From all these four areas, one might be tempted to consider this person an extremely diverse methodologist, but they are not. They are also content-integrated. That is, they always seek to employ these skills *in a particular place*. They have a set subject or issue they are exploring with the power of all these approaches. Still, while they long to apply their other four sets of skills in depth with a single topic (at a time), they are not so linked to that particular topic that it defines those skills. They seek to integrate themselves with a subject, but can also separate themselves (if needed) and move on to another subject when that is what best serves their customer. They want to master an area, but not to be defined by the area. Content is integral to them, but they are always more than the subject they study.

An analyst with robust cognitive, computational, contextual, communicative, and content-integrated skills would address the need outlined in the prior section because, at any time, they would be integrated into a specific subject and exploring it with all the rigors of the methods they have mastered. However, they would not be limited by the normal views and methods associated with that subject since it only captures their identity functionally and at a particular time. From the other perspective, their identity formally and over time is not linked to that particular subject. The way that they do things is defined by a much broader range of methods than any one subject could ever capture. Moreover, they take on a range of different subjects over the course of their career. This also is a major part of their core identity. While they would require some "run-up" time to change from an in-depth analyst of one subject to another, they would not require completely new retraining or reeducation in terms of a new paradigm. And, they would not see this as a fundamental alteration of their identity, since that identity is not linked to any one subject. Neither would they merely be a methodologist free of any connection to a particular subject as they constantly seek to be integrated into a specific subject.

They can think like someone else in a different culture or context, but they are not a social scientist.

At this point, one might object that, while such an analyst might be ideal, there is no way one can seriously expect to find many candidates who truly satisfy this description. That is probably the case. To have a large number of potential analysts like this would require more than merely a change of the ideals used in recruitment; it would require a change to the underlying education that analysts receive. I propose that it requires an education in intelligence analysis itself (conceived of along the lines described above) as its own academic discipline. Note very carefully that it is *not enough* to have someone from a particular existing discipline who is versatile. The picture presented here of an analyst is that they can think and reason rigorously, but they are not a math, philosophy, or logic major. They can use technology to facilitate their assessments, but they are not a computer scientist. They can think like someone else in a different culture or context, but they are not a social scientist. And they can speak and write concisely and compellingly, but they are not an English or rhetoric major. They are all of these in their skills, but from none of these in their disciplinary background.

One might think that what is suggested is an interdisciplinary approach to intelligence education. Even this still misses the point, though. The goal here is not to take existing disciplines and apply them to intelligence. What is proposed is not "intelligence studies" or the study of intelligence from the perspective of one or more existing disciplines. Rather, it is the creation of intelligence analysis itself *as its own distinctive field for academic study*. What has been outlined so far is clearly not captured by any existing field, nor is it captured by merely cobbling together several fields. It is a new enterprise entirely: intelligence analysis as its own discipline. This is the background that future analysts need.

Within the philosophy of science there is a long-standing dispute over what is called "reductionism." A reductionist takes the core elements of one field of study to be ultimately

nothing more than the core elements of another field of study applied a different way. For example, the person who says that psychological problems can be understood only at the neurobiological level is ultimately a reductionist about psychology (they take it to reduce to neuroscience). Or, the person who says that neurobiology is properly understood only at the chemical level is a reductionist about biology (they take it to reduce to chemistry). Similarly, the person who says that the behavior of chemicals is really just a matter of the behavior of the particles at the atomic (or subatomic) level is a reductionist about chemistry (they take it to reduce to physics).

Many academic attempts to explore intelligence have implicitly been reductionist about intelligence analysis. They take it to amount to applied social science or history, for example. Others might take it to be applied computer science or statistical risk analysis, and others applied logic or philosophy of science, or even rigorous journalism. All these approaches miss the point. They (in effect) deny that intelligence analysis could be its own distinctive field that is "more than" the sum total of one or another field. By contrast, I propose that intelligence analysis could be its own distinctive field that is not just the sum of a variety of other disciplines applied to intelligence. It is not "intelligence studies" that is its own field but "intelligence analysis" that needs to be its own academic discipline.

A person educated in the field of intelligence analysis, understood as its own academic field, would have a very unique background. They would have classes devoted to thinking and reasoning that had some similarity to logic and reasoning classes, but the methods would be more applied, holistic, and driven by time constraints. They would have classes devoted to using technology that had some similarity to what might occur in computer science, geography, or information systems, but the methods would go beyond any particular program and would be there to facilitate thinking beyond the technology itself. They would have classes devoted to understanding other cultures or contexts, but it would be more than just a particular culture or context, and more about how to understand any culture or context from the outside. Moreover, they would have classes on how to speak and write more effectively, but not in terms of mere communication theory or journalism, rather how to do so with precise analytical content under time pressures and in an uncertain environment. This person would also take courses connected to a particular subject area, but their core identity would not be defined as that subject area. Their major could not be a subject. "Intelligence Analysis" would be the major. Their minor, or minors, would reflect a variety of areas. They would happily start a career analyzing those issues, but would be equally content to analyze another with which they had no prior experience. Essentially, their form and their identity over time remain locked into the use of their core skills.

CONCLUSION

The history of national security reveals one thing in compelling fashion: we cannot reliably predict what will be the next major issue or when it will arise. As such, we need to have analysts who are not so linked to the current issues of the day that they fail to see the future ones, or are not able to adapt to address them when they are widely recognized. Thus, the ideal analyst's core identity should be twofold: at a time their function (what they do) would be to analyze the issue of the day, but equally their form (how they do things) looking across their career would be in terms of timeless methods that were useful no matter what. However, existing disciplines do not (in general) get at this sort of person. Merely taking one or more fields and applying it to intelligence would not be enough. Intelligence analysis needs to be its own (irreducible) independent field that is not merely understood as the application of another. Such a field will create analysts with rigorous skills in cognitive, computational, contextual, and communicative methods, but who also are content-integrated in their orientation. They would seek to imbed themselves into a particular subject at particular times. The core of who they were, though, would never be limited by the views or methods of any one subject. They would transcend them all. They would not be a WMD analyst or a China analyst or a leadership analyst or a military analyst. They would be an *intelligence analyst*. And *that* is what we should educate and recruit them to be.

[Author's Note: This article is the (slightly expanded) written version of a talk presented at NMIA's 2012 "Education and Training Day." I have tried to keep the text close to the original verbal presentation; thus, there are not really any direct references to outside sources as there would be in a typical written journal article.]

Noel Hendrickson received a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Wisconsin. He is currently Associate Professor and Director of the Intelligence Analysis Program at James Madison University. As part of this program, he developed and now teaches a series of courses in advanced reasoning methods for intelligence analysis including "Hypothesis Testing," "Causal Analysis," "Counterfactual Reasoning," and "Strategy Assessment." Dr. Hendrickson is also Director of the Institute for National Security Analysis. This Institute is an academic research organization whose mission is to discover, develop, and deliver new analytic methods for intelligence and national security. In this capacity, he works to encourage innovative approaches to analytical work through academic research.

Cultural Knowledge for Intelligence Analysts:
Expertise in Cultural Sensemaking

by Dr. Louise J. Rasmussen, Dr. Winston R. Sieck, and Dr. Robert R. Hoffman

Approaching a problem set like this requires a tremendous amount of what we call body of knowledge. What do we know about this organization? What do we know about its leaders? What do we know about its ideology? How do they express themselves? And this is where the language comes back in so importantly. To interpret that kind of information, that kind of data, and I will state this explicitly, is impossible to do in English. It cannot be done…and that is a real problem when you start looking for vulnerabilities because we begin with the wrong context, we interpret the data incorrectly, there is too much interpretation that happens out of context.

— National Air and Space Intelligence Center
Behavioral Influence Analyst

SUMMARY

To be in a position to understand and anticipate the beliefs and actions of individuals from other cultures, analysts need insight into "what it is like to be them." There is a tremendous amount of cultural information that analysts might use to interpret the activities of members of foreign populations, and the specific information they need depends on the problem they are given. In this article the authors argue that strategies for engaging in cultural sensemaking allow analysts to discover what cultural information they need to understand particular problems and to acquire this knowledge on an ongoing basis. As such, cultural sensemaking strategies offer an alternative to the notion of providing analysts with an initial framework or pre-specified items of knowledge that theoretically would allow them to parse and understand a culture. Instead, cultural sensemaking provides a foundation for analysts to build their own culturally-relevant mental models of another culture, and refine them over time. The authors outline a number of specific strategies for cultural sensemaking that they have uncovered in their studies of cross-cultural expertise and describe their application to intelligence analysis.

INTRODUCTION

Analysts must be able to think like the individuals in the populations they study—without bias or mirror-imaging (Hall and Citrenbaum, 2010). To do this, analysts need to effectively and accurately make sense of activity patterns and worldviews that may be culturally foreign to them. Understanding and predicting the activities and specific behaviors of cultural others requires knowledge about their culture. This presents a number of challenges, particularly for novice analysts who have had little time to build regional and cultural expertise. Cultural knowledge and language skills have indeed been identified as important competency requirements for intelligence analysts (Garst and Gross 1997; Moore and Krizan 2005). However, as the quote that opens this chapter illustrates, a major challenge is that there is an overwhelming amount of cultural information that an analyst might use to help him/her approach analysis problems. Another significant challenge is that the specific cultural knowledge the analyst needs depends on the analysis problem on which he/she is working. How can we ensure that analysts have the cultural information that is most useful to them?

The significance of these challenges becomes apparent if we look at the hypothetical experience of a young intelligence analyst, whom we will call John. John grew up in Cincinnati, Ohio. He has a bachelor's degree in sociology and a master's degree in international business. He has been outside the United States once to spend spring break in Cancun, Mexico. John took a couple of years of French in high school and dabbled in German because that is where his ancestors are from and he dreams of going there one day. It is John's first month on the job and his team receives the following problem set: identify the themes that will be used by Al Qaeda in an upcoming propaganda campaign. The principal analyst briefs the team on the methods and frameworks that will be used. He recommends dividing attention between characterizing the decision processes of the Al Qaeda organization as a whole and profiling a couple of individuals who have been identified as visionaries behind previous Al Qaeda campaigns.

John is instantly overwhelmed. He knows that in order to effectively contribute to this analysis he needs to understand group dynamics and decision-making in the Middle East, the political and religious beliefs and sentiments of Al Qaeda's intended targets, and the individual beliefs and motivations of the suspected thought leaders within the organization. Currently he knows next to nothing about the Middle East and he is not sure how to get up to speed.

This hypothetical case illustrates the job challenges cultural complexity presents to a new intelligence analyst. There is a tremendous amount of cultural information for potential consideration, and the information the analyst needs depends on the problem. To address this challenge, analysts need strategies for engaging in cultural sensemaking (Sieck, Smith, and Rasmussen 2008). This is partly a process of discovering the cultural information they need to understand particular problems. Cultural sensemaking strategies also aid in acquiring this knowledge on an ongoing basis to support analysis. Finally, having strategies for efficiently acquiring cultural knowledge may preclude "freezing up" on the part of analysts such as John because they feel they do not have the requisite amount of cultural knowledge.

In this article we will outline a number of cultural sensemaking strategies that we have uncovered in our studies of cultural sensemaking expertise.

CULTURAL SENSEMAKING

Sensemaking is a set of cognitive processes and strategies by which people give meaning to experience (Duffy, 1995). It is particularly important in situations where there is a great deal of uncertainty and where meaning cannot be immediately comprehended. Sensemaking strategies have proven their value in a variety of work domains, such as organizational management (Weick, 1995), military planning and decision making (Klein, Moon, and Hoffman, 2006), and intelligence analysis (Moore, 2009; 2011), as well as domains that require intercultural interaction (Osland and Bird, 2000; Sieck, Smith, and Rasmussen, 2013).

Cultural sensemaking refers to the cognitive processes and strategies by which people come to understand and explain the activities and intentions of culturally different others (Osland and Bird, 2000; Sieck et al., 2013; Sieck, Grome, Smith, and Rababy, 2010). It rests on the idea that the ability to successfully understand another culture relies to some extent on the ability to explain why people do what they do in the same way as a cultural insider would. This idea is based on a theory that regards cultures as shared meaning systems. Within this view, individual members of a culture are able to make sense of events and situations within their own culture because they share ideas—that is, they have a shared meaning system (Rohner, 1984; Kovecses, 2006; Sieck, 2010).

Members of a culture share expectations, or mental models, about how other members of the same culture will act in certain situations.

As a result, members of a culture share expectations, or mental models, about how other members of the same culture will act in certain situations (e.g., Campbell, 1949). Further, these mental models allow them to maintain consensus in how they explain each other's actions or decisions, and the greater the cultural homogeneity the stronger the consensus.

Because everyone belongs to at least one culture, this means that when people set out to make sense of the actions of others the perspective they start with is often based on expectations stemming from the normal situational behavior learned within their own dominant culture (Archer, 1986). In order to understand and anticipate the beliefs and actions of individuals from foreign cultures, people must build their own culturally-relevant mental models of the other culture (Sieck et al., 2010). They also need to learn to develop explanations of people's behavior and activity that are consistent with the cultural meaning system that is shared among members of the culture or population in question. Doing so enables them to make sense of events and situations from a cultural-insider point of view, allowing them to understand, predict, and solve problems within that cultural system.

As part of an ongoing program of research focusing on cross-cultural expertise, we have conducted numerous interviews with experienced intelligence analysts, collectors, and operators focusing on the thinking strategies that drive performance in challenging intercultural situations. The majority of our research involves field studies focusing on operators and analysts who have repeated and extensive experience either interacting with or reasoning about foreign populations. One study examined cultural expertise in the context of intelligence analysis specifically and another of collaborative sensemaking within multinational analysis teams (Sieck et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2009). Although the scientific objectives and methodologies vary slightly across these studies, in one way or another all studies address the knowledge and skill components of cross-cultural expertise. Altogether, 140 members of the military participated in these studies, representing the full spectrum of rank (from junior enlisted to 4-star general) and cultural exposure (ranging from none at all to spending decades overseas).

These empirical studies have revealed a set of sensemaking strategies that allow people to most effectively develop understanding of a different cultural meaning system. Experts having significant experience and credibility in domains that require reasoning about cultural complexity use certain strategies that make them more effective than individuals with less experience in making sense of cultural behaviors and situations. These strategies enable them to learn more effectively from their cultural problem-solving experiences (Osland and Bird, 2000; Sieck et al., 2013) and that can therefore boost the benefits of common overt learning activities such as reading, attending conferences, and traveling.

Because this research has also looked at cultural sensemaking in the context of ground operations, it has included contexts that require a great deal of face-to-face interaction with members of native populations (Rasmussen and Sieck, 2012). As a result, some of the antecedents of effective cultural sensemaking that have been identified pertain to strategies for developing interpersonal relationships. Such strategies are useful for human intelligence collectors and foreign area officers (Sieck, Grome, Smith, and Rababy, 2010), but perhaps less so for desk analysts such as John. However, several of the strategies for reasoning about and acquiring cultural knowledge are useful in the "desk job" situation as well. These strategies involve:

- Framing specific analysis problems as opportunities to learn about a new culture.
- Paying attention to cultural surprises and questioning one's interpretations of a behavior or situation.
- Using perspective taking as a strategy for generating hypotheses about the causes or reasons for a person's actions in a particular situation.
- Using knowledge about oneself and one's own culture as a basis for honing an "inside" perspective on a culture.
- Identifying and interacting with cultural mentors to find answers to questions and get access to a cultural insider's perspective.
- Thinking of cultural learning as a lifelong process.

In the following section we will discuss each of these strategies in more detail. We will focus on ways in which they can provide analysts a foundation for acquiring on-the-fly the cultural information they need to make sense of specific problem sets.

FRAMING ANALYSIS PROBLEMS AS CULTURAL LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES

Cultural sensemaking experts tend to expect that specific intercultural experiences and problems will provide some new insight or understanding that can be useful in the future, thinking of analytical problems as learning opportunities. They may even sometimes deliberately seek out unfamiliar experiences and problems specifically for the purpose of learning.

Thinking of specific analysis problems as being opportunities for learning something new about a culture is also a useful strategy in cultural sensemaking. It frees up analysts to think about and research aspects of the culture that may (or may not) at first be obviously relevant to a particular problem. In the end, analysts may achieve deeper understanding if they realize that not everything they learn about a culture may be used to inform a current analysis problem; it could instead inform sensemaking on a future problem.

PAYING ATTENTION TO CULTURAL SURPRISES AND QUESTIONING INTERPRETATIONS

Analysts may regard unexpected actions of a cultural other or the occurrence of contrasting interpretations (within an analysis team) as opportunities to increase their understanding of a culture. An activity, event or situation may be unexpected because the analyst recognizes that he/she is not used to seeing this in his/her own culture, or is used to seeing something rather different. Alternatively, it could be unexpected in the sense that it appears in conflict with knowledge the analyst already has about the other culture. Also, it could be the case that the analyst, either him/herself, or within his/her team, generates seemingly different interpretations. In all of these cases, the surprise presents an opportunity to ask questions and acquire more information.

The following example illustrates the latter kind of cultural surprise—a case of competing alternative interpretations (from Sieck, McHugh, Klein, Wei, and Klinger, 2004). A multinational analysis team, with an American (team leader), a Dutch, a Turk, a Greek, and a German officer worked together to identify the propaganda themes that the Croats, Bosniacs, and Serbs would use in upcoming campaigns. They had been studying the issue and background data for about nine weeks and the lead analyst was surprised to find at the end of that time that the team was not in agreement:

I thought the team was in agreement on the themes that would be used; but in fact they had two different interpretations and analyses. At one point, the Greek and the Turkish officers got frustrated with the conversations of the others and said, "you don't understand. Look: the problem is you're thinking secular, and they're not." They went on to provide their reasons why they believed Milosevich and the Serbs would switch from Stalinist communism to pursue a religious angle. The Dutch analyst, however, didn't believe that a Marxist could get away with taking that line. He said, 'Milosevich is a Stalinist, he'll never use religion. You know, Stalin is the very antithesis, a Stalinist is the very antithesis of a Christian. It won't work, no one will believe it, and he won't have credibility if he tries it.' The Dutch analyst felt that the nationalist card alone would do it. I knew the Greek and Turk had been working together, the team leader reflected; I ended up listening to them because it struck me as very unusual that people from traditional enemy countries came to the same conclusion and worked together to get the word to me. Also, they had a very good feel for the culture, much better than the rest of us. The rest of us had what I call, the distant political-analytical perspective, and they had a much closer, more personal, visceral perspective Milosevich made his first connection to religion in this conflict in May of 1992, only weeks after their prediction.

To effectively use a cultural surprise as an opportunity to deepen understanding, analysts may consider a scientific examination of its causes. Sieck et al. (2013) had expert and less experienced information operations specialists think out loud as they analyzed problem sets containing cultural elements. They found that, in the context of surprising or unexpected intercultural events, expert cultural sensemakers act very much like inquisitive scientists. When they encounter experimental evidence that is inconsistent with their original hypothesis, they change their goal to one of determining the cause of the unexpected behavior.

An example scenario in the study described a situation in which Serbian college students quit riding their school buses after the U.S. made security changes that were designed to increase protection for the students. In response to this scenario, experts generated significantly more hypotheses than the less experienced analysts about the possible causes for this change in daily activity. Further, the experts tended to ask questions that explicitly challenged fundamental assumptions underlying their conception of the other culture. For example, they would question whether the students themselves were making the decision to ride on the bus or whether someone else could be making the decision for them. The less experienced analysts, on the other hand, were far less likely to ask questions that would allow them to develop a deeper understanding of the culture and the behavior. Instead they would focus on generating ideas for different actions that could increase the ridership. This finding does not mean that all domain experts are inquisitive, nor does it mean that individuals who lack experience are not. These findings merely indicate that inquiry strategies are more common among individuals who have greater levels of domain expertise offering insight into how they developed their expertise.

The notion that inquiry is an effective strategy for learning or developing expertise has been demonstrated repeatedly in research in the fields of education and educational psychology and the cognitive psychology of expertise (Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, and Hoffman, 2006). The literature shows that students who ultimately end up developing the highest levels of competence are students who ask more questions. This is especially true for students who tend to ask questions that tap explanatory reasoning—the reasons or causes for why something happened (Graesser, Baggett, and Williams, 1996).

We have found that one way in which cultural sensemaking experts go about analyzing the possible reasons or causes for surprising or unexpected events or situations is to think about them from the perspective of someone from the other culture. This entails examining why the behavior *was not* unexpected in the other culture, a strategy called *perspective taking* that enables them to formulate and refine questions about reasons for behavior. In the following section we will describe how expert cultural sensemakers use this strategy to develop deeper understanding of another culture.

ADOPTING THE NATIVE'S PERSPECTIVE

The cognitive activity of reasoning about the experience of others, their thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and intentions is often referred to in the scientific literature as perspective taking (Davis, 1983). Perspective taking has been demonstrated to play an important role within same-culture social situations; i.e., enhance interpersonal liking (Galinsky, Ku, and Wang, 2005), improve negotiations (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and White, 2008), and aid in the comprehension of communication (Keysar, Barr, Balin, and Brauner, 2000).

Can a person really know what it is like to be someone else, especially someone from a different culture? This is a question that comes up often in the context of intelligence analysis. Can an analyst really "think like" a native?

Research has found evidence to indicate that people tend to believe that others think the same way they do themselves (see for example Nickerson, 1999; Ross and Ward, 1996). In the intelligence field, this challenge in interpreting the intentions and actions of others is referred to as the mirror imaging bias (Wittlin, 2008).

...perspective taking is an important strategy people use to make sense of people who are culturally different from themselves.

For example, we interviewed an analyst who was part of an intelligence group in the mid-1980s before the Soviet collapse, who recounted a first-hand experience with the mirror imaging bias. His group would, in parallel with a group in Washington, DC, support the Air Force in predicting what the Russians would be building for the coming twelve years. Analysts at the two different organizations would generate estimates for the same quantities and their estimates would be compared at the command level. The consensus between the groups was generally quite high. Nevertheless, the interviewee recalled one estimate that was way off, having to do with tankers.

> *The Russians had just finished a new facility for building tankers, and we were estimating the number of tankers that the Russians would build. Our group hypothesized that they would build less than a hundred, maybe 67 or so; the DC group hypothesized that the Russians would build hundreds of them. The commander asked us to explain why the two were so far off. We reasoned that the Russians have always had a smaller force than the U.S., they have insufficient resources to build many tankers, and they do not have the infrastructure to support that many tankers. We thought that the DC group was reasoning based on how the U.S. would do it. Putting the new facility in place, they would naturally build hundreds of tankers, because that's what the U.S. would do. We felt the DC group was relying on a mirror imaging assumption.*

We have found that perspective taking is an important strategy people use to make sense of people who are culturally different from themselves (Rasmussen, Sieck, and Osland, 2010). Specifically, cultural sensemakers use perspective taking to reason about the causal relationships between concepts, beliefs, and values within another person's meaning system. The insight they gain into another's meaning system through perspective taking in turn allows them to formulate hypotheses concerning situation-dependent tendencies in reasoning and judgment (Hoffman et al., 2011). To illustrate this, consider the way an Army Sergeant First Class takes the perspective of an Iraqi individual to reconcile how the person could hold values that appear to her to be in conflict. To this NCO, the Iraqi official appears to accept Western values on the one hand and maintain conservative Muslim values on the other.

> *For somebody who dressed in Western clothes and had a lot to do with the U.S. Army that was there, and government officials and things like that, it seemed to me to be almost a contradiction. You want to be Westernized for yourself but maybe not so much for your daughter. But, again, that's who he was so who am I to say whether that's right or wrong for him or for her? I mean I can have my own opinions but it is what it is… One way to make sense of it all is if he was doing this liaising with the U.S. government, the military, and making relationships there because he saw that as the way to get ahead in Iraq, and the way to better his country, or maybe the way to get to the point where the Americans would leave. I mean it doesn't mean that he left his traditional beliefs behind…* (Army SFC)

When used effectively, perspective taking can assist an analyst in developing mental models of a cultural other's experience. Through the activity of reasoning about the relationships between the beliefs and motivations of specific individuals and of cultural groups, expert cultural sensemakers are able to develop understanding of a culturally different meaning system. In this way, perspective taking offers a way for analysts to develop what cultural anthropologists call "emic" analysis or understanding of a culture from the "inside" (Geertz, 1974; Sieck, 2011).

The counterpart to the emic perspective on a culture is the "etic" perspective. Etic descriptions of a culture rely on scientific constructs or concepts that can be theoretically applied across cultures in a "culturally-neutral" or "objective" fashion. Geertz (1974, p. 24) offered the concepts of "object cathexis" and "love" as examples of etic and emic cultural knowledge respectively. As such etic knowledge provides an "outsider's" view of a culture. For this reason, etic concepts do not straightforwardly enable emic analysis or "understanding a culture from the inside."

Malinowski's famous characterization of the Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) clearly illustrates the leap that would have to be made to infer the beliefs and values of specific members of the culture from a scientist's characterization of cultural behavior:

> *Yet it must be remembered that what appears to us an extensive, complicated, and yet well-ordered*

> *institution is the outcome of so many doings and pursuits, carried on by savages, who have no laws or aims or charters definitely laid down. They have no knowledge of the total outline of any of their social structure. They know their own motives, know the purpose of individual actions and the rules which apply to them, but how, out of these, the whole collective institution shapes, this is beyond their mental range.* (pp. 83-84)

The extent to which there is such a thing as a truly "objective" understanding of another culture is a debatable point. Regardless, in the context of intelligence analysis the emic mental models that may be developed as a result of taking another's perspective provide at least some direct insight into the beliefs and motivations and therefore the experience of cultural others. Further, such emic understanding can also more readily be used as a basis for further inquiry. In the context of seeking to understand or make sense of another culture, perspective taking allows the individual to formulate hypotheses about the thoughts and motivations of cultural others and to identify information they need in order to improve their understanding.

Some might argue that in order to take someone else's perspective "accurately," to avoid the mirror-imaging bias, one needs to have a great deal of knowledge about the other person as well as their cultures or sub-cultures. In the following section we will describe how cultural sensemaking experts use perspective taking effectively even when they lack culture-specific knowledge.

KNOWING YOURSELF AND HOW YOU'RE DIFFERENT

The more knowledge a perspective taker has about the person whose perspective he/she is trying to take, or about his/her culture, the better positioned the perspective taker is to "accurately" take the perspective of the cultural other. This line of reasoning is valid if intercultural perspective taking is thought of as a "one-shot" way to achieve insider understanding of a cultural other. Social-cognitive research has found that the more one knows about the other, the better one is able to make inferences about what they know, and better able to predict their behavior (Nickerson, 1999; Krauss, and Fussell, 1999; Ames, 2004).

However, we have found that when perspective taking is used within the cultural sensemaking process there is not necessarily a strong requirement for having in-depth knowledge of someone else in order for inferences and predictions to *become* valid. Mainly, when perspective taking is used as part of an iterative process, through which a cultural sensemaker generates hypotheses and refines their understanding of a behavior or situation, it can serve a productive purpose even when the sensemaker might have little to no knowledge about the other, personally, or about their culture.

In starting with self-knowledge to form an initial hypothesis, the expert analyst uses knowledge of the concepts and worldviews that are important in his/her own culture as a starting point for interpreting another culture.

We have found that when expert cultural sensemakers lack knowledge about the beliefs and values of cultural others they use knowledge about themselves, and knowledge about ways in which Americans are different from other cultures as a starting point for sensemaking. It may seem counter-intuitive to assert that this is a good strategy, especially in response to the argument that mirroring is a bias. However, in starting with self-knowledge to form an initial hypothesis, the expert analyst uses knowledge of the concepts and worldviews that are important in his/her own culture as a starting point for interpreting another culture. In one of our research studies, a U.S. Air Force captain recounted how he had noticed that Afghans behaved in a way that made it seem to him like they did not care about acting "heroically." This puzzled him. He used his own perspective on what it means to be a hero and act heroically as the starting for making sense of how Afghans think about what it means to be a "hero."

> *We have this expectation of this warrior culture, and we have that painted image in our mind… We say are you wearing a suit? Do you go get dressed in the booth to come out that super hero warrior? Afghans don't think of it that way. The Afghan fables all describe the Afghan as being successful by outsmarting the enemy by playing dumb…* (Air Force captain)

In this example, understanding the American concept of heroism allowed the captain to recognize that Afghans were not behaving consistently with that concept. This tracks with research showing that self-awareness, or knowledge about the self, can allow perspective takers to identify areas of possible differences between themselves and others. The more aware people are of the beliefs and values that are unique to them, the better they are at identifying the beliefs and values that are unique to others (Decety and Sommerville, 2003).

These findings suggest that analysts could benefit from having a solid general understanding of their own culture and how it influences their interpretation of behavior. Doing so would support cultural sensemaking by providing a basis for analysts to identify cultural differences—and, therefore, for recognizing when they should be surprised. If people are acting in a way that does not seem to correspond with the normal patterns that an analyst is used to seeing in his/her own culture, that is a cue to seek more information to understand the reasons for that behavior.

IDENTIFYING AND USING CULTURAL MENTORS

Knowing oneself and using that as a basis for asking questions about another culture is just the starting point, however. One must also know where to look and whom to ask for information to help build understanding of a culture or a cultural issue. A way for analysts to increase their cultural knowledge and to vet their use of already acquired knowledge to make sense of cultural others' perspectives is to identify and use cultural mentors. Analysts may find expatriates (or academics) in their local communities or on their analysis teams.

We have found that expert cultural sensemakers are very creative in where they get their information, and in how they interact with potential information sources to get the information they need. For example, the American analysis team leader mentioned above recounted having interesting discussions with members of his multinational analysis team in order to familiarize himself with Serbian culture from the perspective of someone who has inside knowledge about the culture.

> *The Turk would tell me about how the Serbs have always seen themselves as the defenders of the gate. That's how history was taught in their history books. And then the Greek went on to explain how many Serbs considered the Bosnians traitors because they used to be Christians and converted to Islam. He said, "and many Serbs consider the Bosnians to be descendants of Turkish soldiers." In fact, many Turks married locally, and many Turks married Greeks because they were admirers of the Greek culture and the Serbs were seen as an extension of the Greek culture because of their alliance with the Byzantium. The bottom line was, the Turk said, "Greece and Serbia have been allies since Byzantine times against Turks and Muslims." The implication was that if my team made a recommendation that would lead NATO to choose sides, then NATO would put their two countries at each other's throats.*

In situations where locating cultural insiders or natives is a challenge, we have found that cultural sensemaking experts can be very creative in identifying other sources of information that can assist in constructing an inside view about a culture. A Marine Corps intelligence collector we interviewed accounted this strategy for obtaining information to allow him to develop background understanding of a culture.

> *One of the things that helped us was understanding that Somali culture focused on the family first, and then the clan, and then the tribe. Understanding that was the center of gravity of Somali culture before we went over there. And we did not get that from the military; we got that from the universities, but that what was key and important to us. But it was only because we exercised some flexibility in going outside traditional channels to get that information, i.e., going to the universities. UC-Berkeley, when they found out we were military, refused to communicate with us; they would not help us because they just disagreed with us going there. The University of San Diego was very cooperative.* (Marine Corps lieutenant colonel)

Interacting with cultural mentors and asking them culture-related questions is an important part of cultural sensemaking. It helps provide a context for interpreting events, actions, and situations. In this context it should be noted, though, that culture is of course in many ways subjective. This means that any one individual or source's account is likely to be biased. We have found that cultural sensemaking experts are typically aware of this, and will critically evaluate information provided to them either by native mentors or by other sources. They might look for a second opinion, or at times go online after a discussion to specifically check facts they have been provided related to a culture. This would serve both as a check on the validity of the information itself and allow assessment of the general reliability of their source.

THINKING OF CULTURAL LEARNING AS A LIFELONG PROCESS

Cultural sensemaking experts use efficient learning strategies to build deep knowledge about a variety of specific regions and cultures in the world. However, we have found that no matter how knowledgeable these experts are, they proceed as if there is always more to know. Interestingly, this is also true of experts in a somewhat similar profession, i.e., expert UN language interpreters (Hoffman, 1997).

In the context of intelligence analysis, a similar orientation to cultural knowledge can form a productive basis for ongoing

cultural learning. No matter how much an analyst thinks he/she knows about a culture, he/she will benefit from realizing that there is more to know. Without this realization, analysts may feel compelled to explain away cultural surprises and forget to question their interpretations.

DISCUSSION

In this chapter we have described a number of cultural sensemaking strategies that analysts may use to support the ongoing acquisition of cultural knowledge. Currently, many efforts to cultivate cultural knowledge and skills in the military use an "etic" approach (see, for example, Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, 2009). However, emic as well as etic cultural knowledge play important roles in analysis. Some problems require understanding and anticipation of the actions of groups and organizations. Furthermore, as our novice analyst John's experience at the beginning of the chapter illustrated, at times analysis problems require characterization of behavior both at the individual and the group level.

If analysts have the expectation that they will acquire cultural knowledge on the job, and if they have effective strategies for doing so, they will be more ready to tackle problems that require them to think about culture at multiple levels of abstraction. Cultural sensemaking strategies offer an alternative to the notion of providing analysts with an initial framework or pre-specified items of knowledge that ideally would allow them to parse and understand a culture. Instead, cultural sensemaking provides a foundation for analysts to build their own mental models of the other culture, over time (Sieck et al., 2010).

Provided early in an analyst's career, targeted cultural sensemaking instruction offers the promise of not only providing strategies for how to think about culture, but at the same time accelerating the development of expertise (Hoffman, et al., in press). Domain-embedded thinking and learning skills training offer a possible approach for promoting cultural sensemaking skills in analysts. Previous studies have found that scenario-based approaches for teaching advanced thinking skills result in positive, subjective learner evaluations (Pliske, McCloskey, and Klein, 2001). The next step in our research program is to use the research outlined in the current chapter to design objective measures of cultural sensemaking ability. Such measures can allow us to examine the effects of explicit cultural sensemaking instruction and to determine the relative usefulness of alternative instructional methods.

References

Ames, D. (2004). Inside the mind reader's tool kit: Projection and stereotyping in mental state inference. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87*(3), 340-353.

Archer, C.M. (1986). Culture bump and beyond. In J.M. Valdes (Ed.), *Culture bound: Bridging the cultural gap*

in language teaching (pp. 170-178). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Campbell, J. (1949). *The hero with a thousand faces*. Princeton University Press.

Davis, M.H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44*, 113-126.

Decety, J., & Sommerville, J. (2003). Shared representations between self and other: a social cognitive neuroscience view. *TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 7*(12), 527-533.

Duffy, M. (1995). Sensemaking in Classroom Conversations. In I. Maso, P. A. Atkinson, S. Delamont, J.C. Verhoeven (Eds.), *Openness in Research: The Tension between Self and Other*, 119-132. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum.

Ericsson, K.A., Charness, N., Feltovich, P.J. and Hoffman, R.R., (Eds.) (2006). *Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Galinsky, A., Ku, G., & Wang, C. (2005). Perspective-taking and self-other overlap: Fostering social bonds and facilitating social coordination. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 8*(2), 109-124.

Galinsky, A., Maddux, W., Gilin, D., & White, J. (2008). Why it pays to get inside the head of your opponent: Differential effects of perspective taking and empathy in negotiations. *Psychological Science, 19*, 378-384.

Garst, R.D., & Gross, M.L., 1997. On becoming an intelligence analyst. *Defense Intelligence Journal, 6*, 47-59.

Geertz, C. (1974). From the Native's Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding. *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 28*(1), 26-45.

Graesser, A.C., Baggett, W., & Williams, K. (1996). Question-driven explanatory reasoning. *Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10*, S17-S32.

Hall, W.M., & Citrenbaum, G. (2010). *Intelligence Analysis: How to think in complex environments.* ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, CA.

Hoffman, R.R. (1997). The cognitive psychology of expertise and the domain of interpreting. *Interpreting: The International Journal of Research and Practice in Interpreting, 2*, 198-230.

Hoffman, R.R., Henderson, S., Moon, B., Moore, D.T., & Litman, J.A. (2011). Reasoning difficulty in analytical activity. *Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 12*, 225-240.

Hoffman, R.R., Ward, P., DiBello, L., Feltovich, P.J., Fiore, S.M., and Andrews, D. (2013). *Accelerated Expertise: Training for High Proficiency in a Complex World.* Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis/CRC Press.

Keysar, B., Barr, D.J., Balin, J.A., & Brauner, J.S. (2000). Taking perspective in conversation: The role of mutual knowledge in comprehension. *Psychological Science, 11*, 32–38.

Klein, G., Moon, B. & Hoffman, R.R. (2006). Making sense of sensemaking II: A macrocognitive model. *IEEE Intelligent Systems*, 21, 88-92.

Kovecses, Z. (2006). *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Krauss, R.M., & Fussell, S.R. (1991). Perspective-taking in communication: Representations of others' knowledge in reference. *Social Cognition, 9*, 2-24.

Malinowski, B. (1922). *Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An account of native enterprise and adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Moore, D.T., & Krizan, L. (2005). Core competencies for intelligence analysis at the National Security Agency. In R.G. Swenson, ed. Bringing intelligence about: practitioners reflect on best practices. Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 95-132.

Moore, D.T. (2009). *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis*, Occasional Paper Number Fourteen, Revised. Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College.

Moore, D.T. (2012). *Sensemaking: A structure for an intelligence revolution*, 2nd edition. Washington, DC: National Intelligence University.

Nickerson, R.S. (1999). How we know—and sometimes misjudge—what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others. *Psychological Bulletin, 125*, 737-759.

Osland, J.S., & Bird, A. (2000). Beyond sophisticated stereotyping: Cultural sensemaking in context. *Academy of Management Executive, 14*, 65-79.

Pliske, R., McCloskey, M., & Klein, G. (2001). Decision skills training: Facilitating learning from experience. In Salas, Eduardo (Ed.), and Klein, Gary (Ed.), *Linking expertise and naturalistic decision making.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, pp. 37-53.

Rasmussen, L.J., Sieck, W.R., & Osland, J. (2010). Using cultural models of decision making to assess and develop cultural sensemaking competence. In D. Schmorrow and D. Nicholson (Eds.), *Advances in Cross-Cultural Decision Making*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press/ Taylor and Francis, Ltd.

Rasmussen, L.J., & Sieck, W.R. (2012, March-April). Strategies for developing and practicing cross-cultural expertise in the military. *Military Review*, pp.71-80.

Roan, L., Strong, B., Foss, P., Yager, M., Gehlbach, H., & Metcalf, K. (2009). "Social perspective taking in the contemporary operating environment." Final Report on Contract No. W91WAW-07-P-0286, Adelphi, MD: Army Research Institute.

Rohner, R.P. (1984). Toward a conception of culture for cross-cultural psychology. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 15*, 111-138.

Ross, L., and Ward, A. (1996). Naive realism in everyday life: Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. In T. Brown, E. Reed, and E. Turiel (Eds.), *Values and knowledge* (pp. 103-135). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Salmoni, B., & Holmes,-Eber. (2009). *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications.* Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Sieck, W.R. (2010). Cultural network analysis: Method and application. In D. Schmorrow and D. Nicholson (Eds.), *Advances in Cross-Cultural Decision Making* (pp. 260-269). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press/ Taylor and Francis, Ltd.

Sieck, W.R. (2011). A cultural models approach for investigating the cognitive basis of terrorism. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, *2*(1), 3-15.

Sieck, W.R., Grome, A.P., Smith, J., & Rababy, D.A. (2010). Expert cultural sensemaking in the management of Middle Eastern crowds. In K.L. Mosier and U.M. Fischer (Eds.), *Informed by Knowledge: Expert Performance in Complex Situations* (pp. 103-119). New York, NY: Taylor and Francis.

Sieck, W.R., Smith, J.L., & Rasmussen, L.J. (2013). Metacognitive Strategies for Making Sense of Cross-Cultural Encounters. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *44*(6), 1007-1023.

Sieck, W.R., McHugh, A.P., Klein, G., Wei, S., & Klinger, D.W. (2004). *Uncertainty management for teams: The strategy of developing shared understanding in the face of uncertainty.* Technical Report on Contract #N00014-04-M-0148. Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA.

Weick, K. (1995). *Sensemaking in Organisations.* London: Sage.

Witlin, L. (2008). Of Note: Mirror-Imaging and Its Dangers. *SAIS Review 28*, 89-90.

Dr. Louise J. Rasmussen is a Senior Scientist at Global Cognition, a cognitive research and training development organization in Yellow Springs, OH. Her research explores how people think, learn, decide, and plan in complex, real-world contexts. Over the past few years she has conducted several studies aimed at characterizing effective cognition and performance in intercultural situations to inform cultural training and education. In addition to several book chapters, she has published articles in journals such as Military Review *and* Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making. *She received her PhD in Human Factors Psychology from Wright State University.*

Dr. Winston R. Sieck is President and Principal Scientist of Global Cognition. He investigates the strategies people use to learn, reason, think critically, and make decisions, including how these strategies differ across cultures and levels of expertise. He identifies cognitive skills and strategies that yield high performance in a variety of contexts, devises methods to assess them, and develops and tests e-learning programs to impart the strategies. A central issue in this work is determining ways to teach general cognitive skills in a manner so that learners apply them in new situations. Dr. Sieck has published extensively on these issues in a variety of scientific outlets, and has served as principal investigator on projects funded by several government agencies to study these and related issues. He received his PhD in cognitive psychology and an MA in statistics from the University of Michigan.

Dr. Robert R. Hoffman is a Senior Research Scientist at the Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition. He is a Fellow of the American Psychological Society, a Fulbright Scholar, and an Honorary Fellow of the British Library (Eccles Center for American Studies). He is widely regarded as one of the pioneers of the field of "expertise studies." He has conducted extensive research on the knowledge and reasoning skills of expert remote sensing scientists, weather forecasters, and utilities engineers. Dr. Hoffman has been recognized internationally for his fundamental contributions to the field of human-centered computing, pioneering research on the psychology of expertise, contributions to the methodology of knowledge elicitation, and research on human factors issues in the design of workstation systems and knowledge-based systems.

The Potential for a National Intelligence Academy as a Future Cornerstone of Intelligence Education and Collaboration

by Matthew K. Wilder

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on how the common basis of education and shared hardship provided by a potential National Intelligence Academy can serve to increase collaboration within the Intelligence Community. Research focused on the curriculum design and training found in a potential Intelligence Academy that builds long-term collaboration in the students and the building of a professional identity.

INTRODUCTION

> To create a diverse community of professionals necessary to provide the best possible intelligence to policy-makers the Community needs to recruit and hire the best people, give them career development assignments in other IC agencies, and begin evaluating them based on how well they engage and collaborate with their colleagues across the IC.
>
> -Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration*

There are real and daunting challenges associated with reform, especially within the Intelligence Community (IC) due to the large number of agencies and equities involved. However, there is intrinsic value in the academic task of exploring options to build the skills for collaboration and a shared basis of knowledge in the education of an intelligence professional. In order to examine clearly the processes that instill collaboration, it is necessary first to define the term itself. *Collaboration* is defined as "working with others or together especially in an intellectual endeavor" and "to cooperate with an agency or instrumentality with which one is not immediately connected."[1] The Collaboration Consulting Team for the Deputy Director of National Intelligence has a more specific definition: "The interaction among members of the IC and their partners—exploiting their diverse expertise and organizational resources to create higher value intelligence than an agency or officer can do individually to achieve the mission of the IC."[2] For the purposes of this article, the ideal collaborative environment is a combination of the above two definitions. In the IC, collaboration must include diverse individuals and groups working together within, across, and outside established institutions in the pursuit of an intellectual endeavor. However, it is useful first to understand some of the criticisms that the IC has faced after the 9/11 attacks and to understand that the reforms suggested by the 9/11 Commission have been insufficient to remedy the IC's issues with collaboration.

After the attacks of 9/11, President George W. Bush recommended a joint Congressional commission to review the events leading up to the terrorist incidents, to determine any lessons learned, and to propose a way ahead for the IC. The 9/11 Commission's findings were published in July 2004 and concluded that a lack of collaboration within the civilian intelligence agencies contributed to missed opportunities that could have warned the nation that an attack was imminent.[3] This sentiment also was confirmed in a January 2009 Government Accountability Office study, which asserted that concrete information-sharing methods are not sufficiently developed and that there is no system in place to hold intelligence agencies accountable for collaboration.[4]

This assessment is especially stark considering the reforms put in place after the 9/11 Commission Report was published, to include the creation of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and such collaboration tools as *Intellipedia*. However, lawmakers and IC leaders recognized that the previous structure of the civilian intelligence agencies made intelligence collaboration difficult at best. Despite the clear mandate from the President and Congress to make concrete changes, there are still significant barriers to change, both in the structure of civilian intelligence agencies and how intelligence officers are trained.

There are several significant factors that inhibit real progress with regard to the IC staying ahead in collaboration. One possible factor is the lack of positive reinforcement and rewards for collaboration, as opposed

to punishment for a lack thereof. This tendency is easily recognized by examining how few significant awards within the civilian IC are given for collaborative efforts.[5] However, this article asserts that the primary factor for interagency collaboration is a lack of a common foundation of education and training that are key enablers for creating a collaborative culture. Unfortunately, there are examples that poor interagency collaboration affects national security, to include the failed 2009 Christmas Day airliner bombing. Several subsequent IC reviews have identified collaboration shortfalls that resulted in missed opportunities to recognize and respond appropriately to the attack. While this article recognizes that some incremental improvements to collaboration may have occurred, there remain approaches to further improve collaboration which will enable the IC to stay ahead of adversaries in decades to come.

The principles of education and training at all academic levels and for nearly every audience have been studied in the U.S. for generations. However, education and training tailored to the unique needs of the IC are relatively new, beginning with the concepts developed for the Central Intelligence Agency by Sherman Kent. These concepts were first published in the inaugural issue of *Studies in Intelligence* in September 1955 and introduced the concept that the education and training of an intelligence officer could (and should) be accomplished effectively by both academics and experienced field operatives.[6] In the 3rd Quarter, 2011, issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*, Dr. Stephen DiRienzo and Dr. Rebecca Frerichs, both faculty members of the National Intelligence University (NIU) at the time, referred to then-MG Michael Flynn's recently published criticism of the IC as a catalyst to further examine intelligence education and training.[7] They also delineated the difference between intelligence education and intelligence-focused training while advocating for a program that offers both. Specifically, the authors defined education as a more comprehensive, broad-based experience as opposed to the narrower and often less comprehensive nature of training.[8] The authors asserted that the interdisciplinary and broad nature of intelligence education is not congruent with the more specific training needs and goals of the 16 agencies that comprise the IC. The ODNI was originally created to coordinate these needs and goals and develop IC-wide analytical standards.

The authors also highlighted a flaw in much of the contemporary theory of intelligence education in that implementing standards for intelligence training and analytical performance do not equal intelligence education. Di Rienzo and Frerichs stated that, for the IC, a potential way forward is to model the original basis for education in the CIA that rests upon the principles of inclusive education instead of the tailored tradecraft education of individual agencies. However, the authors also admitted that, while intelligence education is appreciated in theory, few intelligence leaders appreciate the complex methodologies that accompany a thorough educational program with regard to strategic planning and tactical implementation. DiRienzo and Frerichs insisted that, as it stands now, few intelligence practitioners are conscious of the advantages of education beyond its ability to put the practitioner on the path to career advancement.[9]

...implementing standards for intelligence training and analytical performance do not equal intelligence education.

The IC has not ignored the potential benefits offered through an "academy-like" education. The 2001 Strategic Investment Plan published by the Central Intelligence Agency advocated for a National Intelligence Academy to be established by FY2010. The goal of the Academy, "in addition to increasing professional knowledge and skills, would be to foster interaction—and bonding—among officers across the agencies. The program also would provide a venue for retired IC officials to teach, write, and both document and transmit the history of the IC to future generations."[10] The Strategic Plan, however, does not elaborate on funding specifics or Congressional support for such an Academy and it is unclear why the Academy was not implemented as outlined in the plan.

Intelligence challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan have triggered an examination of how well existing intelligence training and education have served to produce intelligence professionals who are adaptive and adept operators in the current operational environment. A recent article in National Defense University's *Joint Force Quarterly* examines intelligence education and the qualities of an intelligence academy. The article suggests that, while the paradigms for the training and education of intelligence officers traditionally have been separate, they must be joined in such a way as to produce officers who are both technically competent and have the intellectual capacity for strategic thought.[11] Although these authors propose that the National Intelligence University (formally the DIA-based National Defense Intelligence College) could provide such training, they overlook the fact that the University's programs do not currently include the interdisciplinary education that they advocate in their paper and its undergraduate education program is limited to a very small number of students. Despite these factors, the paper points to an intelligence service academy as the only appropriate setting for the complete

education and training of an intelligence officer. The paper also makes it clear that, while many institutions provide some aspects of comprehensive intelligence education and training, none yet exists that provides the complete experience in a "full-service" setting.

In addition to the IC, there are other communities of professionals that have considered a dedicated academy to instill professional identity and collaboration. Advocates of public service and alumni of such organizations as Teach for America have proposed the creation of a U.S. Public Service Academy. Congressional proposals describing this potential academy are comprehensive regarding the potential students, admissions process, and operating budget.[12] Despite good intentions, though, the proposal relies upon a tentative public/private funding structure that accounts only for annual operating costs and an admissions structure similar to the existing U.S. military service academies.[13]

An independent cost-benefit analysis of the proposed U.S. Public Service Academy provides much more detail regarding the total life cycle cost for the establishment of a new service academy. The analysis reveals that, although up-front costs may exceed $600 million, they represent non-recurring costs of construction and are offset over the projected life of the Academy.[14]

Despite the apparent positive qualities that may be inherent in a National Intelligence Academy, there are case studies from countries that have intelligence academies which report that not only has collaboration not improved, in some cases it has been a hindrance. As part of her doctoral research, Romanian political scientist Claudia Cristescu from the West University of Timisoara conducted a study of intelligence academies while conducting curriculum design for a possible intelligence studies curriculum for civilian universities in Romania. Although Romania has both a National Intelligence Academy and a National Intelligence College, Cristescu's research demonstrates that the rigorous entrance requirements and "elite" status of graduates has served only to alienate them from peers.[15] Although there are several theories and methods regarding the structure of an intelligence academy, some literature is convergent regarding the development of collaborative behavior, specifically that professional identity and culture play key roles in collaboration.

PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE AS FACTORS OF COLLABORATION

The concept of professional identity and the steps taken to inculcate it within a group are well known within business circles. There are several theories which indicate that shared hardship combined with a common training experience can instill the basis for enduring collaboration. One such process is outlined in a description of how the CIA indoctrinates and trains recruits new to the Agency. This process emphasizes immersion into a professional culture and the bonding experiences of a group of diverse people enabled through a rigorous training program.[16] Although this paradigm works well for small groups of CIA employees in both analytical and operational specialties, there is no wider participation in the program from other intelligence agencies and thus no emphasis on interagency collaboration. The concept itself may be valid, but its implementation would have to be adopted to include far more participants if it is to have a significant impact on IC collaboration.

A recent U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies monograph states that collaboration within the IC is a factor of organizational culture. [Editor's Note: This school, known affectionately as SAMS, is located at Fort Leavenworth, KS, under the aegis of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.] Organizational culture is defined as "the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization."[17] The monograph author identified several shortfalls in the organizational culture of both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Specifically, DHS was not yet sufficiently mature to develop an organizational culture separate from its component agencies, and the FBI was opposed to intelligence collaboration because of outdated legislation and attitudes.[18] The Bureau also was hindered by a lack of a common training program for intelligence analysts.[19] Perhaps most interesting is how the monograph links an effective organizational culture with a stable membership in the culture and shared history. The author states:

> The primary organizational culture difference between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security is stable membership and shared history. Stability in organizational culture means that its members are firmly established. Shared history in organizational culture means that its members have gone through the social learning and/or socialization process while overcoming challenging events. (Egli, 2011, 41)

In total, the monograph links effective organizational culture that is established with a common training program, a rigid sense of membership, and socialization to cultural norms through shared hardship. The previously mentioned literature seems to indicate that these aspects are the essential building blocks for collaboration and form the basis for advocating for a National Intelligence Academy as a means to stay ahead of competitors.

Some trends in the literature were readily apparent. First, although intelligence training is crucial to the development of an intelligence officer, the studies conducted by DiRienzo and Frerichs among others indicate that it is no substitute for immersive and comprehensive education, especially with regard to building collaborative behavior. Second, there is precedent for the concept of a National Intelligence Academy found in CIA planning documents and literature that seems to link the attributes of an intelligence academy with the foundation of successful collaboration.

POTENTIAL ATTRIBUTES OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY

The National Intelligence Academy approach may be based upon the 47-month academic schedule of the United States Military Academy at West Point.[20] The ideal setting for such an academy would be a facility within driving distance of the Washington, DC, metropolitan area to ensure ease of access to the headquarters of each of the IC agencies. However, to reduce costs, a repurposed facility (perhaps a redesigned campus of the National Intelligence University) of sufficient size may be adapted to fit the needs of the academy. The facility should be of sufficient size to include classrooms, lodging, recreation, fitness, and outdoor training facilities. However, it should also be designed to be segregated from the general public to contribute to the security of the facility and the effectiveness of the immersion experiences. [Editor's Note: In fact, the DNI and the DIA Director have agreed to move NIU to a new IC campus in Bethesda, MD, utilizing renovated structures that previously served as the HQ of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) before it moved to its new facility in Springfield, VA. Current projections have NIU moving sometime in 2016. The IC campus and NIU will continue, at least for now, to remain under the executive agency of DIA.]

The Academy will likely attract younger applicants as it will involve the pursuit of an undergraduate degree and an intensive program of instruction, much like that of West Point. A cornerstone of West Point education is that it focuses on entry-level employees (in this case, Army cadets who aspire to be officers) who are typically younger and less experienced. However, unlike West Point, it will not be exclusively based on age, marital status, dependent status, the results of an intensive physical fitness test, or the ability to secure a nomination from an elected official. All those who meet entrance requirements will be eligible to attend. Entrance requirements will be similar to that of any selective university, to include standardized test scores, high school or undergraduate transcripts, the results of an in-person interview and, because of the potential physical requirements of the intelligence profession, a physical examination. The Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) will also be administered during the interview process and be used as a basis for admission. Entrance to the academy will likely be administered by a panel of intelligence officers and educators at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) level. Depending on interest and capacity, inaugural classes at the Academy will likely start with several hundred students and scale up as needed to support the demand for graduates from each intelligence agency. The ideal student for the Academy would be a highly qualified and service-minded individual who also would likely be competitive for an appointment to a service academy. Successful completion of the academy would ensure employment to a position within the IC.

Successful completion of the program would lead to a Bachelor of Science degree in Intelligence Studies which will meet the requirements for national accreditation through the Commission on Higher Education. A representative academic program might look similar to the four-year curriculum utilized by West Point.

The instructors for the Intelligence Academy likely will be permanent employees of the Academy who are augmented by rotational instructors from the IC. These instructors may have been previous faculty from each of the agencies' separate colleges and training programs, but it is important that experienced field officers also be incorporated. Each instructor will be certified by ODNI to teach and possess not only superior academic credentials but also a demonstrated commitment to collaboration and a desire to teach new employees. The instructors will not remain employees of their parent agency, but will instead be hired, rated, and evaluated by the leadership of the Academy, which should be comprised of experienced members of the Senior Executive Service.

The curriculum of the Academy should be determined by a dean in conjunction with ODNI and will be comprised of a common core of classes as well as optional broadening fields of study. Successful completion of the program would lead to a Bachelor of Science degree in Intelligence Studies which will meet the requirements for national accreditation through the Commission on Higher Education. A representative academic program might look similar to the four-year curriculum utilized by West Point.

Table. National Intelligence Academy Academic Program

Fourth Class Year	Third Class Year	Second Class Year	First Class Year
Introduction to Calculus	Calculus II	English IV	Internship
Chemistry I/II	Probability and Statistics	Political Science III/IV	Internship
History I/II	History III	Foreign Language IV	Internship
Foreign Language I/II	Foreign Language III	Intelligence Law	Internship
General Psychology I	English III	Intelligence Operations	Elective
English I/II	Political Science I/II	Advanced Analytical Skills	Intelligence Practical Exercise
Introduction to Intelligence	Intelligence Collection	Elective	Intelligence Certification Courses
Critical Analysis	Intelligence Analysis	Lifetime Sports	Elective
Ethics/Honor	Collaborative Methods	Collaboration Tools	Collaboration Capstone
Leadership Fundamentals	Leadership Reaction Course	Introduction to Weapons	Weapons/Tactics/ Combative Skills

Source: *USMA Catalog*, Academic Program, Class of 2013, http://www.dean.usma.edu/sebpublic/curriccat/static/index.htm; American Public University, *BA in Intelligence Studies Course Catalog*, http://www.apu.apus.edu/academic/programs/degree/1008/bachelor-of-arts-in-intelligence-studies.

The curriculum includes a core element with intensive periods of language study, intelligence-specific courses to expand the students' knowledge of the IC as a whole, and specific instruction on ethics, honor, and collaboration skills that continue throughout the duration of the program. It also includes leadership instruction as well as courses designed to instill professional identity through shared experiences such as weapons training and a leadership reaction course. After the second class (junior) year, ODNI assesses students to determine which agency they will join upon graduation. That decision will be determined partially by overall class rank and partially by student preference, much the same as career fields and branches are determined at West Point.

Although federal and state funding will offset operating costs, the initial appropriation of construction funds may be a significant political and practical point of contention for ODNI.

The budget for such an academy would likely be its greatest barrier to implementation. Utilizing an analysis of the projected cost of a similar institution for the public service sector (in this case, a proposed Public Service Academy), the estimated cost of total construction would be approximately $600 million, with $200+ million in annual operating costs.[21] This estimate assumes new construction with a student body comprising 1,800 students and with facilities similar to that of the other service academies (with the exception of a few spaces, there would be no need for the entire facility to be secured for classified information). [Editor's Note: The present main campus of NIU at DIA HQ is wholly located within a secure compartmented information facility (SCIF), and its future facility in Bethesda will likewise be in a SCIF. This is necessary because NIU's unique niche in academia is that scholarly research can be conducted at the highest classification levels.] The current yearly operating budget for West Point in FY11 was $132 million, with a number of federal programs contributing to offset costs.[22] However, this operating budget does not include the cost for salaries of faculty who are active duty officers. The approximate cost per graduate is estimated using FY97 dollars at $340,000.[23] Although federal and state funding will offset operating costs, the initial appropriation of construction funds may be a significant political and practical point of contention for ODNI.

Given the amount of resources dedicated to training each student, both the employee and the gaining agency will require a significant return on their respective investments. The student should expect to receive recognition for completing a demanding and tailored degree program with preferential assignments and consideration for accelerated promotion. The gaining agency will receive an employee who has undergone extensive education and training as an intelligence officer and should expect an officer who is far more prepared than his or her peers. Due to the significant investment by the government, an additional service obligation will likely be necessary, with the current obligation being two years of service to the agency for every year of sponsored training. The Intelligence Academy graduate will also be entitled to wear a lapel pin or badge identification device signifying graduation from the Academy. These will also be a visual representation of the professional identity that graduates will share, as well as identifying graduates from non-graduates.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To fully realize the potential that a National Intelligence Academy offers to the IC, it may maximize its effectiveness by making allowances for:

1. A common core curriculum of intelligence instruction: This aspect is fundamental to developing a shared basis of knowledge from which specialization can occur. In addition, students will benefit from instruction in an inherently joint environment where the

instructors and student body come from several different intelligence agencies.

2. An immersion experience that is designed to bond students and enhance instruction. This has proven successful in the past for quickly bonding diverse students.

3. The opportunity for language testing via the DLAB or a similar assessment as well as instruction at the appropriate level of each student's proficiency. Foreign language development is invaluable to the IC, not only for practical application but for the enhanced understanding of foreign cultures that results from this education. Foreign language proficiency is also often rewarded within the IC in the form of a monthly stipend and expanded assignment opportunities. As a result, it can serve as an additional incentive to participate in the education and training approaches described in this article.

4. Tangible incentives: Incentives should include tangible components such as distinctive lapel pins or badge attachments, a monetary stipend, and equitable opportunities for promotion and incentives of increased sense of professional identity and the synergy that results from collaboration will quickly manifest themselves.

5. A strong foundation in the principles of ethics and honor: This instruction will emphasize that both are indispensable to the IC and form the building blocks of professional identity. The students should sign and live by an honor code that is common to the U.S. Army and states that they will not "lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do." Another tenet that should be just as ingrained as honor is collaboration, a primary purpose of the National Intelligence Academy. Students should also sign a pledge and receive daily indoctrination on the meaning and techniques of collaboration to include the concepts of information sharing, how to navigate bureaucracy, and the meaning of the guidance provided by the DNI regarding "need to know vs. responsibility to provide." This instruction should also include detailed classes on proper security classification to ensure ease of collaboration and use of the various online collaboration tools that have so far failed to achieve independently their intended purpose of bridging the gap between intelligence agencies.

6. A modified program of physical training and familiarization with military tactics and weapons: Although these skills should not necessarily be a "testable" aspect of the instruction, they are a proven tool for building cohesion. They also are skills which often are valuable at some point in the course of a career in intelligence and useful for professional training and personal growth. This instruction should not be seen as a discriminator against students of differing abilities, however, and should be implemented in full compliance with equal opportunity regulations.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

Because of the necessity for a significant amount of federal funding, planning, and upfront costs associated with the establishment of a National Intelligence Academy, this author has made several recommendations. Most importantly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence should commission an interagency staff study to determine necessary first steps, assess the level of support across the civilian intelligence agencies, and begin to establish political support. After these initial actions, when federal funding is secured, site selection and competitions for the design of the Academy can begin. With these steps, the nation's first National Intelligence Academy may soon be postured to increase collaboration across the entire IC.

NOTES

[1] *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, 2011, www.merriam-webster.com (accessed September 16, 2013).
[2] DDNI/A Collaboration Consulting Team, 2009, Washington, DC.
[3] 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, Washington, DC.
[4] USGAO, *High Risk Series: An Update*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009.
[5] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *DNI Awards Policy*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007.
[6] Stephen R. DiRienzo and Rebecca L. Frerichs, "Establishing a Framework for Intelligence Education and Training," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 2011: 71.
[7] MG Flynn served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan and wrote an article that was critical of the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence efforts in the country. His article was published by the Center for a New American Society and is available at http://www.cnas.org/node/3924. He was later promoted to Lieutenant General and appointed Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
[8] DiRienzo and Frerichs: 71.
[9] Ibid., 72.
[10] Central Intelligence Agency, *Strategic Investment Plan*, Langley, VA, 2001.

[11] DiRienzo and Frerichs: 72.
[12] Chris Meyers Asch, *United States Public Service Academy: A Proposal for America's First National Civilian University*, Washington, DC: U.S. Public Service Academy, 2006.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Elan Martin, "The United States Public Service Academy: A Benefit-Cost Analysis," 2007, 19-25.
[15] Claudia Cristescu, Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Designing an Intelligence Studies Curriculum for the Romanian Civilian Universities, 2011, 3.
[16] T.J. Waters, *Class 11: My Story Inside the CIA's Post 9/11 Spy Class*. New York: Penguin Group, 2007, 24-54.
[17] Charles W.L. Hill and Gareth R. Jones, *Strategic Management: An Integrated Approach.* 9th ed., Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2009, 394.
[18] Virginia L. Egli, MAJ, The Impact of Organizational Culture on Information Sharing, Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 2011, 38.
[19] Ibid.
[20] USMA Academic Affairs, *Educating Future Army Officers for a Changing World*, 2007, 4.
[21] Elan Martin, "The United States Public Service Academy: A Benefit-Cost Analysis," 2007, 20.
[22] USMA Board of Visitors, Board of Visitors Organizational Meeting Minutes, United States Military Academy, West Point, 2011.
[23] Tench Francis School of Business, Comparative Analysis of ROTC, OCS, and Service Academies as Commissioning Sources, Advanced Management Report, 2004, 7.

Matthew K. Wilder is a career intelligence officer with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. A former Army officer with two combat tours in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Mr. Wilder is also an Honor Graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC). He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science (cum laude), a Master of Military Art and Science degree, and a graduate certificate in Overseas Contingency Planning. In addition, he is a designated Army Strategist and Intelligence Community Officer, and was named the Grierson Distinguished Master Strategist for his 2012 USACGSC class. He welcomes comments at matthew.k.wilder@nga.mil.

Professionalizing Intelligence Studies:
Begin with the Educators

by CDR (USCG) Toni N. Gay

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article explores how civilian institutions of higher learning are contributing to the need for better intelligence analysis noted after numerous U.S. intelligence failures in the first decade of the 21st century. It specifically addresses how, as colleges and universities have begun offering courses in intelligence studies and intelligence analysis, professional development challenges for both the students and faculty exist. The author focuses on civilian institutions with intelligence studies programs designed for graduating entry-level U.S. Intelligence Community analysts. A further focus is on the need for a professional development program for faculty in higher education teaching intelligence analysis to those aspiring graduates. A literature review was conducted. It also included interviews with faculty working in the field and some anecdotal information. In conclusion, it recommends critical thinking development as one area that can be undertaken to professionalize intelligence studies faculty and subsequently the discipline of intelligence studies in higher education.

After the warning and policy failures of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, and the debacle of the failed National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, many in the media, the U.S. government, and the public called for intelligence reform. Better analysis and how better to develop present and future intelligence analysts were at the center of that reform (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004).

Since that time an increasing number of higher education institutions have begun offering degrees in intelligence studies, or related coursework. The number of non-government courses in intelligence has "grown to over 840, with more than 100 civilian institutions providing some form of intelligence education" (Campbell, 2011). Although many in higher education are now recognizing the study of intelligence as an academic discipline, many discussions continue about how to best professionalize it. [Editor's Note: Campbell was in part citing my own extensive research on this subject. See doctoral dissertation for George Washington University titled *National Security Intelligence Professional Education: A Map of U.S. Civilian University Programs and Competencies*, August 2009, which lists the 100 schools and 840 courses that Campbell cited. He also produced a shorter version of his *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* article that appeared in *American Intelligence Journal*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2010, titled "A Snapshot of the U.S. Market for Intelligence Education."]

> ***...Sherman Kent, who is considered the father of intelligence analysis by most veterans within the U.S. Intelligence Community, taught at Yale and encouraged academic collaboration.***

Higher education collaboration with the Intelligence Community is not a new endeavor. Monaghan (2009) notes the study of this burgeoning academic field is not new. He offers that Sherman Kent, who is considered the father of intelligence analysis by most veterans within the U.S. Intelligence Community, taught at Yale and encouraged academic collaboration.

However, for those schools offering intelligence studies curricula, developmental challenges still exist, such as: where to place programs in different departments or colleges; the "right" curricula to offer; what analysis techniques to offer—if any—and the best academic and other background for faculty teaching it. Specifically, in considering how to design curricula to meet those needs for new intelligence analysts, questions come to mind about the appropriate background, education, and skill set of faculty; how and when they are deemed professional educators; and how best to professionalize them.

What makes a good intelligence studies faculty member? Is it enough to have a 30-year career with the CIA, or to have taught at the Sherman Kent School? Is that background well- suited to the present realities of intelligence analysis, which is increasingly technology-driven, collaborative, and team-based?

Although many of those questions remain subjects for ongoing work, the author believes critical thinking development is one area intelligence studies educators can emphasize to assist in their overall professional development, and it will subsequently help professionalize the discipline of intelligence studies in higher education.

LITERATURE REVIEW

"Of the top 10 universities awarding PhDs in International Relations from 2001 to 2006, none awarded a doctorate for work on intelligence" (Sims, 2009, p. 151). Some of this could be due to the secretive nature of the materials; possibly few in higher education understand enough of the intelligence system or cycle to apply any true intellectual thought to the matter.

The unclassified Director of Central Intelligence Community Directive ICD 610, signed by then-Director of National Intelligence J.M. McConnell, outlines a core of competencies for the Analysis and Production segments of the intelligence cycle. Critical thinking is a primary competency throughout and components of the Directive indicate a role for collaboration with higher education (Intelligence Community Directive Number 610, 2008).

There is a growing body of literature in the scholarly world about intelligence studies to improve intelligence analysis. Bruce (2008) notes the U.S. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report recommended that analytical improvements are needed in six areas, most notably from this study "long-term research and strategic thinking, and particularly . . . methodology."

The scholarly work about who is developing the educational leadership is less robust. However, the scholars are out there. Patrick Walsh, a senior lecturer of criminal intelligence at the Australian Graduate School of Policing, Charles Sturt University, Australia, writes: "There are many attributes of professionalism that we could discuss here, but there are five major ones, which define the current challenges and barriers to greater professionalism within national security. . ." The first two he notes are education and continuing professional development (Walsh, 2011).

Stephen Marrin, then-Assistant Professor in the Intelligence Studies Department at Mercyhurst College (now University), in Erie, PA, writes about an emerging relationship between intelligence and academia ". . . as a provider of graduates possessing a practitioner's skill set . . . as well as an educational base emphasizing procedural expertise" (Marrin, 2008).

Dr. Robert Clark, a former group chief at the Central Intelligence Agency, believes "two of the five core competencies – critical thinking and communications – are effectively dealt with in academia." He further states:

> In addition to the core competencies, ICD 610 defines . . . a unique set of technical expertise competencies . . . called subject matter expertise. . . The Intelligence Community cannot afford to provide this expertise; it depends on academia to provide graduates who are well grounded in these studies. For analysts, a background in one of these disciplines or in language and cultural studies (better still, in both) is critical.

The author will focus further discussion on institutions with degrees offering intelligence analysis courses with a core curricula designed to educate graduates as entry-level U.S. intelligence analysts.

DISCUSSION

With the need for better analysis and developing entry-level analysts receiving much of the attention, how to professionalize intelligence studies faculty becomes a key question.

The International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) is emerging as a body of experts seeking to professionalize the academic discipline of intelligence studies. IAFIE formed a subcommittee on certification to map out language for instructor qualifications (Smith, 2012). The IAFIE Board of Directors approved the Certification Program policy and procedures in 2013. Under the new program, institutions offering courses or programs in intelligence studies that apply for and receive IAFIE certification will be able to brand and market their offerings using the IAFIE logo. Administrative process development for the new program is currently underway (Collier, 2013).

Further, an IAFIE subcommittee on certification has mapped out language for instructor qualifications within an accreditation process. That subcommittee has mostly looked at degrees and years of experience as an intelligence practitioner as competencies for faculty; however, continuing education units have been discussed (Smith, IAFIE Certification Subcommittee – Contact Hours, 2012).

IAFIE was founded in 2004 by primarily academics who have an interest in intelligence as a forum for intelligence educators to exchange best practices, and ". . . is devoted to creating standards for the future of the Intelligence Community's personnel" (Mark M. Lowenthal, 2006).

Additionally, critical thinking is a learning outcome shared by many higher education institutions. They most likely

incorporate Bloom's Taxonomy into their curricula. "A common goal in the education field is to get students to think critically about what they're studying . . . many of which require a combination of cognitive approaches and skills . . . which we refer to as higher-order thinking skills" (Lancaster, 2012).

IAFIE member and DoD analytical trainer David Moore notes:

> . . . critical thinking offers a means by which at least appropriate questions may be raised. The combination of critical thinking skills and the disposition to think critically focuses and directs inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning to solve problems. This is an interrogative paradigm. Critical thinking involves questioning that forces broader consideration of issues and problems as well as the various means of resolving or answering them. Such questioning happens at both the individual and collective level. He further elaborates they include, "… individual reflection, Socratic dialogue, community debate [and] global discourse" (Moore, 2009).

Rebecca Frerichs and Stephen DiRienzo believe that "intelligence education should accentuate critical and creative reasoning and thinking and the application of theoretical constructs into current events" (DiRienzo, 2011).

James Stigler, co-author of the book *The Teaching Gap: Best Ideas from the World's Teachers for Improving Education in the Classroom*, shares his thoughts about professional development being "haphazard." Stigler advocates for faculty professional development that should be ongoing and "curricula based . . . so that it helps faculty help their students master the curriculum at a higher level" (criticalthinking.org).

Paul and Elder offer a model for colleges and universities whereby they could foster critical thinking, laying out the key components of such a program for faculty development over several years. The plan includes "Socratic Questioning Through Critical Thinking"; "How to Detect Bias"; "How to Write Substantively"; [how to teach] "Students to Assess Their Own Reasoning"; all of which are learning skills needed by intelligence studies analysis students and those educating them (Richard Paul, 2013).

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STUDY

It is possible IAFIE could develop its own taxonomy for intelligence studies such as that stated by Bloom in 1971. "Ideally each major field should have its own taxonomy in its own language – more detailed, closer to the special language and thinking of its experts, reflecting its own appropriate sub-divisions and levels of education, with possible new categories, combinations of categories and omitting categories as appropriate" (Anderson, 2000). IAFIE could possibly be a certification body for critical thinking development by intelligence educators. [Editor's Note: For an update on IAFIE's efforts along these lines, see separate article by Jonathan Smith in this volume.]

Possibly, Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAEs) could serve as test beds for intelligence studies faculties' critical thinking and professional development. IC CAEs were established in 2004 at civilian colleges as a pipeline to increase cultural, critical language, and analytical skills available to the U.S. Intelligence Community (Willing, 2006). The IC CAEs are currently housed under DIA's Academy for Defense Intelligence, serving as executive agent for ODNI. Perhaps the NIU, also under DIA currently but operating under considerable ODNI supervision and funding, could be the guiding agent for that developmental effort in the future.

In conclusion, much additional research and effort are needed to establish a concerted and comprehensive focus on the appropriate development for the educators who are building the up and coming cadre of new, entry-level U.S. intelligence analysts. Critical thinking development is one area that the educator can currently undertake to professionalize intelligence studies faculty and subsequently the discipline of intelligence studies in higher education. The U.S. Intelligence Community analysts, the consumers of the analysis whom they serve, and the American people deserve no less.

NOTES

(2004). *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

(2008). *Intelligence Community Directive Number 610*. Washington, DC.

Bruce, J., and George, R.Z. (Eds.). (2008). *Analyzing intelligence: Origins, obstacles and innovations.* Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Campbell, S.H. (2011). A survey of the U.S. market for intelligence education. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 309.

Clark, D.R. (n.d.). Dividing up intelligence education. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 1, 3.

criticalthinking.org. (n.d.). Retrieved from Critical Thinking: http://www.criticalthinking.org.

Collier, M.W. (2013). IAFIE Certification Program Coming Soon! *IAFIE Newsletter*, 3.

Collier, M., Chance, R., Lightfoot, J., Lockwood, J., Moore, G., Oleson, P., et al. (2011). Report of the IAFIE sub-committee on intelligence standards (pp. 8-12). Washington, DC.

DiRienzo, R.L. (2011). Establishing a framework for intelligence education and training. *Joint Force Quarterl*,62.

(2008). *Intelligence Community Directive Number 610.* Washington, DC.

(2004). *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

L.W. Anderson, D.K. (2000). A taxonomy for learning, teaching and assessing: a revision of Bloom's Taxonomy of educational objectives. Allyn and Bacon. Lancaster, J. (2012, October 3). *Cengage Learning eNewsletter*. Retrieved from http://learn.cengage.com/content/enewsletter6-framework.

Lowenthal, M.M. (2006). Intelligence as a profession: IAFIE sets its sights. *American Intelligence Journal*, 41.

Marrin, S. (2008). Training and educating U.S. intelligence analysts. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 135-136.

Monaghan, P. (2009, March 20). *The Chronicle of Higher Education.* Retrieved from http://chronicle.com/article/Intelligence-Studies/33353.

Moore, D.T. (2009). *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis.* Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College.

Paul, R. (2013, January 12). Retrieved January 2013, 12, from Critical Thinking, http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/study-of-38-public-universities-and-28-private-universities-to-determine-faculty-emphasis-on-critical-thinking-in-instruction/598.

Sims, J. (2009). *Intelligence Theory Key Questions and Debates.* (S.M. Peter Gill, ed.) London and New York.

Smith, J. (2012, October 14). IAFIE Certification Subcommittee - Contact Hours.

Walsh, P.F. (2011). *Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Willing, R. (2006, November 27). *usatoday.com.* Retrieved January 15, 2013, from usatoday.com: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2006-11-27-intel-college.

Commander Toni N. Gay has served in Coast Guard Intelligence for over 13 years in a variety of operational, staff, and education/training assignments. She reported to LANT-25 in July 2013 from her previous position as Director of the Intelligence Development Program at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), where she taught undergraduate courses in intelligence, analysis, national security policy, and terrorism. While at USCGA she also provided intelligence training for cadets and Leadership Development Center students in officer accession and professional development classes. Earlier, CDR Gay was the Fifth District Commander's Intelligence Officer, providing support to operations throughout an area of responsibility encompassing most of the coastal mid-Atlantic region and the District of Columbia. She also served concurrently as the District Civil Rights Officer. Prior to her District Five tour she was an Atlantic Area Intelligence Maritime Threat Analyst, networking with national-level intelligence agencies and combatant commands to conduct operational-level maritime threat analysis. Previously she was Chief of the Maritime Security Analysis Branch, Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, where she produced and managed all-source drug and migrant smuggling intelligence analysis and interagency assessments for senior Coast Guard decision-makers and interagency partners. Before entering USCG Intelligence, she served at Activities Baltimore as a Response Team Leader, a Small Passenger Vessel Inspector—managing within her fleet and overseeing upgrades/repairs to numerous historic wooden vessels, and a Marine Casualty & Personnel Investigator, Command Intelligence Officer, and Public Affairs Officer. From 1995 to 1997, CDR Gay was Administrative Officer and Congressional Staff Writer at the Coast Guard Personnel Command. She is a 1994 graduate of Officer Candidate School in Yorktown, VA. Prior to receiving her commission she served as an enlisted member in District Seven, and earlier in DoD public affairs assignments, where she conducted extensive media and public outreach, writing for and editing photojournalism materials for military and external publications. CDR Gay is an alumna of the Postgraduate Intelligence Program at the Joint Military Intelligence College and graduated with a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree in 2004. She was recently accepted into the PhD program in Higher Education Policy and Leadership, School of Education, College of William and Mary, in Williamsburg, VA. She will begin her studies there in 2014, and plans to continue her academic research in the area of Intelligence and Security Studies. CDR Gay is a member of, and frequent presenter/panelist for, both NMIA and IAFIE. In her free time she makes surf trips to Hawaii, California, and Central America, and enjoys boating and kayaking on the Chesapeake Bay. She also actively supports numerous patriotic, military, and educational activities as a member of the Comte de Grasse Chapter (Yorktown), Daughters of the American Revolution.

[Editor's Note: I permitted CDR Gay a longer bio sketch than most *AIJ* authors for four reasons: (1) her article is not overly long; (2) she's a loyal repeat author and avid supporter of NMIA and IAFIE; (3) she's retiring and merits special treatment after a long, distinguished career upholding the traditions of "Semper Paratus"; and (4) she was one of my first students after arriving at then-JMIC (now NIU) in 2004. She was the brightest student by far in the elective I taught on Latin America. In other words, I suppose I'm not the perfectly unbiased, impartial editor I should be!]

Defining the Discipline of Intelligence Studies

by Dr. (LTC, USA) Tobias O. Vogt

This article seeks to define intelligence studies as a discipline within higher education. It examines accepted definitions of disciplines and analyzes whether or not intelligence studies merits distinction as a separate field. The article discusses two similar fields – war studies and liberal studies – to demonstrate existing multidisciplinary approaches to research and the dissemination of complex branches of knowledge, and concludes with a recommended definition for intelligence studies. The article is intended to encourage discussion as institutions such as the National Intelligence University look to establish stand-alone doctoral programs in the field of intelligence studies.

Since the end of the Second World War, the study of intelligence has evolved beyond the traditional examination of related topics as a sub-set of larger fields such as history or political science to the awarding of degrees in intelligence.[1] From the standpoint of a federal institution, Congress initially approved a graduate degree in intelligence at the Defense Intelligence College in 1980, and later, an undergraduate degree in 1997.[2] Civilian institutions such as Mercyhurst University, the Institute of World Politics, and Johns Hopkins University have also added undergraduate and graduate programs in intelligence in recent years, while other universities such as Georgetown, George Washington, Penn State, and Michigan State have intelligence concentrations as part of broader graduate degree programs.[3] Nevertheless, despite multiple offerings of intelligence degrees at various universities, there is not a common definition for an academic or professional discipline related specifically to intelligence. For example, Mercyhurst University offers that its Bachelor of Arts in Intelligence Studies:

> …is a unique multidisciplinary degree, which has as its goal a graduate qualified as an entry-level analyst for government and the private sector. An academically challenging discipline, it combines a liberal arts core with a foreign language or computer science requirement, national and international studies, internships, and ten intelligence-related courses to provide its graduates with an advanced level of analytical skills.[4]

Similarly, the Institute of World Politics states that its Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence Studies:

> …is designed for students who seek careers in the intelligence field, as well as professionals whose agencies or clientele are charged with the acquisition and interpretation of intelligence. It features courses in fundamental intelligence disciplines, such as analysis and epistemology, intelligence collection, and deception. The program equips the student with all of the requisite tools and knowledge, required and anticipated, that are necessary for professional success in the field.[5]

Meanwhile, the National Intelligence University defines strategic intelligence this way:

> The profession of intelligence requires mastery of much more than individual skill, but an understanding of the intricate relationship between the entire intelligence community, its specific agencies and the policy and leadership community that it serves. Educated intelligence professionals are expected to understand the interaction between national intelligence, allied intelligence services, and domestic national security communities. Strategic intelligence requires an expansive vision of an integrated world, not a narrow one. The Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence educates students on the components and sum of the parts that comprise the intelligence community, the environment it functions in, and the nature of the threat facing the United States.[6]

All of the above-mentioned programs include a core with specialized electives, but none argues for intelligence studies as a separate academic discipline or attempts to define what constitutes intelligence studies.[7] Because there is a long tradition of training in intelligence there will be many opinions on how to properly indoctrinate – train and educate – future generations.[8] In this regard, this article serves merely as a catalyst for discussion, not a roadmap for implementation, as it seeks to define intelligence studies as a discipline, and evaluates whether or not intelligence studies merits distinction as a separate field within higher education.

ABOUT DISCIPLINES

In the most basic sense, an academic discipline is defined by *Oxford Dictionaries* as "a branch of knowledge, typically one studied in higher education."[9] Historically, academic disciplines were limited to arts, law, medicine, and theology, but the scientific revolution of the 19th century introduced new disciplines such as the natural and social sciences, each with specific sub-fields – e.g., chemistry and physics in the natural sciences, and sociology and anthropology in the social sciences.[10] These early additions were joined by other fields as the 20th century progressed into the 21st. However, despite the addition of numerous disciplines over the past two centuries, there is still no consensus on what an area of study must include to qualify as an academic discipline. Furthermore, debates regarding new academic disciplines ask not only whether an area of study would qualify, but also whether the area is academic or professional in nature. Discussions as to what constitutes an academic versus professional discipline have been captured by scholars such as Franklin Henry. Dr. Henry offered that an academic discipline is "an organized body of knowledge collectively embraced in a formal course of learning; the acquisition of such knowledge is assumed to be an adequate and worthy objective as such, without any demonstration or requirement of practical application; the content is theoretical and scholarly as distinguished from technical and professional."[11] According to this definition, similar fields such as political science and public policy fall into different types of disciplines.

Nevertheless, not all higher education fields subscribe to a single discipline approach to teaching and research. The liberal studies and war studies fields for instance, permit students to draw from numerous disciplines to support their specific interests. While distinctly different from one another in substance, the liberal and war studies fields share a similar approach that relies on the synthesis of numerous disciplines in the examination of topics specific to the study of the liberal arts or war. These fields strive to demonstrate the "interconnectedness of all disciplines" that was absent during the emergence of rigid academic disciplines in the 19th and 20th centuries.[12] For example, the Georgetown University liberal studies program lists 14 fields that comprise the University's multidisciplinary approach which seeks "to shift students' attention away from specialized fields of endeavor toward broader, more comprehensive areas of human intellectual interest."[13] Similarly, war studies programs such as the one at King's College, London, state that "the study of war from any single standpoint produces a narrow perspective which cannot accommodate its complexities." Thus, programs in this field at King's draw "on a variety of disciplines" in order to research "war in its many forms."[14] The approach to intelligence studies at existing universities has similarly followed these multidisciplinary models.

EVALUATING INTELLIGENCE STUDIES AS A DISCIPLINE

Determining whether or not "intelligence studies" represents an academic, professional, or multidiscipline approach is not the crux of this article. Instead, the question that this article attempts to answer is, "Does intelligence studies warrant inclusion as a discipline within higher education?" This question implies that a terminal degree—doctor of philosophy or similar professional doctorate—would merit being awarded in the specific area of intelligence studies. This section evaluates whether or not intelligence studies qualifies as a discipline by assessing criteria presented in the working paper, "What are Academic Disciplines?" In this work Armin Krishnan argues that, while there is not a universally accepted definition of what constitutes a discipline, there are six characteristics shared by most, but not all, of the existing fields:

> (1) a particular object of research (e.g., law, society, politics), though the object of research may be shared with another discipline
> (2) a body of accumulated specialist knowledge referring to their object of research, which is specific to them and not generally shared with another discipline
> (3) theories and concepts that can organize the accumulated specialist knowledge effectively
> (4) specific terminologies or a specific technical language adjusted to their research object
> (5) developed specific research methods according to their specific research requirements
> (6) some institutional manifestation in the form of subjects taught at universities or colleges, respective academic departments, and professional associations connected to it[15]

The first criterion requires a discipline to have "a particular object of research." In the case of intelligence studies, "intelligence" is the object of research. This may include the term "information," but in the public and private sectors, information and intelligence are often used interchangeably. Second, is there "a body of accumulated specialist knowledge referring to their object of research, which is specific to them"? The simple answer is "yes." Modern intelligence writings in support of a separate discipline can be traced back to Sherman Kent's 1949 book, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy.*[16] In this work, Dr. Kent broke from the traditional intelligence themes of espionage and covert action by focusing instead on the theoretical and professional foundations of strategic intelligence and analysis.[17] Since that time the field has added numerous other works. While much of this body of knowledge resides in classified libraries, there are

contemporary unclassified works such as Mark Lowenthal's *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, and Loch Johnson and James Wirtz's *Strategic Intelligence: Windows Into a Secret* World – both of which are widely used in existing academic programs.[18] Other works have dealt with a broad range of topics that include, for example, the relationship between the Intelligence Community and Congress, and in the past decade, Intelligence Community reform following the September 11, 2001, attacks.[19]

Third, a discipline requires "theories and concepts that can organize the accumulated specialist knowledge effectively." In this area the study of intelligence is not restricted to a single field. While experts continue to debate limited theories specific to intelligence, researchers have traditionally relied on multiple disciplines—the humanities, sciences, and professions.[20] In the past, scholars have drawn on the areas of history, economics, policy, international relations, and political science, while others have preferred to study the mathematical, engineering, and scientific—physics, chemistry, biology, etc.—aspects of technical topics related to intelligence.[21] Fourth, does the research object have "specific terminologies or a specific technical language"? Few would argue that intelligence does not have a specific language. There might be arguments over exact definitions, but there are numerous terms and concepts specific to intelligence. For example, authors such as Jan Goldman have attempted to consolidate this terminology in *Words of Intelligence*, accounting for over 1,400 expressions related to intelligence by the release of the second edition in 2011.[22]

***There are also numerous professional associations such as the National Military Intelligence Association and the International Association for Intelligence Education, in addition to related professional and academic journals such as the* American Intelligence Journal *and the* International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence.**

The fifth criterion deals with "specific research methods." In this area there are numerous methods specific to intelligence. Some of the better known works focus on the broader intelligence enterprise and process, while others address critical thinking and analysis.[23] The sixth and final criterion is for "institutional presence in the form of taught subjects, academic departments, and professional organizations." In the case of intelligence, each of these areas is represented. The article began with a short survey of several university programs related to intelligence at the National Intelligence University, Mercyhurst University, Johns Hopkins University, the Institute of World Politics, George Washington University, Penn State University, and Michigan State University. Each of these institutions has programs and supporting organizational infrastructure that date back as far as 1962.[24] There are also numerous professional associations such as the National Military Intelligence Association and the International Association for Intelligence Education, in addition to related professional and academic journals such as the *American Intelligence Journal* and the *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*.[25]

INTELLIGENCE STUDIES DEFINED

This article established that various aspects of intelligence studies are currently taught and degrees are awarded by universities in the United States. Research on how a discipline is defined identified there is no standard acceptance of what does and does not constitute a discipline. Similarly, differences of academic and professional disciplines, and single versus multidisciplinary fields, add to the debate related to what constitutes a discipline within higher education. Despite the absence of agreement, evaluation of six characteristics generally shared by existing fields identifies that the study of intelligence qualifies under these criteria as an individual discipline from both an academic and professional standpoint.

Thus, the discipline of intelligence studies is defined as a multidisciplinary field that explores all aspects of public and private sector information and intelligence. Principal areas of theoretical and empirical study include, but are not limited to, policy, collection, analysis, operations, counterintelligence, competitive intelligence, and science and technology. Relevant disciplines comprising the intelligence studies field come from the professions, humanities, and sciences—applied, formal, natural, and social. It is this broad linkage to multiple disciplines that allows intelligence studies to serve as both a professional and academic discipline.[26]

NOTES

[1] For more on contemporary intelligence education see, Spracher, William C., "National Security Intelligence Professional Education: A Map of U.S. Civilian University Programs and Competencies," dissertation, The George Washington University, August 31, 2009; and Campbell, Stephen H., "A Survey of the U.S. Market for Intelligence Education," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 24: 307-337, 2011.

[2] The Defense Intelligence College was renamed the Joint Military Intelligence College in 1993, the National Defense Intelligence College in 2006, and finally the National Intelligence University in 2011. In academic year 2011-12 the National Intelligence University added a Master of Science and Technology Intelligence degree. National Intelligence University, "Outreach Brief," School

of Science and Technology Intelligence. [Editor's Note: Even before it was the DIC, the institution was called the Defense Intelligence School from its founding in 1962 until 1980. It has evolved through five different names, gradually becoming more civilianized and more joint/combined/interagency with each iteration.]

[3] Mercyhurst University, "About Us," Department of Intelligence Studies, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://intel.mercyhurst.edu/about-us/; Johns Hopkins University, "M.S. Intelligence Analysis," School of Education, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://psl.jhu.edu/programs/msintelligenceanalysis/; Institute of World Politics, "Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence Studies," Programs, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://www.iwp.edu/programs/degreeID.12/degree_detail.asp; Georgetown University, "Concentrations – Center for Security Studies," School of Foreign Service, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://css.georgetown.edu/ssp/academics/concentrations/; George Washington University, "Intelligence – M.A. Security Policy Studies," Elliott School of International Affairs, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://elliott.gwu.edu/academics/grad/sps/intelligence.cfm; Penn State University, "Homeland Security," Degrees and Certificates, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://www.worldcampus.psu.edu/degrees-and-certificates/homeland-security/overview; Michigan State University, "Law Enforcement Intelligence and Analysis Program," School of Criminal Justice, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://criminaljustice.msu.edu/academic/LEprogram.php.

[4] Mercyhurst University also offers a graduate degree in intelligence that, again, includes core and elective offerings "designed to provide a theoretical and practical framework for the study of intelligence and its application in a wide variety of contexts." Mercyhurst University, "B.A. in Intelligence Studies," Department of Intelligence Studies, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://intel.mercyhurst.edu/programs/master-of-science-in-applied-intelligence/undergraduate-studies/, and "Master of Science in Applied Intelligence," Department of Intelligence Studies, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://intel.mercyhurst.edu/programs/undergraduate-studies/master-of-science-in-applied-intelligence/.

[5] Institute of World Politics, "Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence Studies," Programs, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://www.iwp.edu/programs/degreeID.12/degree_detail.asp.

[6] National Intelligence University, "University Catalog 2011-2012," p. 29.

[7] The International Association for Intelligence Education has announced "standards" for intelligence education that are focused on undergraduate and graduate outcomes, but these guidelines are not part of individual institution or regional accreditation requirements. International Association for Intelligence Education, "Intelligence Education Standards," accessed September 6, 2012, from http://www.iafie.org/?page=IntelEd.

[8] For example, see Peter Dorondo's 1960 article on how intelligence should be taught in college courses and Michael Goodman's 2006 article on how intelligence is being taught in the United Kingdom. Dorondo, Peter J., "For College Courses in Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence* 4:3, Summer 1960; Goodman, Michael S., *"Studying and Teaching About Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdom," Studies in Intelligence* 50:2, 2006.

[9] For an in-depth discussion on the definition of an academic discipline see Armin Krishnan, "What are Academic Disciplines? Some observations on the Disciplinary vs. Interdisciplinary debate," January 2009.

[10] Krishnan, Armin, "What are Academic Disciplines? Some observations on the Disciplinary vs. Interdisciplinary debate," ESRC National Centre for Research Methods, NCRM Working Paper Series, January 2009, pp. 31-33.

[11] Henry, Franklin M., "The Academic Discipline of Physical Education," *Quest*, 29, 1978, p. 13.

[12] Georgetown University, "Master of Arts in Liberal Studies," Department of Liberal Studies, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://scs.georgetown.edu/departments/9/master-of-arts-in-liberal-studies/department-details.cfm.

[13] Georgetown University, "Master of Arts in Liberal Studies," Department of Liberal Studies, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://scs.georgetown.edu/departments/9/master-of-arts-in-liberal-studies/department-details.cfm.

[14] King's College, London, "War Studies," Department of War Studies, accessed September 6, 2012, from http://www.kcl.ac.uk/prospectus/graduate/war-studies.

[15] Krishnan, Armin, "What are Academic Disciplines? Some observations on the Disciplinary vs. Interdisciplinary debate," ESRC National Centre for Research Methods, NCRM Working Paper Series, January 2009, p. 9.

[16] Kent, Sherman, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Princeton University Press, 1949 and 1966.

[17] Davis, Jack, "Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis," Central Intelligence Agency, Kent Center Occasional Papers 1:5, November 2002, accessed September 6, 2012, from https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol1no5.htm.

[18] Lowenthal, Mark M., *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, CQ Press, 4th edition, 2009; Johnson, Loch K., and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Strategic Intelligence: Windows Into a Secret World (An Anthology)*, Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004.

[19] For a larger example of intelligence literature see the Central Intelligence Agency's "Intelligence Literature: Suggested Reading List," at https://www.cia.gov/library/intelligence-literature/index.html#general. Snider, Britt L., *The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008; Smist, Frank J., Jr., *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994*, University of Tennessee Press, 2nd edition, 1994; Posner, Richard A., *Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005.

[20] Kahn, David, "An Historical Theory of Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 16, Autumn 2001, pp. 79-92; Treverton, Gregory F., Seth G. Jones, Steven Boraz, and Phillip Lipscy, "Toward a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report (CF219)," RAND National Security Research Division, 2006.

[21] For example, see Mark Phythian, "Intelligence theory and theories of international relations: Shared world or separate worlds?" in Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian, and Peter Gill, eds., *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates*, Routledge, 2008.

[22] Goldman, Jan, *Words of Intelligence: A Dictionary*, Scarecrow Press, 2005, and *Words of Intelligence: An Intelligence Professional's Lexicon for Domestic and Foreign Threats*, Scarecrow Press, 2011, p. ix.

[23] Waltz, Edward, *Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise*, Artech House, 2003; Bodnar, John W., *Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligence Process*, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2003; Moore,

David T., *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis*, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2006; Clark, Robert M., *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach*, CQ Press, 3rd edition, 2010.

[24] National Intelligence University, "Outreach Brief," School of Science and Technology Intelligence.

[25] Additionally, associations such as the Office of Strategic Services Society (OSS Society) may focus on a particular intelligence organization while broader academic discipline forums such as the International Studies Association (ISA) may have sections dedicated to intelligence. For a list of intelligence associations and journals see the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE), "Resources," available from http://www.iafie.org/. [Editor's Note: ISA has a large and busy Intelligence Studies Section. Another fast-growing and active organization that focuses heavily on intelligence because many of its members have served in the Defense Attaché System is the Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA).]

[26] Publication review case number for this article is 13-032.

LTC Tobias O. Vogt is an active duty U.S. Army officer and faculty member in the National Intelligence University's Anthony G. Oettinger School of Science and Technology Intelligence. He has served in Cavalry, Infantry, Special Forces, and nuclear/counterproliferation assignments. He is a veteran of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM, with overseas service in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Toby earned his PhD in War Studies from King's College, London. He is also a graduate of the Master of Policy Management program at Georgetown University. He holds an MA in Diplomacy and Military Studies and a BA in International Studies from Hawaii Pacific University. His latest book is Combating the Bureaucracy: U.S. Nuclear Defense Policy Development and Implementation Following the Cold War.

Education Makes Us What We Are

by Dr. David M. Keithly

Speed, secrecy, efficiency, vigorous enforcement, discretionary authority in individual hands, national unity, long-range calculation—these are the special urgencies of the conduct of foreign affairs and national defense. They are also precisely what are least compatible with the spirit of the U.S. democratic constitutional system. Constitutionalism implies, above all, limits and restraints, while the imperatives of diplomacy and defense thrust toward unlimited and unrestrained action.

The necessity for full-bodied power, especially with regard to diplomacy and defense, was persuasively stated in the *Federalist*:

> It is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.[1]

However, Publius' warning against "constitutional shackles" seems almost to point to an unrestrained power in the government. The constitutionally granted power necessary to cope with all "national exigencies" is inevitably also power sufficient to destroy the liberties the Constitution was established to preserve. On the other hand, fidelity to the restrictive side of the Constitution can enfeeble government. The problem is to find the mean, a prudent path of sound judgment without falling over into either extreme. Prudence ultimately derives from civic values.

INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

Ignorance is the most formidable roadblock in the path of far-visioned foreign policies. Now more than ever, Americans must learn to put themselves in the shoes of other people and view their problems through their lenses. Americans must cultivate understanding and tolerance. They must sublimate suspicion and ill will, and they must meet other people at least halfway.

The study of intelligence involves overlapping disciplines that are taught widely in our educational system. These are seldom taught, however, from the point of view of a set of values held superior to others, but nonetheless susceptible to sound criticism.

The study of intelligence involves overlapping disciplines that are taught widely in our educational system. These are seldom taught, however, from the point of view of a set of values held superior to others, but nonetheless susceptible to sound criticism. Teaching values as normative poses no danger so long as texts and instructors' views are openly examined. The same can be said of other social sciences—political geography, economics, and anthropology. The classics, philosophy, religious studies, and literature abound with issues that encourage reflection on human values.

America faces tremendous challenges in education. Narrowness, intolerance, and demagoguery fatten on ignorance. If the people control foreign policy, as broadly they do, they must know something about the complicated mechanism they are controlling. Schools and colleges should therefore offer more and better work in foreign languages, history, foreign affairs, comparative government, international economics, and international organization. The press, the broadcast media, public forums, and other informational agencies should rise to their responsibilities to present sound and enlightening information about the outside world. Events in faraway places often hatch troubles that, one way or another, come to roost in the United States.

VALUES AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

The word "values" is widely used today, but with such divergent meanings that it is requisite at the outset to define it operationally. Let us use this definition:

> Values are standards in, of, and for action…patterns and standards of choice that guide persons towards satisfaction, fulfillment and meaning. They serve as foci for human aspirations and they orient, not determine, choices through which human beings are enabled to solve problems, to avoid impasses and possible situations, and to create an open future.[2]

Values are the beliefs people hold about the things they consider worthwhile—the things for which they are willing to work, to suffer, and even to die. Values define our choices, and our choices, in turn, reveal our values. With unclear or shifting values, societies and individuals lose their character, become confused about the future, and eventually disintegrate.[3] Devoid of them, technology can become morally blind, bureaucracy intellectually insipid.

The concern here is chiefly with civic values, those Aristotle referred to as the moral and intellectual virtues. These are crucial to free and democratic societies.[4] Democracy centers on the concept of "government by the people," of a society in which citizens control the political process. Democracy is grounded in the idea that the individual is a rational being with a free will, endowed with spirit and capable of more than a physical existence. In this view, the dignity and worth of individuals and their freedom to choose a form of government, worship, and a way of life for themselves and their children are universal values. They are values intrinsic to the humanity of all peoples including those subject to authoritarian and totalitarian rule. The degree to which a government ensures, enhances, and practices these values determines whether it is in fact democratic.

Implicit in this concept are individual responsibility and the need to assent to the values that preserve the individual's freedom. Indeed, the health of a democratic society depends on the extent to which the minds of its citizens are free and informed enough to guide governments and experts in the humane use of knowledge, resources, and power. Freedom is never free; it is paid for by responsible citizenship.

To remain free, individuals must recognize the attendant personal obligations, costs, and self-sacrifices. The values characterizing Western democracy have evolved since ancient times. These are rooted in the traditions of Greece and Rome, and shaped by the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. The Magna Carta, the French Declaration of Rights of Man, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of the United States represent landmarks in the evolution of civic values. This civic value system is "Western," not in any exclusive sense, but because it developed in a small group of Western nations which, despite many lapses, have exerted great efforts to preserve and practice it. Today, it represents a universal aspiration for all of mankind. In the words of Teilhard de Chardin:

> That which had long been known elsewhere only took on its definitive human value in becoming incorporated in the system of European ideas and activities, extended more recently to the New World…The proof of this lies in the fact that from one end of the earth to the other, all the peoples, to remain free or to become more so, are inexorably led to formulate the hopes and problems of the modern earth in the very same terms in which the West has formulated them.[5]

To study and propagate these values is not to nurture chauvinism, but rather to affirm their viability as guides to the fulfillment and satisfaction of all human societies. The authors of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights were educated in the classic works of Western culture. In the past, American education embraced this heritage and its principles of pluralistic democracy and transmitted its principles and underlying values to succeeding generations. The cataclysm of the Second World War, together with a consciousness of the implications of a technological age, sparked a wide desire to apply the basic human rights and values of the democratic tradition in the service of the international order. Thus, the Charter of the United Nations signed in 1945 opens with these words:

> We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow and suffering to mankind…and to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small…and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained…and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom…[6]

In 1948 the UN "Universal Declaration on Human Rights spoke of the "…recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." It proclaimed as universal the right "to life, liberty and security of person…to freedom of thought, conscience and religion…to take part in the governance of his country."[7] These words and concepts owe much to the Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. They show as well the extent of their universal appeal.

If we are to speak, then, of teaching and transmitting values, we must choose those that we are most likely to hold in common, the values which guarantee the continuance of respect for human dignity and freedom. These values leave room for considerable differences in social, cultural, and

spiritual values among, and within, Western nations. They still bind together as societies dedicated to a shared belief about what constitutes a good and agreeable social order.

Integrity and honesty...are basic to the governance of any civilized society.

Integrity and honesty, for example, are basic to the governance of any civilized society. The same is true for tolerance, objectivity, compassion, and respect for the rights of others. Included as well are civility, humility, sympathy, benevolence, open-mindedness, self-control, reasoned discourse, independent thought, the sense of individual responsibility, participation in the democratic process, and devotion to the common good. These values are essential to a society in which the rule of law assures the protection of the human rights to freedom of religious belief, of assembly, of inquiry, of expression. To the extent they are lived up to, such a society assures integrity, justice and equality of opportunity, civic liberties, accountability of those who govern, respect for all persons, their property and their values. Such a society guarantees the right to examine and criticize institutions from school to state, and to assess whether their proclaimed values are authentically applied to their practices. With the right to criticize comes the duty to do so responsibly, and on the basis of reason rather than emotion. The quality of a society is determined by the extent to which these values are authentically practiced.

EDUCATING FOR STATECRAFT

In the last decades, the tendency in the United States has been to question whether schools and universities should attempt to transmit the classic values of the Western world.[8] Some argue that attempts to inculcate values, no matter how positive they might be, risk the worst kind of indoctrination. Others fear that educators are not sufficiently sensitive to the range of values in the community or that efforts to teach values would invade personal privacy. Not only has the teaching of personal and social values been questioned, but in some cases this questioning extends to the civic values basic to democratic society. A kind of moral neutrality has become the posture of many educators, sometimes to protect themselves from administrative or community pressures.

The danger of value neutrality as an end in itself should be recognized. Educators should regard the transmission of civic values a serious responsibility at all educational levels. One should recall that all instruction, indeed all human learning, involves a conscious or unconscious communication of values. Curricular design, topic selection, the use of materials, and their emphases all involve value choices. Teaching from a value-neutral stance itself involves a value judgment. Educators are therefore implicitly immersed in communicating values; they must be conscious of their choices and be aware of their reasons for making them.

In a mature, educated person one would expect to find the capability to speak with authority but without authoritarianism, of morality without moralizing, of limits to legitimate dissent without repressing the exploration of new truths. Inculcation of values is insufficient to assure good citizenship. Education must also develop understanding that provides the basis for sound judgment and wise choices among conflicting values and pressures. A mature democratic society requires citizens with a clear comprehension of, and commitment to, the values they have chosen for themselves and their society.[9] With maturation in making value decisions comes a greater personal setting of goals, standards, objectives, and actions. These are the hallmarks of the discriminating intellect the intelligence community requires.[10]

Knowledge of the past is particularly pertinent to understanding and dealing with transnational problems and potentialities.

Admittedly, many influences shape this process of maturation, but the process of formal education entails at least six responsibilities.[11] The first is to provide a clear, authentic, and faithful exposition of the values of a good society, one that is free, democratic, and respectful of the dignity of each of its members. The second is to provide students, at the appropriate point in their educational development, with the bases of different value systems, allowing for critical commentary and promoting student capabilities to make judgments. The third is to provide instruction in a sufficiently wide range of disciplines so that the evaluation of one's own and other belief systems is informed and seriously pursued. The fourth is to encourage the student to evolve a personal framework of values for committed living, to carry that into coherent action, and to resolve conflicts in a rational manner. The fifth is to inculcate knowledge of the past, in terms relevant to the student's present and future. Knowledge of the past is particularly pertinent to understanding and dealing with transnational problems and potentialities. Finally, the sixth is for educators to reexamine the fundamental assumptions of their pedagogy. Pedagogy alone cannot guarantee a free, stable, and just international order. Its role is nonetheless an important one.

The complexity and gravity of the problems of the 21st century pose special challenges and add new dimensions to the teaching of values. An appreciation of the momentous events of recent history is, therefore, a contextual necessity for tomorrow's leaders. They need to understand fully why free nations found it necessary to engage in the Second World War and the Cold War. They must understand the need, uses, and limitations of technological knowledge and the challenges to traditional values technology can pose. How are they to use technology for humane purposes and not be overshadowed by it? They must understand that civic values have an international dimension, and must be shared across national boundaries.[12]

No nation-state is able by itself to accord the basic freedoms on which free societies depend. Nevertheless, what are the salient and fundamental implications of interdependence, and how are we to cope with them? How are we to resolve, if at all, the moral dilemma of the profound horrors of modern warfare with the obligation to maintain the heritage of freedom?

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

In a democracy, foreign affairs must be conducted within the context of the political process because, whatever else it is, democracy is the political system that rests emphatically upon widespread public opinion. Politics is the mode whereby that opinion influences policy. First of all, politics involves the determination of who is a majority on what. Only through politics can majorities broadly direct the course government takes. Foreign policy thus frequently and properly becomes a central election issue.

At least two other benefits accrue from conducting foreign affairs within the context of politics. It is only when complaint and criticism have had an opportunity to be uttered that an administration can assess the public mood, estimate what the country will put up with, and hence determine what is in the long run feasible for policy. Such gauging is not only a sufficient, but an indispensable, condition for the formulation of policy in a democratic republic. Additionally, only when issues have been aired in the forum of politics will public opinion rest, content that a policy has passed the test of democratic legitimacy. The people and the Congress will put up with much if they know that their consent was fairly secured.

There are, of course, offsetting disadvantages. The vulnerability of every political system lies in the peculiar incapacity of its ruling element. Democracy's problem lies always in the ignorance of the majority. That ignorance is greatest and certainly most dangerous in foreign affairs. Ignorant opinion, packaged, "sloganized," and impassioned by demagogues, is one of the hazards of foreign policy. The best way to promote democracy abroad is to practice it at home. Imperfect products are difficult to export, and every exhibition of intolerance, ignorance, and violence discredits the very democracy the United States is striving to uphold.

Democracy's problem lies always in the ignorance of the majority. That ignorance is greatest and certainly most dangerous in foreign affairs.

When the American colonies declared their independence in 1776, democracy was on trial. Despotism, absolutism, monarchism, and illiberalism were its sworn foes. However, the American people cherished a faith in freedom that was not to be denied, and they wrought the miracle known as America in the face of foreign opposition. Upon all leaders of the American democracy, therefore, rests a solemn obligation to inform themselves, so that they may shape American foreign policy along constructive and far-visioned lines.

NOTES

[1] Publius (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay), *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Mentor, 1961), Federalist 23, p. 153. *Cf.* Federalist 31, p. 194.

[2] Richard Morrill, Conference Report on the Bellagio Conference, July 1-6, 1980, on "The Role of the University in the Search for International Value Consensus," Rockefeller Foundation, New York, January, 1982, p. 6.

[3] Richard Brookhiser, "The Character of George Washington," *Imprimis*, Vol. 32 (July 2003), pp. 1-3.

[4] See Larry Arnhart, *Political Questions: Political Philosophy from Plato to Rawls* (New York: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 65-66.

[5] Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper and Row, 1945), p. 212.

[6] Charter of the United Nations, Department of State Publication 2353, Conference Series 74.

[7] United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly December 10, 1948 (48 votes to none with abstentions by the communist states, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia).

[8] See Christina Hoff Sommers, "Are We Living in a Moral Stone Age?" *Imprimis*, Vol. 27 (March 1998), pp. 1-3.

[9] Scott H. Ainsworth, *Analyzing Interest Groups: Group Influence on People and Policies* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), pp. 55-60.

[10] John B. Chomeau and Anne C. Rudolph, "Intelligence Collection and Analysis: Dilemmas and Decisions," James C. Gaston and Janis Bren Hietala, eds., *Ethics and National Defense* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1993), pp. 113-115.

[11] Max Lerner, *America as a Civilization* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), pp. 745-749.

[12] "Special Report: Intelligence Reform," *The Economist*, March 19, 2005, pp. 29-31.

Dr. David M. Keithly combines professional writing with a wide range of business interests. He has published five books, most recently The USA and the World 2014, *and over 75 articles in journals and magazines. He has been the editor of the* Defense Intelligence Journal *and* Civil Wars. *He has twice been a Fulbright scholar in Europe, was a fellow of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, a scholar-in-residence at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Bonn, Germany, and a legislative fellow in the parliament of the German state of Thüringen. He is president of the Fulbright Association's Southeast Virginia Chapter. He earned a PhD from Claremont Graduate University and an MA from the German University of Freiburg. He did additional graduate work at the French University of Rennes.*

Selected to "Outstanding Young Men of America," Dr. Keithly was designated a Navy "National Reserve Officer of the Year" in 1993. He was named the Individual Mobilization Augmentee Officer of the Year at DIA in 2000, and received the annual faculty research award at the Joint Military Intelligence College in 2001. A retired reserve officer, he held field-grade rank in two services. He has over 25 years of experience in the Intelligence Community and currently serves as Secretary-Treasurer of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE).

Better Intelligence through Better Intelligence Officers

by Walter Andrusyszyn

Each intelligence failure generates soul-searching in the Intelligence Community and on Capitol Hill about a better way to train future intelligence officers. In the middle of the past decade, just a few years after 9/11, Congress authorized grants to universities to develop individual programs for preparing the next generation of intelligence officers. Roughly 30 schools have received grants (some of the smaller ones partnered to form consortia) from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to establish "Centers of Academic Excellence." The University of South Florida was a latecomer but in 2011 received just under $2 million to develop a 5-year program.

Each Center's program is different. USF's program benefits from the proximity of two major joint military commands in Tampa – Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) – to offer students real-life exposure to intelligence challenges.

USF decided not to develop an intelligence curriculum, or major, because trying to teach intelligence to students without a security clearance is like trying to teach someone to cook without a stove.

USF decided not to develop an intelligence curriculum, or major, because trying to teach intelligence to students without a security clearance is like trying to teach someone to cook without a stove. Instead, given the availability of intelligence professionals at the commands, the USF program concentrated on learnable skills required of any professional, whether or not in the intelligence field: (1) effective information gathering; (2) rigorous analysis of that information to draw substantiated conclusions, which also develops a core competency in critical thinking; and (3) an emphasis on effective oral and written presentation skills.

USF currently has just under 400 students registered as participants in the program. Nearly all of them aspire to work in a U.S. national security agency, but participating students cover all majors, including pre-med students who see the training as a valuable tool to become better diagnosticians.

The USF program has four primary components:

(1) Seminars

The four-day seminars, held in the summer, constitute the core instructional platform. Students are immersed in a specific topic hosted by a relevant organization or company. In the summer of 2013, three very different types of seminars were held. SOCOM hosted a seminar at its headquarters June 24-25. Students were admitted to the secure conference room where the Director of the J2 intelligence division offered a briefing on SOCOM's mission and the related intelligence challenges.

Students also were introduced to the open source research being conducted at J2 and given a tour of the Watch Center and its big board. That afternoon, the former Deputy Director of the CIA's National Clandestine Service gave students an overview of the U.S. Intelligence Community and challenges facing intelligence in the coming years. However, the hands-on exercise occurred on Day 2 when students were divided into five groups and given the task of developing a course of action (COA) to identify what SOCOM could do to mitigate the spillover of violence from Syria to Lebanon – not a hypothetical exercise because SOCOM is indeed working on this question. Each group was assigned an intelligence officer and each group briefed four senior SOCOM officers (with the J2 listening in) at the end of the day. Despite the short time span, the students came up with well-reasoned COAs. One could argue that the students' high level of performance was attributable to the pressure they experienced.

The remaining two days at the University were occupied with individual briefings by each student as well as breakout sessions, including a mini tutorial on self-defense by Bill DeClemente, the original Karate Kid, to instill confidence.

Another seminar was a week-long visit to Israel by a dozen students to get first-hand familiarity with the

Middle East. The criterion for selection was the likelihood of the participants working in a U.S. national security agency in the future. Six already had clearances (mainly for their work at CENTCOM as interns). The highlights were an afternoon with the Israeli Air Force, a briefing at the Counter-Terrorism Institute in Herzliya, a day with an Arab (Israeli citizen) in Nazareth, and visits to private families. The impressions were deep and lasting: precisely the purpose for these future analysts to better understand the human dynamic of the Middle East conflict.

The final seminar of the summer was a repeat of the 2012 inaugural seminar on human trafficking, hosted by Citibank. The anti-money-laundering division located in Tampa uses analytic techniques to determine if account holders are laundering money derived from prostitution or drug running. There is also a SOCOM angle because the money watchers at the command rely on reporting from the bank analysts to help them track terrorists and narcotics dealers. The same bad guys keep popping up in a different context.

Topics range from the Arab Spring to North Korean nuclear weapons, but the Africa Command held one on Kenyan elections and a local cybersecurity company showed students how easily hackers get into networks.

(2) Workshops

The workshops are the workhorse of the program. They are four hours long and the aim is to have a workshop a month during the academic year. The lead instructor is always a practitioner, usually from CENTCOM or SOCOM. Topics range from the Arab Spring to North Korean nuclear weapons, but the Africa Command held one on Kenyan elections and a local cybersecurity company showed students how easily hackers get into networks.

The format is the same and also parallels the four-day seminars: students have two weeks to research an assigned topic (effective information gathering); in the first hour of the workshop, students are split into groups and share their data and conclusions (the analytic/critical thinking part in a setting that reflects the interagency process). Each group of 5 or 6 students selects a spokesperson to deliver a 3-5 minute briefing; that student is not alone on the hot seat – the other students in the group have to be ready to respond to the instructor's grilling (students enjoy the challenge and pressure). During the third hour, a professional writing instructor gives students a short tutorial on professional writing, followed by an assignment under time pressure – often an intelligence brief or mock memo to a department secretary. Another regular mock exercise is for students to prepare an item for the President's Daily Brief (PDB). The writing instructor reviews the writing samples and sends each student written feedback by e-mail. In the final hour, students have a seminar-like give and take with the lead instructor.

(3) Professional Presentations

At least once a month, a practitioner (either an intelligence officer or someone on the policy side) delivers a one-hour lecture on his/her area of expertise. CEOs or department heads from local military contractors also discuss partnership with the commands from their perspectives.

(4) Tutorials

The program offers specialized tutorials on resume writing, briefing, interviewing, appearance, and professional writing (memos, formal documents, correspondence). The program places a heavy emphasis on oral presentations and on writing. Arguably, the most important shortcoming of our university system and greatest need professionally is crisp, clear, and effective presentation skills.

The true measure of success of this program is still five to ten years out because it will take students at least that long to finish their academic training, find jobs, and prove their value after breaking into the business of national security. Nevertheless, one clear measure in the past two years has been the increase in the number of students getting internships with U.S. agencies. Both the Director and the professional writing instructor have seen significant improvement in writing, and students who started out giving terrible oral presentations are now confident and eloquent before a crowd. For example, six of the students participating in the SOCOM exercise told our briefing coach that they were terrified of speaking in public. The coach spent a day working with them and their individual briefings were very good; you would not have known about their trepidations had they not told us in advance. In other words, it is possible to build confidence and give students a solid foundation for public speaking in a very short period of time.

There is no template for preparing a perfect intelligence officer, but protection of our nation and its people is only partially provided by hardware and technology. The real key is people who can identify threats and place information in the right

context. Good analysis and sound policy formation always come down to the skills exhibited by the people who use their brain and their experience. Development of these skills is what is offered by the Centers of Academic Excellence.

Walter Andrusyszyn is the Director of the Program in National and Competitive Intelligence at the University of South Florida in Tampa, FL. Born in England, he is a former State Department diplomat who concluded his public service on the National Security Council as a Director for Europe from 2001 to 2003. As a Foreign Service Officer, he was the senior officer responsible for Berlin occupation and post-World War II Four Power rights in Germany during the reunification process in 1989. In 1995 he was the State Department liaison for the deployment of IFOR troops into Sarajevo, Bosnia, and he headed the NATO office at State in 1999-2001. He was director of a special task force established at the State Department following the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Following his tour at the White House, he worked in the private sector as a manager.

[Editor's Note: More recently, Prof. Andrusyszyn has begun to provide expert support to one of the newer elements of the National Intelligence University (NIU), its recently established Southern Academic Center at MacDill AFB in Tampa, which educates students assigned to SOCOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, and other federal agencies in southern and central Florida.]

Certifying Intelligence Courses and Programs:
An Attempt to Advance the Field of Intelligence Education

by Dr. Jonathan Smith

Intelligence is a craft as old as time, but the study of intelligence is a more recent phenomenon. In recent decades, the focus on a more structured approach—both in education and in professional practice—to the study of intelligence has prompted larger questions about parsimony. Do we all mean the same thing when we use the phrase "intelligence education"?

The International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) has been a leading voice in this discussion. Created in 2004, the organization's goal is to serve as an association for advancing research, knowledge, and professional development in the field of intelligence education.[1] From this goal, IAFIE has developed standards in both the realms of intelligence education and training. Available at the website www.iafie.org, these documents represent a long-term initiative by a diverse collection of intelligence professionals to clarify the key elements in the field of intelligence education. From these efforts, the organization has since created a program to certify intelligence-related courses and programs that meet these standards. This certification program is an important step in the progression of this field of study because it will provide schools and programs with an authoritative assessment of whether their efforts meet these recognized standards.

The need for such a certification program is enhanced by the recent growth of intelligence education programs. In the "Intelligence Studies" section of the International Studies Association Compendium, William Spracher noted, ". . . the growth of more specialized intelligence studies, departments and programs, especially since September 11, 2001, is rapid and undeniable."[2] For instance, in comparing the 2011 and 2013 editions of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) publication *Intelligence as a Career*, the number of institutions listed as offering courses in intelligence more than doubled (from 130 to 270) in that 2-year time period.[3] However, with this substantial growth have also come concerns about the quality of instruction in these new programs.[4] The IAFIE certification program represents a modest effort to allow courses and programs to demonstrate that they offer a curriculum in intelligence education that is worthy of the name.

To be sure, I am biased. Since 2012, I have served as the Chairman of IAFIE's Subcommittee on Intelligence Certification Programs. [Editor's Note: This subcommittee was formed under the oversight of IAFIE's long-standing Educational Practices Committee.] This group of nearly 20 intelligence professionals was charged with investigating the need for a certification program and, if warranted, to develop a process for conducting such a program. The subcommittee represented a wide array of interests which reflects the diversity of the actors engaged in the study of intelligence. There were academics and practitioners; there were representatives from the United States, as well as from other nations. Here, I would like to briefly note the extraordinary efforts of Lisa Crowder (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Jeff Corkill (Edith Cowan University, Australia), Christopher Hickey (Patrick Henry College), and Harry Nimon (Boeing/Henley-Putnam University), who were essential in the development of this program proposal.

The certification program that is now available is the product of a multi-year deliberation within IAFIE. After an extensive debate within the organization regarding exactly what constituted "intelligence education," a subsequent question arose: how could the organization promote these standards? To that end, IAFIE initially considered the value of becoming a specialized accrediting body. However, that proposition was rejected by the organization in 2011. Still, there was recognition within the organization that the development of some type of mechanism to promote the standards for intelligence education and training that had been developed was necessary for facilitating the growth of the field of intelligence education. Hence, the certification effort was seen as a more modest attempt to advance this objective.

This progression within IAFIE is reflective of the larger debate within our community about the development of intelligence as a legitimate—and defined—field of study. To be sure, many of the articles in this current issue of *AIJ* touch upon that very issue. The certification effort is an attempt to further advance the development of this field.

It is important to stress what this program accomplishes—and what it does not. As previously noted, it is not an accreditation process. Beyond the philosophical question

regarding whether we have advanced sufficiently as a field of study, IAFIE believed that this was too resource-intensive to be done appropriately at this time. This program also does not certify individuals—either the students of these courses and programs or the faculty who teach in these venues.

The issue of faculty qualifications is illustrative of the challenges for the development of our field, as well as the limited scope of the certification program. To be sure, in the near-absence of doctoral programs in the field of intelligence education within the United States, many instructors and educators rely on prior professional experience as their primary qualification to teach courses in intelligence education.[5] Nevertheless, how much experience would qualify an instructor to teach a course in intelligence education? What types of experiences would count? These and other questions on this topic were fraught with complications that are endemic to the current state of our field of study. Hence, in the end, the governing board of IAFIE decided that it was prudent to omit this area from the certification program.

Instead, this program focuses on assessing the consistency of the learning objectives, educational activities, and the associated assessment structures with the educational standards that IAFIE has developed for the field. These core elements of curriculum design identify the substantive content of a program, as well as the skill-sets that they promote in pursuit of these outcomes. A rubric that identifies the standards of evaluation for these criteria is included in the Certification Program Application document that is posted on the IAFIE website.

The application process is guided by utilizing relevant subject matter expertise to assess the submission. Once the application is submitted to IAFIE, a certification panel is organized to review the request. Each panel is led by the Chairman of the Certification Subcommittee and two additional members who are drawn from a pool of volunteers from within the organization. These additional members are selected based on the relevance of their particular expertise to the course or program being considered. Hence, a program focused on human intelligence (HUMINT) collection would likely be reviewed by a panel that included IAFIE members who had some depth of knowledge and expertise in the field of HUMINT. This design is intended to represent a balance between the specialization that may be reflected in a particular program and the general standards for intelligence education that have been established by IAFIE. From here, this panel reviews the application to verify that the curriculum, activities, and assessment mechanisms meet the standards that IAFIE has identified as hallmarks of a quality educational experience in the field of intelligence education.

The benefit to institutions which successfully undertake this process is that they can advertise that their course or program has been validated by an independent authority as meeting an acknowledged content standard in intelligence education. Further, these institutions can utilize the IAFIE logo in their promotional materials for five years before this status must be revalidated. Given that there is currently no recognized standard of quality in the field of intelligence education, this allows for organizations to demonstrate the comparative advantage of their program relative to other programs that are not recognized.

This program is an important initial effort in the development of the field of intelligence education. It builds upon prior efforts and deliberations to develop a common intellectual framework and lexicon, as well as the ongoing efforts of professionals in the education and training domains of our field. As this area of study grows and evolves, there is a need for a recognized standard to assess high-quality courses and programs as distinct from the others. That is the intent of this effort and I encourage you to join our efforts to advance our field of study.

For more information regarding IAFIE and the Certification Program, please visit the organization's website at http://www.iafie.org.

[1] Bylaws, International Association for Intelligence Education (September 1, 2008), http://www.iafie.org/?page=Bylaws.
[2] William Spracher, "Intelligence Studies," International Studies Association Compendium (2012).
[3] See *Intelligence as a Career: Is It Right For You and Are You Right For It?* (Washington, DC: Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 2011), 29-31. Also see *Intelligence as a Career* (2013), 42-48.
[4] See Martin Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 22:1 (Spring 2009).
[5] For a discussion of this issue, see Jonathan Smith, "Amateur Hour? Experience and Faculty Qualifications in U.S. Intelligence Courses," *Journal of Strategic Security* 6:3 (Fall 2013), 25-39.

Dr. Jonathan Smith is an Associate Professor of Politics and serves as the Director of Intelligence and National Security Studies at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, SC. He currently serves as Chairman of the IAFIE Certification Panel. Dr. Smith also served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve. In his 23-year career, he mobilized in support of Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, IRAQI FREEDOM, and ENDURING FREEDOM. His last assignment was as Commanding Officer of Navy Reserve Joint Intelligence Operations Center 0174 based at the U.S. Southern Command in Miami, FL.

Lessons Learned from Intelligence Internships with Midwest Universities

by Chris Martin, Chris Quillen, and Tim Shaw

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article examines the nexus of intelligence education, training, and practice in the context of intelligence internship experiences of students from three Midwestern universities at the Ohio-based Advanced Technical Intelligence Center for Human Capital Development (ATIC). Students graduating from college or university intelligence studies programs often find their academic credentials are adequate, yet they lack the practical training and experience necessary to secure entry-level positions within the Intelligence Community (IC). The most efficient way for students to bridge this gap is through a professional internship, supplementing classroom study with field experience. While professional internships have existed for some time among IC agencies and associated industry, the relatively low number of seats and the competitive nature of the selection process ensure only a small percentage of students are actually afforded these opportunities. Likewise, most of these programs do not provide the practical skills training that entry-level analysts will see during their initial tenures once hired into the Community. ATIC launched its Intelligence Internship Program in the fall of 2011 with an eye toward addressing all of these shortcomings. This article highlights the successes and strategic challenges that ATIC has encountered along the way in developing and maturing its program.

ISSUES IN TRAINING AND EDUCATING A PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE WORKFORCE

> *… [The] distinctions between training and education are disappearing. Government agencies are providing educational opportunities to their students in addition to the more frequent training opportunities, while academia is simultaneously beginning to provide training in analytic production while maintaining its traditional educational role. Thus, at least in the U.S., the lines between government and academia, in terms of providing analytic training and education, are beginning to blur.*[1]
>
> *Stephen Marrin*

...the lines between training and education for the professional intelligence workforce are becoming more and more blurred.

The Problem. As Dr. Marrin points out, the lines between training and education for the professional intelligence workforce are becoming more and more blurred. Academia continues to explore the concept of intelligence studies as a true and independent academic discipline. Concurrently agency- and service-level training components face their own unique set of challenges in developing and delivering relevant and timely curriculum, balancing skills enhancement with organizational and cultural competencies. Somewhere in the middle, the individual practitioner is challenged with constantly evolving target sets, rapid technological innovation, wandering policy priorities, and the ever-present constrained budget.

At the entry level, there is no identified shortage of bright, talented, and energetic young people who want to pursue a career in the intelligence workforce. However, securing a position in the IC is unlike almost any other profession, given the unique barriers to entry that the novice job seeker will face, particularly a recent college graduate with practically no relevant work experience. The challenge in human capital strategy for the IC is to marry his/her potential with proven capacity to perform at the high intellectual levels and professional standards required to become a successful intelligence analyst. This is a difficult exercise when the only credential he/she brings is educational experience, e.g., a degree or certificate in intelligence studies, or some other substantive discipline with supplemental studies in intelligence. Without practical experience within the Community, particularly analytic experience, each entry-level personnel acquisition is a gamble for an IC agency, and a particularly expensive one given the up-front direct cost in non-productive wages and resource expense of an initial background investigation to determine eligibility for a security clearance. While the security clearance cost

barrier is unique to the IC, the problem of vetting potential employees is certainly not. One way industries have elected to test the transitioning student is through a professional internship.

The concept is relatively simple: Bring a student into the company for a short period of time (without assuming the risks associated with fully hiring him/her) and evaluate his/her performance in controlled situations to determine if the intern would make a good candidate for a position within the company. As in private industry, the internship concept is likewise well established in the IC, for example through summer and other internship programs at intelligence agencies such as NSA and CIA. However, the availability of those internship opportunities is limited and therefore highly competitive. Also, with the increase of intelligence-focused education programs around the country, and the resultant increase in the candidate pool for these limited agency internship opportunities, it is unlikely government agencies will be able to expand their programs sufficiently to keep pace with the growing demand for these positions, if they have the capacity to grow them at all. Additionally, students who are selected for internships are not afforded extensive practical training to supplement their college or university intelligence studies curriculum. While some may receive limited training, the bulk of initial skills training will be reserved for the candidate who is officially hired into an agency. Adding the non-productive labor period while awaiting security clearance adjudication and initial training, it becomes clear that each entry-level employee hired into the IC is an expensive resource, long before he/she offsets the initial investment with successful analytical production.

The Approach. Given the current conditions outlined above that recent college graduates face who intend to pursue a career in the IC, three distinct components emerge as critical for successful selection into the professional intelligence workforce:

- *Education.* Before the emergence of intelligence studies programs, IC analysts came from relevant substantive discipline programs. Today, many students seeking an intelligence career either supplement a substantive discipline degree with an intelligence studies minor or certificate program, or major in intelligence studies either at the undergraduate or graduate level.
- *Training.* Although many will have qualifications through their education programs, most will not have focused, skills-oriented training in analysis, tools and methodology, tradecraft, or software.
- *Experience.* Recent graduates lack the experience of applying principles and concepts they learn in the classroom within a real-world operational environment.

...many students seeking an intelligence career either supplement a substantive discipline degree with an intelligence studies minor or certificate program, or major in intelligence studies either at the undergraduate or graduate level.

The Advanced Technical Intelligence Center for Human Capital Development (ATIC), a not-for-profit firm established in 2006 in Dayton, Ohio, to address human capital and technological shortfalls in the IC, recognized these challenges and launched its Intelligence Internship Program in September 2011 to specifically address each of these three focus areas. With its initial emphasis primarily within the entry-level training domain, ATIC alumni by 2011 were finding significant success in securing positions within the IC. ATIC felt it could extend this practical training experience to support college students through an internship experience. However, while ATIC alumni were enjoying success in placement, an internal review and survey of alumni indicated that limited practical analytic work experience was a significant challenge for them in finding positions within the IC. In order to address this need, and also to address an identified critical shortfall among local law enforcement agencies, ATIC established the Center for Law Enforcement Analysis Training (CLEAT). The mission of CLEAT is to bring tools, techniques, and tradecraft from the IC and apply them to real-world law enforcement data sets. Drawing on advanced analytic techniques like Link Analysis, Human Terrain Mapping, Social Network Analysis, and geospatial visualization, ATIC alumni working as interns quickly established CLEAT as an important law enforcement resource in southwest Ohio. In return for their service, alumni were acquiring essential proficiencies and real-world practical experience, both to enhance skills learned in the classroom and to build their professional resumes. In marrying the skills training learned in ATIC classrooms with the practical experience earned in CLEAT, alumni were becoming well positioned to enter the IC job market. This two-tiered approach, with both a classroom and an experiential component, served as the foundational architecture of the internship.

In late 2011, ATIC entered into a pilot partnership with the School of Criminal Justice at Tiffin University to bring talented juniors and seniors from its Criminal Justice and

Security Studies programs to ATIC under the umbrella of an internship. These students would spend a 15-week semester in-residence at ATIC, with the first ten weeks in a training classroom and the remaining five weeks immersed in an experiential learning component. From that initial partnership, now more than two years later, ATIC has expanded the number of college and university partnerships to six—including Cedarville University, Ashland University, and Notre Dame College (all in Ohio), Westminster College (Missouri), and Indiana State University—and has graduated 43 students from the Intelligence Internship Program. The process has been a vital learning experience not only for the interns, but also for the staff and faculty of ATIC. Some concepts initially thought important turned out to be not so, while other components grew out of necessity or simply as ideas and suggestions from staff, faculty, and even the students themselves.

GROUND UP: BUILDING AN INTELLIGENCE INTERNSHIP PROGRAM

Program design. Education programs generally focus on conceptual and theoretical frameworks, while training programs focus on the skills required to perform tasks. Intelligence analysis is somewhat unique, in that the practice of analysis (i.e., the applied skill) is inherently an intellectual enterprise. In this context, training for an intelligence analyst necessarily is comprised of the application of mental and intellectual rigor *as a skill or technique*. This is the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, and over several decades has evolved from principally an intuition-driven process into a highly ordered process. Through the application of structured analytic techniques like Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, Red Teaming, Alternative Futures, and a host of others, intelligence analysis tradecraft today is a highly practical enterprise. The bridge between understanding the conceptual foundations of critical and creative thinking and applying them as skills to conduct intelligence analysis fundamentally defines the distinction between education and training within the analytic domain. The mission of ATIC's Intelligence Internship is to demonstrate this distinction to students in a classroom, and then afford them the opportunity to apply it to live, sensitive missions.

CLASSROOM TRAINING

The first ten weeks of the 15-week internship are spent in a classroom. Intelligence Interns are integrated into the Analyst Boot Camp (ABC), a full-time intelligence analysis training program for novice analysts. Interns sit side-by-side with "traditional" ABC students and must meet the same requirements for attendance, academic performance, and professional conduct. In the ABC, students spend ten weeks learning the functions, missions, and roles of intelligence from the analyst's perspective. The first five weeks are introductory, focusing on fundamental analytic competencies including critical thinking, research, writing, and briefing, as well as core disciplines, or "INTs," including HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, GEOINT, and MASINT. Following a mid-term research and briefing assignment, students advance to focused, topical study including "theme weeks," five 1-day classes clustered around a central theme. For example, a week on space and missile analysis might include classes on ballistic missile proliferation, foreign space programs, counter-space analysis, and missile defense. Following a week of hands-on software familiarization in the ninth week, students finish with a capstone project where they are formed into small teams and conduct research on an intelligence requirement, drafting a product and then presenting their findings as a team to a panel of intelligence subject matter experts in a professional current intelligence brief.

INTEGRATION WITH TRADITIONAL STUDENTS

During the initial design of the Intelligence Internship Program, the question arose whether to integrate interns into the existing ABC or conduct separate classroom training for the interns, possibly with a modified curriculum to shorten the classroom time to allow for more experiential learning. The issue was debated from multiple perspectives, including that of the interns, the traditional ABC students, and the faculty. Ultimately, as is often the case, the decision was primarily driven by fiscal reality. Simply put, adding more courses for the interns would drive up the cost to an acceptable level. Interns are integrated into the classroom with traditional ABC students, and it appears at this stage the decision turned out to be the right one, not only from the fiscal perspective but also from the student experience.

The student demographics of a traditional ABC are anything but consistent. In its 5-year history, the ABC has drawn students from a broad variety of backgrounds. When not taking the interns into consideration (as they drive down the average), the typical age of an ABC student is early- to mid-30s. Most of them are seeking a mid-career transition, meaning they generally hold a decade or more of professional experience. Career-transitioning ABC students have included former teachers, architects, software engineers, commercial airline pilots, an ophthalmologist, and even a professional figure skater. Over 90 percent hold an undergraduate degree, with around 30 percent holding a graduate or first professional degree. Approximately one quarter are also military veterans with all four military services represented. The importance of the interaction

among the interns and these students cannot be overemphasized. Sitting side-by-side, and partnering in team exercises with older peers who bring professional experience, provides the interns a daily lesson in how to conduct themselves in a professional environment. To reinforce this, all students, whether intern or traditional, are required to wear business casual dress for classes, and business attire when presenting briefings.

WRITING: REPRESENTING RESULTS OF STRUCTURED ANALYSIS

One of the biggest challenges faced by students in the internship is the breaking of some habits learned in academia. This is not to say that these habits are not relevant and useful in an academic setting. Quite the contrary, they are proven and effective ways to learn. As students begin to make the transition from learning to doing, however, it is essential for them to unlearn some old habits and start forming new ones. Foremost among these is shifting their writing audience from a professor to a policymaker. While professors want the student to demonstrate all he/she has learned, the policymakers only need to know what is most important for them to do their job. Moreover, policymakers generally have a solid grasp of the background of issues and therefore are focused on new or upcoming details, not the long history of an issue that is often the focus of academic papers.

Students in the internship are taught to write with brevity and clarity over meeting a certain expected page count. While professors may assign 10-, 20-, or even 30-page papers, no policymaker has the time to read such lengthy pieces. Intelligence analysts will generally write 1- to 2-page papers or deliver 3- to 5-minute briefings. This requires a more rigorous process that places the bottom line up front (BLUF) and focuses the analyst on only the most important information. Many students struggle with this transition as much of their educational experience and their related academic scholarship tend toward longer, more detailed expository papers. To overcome this challenge the students are given strict limits in both space and time, as well as detailed feedback about how better to structure their pieces to meet policymaker needs.

CRITICAL AND CREATIVE THINKING, ANALYTIC BIAS, AND TRADECRAFT

Thinking is a fundamental component of intelligence analysis and tradecraft. Analysts often sift through mountains of data, some of which may be false or otherwise compromised, and make analytic assessments of importance or impact, not simply a recitation of the most salient or common data points. In its approach to thinking, ATIC has woven critical, creative and, to a somewhat lesser extent, divergent thinking throughout the ABC curriculum. Intelligence Interns are exposed to these important concepts, and are expected to display their understanding of these concepts in analytic products that they generate throughout the course.

ATIC has adopted a simple definition of critical thinking: "thinking about thinking while you're thinking."

ATIC has adopted a simple definition of critical thinking: "thinking about thinking while you're thinking." Although somewhat trite, this definition captures the spirit of the reflective nature of pure critical thought and the Socratic Method. Interns are first introduced to critical thought early in the curriculum, in a class called "How to Think Like an Analyst" which focuses on not only reflective thought but also on creative problem solving and divergent thinking (viewing problems in more than one context and understanding that there can be more than one correct or likely answer). Another foundational element introduced to students throughout the course is bias. Almost all ABC students and interns bring no previous study of thought bias from their education programs. Hence, a significant emphasis is placed on introducing them to the most common forms and, potentially, the most costly in terms of analytic judgment errors.

In both the "How to Think" and "How to Write Like an Analyst" courses, interns study cognitive and behavioral biases like Confirmation Bias and the Focusing Effect, probability and belief biases like Anchoring and Authority Bias, as well as social and ideological biases including Mirror Imaging and Projection Bias. A review of student course evaluations for these classes routinely reveals a high percentage of students who report they have had no formal instruction on the topic of bias in their own thought, which is not surprising outside psychology, sociology, and related departments or programs within universities. Here again, as in the ABC approach to writing, the curricular focus is on presenting bias through a set of techniques that analysts can use to identify and mitigate the negative effects of bias within their own analysis, and that of others.

EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: APPLYING SKILLS TO REAL-WORLD MISSIONS

Once the intern has completed the training component of his/her internship, he/she has an option to complete either a directed research project under the guidance of a sponsoring faculty member at his/her home institution, or to work in the CLEAT applying the skills learned during the ABC. While it remains an option, no

student has yet elected to write the paper. As a component of the internship agreement, all of the colleges award internship credit to their interns, and most students are required to provide a written reflective assessment of their experience in the Intelligence Internship Program. All of the interns to date have spent five weeks conducting analysis of law enforcement data to satisfy the experiential component of the internship program.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ANALYSIS IN THE CLEAT

The CLEAT provides an opportunity for students to apply the tradecraft they studied for ten weeks during the Analyst Boot Camp against real-world live datasets. While the data and materials with which the interns work are not classified, they are Law Enforcement Sensitive information and the students are required to strictly adhere to guidelines for handling sensitive information. Interns use cutting-edge Link and Human Terrain Analysis techniques and software to build analytic products in support of ongoing local, state, and federal cases and criminal prosecutions. The CLEAT partners with law enforcement agencies and prosecutors, whose offices often do not have the resources to conduct the detailed and painstaking analysis conducted by CLEAT interns and analysts. In this way, interns are exposed to a professional work environment, with deadlines and high expectations of quality in their analysis, as well as written and graphic products. According to one intern, Patrick, who was a senior from Tiffin University, "In a way, the internship was a maturing process. I was treated as an adult and expected to perform as an adult."

CONCLUSION

The Intelligence Internship Program at ATIC in many ways draws from a traditional field-learning experience with which many students would be familiar. However, by focusing on the skills domain, in a training vice education environment, in order to enhance the conceptual principles they learn in the college classroom, the Intelligence Internship seeks to provide a bridge from education to training, and ultimately to a career in the professional intelligence analytic workforce. The experience during the two years of the internship program was as expected, with some administrative and institutional challenges in negotiating terms and desired learning outcomes with individual colleges. Also, the structure of the program has survived the first year fundamentally intact; however, minor administrative changes had to be made, always with an eye toward ensuring a positive student experience. The program continues to grow. In addition to the six universities which have already finalized agreements for their students to participate, seven more are at various stages in the drafting and approval process.

[Editor's Note: This article was based on a presentation at the 2013 annual conference of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) held at the University of Texas-El Paso, the proceedings of which were published in the *Journal of Strategic Studies* produced by Henley-Putnam University. It is reprinted here with permission. One of the authors, Chris Quillen, also presented at the 2012 "Intelligence Education and Training Day," cosponsored by the local DC chapters of NMIA and IAFIE.]

NOTE

[1] Stephen Marrin, "Training and Educating U.S. Intelligence Analysts," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Volume 22, Number 1, 2009, pp. 131-132.

Chris Martin is the Director of Training at the Advanced Technical Intelligence Center for Human Capital Development (ATIC). He has 20 years of intelligence experience in the U.S. Marine Corps and in private industry. He earned an MPA degree in Geographic Information Science from Wright State University.

Chris Quillen is the Senior Vice President of Operations at ATIC and has 20 years of analysis experience with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Energy, the U.S. Army, and private industry. He earned an MA degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University.

Timothy Shaw is the Director of University Relations at ATIC. He is the former Dean of the School of Criminal Justice and Social Sciences at Tiffin University and is a retired special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He holds a JD degree from Ohio Northern University.

The Generic Narrative Space Model as an Intelligence Analysis Tool

by Laura Sappelsa, H. Van Dyke Parunak, and Sven Brueckner

SUMMARY

Intelligence analysts have long found profit in graphical representations of their mental models. The discipline of constructing such a model can sharpen and refine the analyst's understanding, and externalizing the model enables colleagues to review and augment it. We report on a specialization of the concept map, the Narrative Space Model (NSM), which captures concisely the set of coherent narratives that explain how the world may evolve. We define the notion of a narrative space, compare it with other representational frameworks, discuss the thought processes involved in its construction, and within the context of a current Intelligence Advanced Research Project Activity (IARPA) research program, present a narrative space for a specific intelligence question, and a generic domain narrative space for a class of related questions.

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the evolution of complex situations requires alternative narratives. We present the Narrative Space Model (NSM), a specialization of the concept map developed to account for these alternative narratives. The Background section provides a brief overview of intelligence analysis and the utility of graphical displays in decision-making and communication, collaboration, and avoiding confirmation bias. In *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis,* Heuer and Pherson discuss the use of graphical displays in intelligence analysis.[1] We discuss the concept map as an example. Next, we present the NSM, a specialization of the concept map, and how it is used in our application. In Materials and Methods, details about the construction of the NSM are given. In Results, we show a specific NSM and a generic domain NSM. In addition, we illustrate how the generic domain NSM is used for specific problems. Next, we discuss mental models and the utility of the generic domain NSM, and conclude with the value of such a model for intelligence analysis.

BACKGROUND

Structured Analytic Frameworks

The understanding of the subject matter that is gained during the research process and the research process itself are as important as the resulting intelligence product.[2] Structured analytic tools are useful for intelligence analysis because they externalize the analyst's mental process, making it transparent to others, which facilitates collaboration and communication.[3] Heuer and Pherson identify four different methodologies used in intelligence analysis: expert judgment, structured analysis, quantitative methods using expert-generated data, and quantitative methods using empirical data.[4]

While expert judgment is a combination of subject matter expertise and critical thinking performed at the level of the individual analyst, structured analysis lends itself to collaboration by externalizing and making mental models transparent. This type of analysis is especially useful for the complex problems encountered by the Intelligence Community because it combines the expertise of multiple analysts, it can illustrate knowledge gaps, and it can be used to develop and illustrate alternative narratives.[5] Structured analysis includes network analysis, mind maps, and concept maps.

Example: The Concept Map

The concept map was developed as a tool to represent knowledge in graphical form. It illustrates the associations between different concepts using nodes, and arrows or lines connecting the nodes.[6,7] Nodes contain a word or a short statement describing the concept, which is "a perceived regularity in events or objects, or records of events or objects, designated by a label."[8] The nodes and their connections form statements or propositions.[9] Cross-links are used to describe relationships between concepts in the different sections of the concept map.[10] Concept maps enable the intuitive discovery of associations between the nodes or concepts, facilitate the sharing of information about complex issues, and aid in the understanding of the "big picture."[11] The nodes with the greatest number of

incoming and outgoing links are considered to be the most significant and represent the underlying theories of the concept map.[12,13] The process that goes into creating a concept map is as informative as the concept map itself.[14]

The Utility of Graphical Displays in Intelligence Analysis

Johnston describes intelligence analysis as "the application of individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a secret socio-cultural context."[15] The purpose of intelligence analysis is to inform U.S. officials by providing information in a framework that increases understanding and decreases uncertainty surrounding national security threats, while providing warning about potential attacks to help the decision-maker reevaluate the government's ability to prevent such threats from occurring.[16,17,18,19] Warning and Estimative Intelligence (WEI) addresses long-term issues and is concerned with the monitoring of hostile activities, as well as the identification of events that potentially can have substantial negative consequences.[20] Warning is meant to provide the decision-maker with the information needed to weigh potential responses so that he is prepared to make the appropriate decision when necessary.[21]

Intelligence analysis includes the mental processes used in developing an understanding of complex situations.[22] Analysts often lack hard evidence and instead use inference, judgment, and intuition to identify the main drivers that might lead to a future event; the most probable pathway that will lead to the occurrence of the event, as well as situations and events that could change that pathway and result in an alternate outcome; plus key factors that would indicate a change in the likelihood of the event, developing stories to explain complex intelligence issues in terms of the big picture.[23,24,25] The value of a graphical display is that it can be used to visualize the relevant variables of a problem and it shows the relationships between those variables. Such a tool would be useful for intelligence analysts to inform the decision-maker, so that he/she is prepared to make the appropriate decision when necessary, thereby "enhancing" the decision-making process.[26]

The lack of collaboration within and between intelligence organizations has been given as a reason for intelligence failures.[27,28] An individual analyst working alone may introduce bias into his analysis and, therefore, information sharing should be incorporated into the intelligence analysis process.[29,30] Graphical displays can be used as collaboration tools, either between analysts or by different representatives of the Intelligence Community.[31] These formal structures can be developed by an individual analyst, who also can review those from other analysts and incorporate the relevant portions into a single framework that is comprised of the opinions of multiple analysts.[32] Graphical displays illustrate the underlying thought processes that led to a particular forecast, allow others to examine and question these processes, and identify any gaps in the reasoning or information that is incorrect, redundant or less significant.[33,34,35,36] CMapTools supports collaborative construction of graphical displays, allowing for simultaneous or individual modifications to be made.[37] The resulting graphical display provides an "argument framework" which could be used to supplement written reports.[38]

Confirmation bias occurs in decision-making when evidence in support of a particular viewpoint is favored, while evidence to the contrary is disregarded.[39] Having the appropriate tools that facilitate and foster information sharing will decrease the likelihood that dissenting opinions will be discounted and may improve analytic accuracy.[40,41] Cook and Smallman found that if the evidence was presented in graphical form, instead of text, confirmation bias was reduced.[42] This reduction was attributed to having all of the evidence accessible during the decision-making process.[43]

There are many graphical models that can potentially yield the benefits discussed in this section, including Bayes nets [44] and other probabilistic graphical models,[45] social-entity networks,[46] concept-relationship diagrams (the intended product of CMapTools), influence diagrams,[47] systemigrams,[48] structured argumentation diagrams,[49,50] and state-transition diagrams,[51] to name only a few. All are useful, but there is strong evidence from experimental psychology[52] that the most accessible structure is one in which the nodes are statements (rather than states or concepts), and the links indicate temporal and causal relations (rather than conditional probabilities, logical relations, or grammatical structures). We introduce the Narrative Space Model (NSM) as a graphical structure that is highly accessible cognitively, and can serve as a framework to support other forms of graphical representation.

Development and Application of the Narrative Space Model

We have devised a new structured analytic framework, the Narrative Space Model, to model how people forecast events in the real world. NSMs were developed for the Interrelated Forecasts Reflecting Models behind Experts' Decisions (INFORMED) project, part of the Intelligence Advanced Research Project Activity's (IARPA) Aggregative Contingent Estimation (ACE) program, which aims to advance the science of forecasting by investigating factors that influence individual and group predictions and developing mathematical methods to leverage this information into more accurate forecasts about geopolitical events relevant to the Intelligence Community. ACE empirically tests these forecasting techniques using real-world events.

Forecasters participate through the INFORMED website, selecting individual forecast problems (IFPs) of interest, offering their predictions, and updating their forecasts as often as they like. IFPs are introduced centrally at a specific time and close either when the focal event takes place or when a specific time window expires. A forecast consists of a probability distribution over possible responses. The aggregated forecasts produced by the INFORMED participants are compared to those of a control group of intelligence analysts.

The INFORMED project hypothesizes that a forecast reflects the forecaster's underlying mental model. It further hypothesizes, based on psychological data, that this mental model takes the form of an NSM, and that individual forecasts are generated by following a trajectory through the NSM to a statement (or node in the NSM) that asserts one of the outcomes of the IFP. Narrative space models describe the current state of the world for a given domain, distinctive events that could change the world to a new state, and the associated outcomes. An NSM represents the space of possible narratives that would explain an IFP. The objective of an NSM is to support as wide range of coherent narratives about how a forecasted event might occur as possible. INFORMED tests the hypothesis that many of these models share a common logical structure across forecasting problems and that substantial aspects of mental models are expressible as variants of fragments of abstract generic domain narrative spaces. The diversity of forecasters' mental models is an important factor in developing the algorithms as it provides insight into understanding participants who produce the same forecasts for different reasons.[53] INFORMED uses NSMs developed by a subject matter expert to distinguish different forecasters' mental models and aggregate the forecasters' mental models, which then can be used to generate forecasts and to communicate the aggregation results to decision-makers.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

CMapTools, a free software program developed by the Institute of Human and Machine Cognition (http://cmap.ihmc.us/download/), was used to develop the narrative space models. It utilizes two types of nodes, which in the original concept map formalism are called "concepts" and "relationships,"[54] roughly parallel to "nouns" and "verbs."

In the NSM, concept nodes hold not just concepts but statements (including nouns and verbs). Statements, unlike concepts, can be the object of belief, and can have truth values associated with them. Every NSM begins with a special node labeled "Start." In addition to leading to narrative nodes, the Start node also is linked to a node labeled with the name of the problem, and the problem description is attached to it as supporting information, visible by hovering over it with the cursor. Each concept node has a name that is unique across the CMap. Every concept node, other than the Start node, is a statement about the domain of the IFP. There is a distinct concept node called an "outcome node" for each possible answer to the IFP, labeled with that answer, and carrying a definition of the answer as supporting information. For binary status quo questions, a node for the non-status quo outcome is not included due to space limitations. Every node other than an outcome node can transition to "no" if time expires, but even for a status quo question, if there are intermediate events that can lead only to "no," then an outcome node for that option also is included. All concept nodes (other than Start and the outcome nodes) must lie on a directed path between the Start node and at least one outcome.

"Relationship" nodes have only one parent and one child node, and capture the idea of a narrative sequence between statements. The relationship nodes initially are left as the CMapTools default "????" until they are replaced by transitional probabilities fitted to the observed forecasts (data not shown).[55]

The NSM uses arrows to define the direction of the narrative transition. There are two kinds of transitions: normal ones (solid arrows) and inhibitory ones (dashed arrows). A solid arrow means that if one makes the statement at the tail of the arrow, following it with the statement at the end of the arrow makes narrative sense. The arrows reflect temporal ordering, and usually some kind of causality between the two statements. A dashed arrow means that if a forecaster is entertaining a narrative involving the statement at the tail of the arrow, a narrative involving the statement at the head of the arrow becomes less likely.

News sources, such as Reuters, the BBC, Voice of America, and CNN, were reviewed each day to identify events relevant to each IFP. For each news event, the following information was recorded: the date of the news event, the IFP identifier, a brief description of the event and its relevance to the IFP and, if an NSM has been developed for the particular IFP, the node identifier in the NSM for which the event is relevant. More than one news event may be relevant to a single node and a single news event may be relevant to more than one node. News events are used to weight the fitting of transitional probabilities to specific trajectories.[56]

CMapTools allows for the nesting of concept nodes inside of other concept nodes. Every concept node (including the enclosing one) must have a unique name. The reasoning logic that uses news events only works with nodes that are actually wired into the narrative sequence. If there is

transition logic among a group of enclosed nodes, then transitions to and from statements outside of the nest need to go to the internal nodes directly, not just to their enclosing node. Alternatively, links only to and from the enclosing node can be made, but then news events can only be used if they are assigned to the enclosing node.

By construction, every pair of statements (CMap "concept nodes") joined by a solid transition (a CMap "relationship node") is a coherent fragment of narrative. This convention means that every path through the NSM from the distinct "Start" node to an outcome node is a possible narrative of how the outcome might come to pass. The graph as a whole is a space that can generate many such narratives, leading us to call it a "narrative space." The cognitive primacy of temporal and causal relations over other relations makes this structure a natural framework for organizing and deliberating about intelligence scenarios.

RESULTS

In this section, we present three NSMs. The first is for a specific question. The second is for the generic theme of regime change. The third is intermediate, a single model that captures issues surrounding two specific questions.

Specific Narrative Space Model: Syria

Construction of the specific narrative space model began with the IFP, "Will Bashar al-Assad remain President of Syria through 31 January 2012?" The problem description becomes visible by hovering over the Start note. Figure 1 shows a fragment of the narrative space for this question.

The possible outcomes for the IFP and their associated descriptions are included in the outcome node. See Figure 2 (next page).

Relevant news events were recorded from the date the IFP was released by IARPA, and linked to the related statements in the NSM. These events and additional background research were also used to extend the NSM. As additional relevant news events were recorded, new nodes and links were added, as needed. 235 recorded news events correspond to 43 nodes. After the question was resolved on 31 January 2012, news events continued to be recorded to further develop the NSM. See Figure 3 (next page). The shaded nodes are supported by news events recorded for the time the IFP remained open. Narratives that pass through these nodes are more likely, in the sense of being attested by evidence, than other narratives. Thus, the NSM can be used to reconstruct the series of events that led to the current state of affairs.



Figure 1. Problem description for the IFP, "Will Bashar al-Assad remain President of Syria through 31 January 2012?"



Figure 2. Possible outcomes to resolve the IFP, "Will Bashar al-Assad remain President of Syria through 31 January 2012?"



Figure 3. Complete narrative space model for the IFP, "Will Bashar al-Assad remain President of Syria through 31 January 2012?"

Generic Narrative Space Model: Regime Change

An NSM can also be constructed for a class of questions, and enriched over time as information is gathered about specific instances.

Construction of the generic narrative space model began with the focus question "Will X remain strongman of country Y through Z?" The nodes from the specific NSM shown in Figure 1 were generalized. If the node from the specific NSM was particular to the conflict in Syria, it was not duplicated in the generic NSM. For example, "Arab League suspends Syria," "Monitors allowed into Syria," and "Russia sends its own draft to UN Security Council" were nodes that were only included in the specific NSM. The 43 nodes in the specific NSM are represented by 36 nodes in the generic NSM. As additional relevant news events were recorded, new nodes and links also were added. See Figure 4. The shaded nodes correspond to the news events recorded for the question "Will Bashar al-Assad remain President of Syria through 31 January 2012?" that are shaded in Figure 3.

Nodes and links were added to the NSM for other IFPs within the regime change domain. In addition, historic examples of regime change were researched to further develop the NSM.

Generic Narrative Space Model for Specific Questions: Iran and Yemen

Often multiple specific questions can be supported by a common NSM. Figure 5 (next page) is an example. The nodes shaded in light gray correspond to the news events recorded for the question "Will a foreign or multinational military force fire on, invade, or enter Iran before 1 September 2012?" 174 news events correspond to 13 nodes. The nodes shaded in dark gray correspond to events that occurred in Yemen during the Arab Spring. The node highlighted in black is an event shared by both the IFP about Iran and the 2011 Yemeni revolution.



Figure 4. Generic narrative space model for the IFP, "Will X remain strongman of country Y through Z?"

DISCUSSION

Mental Models

"Intelligence analysis is fundamentally a mental process."[57] Every analyst has a mental model for each intelligence issue he/she is analyzing.[58] However, not every analyst has an awareness and understanding of his/her mental model and is not able to identify how he/she judged which factors were most important in the decision that a particular outcome is the one most likely to occur. The research process and the knowledge gained are as important as the resulting intelligence product.[59] The same is true for NSMs. The process of creating the model is as important as the model itself.[60] Forecasting is not just the forecast, but the process that produces the forecast.

There have been criticisms of intelligence analysis and suggestions about how to make improvements, but there has been little focus on improving analytical thinking.[61] Intelligence failures have occurred because data do not fit into analysts' mental models, and were therefore disregarded because they were considered to be irrelevant.[62] Developing alternative outcomes and pathways to those outcomes is necessary, as is having the appropriate tool to visualize this information for both the analyst and the decision-maker.[63]

Due to the complexity of intelligence issues, analysts mainly rely on conceptually-driven analysis, using their mental models to make judgments about information.[64,65] Analysts with the same data may arrive at different outcomes or may come to the same conclusion for different reasons. The results of the analysis depend upon the data, as well as the conceptual framework used to analyze that data. Improving intelligence analysis requires an improvement in the analyst's mental models.[66]

The Generic Domain Narrative Space Model

Situational logic is the strategy used most often in intelligence analysis.[67] It utilizes what is known about the current issue to develop a scenario that includes what may have occurred prior and what might occur in the future.



Figure 5. Generic narrative space model for the IFP, "Will a foreign or multinational military force fire on, invade, or enter Iran before 1 September 2012?" and the 2011 Yemeni revolution.

Situational logic is not the same as simple comparison of a current issue to historic examples of the same situation in the same country or to similar issues in other countries. Historic examples should not be used to simply fill gaps in knowledge about the current situation. Similarities between a current and historic situation should not indicate that the situations are comparable in all respects.[68]

Heuer cites two problems with situational logic.[69] The first is that it is not easy to understand what is in the mind of foreign leaders or how foreign governments function. Second, situational logic does not utilize what is already known about similar situations that have occurred previously. By examining past examples and developing an understanding of the underlying causes of an intelligence issue in terms of what Heuer calls "a generic phenomenon" or what we call "a generic domain," analysts can develop and evaluate hypotheses that may not have been generated when just looking at one specific situation. This is essential to forecasting, especially for long-term problems.[70]

Structuring the analytic process can help the analyst to check the accuracy of his/her mental model, which directly affects the accuracy of the analysis.

Structuring the analytic process can help the analyst to check the accuracy of his/her mental model, which directly affects the accuracy of the analysis.[71] Heuer divides analytical problem structuring into decomposition and externalization. Decomposition breaks down the problem into its individual components.[72] Structuring the analytic process also aids the decision-maker by identifying triggers or key events that could lead to change the likelihood of a particular outcome. It can identify gaps in reasoning and alternate pathways that could lead to different outcomes. All problems have four components: (1) the "initial state"; (2) the "goal state," which occurs when a problem is resolved; (3) the "solution path" to get from the initial state to the goal state; and (4) the "context" in which all of the problem components are contained.[73] These four components also are the elements of a narrative space model.

Externalization is the illustration of the decomposed problem, showing the interrelationships of the components.[74,75] It makes the mental model transparent by putting it into the form of a graphic display.[76,77] The communicative and conceptual power of narrative as an organizing discipline is illustrated in the work of Mark Lombardi. Lombardi was an artist who wanted a vehicle that had the graphic impact of a painting but could convey information. He created narrative structures from publicly available information. Anyone could read the same information, but they could not tie it together. Lombardi put the information into a narrative structure, giving it the necessary context so he could connect the dots. For Lombardi, pieces of information only made sense in terms of the overall structure. The connections could not have been made without the physical process of constructing the narrative structure.[78]

CONCLUSIONS

"Intelligence analysis is an internal, concept-driven activity rather than an external, data-driven activity."[79] The generic domain narrative space model can be used to understand complex problems by externalizing the analyst's mental model, breaking it down into its fundamental parts and making it transparent to him and the decision-maker.[80,81] Like Lombardi's drawings, the generic domain narrative space model is too large to be internalized. The information can be understood only when all of the components are examined in terms of the "big picture." The generic domain narrative space model helps in the assessment of alternate views that would not have been otherwise obvious. For instance, the generic domain narrative space model for regime change could be used to illustrate the similarities and differences between countries involved in the Arab Spring. This is useful for understanding why the current situation in Syria is different than that which occurred in Libya, for example.

The generic domain narrative space model is an effective tool to address complex problems. If intelligence analysis were conducted in terms of a domain, such as regime change, economics, elections, etc., instead of a narrowly focused area, analysts could develop a library of domain-centered model modules that could be applied across many problem types.

[Authors' Note: This research is supported by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) via Department of Interior National Business Center (NBC) contract number D11PC20060. The U.S. government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation thereon. Disclaimer: The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of IARPA, Dol/NBC, or the U.S. government.]

NOTES

[1] Richards J. Heuer, Jr., and Randolph H. Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis* (CQ Press, 2011), pp. 41-85.

[2] Jeffrey R. Cooper, *Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis* (Center for Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2005), p. 42.
[3] Heuer and Pherson, p. 4.
[4] Ibid., pp. 22-23.
[5] Ibid., p. 24.
[6] Natalia Derbentseva and David R. Mandel, "A Concept Map Knowledge Model of Intelligence Analysis," *Defence Research and Development Toronto* TR 2011-077 (2011), p. 3.
[7] Joseph D. Novak and Alberto J. Cañas, "The Origins of the Concept Mapping Tool and the Continuing Evolution of the Tool," *Information Visualization Journal* 5, no. 3 (2006), p. 4.
[8] Joseph D. Novak and Alberto J. Cañas, "The Theory Underlying Concept Maps and How to Construct Them," *Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition* TR IHMC CmapTools 2006-01 Rev 2008-01 (2008), p. 1.
[9] Novak and Cañas, p. 4.
[10] Novak and Cañas, p. 2.
[11] Richard Kaste, Eric Heilman, and Robert Hoffman, "Concept Map Value Propagation for Tactical Intelligence," paper given at the twelfth International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, "Adapting C2 to the 21st Century" (19-21 June 2007), p. 6.
[12] Derbentseva and Mandel, p. 15.
[13] Alberto J. Cañas and Marco Carvalho, "Concept Maps and AI: An Unlikely Marriage?" *Anais do Simpósio Brasileiro de Informática na Educativa* 1, no. 1 (2004), p. 4.
[14] Derbentseva and Mandel, p. 9.
[15] Rob Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study* (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2004), p. 4.
[16] Jack Davis, "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning," *Occasional Papers* 1, no. 1 (2002), p. 2.
[17] James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George, "Intelligence Analysis – The Emergence of a Discipline," in R.Z. George and J.B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* (Georgetown University Press, 2008), p. 7.
[18] J.R. Thompson, Rosemarie Hopf-Weichel, and R. Edward Geiselman, "The Cognitive Bases of Intelligence Analysis," *U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences* Research Report 1362 (1984), pp. 1-2.
[19] Cooper, p. 42.
[20] Ibid., p. 16.
[21] Ibid., p. 16.
[22] Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton, "Making Sense of Transnational Threats," *Occasional Papers* 3, no. 1 (2004), p. 13.
[23] Ibid., p. 15.
[24] Jack Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise Is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?" *Occasional Papers* 2, no. 1 (2003), pp. 10-11.
[25] Cooper, pp. 19-20, 31.
[26] Ibid., pp. 16, 42.
[27] Douglas Hart and Steven Simon, "Thinking Straight and Talking Straight: Problems of Intelligence Analysis," *Survival* 48, no. 1 (2006), p. 51.
[28] Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, Richard Ben-Veniste, Bob Kerrey, Fred F. Fielding, John F. Lehman, Jamie S. Gorelick et al., *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, 1st ed. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 408.
[29] Haeyong Chung, Seungwon Yang, Naveed Massjouni, Christopher Andrews, Rahul Kanna, and Chris North, "VizCept: Supporting Synchronous Collaboration for Constructing Visualizations in Intelligence Analysis," in A. MacEachren and S. Miksch, eds., *Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Visual Analytics Science and Technology* (IEEE, 2010), p. 107.
[30] Cooper, p. 46.
[31] Michelle Gauthier, "Validation Workshop of the DRDC Concept Map Knowledge Model: Issues in Intelligence Analysis," *Defence Research and Development Toronto* CR-2010-057 (2010), p. 33.
[32] Hart and Simon, p. 50.
[33] Ibid., p. 49.
[34] Gauthier, p. 33.
[35] Erik S. Connors, Patrick L. Craven, Michael D. McNeese, Tyrone Jefferson, Jr., Priya Bains, and David L. Hall, "An Application of the Akadam Approach to Intelligence Analyst Work," *Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting* 48 (2004), p. 628.
[36] Chung, Yang, Massjouni, Andrews, Kanna, and North, p. 108.
[37] Novak and Cañas, p. 9.
[38] Hart and Simon, p. 49.
[39] Johnston, p. 21.
[40] Hart and Simon, p. 50.
[41] Chung, Yang, Massjouni, Andrews, Kanna, and North, p. 114.
[42] Maia B. Cook and Harvey S. Smallman, "Human Factors of the Confirmation Bias in Intelligence Analysis: Decision Support from Graphical Evidence Landscapes," *Human Factors* 50, no. 5 (2008), p. 752.
[43] Ibid., p. 752.
[44] Judea Pearl, *Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems* (Morgan-Kaufmann, 1988), pp. 1-552.
[45] Daphne Koller, Nir Friedman, *Probabilistic Graphical Models: Principles and Techniques* (MIT Press, 2009), pp. 1-1213.
[46] David Easley and Jon Kleinberg, *Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1-744.
[47] Ross D. Shachter, "Probabilistic Inference and Influence Diagrams," *Operations Research* 36, no. 4 (1988), pp. 589-604.
[48] John Boardman and Brian Sauser, *Systems Thinking: Coping with 21st Century Problems* (CRC Press, 2008), pp. 1-240.
[49] Jeff Conklin, *Dialogue Mapping: Creating Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems* (John Wiley and Sons, 2006), pp. 1-266.
[50] Stephen E. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 1-262.
[51] John E. Hopcroft and Jeffrey D. Ullman, *Introduction to Automata Theory, Languages, and Computation* (Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 1-750.
[52] H. Van Dyke Parunak, Sven Brueckner, Elizabeth Downs, and Laura Sappelsa, "Swarming Estimation of Realistic Mental Models," in F. Giardini and F. Amblard, eds., *Multi-Agent-Based Simulation 2012, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 7838* (Springer-Verlag, 2013), pp. 43-55.
[53] H. Van Dyke Parunak and Elizabeth Downs, "Estimating Diversity among Forecaster Models," *Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence: Machine Aggregation of Human Judgment* Technical Report FS-12-06 (2012), pp. 49-50.
[54] Novak and Cañas, pp. 1-2.
[55] Parunak, Brueckner, Downs, and Sappelsa, p. 49.
[56] Ibid., p. 50.

[57] Richards J. Heuer, Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence* (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), p. 1.
[58] Ibid., p. 55.
[59] Cooper, p. 42.
[60] Derbentseva and Mandel, p. 9.
[61] Heuer, p. 2.
[62] Ibid., p. 65.
[63] Thompson, Hopf-Weichel and Geiselman, pp. 4-8.
[64] Heuer, pp. 60-1.
[65] Fishbein and Treverton, p. 13.
[66] Heuer, p. 60.
[67] Ibid., p. 32.
[68] Ibid., p. 38.
[69] Ibid., p. 33.
[70] Ibid., p. 34.
[71] Central Intelligence Agency, *A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis* (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2009), p. 2.
[72] Heuer, p. 85.
[73] Thompson, Hopf-Weichel and Geiselman, pp. 4-6.
[74] Heuer, p. 86.
[75] Gauthier, p. 27.
[76] CIA, p. 2.
[77] Gauthier, p. 27.
[78] Mareike Wegener, "Mark Lombardi: Death-Defying Acts of Art and Conspiracy," 2011, Unafilm, 79 minutes.
[79] Thompson, Hopf-Weichel and Geiselman, p. vii.
[80] CIA, p. 2.
[81] Gauthier, p. 2.

Laura Sappelsa is a Senior Analyst at Analytic Services, Inc., in Falls Church, VA. She is the Subject Matter Expert of the project under the Intelligence Advanced Research Project Agency's (IARPA) ACE program that developed the Narrative Space Model (NSM). She has done research in various fields, including scientific administration, molecular biology, cell biology, biodefense, biophysics, fluid physics, and radiation biology. She can be reached for any questions or comments on this article at laura.sappelsa@anser.org.

H. Van Dyke Parunak is a Senior Scientist at Soar Technology in Ann Arbor, MI. He has extensive academic and research background in artificial intelligence, swarm intelligence, and the discourse structure of natural language. He was Principal Investigator of the project under the IARPA ACE program that developed the NSM, and is currently developing a narrative approach to proactive anticipatory analysis and decision-making. He can be reached at van.parunak@soartech.com.

Sven A. Brueckner is Chief Scientist at AXON AI. He was Technical Lead of the project that developed the NSM and has also done extensive research in swarm intelligence, self-organizing systems, and analysis of massive data. He can be reached at sven.brueckner@axonconnected.com.

The Polemical Use of Islamic Law in the Education System of the United States Military and Federal Law Enforcement

by Dr. Rasheed Hosein

SUMMARY

In his examination of the compatibility of the Islamic legal tradition and its Western counterpart, William Gawthrop arrived at some startling and unsettling conclusions. Due to certain injunctions in the 14th century legal manual *The Reliance of the Traveller*, Gawthrop noted that there was ample evidence that Muslims could lie to protect each other, their faith, and themselves from non-Muslims. In the current "War on Terror," these conclusions have serious ramifications for legal proceedings and information gathering by Western law enforcement and intelligence organizations.

It is the critical misunderstanding of these sources that led to the rise of practices similar to the ones recently unearthed by Spencer Ackerman and other investigative journalists, and which prompted both the Departments of Defense and Justice to reevaluate their Middle East and Islamic studies training programs for military officers and Special Agents in the FBI. However, given the approach of the Bush White House in the early moments after 9/11, and the analytical direction the U.S. government took, mutually exclusive paradigms (i.e., Islam vs. the West) became the dominant view of affairs. In so doing, government analysts from (but not limited to) the FBI, DOJ, and DOD who used *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) displayed a general lack of understanding in the very nature of Islamic law, deducing that Islamic and Western legal traditions were uniform, and that methodology and approach were in reality the same as a conclusion, discovering behavioral maxims where no such injunctions existed.

BACKGROUND

When Spencer Ackerman began his exposé on outbound officer Middle East training in the Department of Defense (DoD) for the on-line news website of *Wired*, he illuminated some practices that were potentially quite troubling and—and reported accurately—clearly at odds with current dictates from the Army command element and a variety of federal agencies.[1] According to materials secured by Ackerman from a class offered by the U.S. military's Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC, part of National Defense University), the course's instructor, LTC Matthew Dooley, promoted a view which stated that "America's real terrorist enemy was not al-Qaeda – but the Islamic faith itself."[2] Indeed, similar training was provided by the FBI's Supervisory Intelligence Analyst William Gawthrop to FBI Special Agents at the Bureau's Academy in Quantico, VA, during this period. However, these instances raise a series of questions, such as the origin of this provocative and polemical position, its potential justification in core Islamic texts (a common assertion of this position's proponents), and the ramifications of such a position on U.S. foreign policy.

After the terrible events of September 11, 2001, the United States was faced with the reality of a devastating attack on American soil. Additionally, the nature of the attack presented some serious problems for analysts and law enforcement. The attackers themselves were mostly Saudi Arabian,[3] but the Bush White House quickly dispelled the notion that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was involved. How then could we frame and understand this attack? The notion of transnational terrorist groups was not unknown in 2001, but the events of September 11 (9/11) demanded a strong and decisive response, one that clearly required framing and direction.

As details emerged in the aftermath of that tragic day, a common factor shared by the hijackers was a particular religious ideology which was stridently anti-American in orientation. In terms of analytical approaches, the various branches of U.S. intelligence were now faced with the task of making sense of the resulting situation. Compounding any analytical approach to the rapidly changing situation immediately after 9/11 was the general orientation of our intelligence and analytical assets, directed as they were for decades toward a recently diminished Soviet threat in the milieu of a Cold War and not yet fully refocused on a threat from an Islamic world.

In very general terms, two dominant analytical paradigms emerged after 9/11 to help frame our potential response. The first of these paradigms was a framework which sought for us to understand and approach our ideological "enemy" by addressing its critique of our actions (i.e., what we do). This particular approach is very introspective and difficult, as it

requires us to look critically at our own culpability in interactions with the Islamic World. The second broadly generalized ideological approach was one that was decidedly more systematized, establishing civilizational paradigms on a model similar to that of Samuel Huntington.[4] This approach looked for systemic and organizational variations inherent in different civilizational models (e.g., who we are and how we differ from them), with an eye toward areas of organization and any potential weaknesses that we could exploit. The direction that several key U.S. policy leaders and the Bush White House chose was the latter,[5] and proceeding from this basic assumption the country waded toward a newly emerging war on terror.

Any domestic threat posed by al-Qaeda seemed at best to be marginalized, and at worst totally ignored in intelligence circles...

Since the attackers were all Muslim, our critique should logically be focused on that element, but was this to be a war on Islam? It was clear that this conflict was not against a specific Muslim nation (such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan). To many policymakers and analysts, a non-conventional war had been declared on America and, as details emerged, the case against al-Qaeda developed. Osama bin Laden, the titular head of the organization, proclaimed his group's desire to attack America publicly in a variety of fora as early as September 2, 1996, again for good measure on February 23, 1998, and many times thereafter.[6] However, any domestic threat posed by al-Qaeda seemed at best to be marginalized, and at worst totally ignored in intelligence circles, despite a steady increase in the intensity and effectiveness of attacks attributed to and executed by the group against U.S. assets abroad (both military and government). However, while Osama bin Laden, himself a member of an extremely wealthy Saudi elite family, held some influence given his connections to and substantial fundraising for the Afghan *mujâhidîn*[7] movement through agencies such as the Afghan Services Bureau,[8] the question of how common extremist views such as his were throughout the Islamic world was debatable. Since bin Laden's warnings to the U.S. government and its people followed established Islamic legal forms, and his arguments and claims against America were couched in language that recalled Qur'ânic verses, some *hadîths*[9] from the major collections, and most importantly opinions and commentaries from selected religious and juridical hardliners,[10] the answer for many in intelligence circles lay in understanding the elements of Islamic legal practice. Very quickly we looked toward the major Muslim legal schools and the mass of materials therein for a better understanding.

Stretching back to the formative age of Islam, the emerging Muslim polity was faced with the very important issue of models of orthopraxy and orthodoxy, and from where to derive them. The Prophet Muhammad was the prime model for both action and belief, but with his death the community had to look at other alternatives. Were these religious practices open to reinvention by descendants of Muhammad, or were they largely canonized in the views and practices of the first centuries of the early community? A large majority of Islamic society (i.e., the Sunnî Muslims) followed a pattern that utilized the latter, but in doing so they were immediately limited to a small and finite series of verses in the Qur'ân[11] and a larger but somewhat tendentious collection of prophetic actions and deeds known as the *hadîth*. It was the human interpretation of these works, referred to as *fiqh* (jurisprudence) by legal scholars (known as the *fuqahâ'*), which filled the void between the explicit dictates of God's law—or the *sharî'ah*—and the practical, everyday needs of the Muslim community.

In his construction of the now infamous JFSC class on Islam, LTC Dooley relied heavily on the research of investigators like William Gawthrop, the former Program Manager of the Joint Terrorism Task Force of the Defense Department's Counterintelligence Field Activity unit and retired member of the U.S. military, and who is now currently employed by the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence. Gawthrop sought to identify patterns within this interpretive legal tradition of Islam by examining an important law manual as a key representative source. His choice was a translation by Nuh Ha Mim Keller of the Shâfi'î[12] legal manual *The Reliance of the Traveller: A Classical Manual of Islamic Law* by Shihâb al-Dîn Ahmad b. al-Naqîb al-Misrî (d. 1367).[13] Utilizing this work, Gawthrop hoped to present:

> … a broad view of various considerations confronting intelligence and law enforcement personnel involved in investigations in which some or all of the principal players … may be subject to the obligations of two competing legal disciplines; the sharia and the protocols of secular, state sponsored, legally sufficient criminal investigations.[14]

In the post-9/11 world, such analysis, as the author points out, is indeed a critical tool for wading through the mass of sources and data in the maintenance of national security. However, as we shall see, such tools may also prove to be dangerous weapons if mishandled.

SHÂFI'Î SCHOLARSHIP, AL-MISRÎ, AND *THE RELIANCE OF THE TRAVELLER*

The life and times of Ahmad b. al-Naqîb al-Misrî are fascinating, and shed some light on the importance of *The Reliance of the Traveller* as a legal source. Born in Cairo in 1302, Ahmad al-Misrî's father, who came from a Christian family in Antioch, converted to Islam after serving as a captain (*naqîb*) for his Muslim master.[15] The period of history just before his birth was one of the most tumultuous in the Near East, having witnessed such major events as the Seventh Crusade (1248-1254) and the defeat of European forces at the Battle of Mansûrah (1250); the Mamlûk military commanders' revolt against the scions of Salâh al-Dîn al-Ayyûbî (d. 1193, more famously known as Saladin in the West), which in turn led to the establishment of the Mamlûk dynasty (1250-1517); and the Mongol invasion of Iran and Iraq which ended direct 'Abbâsid rule in 1258 and finally triggered a climactic confrontation and subsequent defeat in 1260 at the Battle of 'Ayn Jâlût against the aforementioned Mamlûks. Throughout this period and into the life of Ahmad al-Misrî, Egypt also faced pestilence and plague, the latter taking his life in 1368.[16]

Ahmad al-Misrî is perhaps best known for *The Reliance of the Traveller*, which is an authoritative collection of decisions by the leading jurist-counsels of the Shâfi'î legal school of the age. As such, the work is not solely that of Ahmad al-Misrî but is rather a summary of legal decisions, many of which were formulated in the chaotic period just before his birth. The organizing framework of Ahmad al-Misrî's work is found in the earlier *al-Majmû': sharh al-Muhadhdhab* (*The Gathered Whole: Commentary of the Wise*) by Muhyî al-Dîn al-Nawawî (d. 1277). This 20-volume work was ostensibly a commentary on the decisions of the jurist-counsel Abû Ishâq al-Shîrâzî (d. 1083), a teacher with ascetic tendencies at the famed Nizâmiyyah *madrasah*, which was founded by the great Saljûq vizier Nizâm al-Mulk (d. 1092) to serve as the primary bastion of majority (Sunnî) doctrine.[17] In addition to Abû Ishâq al-Shîrâzî, there are 135 other works included—either in the commentary or the appendices—in the *Reliance of the Traveller*, marking it a rich textual source and an excellent starting point for inquiry. Additionally, its translation[18] was endorsed shortly after its publication in 1997 by Egypt's al-Azhar University, which is known throughout the Islamic world for its rigor, and is indeed among the highest accolades for a primary source translation.[19]

It is important to note, though, that a work like the *Reliance of the Traveller* is not meant to be a legal book that denotes a practical approach to the law and daily life. There are many other books in the Shâfi'î *madhhab* alone, such as the earlier work *Ihyâ 'ulûm al-Dîn* (*Revival of the Religious Sciences*) by the famed mystic and theologian Abû Hâmid Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111), or even direct works from the aforementioned Muhyî al-Dîn al-Nawawî like *al-Maqâsid* (*The Aims*),[20] both of which are meant to be used by the individual believer in everyday settings. Rather, the milieu of Ahmad al-Misrî, which was one of foreign intervention, political revolution, and domestic instability, defined the tone and tenor of this collected work. These factors, among others, were critical in the collecting and shaping of the material which went into *The Reliance of the Traveller*, for the work appears to be the product of its age as much as the genius of its compiler and the author of its commentary. Legal texts which enumerate a wide range of aspects pertaining to orthopraxy are especially needed in times of stress, particularly when events are in flux and moral and doctrinal flexibility may provide some needed security from the dangers present in every other aspect of life. Indeed, very few eras are able to match the time of Ahmad al-Misrî for political, cultural, and military foment.

POLEMICS AND FIQH: *THE RELIANCE OF THE TRAVELLER*

Often, those who attempt assessments of *fiqh* texts, such as *The Reliance of the Traveller*, reference them for legal opinions on topics such as slander[21] and lying,[22] to name a few. Islamic legal opinions on topics like these have direct applicability in our current climate of conflict given increased contact with Muslim individuals (both in supportive and adversarial roles). These are crucial elements in intelligence gathering and also have substantial ramifications for the processes of trial law in the judicial systems of the West. However, they also assist in the establishment of a dichotomy between civilizations, which seemed to be the dominant analytical paradigm in the aftermath of 9/11.

On the issue of slander, analysts and commentators such as Gawthrop note that Islam's *fiqh* (juridical) definition contains an element missing from the Western one, creating a potentially exploitable division between the West and the Islamic world. Whereas the West defines slander, according to Gawthrop, as "the utterance of false charges or misrepresentations which defame and damage another's reputation,"[23] Islamic law broadens this definition to include any utterance about an individual whom one would dislike and adds that "the Muslim is the brother of the Muslim. He does not betray him, lie to him, or hang back from coming to his aid."[24] The underlying subtext is that there is a legal and moral imperative for a Muslim to safeguard other Muslims, and to speak any ill of a fellow Muslim constitutes an intolerable form of slander.

On the issue of lying, Gawthrop notes the exceptional situations when such an otherwise reprehensible act is indeed sanctioned. Briefly mentioned are the practices of *taqiyyah* (dissimulation) and *kitmân* (secrecy or

concealment), and their linkages to both the Shî'î and Sunnî branches of Islam. However, the crux of the author's critique on lying is found in his assessment of the aforementioned al-Ghazâlî. Citing passages belonging to al-Ghazâlî in *The Reliance of the Traveller*, Gawthrop attempts to show that there exists a systemic tendency toward lying in key instances. Gawthrop notes the following: "When, for example, one is concealing a Muslim from an oppressor who asks where he is, it is obligatory to lie about him being hidden."[25]

Additionally, Gawthrop points to the 9th century collections of Muhammad b. Ismâ'îl al-Bukhârî (d. 870) and Abû al-Husayn Muslim b. al-Hajjâj al-Nîsâbûrî (d. 875), both of whose works are generally regarded as the most authoritative in the *hadîth* genre. According to the oral record, one of the Prophet's wives, Umm Kulthûm, reported that Muhammad said it was permissible to lie in three explicit instances: war, settling disagreements, and discussions between married couples (to smooth over differences).[26] What appears to emerge is a picture of duality in terms of "the truth." Lying looks to be a context-based exercise, wherein the speaker can determine the best words to expedite difficult situations, without regard for their veracity or more importantly their moral implications.

ASSESSMENT OF THE FIQH CRITICAL APPROACH

When approaching material of this genre, one must do so very carefully, for by ignoring historical context it is easy to make mistakes which, given their context, could have severe repercussions. In a world free of issues such as context, one may view, as Gawthrop and others do, that Muslims are required (both morally and legally) to avoid slander and indeed lie on behalf of fellow Muslims. Following this line of reasoning, he concludes that Western legal standards and principles are often useless for depositions and trials involving Muslims. Even Muslim lawyers and translators for the government may be suspect for the same reasons. The idea that a Muslim (even one in a position of trust and authority) would have no issue with lying in order to protect another co-religionist for no other reason than a shared religious outlook is a borderline racist view. However, the fact that this idea holds currency with some analysts raises some serious ethical questions, as it implies a sort of moral relativism that reinforces a difference in civilization—an "us vs. them" paradigm—while presenting Muslims as automatons incapable of choice, in effect dehumanizing them. We shall see, though, that upon closer scrutiny, a view such as this shows critical deficiencies in interpretation and scholarship, drastically undermining its usefulness.

One issue is the desire by many analysts to find a single representative work from which they may test analytical models and cull their conclusions. While it may be useful for social scientists to construct evidence-driven models in many fields of study, this type of approach requires the necessary historical perspective and source-critical approach to use documentary sources like the Qur'ân and *hadîth* properly. *The Reliance of the Traveller*, as an example, is a very important work, but it by no means constitutes the totality of *fiqh* belonging to the Shâfi'î *madhhab*, let alone the other orthodox *madhhabs*[27] or the *sharî'ah*. It is the cumulative doctrine from important Shâfi'î scholars that the compiler Ahmad b. al-Naqîb found noteworthy. While it is an indispensable compendium of legal opinion for the Shâfi'î *madhhab* in English translation, it was not by any means a comprehensive treatment of Shâfi'î *fiqh*, nor does it take into account any opinions rendered in the last 640 years. That would be somewhat akin to the *Magna Carta* remaining the primary law of England and Wales from its 1297 reissue.[28]

There is such a rich body of *fiqh* literature available, works which possess equal or greater stature in the genre than *The Reliance of the Traveller*. Legal texts and collections do not stand by themselves, but serve to inform the community (or *ummah*) of a shared series of values that are encoded within the laws. Nevertheless, they are sufficiently flexible to be reinterpreted in order to fit other needs and other times. In so doing, new interpretive structures are formed and the community continually reinvents itself within some defined but flexible parameters. One important factor in approaching *fiqh*, however, is that the overwhelming majority of this material is in Arabic. This fact calls us to address a critical issue: How can highly placed analysts and individual scholars reasonably assess a legal tradition as broad and expansive as Islam's *fiqh* literature by using only secondary literature and the barest fraction of the primary literature in translation?

Additionally, analysts falling into traps such as this invariably display no allowance for the understanding of time and place regarding this and other seminal works in the field of Islamic jurisprudence, tacitly assuming that these legal texts exist within vacuums and that the issues and concerns of people remain static, despite the passage of time. According to the best estimates available in modern scholarship, the conversion rate to Islam in Egypt, where *The Reliance of the Traveller* was penned, passes the 50% mark only sometime in the 9th century,[29] reaching roughly 80% by the advent of the Mamlûk sultanate in 1250. However, it is during the initial years of Mamlûk rule (i.e., the 13th century) that the confessional rates finally stabilized at roughly 90% Muslim and 10% Coptic Christian,[30] which continues to be the rough breakdown in Egypt today.[31] Due to various policies enacted by the ruling military elite there

was, in the early years of Mamlûk power, a concerted effort to limit the considerable power wielded by Coptic functionaries holding high offices in the sultanate.[32] It is not difficult to understand that these communal tensions may have begun to appear in the legal opinions of the *qâdîs*.[33] The underlying message becomes one of supporting one's own confessional community, which played in nicely with the official edicts of the time, but was either not necessarily meant for posterity or not viewed as applicable beyond the immediate needs to resolve a specific issue (both of which are prerequisites for legal codes as we understand them).

The legal traditions in the Western and Islamic Worlds are extremely different.

Another element that must be considered is the Islamic worldview of that medieval age. In the view of many at this time, the world was framed and divided into discrete zones: the *dâr al-Islâm* (the abode of Islam), the *dâr al-Harb* (abode of war), and the *dâr al-Sulh*[34] (the abode of treaty or reconciliation). While some view this as a bleak and stark worldview, it served a very practical purpose. It denoted where Islam was the dominant paradigm, where there was conflict between the Islamic paradigm and competing ideologies, and with whom there existed peaceful (treaty-regulated) relationships. The Islamic legal schools of the classical and medieval periods did not envision, as a practical reality, large Muslim populations living outside the borders of the *dâr al-Islâm*. Currently, Muslim scholars cite various passages in both the Qur'ân and the *hadîth* literature that hold the local (and therefore non-Muslim) legal practice as the paramount authority for Muslims living outside the *dâr al-Islâm*.[35] As a result, the notion that Islamic law dictates or otherwise animates the judgment of Muslims in a manner from which one can neither resist nor deviate is a view lacking in context and is potentially dangerous to hold.

An additional answer to this conundrum may lie with the strategic allocation of analytical resources in the post-9/11 world. To say that an Islamic threat was not envisioned prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks is incorrect, but it is fair to say that the training for our Intelligence Community was still dominated by Cold War paradigms up to the mid-1990s,[36] and the senior leadership in intelligence circles in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was firmly inculcated with that mindset. As a result, this "clash of civilizations" model is a theoretical one which dovetails rather nicely with a Cold War mentality. In a very real sense, the answer to the fundamental question of "why they hate us" had only one outcome because, as a bi-product of our Cold War training, we lacked the analytical framework to view these events in any other way.

This issue also brings a host of other related questions to the fore. The legal traditions in the Western and Islamic Worlds are extremely different. Western legal traditions tend either to enumerate all the actions that are forbidden or restricted (which implies that everything else is lawful, i.e., English Common Law), or to proscribe a list of all the actions that are lawful (and consequently forbidding everything else, i.e., Roman law). Both of these models imply a finished product (by consensus, majority opinion, or custom) and an established, definitive method of derivation, wherein the final product is then written and codified for the benefit of the state and its citizenry. Proscriptive and restrictive legal traditions both presuppose established legal frameworks, presumably to assess, amend, and (in some cases) remove laws. This is not so with regard to Islamic legal traditions.

In Sunnî Islam alone, there are four distinct *madhhabs*, each one of which approaches legal questions in a different manner and uses a different methodological process to arrive at conclusions. Likewise, all four schools are mutually orthodox for Sunnî Muslims, which results in unique situations and flexibility of interpretation. A Muslim who approaches a *qâdî* may seek a different ruling from another judge or even another legal school until satisfied. In this way, Islam lacks a single legal framework, opting instead for multiple frameworks that are largely context-based. The implications for this point should not be understated. Many analysts looking at this complex collection of material see only a series of "injunctions" that Muslims must follow. This implies that Muslims will lie in the face of Western law, and that Muslims (either in deposition or at trial), their Muslim lawyers, and even their translators cannot be trusted to uphold Western ideals because they are enjoined to promote through dissimulation and other means Islamic law.

Overarching all of these factors is the critical Qur'ânic concept *al-amr bi-l-ma'rûf wa-l-nahy 'an al-munkar* (enjoining right and forbidding wrong).[37] Often framed as an imperative for Muslims, it dovetails rather nicely with the theory proposed by analysts such as Gawthrop. This particular phrase appears eight times in the text of the Qur'ân, marking it as a particularly important concept for Muslims.[38] On the surface, it would appear that such a concept would limit the ability of a Muslim to act. In all things, a Muslim must "enjoin what is right and forbid what is evil." However, this is not always practical and Muslim tradition presents a very pragmatic approach to such a difficult and thorny issue.

In the historical sources, the great Muslim theologian and legal scholar Abû Hanîfah (d. 767) is recorded as having discussions with Ibrâhîm b. Maymûn (d. 748), one of his students and a goldsmith by trade in the city of Marw, who was renowned for both his piety and probity.[39] According to the narrative, Ibn Maymûn repeatedly exhorted Abû

Hanîfah to rebel against the military commander of the region, who was named Abû Muslim (d. 755) and who was also among the chief architects of the Abbasid revolution that led to the collapse of the Umayyad dynasty (661-750). Despite the fact that Abû Hanîfah is recorded as having agreed with all the points his student made, he refused the call to revolt, citing a lack of understanding of the ramifications of such an action as the cause for his reticence.[40] If an evil arose out of this injunction, even if it is an unintended consequence, then one was not correctly following the injunction to enjoin right and forbid evil.

CONCLUSION

It should come as no surprise that this previously discussed adversarial approach has gained such a hold among the military and in policy and analytical circles, as evidenced by Ackerman's exposés of the recent scandals regarding FBI counterterrorism training and senior officer training in the military. Early on, the Bush White House charted its initial response to 9/11 by framing the conflict in broadly generalized ideological terms. We were at war with a militant brand of Islam, not with mainstream Islam, which is a peaceful religion. Nevertheless, that a dichotomy was enunciated and inherent within this framework is the implication of a mutual exclusivity for both traditions, presupposing that an element of Muslims was not and could never be Western in outlook. However, in our attempts to understand the elements of Muslim religious practice and why branches within that faith tradition were becoming more fundamentalist in outlook, it appears that for some analysts the lines increasingly began to blur between those Muslims we could trust and those we could not. In this way, one may argue that agents such as Gawthrop were merely meeting a mandate but, by using the sources in the way they did, many of these trainers now being investigated were essentializing the material and synthesizing responses to fit narrow political agendas and tendentious theoretical models.

In an instance where there was no clear discriminator except for the level of religiosity, and set within a framework that presupposed a "clash of civilizations" model, a source-critical critique of *fiqh* was an attractive option. Additionally, as *fiqh* works began to be translated, it opened up for analysts a panacea of opportunities, but at the same time a ready trap for those who do not understand, or choose to misrepresent, the literature. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it allowed for a ready justification of extremist attitudes. It was a principal component of Islamic civilization (as a practical legal code) and, while religious in inspiration, it could be argued that *fiqh* was—and continues to be—principally an endeavor and exercise of human reasoning. As such, this interpretive framework was not subject to the constitutional protections of the First Amendment and could be attacked with virtual impunity under the rubric of academic inquiry.

Still, as we have seen throughout this discussion, the laws derived from the Muslim legal schools are neither proscriptive nor restrictive in their orientation and therefore do not function as laws as we in the West view them. Rather, these are opinions or suggestions that are derived by a rigorous, methodological approach. They have a concrete underpinning in both the time and place of their inception and the general intellectual currents that surround them. Most importantly, they are merely the logical extension of certain principles, not final legal conclusions. In this way, *The Reliance of the Traveller*, for instance, is not a work of law. It is merely one book among many that enumerate non-binding legal opinions and decisions, which Muslims are free to choose or reject as their consciences decide, and there are no paradigms outside of the *sharî'ah* that are absolutely binding upon the believer. Even the explicit, although oblique, Qur'ânic dictate to enjoin right and forbid evil has a context and an applied framework of understanding.

In conclusion, there are many shades of Islam within the orthodox framework, just as there are many heterodox practices that are so prevalent that people assume they are orthodox (i.e., customary practices that over time begin carrying the force of law). This reality is no different from the Jewish and Christian traditions which are more familiar to us in the West. Moreover, in setting up this dichotomy, the U.S. government, at least initially, closed the door to any discussions with the Islamic world. By emphasizing the Islamist critique of the West as a function of "who we are," it presupposed no open avenues of negotiation or mediation. Conflict between the Islamic world and the West became the only outcome.

[Author's Note: I would like to thank the following colleagues for their invaluable assessment and input to this project: COL Pilar Ryan, COL Matt Moten, COL Gian Gentile, MAJ C.J. Kirkpatrick, Prof. Greta Butcher, Prof. Tom Nimick, and Prof. David Frey. Their advice and comments were invaluable for this piece.]

NOTES

[1] Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Training*, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cve-training-guidance.pdf (accessed May 14, 2012).

[2] Spencer Ackerman, "U.S. Military Taught Officers: Use 'Hiroshima' Tactics for 'Total War' on Islam," *Wired*, May 10, 2012, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/05/total-war-islam/?utm_source=Contextly&utm_medium=RelatedLinks&utm_campaign=MoreRecently (accessed May 14, 2012).

[3] Fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, with two from the United Arab Emirates and one each from Lebanon and Egypt.
[4] For more, please refer to Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998).
[5] James Fallows, "Bush's Lost Year," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 294, no. 3 (2004), p. 82.
[6] Michael Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), p. xvi.
[7] Due to its commonality in English parlance, I will use the Arabic sound plural for this word.
[8] The Afghan Services Bureau (*Maktab khidamât al-Mujâhiddîn al-'Arab*) was established in 1984 by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam for the purpose of assisting the *mujâhidîn* resist the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
[9] I will use the English plural system here for ease. The plural of *hadîth* in Arabic is the broken pattern *ahadîth*. This body of literature constitutes the transmitted reports on the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.
[10] Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Touchstone, 2002), p. 81.
[11] Only approximately 80 of the 6,346 verses deal explicitly with legal issues. For more please refer to Corinna Standke, *Sharia – The Islamic Law* (Norderstedt, Germany: Verlag, 2008), p. 3.
[12] One of the four canonical Sunnî legal schools, it is most prevalent in Egypt, where the tomb of Imâm al-Shâfi'î is located.
[13] Ahmad b. al-Naqîb, *Umdat al-Sâlik wa Uddat al-Nâsik* (Evanston, IL: Sunna Press, 1993).
[14] William Gawthrop, "The Impacts of Suicide Bombers on American Society," *Suicide as a Weapon*, Fairfax: IOS Press, 2007, p. 76.
[15] Farhat J. Ziadeh, "The Reliance of the Traveller," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 115.1 (1995), p. 147.
[16] Ziadeh, p. 147.
[17] E. Chaumont, "al-Shîrâzî, al-Shaykh al-Imâm Abû Ishaq Ibrâhîm b. 'Alî b. Yûsuf al-Fîrûzâbâdî," (Leiden, The Netherlands, 2007), Brill Online.
[18] Ahmad b. al-Naqîb, *Reliance of the Traveller: The Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred law Umdat al-Salik* (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1997).
[19] Gawthrop, p. 82.
[20] There is some debate as to whether *al-Maqâsid* was truly written by al-Nawawî, but the general consensus among Shâfi'î theologians is that its attribution to him is accurate.
[21] Gawthrop, p. 83.
[22] Gawthrop, p. 84.
[23] Gawthrop, p. 83.
[24] Gawthrop, p. 83.
[25] Gawthrop, p. 84.
[26] Gawthrop, p. 84.
[27] I have chosen to use the English plural system here for ease. The plural of *madhhab* in Arabic is the broken pattern *madhdhâhib*.
[28] It is important to note that three of the 37 statutes remain in force on the legal statute books of England and Wales from the 1297 reissue of *Magna Carta*.
[29] Shaun O'Sullivan, "Coptic Conversion and the Islamization of Egypt," *Mamlûk Studies Review, vol. X, no. 2* (*2006*), p. 76.
[30] O'Sullivan, p. 78.
[31] "Egypt," *CIA: The World Factbook* (Langley, VA, 2007), online edition.
[32] For more on this topic, please see Tamer el-Leithy, "Coptic Culture and Conversion in Medieval Cairo: 1293-1524 AD" (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2005), and J.B. Chabot, ed., *Chronique de Denys de Tell Mahré, quatrième partie* (Paris, 1895).
[33] A *qâdî* is a judge in one of the various legal schools. Please note that English plural preference is exercised here (the correct plural is the broken pattern *qudâah*).
[34] There are other terms that other medieval scholars have used to describe the divisions of the world, including *dâr al-Hudnah* (abode of Calm) and *dâr al-'Ahd* (abode of Truce), among others.
[35] Muhammad Khalid Masud, "The Obligation to Migrate: The Doctrine of *Hijra* in Islamic Law," *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and Religious Imagination*, edited by Dale Eickleman and James Piscatori (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 39.
[36] Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 4 (2007), p. 10. For an interesting piece on this phenomenon prior to 9/11, refer to Elaine Sciolino, "Seeing Green; the Red Menace is Gone. But Here's Islam," *New York Times*, January 21, 1996.
[37] This concept is often repeated in the Qur'ân, and was expounded upon by the early 14th century theologian Taqî al-Dîn Ahmad b. Taymiyyah (d. 1328), *al-amr bi-l-ma'rûf wa-l-nahy 'an al-munkar* (Beirut: Dâr al-Kitâb al-Jadîd, 1976). An excellent study of this injunction was carried out by Michael Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[38] Cook, p. 13 (*cf.* 3:104, 3:110, 3:114, 7:157, 9:71, 9:112, 22:41, and 31.17).
[39] Wilfred Madelung, "The Early Murji'a in Khurâsân and Transoxania and the Spread of Hanafism," *Der Islam*, vol. LIX, no. 1 (1982), p. 35.
[40] Cook, pp. 4-5.

Dr. Rasheed Hosein has been teaching Western Civilization and Middle Eastern History at the U.S. Military Academy since July 2011. Prior to that, he was in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago, where he earned a doctorate in pre-Islamic and early Islamic history in December 2010. During his time there, Dr. Hosein also served as the Director of Public Education for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago, a Title VI National Resource Center. He also attended the University of Toronto, where he earned a master's degree in Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations, and the University of Manitoba, where he received an Honours degree in Medieval European History.

The Wisdom of the Crowd in the Cloud:

Crowdsourcing and Intelligence Education

by Daniel W. Opstal

INTRODUCTION

Crowdsourcing, a *portmanteau* of "crowd" and "outsourcing," is the use of an open, voluntary data call among an online crowd to solve a problem.[1] This powerful capability can enable individuals with an Internet connection to participate in solving dynamic problems in the business, education, and intelligence sectors. This trend, fueled by the ubiquitous use of mobile social media worldwide, is important to understand, especially for intelligence analysts. The first case study chronicles a company taking a big gamble.

Goldcorp, a Canadian gold mining company heavily in debt, used crowdsourcing to grow into a multi-million dollar enterprise. It placed online its entire repository of information on Red Lake, a 55,000-acre site, and challenged anyone interested to help it find its target: at least six million ounces of gold. The participants providing the best methods and estimates were offered a prize of $575,000. Over a thousand participants in 50 countries registered, many with a scientific or technical background.[2] The result of the "Goldcorp Challenge" led to the identification of 110 new gold-digging sites, of which 80% yielded substantial quantities of gold. The company estimated that the challenge saved "3 years of exploration time" and increased its profits from 2 to 52 million dollars.[3] Not surprisingly, this type of grass-roots initiative benefits national security. Jesse Wilson, a writer for *Joint Force Quarterly*, contends that National Intelligence Council assessments, especially those dealing with global trends, tend to be unclassified and fall more into the realm of traditional academic thought vice more sensitive military and political topics.[4] This makes these kinds of topics ideal candidates for crowdsourcing. The business and national security communities each provide lessons, positive and negative, with which to examine the implications of crowdsourcing for current and future intelligence analysts, especially in the arena of education. The business of crowdsourcing can be seen clearly through the case study of the InfoArmy, a research firm using a crowdsourcing model.

CROWDSOURCING IN BUSINESS: THE INFOARMY'S BATTLE PLAN

Jim Fowler, the CEO of InfoArmy, announced in February 2013 that the InfoArmy was temporarily routed due to a combination of factors. Yet, the rise and fall of this remarkable market research start-up bears close scrutiny because of its use of crowdsourcing. The InfoArmy developed gorgeous market-based reports, consumable on any iPad or any other computing device, hence leveraging the "wisdom of the crowd."[5] The operating model was relatively simple; anyone online could sign up to be a market researcher by following three steps:

(1) Claim a company, then follow InfoArmy's guided process for creating a company report. There is a 7-day turnaround for researchers to complete their report.
(2) Upon completion, primary researchers submit the report for review and collaboration with a senior researcher, who combines company data with competitor data, creating a sleek consolidated report.
(3) When a report is published, the primary researcher receives $10. Each time the final report is purchased (at $99), the primary researcher receives 40% of the proceeds, the senior researcher gets 10%, and InfoArmy gets the rest (50%). Researchers agree to update the report every quarter (if they want to continue getting paid).[6]

At its height, InfoArmy had thousands of researchers across the spectrum, and yet the company failed. Why? According to a letter sent out by the CEO, the problems were issues with sales (not enough individual sales registrations), incorrect data sets (revenue projections, etc.), and a publication incentive system that did not focus enough on quality.[7]

Consequently, what is the true difference between the successes of Goldcorp and the failure of InfoArmy? The reasons vary, but incentives in this case matter. InfoArmy offered a small amount of money to its researchers, and got a small amount of return on investment with which it was not

able to sustain its performance. Goldcorp offered a sum of $575,000, received a large haul of data leading to millions of dollars of gold, and changed the conventionally-minded mining industry for good.

Examining a positive and a negative experience within the crowdsourcing business community teaches us that, while openness and communal sharing of data can yield great results, the right kind of thinkers have to participate and the incentives have to be worth their while. Hence, applying crowdsourcing to the national security arena is a complex endeavor, as is anything that touches what Harvard Professor Joseph Nye calls "the three-dimensional chess game of international relations."[8]

CROWDSOURCING IN NATIONAL SECURITY: GETTING THE INCENTIVES RIGHT

Wilson references initiatives such as the National Intelligence Council's Global Threats series as good candidates for a crowdsourcing approach. The latest such document, which analyzes the megatrends and game-changing impacts shaping the alternative worlds of the year 2030, used a blog approach to ensure the trends made sense. The fact that this long-term analysis document focused on trends meant it could keep the information at the completely unclassified level, opening the aperture for a wide range of opinions. With over 71,000 blog hits from 167 different countries, the document clearly made an impact.[9] Yet, why is this so interesting for people vice the market research of the InfoArmy? First of all, these are general data applicable to the entire world vice a specific market segment. Second, the powerful incentive of supporting one's national security interest is the motivator—not money. Third, the study aggregates trends sufficiently so as not to reveal any intelligence sources or methods. These three factors are part of a set that helps identify the kind of national security work appropriate for national security. Wikis, blogs, and collaborative spaces all fall into the same kind of model, and represent an adaptation on various secure computer systems exactly because they delve into the specifics of key intelligence subject matter. They get the incentives right for their community of interest. That said, there remain counterintelligence and other concerns in using these types of techniques. Aggregation efforts such as the NIC assessments are very useful for this toolset because they aggregate data and look at trends, but more specific queries could lead analysts astray.

What if Goldcorp attracted a business competitor which set up a cyber-attack (such as denial of service or botnet) that took down the website? Gathering the right kind of personnel with the right kind of knowledge at the right time is truly the real feat of crowdsourcing information. The theory behind crowdsourcing is an application of a statistical phenomenon known as the "long-tailed distribution" curve. Nicholas Mumm, an author for *Small Wars Journal*, explains this phenomenon in terms of human intelligence reporting by stating that "a large number of single human intelligence reports collected from a large population size exceed the value of a large number of reports collected from a few sources."[10] Having examined crowdsourcing in both the business and intelligence sectors, it makes sense to look at a place where the incentives of this kind of approach outweigh the negative consequences and counterintelligence concerns which keep crowdsourcing of specific topics behind the firewall of secure IT devices. One of those arenas is the topic of intelligence analyst education.



Long-Tailed Power Distribution Diagram
(Source: http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/12036)
Green represents the most frequently occurring 20%; the yellow (long tail) represents the other 80%. The long-tailed diagram indicates that the most frequently occurring 20% of items (reports, sales, etc.) represent less than 50% of occurrences (hits on a website, data reviews, etc.). In other words, the least frequently occurring 80% of items are more important as a proportion of the total population.[11]

COMBINING THEMES: USES OF CROWDSOURCING FOR INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION

The Intelligence Community (IC) is hard at work trying to leverage academic and business programs regarding crowdsourcing predictions. These examples immediately benefit a budding intelligence analyst's situational awareness and education in terms of understanding these types of initiatives. The first effort looks at crowdsourcing as a source of predictive analyses.

George Mason University's Decomposition Based Aggregative (DAGGRE) program, funded by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), tests the concept of long-tailed distribution as it applies to the prediction of global crises. A GMU newsletter notes that "the researchers are recruiting a diverse group of participants to discover whether certain types of people are better than others at making accurate predictions. Participants will be asked to provide predictions about events and trends in areas such as politics, the military, economics, business and science and technology."[12] This initiative is being recast (at the time of this writing) into a prediction service titled SciCast, which anyone can sign up for with regard to predictions on science and technology issues.[13] This type of analysis seeks to replicate the Goldcorp success, where the right geologists signed up and provided the company with a means to find the gold. If the right kinds of minds sign up, then the intelligence, like gold from the earth, can be brought to the surface. Traditional means of disseminating and requesting information through crowdsourcing are also available, such as the widely used LinkedIn.

American Military University students can leverage LinkedIn groups to discover new information about jobs, coursework, and intelligence problem sets in a general sense.[14] Taking this concept a few steps further, the IntelCenter has developed six different intelligence-related feeds that can be shipped off via text or SMS to any kind of consumer and client. These feeds include "Terrorist and Rebel Alerts, Threats, Incidents, Significant Events, Kidnappings."[15] While these feeds can give a general sense of all-source intelligence reporting, crowdsourcing services are rapidly becoming much more targeted as well. From an intelligence education standpoint, the website Tomnod provides an analyst a good feel for what it might be like to serve as an imagery analyst in addition to potentially providing relevant data on a domestic security incident.

Tomnod offers a perspective on imagery analysis while giving the public an opportunity to solve real-world crises. The term derives from the Mongolian word for "Big Eye" and provides anyone with Internet access the ability to mark data based on select images provided by DigitalGlobe, a satellite imagery provider, for the purposes of solving an imagery-related problem set. For example, the current Tomnod page of September 1, 2013, provided the public the opportunity to tag information related to the missing schooner *Nina*, lost off the coast of New Zealand since June 4, 2013.



Imagery of the Missing Vessel* Nina *on the Tomnod Website
(Source: http://www.tomnod.com/nod/challenge/ninarescue2)

Leveraging the above examples of both all-source intelligence reporting and imagery tagging via crowdsourcing, an analyst can gain some exposure to these fields without sitting in a facility accredited to process classified information. Unlike most educational initiatives, educators can ask their students to participate actively in these fora, wikis, blogs, and links. The students can immediately contribute to the wider conversation on the rescue of the *Nina*, for example, and perhaps determine a little bit about their aptitude and interest in this type of work. Tomnod, leveraging the long-tailed distribution curve concept, has expert imagery analysts examine areas that have been "tagged" repeatedly as "interesting" by a large number of participants. Relevant tags, in this sense, can contribute directly to the rescue effort.

CONCLUSION

Crowdsourcing clearly has potential for the national security and intelligence communities, and has provided great value in certain segments of the business community. While Goldcorp succeeded, InfoArmy did not, illustrating that the concept is not a panacea. From an intelligence education viewpoint, the incentives in terms of learning about the intelligence business are very clear. Opportunities such as Tomnod allow us actually to work in the field as part of a real-world experiment. The danger in crowdsourcing, however, is that these opportunities take place without context or with too small a group. There are also real counterintelligence implications in signing up with these types of services (IntelCenter emails to personal accounts, for example). Yet, as the Global Trends reporting shows, the IC can most definitely benefit from these initiatives in the aggregate. Whether or not specific reports, such as those provided to business clientele by InfoArmy, can truly be of benefit to the intelligence analyst remains to be seen. That said, the open Internet is an extremely democratizing institution in this sense; all users can provide a perspective on a specific problem set and this trend is likely to continue with the proliferation of mobile devices. The sites above are sample resources for anyone researching intelligence work using the wisdom of the crowd in the cloud.

NOTES

[1] Jeff Howe, "The Rise of Crowdsourcing," *Wired*, June 2006, p. 1.
[2] Donald Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything* (New York: Penguin Group, 2010), p. 8.
[3] Jesse Roy Wilson. "Goldcorp Crowdsourcing: An Industry Best Practice with Potential for the Intelligence Community," *Joint Force Quarterly* 1, no. 69 (2013); http://www.ndu.edu/press/goldcorp-crowdsourcing.html (accessed August 10, 2013), p. 1.
[4] Ibid., p. 1.
[5] James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations* (New York: Doubleday, 2004).
[6] Barbie E. Keiser, "Bringing Transparency to Private Company Research: PrivCo and InfoArmy," *Online Searcher*, March-April 2013, p. 19; http://www.ebscohost.com/ (accessed September 1, 2013).
[7] Ingrid Lunden, "InfoArmy Retreats After Crowdsourced Research Business Goes Through The Floor," *TechCrunch*; http://techcrunch.com/2013/02/01/infoarmy-retreats-after-crowdsourced-research-business-goes-through-the-floor-all-reports-now-free/ (accessed September 1, 2013).
[8] Joseph Nye, "Diversifying American Power," *InternationalRelations.com*; http://www.internationalrelations.com/2012/09/09/joseph-s-nye-jr-diversifying-american-power/ (accessed September 2, 2013), p. 2.
[9] "Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds," National Intelligence Council; www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf (accessed September 1, 2013), p. 3.
[10] Nicholas Mumm, "Crowdsourcing: A New Perspective on Human Intelligence Collection in a Counterinsurgency," *Small Wars Journal*; http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/12036 (accessed September 2, 2013), p. 3.
[11] Ibid., p. 3.
[12] Catherine Ferraro, "Researchers Help Intelligence Community Improve Predictions of Global Crises," University News - George Mason University; http://news.gmu.edu/articles/7327 (accessed September 2, 2013).
[13] "SciCast Pre-Registration," *SciCast*; http://signup.scicast.org/ (accessed September 2, 2013).
[14] "AMU & APU Online Library," LinkedIn; http://www.linkedin.com/groups/AMU-APU-Online-Library-1240707 (accessed September 2, 2013).
[15] "IntelCenter Feed," *IntelCenter*; http://www.intelcenter.com/icf/ (accessed September 2, 2013).

Daniel W. Opstal works in strategic partner engagement for the Department of Defense using a variety of social media and crowdsourcing tools on a daily basis. He holds an MBA from the Pennsylvania State University, an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College (now NIU), and a BA in International Studies and Russian Language from Emory University. Dan is also an adjunct instructor for American Military University's School of Security and Global Studies. He has contributed book reviews to AIJ *in the past.*

The Enduring Importance of Cultural Intelligence in the Post-COIN Era

by Maj (USMC) William Deleal, Dr. James McGinley, Peri Pourier, and Jason Spradling

INTRODUCTION

The United States' response to the events of September 11, 2001, was initially punitive. Emergency National Security Council meetings at the White House crafted the initial version of an integrated governmental response. The U.S. strategy would aim to:

> …eliminate terrorism as a threat, punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, hold states and other actors responsible for providing sanctuary to terrorists, work with a coalition to eliminate terrorist groups and networks, and avoid malice toward any people, religion, or culture.[1]

The rapid defeat of the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan led to an international focus on the rebuilding of that country. In early 2002, at the first international conference held in Tokyo, Japan, the international community pledged over 3 billion USD in domestic and security aid.[2] The combination of military intervention to defeat a resurgent Taliban and foreign aid to strengthen nation-building characterized Afghanistan as a counterinsurgency operation. In other words, a response framework was built upon elements of military and civil action to defeat an insurgent effort aimed at the overthrow of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) through a combination of subversion and armed conflict.

Counterinsurgency operations, or COIN, in Afghanistan followed closely behind similar operations in Iraq. The similarities between the two campaigns created a perception that counterinsurgency had been overlooked as an operational art. This led to the publication of an assortment of doctrinal publications designed to address the perceived deficiency. Examples include joint doctrine in the form of *Counterinsurgency Operations* (JP 3-24), as well as new service-level doctrine in the form of the Joint Army/Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5) and the U.S. Army's *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07). Recognition of COIN's strong social and cultural components also led to the establishment of new cultural centers in the military services, such as the U.S. Air Force Culture and Language Center, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Cultural Center, the U.S. Navy's Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture, and the U.S. Marine Corps' Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). [Editor's Note: This trend and some of the aforementioned centers were highlighted in my "Editor's Desk" leading off *AIJ*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2012, whose theme was "Cultural Intelligence and Regional Issues." DIA followed suit and created its own Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC).]

Cultural intelligence has been relevant during the past two major conflicts. There are enduring aspects of these two conflict regions which are consistent in areas deemed susceptible to future conflict that may draw U.S. involvement, whether direct or indirect. Cultural intelligence training to understand the complexities and dynamic components of these environments must persist through the post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan periods. Further, it must improve to include more than merely understanding interactive customs so as not to offend host population groups. Cultural intelligence training must emphasize above all else the following: comprehensive understanding of formal and informal power structures, enduring legacies of conflict and competition, and socio-cultural and politically-based opportunity contexts that could be exploited to further the strategic goals of conflict resolution, terrain denial to terror groups, and coalition building. The enduring relevance of socially-grounded power dynamics will be illustrated by an overview of global social dynamics followed by a brief examination of the intersection of social and power dynamics in Afghanistan and an examination of relevant cultural intelligence skills and training.

GLOBAL DYNAMICS

The discussion of cultural intelligence is complicated by competing definitions and perspectives. The range of terms in use, such as "cultural intelligence" and "human terrain analysis," hints at a lack of consensus. The unifying element is a focus on various dimensions of populations and group dynamics. At the global level, demographics will continue to exert a lasting social influence through population strains, their impact on conflict environments, and inequities that result in the disenfranchisement of individuals and groups.

Population Strains

Alternative scenarios from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimate that world population will increase to between 7.4 billion and 10.6 billion by 2050. Global growth will not be distributed evenly, with different trends occurring within developed and developing regions. The population of the world's more developed regions is expected to experience only minor growth, increasing from 1.23 billion to 1.28 billion. This positive shift would have been reflected as a decline to 1.15 billion except for the projected net migration from developing to developed countries, which is projected to average 2.4 million persons annually through 2050. In contrast, the United Nations estimates that the population of the less developed regions is projected to increase from 5.6 billion in 2009 to 7.9 billion in 2050. As an example, if population growth in Afghanistan continues at its current pace, the population, currently at approximately 30 million, is estimated to reach 47 million by 2025 and 76 million by 2050.[3] Overall, by 2050 approximately 86 percent of the world's population is expected to live in less developed regions, including 18 percent in the least developed countries.[4] Unfortunately, most population growth will occur in regions that contain the weakest nations, those least able to respond to the political and economic demands of their populations.

Afghanistan is the largest source of refugees; approximately one out of every four refugees worldwide is Afghan, followed by those who have departed Somalia, Iraq, and Syria.

Trends in displaced persons and migration also create internal pressures. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there were 45 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide at the end of 2012. Afghanistan is the largest source of refugees; approximately one out of every four refugees worldwide is Afghan, followed by those who have departed Somalia, Iraq, and Syria. Least developed countries, with the lowest capacity to absorb additional strains, were host to 81 percent of the world's refugees in 2012. Of 7.6 million persons newly displaced in 2012 due to conflict or persecution, 1.1 million were refugees and 6.5 million were internally displaced persons. This equated to a new refugee or internally displaced person every 4.1 seconds worldwide.[5] [Editor's Note: With the recent dire developments in Syria and Iraq, spurred by Islamic State atrocities, this statistic has likely become even more eye-opening since the article was drafted.] In addition, international migration now involves a wider diversity of ethnic and cultural groups than ever before, and the worldwide pool of international migrants could reach 405 million by the year 2050.[6] Population movements, forced or voluntary, have the potential to disrupt patterns of culture, politics, and economics, and carry the potential for conflict due to competition for resources and the creation of internal stress within nations hosting displaced populations.

Economic and Security Strains

Changing demographics will create new economic and security strains for nations. A larger world population will create additional job demands by enlarging the available workforce from 4.5 billion in 2010 to approximately 6 billion by 2050.[7] Divergent population growth rates between developed and developing countries will create different strains. Developed countries will be faced with slower population and economic growth. This will create conflicting conditions as slower economic growth may encourage protectionism, while reduced population growth and a resulting inability to meet labor demands will likely stimulate a relaxing of immigration rules. For example, due to slower growth rates, it is estimated that the European Union would have to accept 170 million new immigrants through 2025 in order to maintain present levels of its tax-paying workforce.[8] Overall, developing countries are expected to experience higher levels of economic growth, although they will have difficulty keeping pace with their stronger population growth. For example, the World Bank estimates that Afghanistan will have 400,000-500,000 persons enter its workforce each year over the next 5-10 years.[9] It is unlikely that Afghanistan's domestic economy can accommodate this increase, resulting in increased internal pressure and strained relations with neighboring countries as immigrants seek work or illegal income.

As developed countries cope with increasingly older populations, developing countries will continue to face the challenge of dealing with the passage of youthful cohorts. Population age structures affect conflict risk. Very young and youthful age structures are the most likely to undermine security. A long-term study by Population Action International found that, between 1970 and 1999, 80 percent of all civil conflicts that caused at least 25 deaths occurred in countries in which 60 percent or more of the population was under age 30. During the 1990s, countries with very young age structures were three times more likely to experience civil conflict than countries with more mature structures.[10] In addition, nearly 90 percent of countries with very young structures had autocratic or weakly democratic governments.[11] These findings are supported with research by the Peace Research Institute which found that countries with large, youthful populations were 1.5 times more likely to

experience civil conflict.[12] Similarly, a study by the United Nations' Population Division estimated that for each percentage point increase in the youth make-up of the adult population the risk of conflict increases by more than four percent. When young persons make up more than 35 percent of the adult population, which they do in Afghanistan, the risk of armed conflict is 1.5 times higher than in developed countries.[13] It has been estimated that countries in which the 15- to 29-year-old cohort comprises 40 per cent or more of the population are 2.5 times more likely to experience civil conflict than nations which fall below that threshold.[14]

Political Disenfranchisement

According to the *Freedom in the World* report, in 2013 worldwide freedom experienced a decline for the seventh year in a row. Overall, the number of countries rated as "free" by Freedom House stood at 90 by the end of 2012, just 46 percent of the world's governments. The total number of countries rated as "not free" or "partly free" stood at 47 (24 percent) and 58 (30 percent), respectively. The Arab Spring had a dramatic impact, accounting for freedom gains in countries such as Libya and Tunisia as well as modest gains amid Egypt's volatility. However, strong authoritarian reactions to the Arab Spring helped lead to declines in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. Across the globe, regional challenges to political freedom and free speech have included sectarian conflict in the Middle East, state repression and autocratic entrenchment in Eurasia, state media repression in China, and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.[15]

Afghanistan's development as a democratic society is challenged by a persistent insurgency, corruption, insecurity, nepotism, a haphazard judicial system that has difficulty replacing traditional justice customs, and a climate of impunity for officials and warlords.

Authoritarian regimes have intensified their efforts to defend and consolidate power through the suppression of democratic opposition, civil society, and independent media. In Afghanistan, gains in civil liberties for vulnerable groups such as women are under challenge by new, restrictive legislation, the persistence of conservative cultural mores, and Taliban influence within rural communities. Afghanistan's development as a democratic society is challenged by a persistent insurgency, corruption, insecurity, nepotism, a haphazard judicial system that has difficulty replacing traditional justice customs, and a climate of impunity for officials and warlords.[16] The *Freedom in the Press* report notes that in 2012 the percentage of people worldwide who enjoyed a free media environment fell to its lowest point in more than a decade. Yet, despite austere civil liberties, there were some positive developments in Afghanistan where there has been a decrease in violence against journalists and the opening of independent media outlets.[17]

THE VALUE OF CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE THROUGH THE AFGHAN LENS

Cultural intelligence training is essential to analyze and operationalize relevant aspects of the complex societal framework of Afghanistan in order to inform decision-making. This framework is dominated by power brokers and power structures that are nested within political spheres and other social-based groupings that control resources and wield influence over population groups. Power brokers in southern Afghanistan gained power through a series of regime changes beginning in the late 1970s. Traditional tribal society, which is hierarchical, was decimated by the Soviets in the 1980s in a bid to impose a centralized government system which was alien to existing, non-hierarchical power structures. The ensuing power vacuum made space for the rise of religious families, the *mullahs* and *akhunds,* and the ascent of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan soon followed.[18] [19]

With the end of their Islamic Emirate in late 2001, a new type of power broker emerged whose power base relied on *mujahideen*-era patronage and tribal connections that augmented their narcotics financial base with an influx of international development funding. This evolutionary climb to prominence placed these power brokers within existing sociopolitical power structures, local tribally-based networks, financially beneficial illicit facilitation networks, and national political frameworks. These power brokers and their respective power structures generally exist outside formal government bureaucracies and security forces, yet they wield considerable power and influence. Their predominance throughout informal and formal power structures presents an opportunity to enable strategic goals of stability, security, and infrastructure development, and socially-based rejection of the insurgency.

Archaic approaches to this problem set have been ensconced in conventional Western societal perspectives. Adding another dimension to the problem was a misunderstanding of the mutability of socially grounded power structures and the predominance of inverted loyalties to micro organizations first, rather than to notions of confidence in federalized government or a collective sense of national pride. Compounding the

problem further, these power brokers and power structures cannot be marginalized at the expense of a federalized institution-building initiative meant to stabilize nascent governance and security organizations because they are so integral to existing cultural and historical fabrics. Yet, they tend to be predatory on influxes of international development funds or disruptive of security infrastructure development if they conflict with self-interests. Western perspectives of governance and security fundamentally emphasize institutionalized government bureaucracy, meritocracy, staffing of technocrats, adherence to processes and procedures, and collective results-based ends. Mapping these constructs onto decentralized, personalized, patrimonial patronage power structures within a tribally-based, non-institutionalized society demonstrates an ill-developed cultural intelligence support system.

The calculated moves of power brokers and a survival impetus that determines power structure actions have wide-reaching implications among social, economic, security, and governance systems. While both encouraging governance and security institutionalization to benefit their personal and group interests, these moves undermine governance by manipulating initiatives, policies, and appointments through a system of patronage and nepotism to create benefit and survivability for themselves rather than the larger collective. Since power brokers and power structures can neither be ignored nor fully co-opted given their expanse, a nuanced engagement policy in this context is necessary. Applying a structured cultural intelligence analysis model to socially-grounded power brokers and power structures is critical for operationalizing relevant, finished intelligence to this problem set.

CULTURAL DIMENSIONS AND NATION-STATE STABILITY

The assessment of socially-based, cultural attributes can be extended to understanding their relationship to nation-state stability. Geert Hofstede's study of culture has been regarded by some researchers as landmark in cross-cultural studies and serves as an example of a relevant analytic structure.[20] In his original study Hofstede presented a systematic framework consisting of four cultural dimensions including individualism, power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Hofstede has offered the following definitions:

> 1. Individualism/Collectivism: "Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: Everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty."[21]
>
> 2. Power distance: "The extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally."[22]
>
> 3. Masculinity: "Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: Men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life."[23]
>
> 4. Uncertainty avoidance: "The extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations."[24]

There is a need to connect frameworks such as Hofstede's dimensions to specific outcomes. In an effort to more fully understand the potential relationship between cultural dimensions and nation-state stability, correlations between Hofstede's dimensions for 52 countries and their ranking on the Fund for Peace's *Failed States Index* were computed (see Table). The results indicate that a statistically significant relationship exists between a country's ranking on the *Failed States Index* and cultural dimensions for power distance and individualism. A negative relationship was found between power distance and ranking. That is, as power distance decreased (indicative of more equality), a country's score on the *Failed States Index* increased (indicative of greater stability). On the other hand, a positive relationship was found between individualism and score. That is, as individualism increased (or collectivism decreased), a country's score on the *Failed States Index* increased (indicative of increased stability).

Table. Hofstede's Dimensions and the Failed States Index Rankings

	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI
IDV	-0.69**			
MAS	0.02	0.1		
UAI	0.22	-0.33*	0.01	
FSIR	-0.56**	0.65**	-0.12	-0.08

*Note (1): Statistical significance: * p < .05, ** p < .01*
Note (2): PDI, Power Distance Index; IDV, Individualism; MAS, Masculinity; UAI, Uncertainty Avoidance Index; FSIR, Failed States Index Ranking

The finding of a statistically significant relationship between Hofstede's dimensions and nation-state stability may be important. It is proposed that Afghanistan may be shaped by socially-based cultural dimensions of high power distance and high collectivism (i.e., low individualism). Cultural dimensions in these directions are positively related to the *Failed States Index*'s assessment of nation-state instability. High power distance and high collectivism are related to a higher position on the *Failed States Index*, which is indicative of increased instability. While statistical correlations cannot establish causality per se, they do establish the degree of the relationship between variables. If it is true that Afghanistan is high in power distance and collectivism, then it must be considered that socially-based power structures must be examined and understood as potential determinants of its future stability and its likely trajectory in a post-intervention environment.

CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

It is critical to understand relevant cultural aspects of the population in current and potential conflict environments. At their core, population groups are driven first by a survival calculus and second by a benefit calculus. In order to facilitate conflict resolution, intelligence analysis should include understanding the conflicting motives or ideologies of all parties. Further, understanding and predicting the survival or benefit actions of disparate individuals or groups is limited by the level of understanding of the root causes, which typically are culturally grounded. As a result, several important factors must be addressed in cultural training to prepare analysts and analytic organizations effectively to both understand this complexity and operationalize analysis to support decision-making.

An example of the relevance of cultural intelligence is the expansive persistence of patronage networks and the use of bribes as a cultural norm in Afghanistan. Western biases inform the analyst that these practices are archaic, inappropriate, and detrimental to meet the end-state of an institutionalized, centralized federal governance and security architecture. While there is empirical evidence to support this notion, it is not necessarily certain. In a 2012 survey, 68 percent of Afghans considered it acceptable for civil servants to accept bribes, and 67 percent of respondents thought it acceptable for the same civil servants to gain employment based on patronage networks.[25] Nearly three-quarters of those surveyed accepted these "corrupt" activities as routine and normal, while Western societies perceive these actions as undermining the morals and goals of the governing structures. Without an understanding of the culture within Afghanistan, these subtleties can easily be overlooked, causing biased intelligence analysis framed in the perspective of a Western mindset.

The necessity of continued cultural intelligence training is clear. To be sure, a conventional approach to problem sets involving political, economic, and security sectors will dominate analytic training focus into the future. This is both necessary and a symptom of comfort levels within corporate memory. A cultural component must become a formalized pier in this construct. This component must be inclusive of critical aspects such as power brokers, power structures, prominent historical events that led to power basing, involvement in illicit financial gain, familial ties to nefarious groups, and the degree to which self-interest and a survival calculus motivate influential individuals and groups. Neglecting the influential role these aspects deliver to an operational environment limits the all-source intelligence analysis mission.

On the table is the question whether a focus on counterinsurgency—with its emphasis on culture and human terrain—has reached the end of its usefulness.

CONCLUSION

The ongoing U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and budget pressures from the federal deficit are now prompting a reexamination of U.S. force structure and its operational focus. There is a concern that the U.S. may have traded off some of its conventional capabilities to fight counterinsurgencies. On the table is the question whether a focus on counterinsurgency—with its emphasis on culture and human terrain—has reached the end of its usefulness. There may be a tendency to color one's view of counterinsurgency, and the contemporary focus on cultural or social dynamics, as relevant with opinions of whether recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were viewed as successful. It is proposed that cultural intelligence, in fact, is not dead. Debates over the operational success of counterinsurgency notwithstanding, it is argued that cultural intelligence is not a unique artifact of counterinsurgency, that social dynamics are an inherent part of complex conflict environments worldwide. It is argued that the cultural and social aspects of conflict environments involve more than cultural niceties, that the social environment is host to critical power dynamics.

The study of culture and culture training provided to military forces deployed abroad has come under some criticism. For example, an overemphasis on the dimensions of casual relationships (e.g., cultural etiquette) and a general lack of training beyond broad social norms (e.g., customs) may not provide a sufficient foundation to understand the deeper cultural qualities that shape beliefs, attitudes, and

interactions. It may be necessary to balance an understanding of the surface structure of culture with an understanding of its deeper structure. It has been suggested that a deeper understanding of social and cultural patterns can provide a frame of reference to understand observable behaviors. For example, in Afghanistan norms for hospitality, revenge, extended families, and arranged marriages may all relate to a deeper unifying structure that takes the form of collectivism.[26]

The deep structure of culture may also help one understand the mental models which guide people when interpreting events, assigning meaning, and establishing cultural and behavioral frameworks. Some researchers use the terms "desired behavior" and "desirable behavior" to help describe the difference one finds between practical (i.e., surface) and ideal (i.e., deep) behavior.[27] [28] For example, in Afghanistan there may be a mental model for ideal behavior based on the values embodied in *Pashtunwali*.[29] Nevertheless, the expression of *Pashtunwali* in concrete, daily behavior may be less than ideal since it is shaped by a wide variety of practical constraints and competing interests. This holds true for values beyond *Pashtunwali*. The expression of values through individual behavior and custom may be less than the idealized model, although such frameworks may still serve as deep, foundational mental models for guiding behavior and social interaction.

Overall, this article proposes that, as the U.S. ends its involvement in Afghanistan, there may be a tendency to assume the COIN era is over and to discard some of the lessons from COIN operations as the U.S. military is reshaped. However, cultural intelligence, with a focus on alliances and social structures, underpins a broad range of conflict environments. Since social and power dynamics are not a unique artifact of COIN, but rather are inherent in all conflict environments, they should be retained as an intelligence focus area.

NOTES

[1] United States. *9/11 Commission Report*, 2004.
[2] "Billions pledged in Afghan aid," *BBC*, 21 January 2002.
[3] "Afghanistan, Population boom threatens stabilization chances," *Eurasianet*, 2011.
[4] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009.
[5] *Global Trends Report 2012*, United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, June 2013.
[6] *World Migration Report*, International Organization for Migration, 2010.
[7] "Employment Trends in the 21st Century," International Center for Peace and Development (ICPD), n.d.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Afghanistan Economic Update*, World Bank, April 2013.
[10] *The shape of things to come*, Population Action International, n.d.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence*, United Nations, 2011.
[14] *Flashpoints*. Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO), 2010.
[15] *Freedom in the World 2013*, Freedom House, 2013.
[16] *Freedom in the World, Afghanistan*, Freedom House 2013.
[17] *Freedom in the Press*, Freedom House, 2013.
[18] "Mad Mullahs, Opportunists and Family Connections: Then Violent Pashtun Cycle," Cultural and Geographic Research Analysis Center, Tribal Analysis Center, LTD, 2009 3: 5-6.
[19] Folsberg, Carl, *Power and Politics in Kandahar*, Institute for the Study of War, April 2010, 19-27.
[20] Eckhart, G., "Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations [Review]," *Australian Journal of Management*, 2002: 89-94.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] Hofstede, G., *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations* (2nd ed.), London: Sage, 2002.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, December 2012.
[26] Entezar, E., *Afghanistan 101: Understanding Afghan Culture*, Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2007.
[27] Hofstede, G., *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values*, London: Sage, 1980.
[28] Entezar. E., *Afghanistan 101: Understanding Afghan Culture*, Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2007.
[29] Rhezak, L., "Doing Pashtu: Pashtunwali as the ideal of honorable behavior and tribal life among the Pashtuns," *Afghan News Network*, 2011.

Major William DeLeal has recently served in southern Afghanistan as a U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Fusion Officer. At the time the article was written, he was serving as a company commander in the 2d Intelligence Battalion, II MEF. Bill holds an MA in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School.

James McGinley is a Research Analyst in northern Virginia. He holds a PhD in Industrial/ Organizational Psychology from Northcentral University and has a research interest in cross-cultural conflicts and convergences. His articles "Intelligence Community Assessment: Generational Differences in Workplace Motivation" (with co-authors) and "An African Country Called Afghanistan: Development Traps in a Fragile State," appeared in AIJ, *Vol. 29, No. 1, 2011, and Vol. 30, No. 1, 2012, respectively.*

Peri Pourier is a Senior Intelligence Analyst with extensive experience in southern Afghanistan.

Jason Spradling is a Science and Technology Analyst in northern Alabama with a BS in Electrical Engineering from the University of Alabama in Huntsville.

Knowledge Management in Joint Intelligence Operations Centers

by Lou Anne DeMattei

Successful execution of the intelligence missions of U.S. Combatant Commands increasingly depends on the degree to which people, processes, and technologies used in intelligence activities can dynamically create, organize, transfer, and apply new knowledge to inform military plans and operations in adaptive threat environments. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) is the principal Combatant Command organization responsible for creating and managing that knowledge.

A JIOC must succeed in providing coherent intelligence analyses in an environment characterized by progressively larger volumes and sources of information, compressed decision cycles intensified by ubiquitously available data, and increasingly complex intelligence issues. This article examines the JIOC construct as a knowledge management system, identifies key knowledge management challenges, and proposes a more deliberate approach to knowledge management functions in JIOCs within this demanding operating environment.

BACKGROUND

JIOCs are designed to operate as transactive memory[1] systems that perform intelligence integration and analysis as principal functions. Their primary purpose is to serve as central hubs for intelligence supporting Combatant Command military planning and operations. JIOCs are responsible for ensuring availability of, and facilitating access to, all sources of information, fusing information into a coherent and common picture, and coordinating all defense intelligence functions and disciplines supporting their Combatant Command missions. They employ task-organized formations that collaborate internally within Combatant Commands and also across the full range of Intelligence Community (IC) organizations to obtain, leverage, and integrate intelligence information.

JIOCs were officially established in 2006 as organizational constructs for coordinating and conducting intelligence planning, collection management, analysis, and production functions at Combatant Commands. Now in their eighth year of operation, these organizations have a generic set of proscribed functions executed by task-organized teams of specialists from various intelligence disciplines, with their specific composition tailored as needed. JIOCs are Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) organizations which operate under the control and authority of their respective Combatant Commanders, with resourcing and oversight provided by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, or USD(I).

The JIOC construct is an outgrowth of best practices in operational-level intelligence learned throughout decades of military experience. Like their predecessor Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) of the 1990s, JIOCs must "know what they know" and continuously build their collective knowledge in order to deliver tailored intelligence products on focused yet dynamic threat problem sets. Their effectiveness is largely determined by their capability to quickly discern and articulate what information is needed, and then orchestrate collection and synthesize analysis of that information by tapping knowledge and expertise resident across a range of intelligence organizations. In short, JIOCs are involved in the businesses of knowledge creation and organizational learning, depend on effective systems of informational and procedural knowledge transfer to build and deliver their core products, and employ deliberate approaches to knowledge discovery across disparate organizations, segregated information systems and management processes, and diverse knowledge environments.

THE NEED FOR A KNOWLEDGE STRATEGY

The dramatic evolution of the information environment and the way people interact with it has caused the IC to recognize a need for more deliberate, systematic, and scientific approaches to getting, using, displaying, and analyzing information.[2] Like the broader IC, JIOC constructs, concepts, and collaborative technology applications for engaging the information environment are underpinned by a very limited corpus of scholarly research and systematic empirical evaluation. The need for systematic empirical approaches is further underscored by a number of recent studies that highlight intelligence analytic quality and utility as enduring issues.[3]

The Analytic Transformation (AT) program responds, in part, to this need. AT is a multi-year effort that includes initiatives to improve analytic methodology and tradecraft, facilitate integration of intelligence across the IC, and focus on technology development to support collaboration, manage information and collective knowledge, and promote data sharing across the entire enterprise, all underpinned by an integrated intelligence information system architecture.[4]

...knowledge management processes underpinned by "living" knowledge management strategies are needed, with a special emphasis on enabling the knowledge processes of task-organized teams that JIOCs typically employ.

As integrated elements of the IC, JIOCs are intimately involved in AT initiatives. However, it is unclear how near-term organizational management and operations approaches, mid-term staffing and architecture initiatives, and long-term investment strategies for intelligence integration in the JIOC enterprise are linked to these IC enterprise initiatives. Furthermore, implementation of these initiatives is often sequenced independently within individual organizations, in some cases at the work center level.[5] To advance intelligence integration in a manner that engages JIOCs as core elements of the IC, knowledge management processes underpinned by "living" knowledge management strategies are needed, with a special emphasis on enabling the knowledge processes of task-organized teams that JIOCs typically employ.

JIOC KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES

Effective intelligence is rooted in knowledge systems created by the people, processes, technologies, and information that comprise JIOCs. JIOC knowledge processes are predominantly supported by manual, linearly-linked systems of obtaining, exchanging, and analyzing information. However, JIOC knowledge systems are complex, and reflect interactive information behavior characteristics and models that emphasize cognitive effects, the nature of satisfying information needs through iterative user-system interaction and question refinement, collective intelligence, and naturalistic decision-making as conceptualized in modern information, social, and behavioral sciences.[6]

This complexity suggests that JIOC organization and resourcing strategies for people, processes, technologies, and information, which often focus on near-term issues, could benefit from a comprehensive, integrating knowledge strategy that is well-synchronized with counterpart initiatives and programs in the broader IC. To inform an integrating strategy, JIOCs can be studied as knowledge systems that employ knowledge processes. Desouza & Paquette (2011) define and discuss the four critical activities of knowledge processes, to include knowledge creation, organization, transfer, and application.[7] The following discussion examines JIOC knowledge processes using this critical activities framework.

KNOWLEDGE CREATION

JIOCs organize and operate in a manner that sets conditions for continuous knowledge creation at all organizational levels. JIOC division-level portfolios are commonly organized by functional discipline (e.g., analysis, intelligence requirements, productization) and further specialized in branches with a regional topic or sub-discipline focus (e.g., Middle East, terrorism, geospatial intelligence collection management, briefing team). Task-organized approaches address planning and operational support tasks through scheduled interaction routines and processes, as well as collaboration technologies that culminate in information integration and new knowledge creation.

People

Within JIOCs, standing and ad hoc teams and working groups are formed to bring together functional and topical subject matter experts who work collectively to develop new knowledge, encapsulate it in intelligence products, and deliver it to decision-makers. These teams can include individuals from other IC organizations on a permanent or ad hoc basis. This team-based approach to organizing work relies upon and builds on individual tacit and explicit knowledge through scheduled interactions that deliberately prompt individual transmission, cognition, and task-focused positioning – the three key processes of individual knowledge creation. Knowledge creation at the individual level ultimately underpins organizational knowledge creation processes, and relies on autonomy and ownership by individual contributors who turn their tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge that is shared first within their working groups and then propagated more broadly through the organization and the IC.

Technology

Problem-centric working groups in JIOCs are typically comprised of physically dispersed individuals who interact and collaborate on a continuous basis. To collaborate, virtual teaming approaches and technologies are used. Technologies currently employed to enable virtual teaming,

such as teleconferences and videoconferencing, often require one or more intermediaries, and often entail significant administrative overhead for coordination and scheduling. Additionally, teaming technologies currently in use often do not enable efficient on-the-fly and continuous point-to-point or group interaction, and usually cannot be independently initiated by individuals. They are often limited in their ability to capture the collective understanding of the team in an enduring, retrievable, nuanced, and transferable manner.

Process

JIOC teaming, portfolio approaches, and scheduled interactions foster organizational knowledge creation by serving as a means to continuously evolve products, services, and processes. The doctrinally-based military planning process systematizes analytical discussions, debates, development, and communication of a range of potential solutions. This approach and organizational construct directly engender accumulation, analysis, interaction, and integration processes that result in the conversion of tacit to explicit knowledge, and move knowledge among and between individuals and groups, often through counterpart inter-organizational elements within other IC organizations.

Barriers

Three key challenges affect individual and organizational knowledge creation in JIOCs. First, employment of current collaborative technologies is inefficient. Desktop and work center baselines require extensive use of intermediaries and specialized schedulers to enable use of teaming technologies, and their incorporation into business routines is often not systematized nor standardized. Baseline individual skill sets are often not primed to use collaboration technologies that do exist well and routinely. A tendency exists to assign one or two individuals in each work group the responsibility of obtaining user accounts and training for each collaborative technology, and then employ these individuals as the technology "operators" or "schedulers" as a collateral and additional work task. This approach to employing collaborative technologies impacts knowledge creation and sharing at individual, team, and organizational levels.

A second key challenge is building organizational management processes that can quickly assemble effective and efficient teams. Effective execution of the intelligence discipline in JIOCs depends on internal and inter-organizational approaches for coordinating and executing prioritization, staffing, and resourcing tasks to quickly form task-organized teams with specialized expertise. Underemphasizing these management functions within and across organizational elements and echelons limits opportunities to identify, apply, and develop individual skills and talents, and directly affects continuous knowledge creation at the individual and organizational levels. This capability is a particularly important knowledge program and organizational management consideration, in particular because the composition of JIOCs includes key military leaders and many civilian subject matter experts who transfer under routine 2- to 3-year turnover cycles along with their tacit knowledge.

...the composition of JIOCs includes key military leaders and many civilian subject matter experts who transfer under routine 2- to 3-year turnover cycles along with their tacit knowledge.

Third, the deliberate integration and standardized application of technologies as part of JIOC operations and management routines are limited, ad hoc, and underdeveloped. JIOCs have incorporated basic collaborative technologies to support knowledge creation, and have the opportunity to use a recently deployed desktop-accessible set of social computing and networking tools common across IC organizations. These tools include wikis, blogs, chat, secure file sharing, microblog, document repository, virtual meeting, managed and certified content, social bookmarking, and social networking capabilities. Data warehousing, mining, visualization, and data analytics tools are less prevalent desktop features, and shared hierarchical file systems exposed only at internal divisional and work center levels remain a common feature of information management approaches at the work center level. Additionally, collaborative filtering, search, and document development systems are less frequently employed and not commonly available.

The ad hoc approach to integrating collaborative technologies coupled with fragmented and unorganized repositories of explicit knowledge can lead to inefficient use of existing knowledge and having to relearn it, vice building new knowledge. Because JIOC operations rely heavily on structured, scheduled, and continuous interaction, this ad hoc approach to social computing and network technology integration, as well as ad hoc approaches to information and data management, constrain JIOC potential to optimize knowledge creation and can engender a fragmented and chaotic rather than integrated knowledge creation environment.

KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION

Knowledge organization in JIOCs is perhaps the most pressing and persistent knowledge management process challenge, and directly affects knowledge creation, translation, and application. While some JIOCs have more mature knowledge organization efforts and approaches, they are not consistent across the defense intelligence enterprise, not informed by an IC-wide approach, and not interoperable or integrated. Responsibility for categorization (classification) and cataloging systems for products and services is decentralized down to the work center level, with broad, generic, and legacy records management directives applied as implementing guidance. Tagging is only required and standardized for finished intelligence products, which represent a very small part of the actual analytical knowledge base.

...the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is implementing an enterprise store for organizing, sharing, and providing geospatial intelligence products, and making them electronically accessible at GEOINT Online.

As with the application of collaboration technologies, categorization and cataloging are often assigned as collateral and administrative functions and executed by individuals trained on the fly, as opposed to being executed as core functions with professionalized management, integration, and oversight across all organizational echelons. This approach in turn results in non-contextual, non-tagged storage of knowledge that is not always discoverable, retrievable, or sharable within and among JIOCs and other IC organizations, nor with the operational consumers it is intended to serve. More systematic approaches to knowledge organization are evident within discipline-specific intelligence functions at national agencies, such as geospatial intelligence and signals intelligence, which might serve as models. For example, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is implementing an enterprise store for organizing, sharing, and providing geospatial intelligence products, and making them electronically accessible at GEOINT Online.[8]

Barriers

Three specific issues magnify the barriers created by underdeveloped knowledge organization capabilities in JIOCs. First, ad hoc approaches to knowledge representation increase the likelihood and prevalence of disparate work center and individual solutions to organizing knowledge. This creates discoverability, retrievability, and reuse inefficiencies. Second, email remains the common denominator for communicating and coordinating knowledge, as opposed to sharing and dissemination within a common collaborative environment. Continued reliance on email as a primary electronic task and information notification, workflow, and dissemination tool often results in duplication of artifacts and inefficient communication, storage, and retrieval processes. Third, roles-based coordination and dissemination are not standardized in a meaningful way within or across JIOCs, even within the email environment. This results in over-reliance on individual point-to-point relationships for coordination and dissemination functions, on which routine transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge depend. In a complex organizational construct that includes routine personnel turnovers, this knowledge organization and sharing approach contributes to inefficient knowledge transfer and knowledge loss.

KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION AND COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

A specific case of a JIOC core function critically impacted by the gap in standardized knowledge organization capabilities is collection management (CM). Among a range of tasks, CM includes a librarian function that is primarily executed by human intermediaries who are experts in the mechanics of interfacing with specialized, layered (and often legacy) requirements management systems. The intermediary functions include interpreting questions and assisting in the formulation of requests for intelligence information, supporting and conducting information research to address questions, and translating information needs into formal requests that are catalogued in one or more distinct and independent intelligence requirements management systems. These requirements management systems are comprised of locally-developed data sets as well as national requirements databases and systems, and are generally not integrated or interoperable. Local and national requirements databases and systems then underpin intelligence analysis, production, and collection activities conducted by the Combatant Command's organic intelligence assets, by an external Service, and by national systems and processes, often in a manner that does not preserve the context of the requestor's original information need, with results deposited to databases that may or may not be tagged explicitly to the original specific information need. Connecting the results of tasking, analysis, production, and collection actions to the original information need therefore also often involves a search and retrieval function that is executed by both human and machine systems of layered intermediaries.

This architecture is the result of a combination of legitimate needs to protect and preserve sensitive sources of

information, as well as complex, "stovepiped" requirements management architectures, systems, and repositories that have been built through the years—sometimes to preserve segregation and control access to sensitive information resources, and sometimes because the complexity and costs associated with migrating and re-hosting to modern, interoperable systems are not practically surmountable. Limitations of the present architecture in enabling integrated requirements management are well understood, and several IC enterprise upgrades have been attempted over the course of three decades to build more integrated and interoperable systems. A number of these have failed; those projects that have survived have delivered some important, albeit basic, capabilities.

Consequently, one of the enduring challenges of requirements management for JIOCs is bridging the divide between the problem-centric questions of operational-level requirements owners and the resource-allocation, requirements database-centric perspective of national-level intelligence providers. Improved CM processes, architectures, and technologies are a prerequisite for enabling more effective information search and retrieval; more precise tuning of exploitation, production, and collection tasks to address specific intelligence needs; and perhaps more automation of these functions. Initiatives that recognize CM functional and process complexity, and its dependencies on knowledge organization, coupled with an effort to re-conceptualize CM as a set of nested, non-linear intermediary processes that continue to require iterative interaction between and among people, systems, and data, are needed. Emerging semantic approaches along with disciplined and significantly expanded metadata tagging standards and programs may provide capabilities needed to move toward integration and improve knowledge organization in this functional area that is, by its nature, exceedingly complex.

Bottom Line on Knowledge Organization

JIOC knowledge organization processes are insufficient to meet the IC's intelligence integration goals and will require investment in a combination of cataloging, database, web, and recommender capabilities that are evolved consistent with IC enterprise efforts and underpinned by a knowledge organization strategy. Standards and interoperability across JIOCs are important features, and in particular are needed to ensure effective integration of four functionally-aligned JIOCs (cyber, transportation, strategic threat, and special operations). Emerging technologies such as automated tagging and semantic indexing may help to improve knowledge organization systems, but these still will require deliberate and continuing planning, investment, and integration efforts.

KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND KNOWLEDGE APPLICATION

JIOC processes and organizations established to facilitate collaboration also serve knowledge transfer and application functions. As in many organizations, knowledge transfer functions in JIOCs face obstacles such as locating knowledge sources and experts, accessibility barriers, and motivation. These cultural, lexical, semantic, and pragmatic boundaries are inherent among and between commands, different IC organizations, and discrete Department of Defense elements that are involved in sharing and transferring the knowledge that is at the core of JIOC operations. Importantly, the IC has adopted an explicit knowledge-sharing paradigm and has implemented several standards to establish a culture of sharing and facilitate its implementation. These sharing standards are codified in useful Director of National Intelligence Directives such as Responsibility to Provide, Write for Maximum Utility, Tearline Production and Dissemination, Discovery and Dissemination, and Attribute-based Authorization and Access Management—many of which represent major policy shifts toward increased integration and sharing across the entire Community that were developed and implemented as part of post-9/11 initiatives.[9]

One common best practice adopted by JIOCs and the IC to address boundary challenges directly is the assignment of liaisons at both senior executive and subject matter expert levels. Some of these liaison positions are permanently staffed functions across all JIOCs and agencies, with assignees rotated on 3-year cycles. Others are established based on bilateral agreements between the JIOC and a counterpart IC organization that recognize a need to provide an additional deliberate channel for interaction and knowledge transfer for specific command initiatives and programs.

As with knowledge creation and organization, technology plays an important role in knowledge transfer and application. The latter are primarily facilitated through use of email, wiki pages and, increasingly, other social media applications. However, the structured and systematic integration of these self-service technologies in JIOCs is limited, and thus an area for future development.

A second underdeveloped area of knowledge application in JIOCs is the use of value metrics for JIOC products and services. Several initiatives are under way to build out, standardize, and automate use and value metrics for source information which analysts use, as well as analysis products that are provided to support military operations planning and decision- making. These efforts are nascent and often reflect internal agency programs rather than JIOC-wide or IC-sponsored efforts. Likewise, it is recognized that source

citations, evaluations, and feedback are critical components of continuous intelligence product improvement, as well as critical to enabling individual and organizational knowledge creation through iterative interaction and collaboration processes. Reporting and product feedback mechanisms provide essential focus and immediate steerage to collectors and analysts, and enable more efficient use of collection capabilities to satisfy specific problem-centric needs in a tailored manner. However, current feedback mechanisms are semi-automated, are segregated across analysis and collection systems, require intermediaries, and are not well integrated as part of production, requirements management, and tasking workflows.

OPPORTUNITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JIOCs need to systematically develop, apply, and evolve knowledge management processes and capabilities to keep pace with the complex environment in which they organize, collaborate, and execute their missions and functions, in a manner that is effective and relevant to the customers they serve. Better intelligence must be grounded in improved information- seeking behaviors, systems, processes, and organizations for obtaining, retrieving, sensemaking, and sharing intelligence data and information within JIOC knowledge environments.

Some JIOC knowledge management processes, such as knowledge organization, are particularly underdeveloped. This gap is a key barrier to effective integration of JIOCs as IC organizations. This gap impacts effective use and transfer of knowledge within and across the JIOCs toward their immediate operational missions, and their ability to collaborate and leverage the capabilities of other IC organizations with which they interface. This in part reflects the lack of an enterprise knowledge management approach within and across JIOCs. To address this gap and the previously identified barriers in JIOC knowledge processes, five near-term actions are recommended:

1. Develop a comprehensive knowledge strategy for the JIOC enterprise. JIOCs are unique and effective organizational constructs which create knowledge as a core mission. They are also inherently complex, and rely on systematic knowledge organization, transfer, and application processes to accomplish their mission. An enterprise knowledge strategy is needed to facilitate common approaches to JIOC knowledge processes that enables their integration as core operating elements of the IC.

2. Adopt a common, modern, and evolvable desktop collaboration environment with managed content. A common desktop environment is needed to advance JIOC knowledge organization and transfer capabilities. Features should include standard, selectable, and common displays that organize core knowledge using feeds and dashboards. The desktop should also include knowledge wall information, visualization tools, and 2.0 collaboration tools accessible and usable by individual analysts and managers to provide service-oriented products and services that address requirements through direct customer engagement and interaction. Part of this solution also includes investing in a workforce mix that includes library and information science specialists who manage and facilitate interactions among and between people, processes, systems, and information. [Editor's Note: The IC is now in the process of integrating its agencies' IT systems through a program known as the IC ITE (Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise) Strategy. The DoD agencies, and in particular DIA and NGA, so far have led the way within the IC in moving forward with migrating their high-side systems to a "common operating environment." For instance, DIA set 2014 as the target year for migrating its JWICS accounts to the new integrated system, which will allow analysts in different agencies to have common access to selected partner agencies' databases and to be able to access their accounts even while visiting, or on rotation to, other agencies.]

3. Build and train to processes that systematically employ collaboration tools within an integrated knowledge environment. Making tools available is a necessary but insufficient knowledge management program action. Collaboration tools must be deliberately integrated to enhance knowledge processes, with the entire workforce included as part of the integration, implementation, and evolution. Additionally, the core knowledge skills of the workforce must be deliberately and continuously developed to realize the potential of collaboration tools.

4. Flatten dissemination of situational information and management guidance. JIOC activities occur in dynamic environments that demand quick, coordinated responses to emerging issues by rapidly integrating and communicating new information. Processes and technologies must provide access to core and common knowledge across the workforce as a matter of routine, and should aim to eliminate hierarchical and redundant retransmission and dissemination approaches. A variety of technologies is already available to facilitate, such as webcasts and podcasts; investment in their integration into daily business routines is needed.

5. Develop standards and implement best practices for knowledge organization processes and tools. More granular implementation of extant intelligence information and records management programs would facilitate knowledge transfer and align efforts to organize JIOC knowledge with DNI initiatives and standards for discoverability, accessibility, and retrievability. Knowledge use and reuse could be improved by migrating from email to 2.0 environments as the primary tasking, collaboration, scheduling, and information dissemination forums; integrating email within that common collaborative environment; and establishing, organizing, and exposing local knowledge bases to IC repositories, such as the Library of National Intelligence. Investment in tagging and technical architectures which minimize latency and optimize precision and recall in search and retrieval processes is essential.

In sum, JIOCs rapidly task-organize to bring specialized capabilities, information, processes, and skills together to create and provide knowledge to their Combatant Commanders, and can do that most effectively as fully integrated intelligence organizations. The environment in which JIOCs operate and the interactions on which they depend for executing their intelligence missions are complex, and would be well-served by an enterprise knowledge strategy that enables core mission operations and also informs organizational planning and investments. The challenge of developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy is formidable. Not rising to the challenge will consign our collective knowledge to shallow perspectives that cannot inspire rich insights and creative solutions for today's military.

[Author's Note: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or any of its components, nor of the National Military Intelligence Association, nor those of the organization where the author is employed.]

NOTES

[1] Brandon & Hollingshead (2004) define transactive memory as "the shared division of cognitive labor with respect to the encoding, storage, retrieval, and communication of information from different knowledge domains." Brandon, D. & Hollingshead, A. (2004). Transactive memory systems in organizations: Matching tasks, expertise, and people. *Organization Science, 15*(6), 633-644. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034766.

[2] National Research Council (2011). *Intelligence analysis for tomorrow: Advances from the behavioral and social sciences*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Retrieved from http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13040&page=R1.

[3] Discussed in Flynn, Pottinger, & Batchelor, 2010; Moore, 2011; and DSB Task Force, 2011. Flynn, M.T., Pottinger, M., & Batchelor, P. (2010). *Fixing Intel: A blueprint for making intelligence relevant in Afghanistan.* Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security. Retrieved from http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf.
Also see Defense Science Board Report (2011). *Report of the defense science board task force on defense intelligence: Counterinsurgency intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations*. Retrieved from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA543575.pdf. In addition, see Moore, D.T. (2011). *Sensemaking: A structure for an intelligence revolution.* Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press. Retrieved from http://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Sensemaking.pdf.

[4] The IC's Analytic Transformation program and IT architecture are described in pamphlets published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and posted at http://semanticommunity.info/Catalyst_Entity_Extraction_and_Disambiguation_Study_Final_Report and http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_ITE_Strategy.pdf.

[5] For example, a collaborative environment concept for the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC) was presented in *NJOIC Collaboration and Web 2.0* (Shields, M., 2010) at the International SOA, Cloud + Service Technology Symposium. Like JIOCs, NJOIC is a DIA-sponsored Joint Staff intelligence organization. Retrieved from http://www.servicetechsymposium.com/soa_archive/pdf_2010/Day%202%20Keynote%202_Shields_NJOIC.pdf.

[6] Cool, C. & Belkin, N. (2011). Interactive information retrieval: History and background. In I. Ruthven and D. Kelly (eds.) *Interactive information seeking, behavior and retrieval* (pp. 1-14).

[7] Desouza, K. & Paquette, S. (2011). *Knowledge management: An introduction*. New York: Neal-Schuman Publishers, Inc.

[8] The NGA Strategy (2013-2017) discusses efforts to develop GEOINT services that "provide access to content, applications, expertise, and support through a unified Web presence and an enterprise application store on three security domains (UNCLASSIFIED, SECRET, TOP SECRET)." Accessed at https://www.nga.mil/About/NGAStrategy/Documents/19639_NGA%20Strat%20Pub_Public_Web.pdf.

[9] Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2013). *Electronic Reading Room*. Retrieved from http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/ic-policies-reports.

Lou Anne DeMattei is a second-year PhD student at the University of Maryland's iSchool and also a career intelligence officer. She is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Troy University, the Joint Military Intelligence College (now NIU), and the Air War College, and has written several articles on cyber operations and security issues. Ms. DeMattei was on active duty for 11 years and then served as a Navy Reservist for 16 years, retiring in 2010. She has served with DIA since 1998, and has had assignments at ODNI, USD(I), Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and U.S. Cyber Command. In addition, she currently serves as Program Chair for the NCR Chapter of NMIA.

Investing in People:
The Evolution of the Joint Duty Program

by MAJ (USA) Eric W. Miller

"People are our most valuable asset." This ubiquitous phrase or idea is often seen splashed across the website or vision statement of most organizations. Yet, furloughs, downsizes, and layoffs are frequently the option of first resort when an organization—either public or private—is forced to find efficiencies. Some might wonder whether "people are our most valuable asset" is simply a corporate cliché or truly an organizational value?

Recent events indicate Intelligence Community (IC) leadership thinks the latter, as evidenced by the hard-fought decision not to furlough National Intelligence Program (NIP)-funded intelligence officers as part of the ongoing budget sequestration. This decision was largely based on the belief that people—above all other resources—give the IC its competitive advantage and are essential to the products and services of the Community. Director of National Intelligence Clapper frequently states: "Intelligence is a people business," and even charges IC leadership to "lead and develop the next generation of intelligence officers."[1]

When forced to make hard resource allocation decisions, organizations too often propose training, education, and employee opportunities as first victims in the budget battle.

The concept for investing in people comes from the Resourced-Based View (RBV) theory, which posits that an organization can achieve a sustainable competitive advantage only by investing in assets it directly owns, and that are key to the organization's products and services.[2] For the IC, this primary asset is the Community's people. Therefore, according to the RBV, the IC must invest and develop its most valuable resource—its people—to sustain a competitive advantage over other products and services available to IC customers.

This is extremely difficult to do in a "period of declining resources," when an instinctive managerial tendency might be to husband resources and limit investments that do not have an immediate, visible impact on near-term problems. When forced to make hard resource allocation decisions, organizations too often propose training, education, and employee opportunities as first victims in the budget battle. However, this approach is short on vision and has long-term detrimental impacts. It fails to address the environment wherein developing competitive advantage means investing in one's key resource, not restricting it. Therefore, one solution is to vehemently guard against a restrictive approach, and preserve investments in the enterprise workforce, through a robust Joint Duty Program aimed at promoting the collaborative, integrated culture the IC is trying to build. In fact, not only must the Intelligence Community preserve the Joint Duty Program, but now—more than ever—the Community must double down on its investment in its most valuable asset—its people—by evolving the Joint Duty construct.

THE JOINT DUTY PROGRAM

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) strongly encouraged the newly established Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to establish a personnel management system essentially modeled after the Department of Defense's system of joint duty rotations, specifically charging:

> The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community through various elements of the intelligence community in the course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, users, and capabilities.[3]

The intent behind the joint duty proposal was clear: create a personnel system that broadens the experience and education of intelligence officers through interagency exposure, thus increasing collaboration, integration, and teamwork, ultimately with the intent to prevent (or minimize) barriers to information sharing and resulting intelligence failures.

The Joint Duty Program, as it exists today, is fairly straightforward. Intelligence officers receive joint duty

credit for twelve months[4] of service in any of the following roles: as a permanent ODNI cadre; in a rotational assignment in another intelligence agency; service on a Community-wide committee or task force; in an approved "internal position" with Community-wide responsibility; or previous qualifying work experience. Further, joint duty credit is mandatory for promotion to SES-level positions within the Community. Most recently, the minimum grade/pay-band requirement for joint duty was lowered to GG-11, in order to widen the availability of joint duty to Community personnel and reap the benefits of joint duty for a longer period in an officer's career.

Although the majority of the Intelligence Community workforce would probably agree the Joint Duty Program has been largely a success in broadening enterprise exposure, several issues have arisen. The designation of some joint duty positions as "non-reimbursable" meant the donating agency was unable to hire a replacement employee to fill the vacancy created by a joint duty assignment. This issue may quiet somewhat as a recent agreement by the largest IC agencies would make nearly all joint duty positions reimbursable. Within the ranks, some have identified "re-integration" as an area that needs increased attention—the situation when a joint duty officer returns to his/her home agency to find the former billet filled and no career-progressing options available.

Given projected attrition and hiring patterns, the IC currently has the workforce it will have for the next ten years. The IC therefore has no choice but to constantly develop and strengthen this workforce.

The decline of federal budgets would seem only to exacerbate these types of issues. A natural tendency for an intelligence agency might be to hunker down and weather out the fiscal storm by reducing joint duty positions or restricting the number of employees it releases to joint duty. What the IC cannot allow—what the IC must not allow—is to engage in personnel entrenchment and entertain suggestions to reduce the size and scope of the Joint Duty Program. Individual agencies cannot so fiercely husband their personnel resources to the extent it reduces enterprise perspective and limits Community-wide opportunities available for professional growth and development. As Peter Quigley, senior partner and former CEO of Deloitte, stated, "If companies don't invest in building [employee] capability, then they're going to go someplace else, where they think someone will."[5]

From an agency perspective, this mentality manifests in reduction of agency-specific schools, training, career-broadening opportunities, or short rotations to other intra-agency directorates. Directorate leadership is often loath to release officers for these and other opportunities for fear of hearing the old adage: "If you can afford to let them go for that long, you must not really need them." This attitude is a tactical solution to a strategic problem. Restricting these types of professional opportunities demotivates employees and essentially places a ceiling on organizational capacity and performance. Given projected attrition and hiring patterns, the IC currently has the workforce it will have for the next ten years. The IC therefore has no choice but to constantly develop and strengthen this workforce. Can the IC really afford not to let employees seek joint duties?

INVESTING IN CORE ASSETS

John D. Rockefeller, CEO of Standard Oil, knew that smart organizations conserve in economic boom times—let the competition expand when it costs the most—and invest during economic downturns, i.e., buy assets on the cheap. On September 18, 1873—"Black Thursday"—a stock market crash began a six-year depression. Rockefeller and Standard Oil took advantage by investing in their core business—oil refineries—and purchased dirt-cheap refineries throughout the northeast. By the time the economy was moving again, Standard Oil owned 90% of the refineries in the United States.

Rockefeller and Standard Oil understood the principle of RBV. Standard Oil acquired and developed more of its most valuable assets—oil refineries—at a time when the competition could not or chose not to do so. The result? Standard Oil sustained an unparalleled competitive advantage for decades…so great, in fact, it took an act of Congress to break Standard Oil's advantage (monopoly).

It turns out 19th century practices still work well in the 20th and 21st centuries. A 2006 study by Bain & Company analyzed over 700 firms' performance through the 1990-91 recession, to identify trends and practices of companies that capitalize on economic downturns to develop competitive advantage. The Bain study found that the best firms viewed economic contractions as "intense crucibles of opportunity," and succeeded by investing in strategic opportunities directly tied to the core business.[6] Companies that performed poorly failed to properly assess their own strategic positioning and invested in non-core assets, in what investment guru Peter Lynch has called "diworsification."

In a more recent example, drugstore retailer Walgreens followed the principle of RBV during the 2001-02

recession, and strategically invested—during a downturn—to expand its core generic drug business. By the time the recession ended, Walgreens not only increased earnings throughout the recession, but had also gained significant market share over its competitors and was postured to build an additional 475 new stores.[7]

The application of RBV to the Intelligence Community and joint duty is clear. For all intents and purposes, the IC (and the U.S. government) is facing an economic downturn. As the saying goes, the Community must "do less with less." Doing less with less, however, does not mean the Community cannot or should not continue to invest in opportunities—especially those that directly affect its most valuable asset. The IC is entering its own "intense crucible of opportunity," to shape, grow, and develop the enterprise workforce it is going to have for the next decade. Now is the time to invest in its core business—people. What follows are three specific ways in which to evolve the Joint Duty Program. These are not "good-idea fairy" schemes, but rather best business practices that are already in place elsewhere demonstrating positive and long-term success.

EVOLUTION #1: PROGRAM BASELINE AND REVIEW

First, the Intelligence Community should conduct a comprehensive baseline review of positions in light of the goal of joint duty: "to achieve the widest possible understanding." This analysis would determine which existing positions meet the intent for officers to achieve an enterprise perspective of the intelligence mission. For example, can an intelligence officer really achieve an enterprise perspective through internal positions? Or are there missions not currently identified as joint duty experiences that meet the program goal?

Once completed, a comparison of the baseline review with the current joint duty landscape may highlight gaps where the Community can evolve or expand the program. Should the IC keep joint duty positions that fail or only marginally meet the program goal? Can the Community designate positions as joint duty positions if they are in areas where there is the greatest need for integration, energy, and talent? Lastly, are the current positions all at the right grade or responsibility level? This comprehensive review would provide a baseline, a starting point for future decisions on joint duty positions.

A baseline review would not only confirm existing joint duty billets and identify additional ones, but also could highlight key positions in the Community where joint duty qualification is a prerequisite. In other words, some positions within the IC might require individuals who already possess the widest possible understanding instead of serving as a proving ground for more inexperienced officers.

Any joint duty program review should interpret the goal—"achieve the widest possible understanding"—liberally and broadly, as the ultimate goal is to increase, not restrict, the overall number of joint duty positions available. The ODNI has already moved in this direction by increasing the ratio of ODNI personnel cadre to rotational staff up to 50% assigned and 50% on rotation. Although this is a good start, more should be done. Clearly, more positions represent more opportunities for a wider population of the Community. An increase in Community-wide billets should also reduce the need for "internal" positions and make the program truly more joint. Additionally, increasing the positions may also help with the issue of re-integration, by providing more opportunities.

The growth of free agency would give the Community a flexible, adaptive, and fluid personnel pool that much more easily pivots, rebalances, or surges as mission requirements dictate.

In helping to mitigate re-integration issues, the expansion of billets may also help create an internal Community "free agency." For example, an intelligence officer from DIA might complete a joint duty assignment at CIA, only to return to DIA and find his/her billet either filled or reorganized. With additional billets, the officer may find other opportunities within DIA, or conduct another rotational assignment at another agency, say NRO or NGA. In fact, with additional positions and flexibility, an officer could complete multiple, successive rotational assignments throughout the Community, much like a "free agent" (or "integration agent"). The growth of free agency would give the Community a flexible, adaptive, and fluid personnel pool that much more easily pivots, rebalances, or surges as mission requirements dictate. Consequently, free agency would also offer a vibrant, dynamic, and rotational career path—exactly the kind of career that the new workforce generation is seeking.

EVOLUTION #2: AN EDUCATION COMPONENT

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 obligated the Department of Defense to establish a Joint Officer Management Policy that included both an experience and education component.[8] Military officers achieving "Joint Qualified Officer" status have completed both a requisite amount of time gaining joint experience and also

"Joint Professional Military Education" (JPME). The creators of this requirement realized that experience in a joint environment was but part of getting to true "jointness;" military officers additionally needed an academic exchange in a non-operational context. Retired Commander John Kuehn, an associate professor at the Army's Command and General Staff College (a JPME school), likens joint education to "intellectual free play among the services," and identifies these experiences as "some of the best places to test service parochialisms and modify attitudes that are based more on myths and attitudes rather than actual contact."[9]

The Department of Defense has long hailed the success of the education component of the Joint Officer Program as essential to developing future leaders. In a 2001 *Parameters* article, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Henry Shelton identified JPME as central to organizational transformation, and declared "[joint education] programs spark creative, adaptive, and motivated leaders who, in turn, make the entire force more professional and stimulate intellectual development throughout the ranks."[10]

Unlike Goldwater-Nichols, IRTPA suggested—but did not mandate—the inclusion of a joint education component in a joint duty program. As with the Department of Defense, experience in another intelligence agency is significant but just part of achieving true jointness. The joint duty program should therefore evolve to include an education component.

To some degree, a framework for continuing intelligence education is already in place; it is simply not yet required in the joint duty construct. Multiple venues exist that might easily evolve into a joint education opportunity. The ODNI has already created the Intelligence Learning Network (ILN), a series of three courses: an introduction to the Intelligence Community for entry-level officers, integrating the Intelligence Community for mid-grade officers, and leading the Intelligence Community for senior-grade officers. Some may argue these current offerings are really training, not education, but more importantly, they provide a framework to advance the education component. The ILN could evolve into a tiered joint education component, servicing intelligence officers over the course of their career.

Within the various intelligence agencies, multiple programs already exist that cater to agency-specific development of leaders, analysts, or collectors. Nearly all the intelligence agencies conduct or contract development programs that occur in concert with an officer's career progression within his/her home agency. These programs, were they to include dedicated academic components on Community-wide learning objectives, would well serve as an entry-level joint education component, very similar to the system currently used by the military services.

The National Intelligence University (NIU) is currently the most developed joint education venue for the Community; NIU graduates over 300 intelligence officers per year with a master's or bachelor's degree in strategic intelligence. NIU students spend nearly a year or more in "intellectual free play" with individuals from throughout the Community.[11] The NIU also has created various certificate programs for those unable to attend either part-time or full-time, to include a new certificate that debuted in 2013 focusing solely on Intelligence Leadership & Management.

A joint education component both enriches and advances the joint duty experience, and also speeds the reduction of parochial perceptions and the strengthening of Community integration.

Including joint education as a component of joint duty would provide three key benefits to the Intelligence Community. First, a larger population of the Community would receive education in intelligence studies, creating a more knowledgeable and proficient intelligence workforce. Second, increased education facilitates greater levels of research, allowing these academic centers to serve as "think tanks" for the Intelligence Community and focus on critical issues in a non-operational context. Finally, a joint education component both enriches and advances the joint duty experience, and also speeds the reduction of parochial perceptions and the strengthening of Community integration.

EVOLUTION #3: JOINT DUTY AS TALENT MANAGEMENT

The human resource practices of the General Electric Company (GE) are widely viewed as the corporate gold standard in developing and managing talent. Numerous studies have examined the "GE effect," documenting that more company CEOs began their career and were developed by GE than any other corporation.[12] GE's remarkable success is frequently attributed to its unique approach to talent management: the realization that people are GE's most valuable resource and the source of its sustained competitive advantage, a corporate dedication to workforce development, and the detailed management of all employees and their careers.

GE's focus on talent management manifests with the development of a company-wide human resource asset, the "top 500 talent pool."

At General Electric, investment in people is not just a focus; it's an obsession. Famed GE CEO Jack Welch reportedly spent up to 30% of his time on executive development.[13] Jeff Immelt, the current CEO, spends an entire month each year just reviewing the performance evaluations of the top 500 officers across the company. As practiced under Welch, these top 500 officers enter into a "GE top 500 talent pool," the source of GE's sustained competitive advantage. That two successive GE CEOs have dedicated such a significant portion of their time to managing and developing talent within GE reveals an enterprise-wide appreciation that people are indeed GE's most valuable resource and that massive, top-down efforts are made to further invest and develop that resource.

General Electric's top 500 talent pool not only provides for targeted leadership development; it also serves as a talent management tool for GE. The population of the talent pool is visible to each of GE's eight division presidents, as an option of first resort when filling key roles within their division. For example, if GE Capital needs to fill a key position in its division, it can access the talent pool and screen for potential candidates who meet the desired experiences, traits, or skills necessary for GE Capital's mission. GE Capital can then approach any identified candidates from the talent pool to fill GE Capital's vacancy. The candidate can decline, of course, but this is rare. These types of opportunities are often career-enhancing, career-broadening, and often critical for the long-term success and development of the individual.

The advantages are clearly obvious—GE hires from within, retaining great talent and re-allocating talent where it is needed most throughout the enterprise, reaping incredible dividends when it comes to integration across the divisions. A downside to managing talent this way is the possible disruption of operations caused by the sudden departure of an officer. This disruption, however, is but temporary and minor compared to the longer-term benefit for the gaining organization.

To a limited degree, the government and the Intelligence Community are doing this now. Senior executives of one intelligence agency (or government agency) frequently move across the enterprise to similar or greater positions in other agencies. This is usually reserved for the most senior executives, however.

The Joint Duty Program, however, offers a way to implement the same practice more widely throughout the Intelligence Community. For example, when an intelligence officer successfully completes a joint duty rotation, he/she can opt in for his/her personnel file to enter the "IC Talent Pool," based on the merits and performance of the officer while on a joint duty. The officer then enters this Intelligence Community-wide talent pool. Once in the pool, the officer's file becomes visible to the human resources department in each agency. Any agency could then hire an officer in the Community talent pool to meet an operational or leadership need within its ranks.

...when an intelligence officer successfully completes a joint duty rotation, he/she can opt in for his/her personnel file to enter the "IC Talent Pool," based on the merits and performance of the officer while on a joint duty.

Many leaders and managers might immediately shrink from such a thought: losing a top performer from their organization to another agency. That is a parochial view, however, not an enterprise one, and a situation that GE embraces rather than avoids. For one, the organization losing the employee also accesses the talent pool, from which to potentially replace that individual. Second, it forces leaders within GE to develop their internal workforce constantly to assume greater positions of responsibility within the organization, a key factor in succession management. Lastly, this reallocation often frees up positions within organizations and creates additional promotion opportunity for other officers within the organization.[14] These long-term benefits far outweigh the short-term disruptions, and are advantages the Intelligence Community can reap through using joint duty as talent management.

This is a broad, general view. Clearly, such an evolution of the Joint Duty Program would require many more specific details addressing administrative issues and procedural concerns. More important is to push forward the overarching view that the Joint Duty Program has the potential to evolve from much more than a resumé builder, and into a talent management tool that both creates the integrated Intelligence Community for which we are all striving and develops the professionalized intelligence workforce our nation deserves.

Robert Cardillo, in a 2010 *Studies in Intelligence* article, articulated that "…IC reform is a continuous process," and challenged the Community to "create new processes that will take us into the future."[15] The evolution of the Joint Duty Program is one way to answer Mr. Cardillo's challenge.

[Editor's Note: Robert Cardillo is a former Deputy Director, and prior to that Deputy Director for Analysis, at DIA. Earlier he was Deputy Director for Analysis & Production at NGA. Currently, he serves as the first-ever Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration, a position created by DNI Clapper. Mr. Cardillo has been selected to head NGA beginning in late 2014, replacing Ms. Letitia Long. IC reform is a continuing priority concern throughout the Community. See *AIJ*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2011, which explored the theme "Intelligence Reform and Transformation."]

NOTES

[1] James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, "Our Expectations of Senior National Intelligence Service (SNIS) Officers," Keynote Address, SNIS (Senior National Intelligence Service) Promotion Ceremony, McLean, VA, June 6, 2012.
[2] Jay B. Barney, *Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage*, 2nd ed. (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley, 2002).
[3] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458, § 102A, 108th Cong. (December 17, 2004).
[4] Rotations or deployments to combat zones of six months in duration receive the same credit as the twelve- month assignment options listed.
[5] Jim Quigley, "A Successful Company Starts with Investing in Its People" (video, VIP Corner: Video Insights Powered by Big Think), accessed July 9, 2013, http://smartblogs.com/leadership/2012/04/24/a-successful-company-starts-with-investing-in-its-people/.
[6] Harvard Business Review, "Taking Advantage of a Downturn," *Harvard Management Update* (September 2002).
[7] Ibid.
[8] Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, § 401, 99th Cong. (October 1, 1986).
[9] CDR (USN, Ret) John T. Kuehn, "The Goldwater-Nichols Fix," *Armed Forces Journal* (April 2010), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/04/4393061 (accessed May 17, 2013).
[10] GEN (USA, Ret) Henry H. Shelton, "Professional Education: The Key to Transformation," *Parameters* (Autumn 2001), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/uSAWC/Parameters/Articles/01autumn/Shelton.htm (accessed May 17, 2013).
[11] During the NIU's 50th anniversary year in 2012-13, the joint nature of NIU education was formally recognized by military and civilian leadership alike. In October 2012, NIU was formally approved as a JPME Phase One-granting institution by CJCS. In February 2013, the DNI followed suit by designating full-time master's study at NIU as a joint qualifying experience for IC civilians.
[12] Geoffrey Colvin, "Ceo Super Bowl," *Fortune* 140, no. 3 (August 2, 1999): 238-240.
[13] W. Glenn Rowe, "Creating Wealth in Organizations: The Role of Strategic Leadership," *Academy of Management Executive* 15, no. 1 (February 2001): 81-94.
[14] Past agency and enterprise-wide workforce surveys consistently indicate Intelligence Community employees find few opportunities to move and rise within their organization. A talent pool management system may also help to free up or create more of these types of positions.
[15] Robert Cardillo, "Intelligence Community Reform: A Cultural Evolution," *Studies in Intelligence* 54, no. 3 (September 2010): 43-49.

Major Eric W. Miller is an Army Strategic Intelligence Officer and member of the faculty at the National Intelligence University. He has held a variety of tactical, strategic, and national-level positions in the national security enterprise at various locations including Korea, Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), the Department of the Army, and Congress. Eric completed his undergraduate work at West Virginia University, and earned master's degrees in financial planning (College for Financial Planning), business administration (Colorado State University), and strategic intelligence (National Intelligence University). He currently teaches courses on intelligence & national security policy and leadership & management in the Intelligence Community.

[Author's Note: The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.]

The "Responsibility to Protect" Doctrine:
Syria 2014

by Christopher E. Bailey

THE NEED FOR ACTION

The civil war in Syria, like the earlier strife in Libya, resulted in large part from the Arab Spring protests that have rocked the Middle East over the past several years. Initially, President Bashar al-Assad refused to accommodate calls for reform and responded to largely peaceful protests with brutal repression by security forces. The civil war has become increasingly sectarian over time, with a multiplicity of rebel groups, including foreign Salafi jihadists, involved. Claims of war crimes (i.e., violations of international humanitarian law)—including ethnic cleansing and indiscriminate attacks on civilians—have been made by both rebel and government forces.[1] Some countries have responded with verbal condemnations, while others have responded with military and non-military aid. According to the United Nations (UN), as of June 2013, over 93,000 persons had been killed, with many documented cases involving the torture of children, and up to four million more have been displaced.[2] Recently, there have been credible reports that the government of Syria may have used chemical weapons against the opposition; if the reports are true, the use of such weapons would be a violation of international norms.

The Syrian civil war has been an internal armed conflict, with a complex array of armed groups, to include local rebels, dissident members of the Syrian Armed Forces, and foreign fighters opposing the al-Assad regime.[3] Armed resistance began in the summer of 2011 and became a serious challenge for the government by January 2012. The government has used Alawite/Shiite irregular forces, as well as allied forces such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi volunteers, to support or replace its regular forces. The government has used tanks, artillery, and aircraft against rebels, and has experienced substantial equipment losses.

The rebel forces consist of two major "organized armed groups," the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Ahrar al-Sham, as well as a range of others. According to the U.S. State Department, as of November 2011, the al-Nusrah Front had claimed nearly 600 attacks, including more than 40 suicide attacks in major city centers, with many innocent civilians killed.[4] In fact, the State Department has concluded that the Front has a violent, sectarian vision for the country and is actually an extension of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The group, therefore, has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and is subject to sanctions under U.S. law. Ahrar al-Sham is apparently a coalition of Salafist groups, and operates under the Syrian Islamic Front. In any case, the Syrian rebels cannot be considered as an organized army operating under central command, but could be better characterized as disparate armed groups with varying levels of leadership, training, and discipline. The rebels have captured a range of heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, antitank and antiaircraft weapons. There is evidence that rebel groups have killed Syrian military prisoners and have taken reprisals against Alawite civilians.[5]

Sovereignty has been a cornerstone of international law since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. States, such as Syria, have a long-recognized right to manage their domestic affairs free from external interference. This right is recognized by Article 2 (4) of the *Charter of the United Nations*: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."[6] Nonetheless, the emerging Responsibility to Protect (R2P) legal doctrine recognizes two foci of state responsibility: an internal focus, or a responsibility on the part of states to protect their own people, and an external focus, "the responsibility of the international community to act when the host state is unwilling or unable to do so."[7] In other words, under certain conditions, when a state such as Syria has been unwilling or unable to protect its own population from attack, the international community has a moral—if not legal—obligation to do so notwithstanding state sovereignty. Here, Syria is involved in a non-international armed conflict, a characterization under international law that is relevant to Syrian obligations and also the international community's range of options for responding to the actions of the belligerents to that conflict.

The United States has a moral and legal obligation to protect innocent persons from genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, as well as to safeguard U.S. national security from the threats associated with such activity. The 1948

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, for example, acknowledges that genocide is a "crime under international law which [signatory nations] undertake to prevent and to punish."[8] Article 16 of the *Convention Against Torture* (CAT) obligates states to "undertake to prevent … other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture."[9] Both the United States and Syria are state parties to the Genocide Conventions and the CAT. Moreover, President Barack Obama, in an April 2012 speech at the Holocaust Museum, said that "[p]reventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States."[10] The United States should, therefore, undertake action to stop the carnage in Syria, both in an effort to protect the Syrian people from the depredations of the warring parties and to further the interests of peace in the Middle East.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

The United States, as well as other nations, has long recognized the need to strengthen peace initiatives and protect human rights. The R2P doctrine, with deep roots in the Western Just War tradition, emerged in the wake of World War II with the creation of international war crimes tribunals and the International Court of Justice, as well as important treaty law such as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.[11] Indeed, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the United States, Libya, Syria, and 164 other countries, recognizes that all persons have inherent dignity and inalienable rights.[12] Nonetheless, many humanitarian catastrophes, such as the widespread atrocities (i.e., genocides and war crimes) in Cambodia (1975-79), the former Yugoslavia (1992-95), Rwanda (1994), and Darfur (2003-04), call into question the effectiveness of treaty-based law and the willingness of the world community to act in response to emerging situations to protect endangered peoples from *jus in bello* (justice in war) offenses committed by predatory armed groups.[13]

The R2P doctrine is an emerging political norm, in part based upon customary international law, which aims to spur governments to act in preventing genocide and other major violations of international humanitarian law.[14] Indeed, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1674 on 28 April 2006 "[reaffirming] the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."[15] Broadly, the R2P doctrine is based upon three pillars: First, the doctrine recognizes the duty of every state to protect its people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Second, the doctrine recognizes a commitment on the part of the international community to assist states in meeting their obligations. Third, the doctrine recognizes an obligation on the part of other nations to take remedial action under the *Charter of the United Nations* when a state is manifestly failing to meet its obligation to protect its citizens.[16] Thus, if a government fails to protect its people from certain humanitarian catastrophes, the UNSC, acting through either Chapter 6 (the pacific settlement of disputes) or Chapter 7 (threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression), may take collective action through member nations. Moreover, the UNSC may refer a matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation and prosecution.[17]

The R2P doctrine is an emerging political norm, in part based upon customary international law, which aims to spur governments to act in preventing genocide and other major violations of international humanitarian law.

Nonetheless, the R2P doctrine does not obligate the United States to intervene with military force in a time, place, or manner that is contrary to our national interests. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya was not motivated by R2P, but on regime change, and that, rather than protect civilians, the intervention actually prolonged the conflict.[18] Air attacks against government forces or covert action does not necessarily protect civilians. Instead, such aid assists rebel groups and can prolong conflict. The U.S. government has been concerned that the provision of covert aid to certain groups could well be used by groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra against either Israeli or U.S. interests.[19] University of Texas Professor Alan Kuperman calls this the "moral hazard of humanitarian intervention."[20] Moreover, some experts believe that intervention with military force can carry an implicit moral obligation to assist with the postwar governance and reconstruction. Clearly, the complex dynamics of a foreign internal armed conflict, including problems with erroneous reporting by international observers, should give pause to policymakers to ensure an adequate understanding of how means and methods are related to policy goals. Professor Kuperman argues that the key issue should be whether a regime is targeting non-combatants, as Rwandan Hutu groups clearly did in 1994, or whether civilians have simply been caught in the cross-fire between belligerent groups.

The U.S. government does have a robust range of tools that could be used to address violations of international law regarding serious crimes such as genocide or crimes against humanity.[21] First, the United States could impose additional legal and economic sanctions against Syria under existing U.S. law that prohibits the use of chemical or biological weapons.[22] Second, the recently established White House-led Atrocities Prevention Board could examine the need for nonmilitary prevention and response tools.[23] President Obama charged the Board with the responsibility to coordinate the government's actions to prevent and respond to atrocities, to facilitate intelligence support to the government's efforts, and to create a policy framework for preventing mass atrocities. Nonetheless, there is little evidence that the Board has taken an active role in responding to the current conflict in Syria.[24] Recently, the Obama administration has reportedly provided covert support to Syrian rebel groups and has contemplated military strikes against the Syrian military, even though international and domestic support for major operations appears to be lacking.[25]

...the U.S. Intelligence Community has already prepared its first National Intelligence Estimate on mass atrocities, a document that should help raise policymaker awareness about emerging problems...

Next, the Obama administration could release intelligence information to the public about the Syrian civil war that would help shape international and domestic opinion about the nature and extent of excesses committed by any party to the war. Nonetheless, more information could help build a stronger case against the al-Assad regime and Syrian armed groups for *jus in bello* offenses. In fact, the U.S. Intelligence Community has already prepared its first National Intelligence Estimate on mass atrocities, a document that should help raise policymaker awareness about emerging problems and could have some of its content publicly released. Thus, the administration must look for diplomatic and informational tools that could be used in response to atrocities that may have been committed during the Syrian civil war.

The nature of the conflict in Syria, as defined under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), affects Syrian obligations under international law.[26] First, while the 1949 Geneva Conventions afforded major improvements in the legal protection of victims of conflict, they apply essentially to international conflicts—wars between sovereign nations, while providing limited protections to non-combatants in non-international armed conflict. Eventually, the international community addressed this gap in international law with the 1977 Additional Protocol (AP) II. AP II was designed to make international humanitarian law more complete and more universal, and to provide expanded obligations in a non-international armed conflict. Second, Syria has been a state party to the Geneva Conventions since 1953, but the government has never ratified AP II.[27] This means that Common Article III is likely applicable to the Syrian conflict, but not the additional protections from AP II unless otherwise incorporated into customary international law.[28] Common Article III provides significantly lesser (and less clear) obligations than does Common Article II and AP I for international armed conflict. This raises important issues about the difference between combatants and civilians (e.g., what constitutes an organized armed group), and when a civilian can be considered to be involved in "direct participation in hostilities."

One problem involves the definition of a non-international armed conflict and how this affects the legal obligations of the parties to that conflict. In effect, there are two types of non-international armed conflict in international humanitarian law. Common Article III applies to an "armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties," without further qualification. Yet, AP II applies to armed conflicts that "take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol."[29]

The Syrian conflict is likely governed by a combination of Common Article III and Syrian domestic law. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has held that "armed conflict of a non-international character may only arise when there is protracted violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups, or between such groups, within a State."[30] In fact, the ICTY has elaborated on the intensity of the "protracted armed violence" required to develop a robust list of factors that can be used in a totality of the circumstances test.[31] Likewise, the ICTY has also elaborated on the second requirement involving a conflict with an "organized armed group."[32] On one hand, the Syrian government has been faced with internal civil strife and "banditry," meaning that Syrian criminal law applies in at least certain parts of the country for certain situations. On the other hand, the fact that fighting is actually taking place only in certain parts of the country and not others does not necessarily preclude the application of the LOAC provided that the criminal acts were sufficiently connected with the ongoing civil war.

It is apparent that the government has been facing protracted armed violence by multiple organized armed groups, including dissident members of the Syrian Armed Forces, who have established some degree of territorial control. Evidentially, the armed groups have separate headquarters, command structures, and varying levels of access to weapons and foreign recruits. However, the groups cannot coordinate a common strategy, much less "speak with one voice" and negotiate agreements such as a cease-fire. Nonetheless, the Syrian conflict has been of sufficient duration (over two years) and intensity (a considerable number of persons have been killed or displaced throughout the country) that one could reasonably conclude that the conflict is a "non-international armed conflict." One fact here that should be dispositive is that the Syrian government has felt obligated to respond to the armed conflict with the use of its regular armed forces; clearly, the Syrian government believes that it has been facing much more than a law enforcement problem. Indeed, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have both concluded that the war should be characterized as such.[33] Still, the Syrian government has apparently not acknowledged the application of the LOAC to its civil war.[34] The issue then is whether certain actions on the part of rebels or the Syrian Armed Forces have violated the "minimum" provisions under Common Article III.

Although violations of international humanitarian law can be addressed either during or after hostilities, it is not clear that the United States has an obligation under international law to intervene to put a stop to ongoing "war crimes" in a foreign internal conflict. However, if certain acts could be construed as more serious crimes such as genocide or mass atrocities, that could be a different situation triggering a duty to intervene (e.g., the R2P doctrine) during hostilities to stop such ongoing crimes.[35] The issue, then, is whether either the Syrian government has, or "organized armed groups" have, committed violations of international humanitarian law that would justify outside intervention to protect the civilian population from the depredations of an ongoing war.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

The United States has important security interests that are threatened by the civil war in Syria. The 2010 U.S. *National Security Strategy* recognizes four "enduring national interests" that are inextricably linked: security, prosperity, values, and international order.[36] First, the Syrian civil war threatens to engulf the region in a broad and protracted conflict that would impact our security interests and threaten international order. Iran has been a long-standing ally of the al-Assad regime, using Syria as a conduit for support to the Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian groups in their fight against Israel. There have been credible reports of Iranian advisors serving with Syrian security forces, as well as reports of foreign militants who have entered Syria to fight against the current regime. The Syrian military has extensive stocks of advanced weapons, including missiles and chemical weapons supplied by Russia and Iran, that could be used against the United States and Israel if captured by transnational Islamic militants.

Credible UN reports indicate that there have been substantial refugee flows into neighboring Turkey and Jordan.[37] On one hand, the fall of the al-Assad regime could further U.S. regional interests by isolating the Hezbollah from Iran and thereby enhancing the prospects for security on the Lebanese-Israeli border. On the other hand, there is considerable risk that continued fighting will radicalize and fracture the Syrian people, leading to prolonged problems with territorial integrity.[38] Given the range of factions opposing the Assad government, combined with their current inability to work together, continued fighting will likely accelerate the already-visible fracturing of the Syrian people and bring about long-term governance and stability problems.

The 2010 U.S.* National Security Strategy *recognizes four "enduring national interests" that are inextricably linked: security, prosperity, values, and international order.

The reported Syrian use of persistent and non-persistent chemical weapons threatens to undermine long-standing international norms concerning the possession and use of such weapons.[39] In August 2013 President Obama said that "[we] have been very clear to the [al-Assad] regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized."[40] According to an intelligence report released by the White House, on 21 August 2013 the Syrian military killed 1,429 persons, including 426 children, using nerve agents in a rebel-held area east of Damascus.[41] Moreover, there is evidence that Syria may have conducted as many as 63 separate chemical attacks over the past two years.[42] If accurate, such attacks by Syrian security forces would constitute a likely violation of treaty-based law such as the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol that bans the use in war of toxic gases and the 1949 Geneva Conventions that prohibit indiscriminate attacks against civilians, as well as customary international humanitarian law.[43] However, even if the Syrian government violated an existing international treaty, that alone would not give the United States, or any other government, the unilateral right to intervene in Syrian affairs. A complaining government, such as the United States or

neighboring Turkey, would be obligated to obtain approval from the UNSC for collective action under Chapter 7 or to take the case before the International Court of Justice.[44]

ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

Accountability for violations of international humanitarian law furthers important moral and legal interests. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as the main body of the LOAC, are based upon the obligation to respect and protect both combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering. Nonetheless, Syria is not a state party to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which also reinforces the prohibition against chemical weapons, making it difficult to hold Syrian leaders accountable for such actions under that body of law.[45] Still, a strong argument can be made that Syrian use of chemical weapons against its own population is a violation of customary international law, and Syrian political and military leaders can be held accountable for war crimes by means of an independent tribunal established by the UNSC. In short, major violations of international law by senior leaders should be a "redline" for the world community; culpable parties must be held accountable for violations if the rule of law is to have any meaning.

The decision of the ICTY in the *Prosecutor v. Dusan Tadic* case provides legal precedent for the prosecution of members of "organized armed groups," including foreign jihadists for war crimes committed during the course of a civil war.[46] Tadic was a citizen of the former Yugoslavia and of Serbian ethnic descent. He was a Bosnian resident at the time of the crimes with which he was charged. Here, the ICTY statute gave the tribunal the power to prosecute persons for crimes "when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population."[47] In short, the UNSC could establish a new tribunal for the armed conflict that has engulfed Syria over the past two years and that tribunal could investigate and prosecute similarly situated members of Syrian armed groups based upon individual criminal responsibility for violations of customary international law or the LOAC.

Finally, even though the international community might not support U.S. military strikes, it would be more difficult for other nations to argue against investigation and accountability for violations of widely held moral and legal norms committed by either side. In early 2012, after a deadly attack on the Syrian opposition stronghold of Homs, both Russia and China blocked a UN resolution that would have supported an Arab League peace plan, citing concerns over Syrian sovereignty.[48] Moreover, such a broader investigation would complement the current UN efforts to investigate Syrian possession and use of chemical weapons.[49] Recently, both the United Kingdom and the Arab League have opposed military intervention.[50] Yet, the lack of support in the international community for kinetic operations may not necessarily mean a lack of support for legal options. Thus, while airstrikes would be laden with risk in terms of effectiveness, possible collateral damage, and mission creep for U.S. forces, an impartial investigation that examines excesses on both sides and leads to prosecutions that could establish accountability for culpable parties would likely be acceptable to most interested parties.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

The United States should advance the interests of peace, as well as protect the Syrian people from unnecessary suffering, through diplomacy, public disclosure of intelligence that clarifies the nature of ongoing war crimes, and support to a new international criminal tribunal for the Syrian conflict. First, the United States should lead an effort in the UNSC to condemn Syria for its indiscriminate attacks against civilians, as well as attacks against belligerents by means of impermissible weapons. While the al-Assad government has already admitted to possession of illicit chemical weapons, that government must also eliminate existing illicit stocks without delay. Here, the United States could share intelligence information with Russia and China about ongoing Law of War violations, even in advance of public disclosure, to soften their intransigence to UNSC actions against Syria. Second, the United States should publicize intelligence about the foreign arms shipments that have enabled the continuing conflict against innocent civilians, highlighting the need to end that support. Indeed, such use of intelligence would enhance the overall credibility of U.S. claims and would further the legitimacy of any international tribunal.

According to the journalist Sebastian Junger, a war correspondent and author of the best-selling book *War*, in the context of the Syrian civil war, "Doing nothing in the face of evil becomes the equivalent of actively supporting evil; morally speaking, there is no middle ground."[51] The United States should call for the creation of an international tribunal, perhaps modeled on the earlier one for the former Yugoslavia, which would investigate all atrocities committed by either government forces or rebel groups, with a remit to include prosecution or the referral of the case(s) to a prosecutorial body. The UN statute for this tribunal should have express jurisdiction over state actors and individuals accused of violating Common Article III.

Senior Syrian political and military leaders, starting with President al-Assad, should be held accountable through an

independent tribunal that could be established to investigate and adjudicate allegations of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Rebel groups, including any foreign jihadists, must be held equally accountable if the rule of law is to have any meaning. Such evenhanded investigation and prosecution of *jus in bello* offenses would undoubtedly further any post-war peace and reconciliation efforts. In any case, the United States must rally public opinion and lead a robust international effort to stop the spread and use of banned weapons, as well as to protect the Syrian people from the depredations of the opposing combatants. Both goals are morally unambiguous and worthy of a great power that acknowledges its responsibility to protect innocents.

[Author's Note: The opinions expressed in this essay are the author's personal ones and do not imply endorsement by the National Intelligence University, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Department of Defense.]

NOTES

[1] Jeffrey White, Andrew J. Tabler, and Aaron Y. Zelin, *Syria's Military Opposition: How Effective, United or Extremist?* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2013); Samia Nakhoul, "Insight: Syria massacres, ethnic cleansing that may backfire," *Reuters*, 11 June 2012, URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/11/us-syria-crisis-massacres-idUSBRE85A1DY20120611 (accessed 18 September 2013). Cited hereafter as White, *Syria's Military Opposition.*

[2] United Nations News Centre, "Nearly 93,000 people killed in 'vicious' Syria conflict – UN human rights chief," The United Nations, 13 June 2013, URL: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45162#.Uh-qnn-6lrM (accessed 29 August 2013); Erin Banco, "U.N. Reports Increased Number of Displaced People," *The New York Times*, 18 June 2013, online edition, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/middleeast/un-reports-increased-number-of-displaced-people.html?_r=0 (accessed 29 August 2013).

[3] White, *Syria's Military Opposition.*

[4] U.S. Department of State, "Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa'ida in Iraq," Press Release, 12 December 2012, URL: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201759.htm (accessed 23 September 2013).

[5] Anne Barnard, "Syrian Civilians Bore Brunt of Rebels' Fury, Report Says," *The New York Times*, 11 October 2013, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/world/middleeast/syrian-civilians-bore-brunt-of-rebels-fury-report-says.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 15 October 2013).

[6] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations* (New York: The United Nations, 1947).

[7] Aidan Hehir, "The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect," *International Security*, vol. 38. No. 1 (Summer 2013): 137-159, 147.

[8] United Nations Treaty Collection, URL: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cppcg/cppcg.html (accessed 19 September 2013).

[9] United Nations Treaty Collection, URL: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed 19 September 2013).

[10] U.S. President, "Remarks by the President at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum," Press Release, 23 April 2012, URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/23/remarks-president-united-states-holocaust-memorial-museum (accessed 29 August 2013). President Obama affirmed the importance of the issue and the need for concerted action against Syria in his 10 September 2013 speech. See U.S. President, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria," Press Release, 10 September 2013, URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria (accessed 12 September 2013).

[11] In response to widespread violations of the Law of Armed Conflict, the UN Security Council has previously authorized the creation of ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (the ICTY) and Rwanda (the ICTR). The UN Security Council Resolutions for each tribunal enumerated the specific war crimes that fell within their jurisdiction. For the ICTY, see UNSCR 827 (25 May 1993), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/135; for the ICTR, see UNSCR 955 (8 November 1994), available at http://www.unictr.org/Home/tabid/36/Default.aspx. The ICTR is probably the best analogy for the current situation in Syria in that the Rwanda conflict was a non-international armed conflict and the ICTR statute incorporated both Common Article III and Additional Protocol II violations into the enumeration of the crimes within the tribunal's jurisdiction.

[12] United Nations Treaty Collection, URL: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1(accessed 24 September 2013); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," United Nations Human Rights, URL: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx (accessed 19 July 2013).

[13] While the international community later recognized that the situation in Rwanda had been a genocide, the application of that terminology to other conflicts has been controversial. *New York Times News Service*, "Clinton Visits Victims of War He Acknowledges World was Slow to Act in Rwandan Genocide," *The Baltimore Sun*, 26 March 1998, URL: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1998-03-26/news/1998085092_1_kigali-rwandan-genocide-genocide-in-rwanda (accessed 24 November 2013); see generally Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

[14] Madeleine K. Albright and Richard S. Williamson, "The United States and R2P: From Words to Action," Report by the United States Institute for Peace (Washington, DC: USPI, 2013). Cited hereafter as Albright, "The United States and R2P."

[15] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1674, 28 April 2006, URL: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml (accessed 24 September 2013); OXFAM International, "Security Council passes landmark resolution – world has responsibility to protect people from genocide," Press Release, 28 April 2006, URL: http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060428_un (accessed 29 August 2013).

[16] Albright, "The United States and R2P."

[17] The ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The ICC is based upon the principle of complementarity; in other words, the Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases only where national courts have failed to do so. Syria is not, however, a state party to the Rome Statute. See Website of the International Criminal Court, URL: http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 29 August 2013).

[18] Alan J. Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention: Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign," *International Security*, vol. 38. No. 1 (Summer 2013): 105-136.
[19] Ken Dilanian and Raja Abdulrahim, "U.S. fears radical Islamists could take root in Syria," *The Los Angeles Times*, 8 October 2013, URL: latimes.com/world/la-fg-syria-islamists-20131008,0,5605017.story (accessed 15 October 2013).
[20] Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention: Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign," 123.
[21] Michael Abramowitz, "Does the United States have a 'responsibility to protect' the Syrian people?" *The Washington Post*, 6 September 2013, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/does-the-united-states-have-a-responsibility-to-protect-the-syrian-people/2013/09/06/5decf4c0-167d-11e3-be6e-dc6ae8a5b3a8_print.html (accessed 12 September 2013).
[22] See 22 U.S. Code § 5605; Michael P. Noonan, "Staying Out of Syria Is Not Cost-Free," *U.S. News & World Report*, 6 September 2013, URL: http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/09/06/staying-out-of-syria-is-not-a-cost-free-option-for-obama (accessed 12 September 2013).
[23] U.S. President, Presidential Study Directive 10/PSD-10, "Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities" (Washington, DC: The White House, 2011), URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/presidential-study-directive-mass-atrocities (accessed 22 October 2013).
[24] U.S. President, White House Blog, "Update on Atrocity Prevention Strategy Implementation" (Washington, DC: The White House, 2013), URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/05/01/update-atrocity-prevention-strategy-implementation (accessed 22 October 2013).
[25] Ernesto Londoño and Greg Miller, "U.S. weapons reaching Syrian rebels," *The Washington Post*, 11 September 2013, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-begins-weapons-delivery-to-syrian-rebels/2013/09/11/9fcf2ed8-1b0c-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_print.html (accessed 12 September 2013); Stacy Meichtry and Inti Landauro, "U.N. Clash Looms Over Syria Resolution," *The Wall Street Journal*, 10 September 2013, URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323595004579066524164827140.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories (accessed 12 September 2013).
[26] Phillip Carter, "An Attack on Syria: Probably Unlawful; Possibly Justifiable," *War on the Rocks*, 29 August 2013, URL: http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/an-attack-on-syria-probably-unlawful-possibly-justifiable/ (accessed 30 August 2013).
[27] United Nations Treaty Collection, URL: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1 (accessed 24 September 2013); ICRC, "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977," URL: http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=AA0C5BCBAB5C4A85C12563CD002D6D09 (accessed 28 August 2013).
[28] *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War of August 12, 1949*, in Andrew D. Gillman and William J. Johnson, eds., *Law of War Documentary Supplement* (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 2012).
[29] *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims on Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II)*, in Andrew D. Gillman and William J. Johnson, eds. *Law of War Documentary Supplement* (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 2012).
[30] ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj*, Case No. IT-04-84bis-T (The Hague, 29 November 2012), paragraph 393, URL: www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/121129_judgement_en.pdf (accessed 19 September 2013); *The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, para. 70.
[31] See, for example, *Prosecutor v. Milosovic*, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, para. 27 (16 June 2004) (the Court considered the length or protracted nature of the conflict and seriousness and increase in armed clashes, the spread of clashes over territory, the increase in the number of government forces sent to the territory, and the weapons used by both parties); *Prosecutor v. Limaj*, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 90 (ICTY, 30 November 1995) (adding whether the conflict has come to the attention of the UN Security Council and whether any resolutions have been passed on the matter); *Prosecutor v. Haradinaj*, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 49 (ICTY, 3 April 2008).
[32] *Prosecutor v. Haradinaj*, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 49 (ICTY, 3 April 2008) (the Court considered factors such as whether the group has a command structure with disciplinary rules; whether the group has a headquarters; whether the group controls territory; the ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate, and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as a cease-fire or peace accords).
[33] ICRC, "Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent maintain aid effort amid increased fighting," 17 July 2012, URL: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-2012-07-17.htm (accessed 28 August 2013).
[34] A nation, such as Syria, might not want to acknowledge the application of the LOAC to an internal armed conflict because of the attendant international scrutiny that would come from such an acknowledgment. Arguably, a nation could want to claim application of the LOAC in an effort to free itself from the constraints of domestic law. Still, if the government had relatively "clean hands" in its conflict, such an acknowledgment could allow it to capture the moral high ground in the battle for political legitimacy. In August 2008 the Russian military crossed the border into South Ossetia, a Georgian region, claiming a duty to intervene in a non-international armed conflict in order to protect South Ossetians and Russians from Georgian aggression. See Katherine Iliopoulos, "EU Report Targets Both Sides in Georgia-Russia Conflict," *Commentary*, Crimes of War, URL: http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/eu-report-targets-both-sides-in-georgia-russia-conflict/ (accessed 19 September 2013).
[35] Both the 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* and Article 16 of the *Convention Against Torture* (CAT) support the contention that there is an emerging norm under international law that obligates nations to intervene in at least some situations.
[36] U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010).
[37] The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Syrian Arab Republic," Website,

URL: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486a76.html (accessed 30 August 2013). As of September 2012, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were two million internally displaced persons in Syria, with another 800,000 Syrian refugees in neighboring countries.

[38] Jonathan Foust, "The War After the War in Syria," *Defense One*, 26 August 2013, URL: http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/war-after-war-syria/69404 (accessed 30 August 2013).

[39] Human Rights Watch, *Attacks on Ghouta: Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria* (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2013).

[40] James Ball, "Obama issues Syria a 'red line' warning on chemical weapons," *The Washington Post*, 20 August 2012, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-09036bcb182b_story.html (accessed 30 August 2013).

[41] Jeremy Herb, "U.S. Intelligence Report: 1,400 killed in Syria Chemical Attack," *DEFCON Hill*, 30 August 2013, URL: http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/319667-us-intelligence-report-1400-killed-in-syria-chemical-attack (accessed 31 August 2013).

[42] Ken Dilanian and David S. Cloud, "U.S. saw yearlong rise in chemical weapons use by Syria," *The Los Angeles Times*, 6 September 2013, URL: latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-intel-20130907,0,2289261.story (accessed 10 September 2013).

[43] United Nations Treaty Collection, URL: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1(accessed 24 September 2013); *Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare* (Geneva, 1925), in Andrew D. Gillman and William J. Johnson, eds. *Law of War Documentary Supplement* (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 2012).

[44] Under Article 39 of *Charter of the United Nations*, "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

[45] United Nations, *United Nations Treaty Collection*, URL: http://treaties.un.org/Home.aspx (accessed 10 September 2013). It appears that Syria may be joining the 1993 convention as a result of international pressure; see *The Jordan Times*, "Syria applies to join global poison gas ban in deal to avert U.S. strikes," *The Jordan Times*, 12 September 2013, URL: http://jordantimes.com/syria-applies-to-join-global-poison-gas-ban-in-deal-to-avert-us-strikes (accessed 15 September 2013).

[46] Tadic was charged with 31 individual counts of persecution, murder, cruel treatment, and inhuman acts involving persons taking no active part in hostilities; he was found guilty on 11 counts, constituting both violations of the laws or customs of war, including violations of Common Article III to the Geneva Conventions, and crimes against humanity. See ICTY, *Prosecutor v Tadiæ*, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, CC/PIO/190-E, The Hague, 7 May 1997, URL http://www.icty.org/sid/7537 (accessed 18 September 2013); Rochus J.P. Pronk and Brian D. Tittemore, "ICTY Issues Final Judgment Against Dusan Tadic in First International War Crimes Trial Since World War II," *Human Rights Brief* (Washington, DC: Washington College of the Law, 1997), URL: http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v4i3/icty43.htm (accessed 18 September 2013).

[47] United Nations, "Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia," Article 5, URL: http://www.icty.org/sid/135 (accessed 18 September 2013).

[48] Neil MacFarquhar and Anthony Shadid, "Russia and China Block U.N. Action on Crisis in Syria," *The New York Times*, 4 February 2012, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/syria-homs-death-toll-said-to-rise.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 30 August 2013); Joby Warrick, "Ukrainian port eyed as analysts seek Syria's arms source," *The Washington Post*, 7 September 2013, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ukrainian-port-eyed-as-analysts-seek-syrias-arms-source/2013/09/07/f61b0082-1710-11e3-a2ec-b47e45e6f8ef_print.html (accessed 13 September 2013).

[49] The current UN mission, formally known as the Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, was established by the Secretary General on 21 March 2013. UN News Centre, "'Clear and convincing' evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria, UN team reports," The United Nations, 16 September 2013, URL: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?hl=en&q=cache:xJOb33XjnO0J:http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp%3FNewsID%3D45856%26Cr%3Dsyria%26Cr1%3D%2Bun+investigation+syria&gbv=2&ct=clnk (accessed 18 September 2013).

[50] "Britain Will Not Join USA in Strike on Syria," *USA Today*, 29 August 2013, URL: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/08/29/syria-united-kingdom-debate/2725999/ (accessed 30 August 2013); *Time World*, "Arab League Shies Away from Fully Backing Syrian Intervention," *Time World*, 29 August 2013, URL: http://world.time.com/2013/08/29/arab-league-shies-away-from-fully-backing-syrian-intervention/ (accessed 30 August 2013).

[51] Sebastian Junger, "When the best chance for peace means war," *The Washington Post*, 13 September 2013, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/sebastian-junger-a-syria-strike-in-the-name-of-peace/2013/09/12/cad370d2-1af1-11e3-8685-5021e0c41964_story.html (accessed 18 September 2013).

Christopher E. Bailey is a faculty member at the National Intelligence University specializing in national security law, processes, ethics, and strategy. He is licensed to practice law in California and the District of Columbia, and is a member of the National Security Law Division, American Bar Association. He is a frequent contributor to AIJ.

Smart Phones as Proliferated Sensors:
The Coming Revolution in Information Access

by Dr. Gordon Middleton

SUMMARY

Smart phone developments will provide high value to intelligence and information- gathering organizations. This article identifies rapidly expanding smart phone data and application classes (Pattern of Life, Augmented Reality, Ubiquitous Navigation, Environmental Measurement/Imaging, E-Commerce, and Human Physiology). Such developments will expose critical information that will provide early warning information for intelligence applications that has not been available before. These developments may also create massive security problems for governments and privacy issues for consumers. They also provide an opportunity to reduce the cost of collection and do it in a legal and unobtrusive way without placing people at risk. This revolution in information access has already begun in the commercial world and it is available, now, for intelligence applications.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SMART PHONE

The explosive proliferation of smart phones with integrated sensors is radically changing the opportunities for gathering information on consumers and on events in the world around us. An emerging set of smart phone applications is providing escalating capabilities for remotely accessing pattern of life data on individuals, highly complex networks for reporting on public and private events, and widely distributed collection of unfiltered environmental data that, together, have the potential to radically reshape many current information-based processes.

These emerging capabilities have the potential to radically redesign the architectures for marketing, entertainment, and security. These changes include new business marketing opportunities to target advertising to specific consumers on mobile phones through applications that place advertising directly in front of applicable users. When integrated with virtual environment capabilities, they can cue location-relevant inputs to gamers enmeshed in their virtual world or to customers who may be enticed to make a whirlwind virtual shopping stroll through a nearby store. They also open a potential Pandora's Box of intelligence applications for monitoring the location, activities, and associations of individuals and small or large groups, plus provide a crowd-sourced, real-time view of the environment or activities anywhere on the globe. This combination of sensors and location information can be used to determine which advertisements are applicable to specific users, in specific locations, and match previous activity patterns and their consistency in that location with those authorized to be there. These global, social, political, military, and environmental data bypass both governmental censors as well as mainstream media editors. Such an unfettered, unfiltered view of events from such a multiplicity of vantage points has never before been feasible.

Such an unfettered, unfiltered view of events from such a multiplicity of vantage points has never before been feasible.

These sensor and collection methods are already changing market advertising based on the roving location of users and their user profiles, and more change is ahead. These emerging applications currently collect data from the new generation of smart phones and their sensors on a "permissioned" basis. For the most part, these user profiles are also currently limited to location and user identity and the specific application being used. An inflection point will occur when these initial data sets are integrated across sensors and applications. This breakthrough will enable a revolution in marketing, using highly personalized advertising that will leverage automatic and cued data collection from a rapidly expanding set of physical and virtual sensors on smart phones and other similar platforms.[1] If crowd-sourcing represents the new version of distributed analysis and production, smart phones and their progeny are the new "satellites" for global information collection as we approach the middle of the 21st century. The migration of such capabilities to virtual entertainment and security is already emerging. The revolution that will result from nearly ubiquitous, real-time information collection on everything from everywhere has already begun to affect business models in commercial applications.

Business Model Trends Foreshadow Future

The negative trend in price per clicks at the beginning of 2012 reflects the beginnings of a business model transition enabled by broad proliferation of smart phones. Trend analysis reported a 19% reduction in the price per clicks for web-based advertising in the 1st quarter of 2012,[2] and this is a trend of reduced value for click-based advertising. This decline continues a reduction in the value of click-based advertising, which began with a loss of 8% in the 4th quarter of 2011. Google did not provide insight into the reasons behind the trend. Our hypothesis is that this trend is symbolic of the marketing world recognizing a lessened dependence on the per-click business model to a different model made possible by smart phone proliferation. Google has experienced a significant growth in mobile platforms, currently activating 850,000 devices a day.

The new business model is built on mobile applications that directly target individual consumers based on real-time updates to the customer's profile and location, and context information collected by the smart phone. Such data may include email address, phone number, locations from the mobile devices, and applications being used by the individual and by local businesses or entities. Our conclusion is that there is a new wave of marketing that will leverage deeper knowledge of the mobile consumer, his/her location, and the surrounding information environment than has ever been possible from previous marketing constructs. Smart phone data have the potential to present a holistic view of customers to localized business opportunities and also have the potential to transform the value consumer market data, and in turn the business model for marketing. Just as the negative trend in price per clicks reflects the beginnings of this business model transition, innovative developers are beginning to leverage the new capabilities of the smart phone platform.

Smart Phone Developments

Smart phone capabilities and proliferation are not going unnoticed, as innovators have already begun to exploit its capabilities for consumers. For example, Alohar Mobile has developed the Placeme.com mobile phone service for "persistent ambient automatic sensing" using a wide range of iPhone sensing inputs.[3] An examination of the potential for the smart phone sensor platform indicates a nearly unlimited capacity for gathering information on the user and on the user's environment.

This article will analyze the capabilities of the smart phone platform and its implications for intelligence collection. This analysis initially focuses on the potential of the sensor suite and then evaluates these capabilities for intelligence gathering. The conclusion is that the smart phone platform has the potential to change the value proposition for intelligence gathering through the proliferation of the platform and the multiplicity of emerging sensors for it, together with the increasingly easy access to data from it through social media.

THE MOBILE PHONE AS A SENSOR

Physical and Virtual Sensors

The sensors on current smart phones include physical sensors and virtual sensors. The physical sensors[4] have a wide range of capabilities for high-resolution measurements of the surroundings, ambient environment, motion, and communications. The virtual[5] or derived sensors combine the physical sensor data to deduce orientation, acceleration, and relative position data.

The capabilities of these sensor suites enable multiple sets of functions that are only just now being realized, but which provide the foundation for the revolution in information access**.** These far-ranging capabilities have the potential to provide very powerful services to consumers and an almost unlimited range of information about the smart phone users, their location, and environment.

Smart Phone Sensor Enable Applications

The sensors on smart phones vary by manufacturer, by the types of sensors, the sensitivity of the sensors, and the sampling rates of the sensors. The lack of standards across devices makes it difficult to predict the growth of applications that will occur. The sensors on a sampling of smart phones support a range of application classes, as shown in Figure 1. Sensor capabilities may also be viewed in their relationship to lower-level functions, as shown in Figure 2. The higher-order application classes are constructed from combinations of the various functions.

This analysis looked at the sensor types that are available, the approximate instrument sensitivities provided by the manufacturers, and sampling rates of the sensors. The analysis did not consider power consumption in assessing the technical feasibility for specific applications. In addition this effort researched applications that are already being demonstrated in either beta form or supported product or service form to aggregate the range of potential mission applications. As a result, five application classes were identified and are mapped to the sensors that would support specific applications (see Figure 1). These same sensor capabilities may also be combined to support a range of functions, as depicted in Figure 2.

Application Classes:	Pattern of Life	Augmented Reality	Ubiquitous Navigation	Environmental Measurement/Imaging	E-Commerce	Human Physiology
Physical Sensors:						
Accelerometer	✓	✓	✓			✓
Ambient temperature	✓			✓		✓
Gyroscope	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GPS	✓	✓	✓			
Light	✓			✓		
Magnetic field	✓		✓	✓		
Pressure	✓			✓		
Proximity	✓				✓	
Relative humidity	✓			✓		
WiFi	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Radio	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Blue Tooth	✓	✓	✓		✓	
RFID	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Camera	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Microphone	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Virtual Sensors:						
Gravity	✓	✓		✓		✓
Linear acceleration	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Code reader	✓	✓			✓	

Figure 1. Application Classes and Smart Phone Sensor Contributions

Functions:	Orient-ation	Direction of Travel	User Acoustics	Vibration	Phone Movement	XYZ Location	Bio-metrics	Location Info
Physical Sensors:								
Accelerometer		✓			✓			✓
Ambient temperature								✓
Gyroscope		✓			✓			
GPS	✓	✓			✓	✓		
Light								
Magnetic field	✓			✓				
Pressure	✓			✓				✓
Proximity					✓			
Relative humidity								✓
WiFi					✓			✓
Radio								✓
Blue Tooth					✓			✓
RFID					✓			✓
Camera							✓	✓
Microphone							✓	✓
Virtual Sensors:								
Gravity	✓				✓			
Linear acceleration		✓			✓			
Orientation	✓	✓			✓			
Code reader								✓

Figure 2. Function to Sensor Mapping

Application Class—Pattern of Life

Smart phone sensors can provide very sophisticated and comprehensive measurements of pattern of life information. In many instances, applications in this class provide predictive insights to user behavior (see Figure 3).

Key elements these sensors and pattern of life applications can provide include:

- High-resolution ground track information
- Dwell time by location
- Facilities visited and the tracks through the facilities
- Modes of travel (based on velocity, acceleration, altitude, and location)
- Acoustic data by location, including acoustic and vibration signatures and samples
- Light levels, temperature, humidity, and audio levels (noise levels)
- Electromagnetic field strength by location that can locate power sources, powered devices, locations of metal, etc.
- Location data with centimeter accuracy, which makes human movements measurable.

Application Class—Augmented Reality

Augmented reality is a form of real-world environment enhancement in which the computer provides live, direct, or indirect views of a physical environment to the human via sensors, displays, or other outputs. This enables the human to better understand his/her surrounding environment. In this case, the smart phone provides the computing and displays the data to the human via digital displays, visual inputs, and tactile or audio outputs. The smart phone sensors provide the reference frame, such as location, orientation, and movement, so that data can be provided relevant to the location and orientation from either a remote data store or information stored locally. A current augmented reality application on smart phones can provide star locations in the smart phone viewfinder based on the current date, time, and user location, and includes arrows that point to stars, satellites, or planets of interest.

Other available applications in this category translate street signs, billboards, or text documents via the smart phone camera or translate voice input from one language to another. Other applications can identify structures, geographic features, and other objects based on the image in the camera and the location and orientation of the phone, or project weather information in the camera viewfinder and show the distance to golf greens and other golf course data.

Figure 3. A new algorithm developed at the University of Birmingham is capable of making accurate educated guesses as to where you are going to be in 24 hours time (Image: Mirco Musolesi), http://www.gizmag.com/location-prediction-algorithm/23287/pictures.

Application Class—Ubiquitous Navigation

Foundational to this application class is the ability of smart phone sensors to provide data on their location. GPS devices have been functioning for over 20 years and for at least 10 years on smart phones. These phones provide GPS-guided navigation and location services to users when they are in view of at least three GPS satellites. When the signal is blocked by obstructions such as buildings or physical features, the GPS navigation ceases to work. Other methods have been developed that can provide location services within structures or outside in the presence of obstructions. These services use WiFi signals, cell tower location, and in some cases Bluetooth signal beacons to provide location services inside facilities or where there are GPS signal outage problems. The location accuracy of these phones ranges from tens of meters to fractions of a meter, depending on the technology. Broadcom[6] has developed the 4752 chip that will receive signals from GPS satellites, cell phone towers, and WiFi hotspots with inputs from the on-phone gyroscope, accelerometers, step counters, and altimeters to locate the phone-to-centimeter accuracy. This single chip will also enable navigation within buildings. Broadcom calls this capability "ubiquitous navigation."

Location applications offer a range of features to include: remote operation by SMS Code; Google, Yahoo, and WindowsLive Maps format support; SIM replacement detection and notification; remote image capture; map view; and send location by SMS/email. SmartPhoneTracker offers these and other features via freeware download, and works on both GSM and CDMA devices.[7]

One result of improved navigation is the battle of the indoor maps. Competition among Google, aisle411, Micello, Point Inside, Microsoft Bing Maps, and Nokia has constrained these efforts within their defined silos, with the exception of some cooperation between Microsoft and Nokia in which the latter is providing its Destination Maps to Microsoft Bing Maps. This competition and cooperation reflect marketing assessments that people spend nearly 90% of their time indoors.[8]

Application Class—Environmental Measurement and Imaging

The cameras; microphones; and temperature, humidity, barometric, orientation, vibration, acoustic, light, proximity, pressure, and acceleration sensors provide a nearly comprehensive capability to measure the local environment as well as provide methods to navigate the environment. These sensors generally collect data at sample rates less than 40,000 per second and enable exceptionally accurate collection of data that can be used to measure the physical environment. The exceptional bandwidth of the logging systems and on-board memory also enable sophisticated sampling of the data at rates that support high-quality characterization of the acoustic, temperature, vibration, and atmospheric conditions.

If the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is successful in its attempts to make advanced thermal imaging sensors small and cheap enough to be integrated into phones,[1] every U.S. soldier and smart phone user could have a thermal imaging camera in his/her back pocket.

New applications for these environmental and imaging sensors are appearing on a regular basis. An example is the Triggertrap application that converts an iPhone into "a highly-configurable remote release for your camera."[9] It works with a mobile dongle that connects to the phone and a camera cable, in order to provide a variety of ways to trigger images. The intelligence or other applications of its ability to cue images based on time lapse, distance lapse (based upon the phone's GPS), face recognition, and sound, motion, and shock detectors are only limited by the user's imagination. Although this may sound like the technical story line of the latest spy thriller from Hollywood, free trial copies are available from the manufacturer and the full application with the mobile dongle are available for under $20 at multiple on-line retailers.

Future smart phone environmental and imaging capabilities stretch the imagination. For example, thermal imaging shows the environment with or without visible illumination and allows one to see variations in temperature (see Figure 4). At thermal imaging wavelengths (infrared wavelengths of 8 to 12 micrometers), people, warm-blooded animals, and operating engines glow brightly against the cooler background of plants and soil. Firefighters use thermal imaging cameras to identify dangerous hot spots. Soldiers use them to check what might be lurking in the brush, especially in dim light. If the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is successful in its attempts to make advanced thermal imaging sensors small and cheap enough to be integrated into phones,[10] every U.S. soldier and smart phone user could have a thermal imaging camera in his/her back pocket.



Figure 4. Future smart phone cameras could be equipped with thermal imaging capabilities that reveal differences in temperature, as in this thermogram of a traditional building in the background and a "passive house" in the foreground. (Image: Tony McConnell/Science Photo Library)

Application Class—E-Commerce

Some smart phones have RFID sensors that allow reading of RFID devices in close range of the phone.[11] This can be used to identify products and associated pricing along with location data provided in the navigation elements of the phones. In combination with mobile phone electronic payment/credit card options that already exist, smart phones can be used in various market applications. These capabilities may also be used within business processes to provide:

- Positive improvement reconciling actual inventory versus recorded inventory (target 100%)
- Electronic inspection for instantaneous updates on relevant inspection categories and providing electronic records that inspections have been performed
- Reducing and redirecting personnel required to complete and report on inspections
- Effective means of addressing regulatory compliance requirements that demonstrate internally and to the certifying authority that the inspection process is robust, effective, and transparently compliant with regulatory requirements

Application Class—Human Physiology

Smart phone temperature sensors, accelerometers, and microphones provide the capability to potentially measure a person's heart rate, respiration, and temperature. In addition the microphone fidelity, digital sampling, and data rates may be of sufficient quality to deduce whether a person is under stress, excited, or under physical strain.

DATA REDUCTION POTENTIAL AND CAPABILITIES

The most interesting, valuable, and threatening aspect of these capabilities is what can be derived from this information when it is integrated, aggregated, sorted, and combined with other readily available information. The privacy issues are going to be substantial and are intricately connected with the value of the data.

The most powerful aspect of the smart phone data is the combination of the location and context of the information that these phones can gather. This is the case for each of the application classes, and the pattern of life application illustrates the issues.

The places in which a person spends his/her time provides insight into several facets of who he/she is:

- Primary habitat—where they spend most of their time
- Purchasing habits—what they buy, why they buy, and where they buy, including where a person goes through a facility and where he/she stopped and for how long, and where he/she picked items up and quite possibly what he/she bought
- Affiliations—work, education, religious organizations, and his/her likely level of religious devotion
- Modes of transportation—who he/she meets and where
- Patterns of movement—travel routes, work, vacation, restaurants, shopping, etc.
- Use of time—physical activity such as walking, sitting, sleeping, eating, etc.

When integrated, these capabilities have the potential to paint a holistic view of the individual. The sensor capabilities of the phones can be tethered to information in large GIS data stores like Google Earth or Open Street Map, advertising databases, address databases, and identity databases. All of these patterns of life data elements can be gathered from the smart phone platforms and integrated to create a holistic view of the customer and the areas he/she is

visiting. In an analogy to reverse identification of individuals through mapping unknown individuals to known telephone patterns of use, identification through reverse pattern of life matching may not only be feasible but much more accurate.

Correlations that can be made from the data on the phones include:

- Subscriber locations and dwell times at facilities (including map data)
- Predict what a person will be doing each day and spot variances from routines
- Determine specific locations within facilities where the person is living or active
- Locate and detect specific events including audio, video, and high-resolution pictures
- Determine when a person is excited, where and when this happens, and patterns of such activity
- Determine a person's general state of health, heart condition, stamina, and level of routine exercise
- Determine if the person using the device is the device owner or not
- Predict where a person is most likely going when he/she enters a building or a vehicle
- Monitor driving habits, speed, driving characteristics (distracted or under the influence of drugs or alcohol, skill level and efficiency, to include determining the risk of a driver based on when and how often he/she exceeds the speed limit, if he/she is texting while driving or exhibits erratic patterns of driving while distracted, etc.).

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

For the reasons summarized in this paper, smart phones are powerful sensor platforms operated by humans. They enable individuals to be highly instrumented reporters. The combination of technical capabilities of the phones combined with the global access to social media provides nearly three-quarters of a billion mobile users on the ground watching, recording, and commenting on activities that they observe or on things that they deem worth reporting.[12] The Twitter service is a completely open community in which the users have made publicly available most of the information that they generate. The users have become reporters of events in the world, recording by pictures, comments, and location what they see. The location data of social media are of varying quality, but it is estimated that up to 5% of "Tweets" are located to GPS accuracy, and the rest can be located by topic and proximity to a city by directed queries to the Twitter API. The number of people collecting exceeds the resources of any intelligence agency in the world and provides close access information from people who for the most part have a right to be where they are and are reporting for a wide range of reasons, including personal interests, curiosity, human rights monitoring, news reporting, or they just happen to be at the right place at the right time. The intelligence potential to take advantage of smart phone users and their information to gain situational awareness and find early indications and warning of threatening events is immense.

The intelligence potential to take advantage of smart phone users and their information to gain situational awareness and find early indications and warning of threatening events is immense.

Current and Evolving Collection Capabilities

The capabilities necessary to integrate across these emerging sources of data are not merely hypothetical or limited to PowerPoint presentations. For example, a social media mining system, Four Dimensional Vision (4DV), can enable analysts to analyze Twitter feeds and automatically report on items of intelligence interest. This capability leverages the general approach of current users of smart phones in which they use the camera and the associated microphones to record events or items of interest to them only a small percentage of the time. The rest of the time they use microblog services such as Twitter to provide general comments. Experience indicates that these observers will provide GPS-geolocated Tweets when they think it is important to do so, or if they just do not care about releasing the information. Humans have the ability to determine something is important and act on that information without having known in advance what to look for. A careful analysis of a large volume of Tweet information has shown that about one Tweet per 100,000 provides unique insight into events of intelligence interest. This result is based on the locational information only and does not include processing of volumetric signatures, dynamic semantic relationships, or detection of events, all of which have proven to be effective.

This system enabled our team of analysts to analyze Twitter feeds and automatically report based on the content, locations, and topics. For this analysis, the effort focused on a geographic-specific approach using simple "geofences," as these are comprehensive in coverage and very low-cost to implement. In effect, this approach turned many millions of cell phone users into reporters of high-value contextual

information. This capability has allowed the development of effective, highly accurate methods to glean high-value information from social media sources, and to do so without the terabyte per day processing capabilities necessary to process the entire data feed.

The full sensor suite on smart phones has the potential for users to record a much larger complement of information on their phones than is now common. As commercial providers of applications like Alohar and others find ways for consumers to readily use this information for self-management and other services, additional providers will develop capabilities for users to record a much broader range of data. When these applications are developed with appropriate data integration and business models, they will enable the collection of the broader set of data indicated earlier in this article. These future data will include signature data such as vibration, acceleration, temperature, light intensity, and multi-spectral information. Higher-grade cameras will provide microscope recording capabilities and other new uses for these phones.

The full realization of intelligence capability from proliferated smart phones will require adaptation of current analytical techniques. As this article suggests, the volume, variety, and sources of information available from smart phones for intelligence applications are rapidly increasing, with little end in sight. That is the good news. The rest of the story is that the existing analytic processes for review, assessment, and integration of relevant information in such a data-rich environment will need similar transformation.

Intelligence may need to expand its traditional approaches and even be willing to take a page from other disciplines in addressing validation of data in the Information Age.

Computing and process improvements are clearly required. Machine computing has created this situation and using machines to help humans find and understand relevant information will be required (see Business Case Section, below). Data validation is one of the analytic process areas in which the need for new concepts is particularly acute. This issue is not limited to intelligence applications, as just in 2011 courts in Connecticut and Maryland threw out key evidence derived from social networks, because authenticity could not be sufficiently confirmed.[13]

Intelligence may need to expand its traditional approaches and even be willing to take a page from other disciplines in addressing validation of data in the Information Age. The desire for multiple sources has been a long-standing principle in intelligence analysis, but the existence of so many sources describing events from so many personal vantage points is now rapidly becoming part of the challenge. The common approaches to validating Internet information likewise suffer from scalability issues. Assessing author credentials, date of publication, edition, publisher, and title of periodical may still have utility in certain circumstances, but for the most part will have limited applicability in exploiting the type of information sources described in this article. The methodology in the social sciences of content analysis[14] used for studying the content of communication may have some applicability, but it is not clear how well it can address network communications (or so-called "many-to-many communications").

There are approaches in network theory and manuscript analysis that may offer more fruitful approaches to the challenges of validating information from proliferated smart phones. Recent developments in network theory may assist in addressing some of these issues.[15] In addition, the experience of historians and religious researchers doing manuscript analysis of historical Jewish and Christian texts may also provide a useful model. The historical, critical, and analytical methods[16] that have been used to sort through over 20,000 individual manuscripts associated with the New Testament alone may provide valuable approaches for consideration as the Intelligence Community searches for the means to address this problem.

THE BUSINESS CASE FOR INTELLIGENCE

Budget cuts and reductions in the workforce supporting the intelligence function are likely to increase the workload of individual analysts, in addition to the trends making much more information available. Information workers have to consume large volumes of information and then draw conclusions to support action by decision-makers. However, the key to increasing the productivity of expensive knowledge workers is to provide them with information that has a high probability of addressing their issue or problem.

Social media provide a significant potential for reducing the cost of collection operations and increasing the value of existing operations. The precision location data that the social media provide enable relatively simple methods to detect high-interest mobile user locational reporting. Though these data are sparse, they can be acquired at relatively low

cost. With some advanced algorithms and techniques the data can be used to augment other business data to gain situational awareness of events and situations and in many cases high-interest issues. When these data are combined with other information including news reports, business data, and data from other sensors, a much more complete view of a situation can be obtained. For instance, a user may Tweet that in a mob he has observed a group of men with guns wearing police badges. Such inputs can provide unique perspectives on what is really happening at a much more granular level. A person viewing an aviation event may take a picture of the event where data such as propulsion system type can be deduced, or from a live video engine events can be seen. What appears to be a low-interest Tweet in the location may become a high-resolution multi-media observation. When this is combined with other knowledge from unclassified or classified sources, it is possible to substantially add to the value of the individual observations.

Architectures to implement such an approach have been developed. Features include ingesting the multi-source data into a business environment and using customer-assigned "geofences" (areas of interest) to align the data with other information that enables an automatic determination of a high-interest event or activity. This information may be integrated with background data that are near the time of the social media data and business data, and may be combined into a PDF alert that is sent to analysts. This approach allows analysts to effectively review thousands of events quickly and to cue them to events that are highly likely to be of interest. Approaches have been constructed that can be operated at high capacity and relatively low cost.[17] This approach has been demonstrated to produce high-value results and does not carry the massive infrastructure risk inherent in many other enterprise approaches.

CONCLUSIONS

The explosive trend in smart phone proliferation will rapidly expand the data and application classes identified in this paper (Pattern of Life, Augmented Reality, Ubiquitous Navigation, Environmental Measurement/Imaging, E-Commerce, and Human Physiology). It is our expectation that the fidelity of the information will continue to improve and the types of sensor data will increase. These smart phone developments will provide high value to intelligence and information-gathering organizations, but may also create massive security problems for governments and privacy issues for consumers. Such developments will expose critical information that will provide early warning information that has not been available before.

The full realization of intelligence capability from proliferated smart phones will require new computing and analysis techniques and the adaptation of approaches from such other fields as network theory and manuscript analysis. The near-term explosion in geolocated reporting by many millions of consumers worldwide provides an opportunity to reduce the cost of collection and do it in a legal and unobtrusive way without placing people at risk. It may also provide global reach for minimal investment to U.S. as well as other intelligence organizations. This revolution in information access has already begun in the commercial world and it is available now for intelligence applications, as well.

NOTES

[1] See Google's plans for glasses that provide real-time Internet connection, heads-up display, and multiple sensor-enabled collection at: https://plus.google.com/111626127367496192147/posts.

[2] http://www.hochmanconsultants.com/articles/je-hochman-benchmark.shtml.

[3] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n1qDYSCONyg&feature=related.

[4] Physical sensors include the accelerometer, gyroscope, light sensor, magnet field sensor (often called a magnetometer), pressure sensor, proximity sensor, and temperature sensor. The values from these sensors are provided by hardware components directly measuring changes in the physical property of their environment.

[5] Virtual sensor types include calculated sensing of gravity, linear acceleration, and rotation vector.

[6] http://www.technologyreview.com/communications/40075/?p1=A1.

[7] http://smartphonetracker.blogspot.com/.

[8] http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.blogcdn.com/www.engadget.com/media/2012/07/2012destination-maps.png&imgrefurl=http://www.engadget.com/2012/07/16/nokia-grows-indoor-maps/&h=449&w=600&sz=69&tbnid=w0fJNnFcigvwJM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=120&zoom=1&usg=__MM3ceN0kmhPgiYRL9LtSajBV-KY=&docid=PZSFBrIb5srtQM&sa=X&ei=dhJSUu6GKbSv4APOioCgBA&ved=0CFAQ9QEwAQ

[9] http://www.dpreview.com/news/2012/04/30/triggertrap-remote-release.

[10] http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/2011/12/thermal-imaging-for-soldiers-s.html.

[11] Nokia has an RFID kit on its 5140 phone. See review at: http://www.gizmag.com/go/2728/.

[12] The number of smart phone users in the world was estimated in 2010 to be 176 million by the end of 2012, but new shipments in 2012 alone rose to total 694-722 million, with total, unique wireless subscribers at 3.2 billion; by 2016 new smart phone shipments are estimated to top 1.3 billion per year (http://mobithinking.com/mobile-marketing-tools/latest-mobile-stats/a). Some analysis indicates that 13% of smart phone users use Twitter and that, in the U.S., 54% of the smart phone users access Twitter on their phones. Currently the social media community is the fastest-growing category of mobile users.

[13] Investigations Using Social Media: How to Do It; How Not to Do It, http://parkavenuepresentations.com/description_investigations_social_media.html.
[14] Earl Babbie defines content analysis as "the study of recorded human communications, such as books, websites, paintings and laws."
[15] Duncan J. Watts, *The "New" Science of Networks*, Department of Sociology, Columbia University, New York: Santa Fe Institute, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 2004, 30: 243-270.
[16] "The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church," presented by the Pontifical Biblical Commission to Pope John Paul II, Origins, January 6, 1994, http://www.ewtn.com/library/curia/pbcinter.htm.
[17] http://www.4dvresearch.com/home/products-and-services/overview/.

Dr. Gordon Middleton has been the Director of the Strategic Intelligence Program at Patrick Henry College in Purcellville, VA, since 2004. He is a former senior intelligence officer and a retired Colonel in the U.S. Air Force. He teaches upper division courses on U.S. intelligence history, research and analysis, and advanced technology and ethics. He previously taught leadership at the undergraduate level. He is also the Director of Analysis for a start-up company that develops geospatially-aware text and data mining solutions for business intelligence applications. Dr. Middleton's most recent publications include: "War Gaming," in Encyclopedia of U.S. Intelligence, *forthcoming in 2014; "Cyber Assurance: Technical Developments and Cognitive Issues," presented at the National Defense University's First Cognitive-Cyber Conference, August 2011; "Avatars or Robots? The Human Factor in Overcoming Information Overload," presented at the Military Operations Research Symposium (MORS), June 2010, and the basis of an article by that title published in* AIJ, *Vol. 29, No. 2, 2011; and "A Maturity Model for Intelligence Education," which appeared in* AIJ, *Winter 2007/2008.*

CIA Operations in Tibet and the Intelligence-Policy Relationship

by John Masko

One of the greatest challenges of covert action, as detailed in John MacGaffin's essay "Clandestine Human Intelligence," comes in defining how it fits into the larger enterprise of intelligence. As MacGaffin claims, in order to have successful and judicious covert operations conducted through the Intelligence Community (IC), those actions must be integral to the larger human intelligence enterprise.[1] At the same time, though, covert action through the IC has long been closely linked to both foreign policy and diplomacy. In 1954 the Eisenhower administration first instituted regulations creating the Operations Coordinating Board—an organization intended to harmonize policy objectives of the Departments of State and Defense with CIA-directed covert action. In the intervening years, particularly in the aftermath of highly publicized covert operations failures like the Bay of Pigs Invasion, foreign policy, not just intelligence needs, has become an increasingly pivotal player in determining the covert operations agenda.[2] It is easy to see how this dual allegiance—a need simultaneously to support the official foreign policy of the United States and to achieve intelligence collection goals—can create tension. For one thing, foreign policy and diplomacy are conducted largely out in the open, subject to the ever-shifting environment of politics, while intelligence agendas are created and executed behind closed doors.

The example of CIA covert operations in Tibet, an episode of American intelligence history not well-known until the declassification of related documents in 1998,[3] serves as a useful case study of this balance between intelligence and policy. The Tibet project, generally referred to as "Mustang," was a long-term venture which served dual purposes: both the implementation of a foreign policy—to undermine communist Chinese efforts to bring Tibet under direct rule—and the collection of intelligence on Chinese activities.

Whether or not the foreign policy aims of the project succeeded remains somewhat unclear. It depends on whom you ask. For the former Tibetan resistance fighters based in Mustang, Nepal, which the CIA funded, trained, and armed for years, and who now eke out a living weaving carpets,[4] the project was an abject failure. The humiliated former rebel fighting force, which once thought it had a chance to bring down Mao's formidable People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Tibet, was forcibly disarmed by the Nepalese military and abandoned by its foreign benefactors.

For the United States, more mainstream Tibetans, and other opponents of the People's Republic of China (PRC), however, the message is somewhat more ambiguous. While the project failed militarily, its public relations efforts largely succeeded in raising the issue of Tibetan autonomy from a regional squabble to an international human rights rallying cry. Through vigorous propaganda efforts, diplomatic contact with the Dalai Lama, and the creation of "Tibet Houses" around the world, the CIA worked to promote the idea of an indigenous Tibetan government in exile.[5] In the process, it greatly undermined Chinese efforts to portray the PRC as an open and tolerant society.

...Mustang rebels continued to be a fairly viable source of intelligence right up until the program was dismantled in 1971.

Most of all, though, CIA covert operations were an intelligence gold mine for the United States. Between document recoveries in field battles with the PLA, the operation of missile spying stations, and signals intelligence collection, the Tibet program was hugely successful in informing policymakers regarding one of the world's most militantly closed societies. Furthermore, as we will later discuss, those intelligence successes would have been impossible without the CIA's paramilitary efforts. With many of their greatest intelligence discoveries coming in their final years, Mustang rebels continued to be a fairly viable source of intelligence right up until the program was dismantled in 1971.

Though some of the blame for the program's decommissioning lies with changing foreign policy priorities, it was mostly phased out because of ineffectiveness in accomplishing its main policy goal: beating back PRC influence in Tibet. At the same time, as the Nixon administration moved toward a diplomatic breakthrough with

communist China, it increasingly began to see the Tibet operations, and any perception of diplomatic closeness with the Dalai Lama, as a liability.

In the end, the Tibet project paints a complex picture. It shows a program which had difficulty defining its primary purpose: policy implementation or intelligence. At the same time, however, it revealed covert operations and the pursuit of policy objectives as a valuable forum for achieving intelligence collection goals. In the end, many of the lessons we can learn from Tibet—particularly the need for an intelligence program with paramilitary elements to adapt both to a larger national security policy and its own policy goals—can inform some of our current and future intelligence challenges.

This essay uses CIA operations in Tibet as a case study. It draws on anthropological and historical studies of the period—most notably John Kenneth Knaus' *Orphans of the Cold War* and Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison's *The CIA's Secret War in Tibet*—as well as original research in primary source materials. While it summarizes some of these books' historical arguments about the Tibetan episode, the article is an initial attempt to write about this unusual chapter of intelligence history from an IC perspective. After summarizing the pertinent history at play, the essay will bring out some of the key lessons to be learned from the incident and suggest some applications to current intelligence issues.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

In the early 20th century, Tibetan leaders found themselves in a politically difficult situation and one they had not faced in quite some time. Tibet had long enjoyed a sort of quid pro quo with the Manchu or Mongol dynasties in China—religious and political autonomy in exchange for general allegiance.[6] However, when the Kuomintang took power, under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, Tibet declared independence from China, fearing that its time as a loosely-affiliated satellite might no longer survive in the era of the modern nation-state.

Even then, however, Tibet was an ambiguous presence in East Asia. As both a religious and political entity, it has long had an uneasy relationship with the concept of borders.[7] The internationality of Tibetan "northern" Buddhism and the Dalai Lama's growing popularity on the world stage have made Tibet's borders ever more fluid. This fluidity would make Tibet's freedom fighters in Mustang comfortable with living decades in exile. When the Chinese Army invaded Tibet to carry out forced collectivization in 1951, it was the Buddhist connection between Tibet and other South Asian nations that turned a localized resistance into an international one. When the CIA began to establish its Tibetan program following the Chinese invasion, it would take full advantage of both pro-Buddhist and anti-PRC sentiments in the region, creating a network of sympathizers that stretched from India to Taiwan to Nepal. News of Tibetan resistance against the forced collectivization projects of the PLA, and desires to support it, spread throughout the Buddhist world.

When the CIA began to establish its Tibetan program following the Chinese invasion, it would take full advantage of both pro-Buddhist and anti-PRC sentiments in the region, creating a network of sympathizers that stretched from India to Taiwan to Nepal.

India, despite having much to lose from a conflict with China, voluntarily inserted itself into the conflict on Tibet's behalf.[8] This Indian partisanship would become especially strong after 1959. In March of that year, amid a popular uprising against Chinese influence in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, the Dalai Lama, Tibet's spiritual leader, fled to India disguised as a soldier to establish a Tibetan government in exile. The Dalai Lama's flight was met with a harsh reprisal from Mao's lieutenant Zhou Enlai, who announced the official dissolution of Tibet's still nominally independent government.[9]

The previous few years had already seen the inauguration of CIA assistance to Tibet's growing rebellion. Frank Wisner, a CIA officer who had presided over that agency's abortive attempts to support the Hungarian anti-Soviet uprising in 1956, introduced a new program to aid what he saw as a similar rebellion in Tibet later that year. The CIA program was essentially a blank check, as most were during the early Eisenhower years: "a full program of support if the initial teams found it warranted by the situation on the ground…"[10] The CIA program had the potential to become basically whatever CIA administrators wanted it to be. They busied themselves over the coming years with building a reliable, well-trained rebel Tibetan force, both for the purposes of fighting PLA forces and collecting intelligence that the United States could also use on the home front.

In 1960 the CIA relocated its central base for the Tibetan guerrilla project to Mustang Province in Nepal (at first unbeknownst to the Nepalese government), quickly recruiting 300 guerrilla fighters.[11] The CIA would continue to support the rebels for the next ten years, giving aid in the form of weapons airlifts, direct human aid, and even leadership training programs for prospective Tibetan officers hosted by Cornell University.[12]

In the early 1960s, a united front from the communist world made it difficult for the Mustang operation to gain a foothold. With the game-changing Sino-Soviet split still in the future, the Soviet Union emerged as a strong supporter of establishing a communist order in Tibet. Soviet United Nations (UN) diplomat Valerian Zorin announced, for example, that the Soviet Union would not "press [a] U2 [surveillance] complaint" against the U.S. after the U2 spy incident if it agreed to drop support for rebels in Hungary and Tibet.[13] Of course, Zorin was also referring to overt U.S. support for the Dalai Lama's government in exile and incessant public relations efforts. It was almost impossible, though, that both the Soviets and Chinese were not fully aware by this time of U.S. covert involvement in the region, after several confrontations with PLA troops wielding U.S.-distributed weapons.

...in 1964, sensors planted in the ground in Lop Nor, Northern Tibet, were able to successfully gather information on China's first nuclear test.

In the first years of the 1960s, Mustang rebels provided some of the Tibet project's first major intelligence windfalls. In 1961 a captured cache of documents revealed that the consequences of Mao's "Great Leap Forward" were causing significant material suffering and loss of morale among PLA troops in Tibet.[14] This capture of 1,600 classified documents would become known as the "Blue Satchel Raid." Not only did it provide CIA agents and Mustang troops in Tibet with valuable tactical information, it has been referred to as one of the most significant one-off intelligence seizures in American history, including U.S. intelligence's first accurate appraisal of Mao's catastrophic but well-guarded Great Leap Forward.[15] As John Kenneth Knaus recounts, this huge success came at a vital time in the debate over extending funding and support for Mustang. John Kenneth Galbraith, a noted economist and Ambassador to India under the Kennedy administration, vociferously opposed continued support, arguing (correctly) that the program had been miserably ineffective in accomplishing its stated goals, having achieved little in pushing the PLA back.[16] As other members of the administration noted, though, it had become quite effective in accomplishing some of its unstated goals. In the end, the CIA won the day and an extension of the Tibet program.

Over the ensuing years, Mustang would continue to achieve intelligence successes in a variety of different forms. A spying team based out of Tibet, for example, successfully infiltrated and photographed Chinese military bases in 1962, allowing CIA officials to relay some of the first intelligence on Chinese missile capabilities back to the United States. Two years later, in 1964, sensors planted in the ground in Lop Nor, Northern Tibet, were able to successfully gather information on China's first nuclear test.[17] The Tibetans also set up signal-interception stations on the Chinese border to gather Chinese military communications,[18] and used these for tactical analysis. On other occasions the CIA, working with Mustang rebels, also used military interceptions to show a relaxation of PLA efforts at the end of the Indo-Pakistani War,[19] suggesting that there was little chance of a Chinese invasion of northern India, which had been viewed as a possibility at the time. The hybrid paramilitary and intelligence effort in Tibet gathered an unprecedentedly large amount of usable human, signals, and geological intelligence through the early and mid-1960s.

The CIA project did not, however, exist in a political vacuum. In an era of increasing globetrotting by world leaders, the need for the policy and diplomacy apparatus to support the CIA's Tibetan activities became ever greater. President Lyndon Johnson's abrupt cancellation of a summit with the Indian Prime Minister in 1965 undermined vital Indian cooperation in keeping up and running the "Special Center," part of the Tibet project based across the border in India.[20] Dismissal of South Asian developments was, of course, not unusual for President Johnson, who was by this point subordinating most Asian issues to the burgeoning Vietnam conflict.

In 1965, adapting to the political realities of Vietnam and Johnson's almost monomaniacal focus on it, the CIA came up with an ingenious justification for increasing funding to Mustang. Agency representatives lobbied the administration by claiming that the Indian Intelligence Bureau had committed itself to the cause of Tibetan liberation, and that it might be willing to volunteer troops for a second front in Vietnam if the United States continued to support the Tibetan cause.[21] The program remained fully funded throughout the Johnson administration.

Into the early 1970s, the Tibet program continued to aspire to equal parts "political, propaganda, and intelligence operations."[22] Pursuit of its objectives became more strained, though, as Kissinger and Nixon moved toward a Chinese rapprochement and China established more solid authority along the Tibetan border. The Mustangs, facing severe casualties every time they fought, began to focus more exclusively on intelligence.[23] As the CIA began to scale back funding and resources for the rebels, though, achieving the program's intelligence goals began to become more and more difficult. As China increased controls over the borders of Tibet, CIA efforts to place active Mustang intelligence collectors in Tibet became "extremely hazardous."[24] China continued to assert greater control over the southern area of Tibet immediately across from the

Mustang encampment, and State Department officials began to express greater doubts that the Mustangs could be a viable obstacle to China were conflict to break out.[25] The Mustangs were gradually abandoned financially by the CIA.[26] As support evaporated, the Nepalese government saw an opportunity to retake its border territory, forcing out the small remaining group of rebels.[27] An era of integrated policy and intelligence through covert operations had come to an abrupt end.

ANALYSIS: LESSONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE

While we may like to make it so, the story of the Tibet project's end is not a simple one of intelligence interests being squashed under the foot of a foreign policy colossus. Rather, policy and intelligence aspirations were inextricably linked in the Tibetan project, and that linkage proved simultaneously to be a reason for its intelligence successes and its downfall. The Tibetans would never have captured the invaluable Great Leap Forward documentation without CIA financial support. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence officers likely would never have gotten wind of the documents' existence without there having been U.S. paramilitary officers in the field. Even despite significant success on the intelligence side, however, the CIA began to see the writing on the wall for the Tibetan program during the mid-1960s. It started to lean increasingly toward the side of politics, rather than pure intelligence, in order to be justified. Having difficulty justifying the program on its own foreign policy merits, playing to President Johnson's Vietnam War focus seemed a better option for keeping the program's doors open. Amid the Sino-American thaw of the Nixon administration, the program withered on the vine and died, as Conboy put it, "with a whimper."[28]

There were two main ways in which the Tibetan CIA project depended on the policy process: first, it existed within the larger context of U.S. East Asian policy—and sudden changes such as the Indo-Pakistani War or the attempted opening of China; and second, it was *itself* a foreign policy venture, albeit a profoundly unsuccessful one. Any justifications for the program on intelligence grounds were forced to contend with the project's inherent links to failed policy. Former Tibetan CIA operative John Kenneth Knaus argues that it was the second factor (increasingly clear unfeasibility), rather than the opening of China, which motivated the ultimate fall of Mustang.[29] He bases this appraisal, that "the Mustang guerrillas were never a bargaining chip" with China, on an interview with David Anderson, an American aide in Warsaw.[30]

It strains belief, however, to suppose that the sudden change in the U.S.'s China policy under Nixon had no effect whatsoever on the CIA program's quick unraveling in Tibet.[31] The end of the CIA program came at the same time as the administration's indefinite postponement of a meeting solicited by the Dalai Lama, and a general move away from seeing Tibet as a useful partner in East Asia.[32] It is difficult to discount the opening of China as a significant factor in both why Mustang was scrapped and why something more effective was not put in its place. Likely it was these two spheres of *policy*—both "grand strategy" and the ineffectiveness of the Tibet project at achieving its policy aims—which converged to bring the project to an unceremonious end.

The reason why U.S. strategy and the Tibet program ended up in conflict was primarily a policy one. The Nixon administration, if it had kept the doors open on Mustang, would have been trying to address the same problem (Chinese aggression and obstinacy) from two different directions at once: both diplomatic and covert. The administration rightly judged hostile covert operations and diplomacy as contrary approaches, and picked one over the other.

Intelligence-minded officers might take away from the Tibet incident the importance of not making covert operations focus too much on either policy or intelligence—successful projects must embrace both.

To conclude, the demise of the Tibet program points to some uneasy truths about the relationship between intelligence and policy, particularly in an era of increased oversight of the IC by entities such as the "303 Committee" (to which the CIA had to present on the Tibet project several times). Intelligence operations have to prove their worth in the policy arena in order to receive the support they need. The problem with the political oversight process, though, is that sometimes it guesses wrong. The greatest reason for failure in Tibet, and U.S. inability to keep up intelligence strength there in the long term, was that the CIA invested in a losing cause. Because the policy behind the Tibet operations was both ineffective and contradictory with larger U.S. foreign policy goals in the Nixon administration, its intelligence successes were overshadowed. Intelligence-minded officers might take away from the Tibet incident the importance of not making covert operations focus too much on either policy or intelligence—successful projects must embrace both.

ANALYSIS: LESSONS ON COVERT OPERATIONS

The Tibet episode demonstrates the importance of remembering that on-the-ground covert operations have the potential of establishing a *very* effective framework for intelligence gathering, even if the main objective of the covert action is paramilitary. While this "dual-use" model of paramilitary activity can end up with local collaborators feeling used or betrayed (as many fighters in the Mustang force certainly did),[33] it has significant potential for increasing the effectiveness of intelligence efforts. Policymakers and intelligence officers should tread with great caution in conducting intelligence this way, to avoid the accusation of "using" collaborators for their own purposes. Nevertheless, to see covert operations one-dimensionally as a mere issue of policy, as for example Ambassador Galbraith did, is to throw away a very useful method of conducting intelligence.

One of the biggest failures of the Mustang project in Tibet was that it tried to be, both in manpower and money, a complex covert operation, but was not really covert. The Chinese knew about the project as early as 1961, and would likely have used it as a bargaining chip with Nixon and Kissinger had the program not already been on the way down. In order for a project like Mustang to achieve its intelligence goals, it must have a long time to establish local connections and build intelligence infrastructure. A covert operations effort must be genuinely covert in order to achieve these goals.

On the whole, though, the example of Tibet provides valuable encouragement for an Intelligence Community that often fears becoming too fragmented. As MacGaffin noted in his essay, it is easy for paramilitary action to become a black sheep in the IC—not quite held to the same standards as standard HUMINT or SIGINT collection, and not quite sure how it fits in. The example of covert action in Tibet illustrates how covert operations were as much an instrument of intelligence as policy. Mustang gathered intelligence to serve its own purposes but also to feed back into the policymaking process.

APPLICATIONS TO INTELLIGENCE ISSUES TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE

It is not uncommon today to encounter foreign policy issues where intelligence and policy dimensions come into conflict with one another. One current foreign policy concern that bears some uncanny resemblances to the Tibetan example is the issue of Syria.

In Syria, we hold the simultaneous goals of channeling aid to a rebel cause[34]—albeit more hopeful than the Mustangs—while ushering through an agreement with the acting Syrian government on the destruction of chemical weapons.[35] While our official policy tries to embrace diplomatic channels, we are simultaneously acting through the IC to undermine the government with which we are negotiating. It remains to be seen how U.S. intelligence in Syria, which likely benefits greatly from a working relationship with rebel groups,[36] will survive a rapidly changing and somewhat unpredictable policy. If President Assad continues to follow through on the destruction of his chemical weapons stockpiles, or if the rebels begin to lose moral or military high ground, it is unclear whether we will be able to maintain a robust intelligence presence there. The example of Tibet would suggest that intelligence collectors and analysts should plan to weather the dual storms both of changes in overriding U.S. policy and in the viability of rebel forces.

...we may live to see a world in which covert actions or intelligence become increasingly decoupled from foreign policy.

Perhaps a more interesting and open question is how the relationship between policy and intelligence will adapt to an advancing digital age. One of the hallmarks of 21st century cyberattacks and cyberespionage is a degree of anonymity that similar human intelligence efforts in the past never enjoyed. While the most notorious government-sponsored cyberattack yet performed (the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear centrifuges) was eventually discovered by Iranian engineers,[37] the difficulty Iran had in figuring out the problem suggests that better-conceived cyberattacks or intelligence hauls may achieve complete anonymity. If this does in fact become a reality, we may live to see a world in which covert actions or intelligence become increasingly decoupled from foreign policy. Governments may become more able to both effectively make diplomatic overtures and simultaneously skewer the subjects of those overtures from behind without anyone being the wiser. Such a change could make the balance between policy and intelligence significantly less delicate.

On the whole, we come away from our study of the Tibetan episode with a sobering reminder, applicable across the spectrum of intelligence activities, that the policy and intelligence worlds are tightly connected. Even in an increasingly computerized age, it will likely remain impossible for the intelligence world ever to be completely free of the policymaking process (and of politics). It is those intelligence efforts which make both good policy sense and intelligence sense that will prove most durable in the long run.

NOTES

[1] John MacGaffin, "Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert Action," in *Transforming U.S. Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 81.
[2] "Note on U.S. Covert Actions," in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1964-1968, Vol. XVII.
[3] Jim Mann, "CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in '60s, Files Show," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 September 1998. <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/15/news/mn-22993>.
[4] R. Sengupta, "The CIA Circus: Tibet's Forgotten Army," *Friends of Tibet Outlook*, 15 February 1999, http://www.friendsoftibet.org/databank/usdefence/usd7.html.
[5] Jim Mann, "CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in '60s, Files Show," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 September 1998, <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/15/news/mn-22993>.
[6] Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, *The CIA's Secret War in Tibet* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 4.
[7] Carole McGranahan, *Arrested Histories: Between Empire and Exile in 20th Century Tibet*, University of Michigan, ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 2001, 45.
[8] Conboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 27.
[9] "On This Day: 31 March," *BBC*, 9 December 2013 (acc), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/31/newsid_2788000/2788343.stm>.
[10] John Kenneth Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold* War (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 140.
[11] Joe Bagaent, "CIA's Secret War in Tibet," *Military History*, 12 June 2006, http://www.historynet.com/cias-secret-war-in-tibet.htm.
[12] Conboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 205.
[13] Telegram from the Department of State to the Legation in Hungary, 6 April 1961, in *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. XXV, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d165>.
[14] Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War*, 243.
[15] Ibid., 249, Bagaent, "CIA's Secret War."
[16] Ibid.
[17] Bagaent, "CIA's Secret War."
[18] Comboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 227.
[19] Memorandum from the White House Situation Room to President Johnson, 23 September 1965, in *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. XXV, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d223>.
[20] Comboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 215.
[21] Ibid., 219.
[22] Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee, 23 September 1965, in *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d278>.
[23] Knaus, *Orphans*, 294.
[24] Ibid.
[25] "Editorial Note," in *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d273.
[26] Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), 6 September 1972, in *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d280.
[27] Comboy, *Secret War in Tibet*, 249.
[28] Ibid., 253.
[29] Knaus, *Orphans*, 296.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Melvyn Goldstein, "The United States, Tibet, and the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, 153.
[32] Kissinger makes a good case for not postponing the summit, but does not end up following through. (Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 23 March 1970, in *FRUS*, 1960-1976, Volume XVII, <history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d275>.
[33] R. Sengupta, "The CIA Circus: Tibet's Forgotten Army," *Friends of Tibet Outlook*, 15 February 1999, http://www.friendsoftibet.org/databank/usdefence/usd7.html.
[34] Loveday Morris and Michael Birnbaum, "Syria has destroyed chemical weapons facilities, international inspectors say," *The Washington Post*, 31 October 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-has-destroyed-chemical-weapons-facilities-international-inspectors-say/2013/10/31/dc1ff6b8-4214-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html>.
[35] Alexei Anishchuk, "Russia, U.S. agree on how Syria should eliminate chemical arms – Putin," *Reuters*, 8 October 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/08/uk-russia-syria-idUKBRE99706320131008.
[36] Though the intelligence collected this way has sometimes seemed more to favor the Syrian government than the rebel ("Classified U.S. Military Document: Syrian Rebels DO Have Chemical Weapons," *Washington's Blog*, 12 September 2013, <http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/09/classified-u-s-military-document-syrian-rebels-do-have-chemical-weapons.html>).
[37] Marcy Oster, "Second computer virus infiltrates Iranian systems," *JTA*, 26 April 2011, <http://www.jta.org/2011/04/26/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/second-computer-virus-infiltrates-iranian-systems>.

John Masko, originally of Providence, RI, graduated from Yale College with a BA in history in May 2014. He has done work for several think tanks and research institutions, including the American Action Forum and the Hudson Institute, where he contributed as an intern in political-military analysis. He recently completed a senior thesis on UN Ambassador Andrew Young's diplomacy and its role in the Carter administration. Mr. Masko's thesis advisor was the preeminent scholar of international politics, John Lewis Gaddis. This article is based on a paper the author wrote for an undergraduate seminar on intelligence taught by the first Director of National Intelligence and later Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, who is also a Yale graduate.

Egypt, the Sinai, and the Brotherhood

by Cheryl Young

The eastern Mediterranean is perhaps the most strategically important region of the world today. Many countries have fought over access to and control of this region, due to its proximity to natural resources, its strategic location between Europe, Africa, and Asia, and the long history of competing civilizations in the area. Nowhere is this more important than the trade routes to the Middle East, which are concentrated through the Suez Canal and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Access from the Mediterranean to the Middle East and the Pacific requires a secure Sinai to maintain unimpeded access to the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal was a zone of national contention throughout the 20th century and has been controlled by both foreign entities and the Egyptian national government.[1]

Egypt's pivotal location between the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa remains a strategic area of interest for the U.S. and offers a critical transit and regional shipping capability via the Suez Canal. Critical oil and gas pipelines in the Sinai Peninsula to Israel and beyond augment the importance of Sinai's maritime shipping and also serve as a pivot point for Middle East oil transport through the Sinai and the Suez Canal. Over the last several decades, countries have assumed that international shipping may continue to transit its waters despite domestic events within Egypt. However, the 2012 political victory of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt brought access to the Suez Canal and security of the Sinai into question.

An Islamist government came into power in Egypt for the first time in its history following the Arab Spring. Egypt and the U.S. had to start a new chapter in their relationship with old assumptions either discarded or rewritten. The medium- and long-term impacts of the pivotal post-Arab Spring period have yet to be determined. Have they changed access to the Suez Canal? Will the U.S. be able to continue to rely on the Canal for military and commercial purposes? How will policymakers know if there is a threat of closure or denied access?

The Canal has remained open over the last 40 years, despite regime change-associated protests. However, the rise to power of the MB and President Morsi's subsequent ouster raised the possibility that Canal access could be denied. The Egyptian government and security forces have been so focused on pro- and anti-Morsi protests, and what direction the country should take, that security along the Canal may not be a focus of effort. The effects of such a potential event would ripple across the world and affect global markets. If the U.S. missed the profound events of the Arab Spring, is the Intelligence Community (IC) posed to warn of an impending future closure? This article examines some of the factors and determines key indicators for the IC in one of the world's most critical strategic locations.

The post-Arab Spring era will likely reflect developments and trends that the IC has not previously encountered in Egypt.

In September 2013, individuals on the shore of the Canal successfully fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and hit a passing Cosco container ship. Even though that ship was able to continue its journey through the Canal, an RPG is capable of penetrating a ship hull and even destabilizing a double-hulled ship and could threaten any of the 18,000 ships that transit through the Canal each year.[2] Any small arms or RPG threat to the volume of ships that use the Canal as a link between the Mediterranean, the Gulf, and the Indian Ocean would have a significant impact on global trade. In addition, the opening of Artic Ocean shipping routes could convince shipping companies to use alternative routes to avoid the threat.

The U.S. must continue to maintain freedom of movement for U.S. shipping, uninterrupted trade and oil transport, and the capability to counter activities that threaten U.S. national interests in the Middle East. As a result, the U.S. must rely on the Egyptian military's ability to maintain stability along the Sinai Peninsula. Nevertheless, as an indicator of competing interests, while the Arab Spring protests unfolded and regional insecurity increased, the Egyptian military had to maintain security of the Suez Canal, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Israeli-Egyptian border, while reacting to protests in Tahrir Square. The differing resource demands appear self-evident.

The post-Arab Spring era will likely reflect developments and trends that the IC has not previously encountered in Egypt. Throughout the 20th century, Egypt had one authoritarian regime after another. Islamist groups have not been in national positions of power. At the same time, the military has not had to encounter any internal threats to its supremacy. The economy has not been in a position where regime subsidies used to subdue an angry populace are no longer available. Foreign economic assistance has been available in substantial amounts. These and other factors together form a completely new chapter in Egypt's story that has no previous parallel. This creates unchartered territory for the IC to effectively determine what the indicators of instability are that will have an impact on U.S. security interests in the Sinai. The ability to secure locations of U.S. strategic interest in the midst of revolutionary change in Egypt is an issue that must be critically analyzed.

The ability of the IC to detect and warn of these threats is of paramount concern, especially if there is reason to doubt whether or not the U.S. can rely on the security of that infrastructure. There are two drivers of instability that have intensified in post-Arab Spring Egypt that inform the IC's ability to provide strategic warning in the region. First, the MB's complicated relationships with the military, the Egyptian people, the Bedouins, Israel, and the U.S. must be analyzed, because each of these relationships informs the direction Egypt may take for the future. Friction in any of these relationships can cause instability within Egypt or across the region. The U.S. has learned that it cannot take its relationship with Egypt for granted.

Second, economics has played an increasingly crucial role as a driver of instability, especially as the MB-led government failed to rebuild the Egyptian economy in the face of domestic tensions and instability. The turbulent events during President Morsi's time in office and the uncertainty after his ouster have caused further risk for international trade and investment, adding to the economy's problems.

RELATIONSHIPS

In light of the domestic situation, freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and a secure Sinai Peninsula remain key strategic interests of the U.S. Achieving these goals requires the U.S. to engage both the Egyptian military and the MB. Securing cooperation of the Egyptian government is critical to U.S. strategic interests. However, developing a relationship with the U.S. ran counter to the anti-Western rhetoric some of the MB leaders advertised to its followers. Even though the Sinai Peninsula and the border with Israel have remained secure, there is no guarantee that will continue.

The military has been Egypt's most powerful and stable institution. Its leaders continue to maintain profitable businesses and enterprises that play an important role in Egypt's economy and politics. Until the Arab Spring, the relationship between the MB and the military had been relatively stable. However, once the MB controlled the ultimate seat of power in Egypt, the dynamics of their relationship changed. The MB became a greater competitor for power once it was no longer just an outside organization. In fact, President Morsi fired several top generals not long after he came into office. In previous regimes, the military had been able to operate without civilian interference. It became clear that an MB member was in power who could directly affect military leadership. This was a wake-up call to everyone in the military leadership who assumed the MB would allow business to proceed as usual.

Even though the military's candidate lost in the presidential election in 2012, the military cautiously eyed the MB-led government's reach for power once in office. When protests began calling for President Morsi's ouster, the military was right there, ready to present itself as the stable alternative. For a number of Egyptians, the military was the only alternative to stop the further hemorrhaging of the economy and growing instability in the country. Military leaders were ready to step into position and assert their authority. The MB fell back into its role as the outsider. This opens the door to several questions. Where does this relationship go next? How does that relationship affect security, especially for the Sinai? Will disgruntled MB members join the Sinai Islamists?

There are a number of relationship dynamics between the MB and the military, people, Israel, and the U.S that could be explored in further detail. Each of these relationships includes low to high degrees of friction. Even experts cannot predict how these relationships will fare in the near- and long-term future. Analysts can only use historical interactions and recent events to determine whether these relationships are moving in a positive or negative direction. When they are negative and friction is high, there is an increasing degree of instability. Impulsive decisions can be made and unpredictable alliances can form. A list of indicators for a negative MB relationship with a high amount of friction includes:

- Migration to Sinai displaces Bedouin; fewer jobs for Bedouins
- Egypt does not continue Sinai security responsibility
- Salafists present selves as political/economic alternative
- MB and military relationship disintegrates

On the other hand, when relationships are positive with low friction, stability can be established. Such indicators include:

- Positive MB and military relationship
- Salafists unable to organize as an alternative to the MB
- Egypt maintains 1979 Sinai Accord security responsibilities
- President Morsi's administration reaches out to Bedouins

Both indicator groups are listed in Figure 1.

ECONOMICS

The MB survived and prospered by inserting itself as a service provider to the people. No prior regime exerted the same effort at the grassroots level to ensure essential services were available. The MB put its stamp on what matters most to the people–schools, health care, and food. MB investment in these social programs yielded critical political capital when the Mubarak regime fell. However, once in power, the MB was no longer a grassroots social provider. Rather, it had to think and act strategically while fixing a failing economy. Within one year, the MB went from protest marches to negotiations with the IMF for crucial loans. Even the best economic experts would be challenged to unravel Egypt's true current economic problems, which the MB had to accomplish immediately after the election.

President Morsi had to address the deteriorating security situation in the Sinai, but he did not and instead focused on consolidating power. He did this at the expense of attracting Western investment for the capital necessary to generate jobs for Egypt's large number of unemployed, and he did not strengthen security efforts. He did not appeal to an increasingly anti-Israeli population that had the alternative of turning to the Salafists, Egypt's hard-line Islamists, if they became dissatisfied with the MB. President Morsi and the MB had to be all things to different people, balancing the needs and desires of completely contradictory interest groups in a short time span. Furthermore, he had to do so in the midst of economic uncertainty. President Morsi and the MB either did not recognize this need or were unable to address it.

There are a number of economic decisions Egyptian leadership must make that will shape the country's near- and long-term future. The economic indicators intelligence analysts should observe include those decisions and events that have the greatest potential to affect the economy and have been discussed throughout this essay. Under President Morsi's leadership, Egypt did not make the hard



Figure 1[1]

decisions needed to turn around its economy. It remains to be seen whether the current leadership will make the necessary changes. Indicators for a strong economy are as follows:

- Provides same/higher level of social services as provided during Mubarak regime
- Improves rural and Sinai employment
- Trade relationship with U.S. grows
- Invest in economic sectors beyond tourism/gas
- Prevent inflation and cut the deficit
- Unemployment declines

Indicators for a weak economy are as follows:

- Unemployment increases
- Prices rise for goods/services
- Does not adhere to IMF loan requirements
- Deficit grows
- No investment in industry, manufacturing, technology
- Tourism declines
- Repeated attacks against gas pipeline – affect exports

Both of these sets of indicators can be graphically depicted on a continuum that is similar to the one used to describe the relationship indicators mentioned above.

These two drivers of instability have continued to affect Egypt, both during Morsi's presidency and following his ouster. Therefore, it is certainly critical for the IC to track and analyze growing security threats in the Sinai, but also to match those against the relationship and economic indicators that frame the U.S. security interests that may be at risk.

THE SINAI

The Sinai Peninsula is Egypt's equivalent to America's "Wild West" of the 1800s, but now with automatic weapons. It is distant from Egypt's political centers and, in many ways, ignored by them. While Egypt may have



Figure 2[4]

political authority over the Peninsula, there are a host of disparate actors who operate freely. Hamas, Salafists, disenfranchised Bedouins, and jihadists all operate in the Sinai with impunity and pursue agendas that are not necessarily in Egypt's national interest. Cross-border smuggling, human trafficking, weapons sales, and insurgent training are only a few of the activities that have been detected but cannot be stopped by any government authority.

The Sinai has always reflected a relative level of insecurity. However, when combined with pivotal unstable relationships between the MB and the military and a sagging economy, the Sinai has become a powder keg, especially for U.S. security interests. Will U.S. ships in the Suez Canal be threatened? Will terrorists disrupt all gas pipeline operations? Will Egypt be too overwhelmed by internal problems to fulfill its 1979 Peace Accord obligations? Will Egypt turn its back on Israeli-Palestinian peace? These are all critical security concerns for the U.S., and there is no specific piece of information that will definitely answer these questions. Combining the relationship and economic indicators creates a filter to determine what decisions and actions Egypt takes that will have the greatest impact on U.S. security interests.

Under the Mubarak regime, Sinai Bedouins lacked everything from electricity to infrastructure, while mainland Egyptians had more economic opportunities. The Bedouins would instead earn cash by turning to the growing black market in drug, weapon, and human trafficking within the Peninsula. Security further deteriorated when the Mubarak regime fell, since the military had to focus on the Arab Spring protests on the mainland. To make matters worse, the Sinai filled with extremists who had escaped from mainland prisons in the confusion of the protests and Hamas militants from across the border in Gaza. Reports claim that there were up to 2,000 militants operating out of the Sinai as recently as September 2013.[5]

With attention focused on Cairo and the politics of the rise and fall of the first Islamist Egyptian government, there continues to be minimal attention to the growing security threat in the Sinai. The Israeli-Egyptian border has been relatively quiet over the last couple of decades, but even that has changed. Terrorists from the Sinai have not only bombed the pipelines that flow into Israel but have conducted numerous attacks across the border, killing Egyptian soldiers in the process. Egypt is required by the Peace Accords to maintain border security but is hamstrung by treaty limitations and finances on types of weapons and available forces. If the border is difficult to secure, even with Israeli Defense Force assistance on the other side, how can the military be expected to maintain security throughout the Sinai? As a result, most of the Sinai remains out of the military's regular oversight. Only when an attack occurs does the military respond in force.

...weapons from Libya have spread throughout northern Africa into the Middle East and are readily available in the Sinai.

To make matters worse, weapons from Libya have spread throughout northern Africa into the Middle East and are readily available in the Sinai. Unpatrolled areas, a disgruntled local Bedouin population, jihadist opportunists, and available weapons all combine to create a potentially explosive environment that surrounds key U.S. points of interest. While the jihadists who operate in the Sinai focus their attention on Gaza and Israel, there is nothing to stop them from conducting attention-seeking attacks against U.S. interests.

The Egyptian military is in the middle of a power play with the MB in Cairo that remains its focus of effort for the time being. The direction that relationship will take in the near future will certainly affect the military's ability to maintain security along the Suez Canal and the Sinai. At the same time, the Egyptian economy continues to deteriorate. If inflation continues to grow, loans will become even more difficult to obtain and basic goods will become less available. Poorer Egyptians may feel there is no choice but to join the hardliners. Both of these drivers are leading toward further instability in the Sinai. A distracted military and a poorer population can be a lethal combination.

Enough reporting comes out of the Sinai for policymakers to know it is a dangerous place that is only getting worse. Jihadists and terrorists alike operate with impunity and with access to an endless supply of weapons following the regime change in Libya. A disenfranchised local population provides ready new recruits. This situation is not new to the IC. What is not necessarily new and may not be directly connected to the increasing instability in the Sinai are the two post-Arab Spring drivers of instability: The relationship between the MB and the military and the worsening economy.

Using the Alternative Futures Analysis framework,[6] the two most significant indicators of instability are combined to determine best and worst case scenarios for threats to U.S. security interests. A strong Egyptian economy and positive relationship dynamics between the MB and the military, Bedouin, Israel, and the U.S. is clearly the best case scenario for the U.S. It would demonstrate stability, openness to

Western investment and trade relationships, and an Egyptian investment in positive regional relations.



Figure 3[7]

These two drivers of instability have an impact beyond Cairo and the Egyptian mainland. They have a direct impact on the Sinai, the Suez Canal, and the entire region. As long as the Egyptian military is focused on consolidating power and overseeing the transfer to a civilian government, it will not turn its attention to a lawless, inhospitable region that does not directly benefit the military's political position. If the Egyptian government does not focus on making effective and necessary reforms to the economy, the Egyptian people may have to turn elsewhere to earn the means to feed their families. "Elsewhere" could mean weapons smuggling or jihadist training camps. Either way, the MB's relationship with the military and economic decline all shape Egypt's ability to secure the Sinai. The U.S. may learn the hard way it cannot take the Sinai and Suez security for granted.

The near- and long-term future for Egypt and the Sinai specifically depends on how the MB and the military leadership resolve their differences in the post-Morsi era. At the same time, there are regional conflicts that could have a negative impact on security in Egypt. As Libya fell, innumerable amounts and types of weapons flooded the local market. Those weapons became readily available to the Bedouins and the Islamists who operate in the Sinai. Will the weapons and tactics that are available in the Syrian conflict find their way to Egypt? Will the conflict between Islamists and African forces in other northern African countries become a rallying cry for Sinai Islamists? What will be the next event or conflict that would influence the Sinai Islamists to act against Western companies and military forces that use the Canal? These are topics that merit further study. However, it is clear today that there is enough uncertainty in the Sinai region that intelligence analysts should examine the factors that would trigger indications and warning of Sinai and Suez security.

NOTES

[1] This article is based on my thesis, "Egypt, the Brotherhood, and the Sinai: Indicators of Instability for U.S. Regional Security Interests," submitted in May 2013 for the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) program at the National Intelligence University. My thesis reader, LtCol Sean Braziel, and my thesis chair, Mr. V.L. Elliott, provided invaluable guidance, knowledge, and support throughout the thesis process.

[2] Chris Jasper, "Polar Sea Lane Finds Favor as Suez Security Doubts Grow," http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-09-11/sea-levels-may-rise-69-centimeters-until-2100-on-ice-melt.html, accessed November 12, 2013.

[3] Cheryl Young, "Egypt, the Brotherhood, and the Sinai: Indicators of Instability for U.S. Regional Security Interests" (master's thesis, National Intelligence University, 2013), 41.

[4] Cheryl Young, "Egypt, the Brotherhood, and the Sinai: Indicators of Instability for U.S. Regional Security Interests" (master's thesis, National Intelligence University, 2013), 69.

[5] Sara Sorcher, "The World's Biggest, Newest Terrorist Haven," *National Journal*, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-world-s-biggest-newest-terrorist-haven-20130725, accessed September 14, 2013.

[6] U.S. Government, "A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis," March 2009, 34-36.

[7] Cheryl Young, "Egypt, the Brotherhood, and the Sinai: Indicators of Instability for U.S. Regional Security Interests" (master's thesis, National Intelligence University, 2013), 90.

Cheryl Young is a 2013 graduate of the National Intelligence University, where she earned a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree. She is the deputy for the Plans and Policy Branch in the Headquarters Marine Corps Intelligence Department and is a reserve USMC intelligence officer. She earned her bachelor's degree in government from Cornell University and her law degree from American University.

Just-in-Time Intelligence Training in World War II:

The Legacy of the "Ritchie Boys" Seven Decades Later (Part I)

by Dr. William C. Spracher and Dr. Mark Kramar

Most knowledgeable observers of the U.S. Army in action over the last half of the 20th century know that Fort Ritchie in north central Maryland near the Pennsylvania border was a vital strategic communications facility, the somewhat ambiguous location of "Site R" (the Rock), and home to a signal brigade. Many, however, are unaware that the Fort's previous incarnation, as Camp Ritchie, served as a principal training ground for Army intelligence analysts and interrogators during World War II. A large number of soldiers, many of them immigrants with unique skills, trained for overseas wartime duty at the small post and years later came to be called affectionately the "Ritchie Boys." Most of the articles in this issue of *American Intelligence Journal* have dealt with education; this one will cover the beneficiaries of some of the most valuable training ever performed by U.S. intelligence.

In June 2012 the authors were privileged to be invited to a 2-day reunion of the surviving Ritchie Boys, held the first day at the U.S. Navy Memorial Heritage Center in downtown Washington, DC, and the second day at the training site itself, the now closed Fort Ritchie (victim of Base Realignment and Closure Commission, or BRAC, action several years ago). The "Boys" were essentially told they were going on a "field trip," which excited them immensely. During their stay in the DC area, they were also afforded free admission to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.[1] This article will be published in two installments, spanning separate issues of *AIJ*, the first a historical overview by yours truly (editor of the *Journal*) and the second a photographic montage and series of interviews by my co-author Dr. Mark Kramar, a retired Army sergeant major and former editor of *AIJ*. Both of us were graciously invited by the hosts of the symposium commemorating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Camp Ritchie Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) near Cascade, Maryland (in the north central part of the state close to the Pennsylvania line and not far from Camp David, the famed Presidential retreat). The joint sponsors of the event included the National Parks Conservation Association, the National Park Service, the International Spy Museum, The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) Society, and the Holocaust Memorial Center.

The invitation explained that more than 19,000 U.S. servicemen underwent military intelligence training at Camp Ritchie between July 1942 and September 1945. A total of 31 basic 8-week courses, as well as other specialty courses, were conducted. Servicemen with language skills, especially German, Italian, and French, were recruited for this sensitive training, and many of them were prohibited for years from telling their loved ones what they had been up to and why. Approximately 80% of the graduates served overseas. Some were assigned to "P.O. Box 1142," a top secret military intelligence installation near Mount Vernon in northern Virginia (now Fort Hunt Park, part of the George Washington Memorial Parkway complex), south of Alexandria.[2] Unfortunately, after the war the buildings and all on-site records of P.O. Box 1142 were destroyed, and the soldiers who had received training were instructed never to divulge what they did there.[3] Highlights of the symposium included a keynote speech on the contribution of the Ritchie Boys to military intelligence in World War II and beyond, two panels of Ritchie Boys—one discussing the training at Camp Ritchie and the other recounting their experiences during the war—plus a presentation on the interpretation of World War II military history at key National Park Service sites.[4]

...the Director of the National Park Service, Jonathan Jarvis, welcomed the Ritchie Boys and provided an overview of all that the NPS is doing to preserve historic sites and artifacts and to publicize their significance to the American people.

The first day of the symposium was truly inspirational. Held in an auditorium in the Navy Memorial and Museum complex, it was seven hours of panels, testimony, slide shows, and a luncheon in which the "Boys," their spouses or children/grandchildren acting as escorts, U.S. government officials, and "fly on the wall" military/intelligence history buffs like ourselves could reminisce, ask questions, hear war stories, and network. Some more detailed stories gathered in interviews will be featured in Part II of this article in a future issue of the *Journal*. Following administrative remarks by

representatives of the various sponsoring organizations and presentation of the colors by the District of Columbia Army National Guard Honor Guard, the Director of the National Park Service, Jonathan Jarvis, welcomed the Ritchie Boys and provided an overview of all that the NPS is doing to preserve historic sites and artifacts and to publicize their significance to the American people. Then the former Fort Ritchie historian (now retired), Becky Dietrich, presented a photographic journey through history regarding the construction and development of the installation, going back to the days of the early Maryland National Guard and the Civilian Conservation Corps. The keynote speech was given by Col (USAF) Steven Kleinman, an expert on interrogation (has contributed in the past to seminars and works published by the National Intelligence University on this provocative subject). His theme was "The Twin Pillars of Success: Intelligence and Integrity." Following a mid-morning break for a group photograph (accompanying this article), the first of two panels of selected Ritchie Boys was convened. The panel, moderated by Peter Earnest, Executive Director of the nearby International Spy Museum and a longtime CIA Clandestine Service officer, covered "Experiences at Camp Ritchie." The panelists were Gerald Geiger, Max Horlick, Harry Jacobs, and Sy Steinberg.[5]

Their professional duties included such tasks as interrogating German POWs, creating anti-Nazi propaganda and, later, during the Allied occupation era following the end of fighting, serving as translators when Nazi leaders were brought to trial.

Following lunch on-site, the afternoon session began with a moving presentation by Guy Stern, a distinguished professor emeritus and Director, International Institute of the Righteous, Holocaust Memorial Center. A large number of the "Boys," as one might expect given their immigrant roots in Central and Eastern Europe, were from Jewish families and spoke the sorts of languages (German, Italian, French, Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian) invaluable for interrogation of enemy prisoners of war. Many of them personally witnessed untold horrors in concentration camps during the war and/or had close family members who suffered persecution and prejudice; hence, the integral involvement of the Holocaust Museum in the symposium. The second panel of Ritchie Boys, "Experiences in WWII," was moderated by LTG (USA, Ret) Patrick Hughes, former DIA Director, former NMIA President, and an emeritus member of the NMIA Board of Directors. The panelists included Ralph Baer, Arthur Jaffe, Gunter Kosse, and Peter Skala. Memories were amazingly accurate and the stories were vividly recounted by these astute gentlemen. Their professional duties included such tasks as interrogating German POWs, creating anti-Nazi propaganda and, later, during the Allied occupation era following the end of fighting, serving as translators when Nazi leaders were brought to trial.[6]

Next on the agenda was a fascinating photographic presentation on the "Preservation and Interpretation of WWII Military Intelligence History in National Parks," given by Brandon Bies, Site Manager of the Arlington House (formerly known as the Lee-Custis Mansion) on the grounds of Arlington National Cemetery. Then an intriguing slideshow moderated by Dan Gross, a historian, featured "Notable Ritchie Boys" who underwent training at either Camp Ritchie or Fort Hunt. Probably the most well-known name is former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. A summary session of "Symposium Highlights" was moderated by Dr. Patricia Kollander, Chair of the Department of History at Florida Atlantic University. Concluding remarks were made by Joy Oakes, Senior Director of the Mid-Atlantic Region of the National Parks Conservation Association and a key member of the organizing committee. A reception in the Navy Museum followed as the "Boys" became energized and rejuvenated for their field trip the next morning. Although Fort Ritchie is now closed, a few buildings from the MITC era still stand and are undergoing BRAC renovation and reuse. In addition to a bus tour of the post and lots of reminiscing about barracks where the Boys resided, mess halls where they dined, and classrooms where they underwent their intensive training, Nina Wolff Feld, a noted author, historian, and daughter of a deceased Ritchie Boy, gave an inspiring presentation following lunch at the new community center on "A Refugee's Odyssey and the Legacy of Camp Ritchie."[7]

The military installation of Camp Ritchie has a rich and intriguing history. According to a fact sheet issued to all the symposium attendees, its history dates back to the 1890s when the site was used as a summer resort for wealthy families. In 1926 it became a training site for the Maryland National Guard and was named Camp Albert C. Ritchie in honor of the then-Governor of the Free State. In 1942 the Army leased the camp from Maryland and its official name became the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC), or simply Camp Ritchie. It was activated on June 19, 1942, as a highly secret installation. Military and support personnel were instructed not to tell anyone, not even their families, that they were connected with military intelligence. Approximately $5 million was invested in the camp between 1942 and 1945 to construct 165 buildings and house the training staff and students.[8]

Soldiers who had recently escaped from Germany, Austria, and other parts of Europe were recruited for training at the camp. Although many were not yet citizens, their knowledge of German and of the cultural mindset of the German people

was considered a valuable asset. Japanese-American soldiers were also trained there. The basic 8-week course was taught in 31 iterations from July 27, 1942, to September 22, 1945. This course included 53 days of instruction based on an "8-day week" with seven days of instruction followed by one day off. Although each soldier was enrolled and trained in a specific discipline, such as Interrogator of Prisoners of War (IPW), he had to take classes (at least 20 hours) in each of the following subjects:

- Aerial Photo Interpretation
- Close Combat Operations
- Counterintelligence
- Enemy Armies (Order of Battle)
- Signals Intelligence
- Terrain Intelligence
- Military Intelligence (British, French, Russian)

Other special classes tailored for particular infantry and armored divisions were taught. Classes were added later to take into account specific topics, and lessons learned, from actual battlefield experiences. Over 19,000 servicemen received some training at Camp Ritchie during this intense period. The MITC was closed on June 26, 1946.[9]

In Part II of this article, we shall delve more deeply into the personal lives and remarkable odysseys of many of these "best and brightest" of the Greatest Generation of World War II. One individual who is doing yeoman work in publicizing the accomplishment of the Ritchie Boys and keeping them and their admirers interconnected is Kathryn Slattery, an author who publishes a very active blog called "Books, Writing and Me." In it, she states her purpose is "to share myself, my thoughts on certain books, and the process of writing and bringing to publication my novel, *Immigrant Soldier*. Everything in this blog reflects my personal ideas and feelings—a memoir of sorts."[10] In an introductory e-mail announcing her blog, Ms. Slattery states: "Because you are a 'Ritchie Boy' (or the family or friend of a Ritchie Boy), I thought you might be interested in the book I have written titled *Immigrant Soldier, the Story of a Ritchie Boy*… I am hoping to generate interest in both my book and the Ritchie Boys with my author website. You might find the Ritchie Boys information page on the site of special interest."[11]

The first-ever reunion of the Ritchie Boys took place July 23-25, 2011, at the Holocaust Memorial Center in Farmington Hills, Michigan. In 2004 the group and its work were the subject of a documentary film, "The Ritchie Boys," by film-maker Christian Bauer, featuring ten members of the group.[12] According to the secretary/ treasurer of the Mountain Heritage Society, there are plans afoot to preserve the story of the Ritchie Boys, including a possible museum located where Camp Ritchie once proudly stood.[13]

[The authors owe a special debt of gratitude to Dr. Dorothy Canter, Event Chair, who invited them to the reunion and enthusiastically supported their participation.]

NOTES

[1] Letter of instruction, dated June 7, 2012, National Parks Conservation Association Planning Team.
[2] Fact sheet, undated, "Protect Fort Hunt's Rich History," National Parks Conservation Association, which provides amplifying details, such as the fact the land was originally part of George Washington's plantation which then became a coastal defense fort during the Spanish-American War. The land also hosted World War I veteran "Bonus Marchers" and the very first African-American ROTC training center in the country. Fort Hunt was a Civilian Conservation Corps camp and a monitoring station for the Army Signal Corps. The installation's lesser-known history revealed that it was also a top secret intelligence operation for the interrogation of prisoners of war during World War II, to include the famous German aerospace scientist Wernher von Braun, who later became a renowned NASA official for his former adversary the U.S.
[3] Letter, dated July 6, 2012, National Parks Conservation Association, seeking support in an effort to memorialize and interpret the stories of Fort Hunt's contribution to U.S. history through construction of a Visitor Contact Station which would supplement the recreational amenities at the park. According to the letter, which followed up the reunion held a few weeks earlier, more than 130 individuals attended the symposium, including 33 Ritchie Boys and numerous relatives, while almost 80 participated in the field trip to Fort Ritchie the next day.
[4] Letter of invitation, dated June 2012, "Ritchie Boys Symposium and Field Trip Scheduled for June 18-19, 2012."
[5] Written program booklet, "Camp Ritchie and the Legacy of the 'Ritchie Boys'," symposium agenda.
[6] Elaine Durbach, "Soldiers Remember Their WWII Return to Europe: 'Ritchie Boys' Reunite and Recall Their Service in Army Intelligence," *New Jersey Jewish News*, July 11, 2012.
[7] Written program booklet, op. cit.
[8] Fact sheet, undated, "Camp Ritchie Military Intelligence Training Center."
[9] Ibid.
[10] Kathryn Lang-Slattery, http://www.klangslattery.com/index.php/blog.
[11] K. Slattery, e-mail, dated February 17, 2014, "The Ritchie Boys." In the dedication to her book the author states that "*Immigrant Soldier* is dedicated to all those who, through premonition or foresight, determination and luck, were able to escape Nazi Germany before the trap was fully closed. Their lives were uprooted and changed forever. And, most especially, I dedicate it to those immigrant Ritchie Boys who returned to Europe and used their knowledge, experience, and training to help bring an end to the Nazi terror. Each day, fewer of these men are here to share their stories. Finally, but not least, I

dedicate this book to the memory of Herman Lang and his wife, Marge. They welcomed me into their home, shared their stories, and encouraged me to write this book." Mr. Lang was the author's uncle and she began taping her conversations with him, which finally resulted in publishing the book.

[12] Home page, www.ritchieboys.com.

[13] Durbach, op. cit.

Dr. William C. Spracher has been editor of the American Intelligence Journal *since 2009. He is a charter member of NMIA going back to its founding in 1974; at the time, he was an MI officer serving at Fort Meade, MD. He retired from the Army as a Colonel in 2000. He was initially detailed to Armor branch and later spent nearly half of his career as a Latin America Foreign Area Officer, culminating in tours as Army Attaché to Peru, Defense Attaché to Colombia, and Military Professor, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University. For the past ten years, he has been a contracted staff and faculty member at the National Intelligence University in Washington, DC. He earned a BS degree from the U.S. Military Academy, where he later taught in the Social Sciences Department, an MA degree in international relations from Yale University, an MMAS degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and a doctorate in higher education administration from George Washington University. His dissertation dealt with intelligence education in U.S. civilian colleges and universities.*

Dr. Mark Kramar is a former editor of the American Intelligence Journal, *but had to step down due to a deployment to Afghanistan in the early 2000s. He is a retired Army Sergeant Major who has worked for several years at the National Guard Bureau in Washington. He has written book reviews for* AIJ *in the past.*

A group of Ritchie Boys at their reunion in Washington, DC, June 18, 2012. Also appearing in the photo are a few of the speakers/panelists supporting this remarkable event held at the U.S. Navy Memorial Heritage Center.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer:
The Reverend Was a Spy

by Dr. Kenneth J. Campbell

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this article is to relate the story of a man who rebelled against the crimes of the leadership of his country.[1] This can signal to American intelligence the utility of maintaining contacts with talented, but dissatisfied, leaders of such countries as Iran, Syria, and North Korea. This requires agents with psychological complexity who can play many roles at the same time and survive.

FAMILY AND CHILDHOOD

Dietrich Bonhoeffer's father, Karl, was an internationally known psychiatrist whose lineage could be traced back to 1403, when the family's forerunners were farmers, but subsequently produced generations of doctors, pastors, judges, and professors. In 1912 Karl became chairman of the Department of Psychiatry and Neurology at the University of Berlin, a position he held until his death in 1948. Dietrich's mother, Paula, came from a family which included musicians and artists. Paula von Hause was the granddaughter of Karl von Hause, a church historian and preacher for the court of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Karl and Paula produced eight children, and their home included a governess, a nursemaid, a parlor maid, and a cook. The family rarely went to church, but Paula read the Bible to the children during daily prayer, emphasizing the importance of helping others. Dr. Bonhoeffer did not accept the work of Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung, but devoted his efforts to behaviorism, the requirement that one must see and measure the object of a study. Paula ruled the house and children, although Karl taught the children to speak only when they had something to say and to maintain firm control of their emotions. This latter requirement is not part of a psychoanalytical environment where people are encouraged to speak whatever is on their mind.

Dietrich, born in 1906 into a happy family, went to the Friedrich-Werder Gymnasium at an early age in 1913, where he spent six years and enjoyed fighting with his classmates. Dietrich's friends were generally limited to members of his family. Dietrich at age eight began piano lessons, advancing so quickly that by the age of ten he could play Mozart's sonatas, later learning how to compose. Although he majored in theology in his university years, his interest in music continued, having been solidified in his youth by musical evenings for the entire family on Saturday evenings.

...predictions that Germany would probably lose the war increased Dietrich's interest in theology, as he asked the question of "why" these personal and national disasters happen.

In World War I his brother, Walter, was killed in battle, a tragedy which caused his mother terrible grief. Walter's death and predictions that Germany would probably lose the war increased Dietrich's interest in theology, as he asked the question of "why" these personal and national disasters happen. In 1918 Dietrich, along with many other Germans, suffered the realization that Germany was defeated and the symbol of their stability, the Kaiser, had abdicated.

Having finished the Friedrich-Werder Gymnasium in 1918, Dietrich entered the Grunewald Gymnasium. When Dietrich was 14 in 1920, he stated his plans to study theology in the university, though his siblings and friends urged him not to do this, instead of seeing this statement as that of an immature youngster and letting him work out his own plans. He passed the *Abitur* in 1923, which permitted him to enter the university. Surprisingly he did major in theology when he went to the University of Berlin, despite the fact this department was not respected by most of the professors in the institution.

ACADEMIC LIFE

In 1924 Dietrich returned home from the Gymnasium and began to study theology at the University of Berlin. At this time the Department of Theology was headed by Adolf von Harnack, whose approach to Biblical scripture was mainly that of textual and historical methodology. This involved the use of Hebrew and Greek to study the Bible

effectively, enhanced by the use of historical materials. Harnack's studies led Dietrich to believe that the miracles described in the Bible never occurred. Bonhoeffer admired Harnack's sense of independence, but differed from his conclusions. The scholar who influenced him most was the Swiss theologian Karl Barth of Goettingen University, whose neo-orthodoxy was a reaction against liberal theology.[2] Barth believed that God is transcendent, unknowable except through Biblical revelation. Dietrich earned a doctorate in theology in 1927 at the age of 21, a tremendous achievement that involved a first-rate intelligence, the monetary support to free the student from having to find and keep a job during this period, and the ability to focus on a project for long periods. Nevertheless, Dietrich spent his dissertation period going to plays, the opera, and the many museums of Berlin. The subject of his doctoral dissertation was an attempt todefine what the Church is.

Beginning in 1927 Bonhoeffer was involved in an 8-year relationship with Elizabeth Sinn, a theological student at the University of Berlin, a serious student whose post-doctoral dissertation was published in 1930. In 1936 Dietrich broke off the friendship, though it is not clear why he did so. One observer believes that Dietrich had changed, since he was devoting his time to preventing the Nazis from taking control of the Protestant Church [3] in Germany, an explanation that appears to be insufficient to explain Dietrich's behavior.

BONHOEFFER AS CLERIC

Barcelona

In order to be eventually ordained, Dietrich served for a year (1928-29) as an assistant pastor in a Lutheran parish in Barcelona, Spain, where there was no one with his intellectual ability to whom he could relate. Nevertheless, he worked hard and succeeded in this difficult situation, showing a certain flexibility which would be helpful to him in the future.

In 1929 he returned home to write his *Habilitation*, *Akt und Sein* (*Act and Being*), his second dissertation. This achievement enabled him to lecture at the University and be addressed as "Professor Doctor."

America

Because he was still too young to be ordained, Dietrich went to the United States in 1930 to study at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City, where obviously he was not in any degree program, but did have some unusual experiences and friendships. He studied under Reinhold Niebuhr, a major theologian in ecclesiastical circles, and met Frank Fisher, a black student, who introduced him to the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem led by the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Sr. Dietrich disliked the approach of Harry Emerson Fosdick, a well-known pastor in New York City, who was a theological liberal, but he felt comfortable listening to Powell, because both he and Powell were theological fundamentalists. These men felt a close relationship with God and believed in the inerrancy of the Bible. Both men would probably reject today's use of Greek, Hebrew, and the Semitic languages to discover the actual meaning of various passages of the Bible, the method, for example, used by the late Dr. William Foxwell Albright of the Johns Hopkins University and other Biblical scholars. By this time, Dietrich concluded that God was leading him, which raises the question of whether God or his unconscious being was leading him.

Berlin Again

Bonhoeffer, returning to Germany in 1931, became a lecturer in theology at the University of Berlin, a center of scholarship at this time. He seemed to have changed from an intellectual understanding of Christianity to one deeply felt on an emotional level. On November 15, 1931, at the age of 25, he was ordained at the Old-Prussian United St. Matthew's Church.

BONHOEFFER AND THE CHURCH

The German people had become impatient with the Weimar Republic, an attempt to move Germany from a monarchy to a democracy and a change foisted on Germany by the victorious Allies at the end of World War I. The scorn for this attempt to democratize Germany helped Adolf Hitler become Chancellor on January 30, 1933, although the Bonhoeffer family distrusted him from the beginning of his disastrous control of Germany. One of Hitler's main objectives was either to drive the Jews from Germany or to kill the remaining ones in concentration camps. Many Jews in Germany were deeply religious Christians who had converted. Bonhoeffer's sister, Christel, had married Hans von Dohnanyi, a Jew, and another sister, Sabine, had married Gerhard Liebholz, who was of Jewish descent.

In April 1933, Bonhoeffer became one of the first pastors in the Church to denounce Hitler's persecution of the Jews, which raises the question of why other Church leaders had decided to remain silent. To prevent such defiance, Hitler sought to control the Protestant Church in Germany by demanding new Church elections in July 1933, a time when he hoped to place Nazis in key positions of the German Protestant Church. Bonhoeffer fought to elect non-Nazi churchmen as officials to various positions, being the most persistent critic of the Nazi pastors. There was a group of young men—Bonhoeffer, Colonel Hans Oster, Major General Henning von Tresckow, and Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg—who began to fight against Hitler and his thugs.[4] Bonhoeffer later referred to Hitler as the Antichrist.[5]

LUTHER'S INFLUENCE IN GERMANY

Martin Luther was a dominant figure in the lives of Germans, even in these years, especially in the northern part of the nation which was largely Protestant. When he translated the New Testament into German in approximately 1550-52, this version of the German language became *Hoch Deutsch* (High German), which enabled people from different dialects in Germany to talk with each other in business, education, and essentially in all facets of German life. The language problem was a major deficiency until then. In the first part of his life Luther supported the Jews. Before his death he advocated burning synagogues, taking money from Jews, and putting them into forced labor.[6] The Nazi hierarchy, especially Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, used Luther's recommendations to justify the Nazi persecution of the Jewish people. Luther's positions with respect to the Jews unfortunately sounded like Hitler's program for them, something abhorrent to reasonable people today. Later in his life, Luther also called the Pope the keeper of a whorehouse and that he would give Satan a "fart." A decline in Luther's health offers the probable explanation of this change—hemorrhoids, Meniere's disease, gallstones, kidney stones, arthritis, and abscesses on his legs.[7]

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH AND THE JEWS

Some Protestant Church leaders, referred to as German Christians, advocated making peace with the Nazis, some even supporting Hitler. Many of these people believed that the Jews who had converted to Christianity were fine people, but should establish their own church. Some German Christians even wanted a church in accord with Nazi principles, which today is an occurrence difficult to understand. Having become the "younger generation's leading spokesman against Nazification of the Protestant Church,"[8] Bonhoeffer stated that the German Christians were wrong in their approach to the Jewish question, in that they had succumbed to the "great masquerade of evil."[9] Dietrich Bonhoeffer believed that Luther's attitude toward the Jews was wrong, requiring the Church, if necessary, to defy the state, a major disagreement with Luther. An example of this defiance occurred in the autumn of 1942 when Hans von Gisevius, an official in the *Abwehr* and member of the Resistance—obtained the aid of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Chief of Milltary Intelligence, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Major General Hans Oster, and Helmuth James Count von Moltke.[10] This was *Abwehr* money.[11] Dietrich Bonhoeffer also believed that a church which did not support the Jews in this situation was not the Church of Jesus Christ.

NAZI THEOLOGY

Hitler despised the meekness of Christianity, its belief in seeking peace and in turning the other cheek. For Hitler, ruthlessness was a virtue, and mercy a sin.[12] The Nazis hoped to destroy Christianity and, realizing that people must have something to believe in, replace it with the paganism of the early German tribes.[13] Hitler wanted a national church that would stop publication of the Bible and the manufacture of crucifixes and pictures of saints, and would remove the cross from churches and schools, replacing it with the swastika. [14]

The German Christians wanted to remove all Jewish elements from their church, and this included the Old Testament, seen as a Jewish document. In November 1933 a crude, basically ignorant high school teacher, Reinhold Krause, spoke at a German Christian rally where he demanded getting rid of the Old Testament, revising the New Testament so that the stress on the crucified Christ would be eliminated, and every pastor being required to take an oath of personal allegiance to Hitler, as did the German military. Next, Hitler chose Ludwig Mueller, a former naval chaplain, as the Reich's bishop of his new church, an institution which Dietrich and his colleagues found odious.

Bonhoeffer and his colleagues formed the Confessing Church, which consisted of pastors and most of their flock. These people objected to the new Reich church, as well as the Nazi government. Martin Niemoeller, a submarine commander in World War I and later a pastor, joined Dietrich in opposing the Nazi church. Despite their efforts, German Christians elected Mueller, Hitler's choice, as their bishop, creating a split within German Protestantism. Mueller was consecrated as the Reich's bishop on December 3, 1933.

Disgusted and disheartened by the German church that was obedient to the Nazi government, in 1933 Bonhoeffer accepted a 2-year contract as pastor of two German-speaking congregations in London. Karl Barth, one of Bonhoeffer's guiding theologians, wrote him a letter in which he strongly criticized Dietrich for abandoning his church in Germany to the Hitlerites, when the Confessing Church desperately needed him. During this period Bonhoeffer worked closely with the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell, becoming his main source of information as to what was happening in Germany. Contrary to Dietrich's belief, Bell was not a good emissary to Prime Minister Winston Churchill's government, because Bell disapproved of Churchill's area bombing in which entire German cities were obliterated by British bombers.[15] Bonheffer's main contact with the Confessing Church during this period was through Martin Niemoeller.

Stung by Barth's criticism, Dietrich accepted the directorship of the Confessing Church's new seminary and, preaching his last sermon in London on March 10, 1934, returned to Germany

to become head of this seminary located in Finkenwalde. The new facilities resembled a pigsty, certainly not ready to become an educational institution for its 23 students, but due to Dietrich's efforts it was soon rendered usable. Dietrich donated his entire theological library to this new seminary, an act of supreme generosity in view of his love of books. Bonhoeffer's teaching methods were questionable, partly because he had little or no experience in teaching students on the seminary level. He had the students meditate on a particular passage until they felt that they knew what God's word meant to them personally. Most afternoons were spent in hiking or sports, a prime time for study or reflection, which was so necessary for seminary students to study Hebrew or Greek; theology, which the Church sought to convey; various books of the Bible; and church history, necessary for the student to understand from where the Church had come and to where it was heading. For Dietrich, a sermon was a place where God could speak to people, but one must ask whether God is speaking to a clergyman or his unconscious is prodding him to do or believe what may be seen as bizarre or even violent. For example, the Rev. Jim Jones was evidently listening to his unconscious before he poisoned his congregation and himself in Guyana, believing firmly that he was obeying God in committing this heinous crime. Bonhoeffer believed that the Church should not try to make the Bible relevant, but this raises the question: Should the Church present the Bible as irrelevant?

BONHOEFFER AND THE NAZIS

Dietrich opposed the Nazis on religious, not political or social, grounds.[16] He believed that the "Christian faith demanded that Christians resist…"[17] The Nazis passed the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, which prohibited Germans from marrying Jews in order to protect German blood from contamination, a bit of nonsense at best. When in the spring of 1936 the Confessing Church criticized Hitler's treatment of the Jews, the Nazis "came down hard" on the Confessing Church. They arrested Pastor Niemoeller and put him in a concentration camp at Dachau for seven years. As for Bonhoeffer, he was prohibited from teaching at the University of Berlin. Despite the fact that his new book, *Discipleship*, appeared in 1937 and made him a major figure in Christianity, the Nazis arrested him briefly in 1938. They banned Dietrich from Berlin, although he could travel to the city for family matters. In March 1940 the Gestapo shut down Bonhoeffer's seminary, another blow to the Confessing Church's ability to perpetuate itself. A new head of the Reich's church was Dr. Friedrich Werner, who sought Hitler's approval, and who consequently demanded on April 20, 1938, that every pastor take an oath of obedience to Hitler, similar to what the military had done. Nevertheless, the Confessing Church strongly disapproved of Germany's rearmament for Hitler's war of conquest in Austria and Czechoslovakia.

HITLER ON THE WARPATH

On November 5, 1937, Hitler assembled his generals and told them that he planned to attack Austria and then Czechoslovakia to achieve *Lebensraum* (living space) for the German people. The generals were shocked and angered by these objectives in view of the unpreparedness of the German Army to meet a well-armed Czech defense, as well as a British and French attack against Germany in defense of Czechoslovakia. One of these officers, General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff, resigned on August 18, 1938, chiefly because he believed that Hitler's demands were leading Germany toward a war which it could not win. He would later lead the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler in July 1944. Beck also objected to Hitler's constant reduction of the General Staff's authority. [Editor's Note: For a profile of Beck, see the author's "Colonel General Ludwig Beck: Conspirator" in an earlier issue of *AIJ*.]

Hitler invaded Austria on March 12, 1938, an easy operation because the Austrian people generally welcomed the *Wehrmacht*, since the Austrians spoke German, had friends and relatives in Germany, and even business connections with the Germans. Furthermore, in World War I Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were allies against the French, British, and ultimately the Americans. When Hitler next demanded possession of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, an area with a relatively large German population, a group of concerned leaders planned a coup led by Colonel Hans Oster, but Hitler came back from the Munich conference on September 30,1938, with possession of the Sudetenland. This was a gift from Neville Chamberlin, the British Prime Minister. The German people became wild with adulation of their leader. At this moment there was nothing the conspirators could do, because the German people and troops practically worshiped their leader and would turn against anyone who had harmed their beloved *Fuehrer*. [Editor's Note: For a profile of Oster, see the author's "Hans Oster: A True Patriot" in an earlier issue of *AIJ*.)

On November 8, 1938, Hitler ordered the execution of *Kristall Nacht* (Crystal Night), an attack on Jewish businesses, synagogues, and people, which horrified Dietrich. Reinhold Heydrich, second in command of the SS, was the leader of this abomination. Although Bonhoeffer was not permitted to speak out against these crimes, the leadership of the Confessing Church could have; however, it did not protest against what had happened, which discouraged Dietrich. On May 22, 1939, Dietrich received a notice to report for military duty. If he had gone into the armed forces, he probably would not have survived, because if the Russians did not kill him the SS surely would have shot him. If he refused the draft as a pacifist, he would have been beheaded. Through

Reinhold Niebuhr, Dietrich received a 1-year exemption from military service, though the details of this procedure are not clear. Niebuhr did use his friends to arrange Dietrich's appointment to the faculty of the Union Theological Seminary, but how he could keep Dietrich out of the German Army is a question without an answer. On June 4, 1939, Bonhoeffer left for the U.S., but after one day in New York he realized that his task was in Germany. He remained in the U.S. for only 26 days.

Dietrich then realized that the Germany he knew and loved had disappeared under the savagery of Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Chief of the SS, Field Marshal Hermann Goering of the Luftwaffe, and their thugs.

On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, a time when the SS killed thousands of Polish Jews and an event that can be described only as an orgy, as Hitler's SS troops danced on Polish corpses. Dietrich then realized that the Germany he knew and loved had disappeared under the savagery of Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Chief of the SS, Field Marshal Hermann Goering of the Luftwaffe, and their thugs. The clergy and nobility of Poland were also killed, depriving Poland of its immediate leadership, though over time other leaders, such as Cardinal Wojtyla (later Pope John Paul II) and Lech Walesa, did emerge. German generals, such as Colonel General Johannes Blaskovitz, were very angry about what they had witnessed, the result of which was Blaskovitz never again receiving an important assignment.[18] Hitler, ever the humanitarian, planned to enslave the Polish people and kill all of the Polish Jews.

When Poland formally surrendered on September 27, 1939, Hitler instructed his generals to attack the West next, primarily Great Britain and France, which had already declared war on Germany after its invasion of Poland. In May and June 1940, German troops crushed the French Army and forced remnants of the French and British Armies off the Continent due to Hitler's acceptance of General (later Field Marshal) Erich von Manstein's strategic plan. On October 6, 1940, in a speech to the Reichstag, Hitler proposed peace with Great Britain and France, which the British government rejected a week later.

BONHOEFFER BECOMES A SPY

Dietrich Bonhoeffer had seen enough of Hitler's invasions and killings, consequently contacting the German Resistance through his brother-in-law, Hans von Dohnanyi, whose group was planning to kill Hitler. This cluster was led by General Ludwig Beck, although Colonel Claus von Staufenberg has received most of the credit for this assassination attempt. Dietrich had moved from religion to conspiracy, a major transition for any man, especially someone of Dietrich's sensitivity. Bonhoeffer was brought into the group on the basis of his contacts in various European countries, especially in Great Britain, where his friend, Bishop Bell, was erroneously believed to have contacts at the highest levels. Dietrich was now caught up in the painful conflict between love of his country and contempt for Hitler's government. Bonhoeffer was listed as an intelligence officer in the *Abwehr*, German military intelligence, headed by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, so that his future travels could be described as in the service of German intelligence. All attempts to reach British decision-makers failed after Hitler attacked and quickly defeated both French and British forces, a development which created a strong determination among the British to defeat him.

On February 24, 1941, the *Abwehr* sent Bonhoeffer to Geneva, Switzerland, to meet Visser 't Hooft in order to tell him about the situation in Germany and to sense the likely peace terms Germany would get, if the conspirators were able to overthrow Hitler and put one of their own in the leadership of Germany. Hooft later used the World Council of Churches as a "clearing-house for Church Resistance." [19] Another purpose of this trip was to find out whether the Swiss would take in more Jews. The Swiss were supposedly neutral,[20] but had an extensive trade relationship with the Germans and did not want to endanger this commercial advantage. When Dietrich returned to Munich, his base of operations, he found a letter from the Reich Writers' Guild, informing him that that he was not permitted to publish his writings.[21]

Later, in 1942, the *Abwehr* sent Dietrich to Norway, where he successfully encouraged the pastors there to oppose Vidkun Quisling, the German puppet who had consulted with the Germans even before their invasion of this unfortunate country. Dietrich encouraged the clergymen not to back down, insisting that they oppose Quisling who had lost the respect and support of even the Germans. Afterward, Bonhoeffer was sent to Geneva again, where little was accomplished. When Dietrich learned that Bishop Bell would be in Sweden for three weeks, he obtained a special courier pass from the Foreign Office through Admiral Canaris. On May 30, 1942, Dietrich was on his way to Sweden to meet with Bishop Bell and others who were sympathetic to the work of the conspiracy. The result of this contact was to strengthen Bishop Bell's determination to do what he could, in spite of the Churchill government's policy of seeking the destruction of Germany. On June 30, 1942, Bishop Bell presented a memo to the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, who disliked Bell and refused to deal with the conspirators. Bell next contacted John Winant, the U.S. Ambassador to England, who sent Bell's memo to President

Franklin D. Roosevelt. The President rejected the memo, leaving the conspirators without support, and essentially destroying Bonhoeffer's effectiveness as a spy.

When Hitler lost confidence in his generals as a result of their performance in the Soviet Union in the winter of 1941-42, he took direct command of Germany's forces in 1942, reducing the OKH (High Command of the Army) to impotence and created the OKW (High Command of the *Wehrmacht*), a unit in command of all of the German armed forces with himself as head. The result was disaster, as Hitler sent the *Wehrmacht* on a slender and vulnerable path in the Ukraine toward the Caucasus where he hoped to exploit its oil. Experienced generals tried to tell Hitler that the lack of prisoners and equipment captured was an indication that the Soviets were baiting German forces into the Ukraine where they could cut off the German forces at will. This strategy brought the German Army to Stalingrad where it suffered its first terrible defeat, with the loss of perhaps 300,000 soldiers. Only the calm genius of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein enabled the remaining German soldiers to avoid death or capture by a reinvigorated enemy. This defeat could only stiffen the resolve of Beck's group in its efforts to get rid of Hitler.

BONHOEFFER AND MARIA

When Erich Bonhoeffer met Maria von Wedemeyer in June 1942, he was 36 six years old and she was 18, a significant difference in age. Her father had been killed in action, and Bonhoeffer as pastor met with her, at the same time falling in love with Maria despite the pleas of his friends that the age differential prohibited a close relationship between them. Dietrich invited Maria to a Bonhoeffer family farewell event for his nephew who was headed off to war. That evening she met Bonhoeffer's parents and siblings, a sure sign that Dietrich was serious about her. When Maria's brother was killed on October 26, 1942, her mother asked Dietrich not to come to the funeral, which shocked him. The events that followed are not clear, but in November 1942 Dietrich proposed to Maria. She accepted, and now they were a couple—engaged.

General Henning von Tresckow, Maria's uncle, was part of the plot to place a bomb on Hitler's aircraft on March 13, 1943, an explosive that did not function, possibly because the "detonator had not ignited the explosive."[22] At this time the Gestapo was very much aware of Dietrich, since Wilhelm Schmidhuber had been broken under their interrogation and gave information about Bonhoeffer, Dohanyi, General Hans Oster, and Joseph Mueller, an attorney. When he was arrested on April 5, 1943, Dietrich was placed in Tegel, a Gestapo prison in Berlin. His cell was 7 x 10 feet, had a plank bed, and the usual bucket. Bonhoeffer's parents visited him, bringing him food, clothing, and the necessary books of a scholar. Maria also visited him, providing him with various gifts and as much encouragement as she could. The Nazis did not know of his involvement in an organization planning to kill Hitler or they would have executed him. Dietrich communicated with his parents by placing tiny pencil marks under words in various books. Dietrich played the role of the simple and idealistic pastor, an indication of a complex personality who could play many roles at the same time.

When Dietrich was arrested, Maria's mother allowed the engagement to be publicly announced, as Maria made 17 visits while Dietrich was at Tegel for eighteen months, showing considerable courage for a young girl. During this period Dietrich read voraciously and showed bravery during Allied air raids, being a comfort to those around him.[23]

On July 21, 1944, Dietrich learned from the radio that the attempt on Hitler's life had failed. This was a period when Maria began to lose hope, suffering from insomnia, headaches, and even fainting. Dietrich told her that he held her tight in his thoughts, despite indications that she wanted out of the relationship. He assured her that he loved her dearly, but received only one letter from her in six weeks. Maria moved in with the Bonhoeffer family, indicating the strength of her feeling for Dietrich and performing secretarial duties for Dr. Bonhoeffer. Dietrich was moved to the Gestapo prison at Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse. Maria attempted to visit him several times, but permission was denied. In prison he always showed acts of kindness and politeness to everyone, including the guards. On February 2, 1944, the notorious Ronald Freisler of the People's Court sentenced Dietrich's brother, Klaus, to death.

On February 7, 1945, Dietrich was taken to the Buchenwald and Flossenburg concentration camps. In Buchenwald, people were sometimes murdered for their skin, which, for example, would be used to make wallets for members of the SS. We get information about Dietrich at Buchenwald from Captain S. Payne Best, a British intelligence officer who had been captured in the Netherlands during a German deception operation in which British spies were captured. At Flossenburg the SS hanged Bonhoeffer, Canaris, Oster, and others. At the place of his execution, Dietrich said a short prayer and then climbed the steps to the gallows. These men were killed by order of Hitler, who was consumed by the need to get vengeance as his thousand-year Reich was coming to a premature end. Two weeks later the Allies marched into Flossenbuerg and in another week the war was over. The Bonhoeffers had lost three sons in the two World Wars, but a picture from their old age shows two people still engrossed in each other.

NOTES

[1] The organization of this article is based on a book by Erich Metaxas, *Bonhoeffer* (Nashville, TN, Thomas Nelson, 2010).

[2] Metaxas, op. cit., p. 60.
[3] Ibid., p. 67.
[4] Klaus-Juergen Mueller, "Struktur und Entwicklung der national-konsertiven Opposition" in Aufstand des Gewissens (Hamburg: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, no date given), p. 121.
[5] Uta Freifrau von Aretin, "Prussische Tradition als Motiv fuer den Widerstand gegen das NS-Regime," in *Aufstand des Gewissens*, p. 284.
[6] Metaxas, op. cit., p. 93.
[7] Metaxas, op. cit., p. 93.
[8] Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance Against Hitler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 40.
[9] Ibid., p. 38.
[10] Hans Berne Gisevius, *Valkyrie* (Da Capo Press: Cambridge, MA, 2009), p. 4.
[11] This money was placed in Switzerland to be available to a post-Hitler government.
[12] Metaxas, op. cit., p. 168.
[13] Ibid., p. 169.
[14] Ibid., 171.
[15] M.R.D. Foot, *Resistance* (London, Methuen, 1976), p. 302.
[16] Klemperer, op. cit., p. 266.
[17] Victoria Barnett, *For the Soul of the People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1992.
[18] Richard Giziowski, *The Enigma of General Blaskowitz* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1997).
[19] Klemperer, op. cit., p. 45
[20] Denis J. Fodor, *The Neutrals* (Alexandria,VA: Time-Life Books, no date given), pp. 57-58.
[21] Metaxas, op. cit., p. 377.
[22] Metaxas, op. cit., p.429.
[23] Metaxas, op. cit., p. 463.

Dr. Kenneth J. Campbell graduated from Kenyon College and received MA degrees from Johns Hopkins University and the University of Maryland. He subsequently completed a doctorate at the University of Maryland. His area of specialization is German military intelligence. He can be reached at drcampbell3000@comcast.net. He is a frequent contributor to AIJ *and in particular to its historical "Profiles in Intelligence" series.*

The Moral Compass of Counterintelligence:
What Do We Owe It?

by SSG (USA) Corey J. O'Connor

Our career field is one of half-truths and lies, deception and counter-deception, a cat-and-mouse game based around the concept of deceiving one's enemy. We seek the truth in all operations, and we often drift into a world which is no longer black and white, but ambiguous shades of gray.

What we may find most challenging at a personal level is determining where our moral and ethical boundaries lie. These complex decisions are fraught with difficulties and often produce no clear-cut answer of right versus wrong. However, there is one facet of our profession, at least from an ethical perspective, which is a challenge to our moral integrity and produces an unequivocal black and white answer. What we are talking about is our commitment to finding the unbiased truth based on logical conclusions drawn from the facts, or as close to the facts, as we know them.

I present to you a story, which also inspired this article, concerning this exact question of moral integrity in the field of counterintelligence (CI). When a colleague of mine was adamant about an individual's disposition, and subsequently shown a new set of facts that contradicted his own, his response was simply: "What do we really owe him?" hereby meaning a foreigner about to lose his job based on our collective decision. Without diving too deep into the rabbit hole of what we owe another human being, let us instead examine what we owe our chosen profession.

As U.S. Army Counterintelligence Special Agents, our standard, at least on paper, is significantly higher than that of the average soldier. The authorities given to Agents by the President of the United States via Executive Order and the regulations we enforce through the due diligence of CI operations and investigations are immensely important. We often act autonomously, free of direct supervision, relying only on our individual skills and critical thinking abilities to answer a multitude of unknowns. With this extraordinary amount of trust comes an even greater amount of responsibility.

The simple fact of being human implies we are prone to error; therefore, we must separate our natural tendency to make mistakes from a willful violation of ethics and morality. Additionally, the reasoning behind why someone compromises his/her ethics is irrelevant; ethical compromise due to malice and ethical compromise due to fear or embarrassment both produce the same end results. Going one step further, we must not delineate nor seek to separate an Agent's inability to swallow one's personal pride and admit he/she was wrong with failing a test of moral integrity. They are simply one and the same—an amalgamation of wrongs, which culminates in the loss of an Agent's greatest asset, his/her reputation. A reputation is normally built over many years, but it takes only one instance of weak ethics to destroy it in seconds. While some will challenge the assertion of a single incident bringing down someone's character established over years, I firmly believe the opposite. When people are faced with difficult choices or circumstances, their decisions come to either define them or consume them. While there are many things in life which can be learned or enforced, ethics and, for the purpose of this article, moral integrity within CI are typically present or absent in the individual. However, they may surface only when faced with a difficult question or decision.

Going back to one's reputation, we identify a connection between failing to conduct investigations or interviews with the appropriate amount of due diligence and lapses in moral integrity. In some cases these items are mutually exclusive; however, I believe in many instances a failure of ethics is often precipitated by a failure to conduct operational activity appropriately. Some people will admit they are wrong, seek forgiveness, and ultimately move on. While this is not ideal, it reinforces what we already know about human nature—we make mistakes. What is worse is when we seek to hide our mistake, fully aware of the ramifications in doing so. The age-old adage—"The cover up is worse than the crime"—is fitting for these types of scenarios, because in the end one stands to lose much more than his/her pride by admitting a mistake compared to covering it up.

Lastly, it is important to view this topic through the eyes of our own personal self-reflection. Who among us is truly capable of saying we have never strayed from the path of honesty at some point in our lives? The answer is none; however, the actions we take as counterintelligence professionals are markedly more important to honesty than simple "white lies." This is by no means an attempt to justify these small lies, but merely to put them into context in comparison to the importance of integrity and honesty in our chosen profession. When we lose sight of our moral path in CI we compromise more than our personal integrity; we draw criticism to the career field and to its honor and integrity.

Returning to the question of "what we owe our profession," irrefutably I answer that we, as a collective CI society, owe it everything we have. When we fail to act in a manner consistent with the trust and fidelity entrusted to us, we fail not only ourselves but also the CI community. These two items are inseparable when it comes to honoring our commitment to confirming or denying the presence of nefarious activities. The constant search for truth requires a continual presence of ethics and honesty.

[Author's Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author's alone and do not represent the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Army.]

SSG (USA) Corey J. O'Connor currently works for the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, having served three combat tours in support of the Global War on Terrorism conducting tactical-level counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan (2004, 2012) and Iraq (2006). In 2013 he was nominated for the DoD Counterintelligence Team of the Year Award after serving as a CI Operations Officer in Regional Command East in Afghanistan. He recently earned a BS degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Oklahoma.

Years of the Spy:
Russia's President Vladimir Putin

by Dr. Boris Volodarsky

Russian President Vladimir Putin loves spy games. It is no wonder why espionage is Mr. Putin's favorite pastime. As a young intelligence officer he was sent on his first and only mission abroad in 1985, often referred to as the "Year of the Spy." Ironically, no fewer than eight major foreign agents, five of whom worked for the Soviet Union, were arrested in the United States during that year. Two Americans – Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen – started their espionage careers as KGB "moles" in the CIA and FBI, respectively. Later, promoted to head the FSB, a successor to the KGB, Director Putin was one of the top consumers of Hanssen's intelligence.

Back in 1985, no one noticed that a recently married couple of two Peruvian nationals, a "journalist and anthropologist" named Juan Lazaro and his wife Vicky Peláez, a TV reporter, quietly moved to New York. A year before, Lazaro managed to obtain a birth certificate in the name of "Heidrun Freud," born in Lima, Peru, in December 1965, and send it to his Moscow KGB controllers who supervised the work of all Russian undercover agents abroad. It was known as Directorate S of the First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence).

As soon as Vladimir Putin became the FSB chief in July 1998 (and the FSB is a successor to the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, responsible for counterintelligence and internal security), strange things began to happen. In August, about $4.8 billion of International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance went amiss during the implosion of the Russian financial markets. The funds were supposed to prop up the banking system and the ailing and sharply devalued ruble. Instead, they ended up in the bank accounts of obscure corporations headed by FSB collaborators and then vanished into thin air. Strapped for financial resources in hard currency, the Russian intelligence service badly needed operational funds to support its activities, and funds were made available. aIt was later announced that the loan was stolen but the perpetrators were never found. On August 17, the Russian government devalued the ruble, defaulted on its domestic debt, and declared a moratorium on payment to foreign creditors. However, payments to spies never stopped.

Two years before the Russian default, Edmond Safra, a banker and billionaire based in Monaco, founded the Hermitage Fund in partnership with William Browder as a way for Western investors to make money in the Russian stock market. Mr. Browder's grandmother was Russian and his grandfather, like many other family members, was a long-time secret agent for Stalin. Therefore, William Browder and his Hermitage Fund were very welcome in Russia in 1996.

During the same year the KGB, which by that time had been divided into four successor agencies, started to restore its spy networks that had been lost or "put on ice" during the collapse of the Soviet Union. First of all, it became concerned about operations against Russia's main adversaries, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. By 1996, Harold J. Nicholson had substituted for Ames, arrested two years before, as an important source inside the CIA while Hanssen continued to deliver top-grade intelligence from FBI Headquarters, for which he was paid about $1.5 million in cash and diamonds. At the same time, Soviet illegals—spies operating without any official cover—had built up their "legends" and successfully established themselves in the West: Mikhail Vasenkov (alias "Juan Lazaro") in New York, Pavel Kapustin (alias "Christopher Metsos") in Paris and Ottawa, Alexander and Olga Rost (alias "Andreas and Heidrun Anschlag") in Aachen, Germany, and Vladimir and Lydia Guryev (alias "Richard and Cynthia Murphy") in Hoboken, New Jersey, while others settled in Vienna, Zurich, Geneva, London, and elsewhere.

Ten years later they were still in place; only the intelligence priorities had changed. In 2006 one of the most important FSB divisions became the Chief Directorate of Economic Security, headed by the former Leningrad KGB boss of the current Russian president. His first deputy was General Vladimir Dzhabarov, chief of Directorate K (monitoring of credit and financial activity). Additionally, their task was to develop secret budgets for

undercover operations and eliminate business competitors unwanted by the Kremlin. Apart from its traditional role, the SVR, a foreign intelligence agency, was also instructed, as Mr. Putin put it, to "stand up for the defence of the economic interests of our companies abroad." In the meantime, inside Russia, Hermitage had fallen from grace with the Kremlin.

This is how William Browder explained what happened: "Due to weak courts and legal pro-tec-tions," he testified before the U.S. Helsinki Commission, "our biggest lever-age was often the bully pul-pit of the press. Since 1996 we waged dozens of high-profile pub-lic activist cam-paigns tar-get-ing mis-man-age-ment and cor-rup-tion at some of the largest com-pa-nies in Rus-sia. These included Gazprom (the state-controlled nat-ural gas monop-oly), Uni-fied Energy Sys-tems (the national elec-tric-ity util-ity), Sber-bank (the largest bank), and Surgut-nefte-gas (the fourth largest oil com-pany in the country)."

By all standards, 2006 was a notable year. Under FSB's supervision, the Interior Ministry began showing interest in three Hermitage companies registered in Russia and started investigating one of their business partners with Cyprus connections. In April, arbitration courts ruled in favor of three shell companies that had filed fraudulent lawsuits against the two former subsidiaries of a leading Russian investment bank. As a result, the sum of $106.9 million landed in several secret accounts in the West. Later, the Hermitage lawyers somewhat naively suggested it was the work of the Russian mafia. In reality, it was the FSB.

In the same year, the attractive and promiscuous redhead named Anna Chapman left her temporary English home after a successful test run in London and returned to Moscow for some extra training before her next mission. Because of strict compartmentalization rules, she was not told that nine Russian illegals had already been well established in the United States, where she would soon settle. Their controller, a Russian intelligence officer with 30 years of operational experience, was travelling on a Canadian passport using the name "Christopher Metsos." Two others, the already mentioned Anschlag couple with genuine Austrian passports, had moved from Aachen to Landau on the German-French border controlling intelligence assets that included one important source in the Netherlands and several in Germany. In November, after a year-long preparation period, a former FSB officer-cum-dissident named Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned in London by a Russian hit team. All this activity, together with the growing appetites of the Russian leader, required substantial financing.

Such financing is usually supported from two types of budgets: overt and covert. Regarding the former, even figures cited in the official sources are open to interpretation. Funds for secret expenditures are accumulated in offshore accounts of various shell companies registered in different parts of the world. After a sum is "placed" into a financial system, it is "layered" through complex transactions among many shell companies to camouflage the source until it lands in London, Zurich, or Vaduz (in Liechtenstein). From these secret accounts operational costs of the illegals and some star agents like Ames and Hanssen are covered and some extravagant wishes of the Kremlin leaders financed, such as, for example, a luxurious property that became known as Putin's Palace in the Black Sea resort of Geledzhik worth $350 million.

Traditionally, the KGB and its successors always like to kill two birds with one stone. In the summer of 2007, when Moscow Police raided the offices of Hermitage and its solicitors, two shell companies were incorporated, one in Surrey and another in New Zealand. They would be used for secret financial transactions. At the same time a business was established in New York with Anna Chapman as its CEO. In June a Russian aerospace specialist named Vladimir Vozhzhov was caught red-handed in Austria. His German agent, Werner Greipl, an engineer of Eurocopter, which is a division of the European aerospace group EADS, admitted that he had regularly met with Vozhzhov between 1997 and 2007. Sometimes they used an Austrian Army helicopter technician as a middleman when secret documents and money changed hands. This ten-year-long operation was also financed from secret funds.

By December 2007, the Hermitage business in Russia was almost completely destroyed. Its three companies were re-registered and, using the same trick, their previously paid taxes were refunded to several obscure accounts from where the sum of $230 million quickly disappeared in the West. The beneficiaries have never been established. Again, the Hermitage lawyers naively thought it was the work of a "criminal syndicate" and filed protests with Russian government agencies. As expected, this was all to no avail.

In November 2008 Sergey Magnitsky, one of the Hermitage auditors who was trying to help William Browder find out what was happening to his Russian business, was detained. Three months later, Andreas Anschlag arrived in Amsterdam to meet his best agent, Raymond Poeteray, whom he ultimately paid over 90,000 euros for secret documents that this Dutch diplomat stole from his ministry. Later that year, Chapman's real estate

business, which was constantly in the red, took off suddenly thanks to a massive cash injection. No one ever asked where the money came from.

In June 2010 ten Russian illegals were arrested in the U.S. while their SVR controller managed to escape. Not by chance he was in Cyprus where many of the secret funds were laundered. The Anschlag couple was apprehended in Germany in October 2011. In December, Mikhail Repin, a junior member of the Russian embassy, was expelled from the UK for espionage. His operational budget was very substantial. A few weeks later, in January 2012, Jeffery Delisle, who worked at top secret Canadian naval facilities and had flipped sides five years before, pleaded guilty to spying for Russia. His "small" salary was mocked by the media but in five years it amounted to $180,000. In March Poeteray, Anschag's star source, was detained in The Hague. In August a German IT specialist at the NATO airbase in Ramstein was caught stealing military secrets. German authorities found 6.5 million euros in his accounts in London and Luxemburg, reportedly paid by the SVR. In October an indictment was unsealed in a New York court charging Alexander Fishenko of Arc Electronics and ten other defendants with multimillion-dollar conspiracy to illegally export cutting-edge microelectronics from U.S. makers for the Russian military. No one mentioned where this money came from. One of the defendants was later released on $250,000 bail, with a $30,000 deposit submitted in cash. In November, Alexander Perepilichny, a 44-year-old Russian businessman was found dead near his Surrey home. Perepilichny was one of the managers of secret offshore accounts through which millions of dollars were laundered on Kremlin's orders. Several months before his death, he revealed a part of the scheme to Hermitage lawyers who initiated investigations in several countries. In December, President Obama signed the Magnitsky Bill which many thought was going to spark a new Cold War. Voting for the Bill the U.S. lawmakers failed to notice that in reality it was not a Russian mafia-style raid against a Western fund. It was a well-planned and well- executed long-term intelligence operation in which billions of dollars were being funneled out of Russia and secretly placed in the West. It is not a human rights issue; it is a *casus belli*.

"All wars must teach lessons," Frederick Forsyth once wrote. "If they do not do so they were fought in vain and those who died in them did so for naught." The last Cold War taught two clear lessons, if the powers that be have the wit to learn them.

The first is that it is madness for the democratic and industrially developed countries of the world to accept Russia as an equal partner. In slightly over a decade, Putin's repressive regime turned this largest republic of the former Soviet Union into an ominous, criminal, and backward state with no industry except for its vast natural resources. It is governed by a very small group of individuals who own and sell those resources and, thanks to the political foolishness, bureaucratic blindness, and corporate greed of some Western politicians, are accepted as legitimate representatives of the Russian people. With the FSB fully in control, the years of the Cold War will soon seem like a time of peace and tranquility.

The second lesson concerns the assessment of information. When the Soviet Union collapsed, many expected its fearsome intelligence services to wither as well. The reality demonstrated the opposite. They have not only penetrated many leading Western institutions, but also continue to murder people whom they consider enemies of their regime. Now they have huge financial resources to act with as they deem necessary or expedient. Analyzing and interpreting events in which Russia is involved, one should make no mistake about the fact that, although not all evils of this world come from the Kremlin, the only true religion inside its walls is the religion of evil. For civilized society there may be a real problem in the making.

Dr. Boris Volodarsky is a research fellow at the Cañada Blanch Centre of the London School of Economics and Political Science, from which he earned his PhD. He was born in Russia where he received his military education and a university diploma. He is the author of The KGB's Poison Factory: From Lenin to Litvinenko *(2009),* El Caso Orlov: Los Servicios Secretos Soviéticos en la Guerra Civil Española (The Orlov Case: The Soviet Secret Services in the Spanish Civil War) *(2013), and* Stalin's Agent: The Life and Death of Alexander Orlov *(Oxford University Press, forthcoming in late 2014). His earlier article, "The KGB in Ann Arbor," appeared in* AIJ, *Vol. 30, No. 1, 2012.*

NMIA Bookshelf

GENERAL SAM: A BIOGRAPHY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SAMUEL VAUGHAN WILSON

Drew Prehmus.
Hampden-Sydney, VA, Hampden-Sydney College Press.
2012.
277 pages.

Reviewed by Col (USAF, Ret) Greg Eanes, former Reserve Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance at the Air Force Special Operations Command and a military historian.

A member of the Hampden-Sydney College Class of 2008, Drew Prehmus used his unique status as student body president to gain unfettered access to President Emeritus and retired Army Lieutenant General Samuel Vaughan Wilson. He conducted a series of interviews over three semesters for what has become an outstanding first biography of a distinguished patriot and icon in both U.S. Special Operations and the U.S. Intelligence Community. The entire work is based on recorded interviews and anecdotes presented by LTG Wilson as a supplement to the Leadership and Ethics Seminar he has taught for many years on campus.

A chronological approach is taken in the narrative starting with Wilson's humble beginnings on a farm in rural Prince Edward County, Virginia. Prehmus details the story of Wilson hearing a rebroadcast of Churchill's "fight them on the beaches" speech and, after ruminating all night, making his first adult decision—to join the Army. The 16-year-old Virginian ran through a rainy night seven miles and fibbed about his age to join the local Virginia Army National Guard as a bugler. That first step led to a commission (making him the youngest 2nd lieutenant in the Army), recruitment into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and then becoming the second man recruited for a special mission in Burma, known to history as Merrill's Marauders. About 40 pages are devoted to this formative segment of Wilson's life, where he describes leadership challenges and combat operations and then shares the pain of the combat deaths of close friends. In one moving vignette Wilson describes how a direct hit on a foxhole instantly killed one man while mortally wounding another, obliterating part of his body. Accompanied by his sergeant and medic, the then 20-year-old 1LT Wilson cradled the wounded man in his arms throughout the night, during an intense Japanese bombardment, so that the young soldier would not die alone.

The bulk of the work is devoted to "General Sam's" rise through the ranks ending up, often by luck, in positions where he could make a positive difference. After becoming a Russian linguist and a Soviet expert, he worked for the CIA in post-war Europe and then at the Pentagon where he worked for the famous Edward Lansdale, learning firsthand about the anti-communist efforts in the Philippines. Lansdale's influence and life-long friendship helped shape Wilson (now 90) who, to this day, displays a photo of Lansdale on the wall of his home. Wilson was also selected by legendary paratrooper George M. Jones (who led the Corregidor airdrop) as Director of Instruction for the Army's Special Warfare School to develop a training program designed to counter growing communist influence in Third World countries. It was there that Wilson coined the term "counterinsurgency" as a Special Forces mission, a term still used today. Subsequently, in a unique move, Lansdale appointed Wilson as his deputy, with the title Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, where he worked on sensitive special operations problems and issues with many of the "whiz kids" of the Kennedy administration.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Wilson was involved in developing special operations solutions to the crisis, to include identifying Cuban expatriates for guerrilla warfare operations in Cuba. Among other contributions, he assisted in the development of an Air Force airborne radio/television broadcast capability known as "Commando Solo."

In 1964 Lansdale succeeded in having Wilson appointed in a temporary civilian capacity as the Associate Director of the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) in South Vietnam, where he had unparalleled opportunities to put his counterinsurgency concepts to work. Some months later, Wilson was elevated to the position of U.S. Mission Coordinator and Minister-Counselor of the American Embassy in Saigon, receiving in this connection a Presidential appointment to the personal rank of Minister. During the last six months of a 3-year tour in Vietnam, Wilson was placed in charge of all U.S. advisory efforts in Long An Province. His successful innovations in nation-building in this important province provided the basis for the establishment of a revised country-wide pacification effort called CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support), a cornerstone for the U.S. pacification effort in the Vietnam War.

Following his return to the United States, Wilson commanded a Special Forces Group and then served as Assistant Division Commander for Operations in the 82nd Airborne Division. In 1971 he was appointed the first general officer-level Defense

Attaché to the Soviet Union since World War II. In that capacity he routinely engaged senior Soviet leadership who enjoyed hearing him speak Russian like a native, even earning compliments from Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. Wilson took full advantage of this opportunity to gain valuable insights into Soviet military strategy and doctrine. His career was topped off as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the post from which he retired from the Army in 1977. Upon departing Washington for the last time, he walked in reverse the same seven miles to his family farm in Rice from the local National Guard Armory where he had enlisted in 1940.

The last quarter of the book covers other aspects of Wilson's "retirement years," which proved to be as far-ranging in impact as his military career. Shortly after military retirement, he began a second career in education, becoming President of Hampden-Sydney College in 1992. At a time when the College was facing a leadership void, Wilson exercised his organizational and motivational skills, creating an academic and administrative team that any major university would envy (often with the help of "Miss Susi's Country Diner" – his wife's Sunday's dinners). Student stories in the book range from humorous to ominous (e.g., Wilson reaches out to save one student from potential suicide). One of his lasting contributions to that community was the establishment of a leadership program to groom young men for positions of responsibility for the public good. In honor of his efforts, the Hampden-Sydney Board of Trustees established the Samuel Vaughan Wilson Center for Leadership in the Public Interest. [Editor's Note: This is the site where in 2008 I interviewed General Sam as one of six subject matter experts for my doctoral dissertation on intelligence education. I knew he had a passion for this subject after hearing him give the keynote address during a conference at the then-Joint Military Intelligence College (now NIU) in 1999. Even though President Emeritus Wilson is now retired from active teaching and administrative duties, he still maintains an office at the Center.]

Other post-retirement activities proved to be as far-ranging and diverse as Wilson's military career and included part-time consultant roles at national, state, and local levels. He was vice chair of the Holloway Commission reviewing Operation EAGLE CLAW and worked with Congress to develop and shepherd legislation leading to the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). He also served as Chairman of the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group (SOPAG) during the President George H.W. Bush administration. In 1992 LTG Wilson was awarded the Commonwealth of Virgnia's Cultural Laureate for Public Service by the Virginia Cultural Laureate Foundation.

There is a common theme documented throughout all of Wilson's organizational experiences, primarily the importance of mission focus, open communications, individual leadership, networking, and seeking mature counsel and inputs from others to improve teamwork and end results. These are "leadership traits" worth learning

Four former DIA Directors, all retired Army 3-stars, reminisce and share experiences over a recent lunch at the farm of "General Sam" in south central Virginia: (L to R) Harry E. Soyster (1988-91) (Board Member Emeritus, NMIA); James A. Williams (1981-85) (Chairman, Board of Directors, NMIA); Samuel V. Wilson (1976-77); Patrick M. Hughes (1996-99) (former President, NMIA, and Board Member Emeritus). A World War II combat veteran, LTG Wilson is the oldest living Director of DIA. Used with permission of the participants.

and remembering which make this work a good leadership text. One shortfall of Prehmus' work is the lack of an index which would be helpful to future scholars seeking anecdotes regarding the many historical notables involved in some of Wilson's close encounters (such as Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter). At the end of the book I found myself thirsting for more. Nevertheless, Prehmus should be proud of his efforts. In this biography of "General Sam," he has made a great contribution to American military history, one that can be built upon by future scholars.

[Reviewer's Note: *General Sam: A Biography of Lieutenant General Samuel Vaughan Wilson* can be purchased online directly from the Hampden-Sydney College bookstore (http://www.hsc.edu/Bookstore.html) or through Amazon.com. A portion of the sales proceeds goes to Hampden-Sydney College.]

[Editor's Note: For more details on the remarkable life and exploits of General Wilson, to include a summary of remarks he made as a distinguished speaker at DIA in the spring of 2009, see "General Sam: LTG S.V. Wilson as Both Warfighter and Intelligence Supporter of the Fight," by William C. Spracher, in *AIJ*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2009, and an article by Dr. Kenneth Campbell "Lt General Samuel V. Wilson: Extraordinary Intelligence Officer," *AIJ*, Vol. 19, No. 3 & 4, 1999-2000.]

• •

THE CIA'S GREATEST COVERT OPERATION: INSIDE THE DARING MISSION TO RECOVER A NUCLEAR-ARMED SOVIET SUB

David H. Sharp.
Lawrence, University Press of Kansas. 2012.
344 pages.

Reviewed by LT Michael Zaic, a U.S. Navy Reserve intelligence officer and current student at the National Intelligence University.

David Sharp has written a book that has been written multiple times before: the story of a covert CIA operation in the early 1970s to recover a nuclear-armed Soviet submarine which sank in the Pacific Ocean. In *The CIA's Greatest Covert Operation*, however, the author has solid credentials. Sharp was a member of the CIA program team that led the recovery efforts. This book tells the story of "Project AZORIAN" from a firsthand perspective that is unlike any telling before it. The story of the recovery mission is fantastic in its own right. The narrative makes it all the more human and reminds us that we are not reading fiction; we are reading history.

The basic facts are simple. In March 1968, a Soviet Golf II-class submarine sank in the Pacific for unknown reasons. After the Soviets failed to recover their sub, the U.S. Navy decided to search for it. There were discussions within the government about attempting a recovery, but even the Navy thought that such a mission would be impossible. The CIA took up the challenge and formed a team to evaluate, and ultimately to undertake, the mission. It was called Project AZORIAN. David Sharp was a member of that team.

The bulk of this book focuses on how the submarine was raised from the bottom of the ocean. There is an emphasis on technical challenges, and the reader has the potential to get lost in the details. While some of the descriptions of the operations are dry, Sharp does an excellent job in breaking up any monotony with colorful stories. He discusses secret office passageways, debunks conspiracy theories, and talks about the proper way to pronounce obscenities on a ship. Additionally, there are two different photo sections in the book, which really bring life to the story, the ship, and the people involved.

In addition to the engineering challenges, the CIA had to operate without any knowledge by the outside world of what it was up to. Different covers were examined but, ultimately, the CIA decided on commercial cover. The cover story was that the ship was being used for deep ocean mining. At the time, there was a growing interest in ocean mining as having viable economic potential. The CIA utilized the Hughes Tool Company, owned by the reclusive Howard Hughes, as the front company. The book gives great insight into the lengths that the CIA went through in order to maintain the cover. It makes note of the fact that, in early 1974, the story was leaked to a *New York Times* reporter. Yet, CIA Director William Colby was able to appeal to the reporter's patriotism; the author agreed to wait until after the mission was complete before publishing his account. This restraint was particularly interesting given that in 1971 the *Times* refused to delay publication of the *Pentagon Papers*.

This book tells the story in three distinct sections. First, there is the lead-up to the mission. The planning of the ship design and cover story are described in detail. Next—and most compelling—is the mission itself. The author describes each day at sea by augmenting the ship's deck logs with notes and recollections, both

personal ones and those collected from other crewmembers. Finally, the author discusses the aftermath of the mission. The mission was not entirely a success (some have gone so far as to call it a "colossal boondoggle"), and a follow-up mission was initially planned, then scrapped. An extremely objective post-mortem of the mission follows in the epilogue.

The book has its strengths and weaknesses. The story stands on its own merit, but the focus on the engineering and technical details suggests a more narrow audience. There were times when it was difficult to visualize how all of the physical pieces were working together. Another weakness is that the book does not go into the same level of detail post-mission as it does in the lead-up to and execution of the mission. It is also a slight disappointment that the intelligence value of the recovery is not discussed in any detail. Of course, this is all nitpicking.

The story is a sensational one told from a point of view that is undeniably unique. All of the ingredients—the CIA, the Cold War, Howard Hughes, and an engineering feat unlike any other in the past century—make this book a page-turner. The book calls Project AZORIAN the CIA's "greatest" covert operation. David Sharp makes a compelling argument and he seems to be right on point. The mission was executed more than 40 years ago, but it still has relevance today. Though history has judged the mission to be an overall failure, the magnitude of it was astounding. This book is well worth adding to one's collection.

• •

GIDEON'S SPIES: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE MOSSAD

Gordon Thomas.
New York, St. Martin's Griffin. 2012.
400 pages.

Reviewed by MAJ (USA) Krisjand Rothweiler, a career intelligence officer and 2013 graduate of the National Intelligence University, where he earned an MSSI degree. He has worked in the Pacific and European theaters as well as completed three deployments to the Middle East and Central Asia. His current assignment is with the J2 Directorate of U.S. Southern Command in Miami, FL.

Spy stories make for compelling reading for most, and they are much more so when the reader believes there is truth to the story. The thought that there may be clandestine events occurring around us is exciting and the conspiracy theories of major events play into this hunger. *Gideon's Spies* essentially captures this mindset and places Israeli intelligence as a major actor in some of the 20th century's greatest events.

Gideon's Spies is laid out in a chronological manner and aligns with the tenure of Mossad's directors. This approach is beneficial since it provides a logical flow of time and people and allows for the analysis of many of the relationships that exist in a relatively small community. It also allows for following the development of several key personalities' careers. This aspect is important since it describes the development of many of Israel's political and national security leaders and explains some of their beliefs and actions later in their careers. It is this view of the leadership and how it formed the Israeli state and its security community which makes the book relevant to members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

The other key aspect of this book is the "tell-all" regarding the Mossad and the exposure of Israeli operations over the last 60+ years. Gordon attempts to provide a deep dive into the mindsets of Israeli leaders and their intelligence service while presenting theories and evidence (much of it circumstantial) regarding the operations of Mossad. While engaging in its story, it can be difficult to read in this format as it breaks the narrative in several places to flash back to past events or other topics altogether. Gordon Thomas implicates the Mossad as having taken part in numerous headline events throughout history such as the death of Princess Diana and the U.S. Marine barracks bombing in Beirut. Furthermore, he talks of mysterious computer programs that can hack anything and predict terrorist incidents. Much of this is backed up, according to Thomas, by interviews with intelligence operatives and other eyewitnesses. Where firsthand accounts cannot be used, he falls back on conjecture, circumstance, and posing leading questions to draw the reader along with his line of reasoning.

Overall, *Gideon's Spies* is an interesting read and provides a unique perspective on the history of the Mossad in particular and Israeli intelligence services in general. By understanding the author's viewpoint and aims, it is possible for the reader to appreciate the historical aspects of the book while seeing though the "story" part of it.

• •

SPY SITES OF NEW YORK CITY: TWO CENTURIES OF ESPIONAGE IN GOTHAM

H. Keith Melton, Robert Wallace, and Henry Schlesinger. Bellevue, WA, Foreign Excellent Trenchcoat Society. 2012. 159 pages.

Reviewed by Ist Lt (USAF) Rusmir Bilalic, a candidate for an MSSI degree at National Intelligence University while studying with the NGA cohort at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. He is also a distinguished graduate of Northeastern University's engineering undergraduate and graduate programs. Originally a refugee from the Bosnian War, he immigrated to the U.S. in 1999 and received his commission from the Air Force Officer Training School in 2011. Prior to entering active duty, he was a software engineer for telecommunications and data storage equipment makers in the private sector.

The authors of the latest *Spy Sites* series, H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace, have crafted a travel guide for intelligence professionals seeking an unorthodox tour of New York City. They mapped out nearly 200 sites in New York where famous spies lived and operated. Then they provided an intriguing synopsis of each site starting with the Revolutionary War period and proceeding through the latest FBI round-up of ten *Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki* (SVR) illegals in June 2010.

H. Keith Melton is an intelligence historian and authority on espionage technology. He is a historical consultant to the CIA and Technical Tradecraft Historian for the Interagency Training Center in Washington, DC. Robert Wallace is the former director of the CIA's Office of Technical Service, founder of the Artemus Consulting Group, and contributor to the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Kicking off the fascinating New York tales of espionage, patriotism, and heroism, two former representatives of two classical adversaries—the KGB and CIA—detail missions and techniques of spy-vs.-spy games that they played. Fittingly, Oleg Kalugin, a retired KGB general, and Peter Earnest, a retired CIA officer, detail spying techniques and tactics involved in high-stakes operations of deceit and betrayal which occurred in the heart of New York City. They entice the reader to undertake an intelligence excursion to the "heart and mind of America." [Editor's Comment: Often in the past Oleg Kalugin has led "spy tours" of Washington for students of NIU and its predecessor institutions, while Peter Earnest is the founding executive director of the privately-operated International Spy Museum in Washington. Earnest also teaches at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, the private training organization contracted to organize the spy tours for NIU.]

Beginning with the Revolutionary War, the authors detail the importance that General George Washington placed on secret intelligence and tell us about several of his HUMINT-based collection methods under commercial cover. They entice the reader with denial and deception techniques in the form of staged propaganda and assassination plots involving fake desertions of carefully chosen assassins to the enemy in order to carry out the assassination of Major General Benedict Arnold. Not only do they cover sources of intelligence and methods of covert action, the authors also add street addresses in New York City where the action took place, enticing the curious reader to explore them further.

Melton and Wallace continue the tales of patriotism, dishonor, lies, and sabotage through the Civil War and describe numerous intelligence techniques used by both sides in order to gain the upper hand in the conflict. It is interesting to read how intelligence operations during the Civil War in many cases resemble intelligence operations on the modern battlefield. Infiltrations of enemy command structures, double agents, and saboteurs were as valuable 200 years ago as they are today.

The historical travelogue continues through World War I, World War II, and beyond, describing code-breaking efforts, sabotage operations, and spy-vs.-spy chess matches taking place in some of the most recognized landmarks in New York City. The authors marvelously narrate the recruitment of Lt Gen Dimitri Fedorovich Polyakov, a Soviet military intelligence officer, at Grant's Tomb in Upper Manhattan at midnight by an FBI Special Agent. General Polyakov turned out to be one of America's most valuable Cold War spies. Later, FBI Special Agent turned traitor Robert Hanssen betrayed Polyakov to the GRU and Aldrich Ames gave him up to the KGB. Polyakov was arrested and executed several years after he retired in the Soviet Union.

This educational travel book contains many more fascinating accounts of spying activities that took place in New York City throughout history. Even though some of the precise locations have been obscured due to inaccurate information or New York's never-ending construction efforts, this guide will definitely add a twist to the reader's next stateside getaway or provide an exciting, quick, and fact-filled leisurely read.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SECURITY: CONCEPTS, PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT

Harry I. Nimon.
Thorofare, NJ, Edwards Brothers Malloy, for Xlibris. 2013.
444 pages.

Reviewed by Dr. Duane C. Young, a retired Army officer with 20 years experience in the Armor/Cavalry and MI branches. He is currently an education consultant and adjunct faculty member at National Intelligence University, where he has taught since 2004. When not directing NIU graduate students in their thesis efforts, he engages in private research and writing on defense/security topics, especially concerning military transformation and modernization.

The title of Harry I. Nimon's 2013 book, *Offensive and Defensive Security*, suggested, at least to this reviewer, that the work was about national security, and plausibly about strategies Western nation-states might adopt in a world that President Barack Obama recently described as having "always been messy."[1] Indeed, the title suggested the work might further the discussion of what is generally called "Offense-Defense Theory," carried on in works discussing national security policy and strategy. Some examples of such works include Sean M. Lynn-Jones' writing in the journal *Security Studies* (1995), Michael E. Brown and others in *Offense, Defense, and War* (2004) and, more recently, Tang Shiping's journal article, "Offence-Defence Theory: Towards a Definitive Understanding" (2010).[2] Proponents of Offense-Defense Theory argue for what they term an offense-defense balance that can be used to gauge any offensive and defensive security strategy's relative efficacy.

However, Dr. Nimon's book does not discuss the topic of Offense-Defense Theory. In fact, Nimon himself notes that, at least at the time of his writing, the extant literature concerning offensive and defensive security was confined to "the domain of international security," referencing Lynn-Jones' 1995 *Security Studies* journal article.[3] Nor is this interesting work concerned, as many others are, with issues developing from policy changes and/or the state and need for restructuring of intelligence and security organizational structures in a post-Cold War world beset by the threat of terrorism seemingly running rampant. One such recent example was William Lahneman's book, *Keeping U.S. Intelligence Effective* (2011).[4]

This book essentially concerns the realm of physical security, as those better versed in the relevant jargon—and undoubtedly their numbers are growing—will immediately recognize from the phrase in the title, "offensive and defensive security." "Defensive security," as the name implies, focuses on the traditional norm of protecting a physical post, plant, or system and, as applied to cyber systems, for example, would entail measures such as finding and fixing system vulnerabilities or "patching" software—protecting computer systems, networks, and users from attacks wherever and whenever possible. In contrast, "offensive security" measures are proactive and adversarial. These measures are focused on identifying perpetrators of attacks, such as hackers, and in some cases at least disrupting if not disabling their nefarious operations. Very relevantly, given developments well-documented in the press in Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and Ukraine (2014), and the most recent attacks on the U.S. financial sector in the summer of 2014, the book includes a focus, among other aspects of security, on cyber-security.[5]

Dr. Nimon's book, concerned as it is as subtitled with "Concepts, Planning, Operations, and Management," is a primer for the educator and trainer on all the aspects of information, operational, and physical security. It is especially aimed at practitioners—security planners, program managers, and security operations managers. The author provides a comprehensive approach to his study, integrating various aspects and elements of the security discipline. In a departure from the traditional approaches to security, the book is written with an eclectic and holistic approach. It was also written principally to serve as a textbook for a course in Offensive and Defensive Security taught by Henley-Putnam University, a California-based online educational institution offering courses in "intelligence management, terrorism and counterterrorism studies, and strategic security & protection management."[6] [Editor's Note: Henley-Putnam is an active and enthusiastic institutional member of NMIA and frequently mans an exhibit table at the Association's semiannual intelligence symposia. The University offers a large number of intelligence-related courses online.]

The book is divided into three sections, varying in the number of their constituent chapters. Section One, "The Basics" (Chapters 1-3), "provides an orientation for the reader to a common frame of reference."[7] The first chapter covers "Basic Concepts," while the second deals with the "Basic Concept of Security Elements." The final chapter of the section encompasses what the author calls the security domains: "security management practices, access control systems and methodology, telecommunications and networking security, cryptography, security architecture and models, operations security, application and systems development security, physical security, business continuity and disaster recovery planning," and, "laws, investigation and ethics."[8]

Section Two, "The Environment" (Chapters 4-9), "examines the world the security professional must inhabit."[9] This section draws on a disparate mix of disciplines, comprising discussions drawn from analytics, biology, finance, logic, neurology, philosophy, and physics. Its composite chapters examine "terrains" which dissect the environment, as the author sees it. These start with "Human Terrain" (Chapter 4), which looks at the human condition and cognition. Chapter Five then explores "Cultural Terrain," followed by "Legal Terrain" (Chapter 6), "Physical Terrain" (Chapter 7), and "Cyber Terrain" (Chapter 8). The author brings this section full circle to again examine people in "Personal Terrain" (Chapter 9), this time by looking at the human element from the perspective of personnel security.

In Section Three, "Security Planning and Management" (Chapters 10-12), Dr. Nimon "applies the knowledge gained" from the preceding portions of the work "to the planning and management of an integrated security plan."[10] In his final three chapters he examines in turn "Information Evaluation," "Security Planning," and "Security Management." Integral to this section is his elaboration and demonstration of applications of "concepts and processes developed via international agencies, such as the Project Management Institute," to outline ways to create tailored integrated security plans.[11]

Dr. Nimon's work is not an "easy read." Delving into his text can at times be daunting for someone not already well-versed in the various disciplines upon which he draws for analysis of his topic. This is something of a real challenge for the interested reader, given the paucity of extant academic literature otherwise exploring this topic. Nonetheless, on the whole, Nimon labors successfully to present a cogent and well-documented elaboration of this important topic. On balance, I would recommend his work as an addition to the personal libraries or academic libraries of those persons and institutions with an interest in security policy.

Notes

[1] Justin Sink, "Obama: Media Makes You Think 'World Is Falling Apart'," *The Hill*, August 29, 2014, accessed August 31, 2014, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/216281-media-makes-you-think-world-is-falling-apart.
[2] Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies* 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Offense, Defense, and War (International Security Readers)* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); Tang Shiping, "Offence-Defence Theory: Towards a Definitive Understanding," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3 (2010), pp. 213-260.
[3] Harry I. Nimon, *Offensive and Defensive Security: Concepts, Planning, Operations, and Management* (Thorofare, NJ: Edwards Brothers Malloy, for Xlibris, 2013), p. 3.
[4] William J. Lahneman, *Keeping U.S. Intelligence Effective: The Need for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011).
[5] "FBI Examining Whether Russia Is Tied to JP Morgan Hacking," *Bloomberg News*, August 27, 2014, accessed August 31, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-27/fbi-said-to-be-probing-whether-russia-tied-to-jpmorgan-hacking.html.
[6] "Henley-Putnam University," accessed August 31, 2014, http://www.henley-putnam.edu/programs.aspx.
[7] Nimon, p. 3.
[8] Ibid., p. 37.
[9] Ibid., p. 4.
[10] Ibid., p. 6.
[11] Ibid., p. 6.