

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL

THE MAGAZINE FOR INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS



Intelligence in Peace and War

NMIA

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President's Message

This will be my last NMIA President's Message and, in fact, the last ever NMIA President's Message. To explain, the Boards of NMIA and the NMIF agreed to merge the two organizations into one. However, due to legal and bureaucratic complexities, it appears that, instead, NMIA will be totally disestablished and most of its responsibilities transferred to NMIF. For those of you who are not familiar with NMIF, it was spun off from NMIA in April 2007. The rationale for creating NMIF was to have a separate tax-deductible [501(c)(3)] organization (NMIA has always been a not-for-profit [501(c)(5)] professional association). The impetus for having a tax-deductible organization was a substantial offer to support our Scholarship Program from a corporation but only if it could be given with a tax deduction. As such, originally NMIF handled only our Scholarship Program. In order to comply with federal rules, however, separate articles of incorporation and bylaws were established and a separate Board of Directors for NMIF was established.

Over the past ten years NMIF has also taken over responsibility for all arrangements for the Annual NMIA/NMIF Awards Banquet and for various outreach efforts, such as the Scholarship Program. While there were separate Boards, the two organizations coordinated activities when appropriate and supported the activities of the other.

So why did we decide to take this action now? The main reason is tied to fiscal issues. Over the past few years, both NMIA individual memberships and corporate sponsorships have fallen off significantly. There appear to be several reasons why memberships and sponsorships have declined but, in spite of extensive efforts by NMIA Board Members to turn the situation around, NMIA eventually faced a situation in which if it was not able to get additional funding from an outside source it would no longer be able to remain solvent. Fortunately, a strong supporter of NMIA approved a grant request, but this supporter would provide the grant only to a tax-deductible organization.

This forced the two Boards to review the activities of both organizations to determine whether a merger was possible and appropriate. After intense discussions, we determined that virtually all activities currently being sponsored by NMIA could be sponsored by NMIF without impacting its tax-deductible status. These activities include publication of the *American Intelligence Journal*, symposia and other educational or networking meetings, and an annual awards program. The Boards also decided to no longer recruit individual members. Instead, we decided to invite former members and others interested in supporting NMIA/NMIF goals and objectives to make tax-deductible contributions to NMIF and receive recognition as NMIF "Associates" in return. For those of you who are interested in continuing to receive the *AIJ*, we will be suggesting a minimum contribution that will provide you Associate status and electronic delivery of the *Journal* (the bulk of the suggested minimum annual contribution will be considered "fair value" for receipt of the *AIJ* and will not be tax-deductible). NMIF will continue to encourage donations (vice sponsorships) from corporations, but now most of these contributions will be tax-deductible.

In sum, effective sometime in the Fall 2017 time frame, NMIA will be formally dissolved and most of the activities previously sponsored by NMIA (including the publication of the *AIJ*) will be picked up by NMIF.

Finally, I want to thank each of you personally for your support to NMIA over the past 43 years. We encourage you to become Associates of NMIF. Information regarding becoming an Associate as well as information on corporate donations will be available shortly on the NMIF website at: www.nmif.org. Questions regarding any of the information in this President's Message should be addressed to admin@nmia.org.

William R. Arnold
President

The Editor's Desk

With a tinge of sadness, I begin this column with the news that this edition of the *Journal* will be the last published under the banner of the National Military Intelligence Association, which has been its familiar lash-up for the past nearly four decades. Given the imminent disestablishment of NMIA and transfer of responsibilities to NMIF (its sibling Foundation), *AIJ* will continue to appear in uninterrupted (if slightly tardy) fashion, but as a product of NMIF, not NMIA. For our loyal stable of authors and book reviewers, the change is negligible. For our readers, the majority of whom have received *AIJ* as one of the primary benefits of NMIA membership, the change is a bit less transparent, but I leave it up to the NMIF leadership to explain the nuances to our audience.

The theme for this issue was selected quite a while ago, when it dawned on me that some notable anniversaries were coming up. The year 2015, when the theme was chosen, marked the sesquicentennial of the end of the Civil War in 1865, the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1945, and the 40th anniversary of the ignominious end of the Vietnam War in 1975. The year 2016 marked a decade since the so-called “Surge” that turned around the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq, at least for a while. The year 2017 is the centennial of the United States’ entry into World War I, at the time expected to be “the war to end all wars.” That utopian hope did not quite pan out as planned, leading to an even greater global conflagration and subsequently to a seemingly endless Cold War that shows signs of maybe heating back up again given ongoing provocations by an insecure, paranoid Russia and a mischievous, natural resource-hungry China. We will soon be commemorating the 16th anniversary of 9/11 in 2017, and of course the U.S. and much of the Western world have been involved in an asymmetric war against extremists ever since. I had hoped to attract a diverse set of articles that cover the role intelligence has played in supporting several of the wars involving the U.S., and to some degree I succeeded. Not every war is represented, but some of the more significant ones are.

Proud to be an aging “Baby Boomer,” my military career closely paralleled the Cold War. Having served in places like Germany, Korea, and Panama, I can identify most closely

with that conflict. Consequently, I am delighted that the director of the Cold War Museum, Jason Hall, has graced the pages of this issue with an incisive narrative and colorful images about that jewel in the hunt country of northern Virginia. I am confident it will bring back lots of memories for those of you from my generation. I met Jason at an NMIA presentation and book-signing by Gen (Ret) Mike Hayden in Old Town Alexandria (a book reviewed in the last issue of *AIJ*), and he agreed to provide a piece for the *Journal* that will hopefully whet your appetite to visit the Museum. I know some of you—especially those who dabbled in SIGINT and EW and wore the old ASA patch—actually served at Vint Hill Farms Station during the height of the Cold War.

The leadoff article in this issue deals with the pertinent subject of intelligence bridging the gap between peace and war and is penned by one of our repeat authors (and former student of mine), Ray Faunt. Nicole Guajardo holds forth on the controversial “war on drugs” in Mexico, a type of war that some insist is the wrong approach for erasing this transnational scourge. Latin America and the role of intelligence in countering non-traditional threats get scant attention in the pages of *AIJ*; therefore, as a former FAO and defense attaché in that part of the world I am pleased to be able to provide some rare coverage. Ms. Guajardo reviews the Mexican government’s strategy to combat drug trafficking. She describes Mexico as one of the most violent countries in the world today, with spillover effects on the U.S. that have caused our politicians to clash over how best to grapple with them.

Moving to the Middle East, which has had no difficulty capturing Washington’s attention for decades, Nicole Drumhiller, head of the Intelligence Studies Program at AMU (a robust NMIA/NMIF supporter), explains the psychology surrounding the formation of cults, her vehicle being an intriguing case study of the Soldiers of Heaven in Iraq. Staying in that cauldron of conflict, David Belt of NIU builds on the review of LTG (Ret) Mike Flynn’s book in a previous issue of *AIJ* and offers an alternative view about fighting “radical Islam” (a term embraced by Flynn in direct contravention of the Obama administration under which he served as DIA Director before becoming directly involved in

the Trump presidential campaign). Belt argues that in combating radicalization we may actually be increasing it, and suggests what U.S. strategy should be going forward in that volatile region.

As I expected would happen, I received several manuscripts dealing with World War II. Repeat *AIJ* author Bill Streifer discusses the FBI and its wartime relationship with the Manhattan Project, and how this fueled anti-Communist fervor in the early days of the Cold War. To dig further into the topic of nuclear warfare, three scholars from Nigeria review the history of nuclear proliferation and disarmament, and their decidedly non-Western perspective on the U.S.'s and other nations' monopoly possession of the ultimate weapon may bother some of you. As I have often mentioned in this column, I actively seek out international authors who can shake us out of our narrow U.S. mindset. I am delighted to include a piece from a large African country; I am fairly certain this is the first time, at least on my watch as editor, that Nigeria has been represented. Other articles in this volume highlight the work of a Russian, a Turk, and a Finn. So much for our moniker as the *AMERICAN Intelligence Journal*!

Repeat author and Russian historian Boris Volodarsky talks about London as the crossroads of wartime espionage, and Eric Gundersen of the Department of Justice analyzes how the Nazi Party exploited the German diaspora in the U.S. to further that country's interests during World War II. It gives pause to me, and perhaps to others too, how a "nation of immigrants" like the U.S. may have to deal with a CI nightmare during future wars due to the presence of residents from foreign lands who may still harbor more loyalty to their homeland than to their new home. It all boils down to that oft-discussed fragile balance between national security and the rights and liberties of U.S. citizens (or at least "U.S. persons"). This article is a superb precursor to a themed issue we will be publishing in 2018 on "CI & the Insider Threat." Another article in this issue that may attract the attention of some CI types is Joshua Pearce's treatise on how an adversary of the U.S. might use non-violent, administrative techniques to tie up the best and brightest of our academicians so that they are distracted from conducting significant research. This a non-standard *AIJ* article, to be sure.

Looking forward to our next issue that will deal with the cyber threat, we offer a couple of articles here that explore social media and the media in general as they provide a challenge to the intelligence effort. Sofia Charania of Princeton University and Olli Teirila of the National Defence

University of Finland both tackle this subject from different perspectives. Not every article in a given issue of the *Journal* must fit the theme closely. We are pleased to provide here a thought-provoking piece by AFIT's "Deji" Badiru and Anna Maloney on developing a systems approach to intelligence operations, specifically using HUMINT to augment SIGINT. We also feature an article by Lucy Whalley and her Army Corps of Engineers' team that the GEOINT crowd will most certainly appreciate on how to use OSINT to enhance situational understanding of difficult urban environments, using Dhaka, Bangladesh, as a case in point. Gokhan Kuloglu of the Turkish National Police thoughtfully examines organized crime intelligence. Then, tackling a subject near and dear to my heart, "Wes" Westbrook of NIU takes a "community of practice" approach to intelligence studies. This is Wes' first foray into scholarly publishing after completing his doctorate, and he is so excited he has already teamed up with one of his former students in penning an article for the next issue on cyber.

As always, we offer some excellent book reviews in this volume, one of which tracks back to the issue before last when we delved into denial and deception. Other books reviewed that closely align with our theme of intelligence in peace and war discuss urban guerrilla warfare and drone warfare, respectively. The "In My View" column for this issue augments the already heavy coverage of the Cold War with a piece by a retired Marine officer who has vivid remembrances of the Cuban Missile Crisis and reveals a story most have never heard—the shoot down of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft that garnered nowhere near the attention of the downing of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over the USSR in 1960. Incidentally, in the "small world" department, the prime mover in getting the Cold War Museum off the ground was Francis Gary Powers, Jr., the son of that unlucky pilot whom the U.S. finally recovered from across the "Bridge of Spies" in Berlin. Finally, our popular "Profiles in Intelligence" series offers the last-ever installment by the inimitable Ken Campbell, assessing a controversial wartime Pope. I will save that explanation for the tribute I wrote about our dearly departed friend and author immediately after this overview.

In addition to the "In Memoriam" piece dedicated to Dr. Campbell, another former *AIJ* author's passing definitely merits mention in this column. CPT (USA, Ret) Luis Carlos Montalvan was found dead in a hotel room in El Paso, Texas, on the night of December 2, 2016. He was only 43 and was widely known for his book about his personal struggle with post-traumatic stress disorder. Montalvan was a decorated

THE EDITOR'S DESK

17-year Army veteran with a tour during the Iraq War. Injured in combat, he earned two Bronze Stars, the Purple Heart, the Army Commendation Medal (for valor), and the Combat Action Badge. He spent recent years as an author, motivational speaker, and leading advocate for military retirees' mental health and increased access to service animals. During his travels he was usually accompanied by his beloved service dog, named Tuesday. His *New York Times* bestselling book, *Until Tuesday: A Wounded Warrior and the Golden Retriever Who Saved Him*, chronicled how a service animal helped him cope with PTSD. In an *NBCNews.com* obituary, one of Luis' classmates (and fellow Cuban-American) at the Columbia Journalism School in New York, from which he graduated in 2010, commented, "It takes a lot of bravery to be able to write about PTSD, and also to get a prosthetic leg and learn to walk again... He was just a really brave person." CPT Montalvan was the author of "Liberazione d'Italia: One Woman's War" (a profile of OSS veteran SGT Myrtle Vacirca-Quinn), which was published in *AIJ*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2010. I highly recommend both his article and his book. Luis' abbreviated life perfectly parallels the theme of this issue. This courageous soldier had to continue to fight in times of both war and peace; for someone suffering with PTSD, the line between them is forever blurred. It is always sad when someone so young and so promising leaves us so soon. We salute CPT Montalvan and his beloved companion Tuesday.

To wrap up this rambling commentary on "War and Peace," which is not quite as long as the book of the same name by Tolstoy, I recently received an invitation to an event at the Institute for World Politics on the topic "iWar: War and Peace in the Information Age." Regrettably, I was unable to attend due to a teaching conflict, but the summary of the presentation encapsulates much better than I what I was trying to accomplish with this issue of *AIJ*: "Bill Gertz, *New York Times* bestselling author and veteran *Washington Times* columnist, explains how the United States can beat China, Russia, Iran, and ISIS in the coming information-technology wars. American is at war, but most of its citizens don't know it... Covert information warfare is being waged by world powers, rogue states—such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—and even terrorist groups like ISIS. This conflict has been designed to defeat and ultimately destroy the United States... This new type of warfare is part of the Information Age that has come to dominate our lives." The Gertz book, of the same title as his presentation at IWP, describes how technology has completely revolutionized modern warfare and what we must do to catch up and triumph in this timely and important struggle. Another way of putting it is spelled out by the relatively new concept of

the "gray zone." A winter 2016 report by a U.S. think tank, titled "The Characterization and Conditions of the Gray Zone: A Virtual Think Tank Analysis" and described as "a multi-agency deep dive assessment," states in its introduction: "Within United States government and Department of Defense spheres, the gray zone is a relatively new terminology and phenomena [sic] of focus for characterizing the changing nature of competition, conflict, and warfare between actors in the evolving international system of today." This is precisely what my intention was when I came up with this theme of intelligence in peace and war. For more on "Information Warfare," see a previous *AIJ* issue with precisely that theme—Vol. 30, No. 2, 2012.

I hope to hear from many of you in future months as we settle in under NMIF. Here are the future themes approved by the NMIA and NMIF Boards of Directors:

Vol. 34, No. 1, 2017: "The Cyber Threat: The Future of Intelligence in a Wired World" (already closed out unless you have a manuscript ready to go by end of August)

Vol. 34, No. 2, 2017: "Honoring Our Intelligence Heroes: The Historical Heritage of NMIA/NMIF Awards" (a special issue dedicated to those stalwarts for whom our annual awards are named; most of the profiles are already spoken for, but if you are interested in writing one let me know right away)

Vol. 35, No. 1, 2018: "Counterintelligence and the Insider Threat"

Vol. 35, No. 2, 2018: "HUMINT in the 21st Century: Espionage, Attaché Operations, and Other Challenges"

Please let me know if you are interested in writing an article dealing with any of these themes, or anything related to intelligence in general, in particular military intelligence. If you can support one of the themes, you have a better chance of getting your input accepted by this editor and the NMIF Board.

May we all enjoy more peace than war in 2017!

Bill Spracher
Editor



In Memoriam



We at NMIA/*American Intelligence Journal* are deeply saddened by the news that Dr. Kenneth J. Campbell, one of *AIJ*'s most prolific authors, passed away in mid-2016. For years, Ken kept this editor, and my predecessors, well-stocked with his insightful pieces about famous (and infamous) military intelligence figures, especially those making their mark on 20th century Europe during two World Wars. More often than not, our *Journal*'s "Profiles in Intelligence" section showcased the work of this master of character analysis, and we will miss having yet one more manuscript submitted by him waiting in the hopper. Regrettably, this issue's "Profiles" entry will be the final one graced by Ken's byline. He sent it to me the same week he died; little did I know at the time this would be our final exchange of correspondence. Fittingly, for a divine author moving on to his next incarnation, the subject matter was a Pope!

I first learned of Dr. Campbell's death through his obituary in *The Intelligencer*, the excellent journal of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. We are grateful to Elizabeth Bancroft, Director Emerita and former Executive Director of AFIO, and also longtime managing editor of its journal, for granting us permission to reprint that obituary from Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 2016:

Kenneth J. Campbell, PhD, 85, former AMU and Gallaudet College Professor, died 17 May 2016 in Sarasota, Florida. Dr. Campbell was a retired professor who taught part-time at American Military University and did research on the analysis of leadership in military intelligence organizations.

Prior to his teaching at AMU, he was a professor at Gallaudet University in Washington, DC, a university dedicated to the education of the deaf and hearing-impaired. Campbell contributed numerous articles to military journals of profiles of military and intelligence figures. In the early 1980s, he served on the board of the National Historical Intelligence Museum. He studied at Kenyon College, in Ohio, majoring in Economics, and later received an MDiv degree from United Theological Seminary, and a master's and PhD from the University of Maryland. In his youth, he was an avid cross-country runner. He collected books on intelligence and personality assessment. He was an active member of the AFIO Suncoast Chapter, where he had many friends and colleagues. His first wife predeceased him. He is survived by a fourth wife, Marilyn, whom he met three years ago in his nursing home, and also survived by her daughter.

Ms. Bancroft added, "We all valued Ken's quiet scholarship of many decades in this field and am sure he would be pleased to know *AIJ*/NMIA has not overlooked his passing and contributions."

One of our longtime NMIA Board members, Cal Carnes, knew Ken personally and offered a personal reflection:

"I have known Ken for over 40 years. He was a founding member and active participant in the National Military Intelligence Association's local Potomac Chapter in the 1970s. I visited his apartment in Arlington and his subsequent home in Manassas a number of times, and we would always have spirited and informative discussions. He was a student of history, in particular German military history and its intelligence chiefs. He was fluent in the German language. Yet, he had a dark side to him when he talked about his clan, the Campbells, and being on the wrong side in the Scottish wars! Later he moved to Florida and was an active member of AFIO's Suncoast Chapter in Tampa. I will miss Ken's excellent insight and interesting conversations."

Auf wiedersehen, Herr Doktor!

Bill Spracher
Editor

Intelligence Analysis in Peacetime: Inadvertently Bridging the Gap from Peace to War

by LTC (USAR, Ret) Raymond J. Faunt

STAGSETTER

In 1979 the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) was taken by surprise. Shiite religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini inspired an uprising that swept away the U.S.'s closest ally in the Middle East, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.¹ The revolution that followed Khomeini's assumption of power dramatically changed the economic status and political systems of stratification (ESPS) inside Iran from a caste-systemized monarchy to a Shiite-based theocracy.² During a revolution, once a government is overthrown, the revolution continues as forced changes are made to the ESPS.³ A revolutionary elite continues to reshape society and parcel out portions of the ESPS; these changes are often institutionalized through horrific bloodletting or forced re-education of the populace.⁴

The Iranian Revolution was no different. After the Shah's government was overthrown, Khomeini ordered enemies of the state killed by the thousands and the U.S. embassy was overrun by Iranian revolutionaries.⁵ Khomeini had mobilized the masses in a way not seen since Mao had come to power in China.⁶ Diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran were destroyed. During the ensuing 24 years, Iran repeatedly attempted to degrade U.S. regional influence by covert (terrorist actions) and overt (bellicose saber-rattling) measures.⁷

Iran's blatant challenge to the U.S.'s regional influence in the Middle East had to have been noted by many leaders, most notably Middle East strongman Saddam Hussein (SH).⁸ SH possessed two things: (1) supreme confidence in his judgment and (2) a catastrophic ineptitude in global affairs.⁹ By nature a prolific gambler, SH intuitively had to have known that at some point the U.S. would want payback against Iran. For 23 years SH balanced himself on a foreign policy high-wire; he sometimes fell off, but a safety net would bounce him back up onto the wire. His Phoenix-like ability to regenerate internal reins of power after each foreign policy gaffe (and each gaffe was the result of running the same play over and over) was noteworthy.¹⁰ However, SH's erratic, go-for-broke behavior would eventually catch up with him. As much as he fancied himself a brilliant man and consummate poker player, when it came to international affairs SH proved himself a complete amateur. By the end of

his presidency, he was gambling not only with his own money but he was now wagering house money. Like the coach of a bad football team, SH repeatedly went back to the same play whenever his offense stalled.

A perfect storm of factors led the U.S. and Iraq into the maelstrom of war.

Some National Football League teams' offensive playbooks consist of as many as 500 plays.¹¹ At this elite level, defenses assiduously study opposing offenses. If a team runs the same offensive play twice in a season, it runs the risk an opposing defense could diagnose the play. One ill-advised play can change the course of an entire season; a team could be going all in by calling the same play twice in a season.¹²

During his presidency, SH repeatedly called the same play. He went all in far too often; it cost him his life, dragged the U.S. into a war, and upset the regional balance of power. Nevertheless, as foolish as SH was, the second Iraq war (Operation IRAQIFREEDOM) was not all his fault. For myriad reasons, the U.S. deserves some culpability. A perfect storm of factors led the U.S. and Iraq into the maelstrom of war. What happened to SH rests squarely on his own shoulders; over the course of many years, his actions and aberrant behavior resulted in his own demise. The U.S. invaded Iraq because President George W. Bush and his Cabinet firmly believed SH possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD).¹³ SH had a long history of erratically deceptive behavior. Why now believe his public declarations of no WMD? Since the end of Operation DESERT STORM, SH's behavior had not matched that of a man who had nothing to hide. If anything, his behavior made him highly suspect.

Nationwide in the U.S., 9/11 had engendered collective shock and paranoia, and understandably the world's more nefarious leaders, such as SH, were recast in a much darker light. Some experts posited that secular Iraq would never have given WMD to terrorist organizations. After 9/11, though, could anyone put a lot of stock in that line of

thinking? After all, A.Q. Kahn (working for Sunni Pakistan) had provided WMD knowhow to Shiite Iran.¹⁴ There is a phrase that “everyone has a price.” With that in mind, could owners of such destructive material ever be trusted? Once coalition forces were in Iraq, WMD was discovered, but much to the chagrin of the U.S. there were mitigating caveats to those findings.¹⁵

THE FINDINGS

During the process of researching this article, there were a number of verifiable findings: (1) Iraq ineptly disposed of its WMD and these old WMD munitions were found discarded throughout the country by coalition forces.¹⁶ (2) Iraqi scientists maintained WMD technical knowhow (programs and small production facilities were found in nondescript safe houses).¹⁷ (3) In 2003 Iraq was not mass-producing WMD anymore.¹⁸ (4) WMD intelligence was highly suspect, old, and suffered from a lack of new human intelligence (HUMINT) sources from inside Iraq.¹⁹ (5) There was an old HUMINT source named “Curveball” (CB); there was a bewildering belief in him despite the fact he was highly suspected of being a liar.²⁰ (5) Iraqi denial and deception (D&D) operations helped trigger a war.²¹ (6) U.S. IC processes were short-circuited.²² (7) The Department of Defense’s (DoD) Office of Special Plans (OSP) muddled the assessment waters.²³ Post-invasion, there was enough blame to go around. Unquestionably, the U.S. IC helped bridge the gap in bringing the U.S. from a state of relative peace to war.²⁴ However, all the blame cannot be placed on the IC; in all fairness, it had been put in a very bad position. There was a 50-50 chance the IC would answer the WMD question correctly; to be fair, its final conclusion was partially correct. Iraq did possess WMD, but the WMD was old, discarded, and not configured for mass delivery.

SADDAM ALL IN AND FALLING OFF THE HIGH-WIRE: STRIKE ONE

In 1980, due to Iraq and Iran’s long-simmering border disputes, coupled with SH’s worries that Iran’s (with the world’s largest Shiite population at 95%) revolution would incite Iraq’s Shiite majority (60-65 % of Iraq’s populace is Shiite), for foolish reasons SH attacked Iran.²⁵ The sheer level of human carnage incurred from Iranian human wave attacks during the war make a World War I comparison applicable. It is estimated that over one million combatants/non-combatants were killed with unknown numbers wounded.²⁶ After initial ground gains inside Iran, Iraqi political and military incompetence snatched defeat from the jaws of victory; Iran drove the Iraqi Army back to its original borders. By the mid-1980s, Iraq’s economy was in ruins and its army was barely hanging on—strike one for SH.²⁷ Desperate to turn the tide of the war, SH turned to the

use of chemical weapon munitions on Iranian troop formations and internal insurgents.²⁸ Use of these munitions thwarted Iran’s operational movement on the battlefield and helped prevent Iraq’s defeat.²⁹

By the mid-1980s, Iran was a self-proclaimed mortal foe of the U.S. and had been implicated in dozens of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens.³⁰ The U.S. was also dealing with its old geostrategic foe, the Soviet Union, and Libya (a state sponsor of terrorism).³¹ The Iran-Iraq War did not go unnoticed by President Ronald Reagan.

President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114. The content of NSDD 114 specifically focused on U.S. policy for the Iran-Iraq war. “The directive reflects the administration’s priorities: it calls for heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries of state and defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take appropriate measures to respond to tensions in the area.”³² Reagan sent a special envoy, former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Illinois Congressman Donald Rumsfeld, to Iraq to work a deal; post-meeting it was agreed the U.S. would provide Iraq with varied forms of assistance.³³ The Reagan administration knew about, but chose to ignore, SH’s use of WMD against Iran.³⁴ Ultimately, U.S. assistance would help stabilize Iraq’s defensive lines while interminably stalemating the conflict.³⁵

By the time of cessation of hostilities, the U.S. did not consider Iraq a close ally; a wary pseudo-agreement existed between the countries. For 50 years Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq had created a tri-equal balance of power in the region.³⁶ The U.S. gained satisfaction from thwarting Iran, while SH was all too happy to be bounced back onto the strategic high-wire. SH was a bad actor, but on occasion he was *our* bad actor and could be relied upon to balance the region’s worst actor (and our enemy), Iran. Now, however, Iraq was 60 billion dollars in war debt, and its economy was teetering on the brink of collapse.

SADDAM ALL IN AND FALLING OFF THE HIGH-WIRE: STRIKE TWO

Two years later, incomprehensibly, SH began to rattle his saber toward Kuwait. SH had come to the conclusion that: (1) Kuwait was a former Iraqi province and belonged to Iraq.³⁷ (2) Kuwait had declared war against Iraq, by its refusal to stop glutting the oil market (making oil prices drop) versus creating a shortage (thus creating higher prices; what SH failed to mention is that he owed Kuwait approximately 14 billion dollars). SH proclaimed that Kuwait’s oil-related pricing actions hindered Iraq from receiving higher profits, which in turn prevented quicker payment of its 60-billion dollar Iranian war debt.

SH gave the appearance of choosing peace and went through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to fix the oil pricing issue. Nevertheless, SH was pining for the riches of Kuwait and could only get the treasure he needed by stealing it; it was the quickest way to pay off Iraqi war debts. On July 25, 1990, OPEC officials worked with Kuwait to increase oil prices while decreasing oil output. Saddam now had what he requested; diplomacy had worked to avoid a war. However, similar to what Hitler did during his negotiations with Neville Chamberlain, once SH got what he wanted he moved the goalposts. Inexplicably, he went all in and proceeded to invade and plunder Kuwait.³⁸ Saddam's true intentions were laid bare; he wanted nothing more than to rob Kuwait. SH would now face a U.S.-led coalition that would ultimately destroy his army.

U.S. forces deployed in order to prevent SH from invading oil-rich Saudi Arabia. During post-invasion diplomatic negotiations, President George H.W. Bush's envoy, James Baker, told Iraqi envoy Tariq Aziz that the U.S. was prepared to go to war if Iraq did not leave Kuwait. Years later, in a PBS interview, Aziz stated that Iraqi leadership fully expected the U.S. and Iraq to go to war because, in their mind, they had no choice.³⁹ Aziz's account defies logic; then again, what we considered logical and what SH considered logical were starkly different. In 100 hours, the U.S.-led coalition (comprised of forces from many Arab countries) crushed the Iraqi Army. Saddam went all in again and lost—strike two.

SH lucked out again; he was not removed from power because the U.S.-led coalition chose to follow the dictates of the United Nations (UN) resolution which stipulated only Iraq's removal from Kuwait. Again, SH was bounced back onto the high-wire. Post-cessation of DESERT STORM hostilities, the coalition destroyed all WMD that was found (which SH denied he had).⁴⁰ During the ensuing years of UN WMD inspections, SH repeatedly violated the agreement.⁴¹ The UN Security Council believed (given his nature, history, and continued defiance) that he required aggressive monitoring. Due to his continued defiance of inspections, on occasion Iraq was kinetically attacked by the U.S. and the United Kingdom; the most notable instance was Operation DESERT FOX.⁴²

SADDAM ALL IN AND FALLING OFF THE HIGH-WIRE: STRIKE THREE – SADDAM'S OUT

Unbeknownst to the world, around 1991 SH made the decision to get rid of his WMD. After the U.S. invaded in 2003, it was found that Iraq had ineptly disposed of its WMD stockpiles. Some WMD munitions

were found scattered in remote locations of the Iraqi countryside.⁴³ SH made a costly mistake: he never documented the destruction of the WMD.⁴⁴ He simply told his minions to destroy all WMD; then he implemented a D&D program in order to make his regional foes believe he still possessed it. Bottom line, SH did not want to appear vulnerable to his enemies. He needed to make his opponents think, "I believe Iraq has WMD; any action against it could be exceptionally costly." In a post-9/11 world, this would be an irrecoverable gamble for SH. During the 2002 inspections, Iraqi escorts sometimes obstructed UN inspectors by delaying entrance to suspected facilities.⁴⁵ Iraqi WMD experts were assessed as only marginally cooperative, due to the fact they were evasive when pressed for details or they did not fully answer questions. Post-invasion, it was found that Iraqi scientists had maintained WMD technical knowhow and were actively trying to reboot their programs. It was also discovered that Iraq was not mass-producing any form of WMD.⁴⁶ It was later assessed that the Iraqi escorts' cat and mouse games were a crude attempt at D&D; ultimately those D&D measures only further convinced people of SH's guilt and were a factor in triggering the war.⁴⁷ Former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet wrote that he believed SH adopted the D&D tactics in order to obscure what SH felt was an internal strategic vulnerability in a very dangerous region of the world.⁴⁸

Post-invasion, the U.S. IC and Bush administration were eviscerated in the press for believing a German Federal Intelligence Service's (BND) HUMINT source named "Curveball" (CB) (real name Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi).⁴⁹ A former Iraqi chemical engineer, he was a political refugee living in Germany. A few days before he was to brief President Bush on WMD in Iraq, DCI Tenet asked permission from the head of BND for CIA strategic debriefers to question CB. Pre-war, the BND denied Tenet direct access to CB for the debriefing, but the BND did agree to present any and all questions to CB that the U.S. wanted to ask. In a memorandum to Tenet, the head of BND wrote that Janabi's previous confessions were believable and plausible, but unconfirmed and unproven.⁵⁰

After the invasion, the U.S. was allowed to pose questions to CB through a German interrogator. Previously, at lower levels of management within CIA, CB had been assessed as unreliable and a likely fabricator.⁵¹ Pre-invasion, the United Kingdom's MI6 also highly suspected CB of being a fabricator.⁵² Unquestionably, there were indicators of CB's deceptive nature. He had named a Dr. Basil as the head of one of Iraq's WMD programs. Unbeknownst to CB, Basil was already living outside Iraq. It begs the question, if Basil was the head of a top secret WMD program that SH did not want the world to know about, why would SH let Basil emigrate with all those secrets? Strangely, though, CB was assessed as credible within the highest levels of the CIA.⁵³

In the rush to believe CB, CIA officials used him as a credible source for Colin Powell's UN speech.⁵⁴ Little did the U.S. know, but some members of BND middle management also believed CB to be a liar and found his behavior highly suspect, some even labeling him "psychologically unstable."⁵⁵ During a pre-invasion visit to one of the suspected Iraqi WMD sites identified by CB, UN inspectors discovered irrefutable evidence that it was not such a site. CB had lied; it would be found later that he lied about a lot of things.

The biggest problem encountered by the IC was its inability to recruit new HUMINT sources from inside Iraq.

A Congressional bipartisan committee found that the Bush administration relied on "outdated, circumstantial, and fragmentary intelligence to justify the invasion of Iraq."⁵⁶ The committee also found that the CIA had to rely upon "past assessments" as a primary form of intelligence.⁵⁷ However, the U.S. was not the only country grasping at scraps of outdated information. In truth, the U.S., along with numerous other intelligence agencies around the world, believed Iraq possessed WMD; this was not just a case of the U.S. IC being wrong.⁵⁸

One of the problems for the U.S. and its allies was that the last accurate reporting on Iraq's WMD status was from 1998, with the majority of 1998 reporting taken from inconclusive onsite UN inspections and older written reports from 1991.⁵⁹ The biggest problem encountered by the IC was its inability to recruit new HUMINT sources from inside Iraq. Nevertheless, as the D-Day countdown began, the IC's luck changed. A very high-level source in the Iraqi government volunteered his services to French intelligence.

Shortly before the U.S. coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, a source close to SH, Iraq's Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, contacted French Intelligence. During his meeting with the French, Sabri reported that Iraq did not have WMD but was retaining its ability and knowhow. When the time was right, SH had every intention of rejuvenating Iraq's WMD program. In all fairness to the IC, though, there was a very real possibility that Sabri was providing disinformation; it was an attempt at D&D by SH.⁶⁰ Similar to Israel's experience before the 1973 Yom Kippur War, there were a couple of sources now providing the U.S. with direct confirmation that Iraq did not possess or was not producing WMD anymore. Yet, U.S. experts found every reason not to believe the sources.

The second (dated and now dead) HUMINT source was SH's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, who had direct command and oversight of SH's WMD program. In 1995 Kamel defected to Jordan and gave the same information as Sabri. Kamel reported some biological programs were still being carried out in a research manner only, but WMD was not being mass-produced.⁶¹ Kamel went back to Iraq and was murdered by SH's minions. Why was he murdered? To the rational Western mind, it was obvious SH was hiding something larger; after all, he killed his very own son-in-law! Was SH mad because Kamel revealed Iraq to be a toothless tiger? Did SH feel that Kamel's leaks about the research could uncover a larger WMD program, thus proverbially peeling back the layers of an onion? To a rational Western mind, his murder was similar to Mafioso behavior; Kamel was killed for being a rat. In fact, his murder was tribal-related. What appeared to be revenge for ratting on Iraq's ongoing WMD production was simply retribution for Kamel shaming his tribe. Two sources, eight years apart, coupled with unaccounted tribal customs—it could leave the best intelligence analyst in the world wondering forever.

This was not the first time a source close to a Mideast leader had passed accurate information to an opposing power. For years, Ashraf Marwan passed Egypt's secrets to Israel. Marwan warned Israel that the Yom Kippur War was about to start, but the Israeli government ignored the warnings. This was in spite of the fact Marwan had passed the Israelis a treasure trove of accurate information.⁶² Because of these false warnings, the Israelis believed Marwan was more than likely procuring accurate information. Analysts sometimes forget that, even though a source may provide a specific date or time of an event, just because it does not happen as reported does not mean it will never happen. Often factors outside the control of the source, such as bad weather or lack of equipment, can cause delays. Sadly enough, it appears that the truth was staring the U.S. in the face.

Imagine the dilemma for analysts: you have two sources (one now dead) who were very close to SH saying he does not have WMD. Then you have an Iraqi scientist, CB, saying he does have WMD. Whom do you believe? By process of elimination you have to whittle down these stories and find inconsistencies, then come up with a winner. An analyst could have gone down thousands of rabbit holes with the information that these HUMINT sources provided.

Lastly, there were a few problems that occurred with the intelligence processes used to assess whether Iraq possessed WMD. High-level policymakers injected themselves into the process. It is reported that during the buildup to war Vice President (VP) Cheney received about a dozen WMD briefings on Iraq. Reportedly, he asked his briefers direct and probing questions.⁶³ This would make any briefer nervous. It could lead the most competent and

consummate professionals to question their own work, or wonder if the VP really believed what was being briefed. What these briefers did not realize was that Cheney was asking the analysts to dig very deeply into the data; he wanted them to review everything and ensure that their efforts were exactly thorough.

As a former SECDEF, Cheney understood how intelligence was produced. He knew that the IC sometimes had to rely on highly researched and educated guesses that led toward conclusions, rather than intelligence always being an exact science.

In Cheney's mind, there could have been some piece of intelligence that was overlooked.⁶⁴ Apparently, certain organizations within the IC got the opposite impression and backed off, or in some cases adjusted their assessments. This could have been for myriad reasons, to include avoiding unpleasantness and confrontations with the VP.⁶⁵ Unfortunately, these changes would only confirm certain senior policymakers' deep-seated suspicions of SH.

Richard Cheney is a highly intelligent and gifted executive. As a former White House Chief of Staff, Congressman, and SECDEF (he oversaw Operations JUST CAUSE in Panama and DESERT STORM), probably no one came to the vice presidency better prepared for the job. As a former SECDEF, Cheney understood how intelligence was produced. He knew that the IC sometimes had to rely on highly researched and educated guesses that led toward conclusions, rather than intelligence always being an exact science.⁶⁶

VP Cheney may have seen the raw reporting, which he was entitled to view, and in his mind he saw trends or patterns. When WMD intelligence analysts came up with less than certain, or muddled, statements about SH's possession of WMD, in the VP's mind it may have made him uncomfortable. All reporting showed SH possessed WMD, but in some cases Iraqi analysts (as displayed in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi WMD) were telling Cheney with less than 100% absolute certainty that Iraq possessed WMD. It could be argued that his abundant knowledge may have done a disservice to him.

The VP was a voracious reader of everything; to him it may have appeared the IC did not recognize SH's pattern of behavior.⁶⁷ After all, previous reporting from 1991 onward highly suspected Iraq of possessing WMD; there was little intelligence reporting otherwise. It was noted that during WMD-related briefings to the VP some of the briefers had to call others to verify details. In some cases, it took analysts

two weeks to come up with an answer to some of Cheney's questions.⁶⁸ This probably did not leave the VP with the warmest and fuzziest of feelings.

VP Cheney's public and professional demeanor is noted as unemotional, cut and dried, no nonsense, get to the point. Reportedly, he can be a very intimidating person to brief.⁶⁹ In his book *In My Time*, Cheney makes no apologies for the way he questioned briefers; if anything, he felt an intense sense of duty to get the intelligence assessments correct, knowing that the result could mean war.⁷⁰ If there is any lesson to be learned from this, it is that the IC should have stuck to its findings unless it received information that changed an original assessment.⁷¹ These differing degrees of certainty in the WMD assessments understandably concerned the administration.

In what was somewhat of an irregular move, an office was created within the Department of Defense (DoD) that would provide critical assessments of Iraqi intelligence products. Given new offices are created within administrations all the time, this was nothing new, but it was the nature of the office's mission that made it seem somewhat irregular. There was tremendous pressure to relook every bit of intelligence the U.S. had on Iraq. Once Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans (OSP) was created, its job was to find WMD information on Iraq, although it claimed to use solid intelligence provided by the IC. Solid, time-tested IC processes that had been put in place over the course of decades were short-circuited. Unvetted and unprocessed information may have been passed to senior policymakers. A DoD Inspector General's Report on OSP stated that OSP developed conclusions "...that were inconsistent with the consensus of the intelligence community..."⁷² The IG report also stated that OSP did not provide "...the most accurate analysis of intelligence..."⁷³ Feith has argued that OSP was created in order to provide critical analysis of intelligence that was flowing in from the IC. While there have been some positive characterizations of OSP, most of what has been reported on OSP's functions was not favorable.⁷⁴ Injecting OSP into the mix appears to have short-circuited time-tested systemic IC processes and muddled the assessment waters.

IRAQ: TERRORISM AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush (GWB) asked his staff to assess if SH was linked to, or responsible for, the attacks. Given SH's history of support to terrorists, it was not an invalid question.⁷⁵ In 1993, in retaliation for Iraq's defeat in DESERT STORM, SH tried to kill George H.W. Bush while the former U.S. President was visiting Kuwait.⁷⁶ SH had a history of attacking Israel with rhetoric and violent acts. It was found

that Saddam had paid money (similar to a life insurance policy) to the families of PLO suicide bombers who had attacked innocent Israelis.⁷⁷ In addition, SH also had an ongoing relationship with Yassir Arafat.⁷⁸ While SH was not an avid sponsor of attacks against the U.S. (Iran and Al Qaeda were), he selectively involved himself in terrorist actions against the U.S. as evidenced in the attempt on George H.W. Bush's life, and his support of PLO terrorists such as Abu Nidal.⁷⁹ SH also harbored the PLO terrorists responsible for the death of wheelchair-bound American Leon Klinghoffer.⁸⁰ Many Americans seem to forget that the PLO and its affiliated offshoot terrorist groups have been responsible for a number of American deaths (e.g., U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noels, Jr.) during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.⁸¹ While there may have not been any links to Al Qaeda, there were links to the PLO, and SH unquestionably supported the PLO.

Since the end of DESERT STORM, a no-fly zone had been put in place over Iraq. U.S. aircraft had been fired at on approximately 700 occasions. There were also reports that terrorist leader Musab Al Zarqawi was inside Iraq at this time. Pre-invasion, the U.S. made requests through a number of different Arab intelligence services to have Iraq arrest Zarqawi and hand him over, but SH refused.⁸² Zarqawi would go on to lead a vicious insurgency against the coalition that would result in thousands dead.

GOING TO WAR NO MATTER WHAT: GET ON BOARD AND POLITICIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE

There does not appear to be any conspiracy by the Bush administration that war with Iraq was a foregone conclusion. There is no question that the administration was preparing for war; however, it appears that because the administration had become so intimately involved in pushing and cajoling the IC, in the end the IC caved in to what it *felt* was *probably* the real truth. If the IC had collectively and emphatically stated that there was no WMD in Iraq, or there was no conclusive evidence of WMD in Iraq, would the administration have gone to war? That is a very valid, but unanswered, question.

Given the nature of SH's behavior over the course of time, senior administration officials were absolutely convinced (in spite of the dated intelligence) that he was lying and the IC just could not discover any definitive evidence that Iraq possessed WMD. In fact, SH's behavior was highly suspicious and, to a rational mind, it appeared he was hiding something.⁸³ From all available source documentation, it appears that GWB's administration was not comfortable with some of the IC's WMD assessments and pushed for the Community to keep looking. IC briefers should have been prepared to respond to rigorous and pointed questioning,

and been able to defend their assessments. When making a decision to go to war, any policymaker would be understandably uncomfortable with a briefer who appears nervous, shaky, or cannot answer questions when asked. Ultimately, IC analysts came away with the opinion that Iraq did in fact possess WMD. Consequently, the IC has to share some of the blame.

There is no evidence WMD intelligence was politicized. James Steinberg wrote an article in which he interviewed a number of analysts who worked the WMD issue; none of them said they felt pressure (political or otherwise) to change their assessments.⁸⁴ Unquestionably, actions, behavior, and demeanor of high-level administration officials inadvertently gave senior managers an impression that at the highest levels of government senior policymakers were highly skeptical of their intelligence assessments. The truth was that these policymakers were imploring the IC to be thorough and more than likely were made uncomfortable by the differing levels of certainty.

From a review of source documentation, it does not appear that GWB's administration believed it knew better than the IC professionals; some administrations actually do believe they know better. During the Vietnam War, Lyndon Johnson believed he knew better than his civilian/military advisors and he frequently overruled them despite excellent advice.⁸⁵ History has shown that inconvenient intelligence assessments sometimes do not coincide with the political agendas of world leaders. In this case, though, it appears that the GWB administration was inadvertently giving the IC the wrong impression. The constant pushback was viewed by some in the IC as, "We are not going to accept this until you give us what we want." In contrast, "Keep looking; leave no stone unturned at all!" Was the constant pushback a strategy by the administration to get what it wanted? There is no evidence of this, but an argument could be made for this point of view.

In all fairness to the analysts, even though the argument has been used that the information was old and dated, it would have taken a monumental effort by very high-powered people to have overturned what a growing body of intelligence reporting had shown over the course of 11 years. Almost all the reporting the analysts were dealing with stated that Iraq possessed WMD, or was highly suspect of possessing WMD. That type of reporting cannot but weigh heavy on the mind of an analyst. During the research for this article, something else was noted.

Similar to a marriage in which a couple lacks the ability to communicate, it seems all parties were talking past each other; the ability to connect and understand was not there. Yet, some administration members may say, "No one was talking past each other; the IC said there was WMD in Iraq."

Their point would be well-taken. While this all sounds like excuses for everyone involved, what happened with WMD in Iraq is similar to what investigative boards find when reviewing airplane crashes. Most often a perfect storm of *factors leading up to the accident combine* to cause the aircraft to crash. In other words, there were a series of mistakes being made, well before the aircraft began to plummet from the sky. This is the case with WMD in Iraq—a perfect storm of factors. Bottom line, it appears the administration wrongly went with a gut feeling (more than an arrogant dismissal of an advisor or because it knew better), reinforced by information provided by the IC. Ultimately, all parties share the blame.

SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

We should all strive to get better and learn from our mistakes. Analysts should always be trying to get better at their craft by developing processes and systems that ensure rational accuracy; these systems should produce auditable data trails that assist with lessons learned. Analysts should strive to become subject matter experts (SME) in the areas in which they work. Becoming the SME must be balanced with the mindset that, just because you are a SME, you must keep an open mind to contrary warning indicators. Just because a leader (or a country) has always done it a certain way does not mean he/she will continue to do so. During assessments, uncharacteristic behaviors and off-the-wall conclusions should not be dismissed out of hand. Iraqi WMD, the Bay of Pigs, and the Cuban Missile Crisis prove this point.

When time allows, run your thought processes by other people. Seek others' opinions. This is not necessarily done so others may change your mind; it should be done in order to see if your thought processes are solid. In essence, "Is the way I am thinking about this rational; does it make sense, or is there some other perspective I have not considered?" In one of my previous IC assignments, HUMINT Targeting Officers (HTO) had their final targeting packages reviewed only by a board. There was no systematic process for an in-progress review of targeting packages. During my tenure in this assignment, I very rarely, if ever, heard an HTO ask a peer or supervisor to review his thought processes. Everything was geared toward law of averages; upper-level management had posited that more targeting packages increased chances of recruiting a source. It was quantity over quality. Incidentally, I was told the project had never recruited a single HUMINT source.

Analysts must recognize the strategic, operational, and tactical ramifications of their findings. There is no question that, if analysts had assessed WMD was in Iraq (short of SH voluntarily leaving power), the U.S. would have gone to war.

Therefore, analysts must have a higher understanding of the implications of their findings. While this should not influence their thinking, analysts must understand where their final assessment may lead. Be true to yourself, if your final assessment is contrary to what your bosses believe. If you have meticulously done your homework, do not change your assessment. If new facts are introduced that now change your estimates, you may have to change your final assessment.

Within a bureaucracy like the IC, speaking truth to power can lead down one of two paths—that of pariah or that of hero. If you have faith in your work, stick to your final assessment. You can get your point across without becoming angry or emotional. An old phrase comes to mind, "They are going to do what they want to do." This should be taken in the context that higher levels of management (for whatever reason) may ignore or disagree with your assessment no matter what. Articulate and clearly argue your case, but once management makes its decision you essentially have only three choices: (1) If you feel so strongly that leadership's decision is morally unacceptable, resign. (2) Accept the decision and move on with self-satisfaction that you did your best while absorbing the lessons learned. (3) Use the chain of command to talk with senior levels of management in order to explain your assessment. Make it clear to the powers that be that your request is for purely professional reasons, that you completely respect the decisions and opinions of your immediate bosses, but that you feel it is your duty to appeal to higher levels of leadership. In the end, if they refuse to listen, there is nothing you can do. As they say, "It is what it is." History has shown that you will not be the first person ever to have your analysis disregarded.

NOTES

¹ Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1996), 438-444. The Brookings Institution, "Interview with Kenneth M. Pollack," January 24, 2005, accessed July 29, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2005/0124iran_pollack.aspx.

² Greg Bruno, "Religion and Politics in Iran," *The Council on Foreign Relations* (June 19, 2008), accessed July 29, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/religion-politics-iran/p16599>.

³ Dr. Kailash PyaKuryal, "Weberian Model of Social Stratification – A Viewpoint," *Occasional Papers in Sociology*, Vol. VII (May 2001):14-20.

⁴ Marisa Linton, "Robespierre and the Terror," *History Today*, Volume 56, Issue 8 (August 2006): accessed July 29, 2016, <http://www.historytoday.com/marisa-linton/robespierre-and-terror>. Paul R. Bartrop, *Encountering Genocide: Personal Accounts from Victims, Perpetrators, and Witnesses* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2104), 125.

⁵ Leo J. Daugherty III, *The Marine Corps and the State Department: Enduring Partners in United States Foreign Policy, 1798-2007* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2007), 229.

⁶ Mao Zedong, Stuart Reynolds Schram, and Nancy Jane Hodes, *Mao's Road to Power, Revolutionary Writings: 1912-1949* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 266. Mao believed in organization of the (1) Mass Line: Organization of an alternate society; (2) United Front: Making common cause with other parties and organizations that share the same or similar goals; (3) Violence: Application of violence where and when needed. One striking fact stands out about the Iranian Revolution. It began as a massive revolt/protest, similar to what occurred during the Arab Spring. In the case of Iran, there was very little process or organization of the counter-state that Mao writes about. What is truly similar (when one compares the Chinese and Iranian Revolutions) is the mobilization of the masses, but Mao's idea of mobilization is different. Mao believed the masses should be organized under a structured counter-state.

⁷ Robert L. Ivie, *Dissent from War* (Bloomfield, NJ: Kumarian Press, 2007), 193. Over the last 30 years, Iran has carried out numerous terrorist actions against the U.S. Iran's expertise in covert action is unique. It can be argued that, besides Israel, no other state actor conducts special operations better than Iran. Dr. Majid Rafizadeh, "Iran's Covert Military Buildup and Operations," *Al Arabiya English*, September 5, 2014, accessed July 29, 2016, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/09/05/Iran-s-covert-military-buildup-and-operations.html>.

⁸ Cary Fraser, "The Middle East and the Persian Gulf as the Gateway to Imperial Crisis: The Bush Administration in Iraq," in *America and Iraq: Policy-making, Intervention and Regional Politics*, eds. David Ryan and Patrick Kiely (New York: Routledge, Taylor, and Francis, 2009), 204.

⁹ United States Air War College, "Dr. Jerrold M. Post Testimony Before Senate Armed Services Committee: Explaining Saddam Hussein: A Psychological Profile," December 1990, accessed August 1, 2016, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/iraq/saddam_post.htm. In 1990, CIA psychologist Jerrold Post testified to the U.S. Congress about SH. During his testimony he stated, "While he is psychologically in touch with reality, he is often politically out of touch with reality. Saddam's world view is narrow and distorted, and he has scant experience out of the Arab world. His only sustained experience with non-Arabs was with his Soviet military advisors and he reportedly had one brief trip to France in 1976." Post's 1990 assessment would be proven once the U.S. was able to obtain documents from the Iraqi archives. These documents show SH to be strategically out of touch. The meeting minutes display a man who would ruminate out loud, but very rarely got things correct.

¹⁰ Richard Hottelet, "Saddam: A Compulsive Gambler, and a Loser," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 26, 1996, accessed August 24, 2005, <http://www.csmonitor.com/1996/0626/062696.opin.opin.1.html>. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services" (declassified August 2004), accessed August 1, 2016, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB167/05.pdf>. Similar to one of his greatest heroes, Josef Stalin, SH made sure his internal security services were personally and politically loyal to him and the Baath Party. This loyalty assured his grip on power. After coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003, SH archives rendered a treasure trove of documents. SH's "meeting minutes" note reveal a leader who was tremendously influenced by Stalin. In very Stalinist (Soviet-style) fashion, he and his minions often referred to each other as "comrade."

¹¹ Mark Sessler, "Broncos Trade in Paperbound Playbooks for iPads," NFL.com, April 23, 2012, accessed August 1, 2016, <http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d82887463/article/broncos-trade-in-paperbound-playbooks-for-ipads>.

¹² Ofira Seliktar, *The Politics of Intelligence and American Wars with Iraq* (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 32. In 1981 Prime Minister Menachem Begin's cabinet believed SH "was too unpredictable and thus undeterrable." A psychologist from Israel's Haifa University described SH as a "high risk taker prone to miscalculations."

¹³ Jason Leopold, "The CIA Just Declassified the Document that Supposedly Justified the Iraq Invasion," *Vice News*, March 19, 2015, accessed August 1, 2016, <https://news.vice.com/article/the-cia-just-declassified-the-document-that-supposedly-justified-the-iraq-invasion>. Portions of the IC's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi WMD does not provide conclusive evidence of WMD. A Rand assessment of the NIE stated that the intelligence analysts who had worked on it deemed it implausible that SH would have dismantled his WMD program given his long history of deceptive actions. Rand posits that WMD analysts assessed that SH's past behavior would be indicative of his current behavior.

¹⁴ Thomas Joscelyn, "AQ Khan on Iran's and North Korea's Nukes," *The Weekly Standard*, September 11, 2009, accessed October 13, 2008, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/aq-khan-on-irans-and-north-koreas-nukes/article/242142>.

¹⁵ Adriana Scott, "Do Reports of WMD Found in Iraq Vindicate George W. Bush? WMD Were Found in Iraq but Does It Matter?" *U.S. World and News Report*, October 16, 2014, accessed August 1, 2016, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/10/16/new-york-times-reports-wmd-found-in-iraq>. WMD did exist in Iraq. Coalition troops stumbled across WMDs; 5,000 discarded WMD "warheads, shells, or aviation bombs" were found. However, it can be factually stated that at the time of the invasion there was no ongoing production of WMD.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Dick Cheney, *In My Time* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011), 412, 413. Cable News Network (CNN), "David Kay Testifies Before Senate Committee," January 24, 2004, accessed August 1, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0401/28/se.02.html>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Glen Segell, *Disarming Iraq* (London: Glen Segell, 2004), 555.

²⁰ "Faulty Intel Source 'Curveball' Revealed," 60 Minutes, November 1, 2007, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/faulty-intel-source-curve-ball-revealed/3/>. Upon receiving a letter requesting permission to interview CB from DCI George Tenet, the head of BND responded by memo and stated that information provided by CB was plausible but unverified. Tenet has stated that he never saw this memo from BND.

²¹ Arms Control Association, "Disarming Saddam – A Chronology of Iraq and UN Weapons Inspections from 2002-2003," accessed August 4, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iraqchron>.

²² Dr. John Prados, "Push for Iraq War Preceded Intelligence Findings," *National Security Archives*, August 22, 2008, accessed August 11, 2016, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB254/>.

²³ National Security Archives, "Department of Defense Inspector General Report: Report on the Review of the Pre-War Activities

of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,” February 9, 2007, accessed August 11, 2016, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB456/docs/specialPlans_46.pdf.

²⁴ I say relative, because at this time the U.S. was still engaged in low-level combat operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Jason Leopold, “The CIA Just Declassified the Document that Supposedly Justified the Iraq Invasion,” *News Vice*, March 19, 2015, accessed August 11, 2016, <https://news.vice.com/article/the-cia-just-declassified-the-document-that-supposedly-justified-the-iraq-invasion>. Contained within the pre-invasion Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) NIE, written specifically for Iraq’s WMD program, there appears to be second-hand source information (hearsay) upon which the Bush administration relied. While hearsay is not admissible in a court of law, it would not have been the first time intelligence was obtained through hearsay.

²⁵ Pew Research Center, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” October 7, 2009, accessed August 1, 2016, <http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/>. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement,” declassified August 2004, accessed August 1, 2016, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB167/01.pdf>. Wilson Center Digital Archive, “Saddam Hussein and his Advisor Discussing Iraq’s Decision to go to War with Iran.” September 16, 1980. Accessed August 1, 2016. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110099>. During this September 16, 1980 meeting, SH’s comments on the Ayatollah Khomeini are striking; the first 30 minutes are consumed with him simply talking at his cabinet versus getting briefed by them. (Comically, in the middle of the meeting, someone tells SH that he made sandwiches. Ever the gentleman dictator, in the same sentence he thanks the sandwich maker, tells him “good job,” but makes it clear he does not “eat that.”) One gets the distinct impression SH discussions very rarely dealt in fact. During this meeting, SH stated that no one inside Iran was listening to what Khomeini said, because Khomeini’s rhetoric did not match ongoing actions. If SH ever doubted Khomeini’s hold over the Iranian people, those doubts would be dispelled through Iran’s human wave attacks that resulted in the slaughter of thousands. SH’s advisors did not give him bad advice; he often completely misunderstood what his advisors were telling him, or he talked right over them and told them what they should be thinking, or what his reality was. It would be safe to say that SH’s intellectual acumen in foreign affairs was challenged. The statement by Jerrold Post about Hussein being politically disconnected (in an international sense) is evident in these meeting minutes. While Saddam appeared to be open to advice from his cabinet, in fact he very rarely accepted that advice.

²⁶ Ian Black, “Iran and Iraq Remember War that Cost More than a Million Lives,” *The Guardian*, September 23, 2010, accessed August 3, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary>. Annie Tracy Samuel, “Attacking Iran: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War,” December 2011, accessed August 1, 2016, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21698/attacking_iran.html.

²⁷ Helen Chapin Metz, “A Country Study,” ed. Leon M. Jeffries, *Iraq: Issues, Historical Background, Bibliography* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 175.

²⁸ British Broadcasting Company (BBC), “1988: Thousands Die in Halabja Gas Attack,” *On this Day*, accessed August 10, 2016,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthistday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm.

²⁹ Javed Ali, “Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance,” *The Nonproliferation Review* (Spring 2001): 47, 48.

³⁰ Matthew Leavitt, “30 years of Terror Sponsored by Iran,” *New York Daily News*, October 23, 2013, accessed August 3, 2016, <http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/30-years-terror-sponsored-iran-article-1.1493410>.

³¹ Eben Kaplan, “How Libya Got Off the List,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 16, 2007, accessed August 3, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-got-off-list/p10855>. Donald Steury, ed. *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces 1950-1983*, (Washington, DC: CIA Publications, 1996).

³² The National Security Archive, “Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984,” February 25, 2003, accessed August 4, 2016, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/>.

³³ Seymour M. Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War Against Iran,” *The New York Times*, January 26, 1992, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/26/world/us-secretly-gave-aid-toduringiraq-early-in-its-war-against-iran.html>.

³⁴ Shane Harris and Matthew M. Aid, “CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran,” *Foreign Policy Magazine*, August 26, 2013, accessed August 3, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/>. This article is supported by NSSD 114, signed by President Ronald Reagan on November 26, 1983. NSSD 114 made it clear that it was in the U.S.’s national interest to help SH. The U.S. did in fact publicly condemn Iraq’s use of WMD but never cut off assistance to Iraq.

³⁵ Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq...”

³⁶ Afshin Molavi, “Iran and the Gulf States,” *The United States Institute of Peace: The Iran Primer*, <http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-gulf-states>.

³⁷ David Kline, “Mechanisms of Western Domination: A Short History of Iraq and Kuwait, January 2003,” September 16, 2016, accessed September 16, 2016. <http://www.csun.edu/~vcmt00m/iraqkuwait.html>. There was some basis to SH’s claim of Kuwait being a former province, but Kuwait had ceased to be an Iraqi province in 1913.

³⁸ Public Broadcasting System (PBS) Frontline World, “The Crimes of Saddam Hussein, 1990: The Invasion of Kuwait,” January 24, 2006, accessed August 4, 2016, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_kuwait.html.

³⁹ PBS Frontline, “Oral History: Tariq Aziz,” accessed August 4, 2016, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html>.

⁴⁰ CIA, “Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence,” April 9, 1997, accessed August 4, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/gulfwar/whiteper/index.htm>.

⁴¹ Wilson Center Digital Archive, “Cabinet Meeting with Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission,” 1994, accessed August 4, 2016, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117005>. As late as 1994, SH was trying to resurrect his nuclear program; in this document he talks about staffing, seniority, and pay of personnel who will be assigned to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.

⁴² BBC, "Desert Fox December 16-19 1998," accessed August 4, 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/iraq_events/html/desert_fox.stm.

⁴³ Richard Sanders, "What Did Happen to Saddam's WMD?" *History Today*, July 12, 2016, accessed August 4, 2016, <http://www.historytoday.com/richard-sanders/what-did-happen-saddam%E2%80%99s-wmd>. It appears that by 1991 Iraq had unilaterally destroyed its WMD. It foolishly destroyed all documentation of its WMD; in addition, it did not document the destruction of the WMD. Post-invasion during interrogations, SH's minions claimed they did not want inspectors to come back and accuse the Iraqis of having lied to them. If Saddam had kept a record of this, things may have turned out very differently.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ United Nations Security Council, "United Nations Weapons Inspectors Report to Security Council on Progress in Disarmament of Iraq," March 7, 2003, accessed August 15, 2016, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7682.doc.htm>.

⁴⁶ CNN, "David Kay Testifies Before Senate Committee," January 24, 2004, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0401/28/se.02.html>.

⁴⁷ Arms Control Association, "Disarming Saddam – A Chronology of Iraq and UN Weapons Inspections from 2002-2003," July 2003, accessed August 4, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iraqchron>.

⁴⁸ George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 70.

⁴⁹ Elizabeth Flock, "Curveball: The Man who Lied About WMDs, Comes Clean," *The Washington Post*, April 3, 2012, accessed August 10, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/curveball-man-who-lied-about-wmds-comes-clean/2012/04/03/gIQAUdditS_blog.html.

⁵⁰ "Faulty Intel Source 'Curveball' Revealed," 60 Minutes, November 1, 2007, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/faulty-intel-source-curve-ball-revealed/3/>.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Mail Online, "Curveball – Part Two," October 9, 2007, August 15, 2016, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-486590/Curveball—Part-two.html>. "In April 2002, however, British intelligence officials warned the CIA that they had begun 'to have doubts about Curveball's reliability,' according to a cable. MI6 was 'not convinced that Curveball is a wholly reliable source' and 'elements of [his] behavior strike us as typical of individuals we would normally assess as fabricators'."

⁵³ Ibid. Some CIA analysts expressed to their supervisors that they did not trust the information from CB and he was a bridge too far for them to make a linkage on WMD in Iraq.

⁵⁴ Bob Drogin and John Goetz, "How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of 'Curveball'," *The Los Angeles Times*, November 20, 2005, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/>. BND members were aghast when Colin Powell used information that had been gleaned from CB. What the BND knew, and Powell did not know, was the information that Powell was using was completely unverified.

⁵⁵ Bob Drogin and John Goetz, <http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/>. The German authorities, speaking about the case for the first time, also said that CB suffered from emotional and mental problems. "He is not a stable, psychologically stable guy," said a BND official who supervised the case. "He is not a completely normal person," agreed another BND analyst.

⁵⁶ Segell, *Disarming Iraq*, 555.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 555. Loch K. Johnson, *Strategic Intelligence* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 89.

⁵⁸ George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 229.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Peter Taylor, "Iraq War: The Greatest Intelligence Failure in Living Memory," *The Telegraph*, March 18, 2013, accessed August 11, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9937516/Iraq-war-the-greatest-intelligence-failure-in-living-memory.html>.

⁶¹ CNN, "Transcript of Part One of Correspondent Brent Sadler's Exclusive Interview with Hussein Kamel," September 21, 1995, accessed August 16, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9509/iraq_defector/kamel_transcript/index.html.

⁶² Uri Bar Joseph, *The Angel* (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 2016), 152-218.

⁶³ Mark Hosenball, "Cheney's Long Path to War," *Newsweek*, November 16, 2003, accessed August 24, 2016, <http://www.newsweek.com/cheneys-long-path-war-133837>.

⁶⁴ Dr. John Prados, "Push for Iraq War Proceeded Intelligence Findings," *National Security Archives*, August 22, 2008, August 11, 2016, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB254/>. Prados writes, "There were several avenues by which the Bush administration made its preferences clear. Vice President Richard Cheney questioned his CIA briefers aggressively, pressing them to the wall when he saw intelligence from other agencies that portrayed a more somber picture than that in CIA's reporting. He sent briefers back for more information, including in instances when they checked with headquarters and returned with the same word. Cheney was especially acerbic about CIA's rejection of claims that one of the 9/11 terrorists had met with Iraqi intelligence officers in Prague. On a number of occasions, Cheney sent his chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby, to CIA Headquarters to follow up on his concerns. Mr. Cheney also went there himself, not just once but on almost a dozen occasions. The practice encouraged the CIA to censor itself, driven, as Paul Pillar put it, by 'the desire to avoid the unpleasantness of putting unwelcome assessments on the desks of policymakers.'"

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ John McLaughlin, "Serving the National Policy Maker," *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*, 2nd ed., eds. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 81-92.

⁶⁷ Nancy Gibbs, "Double-Edged Sword," CNN, December 23, 2002, accessed August 26, 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/12/23/timep.partners.tm/index.html>.

⁶⁸ Cheney, 414.

⁶⁹ Lou Dubose and Jake Bernstein, *Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency* (New York: Random House, 2006). While this book is politically slanted against VP Cheney, in some parts of the book it portrays people's impressions of VP Cheney's demeanor.

⁷⁰ Cheney, *In My Time*, 413, 414.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Inspector General's Report, Department of Defense, "Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy," Department of Defense, February 7, 2009, accessed August 11, 2016, http://www.npr.org/documents/2007/feb/dod_iog_iraq_summary.pdf.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ United States Senate, "Disaggregating the Pentagon Offices: The Department of Defense-The Office of Special Plans and Iraq Pre-War Intelligence," Republican Policy Committee, February 7, 2006, accessed August 11, 2016, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB456/docs/specialPlans_45b.pdf. In addition, a DoD Inspector General report (dated February 9, 2007) on OSP deemed its activities legal, but inappropriate given that its assessments often contravened what the IC was reporting. It also stated that OSP's assessments did not provide the greatest accuracy.

⁷⁵ Richard Clarke, "The Darkside," *PBS Frontline World*, January 23, 2006, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/interviews/clarke.html>.

⁷⁶ David Von Drehle and R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush," *The Washington Post*, June 27, 1992, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/timeline/062793.htm>.

⁷⁷ John Yang, "Saddam Rewards Suicide Bombers' Families," ABC News, January 2, 2003, accessed August 18, 2016, <http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129914&page=1>. Lawrence Joffe, "Shlomo Argov," *The Guardian*, February 24, 2003, accessed August 10, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/25/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon>. Nidal's groups had direct links to SH.

⁷⁸ "Saddam Gave Orders to Fire Chemical Weapons at Tel Aviv if He Was Toppled in the First Gulf War," *The Times of Israel*, January 15, 2014, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/saddam-gave-orders-to-fire-chemical-weapons-at-tel-aviv-if-he-was-toppled-in-first-gulf-war/>. On these tapes, SH is heard telling Yassir Arafat that he would not hesitate to use WMD against Israel. George N. Lewis, Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from SCUD Attacks in the Gulf War," *DACs Working Paper*, March 1993, accessed August 10, 2016, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/working_papers/wp93-2.pdf. During DESERT STORM, Iraq fired 39 conventional SCUDs at Israel, which resulted in two people killed and 230 injured.

⁷⁹ Jane Arraf, "Iraq Details Terror Leader's Death," CNN, August 21, 2002, accessed August 10, 2016, <https://web.archive.org/web/20050819133048/http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/08/21/iraq.nidal/>. SH's government disavowed any knowledge of him being in the country stating that Nidal entered the country on a fake Yemeni passport. It is hard to believe that, in a closed police state such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Nidal's presence was unknown to the government.

⁸⁰ Bush, 228.

⁸¹ "American Victims of Terrorist Attacks," The Jewish Virtual Library, Accessed August 18, 2016, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/usvictims.html>.

⁸² Bush, 236, 237.

⁸³ United Nations, "Briefing Security Council, U.S. Secretary of State Powell Presents Evidence of Iraq's Failure to Disarm," February 5, 2016, accessed August 18, 2016. This is evident from Colin Powell's speech to the United Nations. During his speech he stated that NSA had intercepted a call from an Iraqi general to one of his subordinates telling him to ensure that some Iraqi WMD warheads, which the Iraqis had found themselves, were destroyed.

⁸⁴ James B. Steinberg, "The Policymaker's Perspective: Transparency and Partnership," *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*, 2nd ed., eds. Roger Z. George

and James B. Bruce (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 100n2.

⁸⁵ Andrew, 316. President Johnson was not a great consumer of foreign intelligence. He was fascinated with domestic intelligence (political intrigue and rumor inside the U.S.), but far too often he chose to ignore CIA assessments on Vietnam. When CIA would stress the social aspects of the Vietnamese insurgency raging in South Vietnam, he expressed no interest in hearing about these nuances. It was said that he subscribed to a philosophy of "grab the enemy by the balls, and the hearts and minds will follow." Like his predecessor (President Kennedy), Johnson preferred covert operations. CIA Director McCone warned that inserting Chinese and South Vietnamese agents into North Vietnam would not work due to the conditions (a virtual police state) of North Vietnamese society. McCone was right; all of the agents were captured, turned, jailed, or killed. John Hughes-Wilson, *Military Intelligence Blunders and Coverups* (London: Constable and Robinson, 2004), 38-59. During Nazi Germany's buildup for the invasion of Russia, all warnings and indicators were pinging red that Russia was about to be invaded. For Stalin it was an inconvenient political truth; even though the Germans were massing on Russia's border for months, the Army and country were not ready for war. Stalin did not want to do anything to provoke Germany. His underlings were profoundly befuddled as to why he would not do anything to preempt the coming invasion. Pleadings to one of the most senior NKVD officers fell on deaf ears when he stated, "Comrade Stalin knows best." This clash of the political and the actual is where disasters often occur. This is what happened in Iraq. The Bush administration simply did not believe SH and chose to ignore contrary assessments that Iraq did not have WMD.

Raymond J. Faunt is a retired Infantry officer in the U.S. Army Reserves and earlier was an enlisted man in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves. He served 28 years (17 years on active duty) in command and staff assignments with light, mechanized, and special operations forces. His final assignment was at the Defense Intelligence Agency. He currently works for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Partner Engagement. A veteran of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, he has educated and trained military personnel from the Republic of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. He is also a former deputy sheriff and police officer who served seven years in the state of Georgia. He is a graduate of the Air War College through distance education and he has earned five master's degrees and three graduate certificates. Most notably he holds a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI, with a concentration in Foreign Denial and Deception) from the National Intelligence University, an MA in Strategic Studies (with a concentration in Counterterrorism) from the National Defense University, and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies (with a concentration in Insurgency and Terrorism) from the Naval War College. He is a school-trained Strategic Warning and Analysis Advocate and a Denial and Deception-trained intelligence analyst.



The Cold War Museum:

Telling the History of the Vint Hill and Cold War Intelligence to the Public

by Dr. Jason Y. Hall

SYNOPSIS

Vint Hill Farms Station, known as Listening Post #1 and the birthplace of the National Security Agency, was also one of the primary sources of Allied interception, decryption, and translation of coded Japanese signals during World War II, including the interception of the message that stimulated the creation of the famous wartime deception called the Ghost Army. It continued to play a key role in U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) during the Cold War, and also processed much of the U-2, A-12, SR-71, and satellite imagery intelligence (IMINT) product of that era, only closing as an intelligence base in 1996. The Cold War Museum, located in one of the former SIGINT processing barns at Vint Hill, tells the Vint Hill story and also the story of Cold War SIGINT, IMINT, Berlin activities, civil defense, the development of advanced atomic weapons, Area 51, U.S. military flying saucers, the East German secret police (STASI), the Liberty and Pueblo incidents, Soviet propaganda, the cultural and Olympic competitions between East and West, “The Man Who Saved the World (Vasili Arkhipov) during the Cuban Missile Crisis,” and much more. Telling the history about these topics to the general public creates challenges in terms of engaging and holding the attention of people who often have little personal experience or knowledge of that history. This article provides a brief background on Vint Hill itself, followed by a discussion and photos of some of the museum’s most significant exhibit topics and artifacts. It concludes with coverage of some of the key ways the Museum has found effective to date in helping increase public interest in the significance of Cold War history, particularly as it relates to SIGINT and IMINT, and in honoring the service of those who served professionally in Cold War activities.

VINT HILL FARMS STATION: A BRIEF HISTORY

In 1942 a farmer at Vint Hill, which lies between Gainesville and Warrenton, VA, in what is now rolling, horse farm country, invited one of his friends—an officer in the Army Signal Corps—to lunch at his farmhouse. The farmer was an amateur radio operator, and after lunch he showed his friend something interesting—that he could hear the taxi dispatchers in Berlin talking to their cabs on his ham radio set.

The Army...created Vint Hill Farms Station, a Top Secret SIGINT facility at what turned out to be one of the four best places in the world to listen to radio signals.

Shortly thereafter, in June 1942, the Army bought the farmer’s land and that of some adjacent small farms and very quickly created Vint Hill Farms Station, a Top Secret SIGINT facility at what turned out to be one of the four best places in the world to listen to radio signals. It became a large-scale antenna farm, taking advantage of very unusual geology that made the entire facility a giant underground antenna. Since Bletchley Park in Great Britain was already successfully decoding German signals, and the U.S. had some urgent need to do the same with Japanese coded messages, the base became a full-service facility to intercept, decode, and translate such messages.

After World War II (hereafter abbreviated as WWII), the base first was under the Army Security Agency (ASA), then the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and eventually the National Security Agency (NSA). Vint Hill, “Listening Post #1,” was the place where NSA originated. The base actively produced intelligence product, both SIGINT and imagery processing, throughout the Cold War, finally decommissioning as a government facility in 1997.

Many of the buildings at the heart of Vint Hill are historic, with some, called the Barns, dating to before the arrival of the Army. These were the farm’s barns where the Army retrofitted the interiors to serve SIGINT purposes but maintained the original exteriors. The Cold War Museum is in one of the Barns, while the Vint Hill Craft Winery now occupies the Barn that was the chief intercept facility and the Covert Café occupies a third. Adjacent brick buildings were also built by the Army, and one of them still houses a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Another, renovated inside, houses Old Bust Head Brewing Company, a craft brewer. All of these entities are next door to each other.

THE COLD WAR MUSEUM: USING ARTIFACTS TO CONVEY THE VINT HILL STORY AND KEY ELEMENTS OF COLD WAR HISTORY, WITH A FOCUS ON INTELLIGENCE

History and Purpose of the Museum

The Cold War Museum was founded as an entity in 1996 by Francis Gary Powers, Jr., son of the famous U-2 pilot shot down in 1960 over the Soviet Union, and John Welch. After the creation of a website (www.coldwar.org) and the accumulation of collections, the Museum signed a lease with the Vint Hill Development Authority in December 2009 and opened its doors in a renovated facility at Vint Hill in 2011. The Museum's collections are particularly strong on signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, aerial surveillance, civil defense, Berlin, the East German secret police (STASI), the Cuban Missile Crisis, and events such as the Pueblo and Liberty incidents.

The Museum is a 501(c)(3) charitable organization dedicated to education, preservation, and research on the global, ideological, and political confrontations between East and West from the end of WWII to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Its specific mission is twofold: (1) to assure that coming generations understand the significance of the Cold War, and (2) to honor the service of those who served professionally in Cold War activities. The Museum is open Saturdays 11-4 p.m., Sundays 1-4 p.m., and by appointment. Weekend admission and the orientation tour are free, but donations are welcomed; visits by appointment incur a small fee.


The Museum's vision is to be the premier source of information and education for the general public about the Cold War and its significance, using multiple channels such as its website, its Presentation Series, the physical Museum with its artifacts, and a distributed network of partner museums with related missions which would ultimately have a unified collection online. To realize this vision, the Museum intends in the future to move to a larger space, probably also within one of the historic buildings at Vint Hill, which will allow it to present Cold War history more systematically and in greater depth, to collect more artifacts in subject areas such as human intelligence and proxy wars to allow it present the full range of Cold War subjects, and to bring its Presentation Series into the Museum facility.

Presentations in that series, which began in the fall of 2016, focus on eyewitness accounts by experts of key Cold War and Cold War-related events. The sold-out first two were an eyewitness account by one of our Moscow embassy military attaches of the 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev and a

description of what it takes to fly the U-2 (which we still use for surveillance) by a former U-2 flight instructor and squadron commander. The third, on March 19, 2017, is by General (USAF, Ret) Michael Hayden and his wife (a former NSA staffer) on his time as Director of both NSA and CIA. On May 21, 2017, is "Eyewitness as the Wall Falls: A Fateful Week in Berlin." The presenter, Jim Gray, was an Army intelligence officer who was present that fateful week in 1991 and observed the events. The fifth is set for July 23, 2017. Buz Carpenter, a former SR-71 pilot, talks about flying that very difficult and exotic aircraft, the fastest and highest-flying air-breathing piloted aircraft ever built. All of these events have a similar format to the Eventbrite posting for the Hayden presentation. Those interested in being on the Museum's notification list for upcoming presentations should send a brief email to jason@coldwar.org expressing their interest.

A Selection of Some of the Museum's Artifacts Used to Tell the Cold War Story

- The Vint Hill Room. Museum tours typically start here, where we focus on the WWII history of Vint Hill and SIGINT. The photo below shows part of what is displayed in that room.



Topics covered during this part of the tour include:

- The discovery of the sensitivity of the site and the Army's creation of the SIGINT base.
- Explanation of how the site related to Bletchley Park and the process of intercept, decryption, and

translation at Vint Hill, using WWII photos of aspects of the base in operation.

- A description of the most famous event in Vint Hill's WWII history, the interception of the detailed report to Tokyo of Japanese Ambassador to Berlin Baron Oshima on the order of battle (troops and fortifications) along the entire northern coast of France, which was directly responsible for the creation of the famous Ghost Army, one of the great deceptions of WWII.
- The how and why Vint Hill was the first place in the U.S. Army to provide opportunities for women to do more than routine clerical and cleaning tasks, using the WWII photograph visible above.
- Explanation of a photograph of soldiers cutting records at Vint Hill while in the background are 40 towers of complex technology far more expensive and sophisticated than is necessary for this task. (This leads to an explanation of what was really going on, as in making the SIGSALY system run at Vint Hill, how that was related to solving the problem of wartime coding of voice transmissions using an analogue to one-time pads, etc. (See the website of the National Cryptologic Museum at Fort Meade, MD, for an explanation of SIGSALY.)
- Discussion of the purpose-built surveillance receivers visible in the illustration, from the beginning of the Cold War with the Collins 390A, the standard for air, sea, and land interceptions from the period 1955-1975, to the end of the Cold War, with our 1989 Watkins-Johnson (W-J) receiver (blue housing), tuned to intercept real-time Morse messages from contemporary amateur radio operators.
- Recounting the story from a former W-J employee of how 1972 W-J gear figured in the Watergate break-in, and how its misuse led to the perpetrators' capture. (We have recently confirmed this story via an independent source.)

Civil Defense

The tour typically continues in the larger adjacent main room on the first floor, where we show a small selection of our extensive civil defense collections. When the District of Columbia Civil Defense Headquarters at the former Lorton Prison closed, we were offered and took possession of its entire contents, including its office equipment and all of its records along with a plan of the entire office, such that we could reconstruct it if we had sufficient room in a larger building.



Here we typically cover:

- The famous "Duck and Cover" movie that played in virtually every U.S. public elementary school in the 1950s, teaching children how to assume the position in virtually any situation. We have the film running on a loop.
- Various pieces of civil defense equipment, including the Geiger counters, sirens, and dosimeters used in pocket protectors to test for radiation exposure. We usually tell another story here, which we obtained from an expert in this area when he visited the Museum, i.e., that these were so inaccurate that if you saw any reading at all, you were probably close to death, and how such readings at places like Fukushima, Japan, are taken with extremely sensitive electronic sensors.

Soviet Anti-Aircraft Missiles and the U-2

The Museum owns an entire SA-2 missile, the first Soviet missile with the capability to successfully attack a U-2. For floor space reasons in our current facility, we are able to display only the missile's booster. The missile itself, which is about 34 feet long, is in its protective canister in our storage facility next door and is rented periodically to larger

museums, including the American Museum of Energy and Science and COSI (Center of Science and Industry) for their exhibits. We own it because this was the type of missile that brought down U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, and his son was one of the Museum's founders. Below is how it looked on display at COSI in Columbus, OH; we have room to exhibit the booster, which you can see at the far left of the illustration.




The Movie “Bridge of Spies” and Glienicke Bridge Itself

We run “Bridge of Spies” on a loop, both because we know from Francis Gary Powers, Jr., who was a technical advisor to the film, that it is an accurate account of the events with the exception of a few minor details, and because the Disney Corporation underwrote a fundraiser for the Museum at the Angelika Theater (VA suburbs of Washington, DC). There we had a leading U-2 pilot speaking about Powers and the U-2 prior to the showing of the film (two days before it opened to the public), plus Gary Powers, Jr., and his sister, as well as the granddaughter of James Donovan, speaking afterward. In the audience, for recognition, was a former CIA officer who was actually on the Bridge for the exchange.



Berlin and Military Liaison Missions

The Museum has considerable holdings relating to East Germany and Berlin, including STASI artifacts. On the ground floor we display a large piece of the Wall, a variety of East German Border Patrol uniforms, and an actual Military Liaison Mission license plate and MLM sign in four languages. This allows us to tell the story of the Military Liaison Missions and that of the last casualty of the Cold War, Army Intelligence Major Arthur Nicholson.



Using these artifacts, we typically cover:



- What Military Liaison Missions were about—their ostensible purpose, and how both sides used this opportunity.
- MAJ Nicholson's amazing success at his real mission, which had true-life James Bond elements.
- The price he paid (summary execution) when he next crossed the border in March 1985.
- The larger significance of his death—representative of the many people who lost their lives performing their duty during the Cold War even when there was no “hot war” being fought.

Aerial Surveillance (both from aircraft and satellites) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

The Museum has considerable collections relating to IMINT, including some extremely rare artifacts, such as film from an SR-71 Blackbird (one of the few rolls of unclassified film, from a training mission over Washington, DC) on display on a light table with a stereo viewer, and film that was in outer space on a Corona satellite, which is interpreted by a former career CIA IMINT analyst who explains what it was like to look down at Dolon Airfield every day to view the Tu-95 Bear strategic bombers. We have enough of the relevant artifacts to tell the IMINT story from the immediate post-WWII period, through the development of the U-2 and SR-71, to problems with developing and securing the product from the Corona series, and how that differed from treatment of the KH series product. We have too many exhibits in this subject area to show via pictures for this article, but here are examples of our coverage of the Privateer incident in the early Cold War period, a fragment of the U-2 piloted by Major Rudolf Anderson that was shot down over

Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, our SR-71 film on display, and our Corona and later satellite coverage:

- In the Privateer exhibit photo, please note the black POW jacket that was given to the Museum by Mrs. Reynolds, the wife of the Privateer pilot (top row, middle photo) who, with his crew, was listed as Missing in Action but actually survived to live out his life in Soviet prison camps. Mrs. Reynolds visited the Museum, and we tell the story she told us of how, after many years of effort, she was finally able to get a response from Moscow once the Soviet Union fell, and what she found from the Soviet archives when she visited Moscow, wearing this jacket.
- With respect to the SR-71 film and story, our visiting friends from the CIA Museum have happily reminded us that the original aircraft made for the Agency was the A-12, and that the SR-71 two-seater came into being only when U.S. Air Force later insisted on its own version. To the



extent time allows, we tell the amazing stories of the technical problems overcome by Lockheed's "Skunk Works" in developing the U-2 and especially the A-12, drawing on our U-2 plans from Lockheed and Kelly Johnson's memoir titled *Skunk Works*.

The information above covers some of the main exhibits on the Museum's first floor. The entire second floor has many additional exhibits. Some of the topics we cover using those artifacts include:

- Area 51: what did not happen there (aliens and flying saucers) and what did (testing our most exotic aircraft like the U-2 and SR-71, and the Air Force's one-upping of the Navy's Fighter Weapons School with a Top Secret program using advanced MiGs secretly acquired from the Indonesians to fly against U.S. pilots.)
- Where we actually did build flying saucers, why they could not be produced by a U.S. contractor or tested in the U.S., the extent to which they worked and did not work, and why, and how that ultimate failure actually was a success in advancing technologies we use today.
- The STASI and the total surveillance society it produced, eclipsing even KGB efforts in domestic surveillance, and the disinformation assistance it provided to the KGB to damage the reputation of the U.S. in the Third World.
- The Liberty and Pueblo incidents, using an actual Liberty crew member's uniform, and the North Korean POW jacket worn by one of the Pueblo crew. In telling the Pueblo story, we draw the connection to the Walker family spy ring, which at the time of the incident was not known, and the overwhelming damage the two incidents together created for the security of our missile submarine fleet.
- Soviet propaganda posters for Russian domestic consumption.
- The Cold War at sea, Strategic Air Command (SAC), missile technology, why the East Bloc awarded so many civilian as well as military medals, the Berlin Airlift and the Candy Bomber, Cold War toys for kids, etc.
- We usually conclude with our exhibit on Vasili Arkhipov, who has rightly been called "The Man Who Saved the World during the Cuban Missile Crisis."

ENGAGING THE PUBLIC: WHAT HAS WORKED FOR US

It is not difficult to arouse real enthusiasm for the Museum from veterans of professional Cold War activities when they see what we have and the stories we can tell about those artifacts. Reaching people who have no experience of the atmosphere of threat that hung over life when there was a realistic possibility that nuclear weapons might be used is more of a challenge, especially with the younger and future generations.

We continue to learn what works and what does not in that area. Some of the more successful approaches we have found are:

1. Interactivity. Researchers have observed for a long time that children, especially younger children, learn best by interacting tangibly with their environment, especially when they are emotionally engaged, as in play. More recent research on adult learning shows quite a bit of similarity, especially with the out-of-school adult population. Thus, explaining about the Cold War in ways that break up the stream of facts from the tour guide with questions, touching, viewing, etc., seems to work well. There are multiple ways we have seen this approach work, including:
 - a. Via the artifacts. We have artifacts that literally amaze, without much explanation. The attention they provoke encourages curiosity, which we can usually satisfy with additional verbal information. An example: the Corona film, and the photos we have relating to its recovery in air.
 - b. Via proactively asking visitors questions. Saying to visitors that Vint Hill is one of the four best places in world to listen to radio signals (as it is) usually leads one or more to ask where the other ones are (as we did when first hearing this from an ASA expert), and why Vint Hill is so sensitive. When it does not, we ask visitors the question, and they engage with different ideas from different people. Then what we say about the nature of radio waves and the geology that produces this effect at Vint Hill tends to penetrate more deeply.
 - c. Via spontaneous first-hand testimony, both by other visitors in this group and by prior expert visitors when we can recount what they said. There is a shock value to such testimony that gets people's attention, and the providing of third-party credibility which draws more attention from that time onto what the Museum's staff says. Visitors can then ask questions directly to the experts who happen to be in the group, enhancing their learning experience. We see this quite a bit.

2. A focus on stories. Wherever possible we try to relate the artifacts to the stories of particular individuals who used them, both to honor those people's service and to create a greater sense of reality. I know as someone both trained as an academic and working as one that teaching in a museum environment is very different. Abstractions and systematic learning can and do work in a university environment, but that is not the case with informal learning. Most people of all ages respond much better to narratives, especially about real, individual people, and the more unusual the actions of those people, whether for good or evil, the greater the attention.

Consequently, if you come to the Museum, you will see us again and again explaining the significance of the artifacts by talking about how particular, named individuals used them. Those people cannot be there in front of visitors, but the objects that are part of their story are in front of them. Hence, the named people then become more real, and in turn the artifacts now have more significance because of their roles in those people's lives.

Here are a few of the many ways that work:

- In the Vint Hill Room:
 - o The farmer and his Army Signal Corps friend.
 - o Private Mudloff, who intercepted the Oshima message that led to the Ghost Army.
 - o Helen Weiss, one of the women who had significant jobs at Vint Hill, and how she was the first person in the U.S. to hear the Japanese message of surrender.
 - o The use of W-J gear in the Watergate burglary, from a former W-J employee.
- In the main ground floor room:
 - o An expert on civil defense dosimeters and their flaws, who told us about that when he visited the Museum.
 - o Gary Powers, Jr., and his sister, James Donovan's granddaughter, Chuck Wilson (U-2 flight instructor), and Joe Murphy (on the bridge at the exchange—people involved in the Powers exchange).
 - o MAJ Art Nicholson's personal story as a way to explain about Military Liaison Missions and how one kind of HUMINT was gathered.
 - o The first-hand account of Mrs. Reynolds about seeking the fate of her husband—also from when she visited the Museum.
 - o Kelly Johnson's account of the creation of the U-2 and A-12/SR-71.
 - o What kind of award pilots actually received for successfully capturing a Corona canister, from

two veterans of the Corona program who were Museum visitors.

There are many more examples relating to our second floor exhibits as well.

3. The credibility of our tour guides. With the exception of this author, all of our tour guides have direct professional experience in Cold War activities on the military side, the intelligence side, or both. They add their own perspectives beyond the labeling to the learning process. There is a "horse's mouth" factor that tends to draw attention.

For more information, please see www.coldwar.org. Readers of *AIJ* are particularly welcome at the Museum and at offerings of its Presentation Series noted above.

[Author's Note: As a reminder, there are superior adult beverages nearby!]

Dr. Jason Y. Hall is Executive Director of the Cold War Museum in Vint Hill, VA, a former Top Secret Army signals intelligence base in World War II which was later operated by the CIA and NSA. He is also principal at a consulting firm for associations and other non-profit organizations. In addition, he is a part-time professor at George Mason University teaching a variety of courses in the Public Administration master's program. He worked for many years at the American Association of Museums, in two federal agencies, and in the U.S. Senate. Dr. Hall earned a PhD in Modern European Intellectual History from the University of Michigan; his BA is from Harvard University.



Location:

7142 Lineweaver Road, Warrenton, VA

Hours of Operation:

Saturdays 11am-4pm; Sundays 1pm-4pm and other hours by appointment. Contact Executive Director Jason Hall by email (Jason@coldwar.org) for an appointment.

Ground Zero for the War on Drugs:

Mexican Government Efforts to Curtail Trafficking and Violence

by Nicole A. Guajardo

SUMMARY

Since the beginning of time, trade has been a lucrative business across the world. Trading goods for other goods and goods for services separated civilized humans from the uncivilized and helped build societies. Food, textiles, animals, alcohol, and drugs have been major supplies within the trade business, but as time has shown products that are hard to acquire and/or prohibited seem to drive the highest demand. Drugs infiltrating society have been a large and growing concern for many countries around the world, so much so that multiple countries within North and South America have declared war on that commodity. Colombia, Mexico, and the United States have been at the forefront of the war in trying to stop drug trafficking organizations, such as the FARC, the Gulf Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel, and Los Zetas, from producing and trafficking drugs between and within their countries. As we have seen, the recent news has focused primarily on Mexico and the violence that has occurred and spilled over into the United States due to drugs. Since the drug wars started, popular tourist and transportation areas such as Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and neighboring El Paso, Texas; Acapulco, Mexico; and Tijuana, Mexico, have been designated the world's most violent cities. At one time, Ciudad Juarez and El Paso were the continental crossroads, a north-south route along a historic *camino real* during the Spanish and Mexican period turned into a battleground of drug violence among cartels, police, and the military.¹ Past Mexican presidential administrations have tried various operations and strategies to try to eliminate the growing threat of cartels and to reduce drug production and trafficking.²

LITERATURE REVIEW

Many of the sources researched for this study seemed to come up with the same conclusion and statements on what caused the drug war and the failures that the Mexican and U.S. governments have had in fighting the drug cartels. Justice in Mexico, a source from the University of San Diego, follows the war on drugs in Mexico rather closely due to the lack of accurate information on the statistics of violence and information relevant to the types of operations and homicides that have occurred during the war

on drugs. Justice in Mexico stepped in to provide information on approximate murder rates throughout Mexico and what is believed to be the pitfalls of the government's operations and strategies as possible solutions. Other sources stated that then-President Calderon's straightforward aggressive military actions caused the increase in violence but were unsure if they have impacted the war on drugs in a positive or negative manner.

METHODOLOGY

This research topic focuses on the variables of what caused the initial drug issue which created the drug war zone in Mexico and what efforts have been made by the Mexican government. Why the Mexicans have either succeeded or failed is important to understand for future options of developing operations and strategies that will not repeat the failures of the past. As Einstein said, "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result."³ Without knowing and having an understanding of the past, one will continue to repeat the same processes. If the root cause can be narrowed, then one has a greater chance of knowing his/her enemies, what drives their efforts, and how to cut off those lines.

The overall methodology will be a case study on Mexico, but the study also uses various other methods to answer the question. One is experimentation by testing causal relations. In this method I test variables to find my research question of what caused the increase in violence and transporting of illegal drugs in Mexico. Another method is using quantitative data analysis from graphs depicting the fluctuation of violence within Mexico. This analysis helps in pinpointing the time frame of the increase, which in turn allows a researcher to then employ another method known as research using available data, to see what may have influenced it. Research using available data is the primary method for answering my research question since we have a plethora of knowledge at our fingertips. I limit my use of quantitative research since most of the information available is qualitative. Quantitative research consists more of charts and graphs which are helpful in answering the research question or showing the impact the drug war has had on Mexico by the fluctuation of violence over the course of

several years. Some charts are also able to depict the increase in transporting of various illegal drugs coming out of Mexico. The concern, though, is the validity and reliability of this information. It is known that statistical data have been manipulated in other studies to be beneficial to one side or the other.

What is different today about violence in Mexico is that, rather than fighting and dying for revolutionary ideologies, the region's young men are fighting for little more than a fistful of dollars.

My question regarding some statistical graphs is: Does the researcher who collected the data have any bias in the matter? It is possible that some graphs may show a decrease in violence to promote a political agenda when factually the violence may have remained the same or even increased. The concern with reliability is that statistical data which are presented by one researcher may not be the same that another researcher might obtain even by using the same methods. The violence and trade of illegal drugs are continuously fluctuating day to day which makes the data only good for that moment in time. There may be five deaths by 0900 and then four more by the end of the day. If one did his/her study at 1000, he/she may have captured only the five deaths. Knowing that statistics can have biases, the charts and graphs represented in this research are presented only to show the fluctuations or estimations and not meant to represent exact figures. The first variable I will be addressing is what was the initial start of the drug war and how knowing what it was can help in avoiding possible failed tactics in fighting it. The second variable is what the Mexican government has done to fight the drug issue within the country and why it has succeeded or failed.

INTRODUCTION

Death is a norm that has occurred and recurred since the beginning of time, but not all forms of death provoke concern. Nearly two-thirds of deaths around the world are attributable to contagious disease and 16% are attributable to infectious disease.⁴ South Korea has had a suicide rate of 29 per 100,000 people in recent years.⁵ Therefore, why is the drug violence in Mexico such a greater concern that it has been considered a national security risk by the United States? Violence has been considered horrendous since the beginning of time, but in every society it occurs frequently and in larger societies it can occur on a daily basis. However, the violence that has been perpetrated by cartel/organized crime groups (OCGs) has been far

outside the normal range of acceptable human conduct and experience.⁶ What is different today about violence in Mexico is that, rather than fighting and dying for revolutionary ideologies, the region's young men are fighting for little more than a fistful of dollars.⁷ What caused Mexico to become a drug war zone in the first place? What efforts has the Mexican government made to assuage the hostility that has been brewing in the country?

Past Mexican Presidential administrations have tried various operations and strategies to try to eliminate the growing threat of cartels and to reduce drug production, trafficking,⁸ and violence but, as trends have shown, those operations have failed and in President Calderon's administration violence increased significantly.⁹ Could the possible cause of failure be corruption within the Mexican government, the military, and law enforcement?¹⁰ Is this failure due to a lack of information on what initially caused this growth in drug production? With the increase in drug use by neighboring countries creating a high demand for such products, could that be the initial cause of the war on drugs? The start of the drug war is a highly important factor; this will indicate what the driving force is for the war and if the operations and strategies that are in place will be effective. Did Presidents Calderon and Fox understand the causes of this war when initiating their operations and strategies? What operations and strategies did they implement in an effort to save their country from a rise of violence? Has current President Peña Nieto strategically attacked this war differently during his administration than Fox and Calderon, or will he continue to follow suit and attempt the same operations and strategies as his predecessors?

Marijuana was first introduced to North America in the 1700s by settlers who sought to grow hemp for textiles.

Marijuana was first introduced to North America in the 1700s by settlers who sought to grow hemp for textiles. Even George Washington was among the hemp farmers.¹¹ However, once the development of cotton fibers was perfected, the production of marijuana decreased.¹² In the 1850s opium smoking had been introduced to the United States by Chinese immigrants who arrived to work on the western railroads.¹³ By the late 1890s, cocaine was commonly used in the United States for therapeutic purposes such as reducing fatigue and mitigating the symptoms of a cold.¹⁴ In 1900 opium, its derivatives, cocaine, and marijuana were legal substances that could be purchased and sold within the United States.¹⁵ Cocaine was an active ingredient in Coca-Cola. Parke Davis (now part of Pfizer, Inc.) sold tablets and an injectable liquid based on coca leaves, and Sears, Roebuck & Co.'s catalogue offered hypodermic kits that

included a syringe, two needles, two morphine bottles, and a case for only \$1.50.¹⁶ Around the same time, Chinese immigrants also emigrated to Mexico for the construction of the railroads and brought opium along with them. In the states of Sonora and Sinaloa the Chinese immigrants taught Mexican peasants how to grow opium poppy.¹⁷ After the Civil War many injured soldiers who had been treated with morphine in order to reduce the pain caused by combat wounds resulted in a significant number of them becoming addicted to drugs.¹⁸ By 1895 around three percent of the population in the United States were addicts; some were high-income women known as *habitués* and others represented poor minorities such as Chinese, Mexicans, and Blacks.¹⁹

Total prohibition created black markets worth millions of dollars, and the long border shared with the United States encouraged the expansion of liquor and narcotics markets on the Mexican side.

The drug issue initially evolved in the early 1900s when racist anti-vice groups joined forces with other groups that were fighting prostitution and alcohol consumption. They began to lobby for drug and liquor control; this created an alternative view toward drug and alcohol consumption and commercialization in U.S. public opinion.²⁰ Due to the new perception that emerged regarding drug and alcohol consumption, the U.S. government promulgated laws regulating opium, cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol.²¹ In 1909 the first international conference on opium traffic and control was held in Shanghai; another met in 1912 at The Hague International Opium Convention.²² These conferences were convened in order to eliminate the manufacture, consumption, and trade of opium, morphine, cocaine, and marijuana. In 1909 the Opium Exclusion Act barred the importation of opium for smoking. In 1914 the Harrison Act was passed, prohibiting all non-medicinal use of opium, morphine, and cocaine. The Volstead Act (National Prohibition Act) made production, importation, and consumption of alcoholic beverages illegal, and the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 made marijuana illegal.²³ Cutting off these resources to people only created a high demand for the product and criminal avenues for satisfying this need. Like most commodities that have a high demand, they come at a high cost which makes it a lucrative business to be the driving force of manufacturing and distributing these illegal substances.

With Mexico's proximity to the United States it became an easy source for traffickers to supply their neighbors with illicit narcotics and alcohol.²⁴ The U.S.-Mexican border

became legendary for drug tourism by Americans due to Prohibition providing a boost to the local economy and stimulating a growing tourist trade of drinking and gambling establishments.²⁵ One observer stated, "Ciudad Juárez is the most immoral, degenerate, and utterly wicked place I have ever seen or heard of in my travels. Murder and robbery are everyday occurrences, and gambling, dope selling and using, drinking to excess and sexual vices are continuous. It is a Mecca for criminals and degenerates from both sides of the border."²⁶ Total prohibition created black markets worth millions of dollars, and the long border shared with the United States encouraged the expansion of liquor and narcotics markets on the Mexican side.²⁷ Liquor smuggling increased considerably during the 1920s; most of the illegal traffic was handled by land but maritime routes on the Pacific and Gulf Coast were important too.²⁸ Al Capone grew wealthy in the Midwest and Enoch Johnson ruled the boardwalk empire in the Northeast. In Mexico, Governor Cantu of Baja California²⁹ and Juan N. "Don Juan" Guerra, a Mexican national from Matamoros, entered the bootlegging business and quickly controlled liquor and drug movement along the border.³⁰ During the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), several states prohibited liquor production and consumption; also more stringent laws were imposed at the national and state levels.³¹ Since most of Mexico's drugs were imported from Europe and transported through the Panama Canal, this caused traffickers to begin planting opium in the states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit, Chihuahua, and Durango.³² Prohibition created a new class of criminals and drug violators, and as history has shown there was progressive growth in the number of criminal drug organizations, the trafficking and consumption of drugs, and violence.³³

In 1938 the head of the Mexican Federal Narcotics Service, Dr. Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, implemented a new drug policy and believed that Mexico could control the drug trade in three ways: (1) create a government-regulated system of drug distribution, (2) implement a public health campaign to educate people honestly about drugs, and (3) expand the drug treatment system.³⁴ He also stated, "It is impossible to break up the traffic in drugs because of the corruption of the police and special agents and because of the wealth and political influence of some of the traffickers."³⁵ The *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (or PRI, the Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the cartels solidified their relationship and the ruling party began creating a political, police, and military infrastructure that enabled the cartels to cultivate, manufacture, and distribute cocaine, heroin, and marijuana for export to the United States as a source of profit.³⁶ In 1947 President Miguel Alemán created the *Dirección Federal de Seguridad* (DFS, or Federal Security Directorate), which assisted the U.S. government in surveillance of communist and Russian influence but also had another agenda for the PRI in organizing and controlling drug trafficking within Mexico.³⁷

The real beginning of violence between the cartels and the government occurred after one cartel in 1985 ordered the murder of Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent.

There are two significant things to note about the early decades of the 20th century: first, the illegal drug trade did not create corruption among Mexican authorities, as it was only one of many illegal activities that corrupt officials were running in their states; second, cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez were crucial transit points for drugs entering the U.S. and remain so to this day due to the high number of vehicles and people crossing each day, making it difficult to search them all.³⁸ In the 1980s there were relatively few drug cartels in Mexico compared to today, and those that existed operated in well-defined areas of influence under the informal control of the DFS.³⁹ As mentioned before, Don Juan in Matamoros took advantage of the lucrative drug market and became a bigger drug lord transporting drugs into southern Texas. He was even credited for the 1960 assassination of police commander Juan Octavio Villa Coss, son of Pancho Villa.⁴⁰ Don Juan’s empire eventually would become known as the Gulf Cartel and, as leaders were replaced due to either death or arrest, the more violent they would become. The real beginning of violence between the cartels and the government occurred after one cartel in 1985 ordered the murder of Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent.⁴¹ As a result, Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo and Rafael Caro Quintero, co-founders of the Guadalajara Cartel, were arrested and the DFS dismantled.⁴² While Felix Gallardo was in prison, he organized a meeting of the major drug traffickers in Acapulco where it was decided that the country would be divided into seven regions, each controlled by a different drug cartel. In addition, any group could transport drugs inside another region but had to pay taxes to the cartel group controlling that region.⁴³ Unfortunately, there is no honor among thieves, and soon afterward the peace was broken due to the cartels cheating each other to avoid paying the taxes.⁴⁴

President Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s administration declared “a national crusade” against the drug cartels and their links to various branches of the Mexican government and law enforcement agencies.⁴⁵ President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon increased the use of the armed forces for antidrug tasks and continued to purge the federal police. In an effort to deal with the weakening of the *Procurador General de la República* (PGR, or Attorney General), army troops were sent to work with the agents. However, some of those troops were coerced by the drug cartels and formed a group of

killers known as “Los Zetas,” the paramilitary group of the Gulf Cartel.⁴⁶ As the government was fighting the cartel groups, it was also trying to clean up the corruption within its own agencies. Meanwhile, the second-generation cartel groups were creating new criminal organizations with emerging leaders. In the early 1990s, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán controlled the Sinaloa Cartel; Amado Carrillo Fuentes, known as “Lord of the Skies,” controlled the Juarez Cartel; and the Gulf Cartel was headed by Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, who recruited the elite former Mexican military personnel “Los Zetas.”⁴⁷ New mid-level regional groups began to gain more significance, such as the Beltran Leyva Organization, the La Familia Michoacana organization, and the Eduardo Teodoro “El Teo” García Simental Organization, known for its extreme violence, kidnapping, and alleged ties with the Guzman-Zambada organization.⁴⁸

With this increase in military presence, the criminal organizations began to retaliate for the deaths and arrests of their leaders and others in their organizations. Drug trafficking-related homicides doubled between 2007 and 2008.

Eventually, during President Fox’s time in office, many of these emerging criminal organizations were shifting alliances, diversifying their criminal activities, and increasing the overall violence due to clashes with the authorities.⁴⁹ A lot of this occurred due to Mexican criminal organizations taking over the smuggling routes from Colombian traffickers, since the United States was cracking down and eradicating many of the criminal organizations and drugs within Colombia.⁵⁰ Although many politicians, military personnel, and police were on the payroll of the cartels, there were still some individuals who were on a mission to root out the evil and rid the country of corruption. These types of internal tactics are what contributed to the chaos and violence of the drug war.⁵¹ Mexican officials have requested their drug agents be permitted to cross into the United States to carry out activities, gather intelligence on drug smugglers, make arrests, and extradite suspects, but they usually have been turned down by the State Department and the Bureau of Narcotics, although the DEA would send agents to Mexico without Mexican approval.⁵² This was due to the lack of trust with the Mexican government, knowing that many of its officials and law enforcement agents were corrupted by cartel groups. Nevertheless, when President Calderon entered office in December 2006, he launched an aggressive campaign and deployed 49,000 troops to hotspots throughout the country to combat the organized crime groups.⁵³ With this increase in military presence, the criminal organizations began to retaliate for the deaths and arrests of

their leaders and others in their organizations. Drug trafficking-related homicides doubled between 2007 and 2008, and they continued to spiral upward to about 28,000 people by July 2010.⁵⁴




Figure: Total Annual Homicide Data in Mexico as Reported by INEGI & SNSP (1990-2014)⁵⁵

At the same time cartel leaders were being arrested and killed, President Calderon also focused on corruption within the Mexican government and police forces. In August 2010, 3,200 officers were fired by Mexico's Federal Police Commissioner.⁵⁶ Calderon's administration worked with the United States on many operations due to the Mérida Initiative. This bilateral pact represented a historic level of cooperation and acknowledgment of sharing responsibilities by the United States and Mexico to counter drug-fueled violence.⁵⁷ The Initiative has four pillars: (1) to disrupt the capacity of organized crime to operate, (2) to institutionalize capacity to sustain rule of law, (3) to create a 21st century border structure, and (4) to build strong and resilient communities (per U.S. Embassy Mexico, 2015). Agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) worked with the Mexican government to establish a Spanish-language, e-Trace, web-based system to track smuggled U.S.-originated weapons.⁵⁸ President Peña Nieto retained this initiative and also continued using the military to help fight organized crime groups. Just like Calderon, President Peña Nieto also had plenty of success in eliminating or capturing organized criminal group leaders such as El Chapo. There is some noticeable difference between the two presidencies, reflecting two distinct political parties. Peña Nieto has not been as public about the arrests and deaths of organized crime leaders as Calderon was, and he also said that he wants to focus on other factors while fighting this war.

CONCLUSION

With every presidency the main effort in fighting the organized crime groups has been to deploy military troops; however, time has shown these efforts have had various impacts. During President

Calderon's time in office, violence increased tremendously due to the government's efforts and intra-cartel fighting for domination of territory and market. During President Peña Nieto's tenure, there has been a gradual decline of violence but not significant enough for positive public opinion. Hence, what will help in this war on drugs to reduce the violence to the point where it was many years ago? First, the Mexican government needs to have a set goal and determine how it would measure the success it accomplishes. Currently, the strategy is to direct the involvement of military personnel in combating organized crime groups, the sequential targeting of specific organizations for the dismantling of leadership structures, long-term investment and reforms intended to improve the integrity and performance of domestic law enforcement institutions, and the solicitation of U.S. assistance in terms of intelligence, materiel support, and southbound interdiction of weapons and cash.⁵⁹ Once the groups are dismantled, then reform and trusted law enforcement need to be in place so that new organized criminal groups cannot take root.

Another element on which both the U.S. and Mexico need to focus is the drug users, with 90% of the drugs coming from Mexico into the U.S. for consumption. An effort to rehabilitate and stop drug addiction and consumption in the U.S. would help reduce the demand for illegal drugs, which in turn would curtail drug trafficking. A possibility at which Mexico has looked in the past is legalization of a set quantity of drugs and reduced punishment for those caught no more than twice with only a small amount in their possession. If, for example, marijuana was legalized, the supply would no longer be restricted and the demand for the product would likely diminish. Suppliers cannot sell more of a good than buyers are willing to purchase, and drugs like marijuana reflect what economists call "inelastic demand"; i.e., as the price of marijuana increases, the quantity demanded decreases at a smaller rate than for other goods (consumers are less responsive to price changes and are willing to pay higher prices to get their fix).⁶⁰



The *supply curve* is far to the left side of the graph because the supply of marijuana in the United States is restricted, and even the black market supply is often interdicted and

destroyed by police. This combination—a product with an *inelastic demand*, plus an artificially restricted supply—has the result that any economist can predict: artificially high prices. These high prices are what make the market for marijuana so lucrative that smugglers in Mexico and border cities are willing to kill each other over the profits, so lucrative that drug dealers will fight turf wars to cash in on the loot. By legalizing the cultivation, possession, and recreational use of marijuana by adults over 21, the market for it would radically change. Supply would no longer be restricted, as represented by the rightward shift in the blue supply curve below. Yet, look what this does to the price of marijuana and even to the overall value of the industry. They both drastically *decrease*!



Economists can predict this kind of result because, as noted earlier, the *demand curve* for drugs is *inelastic*. As supply increases, every increase in the quantity of marijuana is significantly outdone by the corresponding *decrease* in per unit price. As prices drop, the market for marijuana will no longer be so artificially lucrative as to incentivize perverse and violent behavior. Furthermore, illegal dealers will be outpriced by the onslaught of new, legal suppliers and will lose their business nearly overnight—cleaning up bad neighborhoods in one fell swoop.”⁶¹

History has shown that crime tends to increase during a period of prohibition and does not prevent people from obtaining the illegal product/substance. It allows a gateway to open for black markets with dangerous individuals willing to do anything to gain profits from the demand of the illegal product/substance. The same scenario occurred during the Prohibition era of alcohol with increased crime (violence, murders, and smuggling), but over time crime dealing with alcohol decreased tremendously due to the re-legalization and regulation of

that product. Portugal has decriminalized marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine and has shown that between 2001 and 2006 teen drug usage and HIV rates have decreased, while money that has been saved on drug enforcement went to funding drug-free treatments.⁶² Understanding this, one would assume that it would be logical to attempt to legalize these products with obvious governmental regulations in order to put organized crime groups out of business and reduce the violence that Mexican citizens have been enduring for the past few decades.

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Apocalyptic Opportunism: Cult Formation and Violence in an Unstable Nation-State

by Dr. Nicole K. Drumhiller and Dr. Craig A. Whiteside

[Editor's Note: This article was adapted from an earlier presentation by the authors at the annual convention of the International Studies Association.]

SUMMARY

The United States' efforts to extricate itself from Iraq and leave a stable government behind was an unsteady road mined with pitfalls. Throughout this period, the Iraqi government has slowly attempted to gain control over many state and non-state actors since it regained sovereignty—with varying degrees of success. In early 2007, the Iraqi government turned its attention from the two major factions undermining its legitimacy to a known but ignored cult in south Iraq—the Soldiers of Heaven. This insignificantly-sized group plotted the assassination of the most important cleric in Iraq in an attempt to bring about an apocalypse. The Soldiers of Heaven demonstrated characteristics associated with cult violence. These factors, coupled with the group's operation within a conflict-prone environment, provided the prime conditions for the group to become violent. The events set in motion by the Soldiers of Heaven serve as a warning to nation-states about the fringe groups that exist in every society, and the perils of ignoring their threat to the existence of the government.

On a cool January day in 2007, Iraqi Army soldiers and policemen serving the relatively peaceful province of Najaf were anxious about the coming days. Security forces were on high alert to guard against terrorist threats to the ongoing Ashura festival. The Iraqi government felt safe focusing its efforts on the threat of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) inspired bombers targeting the Shi'a faithful walking the highways to Karbala and Najaf—ancient cities containing the two most important mosques in the Shi'a sect outside Mecca and Medina. These golden-domed mosques are the object of long pilgrimages on foot which often end with bloody reenactments of the martyrdom of Husayn, the grandson of the prophet Muhammad. Previously banned by Saddam Hussein, the pilgrimages during Ashura became a favorite target of Sunni extremists attempting to incite

sectarian bloodshed between the sects.¹ During that time, the only other realistic threat to the pilgrims was the possibility of being caught in the crossfire of internecine violence between rival Shi'a groups attempting to gain power in post-Saddam Iraq.²

Instead of the known came the unexpected; on the morning of January 28, Iraqi forces on a routine investigation stumbled into the fiercest fight of their new existence at a small farmstead two miles north of Najaf. Before it was over, American advisors to the Iraqi Army were frantically calling in dozens of air strikes on hundreds of dug in troops near the wreckage of an Apache helicopter shot down during the fight. Initial reports were confused at best; officials from the provincial government of Najaf immediately claimed the fighters consisted of Sunni terrorists attempting to disrupt Ashura in the overwhelmingly Shi'a province.³ While not outside the realm of possibility, this claim turned out to be false. The nearest Sunni community was about 40 miles away in northern Babil Province. Instead, the fighters came from a religious cult known as the Jund al Samaa or the Soldiers of Heaven. After the fight concluded, hundreds of dead fighters, mortars, armored vehicles, machineguns, and the remains of an Apache helicopter were all within sight of one of the most important shrines in Shi'a Islam. This violent conflict became a reality check that the situation in Iraq was teetering ever closer to the precipice of dangerous instability.

THE SOLDIERS OF HEAVEN

Ironically, another shrine, the third most important Shi'a mosque in Iraq, is the key to understanding how this story unfolds. The Askariya Shrine of Samarra is home for the remains of two 9th century Shi'a imams. Imam Hassan Al-Askari was buried at his namesake mosque and according to some traditions, was the father of *al-Mahdi*, the 12th and last of the Shi'a imams to challenge the Sunnis for control over the Islamic caliphate. Instead of martyrdom, some Shi'a traditions espouse *al-Mahdi* disappeared into a state of occultation, and is often referred to as the Hidden Imam.⁴ Prior to the attack outside of Najaf in 2007, on February 22, 2006 al-Qaeda insurgents dressed as Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members planted enough explosives within the Askariya Shrine to destroy the famous Samarra golden dome.

The bombing drove tens of thousands of Iraqi Shi'a to violent protests; the event was equated to being "as 9-11 in the United States."⁵ Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born head of AQI and a Sunni Muslim, ordered the bombing so it would start a Shi'a-Sunni civil war.⁶ The Shi'a elite's response was swift:

Iraq's most influential Shi'ite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, called on Shi'ites to take to the streets, but peacefully... A separate statement from Sistani appeared to warn that the well-armed militias of the Shi'ite religious parties might be called out to protect other shrines if Iraq's unsteady government failed to do so. "If its security institutions are unable to provide the necessary security, the faithful are able to do that by the will and blessings of God."⁷

The tragic results of the subsequent civil war would inspire many other groups to act out in violence. One group, the Soldiers of Heaven (SOH), believed the sectarian violence started by Zarqawi could be improved through a devious twist they thought would help achieve their apocalyptic goals. The conditions in Iraq were chaotic; the government had no exclusive right to the use of force. To capitalize on the political and religious conditions, the SOH planned to assassinate the most influential Shi'a clerics in Najaf during the Ashura holiday. Mayhem would most assuredly follow, thus creating the conditions for the SOH to take control of the most significant city in the Shi'a religion. The SOH would then reveal the Hidden Imam returned to fight in their midst, as they rode out a new wave of apocalyptic violence.

A 37-year-old Iraqi Shi'i named Diya Abdul Zahra Kadim led the SOH. He declared himself the Mahdi and, accordingly, wore the black turban identifying himself as a descendant of the prophet Muhammad. Kadim had been arrested twice during the Saddam regime for his involvement with Mahdi cults.⁸ The SOH owned a large property north of Najaf near Zarqa, within sight of the Euphrates River.⁹ The rural farmland outside the city, along with the irrigated canals that latticed the countryside along the river, allowed Kadim to gather his close supporters undisturbed and prepare for the upcoming conflict. Satellite photos taken prior to 2007 revealed trenches and tunnels that had been improved upon.¹⁰

Prior to the 2007 attack, Kadim assembled 200 well-trained and -outfitted core followers at the Zarqa farm. The organization stockpiled assault rifles, machineguns, truck-mounted heavy machineguns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. The weapons were not hard to acquire in southern Iraq after the defeat of the Iraqi Army in 2003, and most of the weapons recovered after the battle had military identification markings.¹¹ Each fighter donned a SOH headband, loaded military-style bandolier, and AK-47. Core members also demonstrated basic military training.

The farm complex sat less than a mile from the major Karbala-Najaf freeway, called Highway 9. This position gave the SOH access to the large stream of pilgrims transiting Najaf for the Ashura spectacle. The pilgrims often walked from places like Baghdad (about 50 miles north) with just the clothes on their backs. They relied on fellow Muslims and hospitality tents along the pilgrimage routes to feed, hydrate, and house them at night. However, some pilgrims would be forced to fight alongside the SOH before they reached the culmination of their pilgrimage. On January 27, the night before Ashura, a convoy of 200 SOH affiliates from Diwanayah arrived to reinforce the Zarqa element just before the festival, bringing their numbers to 400. The reinforcements arrived at the Highway 9 checkpoint just outside Zarqa in the middle of the night. With raised suspicions, the officer on duty called his superiors for guidance, thus triggering a panicked reaction from the convoy. When armed SOH members attacked the checkpoint, the soldiers dispersed, returning to the nearby Army base. The abandoned armored vehicles were confiscated by SOH members and brought to the nearby compound.¹² This incident alerted the ISF and the Ministry of the Interior that the SOH were active in the Najaf area. The Iraqi Army was directed to investigate the compound at Zarqa. Despite the skirmish the night before, neither the Army nor the Ministry of Interior had any inkling of what awaited them in Zarqa.

THE SOLDIERS OF HEAVEN AS A RELIGIOUS CULT

The Soldiers of Heaven can be classified as a new religious movement (NRM) founded on an apocalyptic belief structure; more plainly, it was an apocalyptic cult. The study of these groups is a fairly new undertaking that has largely focused on European and Eastern organizations. The SOH as an apocalyptic cult of Middle Eastern origin presents a unique case for the study of cult violence. The group's label as a cult comes as a result of the group dynamics at play within the organization, not as a result of its beliefs.

Cults are typically groups of individuals who have aligned and submitted themselves to a charismatic or narcissistic leader who uses the captivated following to carry out selfish ends. These organizations are totalistic in their belief structure, having only one path to the end goal.¹³ The leader exacts hyper-compliance through abuse, coercion, and social engineering.¹⁴ Within the SOH, Kadim gathered a following due to his ability to weave traditional Shi'a doctrine into an intricate and elaborate web, placing himself in a position of power. The leader's credible appearance and attractiveness magnetically pulls in individuals seeking void fulfillment. Similar to Kadim, Branch Davidian leader David Koresh was a gifted speaker, and is often credited for having a divine

ability to recall passages from the Christian Bible. This gift helped legitimize Koresh to individuals seeking spiritual void fulfillment. This connection serves as a cohesive glue among the following, furthermore empowering the group to help the leader maintain his position of power.

In cults, dissent often leads to extreme forms of punishment including mental abuse such as humiliation and violent criticism, along with various forms of physical abuse.

The belief system of the SOH comes from Kadim formulating a paradigm which supplies the answer to all the group's "social, natural, scientific, political, economic, historical, [and] philosophical issues."¹⁵ Information is strictly controlled to prevent the influx of new or contrasting information threatening the group's worldview. The isolation of the SOH compound provided Kadim with the necessary conditions to control the information received by the group. All information passed down through the group's hierarchy is considered beyond contestation. Within closed groups, any demonstration of difference can result in an individual becoming an outcast, and labeled as an enemy of the group. This is done to generate a visceral reaction against ostracization, thus fostering group cohesiveness. In cults, dissent often leads to extreme forms of punishment including mental abuse such as humiliation and violent criticism, along with various forms of physical abuse. Over time, the leader will act in a more grandiose and often paranoid manner. Paranoia is driven by the leader's constant pursuit of additional power and wealth, along with his fear of being dethroned.

Leaders may come to impose rules upon their following they themselves do not follow. For example, David Koresh ruled sex was strictly forbidden between members, but permissible between himself and his following.¹⁶ The paranoia of cult leaders causes them to go to great lengths to increase their own, and by extension the group's, safety. This is done through such means as requiring members to change their names, requiring constant relocation, physical isolation, stockpiling weapons, initiating armed patrols, etc.¹⁷ The internal dealings of the SOH are largely unknown; however, post-attack accounts describe members as participating in unholy conduct, including mass orgies, to create pre-apocalyptic conditions.¹⁸ Though these claims have not been substantiated by former cult members, such behavior would not be surprising given the above group dynamics are characteristic to cults.

Cult leaders, like Kadim, commonly solidify membership within the group by identifying a scapegoat for the group's problems. This scapegoat is deeply integrated into the belief structure of the organization and all its problems are said to stem from this target. Increased paranoia can cause group members to develop a strained relationship with the identified target, leading them to take direct action. With the top Shi'a clerics being the original targets of the SOH, one can conclude Kadim's speeches would have mentioned Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr, and their role in the religious fall from grace.

THE BATTLE OF ZARQA

When Iraqi Army (IA) and National Police (NP) elements entered the SOH compound early on January 28, their Army scout platoon was immediately fired upon. Several soldiers were killed and wounded; one captured Iraqi soldier was summarily executed by the SOH in view of all parties. While this was happening, heavy machinegun fire and rocket propelled grenades pinned down the Iraqi platoon, leaving it unable to either attack the compound or withdraw to safety.¹⁹ Several IA vehicles were captured, calls were made to American advisors, bringing several U.S. Special Forces teams in the Najaf area to the aid of their Iraqi counterparts.²⁰ Upon arrival, the Special Forces soldiers mounted an assault on the compound with up-armored vehicles and heavy machineguns, but were surprisingly turned back due to heavy fire and friendly casualties.²¹ The combat air controllers assigned to the Special Forces teams brought in F-16 fighters with cannons to disable the captured vehicles and then A-10 ground attack planes to eliminate large numbers of SOH fighters shooting from trenches surrounding the compound. Under cover of the air assault, the Iraqis and Americans were able to disengage from the compound and pull back to a safe distance. At this point, the fighting strength in the compound rivaled an infantry battalion, later causing the Deputy Governor of Najaf to claim that "this group had more capabilities than the government."²²

The arrival of Hillah SWAT at the compound revived the battle as the policemen and their Special Forces advisors secured the southwest corner of the trench system at Zarqa. At 1330 hours, all combatants paused to watch as the attack run of one of the Apache helicopters brought in was abruptly stopped in mid-air after taking fire from an SOH vehicle-mounted heavy machinegun.²³ The downed Apache brought more U.S. reinforcements; the Americans used nightfall to reorganize, suppress the cultists with mortar fires, and maneuver units in and out of the cordon without drawing enemy fire. At sunrise, American soldiers began to move into the compound while loudspeakers broadcast surrender appeals. After a tentative response from a handful

of fighters, the overwhelming majority of SOH fighters—still alive, their families, and many of the hijacked pilgrims surrendered. Only two SOH soldiers continued the fight and were killed as the Americans swept the village and farm compound.²⁴

POST-BATTLE ASSESSMENT

The clearance results at the SOH compound at Zarqa were staggering: over 330 dead, including Kadim; approximately 400 men and 300 women and children detained. Among those captured included some high-ranking cultists including the leader's brother. Reports from individuals on site noted a safe containing \$10 million in cash.²⁵ Two operating rooms well equipped for surgery were discovered on the complex.²⁶ The group had planned to have a series of teams assassinate top Shi'a clerics, including Sayeed Abdul Azziz al Hakim, Muqtada al Sadr, and Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani. After the plan was carried out, up-armored vehicles were scheduled to arrive to help extract the survivors of the assassination teams and facilitate their withdrawal to the Zarqa compound, where they would hold out against any government reprisal.

An analysis of the SOH fighting skills by the American soldiers fighting against them consistently rated them as high, especially compared to normal interactions with insurgents. Most of the fighters were killed in the trenches surrounding the farm complex while fighting. Of the wounded, the Stryker soldiers estimated 90 percent of the casualties treated after the battle were combatants and only 10 of the dead were non-combatants. The Stryker company first sergeant commented, "That's the first time I saw the MEV (Stryker Medical Evacuation Vehicle) completely empty of all first aid equipment...we went completely black (empty) on equipment and first aid supplies (in treating the wounded SOH fighters)."²⁷ Indeed, the consensus was that these fighters were extremely capable and motivated. Some of these pilgrims were later found chained to positions or to each other to force them to fight, while others seemed to be easily convinced to fight on behalf of the Hidden Imam.²⁸ Twenty-four ISF members and two U.S. pilots had been killed; scores of Iraqis and a dozen Americans were wounded during the battle.²⁹ An Apache helicopter was destroyed along with dozens of IA and police vehicles.

ROAD TO THE APOCALYPSE

Like many religious organizations, those devout members of the Shi'a tradition anticipate and welcome the coming apocalypse as the Hidden Imam, the rightful leader of the religious community, will rid the world of injustice and tyranny. The ongoing conflict within the Middle East and, specifically, within Iraq creates an environment in which hope for the Mahdi's return is an even

stronger desire for the Shi'a. Tradition requires the Shi'a to guard against "false prophets"; at the same time, they are also taught to be vigilant in the case of his return. The anxiousness revolving around the Mahdi combined with the environment in Iraq set the stage for the manipulation of a religious population desperately searching for salvation from the violent political turmoil ongoing within the country. Under these circumstances, the SOH came into existence. Even more troubling, this particular type of group is not the only one of its kind operating in Iraq.

The Twelfth Imam is believed to have "disappeared" (or to be in hiding) and be in a state of occultation, according to the Twelvers. The Twelvers further believe that "all legitimate political power must derive from [the Mahdi], and he will appear one day to bring justice and peace to the world as part of eschatological events that will bring human history to a close."³⁰ During the time of judgment, Islamic traditions describe that both *al-Mahdi* and the Prophet Jesus Christ will rid the world of injustice, defeat religious enemies, and reestablish order and religious purity to the world. Some Shi'a believe that *al-Mahdi* is the forerunner to Jesus' messianic rule, a time when the "False Messiah," or Antichrist, will appear and be defeated.

Prior to the Mahdi's return, the world is foretold to be in a state of chaos and godlessness. The world is characterized by a "loss in the meaning of the sacred, the obliteration of all that connects man to God and to his neighbor, general failure in the observation of religious precepts and moral duties, turning human values upside down."³¹ After these events are realized, the Twelfth Imam will come out of hiding. According to some Shi'a traditions, "The Mahdi's followers, gathered under black banners, will supposedly appear to confront al-Masih al-Dajjal (the false messiah) and his armies of evil at the end of time."³² Within the various teachings, the Mahdi plays an important role in reestablishing religious purity and peace, after a period of turmoil and chaos.

The Mahdi's function as a religious guide for the Shi'a is of supreme importance, as "he alone can bring a true Islamic rule of justice and equality on earth."³³ This promise of salvation causes devotion to *al-Mahdi*, in addition to causing hyper-vigilance for his impending return. The exact date of *al-Mahdi's* return is unknown; however, the most often cited day is "the tenth day of Muharram, the day of Ashura" during an even Islamic year.³⁴ This is the key reason why Kadim planned to assassinate the top Shi'a clerics and announce his return to the world during Ashura. The return of the Mahdi is interpreted to take place for three different reasons: (1) to take revenge on those who killed Husayn in Karbala; (2) to return Islam to its original purity, thus further restoring the other religions which have also been distorted; and (3) to bring wisdom and reveal hidden spiritual truths.³⁵ Depending on

what the tradition believes is the key purpose for the Mahdi's return, he is said to return in Najaf during Ashura to exact revenge, as well as in Mecca at the time of the hajj, signifying a wider implication of restoring religious purity and the maintenance of justice.

The apocalyptic tradition of the Mahdi is not a phenomenon exclusive to the Shi'a. Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, among a number of others, all maintain millennialistic or apocalyptic beliefs utilized to justify violence against others.

The apocalyptic tradition of the Mahdi is not a phenomenon exclusive to the Shi'a. Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, among a number of others, all maintain millennialistic or apocalyptic beliefs utilized to justify violence against others. The SOH is not the first group to utilize an interpretation of religious doctrine to justify the use of violence upon others, nor will they be the last. This does not mean violence is a common occurrence among groups classified as cults. In further studying groups similar to the SOH, namely those prophetic in nature, few cases of cult violence arise. Groups demonstrating cult violence on a large scale include the Manson Family murders in 1969; the People's Temple murder-suicides at Jonestown, Guyana, in 1978; the Branch Davidian community at Waco, Texas, in 1993; the murder-suicides of the Solar Temple between 1994 and 1997 in Switzerland and Canada; the sarin attack of Aum Shinrikyô in Japan in 1995; and the mass suicide of the Heaven's Gate UFO cult in 1997.³⁶

Totalistic organizations present a particular problem for society, as their extreme worldview shapes everything important to them and justifies any actions they carry out. The Soldiers of Heaven represent a unique case, as they not only represent a new religious movement (NRM) from the Middle East but they have also exerted outward violence in an attempt to bring about the start of a world-cleansing apocalypse. Historically, "groups with millennial/apocalyptic expectations have been proposed to be prone to violence due to their fiery rhetoric condemning the existing social order and separation from that order."³⁷ However, the connection between violence and millennialism is not a simple one; in fact, millennialism is an element within many non-violent theologies. More likely, an apocalyptic group will be the target of violence or provocation rather than be the perpetrator of violence.³⁸ Millennial cults await the end of days in isolation and typically do not attempt to insert themselves to hasten the event. Any potential violence associated with the group typically occurs as a result of internally-directed violence carried out by group members on other groups' members. This belief may have played a partial role in the lack of preparedness on the part of the governing actors in the area.

The case of the SOH is distinct in that it is the second group since Aum which has actively tried to precipitate an apocalypse as opposed to withdrawing from society to patiently wait it out.

While no laws prevent individuals from participating in these types of closed organizations, groups such as these present problems for mainstream society when they begin to demonstrate violent behavior like that demonstrated by the SOH. Kadim was able to utilize the teaching within the Shi'a traditions to take steps to carry out events furthering his own personal gain. As a charismatic leader, Kadim had the ability to integrate some of the traditionally held signs of the Mahdi's return with the political environment to captivate a hardcore group of followers. For example, the Mahdi is said to return when Baghdad and Kufa are struck by rains of fire, and when the Euphrates overflows its bed.³⁹ Prior to the 2007 battle at Zarqa, the United States participated in a series of battles in both Baghdad and Kufa which could be interpreted as being struck by "rains of fire." The overflow of the Euphrates is also a convenient sign, as the Euphrates frequently floods causing vast amounts of destruction. The noted battle against "Sufyani" could have been projected by Kadim to represent any battles, or planned battles, against Muqtada al-Sadr. Fueling this image is the widely-held Iraqi belief that Sadr is uncouth and untrained to interpret the *Quran*. For many, his only claim to any sort of standing is due largely to his famed father Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr. In this light, Kadim could have utilized perceptions already maintained by the public to translate this into a sign of the Mahdi's return.

Another sign leading to the appearance of the Twelfth Imam is the murder of a "Pure Soul."⁴⁰ This has been interpreted to point to the foretold murder of the envoy to the Mahdi. Kadim, using the circumstances in place before him, could have molded this to align with the planned murder of Sistani. Sistani has been described as being the envoy to the Mahdi and, as a result, Kadim could have used this as justification for any attempt on Sistani's life as a necessary element of the Mahdi's return. Furthermore, Kadim could have utilized the cries from the self-flagellation rituals, heard during the Ashura holiday, as a way to invigorate the hardcore membership he had amassed alongside the pilgrim captives, as an interpretation of the shouts reverberating from the Mahdi's followers to silence evil forces. Without much trouble, he could have also made the easy connection between the U.S. military presence in Iraq and the foretold evil army presence in the Arabian Desert.

Finally, Kadim could have brought further legitimacy to his claim of being the Mahdi by preaching to his followers about the Mahdi's return during the Ashura holiday to signify the coming revenge for the slain caliphs marked by the holiday. It should be noted, that this description of key events does not need to align fully with what the traditions have passed down as the chain of events leading to the reappearance of *al-Mahdi*. Within some

Shi'a traditions, the information about the Mahdi's return is described as being:

given by the Prophet himself... As a result, it is incumbent upon the umma to obey him and carry out his orders. When the umma does so, even if al-Qa'im's orders might appear to contradict the earlier injunctions, they do not abrogate Islam... On the contrary, they are the original, unadulterated rulings of Islam.⁴¹

This alone could be used by any charismatic and seemingly credible individual to convince a devout follower that, while the orders and even the chain of events are contrary to what is foretold to happen when the Mahdi arrives, it is in fact the true doctrine of Islam and must therefore be followed without question.

INDICATORS OF GROUP VIOLENCE

Though there are historically few cases of violence carried out by NRMs, the above description of cult characteristics and environmental provocation helps demonstrate how a group of individuals can be led to carry out a violent plan in the name of God. The fact that the SOH represents a unique case in no way means it was an unknown group that just happened to turn violent. Instead, this organization, along with its apocalyptic beliefs, was known to the ISF years before the battle at Zarqa. In addition, there were a number of indicators present which demonstrated this group's potential for violence. This should have raised alarm bells within the ISF warranting enough importance to place the group under a watchful eye.

In looking for answers as to why various groups become violent, a study conducted by Post, Ruby, and Shaw sought to assess a series of observable indicators and evaluate their importance as possible indicators for terrorism.⁴² The study focuses upon five types of radical groups, including new religions and millennial cults. Utilizing the integrated framework for the analysis of a radical group's risk for terrorism, one can point to a series of indicators that could have served as warning signs for this group's propensity to partake in violent actions.⁴³ The framework for assessing the propensity for terrorism draws upon four overlapping and interacting fields, including (1) the historical, cultural, and sociological factors which not only allowed for the group's creation but also provides a backdrop for the group's operating environment; (2) key actors impacting the group; (3) the characteristics, structure, and processes of the group itself; and (4) the trigger or situation confronting the group and causing its increase in violence.⁴⁴ This framework can provide an analyst with a comprehensive, yet focused, set of elements which have been found to serve as clues for understanding group violence. Important indicators for

assessing cult violence include the characteristics of a group's leaders, as well as the group decision-making structure.⁴⁵ With this being the case, analysts assessing groups like this should focus their attention on the key actors affecting the group, its characteristics and beliefs, and situations or events that could heighten the group's intensity, thereby increasing its potential for violence. The historical, cultural, and contextual features should not be discounted altogether, but utilized in an explanatory way to help one understand the context of the group's development.

Important indicators for assessing cult violence include the characteristics of a group's leaders, as well as the group decision-making structure.

When looking at the influence of key actors upon an NRM or cult, opponents of the group are thought to have a moderate impact on whether or not a group becomes violent.⁴⁶ For example, an oppressive regime which puts forth policies unfavorable to the group would not be enough on its own to push a cult into violent action. However, if that regime comes to threaten the group's core identity symbols, the group can come to perceive that it is under attack by the regime and justify the use of violence in an effort to preserve its identity. Likewise, a group's supporters are important elements analysts should follow as the activities of an avid supporter have the potential to be transferred to the group.⁴⁷ In this manner a source of financial support with a known violent agenda could come to transfer such expertise to the group or could place additional pressure on the group to participate in violent behavior.

Factors of particular importance in determining the propensity of cult violence stem from the characteristics and organization of the group itself. A group's ideology and goals are considered to be of critical importance in assessing the potential for violence. If a group legitimizes the use of violence against enemies, identifies a specific target group, and maintains an ideology characterizing the group members as being righteous in their cause (not to mention being empowered by a higher rule of law), the group can be considered to idealize goals, methods, and leadership advocating the use of violence. Furthermore, if a group or its leader has a history of violent activity, or if the group purposely recruits violent members, one can conclude the group has a violent agenda.

The personality of the leader and his decision-making style are also important factors which can be used to determine a group's propensity for violence. Leaders who are malignantly narcissistic, paranoid, or sociopathic all drive their followers to exert violence.⁴⁸ The narcissistic personality type is found

commonly in cults. In this case, the leader is sensitive to dissent and surrounds himself with sycophants. Such a leader tends to overvalue his potential for success and is often shocked by his failures. A malignant narcissist brings to the group an element of grandiosity.⁴⁹ Because such leaders have a grand view of their own glory they will do whatever it takes to obtain it regardless of the cost. In this way such leaders have no empathy regarding the impact of their actions on others. Paranoia is another characteristic common to cult leaders; this paranoia will lead them to become obsessed with their own safety and security. Finally, a sociopathic leader is one who will have a demonstrated history of violence and will, in turn, come to focus the group's actions on increasingly violent actions.⁵⁰

Add to this a cohesive leader-follower relationship and the group will then take on a heightened sense of urgency in carrying out its actions. Common characteristics of this leadership style include millenarian or apocalyptic urgency.⁵¹ In this dynamic, members typically follow the directives of the leader without critically assessing the given instructions. This leader is perceived to be the only person who can provide for, maintain the safety of, and ultimately save the group. There are a number of reasons why a leader is able to exact destructive obedience from his membership. First and most likely is the "expert-power explanation," in which individuals perceive the leader as having expert knowledge or, in the case of cults, divine knowledge.⁵² Second is the "legitimate power explanation." Under this explanation the leader is the legitimate authority in the individuals' lives; as such, the leader is then able to "define reality for the person who accepts his or her authority."⁵³ Third, leaders can exact obedience from their followers under the "coercive power explanation"; here the group members see the leader as one with supreme punishing power.⁵⁴ The fourth explanation as to why individuals turn authority over to another is due to informational power. Under this explanation the leader is perceived to have convincing and persuasive information, causing individuals to turn over their authority.⁵⁵

Monitoring the group's promotion of its beliefs (including literature, flyers, brochures, social media, etc.) also helps provide clues as to a group's potential for violence. As a group begins to grow bolder in spreading its beliefs, it may also begin to advocate openly for the use of violence against specific targets and may publicly recruit others. The type of individuals the group seeks to recruit can also provide clues to its doctrine of violence. Signs a group is, or is seeking, to become violent can be demonstrated in its active recruitment of disenfranchised, victimized, radicalized, or violent individuals. Typically, a group looking to conduct a violent action may seek out individuals with specialized skills or training.⁵⁶ For example, weapons training, communications, and operational planning such as surveillance, weapons, and transportation could indicate the group is planning an event. Minor criminal activities requiring skill and planning could also demonstrate the group is practicing for a much larger event.

As a group begins to grow bolder in spreading its beliefs, it may also begin to advocate openly for the use of violence against specific targets and may publicly recruit others.

Once in the group, the socialization of members becomes pertinent to further bind the recruit to the group. Often cults will isolate members both physically and psychologically to enhance group cohesiveness.⁵⁷ Members of cults demonstrate a high degree of obedience to authority and are loyal only to their leader. All dissent is punished and further suppressed. In this way, the group itself becomes a self-sealing system wherein it has "closed in on itself, allowing no consideration of disconfirming evidence or alternative points of view."⁵⁸ Over time, the enemy comes to be dehumanized and the group will require members to participate in behaviors far outside their normal code of conduct.

In addition to physical progression toward violence, cults can also psychologically move toward violence. For example, a particularly humiliating event can cause the onset of a need for revenge to occur. If the group perceives an imminent and impending threat, it will begin to take on a paranoid and defensive posture, often resulting in the perpetration of an attack. Furthermore, when analysis of a group's behavior takes a more extreme form, one needs to consider seriously the group's potential for violence. Specifically, if the group begins to promote and push the possibility for violent behavior, the group begins to organize itself into militaristic units; it begins to carry out more overt and intentional acts of violence against a specified target; or it begins to engage in operational planning to perpetrate violent acts against enemies, acquire weapons, or prepare a plan of escape. One can conclude the group is planning on carrying out a violent plan of action.⁵⁹

While all of these components can help one determine that a group has the potential to become violent, none of these indicators can tell us exactly when a group will strike out. Bromley asserts cults build their propensity for violence within society through a series of stages including latent tension, nascent conflict, and intensified conflict.⁶⁰ In attempting to predict when a group will strike out violently, the best we can do is look for points of polarization, or a flash point igniting the bomb that has already made preparations for its explosion. Specific to the indicators present prior to the 2007 battle, one can attest the Soldiers of Heaven were giving off warning signs of their impending violence; however, these signs were disregarded or at best overlooked. Prior to the incident at the checkpoint, this group demonstrated an apocalyptic belief

structure, and the group was known by surrounding societal members. Evidence demonstrates the group had dispersed literature on its beliefs, or at least planned to do so, as after the battle the group was found to have 1,000 copies of a book called *The Judge of Heaven* and 1,000 copies of a pamphlet called “The Holy Coming.”⁶¹ Kadim, the group’s charismatic leader, was detained twice for claiming to be the Hidden Imam. Even though proclaiming one’s self to be the Mahdi is taboo, it is important to keep in mind “the strategy of arguing against your own self-interest can be used to increase the perception of your trustworthiness.”⁶² In this manner, Kadim could have utilized his past detentions as an example that what he was telling his followers came at great expense to his own well-being.

In terms of indicators of impending violence, one could determine the group was making preparations for a major event. As previously mentioned, satellite evidence demonstrated its isolated compound included a few previously dug berms, with accounts in the days leading up to the attack stating that improvements were being made to the compound. The group had also recruited individuals with a violent past (including a freedom fighter from Sudan), imported and stockpiled weapons, and received military-like training from an outside source. Furthermore, this group was alleged to have participated in criminal activities including car theft. Participation in this particular enterprise would have allowed it to gain specific knowledge of the layout of Najaf and find obscure side streets for use after the planned attack on Sistani took place. Despite the original plan to attack Sistani, the incident which occurred at the checkpoint served as a trigger mechanism, hastening the group’s violent outbreak. After the checkpoint incident, when the convoy went to investigate the group, the investigating unit was attacked. This attack can be argued to have occurred as the group perceived the ISF as an imminent threat warranting a massive display of violence.

POLITICAL FALLOUT

The legacy of the largest single-day battle of the post-invasion period of the Iraq War was surprisingly modest. The odd but fierce encounter among ISF, the Americans, and the cult was quickly forgotten. February 2007 was a pivotal month in Iraq and the impending “Surge” operations overshadowed this event. Najaf was transitioned from U.S. to Iraqi provincial control, and the violent eruption brought the timing of that transition into question. The U.S. military leadership was quick to give the credit to Iraqi forces after the battle, despite the evidence of extravagant expenditure of U.S. ordnance.

The Iraqi government, at pains to deflect attention from Shi’a militia issues to a Sunni/Saddamist terrorist agenda, faced a quandary. On the one hand, the defeat of the armed uprising was a victory of sorts, and the prevention of the assassinations

kept its Shi’a base satisfied. On the other hand, a blasphemous group falsely claiming to be led by the Mahdi himself was exposed as a fraud and punished. A credible and potentially disastrous threat to the new religious power base in Iraq, and one that advised Prime Minister Maliki himself, was thwarted. At the same time, however, the local government of Najaf could not answer how this powerful army was allowed to accumulate within two miles of the spiritual capital of Iraq. One could argue much of the response gap around this conflict stems from the Shi’a government. During the time of this event, there was a general failure on the part of government officials to recognize a credible threat could not only come from Sunni antagonists but from within the Shi’a themselves. Up to this point, the Shi’a government maintained an enemy image in which the Sunni were the primary threat to its existence. In this regard, therefore, the enemy should be Sunni, and all threats and violent conflict would come from Sunni groups. Even after this event took place, the Shi’a government was reluctant to admit internal power challenges existed. On January 29, 2007, when investigation of the group began to take place, the local Shi’a government proclaimed that the Soldiers of Heaven was a Sunni-based organization, despite it being highly unlikely a Sunni group could have flourished like the SOH deep in the Shi’a south.

The government then began to go to great lengths in order to save face with the United States by stating it had known about the group the entire time. Such a proclamation was likely made in order to demonstrate to the U.S. that the Iraqi provincials were in control of the situation and this event should not reflect a challenge to their legitimacy. These conflicted motives explain the discrepancies of the official statements after the battle, often within the same press conference.⁶³ Ultimately, Shi’a face-saving would come to cloud many of the facts involving the SOH. For example, digging through media reports demonstrates different individuals being referred to as the leader of the SOH, and that this group was reportedly linked to a host of other organizations (which is more than likely to be far from accurate). Despite the explanatory and inevitable conspiracy theories (legion in Iraq), including one about a Shi’a tribe inexplicably attacked by the Iraqis and Americans that made it into a major British newspaper,⁶⁴ the truth was hard to explain and not according to the script.

THE WAY FORWARD

Of the facts made clear at the battle of Zarqa, despite the message being promoted by the Shi’a government, i.e., that there is no dissent among the Shi’a, a Shi’a-based group did in fact rise up to challenge directly the religious infrastructure of the Shi’a. Attempts made to downplay or forget the events which unfolded at Zarqa on January 28-29 would be extremely reckless and irresponsible. The Soldiers of Heaven is not the only group of its kind operating within Iraq and, much like the insurgent

violence in Iraq, violence on the part of religious organizations is likely to occur again and will be difficult to predict. Groups such as Ansar al Mahdi and the Al Mahdi Army are not immune from a leader's grandiosity or paranoia. Add to this government mismanagement and the propensity for these groups to become violent is enhanced. In fact, Ansar al Mahdi leader Ahmed al-Hassan al Yamani has already flirted with claims of grandeur by proclaiming to be the Deputy of the Imam Mahdi, and also claiming to be the Prophet himself.⁶⁵ Other accounts have stated that the SOH was the armed wing of Yamani's movement.⁶⁶ Further, Yamani has been reported to have overseen Ansar al Mahdi's participation in violent confrontation during the Ashura holiday.⁶⁷ If we are to learn anything, it should be that the threat from Shi'a-based groups is not an impossibility. Government agencies must take steps to inform themselves of the propensity for group-based violence and come up with effective response strategies.

Not all religiously-driven groups will become violent, but a group's turn toward violence can take place at a very rapid pace. In order for government agencies to take efforts against the mismanagement of potentially violent confrontations, they must take steps to inform themselves about the key groups operating within the country's borders. The indicators presented by Post, Ruby, and Shaw should help provide clues for intelligence teams monitoring for potential violent conflict.⁶⁸ If the local Shi'a government in Najaf had known of the SOH and its ideals in advance, as they have stated in the media, they would have come to recognize this group was making preparations for a major event that had the potential to turn violent.

Government agencies must take steps to inform themselves of the propensity for group-based violence and come up with effective response strategies.

Having assessed that a group has the potential to become violent, government agencies then need to have a strategy in place for dealing with such groups in a way which "will produce the highest probability of nonviolent resolution."⁶⁹ In order to do this, government agencies will need contingency plans which balance a menial response with a potential overreaction. One way to do this would be by first seeking out as much accurate information as possible from reliable sources and screening out any questionable or misleading information. Then it is of key importance that government agencies initiate "'meaningful dialogue' with the group" and keep this line of communication flowing.⁷⁰ Finally, an emergency protocol must be established in case the group in question carries out a violent action.

This kind of violence is not restricted to religiously charged areas in the Middle East. The United States had a very similar episode at a Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, which started in almost the same manner. Nation-states, jealous of their power to utilize force in the maintenance of social order, continue to be surprised by groups like the Soldiers of Heaven. The Battle of Zarqa is a warning that sub-state groups can amass instruments of war, and even weapons of mass destruction. It must be recognized these groups pose a real threat to the citizens and sovereignty of the state. The close call the Iraqi government and its U.S. sponsors dodged in January 2007 has not been carefully examined due to dissembling by officials less than eager to expose weaknesses during a period of substantial instability. However, this should not prevent critical observers from further assessing this issue and forcing governments to pay attention to dangerous groups like the Soldiers of Heaven.

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A Conceptual Framework for the Application of Systems Approach to Intelligence Operations: Using HUMINT to Augment SIGINT

by Dr. Adedeji B. Badiru and Anna E. Maloney

OVERVIEW

There are terrorist groups around the world whose primary mission is to inflict as much harm on American interests and citizens as possible. These groups have to be successful only once, as 9/11 taught us, but stopping them requires a 100% success rate of homeland security and national defense efforts. This means having to be right a large percentage of the time in assessing threats and in effectively deploying adequate resources to minimize the risks. This requires robust intelligence gathering and application to execute preemptive strikes. The premise of this article is that the more systems modeling is applied to an intelligence strategy, the more robust the strategy will be. There will never be sufficient resources to meet every threat. The problem is to deploy available resources judiciously in the most effective manner so that the overall risk of a terrorist attack is minimized. In this article, we propose the application of the DEJI (Design, Evaluation, Justification, and Integration) systems engineering model to intelligence applications. Specifically, we propose applying the DEJI model in a conceptual framework by using HUMINT (human intelligence) to augment SIGINT (signals/sensor intelligence) from a systems perspective.

INTRODUCTION

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), homeland security concerns have dominated the national agenda. Amid unprecedented tragedy, many government agencies rapidly initiated a vast array of security improvements as stop-gap measures to protect critical facilities, transportation systems, and other infrastructure. As the nation and the Intelligence Community (IC) adjust to the “new normalcy,” it is logical to question whether:

- the right things are being done to deter, detect, prevent, or mitigate future terrorist attacks;
- too much or too little effort, and too many or too few resources, are being applied;
- new technologies will help deter attacks or simply cause the attacker to use a different,

but equally effective, means to achieve the same result; and

- all the factors that impinge on national security are being factored into intelligence decisions.

These are logical questions. No one can state definitively what should or should not be done to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, but some level of consensus decision-making will have to occur. It has been shown that effective homeland security is not just a matter of technological gadgetry but also of an effective, high-fidelity decision process. It is the position of this article that a systems-based, adaptive, risk-based approach can help improve decisions, particularly decisions that must be based on uncertain information. Systems Risk-Based Decision-Making (SRBDM) can help decision-makers (users) address these questions and a wide range of other related ones.

For example, the U.S. Navy is using a risk-based approach to evaluate and implement an interdependent suite of antiterrorism (AT) capabilities aimed at increasing its ability to deter, detect, and respond to terrorist threats. While many capabilities already exist and others are being developed, the Navy must make decisions on how to allocate resources in a resource-constrained environment to best manage the risks associated with security threats. The Commander, Navy Installations (CNI), has sponsored efforts to link the results of a risk-based model with classic operations research modeling to help optimize the allocation of limited resources among many AT capabilities. The prototype Navy model (at that time) was not comprehensive and did not adequately cover all decision factors, but it did demonstrate the feasibility of developing an adaptive, risk-based, resource-allocation decision tool for homeland security application.

Although the AT capabilities were considered individually, significant dependencies exist between some capabilities due to the integrated performance expected from the systems that will be implemented to reduce the overall threat of a terrorist attack. For example, certain robust command and control actions rely heavily on information management and display infrastructure, and on communications capabilities among various Naval and civilian agencies. Therefore, the

benefits associated with improved command and control systems cannot be fully realized without also addressing infrastructure needs related to information management and communications. This presents the following challenges:

1. How to directly incorporate interdependencies into a risk model
2. How to determine the benefit (reduction in risk) that might be derived if a particular capability is only partially implemented
3. How to change the assessment of overall risks and adjust strategies given the two-player nature of intentional attacks
4. How to incorporate intelligence (both HUMINT and SIGINT) into AT decision-making
5. How to ensure integrative continuity of the AT strategy

BACKGROUND

Researchers all over the nation are developing, testing, and integrating advanced signal-processing, image-processing, and data-processing technologies for high-fidelity sensing systems. Improved technologies will increase reliability and accelerate the speed at which data are transmitted from sensing systems to humans, who monitor and analyze the data. Intelligence on terrorist activities will always be incomplete and imperfect. Intentional planned attacks involve two opponents with competing objectives. Each opponent will consider the options and objectives of his adversary in formulating a strategy, and will change his strategy based on what his opponent does or what he expects him to do. Although it is clear that some terrorists are willing to die while attacking a target, there is no evidence to suggest that a terrorist will deliberately attack a target if he perceives that he will fail in the attempt. Therefore, making a target invulnerable to a particular mode of attack will not necessarily put the terrorist out of business; rather, it may cause him to consider other targets or modes of attack. Therefore, taking action to reduce a specific threat may increase the likelihood that an alternative target will be attacked. These are all issues that must be addressed from a systems perspective within the realm of effective human decision-making and not just from a technical assets point of view, as embodied in the DEJI model.¹

Decision-makers must be aware that terrorists will adjust attack modes and adopt strategies that will exploit vulnerabilities in a dynamic manner. Actions designed to reduce vulnerability to a specific attack mode must not only be considered to ensure they are effective; their impact on other scenarios must also be considered. Myopic focus on safeguards for a specific target or attack mode could simply

shift the risk to other targets or attack modes, and could actually increase overall risk. The research question is posed as follows:

*Can an effective systems-based methodology be devised that will effectively **Design, Evaluate, Justify, and Integrate** the trade-offs between risk and costs, acknowledge the interdependencies in resource-allocation decisions and the integrated nature of systems execution, respond in a timely manner to counter strategies perceived to have been made by the terrorist adversaries, take into account the imperfect and incomplete nature of intelligence on terrorist activities, and effectively guide resource allocation decisions so as to minimize the overall threat of an intentional attack?*

In the approach of this article, we recommend using the systems-based DEJI model, which has been applied to a variety of practical problems² dealing with designing, evaluating, justifying, and integrating problem parameters and factors. Figure 1 illustrates the basic structure of the DEJI model.




Figure 1. DEJI Model for Intelligence Data Analytics

The research problem has two components:

- the *risk assessment* part, in which benefits (defined as reduction in the risk of attack) are moving targets that must be continuously reevaluated based on current intelligence and dynamically fed into a capital budgeting model for strategy development and adjustment
- the *resource allocation* part, in which decisions are generated as to which capabilities should be implemented, and at

what level, in order to minimize the overall threat based on the most recent systems risk assessment

PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

Given the wide range of attack scenarios (i.e., possible terrorist targets and attack modes), and the uncertainty associated with each scenario, the benefit provided by a particular resource allocation can be difficult to predict. However, we can establish a structured methodology to evaluate the risk benefit for each capability based on how it might change the threat, target vulnerability, or consequences (TVC) for each scenario.

Design Section

Under the DEJI model approach, the Design aspect relates to the resource allocation model as formulated in the following large-scale, nonlinear, mixed binary integer programming problem:




Figure 2. Modules in DEJI Model for Intelligence Problem Abstraction

I = set of counterterrorism capabilities T = set of funding cycles (e.g. fiscal years) J = set of funding sources = $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$
e.g. funding source 1 = capital works; 2 = research/development; 3 = procurements; 4 = operations/maintenance

x_{ijt} = proportion of full funding allocated to capability i from funding source j in time period t

$\phi(x_{i4t})$ = utility function; expressed as the % benefit derived as a function of funding level (% of total funding) in time t – applied only to operations/maintenance funding source

$$y_{it} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if capability } i \text{ is deployed at time } t \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$i \in I \quad j \in J \quad t \in T$$

c_{it} = reduction in risk (threat) achieved by fully implementing capability i in time t .

Objective: Maximize the reduction in the risk of a terrorist attack.

$$Max \quad \xi = \sum_i \sum_t c_{it} y_{it} \phi(x_{i4t})$$

1. Appropriation Limits (Budgets from each funding source cannot be exceeded).
2. Dependencies Across Funding Sources (e.g. sequencing of spending).
3. Dependencies Across Time Periods (e.g. sustaining funding commitments).
4. Dependencies Across Capabilities (e.g. funding prevention before detection).
5. Contingencies (either/or, if a then b).
6. Deployment (only allocate funds to deployed capabilities).
7. Bounding (force minimum funding levels if appropriate).
8. Structural (e.g., linearization, binary)

The proposed model consists of the modules shown in Figure 2.

Evaluation Section

The capital budgeting class of problems, including uncertainty and risk, has been investigated from numerous perspectives. Recent work includes the use of fuzzy numbers to estimate uncertain returns, a modified weighted average cost of capital methodology to project returns, pooling of risks across multiple projects, analytic hierarchical process (AHP) as a decision framework, zero-one integer programming to accommodate sequencing decisions in a dynamic environment, an integrated approach that combines risk management with capital budgeting, a methodology for selecting projects in high-risk R&D environments, goal programming for decision-making in an uncertain environment, a generalized dynamic capital allocation methodology using distortion risk measures, sensitivity analysis as a tool applied to capital budgeting under uncertainty and risk, and game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation for timing resource allocations in a homogeneous commodity market.

The desired methodology will allocate resources sequentially across competing highly interdependent projects, where each project may be partially funded, with non-linear utility functions that are dependent on the counter-moves of an intelligent adversary. A model to allocate resources to combat terrorism must address all these issues from an overall systems perspective. Developing such a model requires the integration of mathematical programming, stochastic processes, risk assessment, and classical game theory.

1. There is an urgent need for decision tools that will reduce the threat, help decision-makers to spend public money more wisely, and rapidly respond to changes in the threat due to actions by terrorists.
2. The integrative nature of the proposed model represents an application of established research to new areas of expertise.
3. The use of a decision model that directly links resource allocation strategy dynamically with counter-moves by a terrorist adversary, factoring in the imperfect nature of intelligence information and the political process, has largely been untested.

Because acts of terrorism can be vastly different, widespread, and involve ever-changing methods, analysis of information must be performed every step of the way. Those who gather intelligence need to realize that some information is more vital to national security and the analysts themselves need to take into account the very

human aspect of terrorism. Humans are irrational at best, especially when angry and trying to get a point across. Analysts in today's world need to be trained in the art of analysis, not just in specific topics or regions. Analysts nowadays must have a global perspective that was not needed during the predictable days of the Cold War. Additional funding for analysis is vital. This funding would allow additional analysts to keep an eye on small threads linking bits of information to potential terrorist attacks. While the large amount of information possessed by the IC is impressive, national security interests are protected only if that information is transformed into intelligence.

We are no longer in a Cold War world. In our world, terrorist organizations are proud of their blatant disregard of humanity. The IC can no longer fund specialists like it could in the mid- to late 20th century. When the United States had one large, known enemy it was possible for analysts to pick a specialty and stick with it their entire career. Now it is nearly impossible to have specialists on every threat to the U.S. From Russia to China and North Korea, we face states that would like to see the United States taken down a peg; from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to Hezbollah and Boko Haram, we face non-state actors with no limitations to their cruelty and barbarism.

Justification Section

Assuming a set of predetermined strategic scenarios, risk-based payoff values will be developed and evaluated using a modified risk-assessment procedure and appropriate statistical procedures. The best strategy can be found by solving a mixed (randomized) strategy game problem based on the payoff matrix obtained from the Risk Assessment Module. The optimal solution of a linear programming (LP) formulation will represent the probabilities for each strategy to return the best expected payoff value. Based on the optimal solution from the Strategy Selection Module, the predetermined strategies can be prioritized. The objective of the proposed resource allocation model is to maximize the reduction in the risk of a terrorist attack, and can be formulated as a large-scale, nonlinear, mixed binary integer programming problem.

The money it takes to build a new satellite is astronomical compared to the money it takes to hire additional analysts into different intelligence agencies. As stated by Best, "Unfortunately, sophisticated political and social analysis is often not emphasized in intelligence agencies, especially within the Defense Department, that are focused on technical collection and direct support to operational commanders."³ The U.S. government is

setting the IC up to fail should policymakers not fund what the IC deems necessary. The cost is very low when it comes to linking intelligence agencies and allowing them to share their information and analysis. The way the IC has grown to be so bureaucratic and have immense tangles of red tape can be reversed only if policymakers decide that information sharing between agencies is as vital as many IC members claim.

Integration Section

This section is presented as a hypothetical case example of the importance of integration in intelligence analyses.

Hypothetical Case Example: More attention to Human Intelligence in order to augment Signals Intelligence

The Intelligence Community, including the armed forces, has focused the majority of its research, time, and money on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) while leaving Human Intelligence (HUMINT) without sufficient attention and funding. Though SIGINT worked wonderfully during the Cold War to decode and decrypt Soviet messages, the developing world has seen a rise in non-state actors threatening the United States. These non-state actors utilize the exponential growth of social media and the Internet. Because there are entirely too many pieces of information circulating every day, vital information can fall through the cracks. SIGINT cannot, and should not, be responsible for keeping track of all signals. Therefore, HUMINT should return to the spotlight, and the Intelligence Community should put a renewed focus on quality over quantity.

Many countries around the world have developed high-performing and gainful human intelligence agencies. Though these nations tend to use tactics considered inhumane or illegal, nations like Russia and Israel have found a way to gather relatively secure sources in places where SIGINT is no longer the best option. The United States needs human intelligence in order to be better prepared to deal with small terrorist cells and lone-wolf attacks. While the U.S. values human rights and should not resort to cruel measures to secure information, the U.S. needs to understand the importance of intelligence “boots on the ground.”

In many ways, Signals Intelligence intrigues people. Congress is fascinated by new technology and likes to see physically what it is funding. This emphasis on SIGINT, however, is not always the most cost-effective. Human Intelligence, though occasionally subject to manipulation and deception, can provide data and information that signals intelligence cannot. A human being can ascertain if a person looks worried while talking

to different individuals or takes extra caution crossing a certain stretch of the road. A human being can detect when a voice seems weary or cautious. A human being can begin to bond and build relationships with people who hold vital information. While reading communications and listening to recordings is wonderful for quantitative information, the United States is in dire need of qualitative information if there is any hope of staying two steps ahead of its adversaries. As the head of Intelligence Collection Management at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s mission in Sarajevo, Arpad Palfy,⁴ said it best, “... increased collection does not necessarily or automatically lead to better intelligence outcomes.”

We can look to history to compare and contrast SIGINT and HUMINT. During the Cold War, missions like the Bay of Pigs had many photos and technical information about Soviet intervention in Cuba, but there was very little focus on HUMINT. Had the United States noticed that the Cuban people did not really want to overthrow Castro, it might have been spared this embarrassing blemish on the Kennedy administration.

The implementation of this shift in concentration would not likely be difficult. The most time-consuming and difficult step in the process would likely be funding approval from Congress. Congress would likely be unhappy to cut funding to Signals Intelligence because, in many cases, creating technology used for SIGINT brings in money and jobs to members’ constituents back home. As long as Congress approves the reassignment of funds, integrating this new policy should be smooth. SIGINT should continue to be funded, of course, because of its vital role in the Information Age.

CONCLUSION

This article has presented a conceptual framework for the application of a systems approach to addressing systems challenges. Although no specific problem is tackled in the article, the framework can give readers in the Intelligence Community an expanded idea of how to design, evaluate, justify, and integrate intelligence strategies. In recent years, sensor-based systems have increased in development and applications. The variety and diversity of HUMINT and SIGINT systems necessitate the application of a systems approach. This article has introduced the application of the DEJI model by proposing the use of HUMINT as an integrated augmentation of SIGINT.

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[Editor's Note: He also has quite cleverly applied his nickname to the model in this article!]

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Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament: The Politics and Failure of Compromise

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Republic of Nigeria

OVERVIEW

Given the experience from the Second World War with the application of nuclear weapons and thereafter, disillusionment with disarmament as a way of achieving peace and security has characterized many actors' attitude. However, attempt at arms control by the two superpowers—the United States and Russia—has been more or less a skeptical arrangement in which neither wanted to compromise its security for peace. Despite this, there was still a move toward greater possibility and flexibility at the policy level to what has been described as “new thinking,” which is arms control within the defense community.

Attention was focused on mutual interests that existed between the superpowers' adversaries to avoid nuclear conflagration. Despite these moves, various explosions thereafter highlighted the weaknesses of the treaty on the ground that it froze the nuclear status quo and incorporated limited commitment to the nuclear powers in giving up their own weapons. Findings show that various recent issues also enter the theater of non-compromise to a disarmament treaty such as mistrust, fear, economic profitability, politics, and failure to compromise. This article therefore explores the historical antecedents, the politics, the factors responsible for lack of compromise on disarmament, and the implications for world peace and security.

It is also a reality that the world is not at peace for fear of an unpredictable pre-emptive attack, which could occur. However, suggestions for populist opposition to proliferation provide unnecessary interference to the practical affairs of other countries by the superpowers, especially the U.S., and a comprehensive overhauling of strategic arms limitation talks must be addressed thoroughly in terms of sovereignty and security.

INTRODUCTION

In the Second World War, the concept of total war reached a peak where the faith of a nation was totally put in danger as a substitute for victory. The ultimate example was the application of the atomic bomb on the

Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S. in 1945. With this devastating effect, it later generated the formulation of full-scale nuclear war strategy, whereby every nation is on its own to fashion a strategic model that will suit its own purpose of defense in case there is a provoked nuclear attack from an adversary nation. The emergence of the nuclear race during and after the Cold War signaled that the post-Cold War and the contemporary threats that followed in its wake were very much a product of a warning that emergence of peace thereafter might be premature. Again, from the contemporary example of 9/11, the first and second Gulf Wars, and the nuclear fissure among the U.S., Iran, and North Korea, it is apparent that military force remains the ubiquitous feature of the contemporary world.

The emergence of the nuclear race during and after the Cold War signaled that the post-Cold War and the contemporary threats that followed in its wake were very much a product of a warning that emergence of peace thereafter might be premature.

A decade after the onset of the Cold War, international policy began to converge as the prospect of using arms control to stabilize the superpower relationship emerged. The 21st century saw the establishment of a weapons control regime which set a bilateral arrangement between the superpowers. As the century drew to a close, the global problem of weapons of mass destruction remained unresolved. The increasing concern for this failure of disarmament could be found from the exercise of power, mistrust, fear of the unknown, political consideration, and the possibility that the disarmament regime might be losing its effectiveness due to failure of compromise by the participating actors.

THE HISTORICAL EXPLORATION

The world war of 1945 opened the history of the devastating technology known as the nuclear weapon, a weapon of mass destruction dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—which resulted in the U.S. waking up the other superpower to the nuclear race. The weapons were used due to the dangerous dimensions the Japanese introduced to the war, such as suicide bombing by the Japanese *kamikaze* and the attack on the U.S. at Pearl Harbor. It should be noted that the advent of the atomic bomb was initiated in Chicago by Enrico Fermi on December 2, 1942. Fermi, Niels Bohr, and other exiled scientists induced Albert Einstein to write a historic letter to President Franklin Roosevelt, and the resultant Manhattan Project established by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was to carry out the effort. At Los Alamos, New Mexico, the first atomic bomb was built under Fermi, Bohr, and other scientists (Palmer and Perkins, 2007).

The first atomic bomb ever to be tested was exploded over Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945. On August 6, 1945, an American B-29 bomber dropped bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The weapons were totally destructive. The Congress under President Harry Truman thereafter requested the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission to supervise all work relating to experimentation in the use of atomic energy for military and peaceful purposes. The U.S.'s monopoly of the atomic bomb came to a halt in September 1945, when Truman announced at Potsdam that the Soviet Union had recently exploded its first atomic bomb. Great Britain entered the nuclear club on October 3, 1952; France on February 13, 1960; and China on October 16, 1964. The Soviet explosions of the atomic bomb later changed the mind of the opposition. On January 31, 1950, Truman gave the Atomic Energy Commission permission to embark on hydrogen bomb research. One was tested by the U.S. on November 1, 1952, on Eniwetok in the Western Pacific in the megaton range (a megaton is equivalent to one million tons of TNT). In 1953 President Dwight Eisenhower advanced a proposal for the pooling of atomic resources for peaceful uses. On August 8, 1953, Premier Malenkov revealed that the Soviet Union had acquired the H-bomb secret. The first actual explosion of a hydrogen bomb was conducted in March 1954 by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in the vicinity of Bikini Atoll in the Pacific, with residual radioactivity called "fallout" which caused contamination. In 1954 the Hydrogen Age actually arrived. A month after the U.S. explosion in 1954, the USSR exploded its own. In June 1967, China followed suit and France conducted a similar test in 1960 in the Sahara Desert. By October 1964 France had tested its bomb more than any other country. Due to scientific curiosity it was also discovered that a weapon more powerful than the hydrogen bomb, called the cobalt bomb, could be successfully built.

The U.S. further resorted to underground testing in order to build a monstrous weapon either of hydrogen in the 100-megaton range or a cobalt bomb (Palmer and Perkins, 2007).

The Cold War between the then-USSR and the United States was characterized by tension, provocation, propaganda, nuclear arms, and a space race with each side trying to outdo the other.

The invention of chemical and biological weapons such as fungi, bacteria, rickettsia, viruses, and toxic agents added a new dimension to international wars. This arms race did not leave Germany in isolation. In 1944 when the Blitz started that summer, Germany Vicker 1 and Vicker 2 rockets, otherwise known as the V1 and V2, were launched from northern Germany beginning in 1945. The Cold War between the then-USSR and the United States was characterized by tension, provocation, propaganda, nuclear arms, and a space race with each side trying to outdo the other. Decisions over the future of Germany at Yalta and Potsdam were not comfortable for either the U.S. or the USSR; hence, the intensification of the Cold War began (Feiriby, Hansom, and Waugh, 2000).

SPACE RACE AND SPY IN THE SKY

The world situation added another threat to international relations from the arms race to the Space Race and "Spy in the Sky" between 1957 and 1963. The Launch of Sputnik 1 on October 4, 1957, into space by the USSR upset American pride. The rocket that blasted the Sputnik into orbit was powerful enough to carry nuclear weapons to its target. The advancement in space technology encouraged the development of nuclear missiles, especially intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). By the 1960s each side had developed nuclear weapons capable of destroying each other, with the Soviets upgrading their own to the SS-20 and the U.S. developing nuclear submarines, firing the first Polaris missile from beneath the sea. The balance of terror automatically stabilized the Cold War because of the danger likely inherent on both sides. On November 3, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 2, with the first animal in space—a dog named Laika (*Congressional Quarterly*, 2007).

The U.S. followed on January 31, 1958, with its first satellite in space. On September 12, 1959, the Soviet Union launched Luna 2, in the direction of the moon. On October 4, 1959, the Soviet Union put the first man into orbit, Yuri Gagarin, with Vostock 1. On April 12, 1961, U.S. pilot Alan Shepard became the first American in space. On February 20, 1962, U.S. pilot Colonel John Glenn became the first American to orbit the

earth. In 1963 Soviet cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova became the first woman in space. The Space Age swiftly generated into a spy race in the sky which was the result of the technological curiosity of both nations to outsmart each other and to discover missiles buried in underground silos. Spy in the Sky was first carried out by the U.S. on May 1, 1960, when a U-2 spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers took off from a U.S. base in Peshawar, Pakistan, and was able to take pictures deep inside the USSR. A Soviet SA-2 missile was fired at the aircraft and brought it crashing down near Sverdlovsk.

The Cuban Missile Crisis added more to the volatility of the arms race. Cuba had become essentially a U.S. colony after the defeat of Spain in 1898. The Cuban dictator, to the dismay of the U.S., was ousted by Fidel Castro, who supported communism. To make his regime stand against the U.S., the Soviet Union sent intercontinental ballistic missiles to Cuba and installed them in defense of a U.S. attack. The missiles were upgraded by the Soviet Union from SS-4s and SS-5s later to SS-20s. Missiles were discovered by a U.S. U-2 spy plane on October 22, 1962. A naval blockade of Cuba was ordered by President John Kennedy as a consequence of the missiles in Cuba. The end result was that both sides, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, cooperated on a Test Ban Treaty, which was signed in 1963. This stopped both superpowers from testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The Cuban Missile Crisis also led to “détente,” meaning a “relaxation.” Attempts were made to control the arms race and reduce the number of missiles through SALT I (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) in 1972. Another agreement was called to normalize the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union regarding cooperation in space, culture, and sport (Ferrby, Hansom, and Waugh, 2000).

During the Afghanistan war, U.S. President Reagan detested Soviet actions and referred to the USSR as the “Evil Empire.”

The second phase of the Cold War started when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and all efforts were made by the U.S. to frustrate SALT 2. This led to President Ronald Reagan increasing the defense budget to launch a “Star Wars Project,” which would create an anti-missile shield against Soviet missiles reaching the U.S. During the Afghanistan war, U.S. President Reagan detested Soviet actions and referred to the USSR as the “Evil Empire.” This led to Reagan increasing U.S. spending from \$178 billion in 1981 to \$367 billion in 1986. New weapons and missiles were developed such as the cruise missile, the neutron bomb, and

the MX missile, which led to global protests. This development was capable of upsetting the balance of terror in which each side had the ability to destroy the other, totally based on the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The utmost aim for the intelligence surveillance between these powers was to learn the intentions and capabilities of the other with regard to political and military strength. In 1987 both the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed on arms control and to get rid of medium- and short-range nuclear weapons. This was referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). However, both nations are still skeptical of each other regarding sincerity and being faithful to the agreement due to fear and mistrust (Ferrby, Hansom, and Waugh, 2000).

THE POLITICS BEHIND DISARMAMENT

Baylis et al. (2007: 231) state that disarmament may be unilateral or multilateral, general or local, comprehensive or partial, controlled or uncontrolled. Spanier and Noguee in their book *Politics of Disarmament* define disarmament as the complete abolition or partial reduction of the human and material resources of war (Spanier and Noguee, 1962: 15). Proliferation had generated sanctions levied by the United Nations on erring countries of the world which secretly embark on misusing nuclear power. Disagreement on disarmament also ensued between the possessing and the non-possessing states regarding Article 6 of the Arms Reduction Treaty. A series of secret tests was also executed by India and Pakistan. This also witnessed the increased tension to have the weapons by the non-possessing states despite the strategic offensive reduction treaty between the U.S. and Russia. All these were due to the changes that affected the international environment in the post-Cold War (Baylis et al., 236-238). The scuffle between the U.S. and North Korea has prompted the U.S. into mobilizing spy satellites and reconnaissance aircraft against that rogue nation for running a uranium enrichment program. North Korea said its nuclear program was directed against the U.S., which was being accused of plotting to topple the North Korean government and its regime. This situation has graduated from reflecting a military to a political motive. Iran also has defied the United Nations and the U.S. threat to its nuclear production. The conflict remains unabated after the second Gulf War between the U.S. and Iraq. Added to the above, fear and mistrust also contribute as factors behind the politics of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Despite the collapse of communism, the defunct Soviet Union still buried its weapons awaiting retaliation by any assault from the U.S. or other countries. Reagan even advised Clinton on Russia after the collapse of communism that they had slain the monster (the former USSR) but one lives in a forest bewildered with a poisonous snake (Russia). Nuclear proliferation has now divided the world again into nuclear axes as the U.S. does not

oppose Israel becoming a nuclear power but opposes countries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea becoming nuclear powers. The U.S. and Russia now continue accusing each other of helping lesser countries become nuclear powers. The politics behind this is that the world is about to be divided into nuclear and ideological axes between Russia and the U.S. (Gabriel, 1993: 1-45).

***Do not negotiate when you are behind and
do not negotiate when you are ahead.***

The superpowers which possess the weapons do not want lesser countries like Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and others to produce them for fear of terrorism and the possession of these nuclear weapons by lesser powers. The myth and superiority of the larger powers will be broken due to nuclear parity with the lesser powers. Again, the U.S.'s selective engagement in preventing Iran but allowing Brazil to have the weapons despite the non-proliferation parity offends the peaceful possession by Iran for economic gain (Hoge, 2007: 116). There is also the political philosophy that guides all nations regarding this policy of possession which is: Do not negotiate when you are behind and do not negotiate when you are ahead. This philosophy outright makes every nation that possesses it and those that are making an attempt to possess it so evasive to honor the disarmament treaty (Charles, 2007: 516-519).

However, the argument on wastefulness of military effort may serve to dissuade additional countries, but global diffusion of nuclear reactor technology for peaceful power purposes has also greatly compounded the difficulty of halting the further spread of nuclear weapons. The fact that nuclear energy was becoming economically competitive with the pride, fear, national interest, balance of power, and terror associated with it are enough to ensure that proliferation would become more common as a source of power throughout the world. Added to this political undertone is the view of Sipri (1975: 56), outlining the various dimensions of policies and political indenture of nuclear weapons on world peace and security:

Most arm control theorists seem agreed that the problem of nuclear proliferation was likely to worsen with the passage of time. Although some states might conclude that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would decrease rather than increase their security, others might well find the political and military incentive stronger than the disincentive. It was generally thought that as the number of reactions and threshold in the world increase, the greater would become the danger that the storage, transit, use and disposal of nuclear materials would harm the human

environment. It was also feared that the effectiveness of government control system functions, revolutionary insurgents and terrorist organizations would be able to circumvent state safeguards and seize weapons or materials to make weapons and that the mathematical possibility of nuclear weapons being used for blackmail or actually fixed in anger would rise. It was as a result of this political game that no nation wants to be isolated from achieving maximum security against all odds that led to disagreement with the proliferation treaties.

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR AND THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL COMPROMISE ON DISARMAMENT

According to Charles (2007), while highlighting the danger and fear behind nuclear proliferation: "Considering the propensity of modern technology towards arm race, it is difficult to deny that present day competition in weapons technology is bound to heighten international fear and tension, both at the popular level and among the elites who must worry about stable deterrence and adequate defense. One who constantly reads and hears cannot causally dismiss the contention that uncontrolled armaments competition between rival powers may create a climate conducive to war. Proliferation has paved the way for deterrence and arms control in which Dougherty and Robert [1981: 395-396] described arms control as the kind of policies usually aimed at some kind of restraint or regulation in the qualitative design, quantitative production, method of deployment, protection, control, transfer and planned, threatened or actual use of military forces and weapons."

Such policies may imply collaboration between adversary states, formal agreements, tacit understanding, informal cooperation, or unilateral decisions taken with the expectation of reciprocal action. The reasons for proliferation by the superpowers are power, economic development, or fostering national and foreign policies, while to some rational minds it serves no useful purpose but to instill fear, terror, and instability in world politics. Due to the quest for power, various strategic arms limitation talks had failed to prevent further production of nuclear weapons. It is to be noted that one threat which connected with the newly nationalist states is the problem of weapons of mass destruction.

However, all nations are jostling to possess these weapons because it will stand as a balance of terror and power, and against impending danger of pre-emptive attack from any quarter. The weapon is a security risk to the world at large. The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in an American century in which the U.S. now assumes world leadership.

The U.S.'s dogmatic leadership of the century with unapologetic foreign policies on war and the arms race infuriated other powers and called for a showdown of its hegemonic stability. George W. Bush in his foreign policy opposed those who wanted to erect a proud tower of protectionism and isolationism, calling it a short cut to chaos. The policy to venture into every nation's affairs such as China, Russia, North Korea, Taiwan, Iran, and Iraq calls for immense resistance (Oshuntokun, 2003: 10).

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Bush's last item that required more thought was his call on the U.S. to build and deploy a missile defense system, which was not allowed under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The Senate rejected it as unverifiable, unenforceable, and of little use in halting proliferation (Christopher, 1999: 31). Since globalization had opened the world to free access by invaders, there is an attempt to protect national sovereignty, power, integrity, pride, and security. The aim of promoting and sustaining national interests directly or indirectly influences proliferation. U.S. national interests, pride, and ideology are sustained because it has been one of the world superpowers that possessed nuclear weapons. This is one of the factors which now makes other nations join the race with a view to promoting their own national interests, pride, and ideologies through foreign policies. On international politics, the quest for balance of power and terror signals nuclear weapons proliferation. Fear of domination, threat to sovereignty, and unnecessary interference in political affairs of the weaker nations by the stronger ones has given way to proliferation in order to stand as checks and balances on powers and terror, thereby giving way to security leverages (*The Guardian*, 2004: 11).

Again, the U.S. doctrine of pre-emptive attack in recent times invoked by George W. Bush on international terrorism had led others to be well fortified with nuclear power in case such an attack is launched (Robert, 2003). On the economic side, the gain accrued from borrowing nuclear technology from the country that possesses it is enormous. A nuclear arsenal and satellites are built with enormous capital from a nation's military budget. Russia is being accused by the U.S. of building an arsenal for Iran and North Korea, and erecting radars at Krasnoyarsk while Russia also has led counter-accusations against the U.S. for putting canvas or protection tents on its nuclear weapons contrary to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (Viotti and Kauppi, 2009: 323s). There are lots

of secret transfers of nuclear technology among nations. Technological curiosity has paved the way to nuclear proliferation in which nations now base their security on technology development (Congressional Quarterly Research, 2007: 83-84).

Every nation of the world is now jostling for nuclear enrichment in the area of technology. It is to be noted that one threat connected with the newly nationalist states is the problem of weapons of mass destruction. There are nine nuclear powers in the world today: U.S., Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and just joining the club as its repulsive member is North Korea. There are also "latent" nuclear power countries with their technology affording the potential to go nuclear, i.e., Japan, Germany, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea. The third category is pariah countries seeking to acquire nuclear power, i.e. Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Nuclear satellites are built with an enormous amount of capital from a nation's budget (Oshuntokun, J., 2008: 50).

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY

Admiral William Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the U.S. President, in 1945 condemned the use of the atomic bomb on Japan when he said, "The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan..." (Ferrby et al., 2000: 247).

The devastating effects of this weapon on world peace and security could also be seen from a secret report to President Truman in April 1945 by the scientist who made the bomb, warning him about the danger inherent in the use of the weapon:

We remind you of the report sent to President Roosevelt in 1940. It spoke of the danger of radiation which killed men, women and children for several miles around the exposures. They will go on dying after the bomb has fallen. This will be a completely new horror in war. We began to build this bomb because we feared Hitler, who is now defeated. You want to use it against Japan. We believe this wrong. The U.S.A. should not be the first to use the atom bomb. Military advantage and saving of lives by dropping the bomb could be outweighed by the horror and revulsion that would sweep the world if we use it... (Ferrby et al., 2000: 248 Ibid).

When these weapons were eventually used, the devastating effects were recoded thus:

We saw the cloud coming out. The cloud, two minutes after explosion, was at air height of three thousand feet. It continued to go right up in a boiling fashion. Where there had been a city with distinctive houses and buildings, now you couldn't see anything except a black boiling debris (Ferrby et al., 2002: 46).

The common emission of gas from the bomb is capable of instilling abortion, instant death, and destruction of the eco-system. It also portends danger to the investors because the consequence does not spare any man, much less animals. The danger of radiation will kill several populations of human beings at near and far distances. The world is now in danger with the increasing wave of nationalism and international terrorism because terrorists could incidentally possess such weapons and will use them for total destruction of the earth. The effects of the use of these weapons may never be erased from world history. It may lead to a holocaust removing mankind and resources from the face of the earth. It can also lead to immediate stiff competition among the superpowers for a balance of power and terror. It may also instill fear and terror on mankind and make it insecure on the face of the earth.

The incessant militarization of the globe through nuclear weapons proliferation in the present century makes man's habitation presently exposed to danger.

It eventually exposes the world to the futility of security through arms race. Proliferation of nuclear weapons may likely pose a new threat and horror to world peace and security. There is danger that the use of this weapon any time could kill men, women, and children out to several miles around the exposure. The incessant militarization of the globe through nuclear weapons proliferation in the present century makes man's habitation presently exposed to danger (Robert, 2002: 197-210). The Second World War was a big lesson for other nations to embark on nuclear power because it has radically altered the state of modern warfare. In that war, the ultimate weapon was manufactured, used and, as expected, it effectively sealed the fate of nuclear victims (Obasi, 1989: 15-16).

The U.S. installation of missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland, and Russian installation in Azerbaijan, pose the threat of nuclear proliferation. It ushers in a constant face-off between the U.S. and North Korea regarding the nuclear tests carried out recently in the Pacific by the latter. Iran singing nuclear revolutionary choruses in the Middle East and the Israelis' preparation for assault against Iran for United Nations intervention (Punch, 2009:

6) (Bernard, (1959: 147), stressing the danger nuclear war will pose to the world's security and peace, said:

In the nuclear age, the outbreak of a war fought with nuclear weapons came to be viewed as the greatest of all catastrophes.

Despite the negative view of Bernard on the weapons proliferation impacts, nations still see it as security leverage against pre-emptive attack.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, the world is not at rest with contemporary issues troubling it in which nuclear proliferation takes the lead. Since aggression is inherent in man, nuclear war is therefore unpredictable due to a series of threats, aggression, power fissures, and international terrorism that has polluted the world. The fear now is who will use it first and when? This places the world on the equilibrium of the balance of terror and fear. The world is now living in perpetual fear, threat, and insecurity. Attempts at further production are currently generating serious conflict. Furthermore, as the magnitude of this problem grows, the prospect becomes dimmer that an international regime would be capable of coping with it effectively.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Vigorous pursuit of Arms Control and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) of 1979 must be revisited by the United Nations.

The tagging of some nations as "rogue states" should be withdrawn by the U.S. The term is infuriating and capable of challenging U.S integrity and power on nuclear proliferation by these states, e.g., North Korea, Iraq, Iran, etc.

Since no nation can stand in isolation without relating to other nations, it means nations really need others since the whole of our actions and desires is bound up with the existence of other human beings (Eistein, 2003: 3-4).

There must be parliamentary and populist opposition against any country which is in possession of nuclear weapons for military adventurism rather than economic development. This is a typical example that Germany has shown the world.

Though science has taught how to put the atom to work, to make it work for good instead of evil should lie in the domain dealing with the principle of human duty. Since we are now facing the problem of ethics rather than physics,

the solution to proliferation will require apparent sacrifice, better pain as the price of peace than pride, position, and death as the price of war (Bernard, 2004: 34).

There should be advocacy and apostolic approaches to world peace and security in the 21st century. This is borne out by former President Obama's ethical advocacy and apostolic approach to world peace and security when he pledged that:

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. These goals will not be reached quickly—perhaps in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change (Obama, 2009: 78).

What nations need now for security is not military might but socio-economic relations in which nations enjoy good leadership, better economy, environment, democracy, and fundamental human rights (Millerlynn, 1990: 251). Nuclear disarmament in recent times should be according to principle with mutual understanding of what begets international peace and security among world leaders and not on any forceful international law or exhibition of power of compliance from any of the superpowers hiding behind world order.

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The Investigation:

J. Edgar Hoover and The Manhattan Project

by Bill Streifer



Dr. Victor K. La Mer, Professor of Chemistry at Columbia University, who is himself presently working on National Defense matters, advised that he has no specific reason for distrusting [Dr. Leo] Szilard, but expressed himself as being very reluctant to trust secrets or confidential matter of national importance to any of the foreign scientists who have recently arrived in the United States. [La Mer] pointed out that even if the man himself were motivated by the best of intentions, it would be entirely possible some member of his immediate family could be held hostage in a foreign country to force the person in the United States to disclose secret or confidential matters.¹

—FBI report, October 28, 1940



Major General Leslie R. Groves awarding Enrico Fermi a medal.

The “Manhattan Project” (the post-war vernacular for the “Manhattan Engineer District”—MED), was a top-secret wartime program, the largest ever undertaken by the federal government, to develop the atomic bomb. By the end of World War II, the total cost of the program was nearly \$2 billion. Yet, despite the program’s massive size and complexity, a remarkable level of secrecy was maintained throughout the war to prevent “the secret of the atomic bomb” from falling into enemy hands.

Although basic atomic research began years before the U.S. was drawn into the war, the Army Corps of Engineers selected then-Colonel Leslie R. Groves to head the Manhattan Project on September 17, 1942, nearly a year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Colonel Groves (promoted to Brigadier General six days later²) then chose Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, a theoretical physicist and University of California, Berkeley, professor of physics, as the Manhattan Project’s scientific director (see photo at beginning of the article); Enrico Fermi as the head of theoretical studies; and Dr. Harold C. Urey of Columbia University (the 1934 recipient of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry) to head isotope separation and heavy water production. By early 1941, however, Dr. Urey had already assumed responsibility for formulating and coordinating all federally-funded academic and industrial work in those two important areas of research. Last but not least, Lieutenant Colonel John Lansdale, Jr., was responsible for project intelligence and security.



A post-war recreation of the Einstein-Szilard letter.

Many of the 150,000 or so scientists and engineers who took part in the Manhattan Project were aliens, including two key atomic scientists: Italian Enrico Fermi and Hungarian Leo Szilard. Between 1942 and 1945, Fermi collaborated with Szilard and a team of scientists at the University of Chicago on the construction of the world's first nuclear reactor, also known as an atomic pile. When Fermi proved that his small reactor would work, President Roosevelt ordered the construction of a large-scale reactor at the Hanford Site along the Columbia River in the state of Washington. At the Hanford "B Reactor," plutonium was produced for use during the atomic test, codenamed "Trinity," in the desert at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, and in the "Fat Man" atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945, three days after Hiroshima.

Leo Szilard is also credited with sparking the Manhattan Project. In the now-famous August 2, 1939,³ "Einstein-Szilard letter" to President Roosevelt (composed by Szilard), Albert Einstein wrote, "Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future."⁴ It might also be possible, Einstein wrote, through the recent work of "Joliot" [*sic*] in France, "as well as by Fermi and Szilard in America," to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium in which vast amounts of power are generated.⁵ In this way, Einstein said an atomic bomb might be possible:

This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable—though much less certain—that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory. However, such bombs might very well prove to be too heavy for transportation by air.⁶

Later, during an interview by the FBI, George G. Pegram, Dean of the School of Physics at Columbia University, "advised that Szilard was considered one of the leading theoretical physicists in the world today [and] in his opinion, Szilard and Enrico Fermi know as much or more than any other scientist in the world today about the smashing of the atom and the uranium theory."⁷ But what if Leo Szilard and Enrico Fermi, like Albert Einstein, had been labeled security risks by the U.S. Army,⁸ and had been prohibited from working on the design of nuclear reactors and the production of plutonium? How much longer might it have taken other Manhattan Project scientists to develop the "Fat Man" plutonium bomb—the second of two atomic bombs dropped on Japan—which many believe convinced Japan to surrender? As disruptive to the project as this scenario could have been, it is not as far-fetched as one might imagine.

THE FBI INVESTIGATION

On August 22, 1940, in a letter to J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, Colonel J.A. Crane, General Staff, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, stated that two Columbia University scientists, Enrico Fermi and a Mr. Szelard [*sic*], were under consideration as advisors pertaining to the National Defense Program.⁹ "Inasmuch as these men would have access to secret matters," COL Crane said, "I am attempting to verify their loyalty to the United States."¹⁰ Crane then requested Hoover conduct an investigation of these two individuals, and that a copy of the FBI report be sent to his office.¹¹ The following are the results of the investigation by U.S. Army Intelligence. Their conclusion, based on information received from "highly reliable sources," was that the employment of both Fermi and Szilard on secret work was "not recommended":

ENRICO FERMI: Department of Physics, Columbia University, New York City, is one of the most prominent scientists in the world in the field of physics. He is especially noted for breaking down the atom. He has been in the United States for about eighteen months. He is an Italian by birth and came here from Rome. He is supposed to have left Italy because of the fact that his wife is Jewish. He has been a Nobel Prize winner. His associates like him personally and greatly admire his intellectual ability. He is undoubtedly a Fascist. It is suggested that, before employing him on matters of a secret nature, a much more careful investigation be made. Employment of this person on secret work is not recommended.¹²

MR. SZELARD: It is believed that this man's name is SZILLARD [*sic*]. He is not on the staff of Columbia University, nor is he connected with the Department of Physics in any official capacity. He is a Jewish refugee from Hungary. It is understood that his family were wealthy merchants in Hungary and were able to come to the United States with most of their money. He is an inventor, and is stated to be very pro-German, and to have remarked on many occasions that he thinks the Germans will win the war. It is suggested that, before employing him on matters of a secret nature, a much more careful investigation be made. Employment of this person on secret work is not recommended.¹³

The FBI began its investigation of Szilard and Fermi with a Special Inquiry by Director Hoover to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in New York City. As Hoover explained, he had received a request from a COL Crane that the two named individuals were to be engaged in secret matters pertaining to the National Defense Program; that an investigation be conducted to determine their "character, background, loyalty and patriotism"; and that their loyalty to the United States should be verified.¹⁴ Attached to Hoover's Special Inquiry

was the result of the U.S. Army's preliminary investigation which recommended that the two men *not engage* in secret work for the government.¹⁵ The FBI Director also recommended that separate files be opened for Szilard and Fermi, and that FBI headquarters be "advised promptly" concerning the status of the investigations by SAC New York City.¹⁶


The clock ticked, and with each delay the U.S. nuclear program—without two of its key atomic scientists—fell further and further behind schedule.

About a month later, on September 25, 1940, Hoover once again contacted the SAC in New York City, this time with an admonishment. "To date, no reports have been received from your office reflecting the results of investigation conducted by you," Hoover wrote, "and you are, therefore, instructed to afford this matter your personal attention in order that this investigation be completed without delay, and reports forwarded to the Bureau at the earliest possible moment."¹⁷ Hoover's message was followed up by a telegram that read, "COMPLETE INVESTIGATION AT ONCE AND SUBMIT A REPORT NO LATER THAN FOURTEENTH INSTANT [14th of October]."¹⁸ The clock ticked, and with each delay the U.S. nuclear program—without two of its key atomic scientists—fell further and further behind schedule.

THE NAVY PROJECT

Aside from plutonium—produced in a nuclear reactor from natural uranium—the Manhattan Project also developed several methods of extracting U-235 (the fissile material used in the Hiroshima bomb) from U-238, the far more abundant uranium isotope. One advantage of the liquid thermal diffusion method of extracting U-235, for example, was its relative simplicity.¹⁹ First tested in the late 1930s by German scientists, thermal diffusion managed to produce only a small amount of separation, and until 1940 the phenomenon remained a little-known scientific curiosity until wartime events in 1940 precipitated intensive research by American scientists to secure the fissionable materials needed for their atomic project. In Washington, DC, chemist Philip H. Abelson of the Carnegie Institution and physicist-technical advisor Ross Gunn of the Naval Research Laboratory simultaneously sought financial support from the government for a liquid thermal diffusion research program. Abelson, who had worked with chemist Glenn Seaborg on plutonium chemistry at the University of California, Berkeley, wrote to Uranium Committee Chairman Lyman Briggs at the National Bureau of Standards and described how uranium

isotopes might be separated by thermal diffusion. Gunn, also a member of the Uranium Committee, passed on to other committee members his own interest in the potentialities of the process. Acting on Briggs' suggestion, the Navy decided to support research hoping that it might provide the fuel for a nuclear power plant suitable for use in submarines.



"Neutronic Reactor":

A patent by Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard.

At 1045 hours on the morning on October 11, 1940, the FBI received a call from Lieutenant Dick Wilson of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) concerning Szilard and Fermi. Wilson said they were currently working on an "important Navy project," that the National Defense Research Commission had refused to clear the two men, and that the Military Intelligence Division (MID) had agreed to clear the two scientists only for the current project. Consequently, Wilson said ONI wanted a report on the two scientists "as soon as possible" so they could determine whether these

men should “remain on the project.” Major Beckett of MID had previously advised Naval Intelligence that the FBI was presently investigating these two scientists.²⁰ Due to the “very keen interest” the ONI had in these two individuals, Wilson said he would appreciate a copy of each investigation immediately upon receipt by the FBI.²¹


After the FBI had received Wilson’s call, Hoover once again issued a Special Inquiry to the SAC in New York City concerning Szilard, which read, “COMPLETE INVESTIGATION AND SUBMIT REPORT AT ONCE.”²² Hoover’s telegram was followed by a message the next day marked “urgent,” in which he demanded that a complete investigation be submitted no later than October 17, or by telephone with the reasons “for failure to comply with instructions.”²³ Then at 1425 hours on the 17th, the day Hoover expected the report on Leo Szilard and Enrico Fermi to arrive, Special Agent Eugene J. Charters²⁴ from the New York City Field Office informed FBI Headquarters in Washington that he hoped a report could be submitted that day and, if not, one would be forwarded to the Bureau the following day.²⁵

Finally—after too long a wait—on October 24, 1940, Special Agent Cooney at FBI Headquarters issued a report on Szilard, based on a teletype message from B.E. Sackett, Director of the Bureau’s New York City Field Office dated the 19th.²⁶ On October 22, Hoover sent copies of Sackett’s report on Szilard and Fermi (below), which FBI Headquarters had received from the New York City Field Office, to Brigadier General Sherman Miles (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, in Washington) and to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson (Director, Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, also in Washington):

Leo Szilard, Special Inquiry National Defense Program. Dean George Pegram, Dean of Physics Dept., Columbia University, states Szilard is an Hungarian at birth, of Jewish faith, but after studying and teaching in Berlin became a German citizen. Left Germany about 1933 soon after Hitler came into power foreseeing his program against the Jews. Since then traveled between England and U.S., apparently looking for employment as teacher of physics. Refused position at Oxford at outset of present war upon his belief England would be defeated. Presently at Columbia as guest scholar working on experiments in uranium. Made efforts to interest U.S. Army and Navy in possibilities of this field particularly in defense of this country. Interested President Roosevelt in this matter and he appointed a Commission to examine the merits of uranium. Very much interested in anything which will further defense of U.S., Pegram advises applicant associated with Einstein in several inventions from which he receives royalties. Believes family is located in Switzerland and

New York State. Prof. I.I. Rabi, Columbia [Isador Isaac Rabi, Nobel Laureate in physics, 1944] states Szilard is rabid anti-Nazi and believes him trustworthy. Szilard filed Declaration of Intention to become citizen of the U.S. April 18, 1937. Gave nationality then as German, born in Hungary, 1898. Re-entry permit P1020963 granted evidently for travel to Europe. Arrived in U.S. Feb. 21, 1935 on S.S. Olympic. Manager of building where Szilard lives states he does not associate with anyone there and could give no information concerning him. Washington Field [Office] will check at State Department re-entry permit P1020963 and determine dates of travel by Szilard and countries visited by him. Newark Office at Princeton, N.J. will contact Prof. Albert Einstein for any information he may be able to give concerning Szilard. No credit or criminal record NYC.²⁷

Dean George Pegram, Columbia University, states Fermi was Nobel Prize winner in 1938. Prior thereto, Mr. Fermi taught physics at the University of Rome and he was a member of the Italian Academy of Sciences. As such was Italian government employee and necessarily a member of the Fascist Party but he asserts that he had no love for or commitment to that party. Mr. Fermi left Italy in October 1938 when Mussolini began discriminations against the Jews as Mr. Fermi’s wife and children are Jewish. Pegram states Fermi is forthright, honest and straightforward. He believes Fermi has no relatives in Italy although his wife’s people may still be there. I.I. Rabi, Professor of Physics at Columbia University, states Fermi is trustworthy and he believes loyalties will be with the United States as long as Fascist Party retains control of Italy. He advises that Fermi has bought home at 283 Summit Avenue, Leona, New Jersey, and apparently plans to make this his permanent residence. Prof. V.K. La Mer, Columbia University, states he believes Fermi to be man of personal integrity. However, La Mer states he has general reluctance to disclose secret matters relating to National Defense to any recent foreign arrivals. Fermi made Declaration of Intention to become United States citizen in November 1939, stating he was born in Rome, Italy, in 1910. He arrived in the United States January 22, 1939, on the S.S. Franconia with his wife and two children. Credit record found to be good. No criminal record located.²⁸



An invention by Einstein and Szilard.

While the reports on Leo Szilard and Enrico Fermi were generally favorable, concerns lingered regarding Szilard's loyalty to the United States; hence, the FBI's investigation continued. The Newark Field Office followed up on undeveloped leads including the interviews of Albert Einstein, the co-author of the Einstein-Szilard letter, and Professor Eugene Wigner, a Hungarian theoretical physicist and mathematician whom Szilard had listed on his entry paper as the one he traveled to meet upon his arrival in the U.S. in February 1935.²⁹ Below is from FBI Special Agent McMahon's interview of Dr. Einstein and Prof. Wigner, who McMahon said was the only professor at Princeton available for interview.

Einstein, who was interviewed at his home at 112 Mercer Street in Princeton, New Jersey, said he had known Szilard since about 1920, that Szilard was about 30 years old, and that he was born in Hungary of Jewish parents. He said he did not know anything about Szilard's relatives since he knew him only "from a scientific point of view." While in Berlin, Szilard had been assistant to a Professor Laue at the University of Berlin, whom Einstein described as a "very decent man" and the "only German he knows who behaved in an admirable way after Hitler's advent to power." When Szilard was at the University of Berlin, Einstein said he saw him "every day for many years." While Einstein did not believe Szilard had ever been a German citizen, he was not positive.³⁰

Einstein also stated that Szilard was connected in some fashion with Columbia University in New York City, where he was working on uranium experiments for military

purposes. He said the work was on a private scale but that it was financed by the University, and that he was working with an Italian by the name of Fermi whom Einstein described as a "very trustworthy man." Einstein then revealed that he saw Szilard quite frequently as he visited him "to inform him as to his work on the uranium experiment." The last time Einstein said he saw Szilard was a week or ten days earlier when Szilard, together with Eugene Wigner, had visited him at Princeton University. Although Einstein said Szilard was acquainted with Prof. John von Neumann at Princeton, he described Wigner as Szilard's "very close friend" and therefore he would know more about him.³¹

Einstein, who referred to Szilard as a "very idealistic man," said he was not at all politically-minded and was never connected with any organizations, societies, or political groups abroad. Einstein, who described Szilard as a "very fine, gifted young man...absolutely honest, reliable, and trustworthy," said he would "recommend him very highly" to the U.S. government "without any hesitation," and that he would "assume any responsibility for his conduct." Einstein also claimed Szilard was "anti-Nazi" as he himself was, and believed that the government could trust him in any respect "without fear whatsoever that Szilard might disclose confidential information to a foreign power."³²

Prof. Wigner, who was later interviewed by the FBI at his home in Princeton, said Szilard spent the early part of his life in Hungary, and when he was about 18 years old he went to war with the Hungarian Army which fought on the side of Germany. Wigner said that Hungary and Germany had had very close ties during that period, but their relationship was currently very strained. After World War I had ended, Szilard (who was about 21 years old at the time) went to Berlin where he studied at the Berlin Institute of Technology for about five years. He then remained in Germany where he taught physics and did research work. Wigner agreed with Einstein that Szilard had been employed by the German General Electric Co. (A.E.G.) in Berlin as a consultant engineer; that he may have been a member of the German Physical Society, but that it was a scientific society; and that Szilard had worked on a number of inventions with Einstein. Although editors of scientific publications were advised to send all publications on uranium to a Reference Committee so that they could be examined and suppressed if necessary, according to Wigner, Szilard may have recently submitted a paper for publication "merely for the purpose of seeing whether or not the Reference Committee was actually checking on all publications."³³

Although Wigner felt Szilard was "a little weak in the mathematical angle," he called Szilard "the most brilliant and most ingenious persons [*sic*] in the world," and that his "imagination and creative ability are very extraordinary."

Wigner, who described himself as one of Szilard's closest friends, said he always had complete confidence in Szilard, calling him "absolutely honest and trustworthy." He also knew nothing derogatory about him, although Wigner said Szilard could be "a little blunt at times" in that he gave his opinion on matters a little prematurely, but once people get to know him they liked him very much. He also insisted Szilard was definitely interested in the American way of life, he was opposed to all totalitarian forms of government, and he was outspokenly anti-Nazi. So far as he was concerned, Wigner said Szilard could be trusted completely and he would recommend him to the U.S. government. Wigner and the FBI Special Agent then discussed Szilard's source of income including royalties he had received (amounting to \$2,000 per year on some of the patents he had perfected with Einstein) and the fact he had deposited some of that money in a Swiss bank account.³⁴

Later that month, on November 30, 1940, in a letter to the SAC in New York City, Hoover wrote, "From a review of the Bureau file in the above-entitled case [Leo Szilard, Special Inquiry, National Defense Program], it appears that all investigation has been completed. You are, therefore, instructed to review your file in this matter and submit a closing report to the Bureau at the earliest possible moment."³⁵ Then on December 23, Hoover again asked the New York City Field Office to submit a closing report without further delay.³⁶ In compliance with Hoover's request, on New Year's Eve 1940, four-and-a-half months after U.S. Army Intelligence issued its initial report on Szilard, the New York City Field Office wrote, "A review of the file in this matter discloses that all investigation leads have been closed. Accordingly, this case is being closed."³⁷ Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy was still not entirely convinced of Szilard's loyalty to the United States.

Consequently, on May 4, 1942, four months before the Manhattan Project was officially to begin,³⁸ Hoover sent a message to the New York City Field Office requesting that yet another investigation of Szilard commence:

The Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department has requested this Bureau conduct an investigation of the subject [Leo Szilard], who has applied for a position with the Office of Scientific Research and Development [OSRD]. This Bureau has previously conducted an investigation of the subject in 1940, which failed to disclose that he was disloyal to the United States, your file number 62-6878. Copies of these reports have been furnished to the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, a summary of information prepared by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, dated October 1, 1940, indicates that the subject is reportedly pro-German and that members of the

faculty of the Columbia University state they would not care to guarantee his loyalty to the United States. For this reason, the Office of Naval Intelligence has requested this investigation be conducted...³⁹

According to a special inquiry by the Department of the Navy, subsequent FBI interviews with Columbia University faculty showed Dr. Leo Szilard to be "thoroughly loyal to the United States with no pro-Axis sympathies."⁴⁰ Dean Pegram, for instance, reiterated his support of Szilard, calling him "a man of outstanding ability and one who he felt was thoroughly loyal to the United States." Yes, Szilard was formerly connected with the University of Berlin, but when Hitler began his persecution of the Jews, Pegram said Szilard resigned his position and went to England with Prof. Einstein where he acted as Einstein's assistant. Prof. Webb, who made reference to Szilard's Jewish background, said he believed Szilard was "definitely opposed to Hitler and the Axis powers." Dr. V.K. Le Mer said he did not know Szilard well enough to vouch for him personally, although he had never heard Szilard indicate any sympathies for Germany, nor had he heard any member of the Columbia University faculty indicate, in any way, their distrust of Szilard. Prof. Farwell, who said he was not sufficiently aware of Szilard's views and opinions, nevertheless said he would be very surprised if Szilard had ever done anything to "injure the United States in its present war effort."⁴¹ Prof. Jan Schilt, the chairman of Columbia University's astronomy department, said he did not know Szilard that well. Nevertheless, he had never heard any member of the faculty make derogatory comments about him, nor should the Navy fear disclosing to him confidential secrets. When Prof. Harold C. Urey was asked for his opinion of Szilard, he said he had had numerous conversations with Szilard and would recommend him "without qualification."

POST-WAR CONCERNS

Following the defeat of Japan and the end of World War II, the ferocious hot war against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan quickly turned into a "Cold War" with the U.S.'s former ally, the Soviet Union. With it came new concerns: Szilard's Communist sympathies. In a June 4, 1946, letter, the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) informed the FBI that, effective June 30, Szilard would no longer be employed by the Manhattan Project.⁴²

Dr. Szilard has been with the Manhattan Project since its inception and has worked at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago. Although this office has no evidence of un-American activities on the part of Szilard, he has constantly associated with known "liberals." He has been a leading member of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago and has been

outspoken in his support of the internationalism of the atomic energy program. He has been a constant influence on other scientists in influencing their support of this international program.⁴³

Dr. Szilard has been with the Manhattan Project since its inception...Although this office has no evidence of un-American activities on the part of Szilard, he has constantly associated with known "liberals."

In view of Szilard's position and background, Hoover thought it desirable that upon termination of Szilard's employment with the MED he be closely investigated in order to determine whether he revealed information pertaining to the project to "unauthorized sources."⁴⁴ About a week later, in reference to Hoover's June 10 letter, the MED in Chicago further advised the FBI that, by mutual agreement, Szilard's separation from the Manhattan Project had been backdated to June 1, and that the MED's Chicago Branch had conducted "an extensive investigation" into the activities of Dr. Szilard. In a personal and confidential memo to the FBI Director, George R. McSwain, Special Agent in Charge (SAC) at the FBI's Chicago office, enclosed a copy of a summary report dated March 12, 1945, on the basis of which, McSwain said, the investigation by the Manhattan Project was closed. Another copy of that summary report was furnished to the San Francisco Field Division together with McSwain's letter. In accordance with Hoover's June 10 reference letter, McSwain indicated an additional investigation on Dr. Szilard would be conducted. McSwain also noted that the FBI had been advised Szilard had personal knowledge of information classified as "top secret" pertaining to the Manhattan Project.⁴⁵ McSwain, who advised Hoover of Szilard's current address, said the FBI's Chicago branch had no information concerning Szilard's future plans.⁴⁶

In connection with the FBI's interview of the Director of the Institute for Nuclear Physics at the University of Chicago, Dr. Samuel K. Allison said Szilard had been considered for a position with the Institute for Nuclear Physics. His application for employment, however, was rejected since it was felt Szilard's activities were "too political" and his interests were no longer strictly in the sciences. Allison also advised the FBI that Szilard was a close friend of Jean Frédéric Joliet, the French nuclear physicist who was presently in the U.S. as a representative of France in connection with the United Nations' consideration of nuclear matters. He also said Szilard was very "patent conscious," and "was by nature an inventor and promoter

who thinks only of his own interests." In 1959, for example, Szilard wrote to Joliet in an attempt to gain patent rights from him related to a nuclear invention for patenting by Szilard in the United States. Szilard had urged Joliet to keep secret his discoveries with respect to atomic matters, but Joliet refused and went ahead with the publication of his findings. McSwain also noted that Dr. Allison referred to Joliet as "a Communist." McSwain's memo to Hoover ended as follows: "Dr. Allison stated that he had been given to understand that Dr. Szilard was being considered by the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago as a professor in some line pertaining to world politics."⁴⁷

POSTSCRIPT

Ex-FBI Chief Here Is Found Hanged in Room

(Chicago Tribune, November 30, 1972)



George R. McSwain

George R. McSwain, the FBI Special Agent in Charge who led the postwar investigation of Szilard, committed suicide in 1972. In the *Chicago Tribune*, in a story titled "Ex-FBI Chief Here Is Found Hanged in Room,"⁴⁸ McSwain, "a former head of the FBI office in Chicago and once the central figure in a Supreme Court case," was found hanged in his residence in his room at the Chicago Athletic Club. According to police, McSwain had apparently stretched twine over the bathroom door and nearby plumbing, climbed on a stool to tie the rope around his neck, and then kicked over the stool.⁴⁹ No suicide note was found.⁵⁰

George R. McSwain, the FBI Special Agent in Charge who led the postwar investigation of Szilard, committed suicide in 1972.

The 61-year-old former agent headed the FBI's Chicago office for six years, from September 1945 until September 1951, when he was promoted to the Washington headquarters to become inspector general in charge of investigations. Within a week of his appointment, and before leaving Chicago, McSwain announced he was leaving the FBI. Declaring instead he was entering private business, McSwain said his departure from the Bureau did not reflect "dissatisfaction with the FBI in any way."⁵¹

As head of the Chicago office, in addition to leading the FBI's investigation into Leo Szilard's alleged ties to Communists, McSwain also became embroiled in a court case that was finally settled in his favor by the U.S. Supreme Court.⁵² In refusing to abide by a court order to produce FBI records on Roger ("the Terrible") Touhy, a Prohibition-era gangster, McSwain was cited for contempt in several lower courts.⁵³ The refusal, McSwain said, was in accordance with Justice Department instructions.⁵⁴ Touhy is best remembered for having been framed for the faked kidnapping of gangster John "Jake the Barber" Factor, a brother of cosmetics manufacturer Max Factor, Sr. In the end, after having spent 25 years in Stateville Penitentiary for a crime he said he did not commit, Touhy was gunned down a brief 23 days after he was released on parole.⁵⁵

[Author's Note: This article is drawn mostly from wartime and post-war FBI documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Of the 405 wartime pages reviewed, only 89 were released; many of the remaining documents were withheld either because they originated with Other Government Agencies (OGA), including the U.S. Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Attorney General (DOJ) and the Assistant Solicitor General, or because the FBI required a referral/consult, or because their release "could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source." Many of the post-war FBI reports on Leo Szilard remain heavily redacted.]

NOTES

¹ "Leo Szilard," by D.J. Williams (New York City), FBI, Special Inquiry, National Defense Program, October 25, 1940.

² F.G. Gosling, *The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb*, U.S. Department of Energy, 1999, p. 13.

³ President Roosevelt received the August 2, 1939, Einstein-Szilard letter on October 11—the outbreak of war intervened.

⁴ <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Begin/Einstein.shtml>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Letter, FBI (Washington) to FBI field office (New York City), August 30, 1940.

⁸ David E. Rowe and Robert Schulmann, *Einstein on Politics: His Private Thoughts and Public Stands on Nationalism, Zionism, War Peace and the Bomb*, Princeton University Press, p. 41.

⁹ COL Crane to LTC Hoover, War Department General Staff, Washington, DC, August 22, 1940.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, HQ, 2nd Corps Area, Governors Island, NY, August 13, 1940.

¹³ Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, HQ, 2nd Corps Area, Governors Island, NY, August 13, 1940.

¹⁴ Hoover to SAC New York City, August 30, 1940.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Hoover to SAC New York City, September 25, 1940.

¹⁸ Teletype, Hoover to SAC New York City (via FBI Communications Center), October 9, 1940.

¹⁹ All references to thermal diffusion and the U.S. Navy are from Vincent C. Jones, *Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb*, Chapter 8: "The Liquid Thermal Diffusion Process," U.S. Army Center of Military History, pp. 172-173.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "Memorandum for Mr. Clegg," by M.C. Spear, FBI (Washington, DC), October 11, 1940.

²² Teletype, Hoover to SAC New York City (via FBI Communications Center), October 15, 1940.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ E.J. Charters, a graduate of Wharton School with a degree in economics and an LLB from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, joined the Division of Investigation, Department of Justice, in 1934, before it was renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the following year.

²⁵ "Memorandum for Mr. Clegg," by C.H. Carson, FBI, October 17, 1940.

²⁶ "Leo Szilard," by John F. Cooney (New York City), Special Inquiry, National Defense Program, October 24, 1940; teletype from New York City Field Office to SACs Washington and Newark, October 19, 1940 at 5:00 p.m.

²⁷ Teletype, New York City Field Office to SACs Washington and Newark, October 19, 1940 at 5:00 p.m.

²⁸ Hoover to General Sherman Miles (attention: Colonel J.A. Crane), memorandum, October 22, 1940.

²⁹ "Enrico Fermi," FBI report by D.J. Williams, October 28, 1940.

³⁰ "Leo Szilard," FBI report by Joseph P. McMahon, November 8, 1940.

³¹ "Leo Szilard," FBI report by Joseph P. McMahon, November 8, 1940. The following three paragraphs all reflect on the same citation.

³² "Leo Szilard," FBI report by Joseph P. McMahon, November 8, 1940.

³³ "Leo Szilard," FBI report by Joseph P. McMahon, November 8, 1940.

³⁴ "Leo Szilard," FBI report by Joseph P. McMahon, November 8, 1940.

³⁵ Hoover to SAC New York City, November 30, 1940.

³⁶ Hoover to SAC New York City, December 23, 1940.

³⁷ "Leo Szilard," by D.J. Williams, FBI, Dec. 23, 1940.

³⁸ The *Manhattan Project* officially began on September 23, 1942, when Colonel Leslie R. Groves was named director of the project.

³⁹ "Leo Szilard," Hoover to SAC New York City, May 4, 1942.

⁴⁰ "Leo Szilard, Character of Case: Alien Employment – Aircraft and Munitions Production"; Special Inquiry (Navy Department), by D.V. Shannon (New York), FBI, July 10, 1942; this entire paragraph carries the same citation.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² "Dr. Leo Szilard: Internal Security – R (Russia)," FBI, June 10, 1946.

⁴³ This paragraph is quoted in "Dr. Leo Szilard: Internal Security – R (Russia)," FBI, June 10, 1946.

⁴⁴ "Dr. Leo Szilard: Internal Security – R (Russia)," FBI, June 10, 1946.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ SAC George R. McSwain to Hoover (SECRET), June 19, 1946.

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⁴⁸ The photo of George R. Swain is from an article in the *Chicago Tribune*, "Ex-FBI Chief Here Is Found Hanged in Room," November 30, 1972, Sec. 2, p. 14.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ "Ex-FBI Chief Here is Found Hanged in Room," *Chicago Tribune*, November 30, 1972, Sec. 2, p. 14; this and the following paragraph carry the same citation.

⁵¹ "Ex-FBI Chief Here is Found Hanged in Room," *Chicago Tribune*, November 30, 1972, Sec. 2, p. 14.

⁵² "Ex-FBI Chief Here is Found Hanged in Room," *Chicago Tribune*, November 30, 1972, Sec. 2, p. 14.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ "The Murder of Roger Touhy," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Part 1, December 18, 1959, p. 10.

Bill Streifer is a freelance journalist and historical researcher. He writes on topics ranging from World War II missions by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—the forerunner of the CIA—to the history of the Japanese, North Korean, and Soviet nuclear programs. He is also the only American on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Oriental Studies, published by the Russian Academy of Sciences in

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Battleground London

by Dr. Boris Volodarsky

BACKDROP

In spite of the well-publicised ARCOS case, Soviet espionage activity against Great Britain in the period between the two world wars never stopped. The operation began soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917.

THE OPERATION

Although Nazi Germany was quickly recognized as an imminent and present danger, Stalin's largest intelligence operation before the war was in the ISLAND. In Soviet intelligence reports ISLAND stood for Great Britain. The operation began soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 and made Guy Liddell, a MI5 counterespionage expert, note in his diary, "I am perfectly certain that they [Russians] are well bedded down here and that we should be making more investigations." Nevertheless, for about four decades after the establishment of the Security Service, Soviet espionage (unlike Soviet subversion) was not identified as a significant threat.

For about four decades after the establishment of the Security Service, Soviet espionage (unlike Soviet subversion) was not identified as a significant threat.

A massive attack on British institutions (the Foreign Office, Scotland Yard, intelligence and security services, political parties, military production facilities, armed forces, and media) started after the Bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky recognized that the British Empire was the main adversary of the young Soviet empire. The ARCOS raid in 1927, in which Liddell was involved, was a major coup in an attempt to uncover Soviet espionage networks in Britain. ARCOS, the All-Russian Co-operative Society, Ltd., a British-registered company with only Soviet stockholders that began operations in London in October 1920, was responsible for trading with the Soviet government, at the same time serving

as a front for espionage and propaganda activities. The chairman of the board and managing director of ARCOS was a civilian who previously served in Soviet trade delegations in France and Germany. He was later sentenced to death and shot in Moscow.

At the time, many employees of various Soviet businesses abroad were émigrés. One of them, who went by the name of Isaak Groushko, came to Great Britain as a political refugee in 1914. By 1922 he had made a career serving as the general manager of the Soviet trade delegation where he was engaged in the purchase of aircraft machineguns for the Red Army. Naturally, he was suspected, although his contact with the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) had never been conclusively established. Neither was that of Nikolai Klyshko, who is sometimes named by intelligence historians as the first resident agent of RIS in London. Although the head of the Russia section, Captain Maurice Bray, one of MI5's Russian speakers, concluded in July 1918 that Klyshko was the "most dangerous Bolshevik here," he probably had in mind Klyshko's communist propaganda efforts but not his espionage. Before he shared the fate of his ARCOS colleague in October 1937, Klyshko had no links with Soviet intelligence.

Finally, agents of the Special Branch of Scotland Yard managed to arrest the person whom they thought was a real spy. Wilfred Frances Remington Macartney was identified as a Russian agent tasked with collecting military intelligence. According to one report, Macartney is "very neatly dressed, usually wears an eyeglass, and of excellent address and good education; small to medium height, clean shaven, dark hair usually worn brushed right back from his forehead... [He] is completely unscrupulous, can never tell the truth about any matter, is very clever but not quite so clever as he thinks." Another Secret Service report written on 19 October 1926 claimed that Macartney had joined the Communist Party of Great Britain. He was arrested in November 1927 and brought to trial two months later. Macartney was convicted of various charges under the Official Secrets Act, including "attempting to obtain information on the RAF" and "collecting information relating to the mechanized force of His Majesty's Army," and sentenced to ten years in prison. It has always been thought that Desmond Morton of SIS and Guy Liddell of MI5 were

asked to investigate Macartney and finally managed to spring the trap with the help of Lloyds underwriter George Monckland, who acted as the main witness against Macartney at the Old Bailey.

Macartney had worked for SIS (then MI1c) during World War I and is often believed to have spent his term in jail for “comic opera espionage,” as one author put it. Morton, who headed a new SIS department, Section VI, formed to gather intelligence on the economic preparations for war of potential enemies, thought that Macartney was linked to ARCOS and the Russian Intelligence Services, though he could not know at the time which service. Although no definitive documentary proof has surfaced so far, there is little doubt that Macartney tried to collect intelligence for the organization headed by Rudolf Kirchenstein (codenamed KNYAZ), known to the Security Service as Jacob Kirchenstein or “Johnny Walker.” A career military intelligence officer, Kirchenstein had served as the Red Army Intelligence Directorate’s (future GRU) head of station in Great Britain from 1924, first under Plenipotentiary Christian Rakovsky, then Leonid Krasin, and after the latter’s death in November 1926, Arkady Rosengoltz, the last Soviet diplomatic representative in London before relations were interrupted for two years.

Contrary to what is stated in his official GRU biography, Kirchenstein gained employment with the ARCOS Steamship Company in 1924. Interception of his correspondence and that of his colleagues began in May 1924. Kirchenstein’s friend, Stefan Zbikowski (codenamed ALOIS), who had been together in Germany during the Hamburg Uprising a year before both moved to London, was controlling an undercover spy cell which, as reported, was not too productive before the headquarters of ARCOS and the Soviet Trade Delegation at 49 Moorgate were raided on 12 May 1927. On that day police decided to search one Anton Miller, a cipher clerk at ARCOS. During the following parliamentary debates, he was described as “one of the leaders of the Russian spy organisation, in the very closest touch with the actual leader of it” (HANSARD, The House of Commons debates, 2 June 1927, vol. 207, cc. 523-4). In reality, it was not Anton Miller but his brother Peter Miller who served as cipher clerk in the Trade Delegation and was Kirchenstein’s assistant. Others, like the German Communist Karl Bahn, Robert Koling (alias “Kaulin”), and Stepan Melnichuk, all employed by different Soviet organizations in Great Britain, and Yakov (“Jan”) Zhilinsky, head of personnel at ARCOS, were members of the Kirchenstein espionage organization.

The authorities were not aware of Zbikowski and his undercover cell as at that time they knew nothing about the so-called “illegals,” i.e., intelligence officers and

agents who operate without the benefit of official cover. However, when Kirchenstein, who was permanently shadowed, made contact with two officials from the Air Ministry, Scotland Yard became concerned. Soon the ARCOS headquarters was raided with considerable manpower. A well-travelled American correspondent, Louis Fischer, then living in Moscow, wrote in *The Nation* that the “supposedly free governments of the West were more tyrannical” than Stalin’s regime. Fischer commented on the ARCOS affair: “It disclosed nothing that had not been known before, and failed to produce the highly important War Office documents the rumoured theft of which served as excuse for the raid. The official White Paper containing the documents found in the raid was thin evidence indeed, and led to no arrests or charges for illegal or subversive activities by Russian or British subjects.” Fischer later regretted his pro-Soviet stance in joining the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

...the British Vickers Mark E light tank was copied almost exactly by the Soviets as the T-26, which was produced in great numbers and was the most important tank of the Spanish Civil War.

In spite of the well-publicized ARCOS case, Soviet espionage activity against Great Britain never stopped. In the early 1930s, Moscow received a large number of secret documents from its sources in the Foreign Office Communications Department. They were Captain Ernest Holloway Oldham (ARNO), Raymond Oake (SHELLEY), and from 1935 Captain John H. King (MAG), as well as a long-serving agent at the British embassy in Rome, Francesco Constantini (DUNCAN), and his brother Secondo (DUDLEY). Secret contacts with all of them were established and maintained on the continent. Unbeknownst to the Security Service, separate spy rings were also set up in London under the supervision of OGPU (predecessor of the KGB) officer Yevgeny Mitskewicz (ANATOLY) and Red Army officer Mikhail Weinberg. Weinberg, using the alias “Sokolov,” was manager of the Engineering Department of ARCOS from 1932 to 1936. The authorities suspected him of having an intelligence function because of his receipt of aircraft plans from a draftsman named Eric Camp, who was bound over under the Official Secrets Act. Upon his return to Moscow, Weinberg/Sokolov was first promoted to department chief but in 1938 arrested and shot.

Mitskewicz operated undercover and controlled two groups of agents in England, both in place when he was leaving the country in the first half of 1933. One was in

the Royal Arsenal in Woolwich, consisting of Percy Glading, George Whomack, Albert Williams, Charles Munday, and perhaps one or two others. The four were later arrested and went on trial. Glading, Whomack, and Williams were found guilty of espionage and sentenced to different prison terms while Munday pleaded not guilty and was acquitted. As a result of their activity, the British Vickers Mark E light tank was copied almost exactly by the Soviets as the T-26, which was produced in great numbers and was the most important tank of the Spanish Civil War.

Nothing has been established so far about the second group, but it was probably affiliated with the Soviet trading organization Russian Oil Products (ROP), which was registered as a British limited-liability company in 1924. All its shareholders were Russian nationals, which did not go unnoticed by the Security Service. Its recent *Authorized History*, written by Christopher Andrew, states that "MI5 and the Special Branch calculated in 1930 that ROP had almost a thousand employees, about one-third of whom were members of the CPGB, and had built up a network of thirty-three offices, depots and installations across the UK." The service reported in 1932 that "one of the principal comrades who acts as liaison between ROP and the Party" was Percy Glading. The oil company provided a sophisticated front for the increasing Soviet scientific and technological intelligence operations of the 1930s.

The discovery that the Special Branch had been penetrated led to responsibility for countering Soviet espionage being transferred to MI5 in the same year. This, however, in no way helped to prevent Soviet penetration of British institutions.

In early 1933 Mitskewicz reported to Moscow that these two groups of agents were temporarily put on ice and requested that his successor be sent to London as soon as possible. He recommended Ignaty Reif (MAR), but the latter did not arrive until September and then remained only for a short while. The aim of his visit was to establish a contact with an Englishman whom Reif's colleague Vasili Zarubin recruited in Paris some time ago. It was a pro-Soviet foreign editor of the *Daily Herald*, William Norman Ewer. Until 1928 Ewer was running a network of agents in the Metropolitan Police also using the services of John "Jack" Hayes, a former Metropolitan Police officer who would be reelected as a Labour Member of Parliament in 1929. Despite the fact that Ewer's subversive activities for the Russians had been

established without any reasonable doubt, MI5 chose not to prosecute him and his agents. In June 1929 Hayes went on to serve as a party whip and also as vice chamberlain for the Royal Household in the second MacDonald government, the post he occupied until 1931 when he refused to join the national government and in October lost his seat. The discovery that the Special Branch had been penetrated led to responsibility for countering Soviet espionage being transferred to MI5 in the same year. This, however, in no way helped to prevent Soviet penetration of British institutions.

Initially, it was decided to send Zarubin to London where he was to be assisted by Reif and the Austrian OGPU operative Dr. Arnold Deutsch but, because of the Nazi victory in Germany, Zarubin was urgently redirected to Berlin. Reif settled in Copenhagen and in February 1934 Deutsch arrived in London where his cousin, Oscar Deutsch, was the millionaire owner of the Odeon cinema chain. Reif joined him two months later, having found an apartment at 16 Brixton Hill in Lambeth.

There were now more Soviet agents in London than in any other European capital.

They worked together until June when Reif left for Copenhagen again. By the summer, their network of agents, helpers, talent-spotters, and couriers had already included Edith Suschitzky (EDITH); her husband Alexander Ethel Tudor-Hart (alias "Harold White"); Alice "Litzi" Friedmann, the first wife of Kim Philby, later recruited as agent MARY; Philby himself, then only a candidate for recruitment; agents PFEIL (also GERTA or HERTA, in Russian STRELA); JOHN (unidentified); FRIEND (Brian Goold-Verschoye); PROFESSOR; LUXI; GRIMM; and YEGOR (all four unidentified). In a few weeks Glading (codenamed GOT) introduced Deutsch to ATILLA (unidentified) who also brought along his son, adding another agent (codenamed NACHFOLGER) to this impressive list. There were now more Soviet agents in London than in any other European capital. Therefore, an urgent telegram was sent to Vienna where Lev Lazarevich Nikolsky was enjoying a warm Austrian summer with his family.

His Soviet passport No. 104290, valid for foreign travel and signed personally by the NKVD chief, identified him as "Léon Nikolaeff" but neither "Nikolsky" nor "Nikolaeff" was the name given to him at birth. The man, now aged 39, was born in the provincial Byelorussian town of Bobruisk as Leiba Feldbin. However, after the revolution he was able to change his name legally to Nikolsky. Almost all his relatives subsequently emigrated

to the United States, and the only one who remained became a big NKVD mandarin. Accordingly, on 1 April 1924, Nikolsky joined the organization. He took the necessary oath, signing a paper never to disclose anything related to his work for the Russian Intelligence Service that was soon to become Stalin's secret police.

Each intelligence mission has a chance to succeed or fail. Before he received his summons to London, Nikolsky managed to fail at all his spy missions in Europe. Now he did not want to work against His Majesty's government, preferring to go to America where there was no counterintelligence. He had been fortunate enough to obtain a genuine U.S. passport in the name of "William Goldin" when he visited the country in 1932. After a week in London, Nikolsky returned to Moscow, begging his bosses not to send him back. It was to no avail. On 18 September 1934, "businessman" Goldin registered what he called American Refrigerator Co., Ltd., in the Imperial House on 84 Regent Street and began an adventure that would not become known until the present day despite widespread rumors.

All three of them were pitched in a false-flag operation; that is, it was not explained to the agents for whom they were going to work. They were given an impression, as all of them were staunch communists, that they were helping the Comintern.

By early 1935, Nikolsky/Goldin was travelling back and forth doing courier work until he permanently settled in London in mid-January. In the meantime, Deutsch managed to recruit Philby (SÖHNCHEN), whom he first met in June after he and Litzi returned from Austria and settled in London. However, it was not Litzi, as Philby wrote in his KGB-sponsored memoirs three decades later, who told him that she had arranged for him to meet a "man of decisive importance." It was her Vienna friend, a fellow Austrian named Edith Suschitzky, now Tudor Hart, who arranged Philby's first contact with Deutsch in Regent's Park. When another Soviet agent, James MacGibbon (DOLLY), was commissioned to publish Philby's memoirs in London in 1968, Edith was still alive; hence, her identity as Philby's talent-spotter could not be revealed.

Soon Philby introduced his two Cambridge mates, "both with excellent opportunities and connections," as Deutsch reported to Moscow, to Soviet spymasters. First, Philby arranged a meeting between Reif and Donald Maclean, and they met several times between October and December 1934. During this time Reif was "cultivating"

the young Englishman before finally recruiting him as agent LYRIC in December. A month later, his and Philby's friend Guy Burgess started working for Stalin. He was formally recruited as a fully-fledged agent MÄDCHEN in summer. All three of them were pitched in a false-flag operation; that is, it was not explained to the agents for whom they were going to work. They were given an impression, as all of them were staunch communists, that they were helping the Comintern. From February to October 1935 Nikolsky/Goldin was controlling Philby, Maclean (now WAISE in operational correspondence), BÄR (unidentified), and PROFESSOR, who was almost certainly a real professor at Cambridge. However, Nikolsky was not able to report a single result because, before Maclean was appointed to the Foreign Office in October 1935, none of them was able to collect any intelligence. By the time WAISE became a proud member of His Majesty's Diplomatic Service, Nikolsky was already in Moscow sacked from the Foreign Department.

While still in London, Nikolsky paid himself £120 pounds a month, which is about £7,220 today, and Deutsch, with whom he worked for only one month in June-July, received £80 (£4,813). Their courier PFEIL was paid £56 (£3,369) while the agents were earning, respectively, Maclean £40 (£2,406), Burgess £12 10s (£752), and Philby £11 (£662). Remarkably, during the time Nikolsky was in London none of them seems to have produced a single intelligence report.

In some sources it is claimed that Deutsch, who was not a commissioned officer but a civil employee, during his three years in England recruited about 30 agents, including the Cambridge Five. According to the KGB files, however, between Burgess and the next member of the Cambridge Spy Ring, Anthony Blunt (TONY), 103 agents were successfully recruited and run by the Soviet controller.

Nikolsky saved his skin by volunteering to go to Spain after the civil war broke out there in July 1936. He remained at his post and was even promoted to head the small NKVD station, first in Madrid and later in Valencia and Barcelona, until he decided it was time to join his relatives in the U.S. and deserted in July 1938. There, he published three books and several articles. All of them were meticulously studied by historians over several decades and many served as the basis for different chapters and even books. Alas, none of what this wily Willy wrote or even told the U.S. Congress while testifying under oath is true—not a single word.

In 1953, after his first book was serialized by *Life* magazine, the FBI and later the CIA started to interview the author, who introduced himself as "General Alexander

Orlov.” As soon as Roger Hollis, a recently appointed deputy director general of MI5, heard about those interviews, he took a keen interest. Evelyn McBarnet of Section D.1.A. was instructed to look into the case. The MI5 assessment of Orlov’s information is analyzed at length in the new biography of the man. In August 1955 Ronnie Reed, an officer who worked on the VENONA material (wartime UK-U.S. operation in which secret Soviet radio traffic from and to Washington, New York, and London was intercepted and encrypted) in D Branch, concluded: “I have thanked the FBI for their efforts but unless I have missed something there appears to be nothing at all of value in the report... ORLOV knew very little that is of interest to us.”

Before the *Authorized History of MI5* was published in 2009, it was impossible to predict which names of the Soviet spies and spymasters might appear in the book. The challenge faced by the author was enormous. Consequently, it was quite a relief when the name of Orlov was not found in Christopher Andrew’s impressive volume. Fortunately, Andrew had not fallen into the trap of believing the fabrications of Orlov in the U.S. or his later KGB-sponsored biography published in 1993. At the same time, the past cannot be changed, forgotten, or erased. One of the lessons learned from the long history of Russian espionage in Great Britain is probably best of

all formulated in Winston Churchill’s adage, “The further backwards you look, the further forward you can see.”

Dr. Boris Volodarsky was born in Russia where he received his military education and a university diploma. In 1983 he was drafted into the Soviet Army as a second lieutenant, where he served as a GRU Spetsnaz airborne unit commander and underwent specialized training for deep-penetration missions behind enemy lines. A captain in 1989, Boris was not deployed because by the time his training was successfully completed the Soviet Union had collapsed. Since the early 1990s, Volodarsky and his family have lived in Western Europe. Boris is the author of several books published both in the UK and the U.S. He earned his PhD at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He works as an independent intelligence analyst consulting leading risk management companies in London and Washington and is a regular lecturer at intelligence seminars in London and Cambridge. His articles “The KGB in Ann Arbor” and “Years of the Spy: Russia’s President Vladimir Putin” previously appeared in AIJ.



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American *Volksdeutsche*:

An Analysis of the Nazi Penetration of the German-American Community in the United States

by Eric T. Gundersen

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of the European colonization of the New World to the present time, the promise of riches and freedom in America has pulled foreign populations to its shores.¹ Whether or not one views the Spanish settlements in Florida and the American Southwest or the various Northern European settlements scattered along the Atlantic coast as the beginning of American history, this fact remains unchanged: immigrants have played a central role in the development of the United States. In the opening remarks of his Pulitzer Prize-winning *The Uprooted*, historian Oscar Handlin wrote, "Once I thought to write a history of immigrants in America. Then I discovered that the immigrants were American history."² Handlin's words highlight an important aspect of U.S. history: the story of America cannot be told apart from those who have immigrated to its shores.

Not only has immigration been inextricably woven into the American identity, it has also proven to be a force for good throughout the country's history. Immigrants have been central to the U.S. economy as laborers and professionals have often been the impetus for technological innovation, and have served as a driver for much of the country's progressive political and social changes. This idea was perhaps best summed up by famed author and Yale law professor Amy Chua in her bestselling book *Day of Empire* when she wrote:

Throughout the nineteenth (and even much of the twentieth) century, the ability of poor but enterprising Europeans to leave their homes and find success in another European country was burdened by a host of barriers, including historic religious enmity, cultural chauvinism, social rigidity, and linguistic differences. By comparison, America—with its religious pluralism, social fluidity, and polyglot communities—was remarkably open to talent and entrepreneurial drive from every European background.³

Apart from its traditional liberal immigration policy the U.S. would not be the unrivaled superpower that it is today.

Apart from its traditional liberal immigration policy the U.S. would not be the unrivaled superpower that it is today.

While immigrants have been giving the U.S. an advantage over less open societies, America's reliance on them has not come without cost during times of war. This is due to the fact that there are inevitably members within America's foreign communities whose loyalty is to their native land, not their adopted one. Historically, whenever the U.S. has found itself at war, this fact has not been lost on the intelligence services of enemy nations. Throughout its history, ethnic communities within the U.S. have been targeted by its wartime enemies in order to control and influence certain members of those communities in order to damage and disrupt U.S. war efforts. Historically, the use of America's ethnic communities during times of war has complicated the work of those whose duty it is to protect the homeland. This was particularly troublesome during World War II when German immigrants worked on classified defense projects or were in positions of trust that afforded them access to sensitive military information. In an effort to demonstrate the potential threat posed by foreign intelligence services in their attempts to infiltrate and recruit members of America's numerous ethnic communities during wartime, this article will show the ways in which Nazi Germany used its intelligence agencies to target and recruit the *Volksdeutsche* (German people) in America to further Hitler's goals of establishing an Aryan empire.

THE PEOPLING OF NORTH AMERICA: ICE AGE TO THE FOUNDING

Perhaps the most important explanation for answering why immigration has been such an important part of U.S. history is the simple fact that at the outset of human history the Americas were disconnected from the "Cradle of Civilization" by oceans on both sides. This geographic isolation was briefly ended due to a global cooling period some 10,000-25,000 years ago. During this cooling period, enough of the Earth's water was locked up in

in glaciers that a land bridge (Beringia) connecting Siberia and Alaska was formed. It has been speculated by archaeologists that those who first traveled into the Americas over the Bering land bridge were driven eastward by a dwindling food supply.⁴ In time these Paleo-Indians and their descendants would inhabit all of the Americas, from the Arctic Circle to Tierra del Fuego. By 10,000 B.C. the Bering land bridge was submerged underwater and the two hemispheres were cut off from one another once again.

The earliest recorded break in the separation between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres occurred when Norse voyagers sailed across the Atlantic and reached North America during the 11th century. Failing to stay long enough to make any meaningful exchange with Native Americans, the Viking impact on North America was minimal. It was Christopher Columbus, an Italian mariner sailing under the Spanish flag, who discovered the Americas for a modern nation-state which was not only capable, but proved willing to exploit his discovery. Columbus' discovery marked the beginning of an age of exploration and colonization of the Americas by European powers that would forever transform both continents. Over the next 300 years the great powers of Europe, namely Spain, Great Britain, and France, competed with one another for land, wealth, and national glory in the Western Hemisphere.

By the mid-1600s the English colonies that would eventually form the United States were sandwiched between an established, wealthy Spanish Empire to the south and to the north a French enemy which was protective over its increasingly profitable fur trade. Periodic skirmishes flared up throughout the Americas during the 17th and early 18th centuries among the three powers, with Native Americans often caught in the middle as allies or belligerents. The struggle for the North American continent culminated in a war that would ultimately prove global in scope. By the war's end Great Britain was victorious and the subsequent Treaty of Paris in 1763 gave the English free reign over nearly the entire eastern part of North America.

Due to the presence of Spanish, French, and English colonists, by the eve of its founding what is now the United States was an ethnically diverse place. It is also worth mentioning this area was not only inhabited by the main colonial powers, but also by Native Americans, African slaves, and a sizable number of colonists from the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden as well. The European colonization of America ensured that the origin story of the United States would be inextricably linked to immigration. This reflects not only the importance of immigration to the development and founding of America, but also the inseparable link between immigration and American identity.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THE FOUNDING TO WORLD WAR II

Although the British were triumphant in the French and Indian War, the conflict created a fissure between the colonists and Great Britain. Fighting alongside one another during the French and Indian War had shown British Redcoats and colonists alike just how different culturally they were from one another. Contributing to the growing discord between the colonists and Great Britain was not only an emerging American identity, but British tax policy following the war. Due to a strong identification as "freeborn Englishmen," plus all the liberties that were assumed with that birthright, the colonists were outraged at being taxed without having representation in Parliament.

The taxes that were meant to help pay down the debt incurred during the French and Indian War, along with the Proclamation of 1763 which restricted the colonists from settling west of the Appalachian Mountains,⁵ proved to be the tipping point for many in the colonies. They subsequently formed an independent confederation and declared their separation from Great Britain. The war that ensued dragged on for over five years, but eventually resulted in the colonists' successful overthrow of their British overlords and subsequently the establishment of a new country, the United States of America.

No doubt recognizing the special role immigration would have in the development of their new nation, the Founders enacted liberal naturalization laws (liberal by 18th century standards, that is).

Reflecting a tradition that had started since the discovery of America, when the United States was founded, first-, second-, and third-generation European immigrants filled the rolls of the first census taken in 1790. While much of the population traced its lineage to Great Britain at the time of the first census, there were other ethnic European groups represented as well, including Germans, French, Scandinavians, and Dutch. No doubt recognizing the special role immigration would have in the development of their new nation, the Founders enacted liberal naturalization laws (liberal by 18th century standards, that is). For example, when crafting the Constitution, the Founders allowed for immigrants to occupy all of the highest offices of the government, with only the Presidency being excluded. This

was a major departure from 18th century English precedent as historian Akhil Amar has pointed out: “Under England’s famous 1701 Act of Settlement, naturalized foreigners could never serve in the Privy Council or Parliament, or enjoy any office or place of trust, either civil or military.”⁶ The first Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790 providing that any “‘free white person’ who had been in the United States as little as two years could be naturalized in any American court.”⁷ Considering the loose immigration and naturalization laws approved by the Founders, it is clear they were convinced immigration would continue to have an important role in the country’s development.

During the 19th century the United States grew in size as its people’s westward movement expanded the country’s borders. By century’s end the nation had become a true continental power, with its east and west borders delineated by oceans. Filling the newly acquired land would require more than just relying on the increase of natural-born citizens; immigrants were expected to play a part in the nation’s expansion as well. Declaration signer and Pennsylvania Congressman James Wilson had argued for the need to “draw members from the other side of the Atlantic, in addition to the natural sources of population.”⁸

...the trauma America experienced on the battlefields of Europe during World War I caused much of the country to grow even more distrustful of all things foreign.

Since the founding, Great Britain was the largest source of immigration to the United States. However, that would change by the mid-19th century as immigrants from Great Britain were eclipsed in number by those from other parts of Europe, in particular Ireland and Germany. The 1880s marked the arrival of a new group of European immigrants who were often met with disdain and open hostility by “Old Stock” Americans. Hailing from Eastern and Southern Europe, these “New Immigrants” not only practiced different faiths (various forms of Catholicism and Judaism) than that practiced by established white Americans, but they also looked physically different from the native white population in America. Many Americans viewed these New Immigrants as biologically inferior and their religion a threat to orthodoxy. Despite the hostility shown by Protestant, white America, millions of these New Immigrants and their descendants would eventually call America home. The transformation that the New Immigrants wielded on demographics in America is demonstrated by the fact that “as late as 1900 nearly 60 percent of Americans had been of British stock... By 1920 the proportion of Americans with British ancestry had fallen to 41 percent.”⁹ Not only were

Americans suspicious of these newcomers’ religions and backgrounds, the trauma America experienced on the battlefields of Europe during World War I caused much of the country to grow even more distrustful of all things foreign. This is a time in history when many Americans wanted to divorce themselves from all things foreign.

In response to the threat posed by disloyal Americans and the fear that American society was being reshaped, Congress passed some of the most restrictive immigration legislation in its history. Washington Congressman Albert Johnson vocalized the fears shared by many Americans when he proclaimed in December 1920, “The welfare of the United States demands that the door should be closed to immigrants for a time. We are being made a dumping ground for the human wreckage of the [world] war.”¹⁰ In May 1921 President Warren Harding signed the Emergency Quota Act, imposing a flat ceiling of 357,800 immigrants annually from outside the Western Hemisphere. In an effort to preserve the country’s traditional racial heritage, on May 26, 1924, the Johnson-Reed Act (or National Origins Act) was passed, setting a quota on immigration based on 1890 levels. According to historian Elliott Barkan, the National Origins Act meant that U.S. immigration laws would favor traditional sources of immigration by ensuring that “over two-thirds of the total were designated for Germany, Great Britain, and Ireland.”¹¹

From the migration of the Paleo-Indians over Beringia, to the age of European colonization, to the formation of the United States, an important principle was demonstrated: owing to its geographic isolation the American continent has been shaped, transformed, and remade over the centuries by migratory populations. There were a number of pull factors for the initial European colonization of what is now the United States. Many were searching for wealth and glory, some were second-born sons attempting to make a way for themselves, while others were looking to establish religious utopias in an attempt to demonstrate to the Old World what a proper Christian community should look like. Whatever the disparate motives for immigrating to the United States may have been, the importance of the immigrant tradition in the formation of the American identity cannot be denied.

A HISTORY OF GERMAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

While the United States has been touched by immigrants from every corner of the globe, immigrants from Germany hold a special place in American history. One cannot tell the history of immigration in America without also mentioning the impact that German immigrants have had on the United States. Between 1820 and 1970 nearly seven million Germans immigrated to the United States, “a greater number than came from any other

country.”¹² The reasons for the immigration of Germans to the U.S. are as varied as the span of time between the first settlers of Germantown in 1683 to the heyday of German immigration in the 1880s. *Pushed* from their native land by war, religious persecution, and economic dislocation, while also being *pulled* by the prospect of cheap land and religious freedom, Germans across the centuries found in the United States a stable, secure place to raise their families.

The powerful influence of American culture was not lost even on Hitler as he declared near the end of World War II, “Transplant a German to Kiev, and he remains a perfect German. But transplant him to Miami, and you make a degenerate out of him.”

As is the case with most first-generation immigrants, many who left Germany to build a life in the United States were committed to preserving Old World ways as much as possible in their new land. From the founding of the first German settlement by Francis Pastorius at Germantown, Pennsylvania, in 1683, to the countless number of German communities that sprang up in the Midwest during the latter half of the 1800s, first-generation German immigrants often chose to set themselves apart from the dominant Yankee culture by settling in separate ethnic communities. Within these communities first-generation Germans were able to preserve many aspects of their life from the Old World. Germans established their own schools and newspapers (which were taught and written in their native language); they were active in politics at the local and national level; and they were adamant about teaching their children their native tongue. In fact, German speakers had so much influence in certain parts of the country that by the early 20th century “German was the most-taught modern foreign language, studied by perhaps a fourth of all high school students.”¹³ Fragments of German culture and language can be seen in many forms throughout the United States up to the present day. Perhaps the most noticeable and enduring example are the small pockets of communities within the United States which speak a form of German to this day known as Pennsylvania Dutch. First-generation Germans no doubt found it important to pass on their native tongue and culture to their children, not only to preserve ties to the Fatherland but also to impart a sense of ethnic identity as well.

While German immigrants undoubtedly left a lasting imprint on American culture, each passing generation inevitably lost its affinity and attachment to the Fatherland. The powerful influence of American culture was not lost even on Hitler as he declared near the end of World War II, “Transplant a German to Kiev, and he remains a perfect German. But transplant him to Miami, and you make a degenerate out of him.”¹⁴ German assimilation into American society was especially heightened after the arrival of “New Immigrants” from Eastern and Southern Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as Germans started to become increasingly identified as “Old Stock” Americans. While common traditions and cultural similarities ensured that there were few obstacles to assimilation for Germans into American society, there were many who resisted assimilation and consciously set out to maintain their ethnic identities by choosing instead to view themselves as German first and American second. An example of this view can be found in an excerpt from a speech given in 1915 by then-President of the National German-American Alliance Charles Hexamer. He argued:

For a long time we have suffered the preachment: “You Germans must allow yourselves to be assimilated, you must be merged in the American people”; but no one will find us prepared to step down to a lesser kulture; no, we have made it our aim to draw the others up to us... we will not permit that our kulture of two thousand years be trodden down in this land.¹⁵

In times of peace these types of attitudes are not a threat to the country’s security and can often be explained away as a sign of insecurity within a community or even as a legitimate attempt to impart a sense of pride in one’s ethnic background. However, during the first half of the 20th century the U.S. found itself at war with Germany twice, and views such as Hexamer’s within the German-American community certainly attracted the attention of Nazi intelligence agents.

GERMAN-AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR I

By 1917, the United States found itself fighting alongside Great Britain and France, which had been at war with Germany since 1914. The United States’ entrance into the conflict came at the perfect time for the Allied Powers as Russia was forced to pull out of the war due to revolutionary upheaval within its borders. As a result, German-Americans on the home front often found their patriotism and allegiance questioned when they failed to enthusiastically support the war or buy war bonds. German-Americans often responded to these pressures in one of two

ways: they made every effort to hide or deny all attachments to the Fatherland, or they became hardened in their loyalties to Germany.

While “xenophobic” would not be an inaccurate term when describing the attitude of Americans at this time, one can somewhat understand their concern over the presence of such a high number of German-Americans. Historian David M. Kennedy has pointed out that according to the Census of 1910, “one of every three Americans in that year had either been born abroad or had at least one parent born abroad. Of those 32 million persons from families with close foreign ties, more than ten million derived from the Central Powers.”¹⁶ The sheer number of immigrants with familial and emotional ties to openly hostile nations certainly played a part in creating an atmosphere in which many Americans felt overwhelmed and engulfed by potential adversaries.

In an effort to combat what they viewed as a legitimate threat to the war effort, citizens often passed the names of neighbors they suspected of unpatriotic activities to local and federal authorities. With the blessing of the cash-strapped Department of Justice, Chicago businessman Albert M. Briggs formed an organization called the American Protective League (APL). This group, made up entirely of private citizens, took on the responsibility of spying and opening the mail of neighbors who were the subject of their suspicions. By the end of the war the APL numbered 250,000 strong.

Along with ordinary citizens the federal government was active in its attempt to determine which German-Americans were loyal from those who wanted to harm the U.S. war effort. Primarily through the Bureau of Investigation (BOI, later the FBI), the government placed many German-Americans under surveillance. Along with the work being done by the BOI and military intelligence to ferret out German spies and saboteurs, Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 in an effort to undermine the work being carried out by enemy intelligence services. The measures taken by the United States were not without merit as Germany’s intelligence services were unquestionably active in the U.S. during World War I. In fact, during the war German and Austrian intelligence services:

secretly funded propaganda...to break up the British monopoly of war news. They encouraged and subsidized activists in the Indian and Irish nationalist movements who were trying to overthrow the British Empire from their secure bases in the United States. They organized strikes, sabotage, and bacteriological warfare aimed at disrupting the flow of supplies to Britain, and they planned to place bombs on merchant ships.¹⁷

Under official cover many German intelligence agents worked out of their country’s diplomatic establishments and made a concerted effort to keep the United States out of the war altogether by spreading pro-German and anti-war propaganda within the German-American community.

Once the U.S. entered the war, German intelligence efforts shifted from spreading anti-war propaganda to committing acts of sabotage aimed at damaging the U.S. war effort. Perhaps the most well-known act of sabotage perpetrated by German intelligence in the United States was the explosion of a munitions storage facility on Black Tom Island in 1916. Located in New York Harbor, this facility was the principal transfer station of munitions from the United States to the Allied Powers. The explosion not only destroyed the storage facility, but caused the deaths of at least seven people. Regarding the Black Tom explosion, historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones commented, “Suspicion fell on the German secret service, and it is evident in retrospect that Captain Franz von Rintelen and Friedrich Hinsch did organize sabotage attacks all over North America to prevent strategic supplies from reaching Germany’s enemies.”¹⁸ While most German-Americans were loyal to the United States, there were some who undoubtedly engaged in espionage or sabotage during World War I out of allegiance to the Fatherland. This would also prove to be the case when the nations found themselves at war again in 1941.

GERMAN-AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR II

While World War I certainly saw the penetration of the German-American community by intelligence agents working for the Kaiser, considering the significance of race in Nazi Germany one can understand why the penetration of the German-American community took on an entirely new level of importance during World War II. Heavily influenced by the belief in the superiority of the German race, “foreign-policy planners in Nazi-created and recently Nazified agencies called for the unification of Germany’s ‘racial comrades’ in the United States.”¹⁹ Relying on extensive records kept on Germans who immigrated to the United States, much of the work related to promoting ethnic awareness and support for Nazi Germany in the German-American community was performed by the *Deutsches Ausland Institut* (DAI). Headed by Dr. Ernst Bohle, the DAI’s purpose was “to ‘Nazify’ all persons of German descent who lived outside the Third Reich—primarily the 30 million Americans who had German blood in their veins.”²⁰ In 1937, when speaking in Stuttgart at the Congress of Germans Living Abroad, Bohle proclaimed, “The complete German who is a citizen [of another country] is always a German and nothing but a German.”²¹ It is worth noting that when attempting to find German-American recruits to commit acts

of sabotage, *Abwehr* (German military intelligence service) head Wilhelm Canaris is said to have used the indexes of the DAI.²²

One of the major goals of German intelligence agents operating in the United States was to make German-Americans aware of and delighted in the accomplishments of the New Germany. An example of the type of German-American agents the Nazis were looking for was Dr. Ignatz Griebel, who was not only a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army Medical Corps but also a vocal supporter of Nazi Germany. A highly respected and visible member of the German-American community in New York City who served as an artillery officer for the Kaiser in World War I, Griebel insisted in his numerous speaking engagements that the German and American flags “be displayed with equal prominence.”²³ Griebel was the head of a German-American Nazi spy ring in New York City, which had members in the nation’s armed forces and at sensitive defense plants.

In 1937, when responding to U.S. Ambassador to France William Bullitt’s concern that Nazi Germany was attempting to control the German-American community in the United States, Hermann Goering replied:

It is true that certain persons in our Government here believe that we should attempt to organize the Germans, especially in the Middle West, because they feel that if Germany should again become involved in war with France and England, there would come a moment when the United States might again consider entering such a war against Germany and they believe that such groups of organized Germans in the United States might throw their influence decisively against a declaration of war and might prevent the United States entering such a conflict.²⁴

Goering’s words show just how aware the leaders of Nazi Germany were of America’s sizable German-American community in the United States. Also, undoubtedly mindful of the substantial number of German-Americans in the U.S. were Nazi intelligence workers who viewed the nation as a potential intelligence gold mine.

Propaganda

Central to German intelligence efforts in the United States before 1941 was the goal of keeping the U.S. from supplying and entering the war on the side of the Allies. While Hitler was convinced in the superiority of the Aryan race, a sincere conviction that contributed to his downfall and the empire he sought to build, he and many of his top military commanders were realistic in their view of America’s potential to wage war—a lesson learned from World War I. The shared belief among the leadership of the Third Reich

was that keeping America out of the war as long as possible was crucial to understanding the purposes in their spreading of anti-interventionist propaganda within the German-American community. Much of Nazi Germany’s propaganda activities were carried out by intelligence agents working out of German diplomatic establishments and funded “through diplomatically protected consulate and embassy funds and accounts in U.S. banks.”²⁵ Famed aviatrix and paid German agent Laura Ingalls was advised by Baron von Gienanth, Second Secretary of the German Embassy in Washington, DC, and head of the Gestapo in the United States, that “the best thing you can do for our cause is to continue to promote the America First Committee.”²⁶ Dr. Hans Thomsen, the Charge d’ Affaires of the German Embassy in Washington, “was spending every dollar he could lay his hands on to support American isolationists in their efforts to keep the United States out of the war.”²⁷ Although German diplomatic personnel were covertly acting against the interest of the United States, they depended largely on the willingness of German-Americans to become involved in this work as well.

That the German government was able to get one of its paid operatives to establish a base of operations on Capitol Hill demonstrates its effectiveness in penetrating the highest levels of the U.S. government with German-Americans whose loyalty was ultimately to the Fatherland.

One of the major successes Nazi Germany had in infiltrating the German-American community in order to spread propaganda is evidenced in the work of German-American George Viereck. Originally born in Munich, Viereck, a paid German agent, used his cover as a free-lance journalist to infiltrate the highest levels of the U.S. government. Viereck’s mission was to ensure the United States would not provide military aid to the Allies or enter the war against Germany. Viereck’s work was a goal of the highest priority, as Goering testified after the war that “Hitler relied on isolationists to weaken the Roosevelt administration and keep the United States out of the struggle.”²⁸

Viereck managed to operate his propaganda ring out of the office of German sympathizer and staunch isolationist Minnesota Senator Ernst Lundeen. Eventually, inadequacies in Senator Lundeen’s mailing services were noticed. Hence, Viereck was then redirected to work out of the office of another isolationist, New York Congressman Hamilton Fish. Using the Congressional franking privilege without any charge to Viereck and at the behest of the German government, anti-war and anti-Roosevelt editorials were

mailed from Senator Fish's office. On the effectiveness of Viereck's work, historian William Breuer wrote that "Viereck knew that he stumbled onto a propaganda bonanza in his congressional operation and moved rapidly to exploit it."²⁹ Eventually Viereck's true activities were discovered and a jury rightly found him guilty of working as a paid Nazi agent.

While the United States would eventually enter the war on the side of the Allies, hindsight affords us the knowledge that any damage caused by Viereck to the Allied war effort was minimal. Nevertheless, that the German government was able to get one of its paid operatives to establish a base of operations on Capitol Hill demonstrates its effectiveness in penetrating the highest levels of the U.S. government with German-Americans whose loyalty was ultimately to the Fatherland.

Espionage

Nazi spymasters met much success when recruiting German-Americans who held positions in vital defense industries. Dr. Ignatz T. Greibl, who led one of the most successful spy rings for Germany in the U.S. during the war, claimed his motive for spying was a desire to "make a contribution to his native land." While practicing medicine in the Yorkville neighborhood of New York City, Dr. Greibl was able to assess the value and willingness of his German-American patients to spy for the Nazis. It was in this "careful and deliberate manner, the *Abwehr* maintained a successful international military-industrial espionage organization with access to a wide variety of valuable technical information."³⁰ Along with stealing military technology, German intelligence workers also targeted for recruitment German-American dockworkers in the nation's ocean ports. These port workers were able to relay information regarding ship movements to German submarines positioned along the Atlantic coast, some within view of the shoreline. Much of the success found by Nazi spymasters in the United States is undoubtedly the result of the high number of German immigrants employed in sensitive positions of trust.

The *Abwehr* placed Nikolaus Ritter, a man who spent twelve years in the United States after leaving Germany in 1924 at the age of 24, in charge of obtaining U.S. air intelligence. Ritter's job was of high value to Nazi Germany due to restrictions placed on its military as a result of the Treaty of Versailles. Ritter was undoubtedly aware that the success of his mission to steal air technology was vital for Germany to catch up with the capabilities of France, Great Britain, and the United States. Under the guise of a textile engineer, Ritter set out to recruit agents employed in America's air industry to work for Hitler.

Ritter's greatest accomplishment was the recruitment of Herman W. Lang, who happened to be the exact candidate Ritter had in mind when he set out to build his spy network—a technically skilled, well-placed, idealistically driven German-American whose loyalty to Germany surpassed that to his adopted homeland. Immigrating to New York City from Bavaria in 1927, Lang, a skilled machinist, found work with Carl L. Norden, Inc., a military contractor operating in Manhattan.

Produced at Norden was what Major General Benjamin D. Foulois referred to as "the most important military secret project under development,"³¹ the Norden bombsight. This engineering marvel allowed high-altitude bombers an extraordinarily high level of precision, ensuring that mission objectives were safer and more easily attainable. Lang showed his open support for Nazi Germany when he joined the *Bund*-affiliated labor society, the German-American Vocational League. This pro-Nazi organization was comprised of technicians, many of whom held highly-placed positions in the defense industry. The Justice Department would later refer to this group as "the most dangerous of Nazi organizations in the United States."³² When explaining to Ritter his motivation for spying, Lang made it clear that he did not expect money in return for his services. Lang claimed that he genuinely wanted the nation he still considered his own to have the bombsight too as he emotionally declared, "I can never forget the Fatherland."³³ When Ritter arrived in Germany with the Norden blueprints that were passed to him by Lang, *Abwehr* chief Canaris declared, "This will revolutionize our whole bombing strategy."³⁴ The work done by Lang provided German scientists the ability "to construct a bombsight that was more advanced than the Norden original."³⁵

German spies not only infiltrated sensitive positions in U.S. defense industries, but were found in academia as well.

To the astonishment of many, by 1942 Germany had conquered much of Europe, a feat all the more spectacular considering the restrictions placed on the country in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles following World War I. Unbeknownst to most Americans, even within the government, it was the "theft of American military secrets by German spies during the previous twelve years"³⁶ that had played a part in the creation of Hitler's fierce military machine.

German spies not only infiltrated sensitive positions in U.S. defense industries, but were found in academia as well. Klaus Mehnert, an anthropology professor at the University

of Hawaii in Honolulu, was “deeply imbued with the glories of Teutonic splendor and the ideals of Nazism.”³⁷ Backed financially by Dr. Alfred Rosenberg’s Foreign Political Bureau, Mehnert went to the United States where he attempted to recruit a ring of intellectual spies in American universities. His placement in Honolulu allowed him to observe ship movements and maneuvers at Pearl Harbor. Following a naval exercise in which he observed Pearl Harbor’s defenses easily penetrated, he sent a report to Berlin describing the vulnerabilities in the base’s defenses. After the end of World War II it was concluded by high-level Naval intelligence officers that “Mehnert’s hand was visible in Japan’s grand strategic design for conquest in the Pacific, including the opening sneak attack against the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.”³⁸

German-American harbor spies positioned along the Atlantic coast fed the German Navy information regarding the movement of U.S. merchant ships and naval vessels in an effort to disrupt Allied shipping. Their contributions led Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to write gloomily to the commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Ernest King, in June 1942:

The losses to submarines off our Atlantic seaboard now threatens our entire war effort...I am fearful that another month or two of this will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient men and planes to bear against the [German and Italian] enemy.

Along with communications intercepts and the work of Nazi sympathizers who were employed as dockworkers, German submarines by the end of August 1942 had “sunk some 485 ships, a total of almost 2,600,000 tons, off the coast of North and Central America in what must be regarded as the most disastrous defeat ever suffered by American naval power.”³⁹ One of the most successful German-Americans providing information regarding ship movements was Kurt F. Ludwig. Born in Fremont, Ohio, and taken by his family back to Germany while he was a child, Ludwig returned to the country of his birth in 1940. Claiming to be a leather goods salesman, he was charged by his *Abwehr* masters to report on the size of U.S. Army units as well the movement of ship convoys between the United States and Great Britain. Ludwig dutifully “mailed detailed reports to Germany on ship sinkings, troop placements, and American supplies to Britain.”⁴⁰ Ludwig recruited a large network of German-American spies from New York to Florida who regularly fed him information regarding military bases, troop strength, and ship movements.

Sabotage

Due to the work performed by German spies in the United States, a long list of factories, power plants, and key points of infrastructure was targeted for sabotage by the *Abwehr*. Even before the United States and Germany were at war with one another, many German agents in the United States were provided with two documents: “Memorandum of Instruction to Saboteurs” and “Index of American Industry.” These memos provided Nazi saboteurs with techniques and specific targets for sabotage. Recruited by German intelligence to carry out these attacks were German-Americans. The plan was to recruit pro-Nazi German-Americans in the United States, bring them back to Germany for training, where they would then be “returned to their adopted homeland and planted in locales near key targets.”⁴¹ The week after Franklin Roosevelt won the presidency for a third consecutive term, blasts occurred in three separate defense plants in the northeast: the Trojan Powder Company in Allentown, Pennsylvania; torpedo manufacturer United Railway and Signals Corporation in Woodbridge, New Jersey; and the Burton Powder Works in Edinburg, Pennsylvania. The blasts occurred at 10-minute intervals (8:00, 8:10, and 8:20 a.m.), the timing of which appeared suspicious enough for Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to hint that it represented “Teutonic efficiency.”⁴²

Perhaps the most well-known attempt to infiltrate the German-American community in order to commit acts of sabotage was Operation PASTORIUS.

Perhaps the most well-known attempt to infiltrate the German-American community in order to commit acts of sabotage was Operation PASTORIUS. Often sensationalized under the heading “The Time the Nazis Invaded Florida,”⁴³ the members of this operation are often likened more to “Keystone Cops” than to operatives of a foreign government tasked with bombing and incapacitating U.S. industry and infrastructure. The 8-member, handpicked German-American team was trained in the Fatherland and chosen for the mission based on “their fluency in the English language and previous residence in the United States,” although no mind was paid to the fact that many of them still spoke with an accent as they would easily “blend into the polyglot” crowds of New York City.⁴⁴ The man designated to train the operatives and launch the operation was Walter Kappe, a former Teutonia Society (a precursor of the *Bund*) leader turned *Abwehr* agent.

Split into two groups of four, these saboteurs landed on Long Island and the northern coast of Florida in June 1942. The two groups were tasked with targeting America's aluminum and magnesium industry (important in the production of aircraft), strategic points of infrastructure such as locks along the Ohio River, and symbolic Jewish targets such as Macy's and Gimbels department stores. Some of the specific targets chosen for the saboteurs by German industry experts were the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, hydroelectric plants at Niagara Falls, the Aluminum Company of America plants in Alcoa, Tennessee, and the Hell Gate Bridge connecting Long Island with Manhattan.⁴⁵

The first group of saboteurs was led by German-born George Dasch, who after coming to America in 1922 drifted for a time before enlisting as a private in the Army Air Corps, eventually serving in the 72nd Bombardment Squadron. The group under Dasch disgorged from a U-boat off the Long Island coast and was accompanied to the beach by two sailors in a rubber dinghy. Unaware that the part of Long Island on which they had landed, Amagansett, was designated an important military region by the War Department, Dasch and his group of German-Americans turned Nazi terrorists quickly set out to bury their explosives in the sand. Upon digging up the cache left by the saboteurs, investigators later determined that the items buried in the sand contained:

seventy three different items, including large yellow blocks of TNT, fuse lighters, thirty-caliber blasting caps, and fifteen wooden boxes filled with an assortment of detonators which Earl Connelley, the head of the investigation, called the "most impressive" collection of sabotage equipment he had ever seen.⁴⁶

In the process of unloading their gear they were approached by Coast Guard Seaman John Cullen who was out on a routine patrol armed only with a flashlight. After a tense exchange the two parties separated, Dasch and his group eventually taking a train from Long Island to New York City and Cullen going back to the Coast Guard station puzzled by his odd exchange with the nighttime "fishermen."

With the notable exception of never being spotted by the Coast Guard, the second group was dropped off by U-boat in a similar fashion off the Florida coast just south of Jacksonville. This second group was led by Rhineland native Edward Kerling, who before coming to the United States in 1928, where he found work in a meat plant in Brooklyn, New York, was an early supporter of the Nazi Party in Germany. While in the United States, Kerling maintained his open support for Nazi Germany, eventually

becoming a highly-placed member of the Bund. Kerling eventually returned to Germany where he found work in the production of Nazi propaganda. It was while he was serving in the Propaganda Ministry that he was approached by German intelligence to participate in Operation PASTORIUS.

The two groups were doomed from the start as George Dasch, perhaps spooked by his exchange with Seaman Cullen,⁴⁷ reported the details of the operation to the FBI. The other seven members were eventually rounded up and six were subsequently electrocuted at the urging of President Roosevelt. Due to their cooperation with the U.S. government, two members of the operation were spared execution: Dasch and Ernst Burger, a German immigrant who at one time served in the Michigan National Guard.

While Operation PASTORIUS was a failure, Nazi Germany's success in finding eight German-Americans to willingly commit acts of sabotage and terror speaks to the loyalty and strong racial bond felt by many in the German-American community toward the Fatherland. The success of the German intelligence service in recruiting this group of saboteurs is a reflection of the inherent danger posed to the U.S. by the presence of immigrant communities which are targeted by hostile intelligence services that appeal to race and nationalism.

CONCLUSION

One should not ignore the achievements Hitler's agents found when appealing to "blood and nation" in the German-American community during World War II. The success met by the Nazis in calling German-Americans to action on behalf of the Fatherland has been forgotten by most Americans. This is understandable, as the greatest threats facing America for the past 70 years have been driven not by race but by ideology—communism and radical Islam. This article is not meant to raise an alarm about the dangers of America's immigrant communities or to call for the surveillance of particular groups in the name of national security. Instead, the author's goal is to remind the Intelligence Community of immigration's unique role in American history and the dangers facing the United States whenever it finds itself in a conventional war with a nation that trumpets ethnic supremacy and the call for a return to national glory. This threat is especially great when that nation is heavily represented in defense industry and the military.⁴⁸

NOTES

¹ Roger Daniels, *Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life*, 2nd edition (New York: Perennial, 2002), 17. Key terms are used by demographers who study the migration of people throughout history. Historian Roger Daniels describes those terms as “push, pull, and means,” and defines these factors the following way: *push* refers to reasons why an individual chooses to emigrate; *pull* being the “attractive forces” that may draw an emigrant; and *means* simply being the ability to migrate.

² Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People*, 2nd edition (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 3.

³ Amy Chua, *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance – And Why They Fall* (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 246.

⁴ Stuart J. Fiedel, *Prehistory of the Americas*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 46.

⁵ Colin G. Galloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 111.

⁶ Akhil Reed Amar, *America’s Constitution: A Biography* (New York: Random House, 2005), 164.

⁷ Daniels, 113.

⁸ Amar, 272.

⁹ David Hackett Fischer, *Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991), 870.

¹⁰ Elliott Robert Barkan, *And Still They Come: Immigration and American Society, 1920 to the 1930s* (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1996), 11.

¹¹ Barkan, 13.

¹² Russell A. Kazal, *Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 20.

¹³ Daniels, 160.

¹⁴ Alton Frye, *Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere 1933-1941* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 191.

¹⁵ Kazal, 167.

¹⁶ David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society*, 2nd edition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 24.

¹⁷ Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The FBI: A History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 65.

¹⁸ Jeffreys-Jones, 69.

¹⁹ Sander A. Diamond, *The Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924-1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 26.

²⁰ William Breuer, *Hitler’s Undercover War: The Nazi Espionage Invasion of the U.S.A.* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 100.

²¹ Breuer, 100.

²² Louis de Jong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), 216.

²³ Breuer, 10.

²⁴ Frye, 15.

²⁵ Raymond J. Batvinis, *The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2007), 119.

²⁶ Frye, 163.

²⁷ Breuer, 164.

²⁸ Breuer, 16.

²⁹ Breuer, 179.

³⁰ Batvinis, 13-14.

³¹ Peter Duffy, *Double Agent: The First Hero of World War II and How the FBI Outwitted and Destroyed a Nazi Spy Ring* (New York: Scribner, 2014), 24.

³² Duffy, 27.

³³ Breuer, 47.

³⁴ Breuer, 48.

³⁵ Thomas A. Reppetto, *Battleground New York City: Countering Spies, Saboteurs, and Terrorists Since 1861* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012), 127.

³⁶ Breuer, 124.

³⁷ Breuer, 171.

³⁸ Breuer, 173.

³⁹ Gerald L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 378.

⁴⁰ Francis MacDonald, *Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column & the American Home Front* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 129.

⁴¹ Breuer, 141.

⁴² Breuer, 187.

⁴³ Josh Clark and Charles W. Bryant, “The Time the Nazis Invaded Florida,” *Stuff You Should Know*, HOWSTUFFWORKS, released July 16, 2015.

⁴⁴ Duffy, 5.

⁴⁵ Alex Abella and Scott Gordon, *Shadow Enemies: Hitler’s Secret Terrorist Plot Against the United States* (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2002), 21-22.

⁴⁶ Raymond J. Batvinis, *Hoover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies: FBI Counterespionage During World War II* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2014), 60.

⁴⁷ There are some who argue that Dasch intended to betray the operation from the beginning. For evidence regarding this position, see Alex Abella and Scott Gordon’s *Shadow Enemies: Hitler’s Secret Terrorist Plot Against the United States*.

⁴⁸ It is worth noting that the U.S. was not particularly vulnerable to this threat during the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars due to the simple fact that those communities in America at the time were miniscule and had very little presence in U.S. defense industry and the military.

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Countering Violent Extremism with "The Washington Playbook": How a Former Intelligence Chief Reaches for Anachronistic Scripts in His Bestselling Book

by Dr. (CAPT, USN, Ret) David D. Belt

[Author's Note: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, or any of its components, or the U.S. government.]

[Editor's Note: This article was written and submitted prior to LTG (Ret) Flynn being appointed President Trump's National Security Advisor, and thus before the latter's dismissal from the Trump administration. A review of the book to which the article refers was included in the last issue of *AIJ*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2016.]

In his series of interviews with Jeffrey Goldberg, then-President Obama pointed to what he called "The Washington Playbook." "There's a playbook in Washington that Presidents are supposed to follow," he said—one that "prescribes responses to different events, and these responses tend to be militarized responses." Categorizing this script, the President added that this playbook "comes out of the foreign-policy establishment," especially its "think-tank complex." The President saw that this complex had been coopted by the nation's high-maintenance allies in the Middle East that—in Goldberg's words—"seek to exploit American 'muscle' for their own narrow and sectarian ends." In other words, it was the view of most at the White House, said Goldberg, "that many of the most prominent foreign-policy think tanks in Washington are doing the bidding of their Arab and pro-Israel funders." That notion, of course, was not new. There has been much ink spilled describing the cottage industry of special interests that inhabit Washington, particularly the powerful Arab and Israel lobbies.¹ However, this time it was different; now a President was loudly complaining about the industry's influence on national security strategy.

Years of such influence and discourse by these agents construct within segments of the populace an unofficial security "common sense"—culturally-resident pretexts, strategies of action, scripts, ideologies, hostile myths, master narratives, schemas, frames, and other terms for the powerful *a priori* cognitive structures that construct all that we "know" or can discuss about our security. These unconscious regimes of truth not only reconstruct our

security knowledge—who are our "friends" and "enemies"—but they semi-determine our security action.² In American football parlance, they become our security "playbook." Again, the President's point was that this security "knowledge" is not *pure* knowledge, but *political* knowledge—knowledge in the service of power.³ Barely three months after the media had thoroughly aired the outgoing Commander-in-Chief's frustrations over how this security playbook had so limited his options, an outgoing intelligence chief published a book with much fanfare that promised to break free of that stultifying playbook and the regime of truth that it was based upon. What is more, it promised to do so on a topic that had stumped the security establishment for the past fifteen years: countering violent extremism.

The Field of Fight: How to Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies, by recently retired Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, and Michael Ledeen,⁴ was an "instant *New York Times* Bestseller," and enjoyed 4.5 stars in the first one hundred reviews on Amazon.com. Both the author's up-front, self-admitted reputation for being "politically incorrect," and a "maverick," along with the book's subtitle, suggested for many that the former intelligence chief had distilled in the book many playbook-breaking strategic insights that might finally help turn the tide of rising extremism—insights that he had gained from his more recent experience, including the top intelligence job at the U.S. Central Command, and then as head of the world's largest, most globally-focused intelligence agency.

The widespread popular acclaim for the book aside, however, I found the former intelligence chief's strategic formula to be anything but new or insightful. Each part of it flowed from the same anachronistic scripts—the Washington Playbook—that had so shaped the policies of both two-term Presidents. Rather than "winning the war"—as the book's subtitle claimed—they all struck me as promising to continue to produce the same results: proliferate our adversaries and make us less secure.

What follows is not a book review; it is something of a more in-depth counterargument to each of the four highly scripted strategy elements that General Flynn mobilizes in his book, and that have so shaped our strategic thoughts since 9/11. These four elements, set forth in the last third of the book, are: first, discredit the ideology; second, destroy the jihadi armies; third, weaken or topple the regimes that support them; and, fourth, create a new set of global alliances (p. 113). After my critique, I offer a strategic framework to counter violent extremism that—I hope you will agree—emerges from an entirely different security paradigm.

1. DISCREDIT THE IDEOLOGY

Since 9/11, a vast discourse has emerged on this notion of a “war of ideas,” or discrediting the ideology of Sunni global militant revolutionaries like al-Qaeda and ISIS. This first strategy element falls within that category, under a 16-page section “Waging Ideological War Against Radical Islam” (p. 118).

This first strategy categorizes the threat within a West/Islam “clash of civilizations” theory of conflict or master frame that was articulated by Bernard Lewis in his 1993 “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” popularized in Samuel Huntington’s 1996 *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*, and enshrined as “truth” for many after 9/11, due in large part to a cottage industry of intellectuals and institutions funded largely by U.S. and Israeli farther and religious right patrons.⁵ At the macro or structural level, the clash of civilizations schema after 9/11 functioned to establish the unconscious West/Islam, friend/enemy distinction that permeates popular Islam-as-threat discourse. Although reductionist and essentialist, it also creates something of an empirically unsustainable myth: A cosmic struggle between the West on the one hand and its ineradicable enemy, “Islam,”—as if there were but one—on the other. The influence of this paradigmatic cultural or ideological structure was evident in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, as President Bush, his advisors, and neo- and religious conservatives broadly spoke of the world in these terms, and enacted failing and even catastrophic foreign policy based upon this schema.⁶ This cognitive framework led to the Bush administration’s “global war on terror,”⁷ which multiplied the enemies of the U.S. from a small vanguard of fighters on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border into a worldwide movement, and continues to radicalize young Muslims in every community.

Influenced by that master security narrative, General Flynn’s strategic premise reenacts the cultural antecedents, asserting problematically that our enemies in World War II and the Cold War were also “conflicts of and between civilizations” (p. 120). Such essentialist, lazy groupings, of course, always

obscure the messy reality. What was in the general’s mind enemies of other civilizations can hardly be sustained; our chief enemy, Germany, for instance, is now non-problematically central to “the West,” and fifteen of the former Soviet bloc states were viewed by Western Europe as Western, and are now firmly part of the European Union.

After establishing that basic strategic premise, three sub-strategies of discrediting the ideology are discernable: first, to reveal unapologetically the threat’s Islamic root; second, more actively support the “global Muslim reform movement;” and, third, increase Western civilization’s ideological appeal.

a. *Dispense with Political Correctness and Reveal Extremism’s Islamic Essence*

After outlining that basic West/Islam clash frame, the first sub-element within the broader strategy to discredit the ideology is that of speaking truth to power—that is, dispensing with political correctness that has purportedly prevented us from thinking about the threat in Islamic terms. If we could only “describe our enemies properly and clearly” (p. 3), General Flynn asserts, then we could defeat them. The best way to “defeat the Islamists,” he says elsewhere, “is to stop feeling the slightest bit guilty about calling them by name and identifying them as fanatical killers acting on behalf of a failed civilization” (p. 10). In complaining about being unable to criticize Islam, he cites Iranian-born Amir Taheri, of the Israel-advocacy organization, The Gatestone Institute, who complained that “criticism of Islam as racist, ethnocentric, or simply vile, [are] all crammed together in the new category ... Islamophobia” (p. 125). He further complained that senior U.S. policymakers shied away from any criticism of Islam, repeating “despite all evidence to the contrary” and complaining that political correctness has framed Islam as a “religion of peace” (p. 63). “Until recently”—a reference to a particular Presidential nominee—the retired general went on, virtually no one in public life or academic circles “dares speak of Islamic terrorists, even when their motivation [i.e., Islam] was utterly explicit” (p. 124). Moreover, as if to lead the way in enacting this strategy, General Flynn criticizes Philadelphia’s mayor who denied that Islam had anything to do with the shooting of a police officer, for instance, and celebrates the city’s police chief who offered the counter-narrative, that the shooting occurred in the name of Islam.

Nevertheless, the fact that scholars and some officials do not speak in these terms in no way means that such politically-incorrect discourse is not powerfully propagated around the world. Just one author, Robert Spencer, for example, published the bestseller *The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam* (2005), another bestseller, *The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World’s Most Intolerant*

Religion (2006), *The Complete Infidel's Guide to the Koran* (2009), and a dozen other books like those. Spencer—the director of the highly anti-Islam Jihad Watch blog, and an employee of conservative pro-Israel advocate David Horowitz—has been incredibly influential and represents an entire world of discourse that centers *all* that is tabooed or negative regarding Islam, the *Quran*, Muhammad, and Muslims. What's more, Spencer represents just a drop in the proverbial bucket of this kind of discourse that General Flynn laments as somehow lacking.

A key segment of U.S. political and religious elite has also been unshackled from political correctness and has securitized not just al-Qaeda, but Islam itself.

A key segment of U.S. political and religious elite has also been unshackled from political correctness and has securitized not just al-Qaeda, but Islam itself. Think of the elite military symbols of political incorrectness with respect to Islam, such as the former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Lieutenant General “Jerry” Boykin, whose speaking is in high demand among evangelicals for his politically-incorrect position on the nature and threat of Islam, and who also warned of the Islamization of America with his lead role in the politically-incorrect 2011 report, *Sharia: The Threat to America*. The practice of breaking with political correctness and identifying extremism as Islamic has been a main element of popular security discourse in the U.S. since 9/11. Political elites followed suit, with all of the Republican frontrunners except Mitt Romney and Chris Christie embracing the Islamization of America threat frame. Republican Presidential front-runner Newt Gingrich, for instance, went so far as to produce a film with his wife in 2010 on the existential threat of Islamization, *America at Risk: The War with No Name*. In it, he warned Americans about unspecified and ambiguous “radical Islamists” inside America, who were threatening “to impose an extraordinarily different system on us”—to “replace American freedom with Sharia.”

Social scientists have long understood that our discourse is in no way benign. It does not merely describe but prescribes; it systematically constructs the worlds of which it speaks.⁸ In this case, the vast U.S. popular security discourse that conflates Islam with threat is similarly not merely descriptive, but performative—it works to construct the very threat that it purports to deconstruct. As countless Muslims of every stripe have attested, and as is now a consensus of the literature, such Islam-as-threat discourse creates a structure of humiliation or grievance structure that makes the master narratives of ISIS and al-Qaeda more

credible. Egyptian political satirist Bassem Youssef—known widely as Egypt's Jon Stewart—in an interview with Larry King this year nicely captured the Muslim street's perspective on the phrase “radical Islam.” Youssef said that it alienated Muslims from the U.S., was used by the extremists in recruiting, and hindered a broader reform effort from emerging.⁹

Long before Lieutenant General Flynn was confirmed as DIA's Director in 2012, for instance, evidence overwhelmingly suggested that the very discourse about Islam that he is advocating here to become official U.S. policy was beginning to create the perception among Muslims worldwide that much of the U.S. population had essentially declared a war on Islam. That “war on Islam” master narrative was beginning to emerge as early as the fifth anniversary of 9/11, when citizens of eight Muslim-majority countries were already citing “American negative perceptions of Islam” as the greatest threat to the Muslim world.¹⁰ By the end of the Bush administration's “Global War on Terror,” that “war on Islam” frame had settled into a discourse all its own—a pervasive cognitive structure in Muslim communities worldwide.¹¹ The main page of *Islamophobia Watch* in 2009, for instance, was describing its mission as “Documenting the War against Islam”—a function which amounted to archiving the statements of U.S. intellectuals and religious and political elite who popularized the notion that Islam itself was the threat.

It was clear to the security establishment that in an ever-more connected, globalized world, even our discourse about the threat was itself a hazard to national security, creating the very threat that it purported to describe.

For most Muslim leaders, that war on Islam master narrative was itself a threat to Muslims broadly, given the context of their own restive population of underemployed and increasingly online youth. It is not surprising that some Muslim leaders took the matter to the UN, via their collective lobbying vehicle, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). In March 2010, the UN Human Rights Council agreed with the OIC and passed the historically unprecedented resolution, “combating defamation of religions.” If unchecked, the resolution warned, even this *popular* (not official) security discourse would “fuel discrimination, extremism and misperception leading to polarization and fragmentation with dangerous unintended and unforeseen consequences.”¹² As one group of researchers noted, “One of Al Qaeda's greatest recruitment and propaganda tools is the assertion that the West is at war with Islam and

Muslims—an argument that is strengthened every day by those who suggest all Muslims are terrorists and all those practicing Islam are jeopardizing U.S. security.”¹³

Thus, just as Salman Rushdie’s book, *Satanic Verses*, created an anti-Western solidarity among Muslims worldwide in September 1988,¹⁴ so did this post-9/11 popular U.S. threat discourse on Islam. This discourse—the kind that General Flynn apparently seeks to enact in official U.S. policy—functioned within the category of a political grievance structure, which is widely established in the literature to be a key factor leading to radicalization.¹⁵ By the time of the Bush-Obama administration turnover, this more tendentious discourse on Islam had created something of a “security dilemma,” fueling ever-increasing mutual hostility.¹⁶ At the tenth anniversary of 9/11, for instance, a global poll by the Pew Research Center empirically established that such a mass-level structure of mutual hostility had indeed emerged.¹⁷ It was in that security context that the *first* two foreign policy initiatives of the newly-elected Obama administration were historic speeches to Muslims worldwide from both Turkey and Egypt, where he expressly used the term “war on Islam,” denying that there was one. Thus, it was clear to the security establishment that in an ever more connected, globalized world, even our *discourse about the threat* was itself a hazard to national security, creating the very threat that it purported to describe.

The Counterargument from Complexity

In this scripted urge to conflate the broad categories of “Islam” and “threat,” the former intelligence chief conveys the implicit message found in a wider swath of a segment of U.S. popular security writing—that there really is little difference between “radical Islam” narrowly and Islam broadly. Steeped in that frame, he views Muslim Americans as working to Islamize America with sharia, leading to “an Islamic state right here at home” (p. 164), and that the threat from within and without is so great that “we are in crisis” (p. 170). “Radical Islamists,” he says in the book, “represent a failed civilization” [i.e., one Islam] (p. 127). Moreover, promoting his book at the Dallas chapter of ACT! for America, a key cog in the U.S. anti-Islam cottage industry, he described “Islam”—the one—as “a political ideology” (singular). “It,” he says of a singular substance called Islam, “definitely hides behind being a religion.”¹⁸

This form of reductionism summarily abandons one of the more basic axioms that security professionals learn early on: *disaggregation*.¹⁹ We learn to distinguish between things in the world that have apparent unity, learning to see something as less *the one* than it is *the many*; we learn to speak in more anthropological terms—not the one

“Islam,” but the many “Islams”—a diverse and even dynamic continuum, with the vast majority of Muslims structured ideologically within their state’s or tribal region’s highly peculiar hegemony.²⁰ The categories of people we have found in Muslim societies are the categories we had found in every society—a continuum of dynamic and diverse parties, groups, and agents, with “Islam” being but one of many identities and ideological commitments, and differing as widely as the dynamic and diverse socio-historical conditions in which they are situated.²¹

Then, with still greater granularity, we have learned to disaggregate and distinguish between—in the title of scholar Mohammad Ayoob’s book—“the many faces of political Islam.”²² In the wake of broad failure in corrupt authoritarian post-colonial governance structures, the only common denominator among them is that society would be better governed by a more socially just framework secured by God’s law, or sharia, because the governance according to the whims of their ruling families with armies have failed them. Furthermore, with still greater granularity within this ethos of disaggregation, the literature demonstrates how even the notions of Salafism are highly contested.²³ Yet, the scripted language this strategy element reflects reduces the many to the lowest possible one. “Sharia,” for instance, in General Flynn’s reductionist terms, is “a violent law that is buried in barbaric convictions” (p. 110). In his similarly reductionist terms, “Islamists” are “a messianic mass movement of evil people” (p. 8).

The scholarly and professional security literature portrays even Muslim revolutionary movements similarly in terms of the many, and not the one. In this farther right militant segment of the Islamic continuum, we learn to distinguish between defensive and offensive jihadists—those who fight within the just war principle of defensive jihad to repel foreigners who are occupying a particular local Muslim territory, and those who subscribe to a more global revolutionary ideology that legitimizes violent struggle in terms of a more cosmic war against the perennial enemies of the faith to usher in the imagined Islamic utopia. Yet, the script that General Flynn reaches for is a homogenizing one that not only obscures these important differences but brings in a much wider swath of Muslims. He approvingly cites the anti-Islam pundit Andrew McCarthy’s statement, for instance, that “Islamic supremacism is not merely the creed of the outlier ‘violent extremists,’ but of hundreds of millions of Muslims, the ocean in which jihadists comfortably swim.”

In all of these instances, this frame of the one Islam rather than the many—this failure to disaggregate—constructs far more enemies than otherwise would exist. By gradually

conflating more and more of Islam with threat, it securitizes so much more of the religion of 1.5 billion people in the world, erasing the hard-won distance that the world's Muslims might enjoy between their notion of Islam and terrorism. The recent assessment of this script by Fawaz Gerges, a world-renowned French scholar on Sunni extremism and Islamism, provides a final bookend for this counterargument:

By characterizing the fight against ISIS as a Cold War-style ideological struggle between “radical Islam” and the West, Trump not only reduces a complex crisis to a binary narrative; he recites from the same script that ISIS recruiters are using to attract support. Unsurprisingly, ordinary Muslims, who wholeheartedly reject ISIS’s nihilistic ideology, are condemning Trump’s simplistic rhetoric, which fuels Islamophobia. But, for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’s self-appointed emir, and his associates, Trump’s campaign is music to their ears. It gets worse. By comparing the fight against ISIS to the struggle against the Soviet Union, Trump elevates the terrorist organization to the status of a great power. This contributes to perceptions that ISIS is much more potent than it actually is, again playing into the hands of ISIS recruiters.²⁴

b. Support the “Global Muslim Reform Movement”

Flynn describes a “global Muslim Reform Movement that asks for Americans to support their campaign against the imposition of head covering for Muslim women” (p. 118). However, as anyone who has spent any time among the world’s Muslim communities knows, this so-called “global Muslim Reform Movement” is a highly imaginary frame. There simply is no reform “movement” in the Western sense of the term. The only critical mass of Martin Luther-like figures who are transforming Islam are the highly fundamentalist Salafis, or what the Saudis officially refer to as “the Salafiyya reform movement,” backed by them and other Arab monarchies. In the case of the popular Islamists with significant religious capital to speak with authority, who are effectively working on the front lines to keep Muslim youth safe from extremist interpretations, the last thing they want is taint by the U.S. Even rumor that they had any material or even verbal support from anyone in the U.S., they all agree, would spell their end.²⁵

Despite the Western media’s darlings who have abandoned and criticized all that resembles Islam, like Irshad Manji or Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the real allies in the ideological struggle in no way view themselves as “reformists,” but simply as pious Muslims who are preaching the traditional faith that extremist master narratives have largely silenced. Those on the front lines of the war of ideas are necessarily Islamists

and even Salafists, given the fact that Islam everywhere—even among Sufis—has morphed or is morphing into Islamism and Salafism in its various forms. Thus, when approached by well-meaning U.S. officials and NGOs about support with the question, “What can we do to help?” it is not surprising that the most effective allies in discrediting the ideology of extremism consistently whisper in desperation: “PLEASE! NOTHING!” In this realm, the U.S. does not have the proverbial “Midas touch” as some imagine; those leading change in Muslim communities think of us not as “Goldfinger,” but leadfinger. In an increasingly transparent world, anyone tainted with U.S. fingerprints quickly sinks into oblivion, as if trying to swim while wearing lead boots.

When the former intelligence chief says that “reformation is required”—a more fundamental “complete reformation of the Islamic religion” (pp. 132-137)—he approvingly cites the case of fellow former army general and now political head of state, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, of Egypt’s *de facto* military dictatorship, and quotes most of al-Sisi’s famous speech at Al-Azhar University where he chastised Sunni Islam’s main institution, calling for “a religious revolution.” That kind of effort, and those who pursue it, Flynn says, “we must accept, and help lead” (p. 135).

Again, this strategic notion of supporting leaders like al-Sisi who want to manage Islam within their borders fails to grasp that these leaders need no such support. Nearly every Muslim-majority state has long had a ministry of religious affairs that carefully manages the official state Islam, going so far as to specify what is taught at the mosques or schools, and even vetting the imams or clerics who will do the teaching. General al-Sisi, for example, takes the more draconian approach to official Islam, planning to have one vetted sermon given to the entire nation of 80 million each Friday.²⁶ Yet, the evidence across a broad range of the literature on this issue over the past fifteen years suggests that such rigid official state Islamism would drive the kind of authentic Muslim discourse needed for real reform underground.²⁷ In such a structure of power-knowledge, the counterhegemonic forces—the revolutionaries who legitimize violence in the name of Islam to overthrow this structure of societal injustice—are already retreating to the ungoverned virtual territory—a *samizdat*-like alternative or parallel society of dissident institutions, increasingly based in the alternative media. From this emerging parallel universe, they are creating a dissident Islam, set against the formal, official one.

c. Increase Our Ideological Appeal

The third sub-element in this strategy is to discredit the ideology from *decreasing* the appeal of our adversary’s ideology to *increasing* the appeal of our own. “Those

seeking freedom in Muslim countries,” he notes, will continue to “call out to us for support, knowing that American traditions and values and, eventually, American leadership is their only chance to gain liberty” (p. 130).

Here is where the aforementioned strategy pillar to link “radical” and “Islam” begins to undermine U.S. identity among the population most at risk of radicalization. The earlier discussion has already underscored how the U.S. lost so much of its moral capital with the Muslim street when a popular security discourse emerged that did not align with the more universal values enshrined in our Constitution—one that created a humiliation or grievance structure among the broader masses by erasing their hard-won identity that had distanced their Islam from terrorism.

...the Obama administration stood firm in the face of criticism for not invoking the clash of civilizations master frame, and by not using the terms like “radical Islam” that this master frame requires.

We have already mentioned the role of such ideational structures in influencing discourse and social practice broadly. According to discourse theorist Teun Van Dijk, for example, ideologies “are the ultimate basis of the discourses” and play a key role in identity politics, with the polarization between in-groups and out-groups being a prominent feature of these ideological structures.²⁸ In the words of the late prominent French social philosopher Michel Foucault, discourses—taken for granted “truths”—“systematically form the objects about which they speak.”²⁹ In other words, what we talk about, and how we talk about it, actually creates the world of objects that we “know” or “see.” Of course, this is precisely what has happened. At the macro or structural level, the clash of civilizations schema after 9/11—along with the vast discourse that erased all distinction between Islam and terrorism—functioned to create something of a security dilemma. For non-Muslims in the West, it securitized not just al-Qaeda, but all of Islam. For Muslims worldwide, the effective securitization of their faith by a superpower caused a reactionary grievance or humiliation structure at the mass level. That in turn caused a reciprocal securitization of the West, in the form of the war on Islam master narrative that we have already discussed. Thus, the first step in increasing our ideological appeal is to remove that mass-level grievance structure, which will in turn deflate the war on Islam master narrative.

It is in that security context that the Obama administration stood firm in the face of criticism for not invoking the clash of civilizations master frame, and by not using the terms like

“radical Islam” that this master frame requires. While increasing the ideological appeal of the U.S. in view, the President at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in February 2015 took an opposite tack: “We are not at war with Islam. We are at war with people who have perverted Islam.”³⁰ Similarly, in her appearance on ABC’s “This Week,” Hillary Clinton explained in early December 2015 that she would not use the term “radical Islam” because it “sounds like we are declaring war against a religion.” First, she said, it is morally wrong; “it doesn’t do justice to the vast number of Muslims in our country and around the world who are peaceful people.” Second, she added, it also “helps to create this clash of civilizations that is actually a recruiting tool for ISIS and other radical jihadists who use this as a way of saying, ‘We are in a war against the West—you must join us.’”³¹ Even the Pope—the head of General Flynn’s own Catholic faith—refuses to link Islam with terrorism for moral and strategic reasons. Pope Francis recently said, “It’s not right to identify Islam with violence.”³² The Pope noted that he had spoken with enough imams to have gained empathy: “I know how they think; they are looking for peace,” he said, adding that the Islamic State group “presents itself with a violent identity card, but that’s not Islam.” It is the Pope’s strategy and not General Flynn’s, therefore, that will increase our ideological appeal, and remove the radicalization structure which our discourse and actions to date have erected.

The key point of the war of ideas that we tend to miss is that all *ideological* competition is at its root and very nature *moral* competition.³³ Our wisest statesmen and strategic thinkers have understood that moral culture and moral action are the greatest power a nation can wield.³⁴ To resurrect the Chinese sage Sun Tzu again, moral and mental strength were the greatest arsenal in war.³⁵ To Israel’s renowned King Solomon, it was not the Machiavellian virtue that the general proffered, but rather “righteousness” that “exalts a nation.”³⁶ America’s own wise sage of the Cold War, the late George Kennan, believed that his generation’s “great game” is “in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations,” and that to win “the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions....”³⁷ The power and necessity of moral competition are so fundamental that even the Islamist ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, from his prison cell in Jordan in 2004, conveyed his understanding of the principle to the highly sectarian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: “I advise my fraternal mujahideen to protect their efforts and keep jihad in its brightest image,” he wrote. “This is the best victory for them—better than sacrificing their lives.”³⁸ From this basic axiom it is clear that to enact an efficacious strategy of moral competition which denies Zarqawi’s ideological offspring the hearts and minds of the next generation of young Muslims, we need to examine reflexively our culturally-embedded hostile myths and the parts of the playbook that

flow from them. By creating the vision of a hostile America—the America hostile to Islam and its adherents—these scripts effectively dwarf and thwart all other efforts that aim to increase our ideological appeal.

2. THE BATTLEFIELD PART OF THE WAR OF IDEAS

The second of the four strategy elements reflects the notion that defeating Muslim militants decisively on the battlefield is the key to defeating the more abstract ideology of militancy in hearts and minds. That strategic syllogism emerged early after 9/11 and stems from the more basic idea that the validity of every political ideology has an element of pragmatism—the idea that the truth-value of something lies in its practical success and can be measured in the answer to this question: “*How well does it work?*” In the case of radical Islamist ideology, this idea has been widespread in the U.S. security community since around 2004 when militant discourse about what was a “valid jihad” emerged. If a declared militant jihad (or *jihad bil saif*) was just, valid, or legitimate—so the logic went—then God would bless it under the precedent of earlier Islamic contexts. The *Quran* 22: 39-40, for example, outlines a kind of just or defensive war, giving “permission” (to fight) “to those on whom war is made, because they are oppressed. And surely Allah is able to assist them.”

a. “Destroy the jihadis on the ground”

From that basic syllogism, it is not surprising that we see General Flynn’s first sub-strategy: “We must destroy the jihadis on the ground, eliminate their support from friendly or frightened states, and destroy their commercial and virtual networks” (p. 139). “We know how to win on the ground, as we demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Flynn insists, and “we can’t do it exclusively with airplanes and drones; we need our fighting men and women” (p. 139).

However, this boots-on-the-ground strategy merely replicates a key cultural intelligence failure of Afghanistan and Iraq: that non-Muslim foreign occupation triggers the defensive jihad and Islamic just war doctrine among a segment of the populace sufficient to create an unstoppable insurgency and multiply our adversaries a hundredfold. That fact is ensconced in the religious edicts of too many influential clerics—from those funded by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia during the latter part of the Cold War in Pakistan’s Federally-Administered Tribal Area and Northwest Frontier Province to those state-supported and so-called *wasatiyya* clerics like the powerful Sunni Pope-like figure, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi.³⁹ This notion that occupations trigger deadly nationalist resistance with a thin veil of religious legitimacy has been the finding of too many studies of young people who impaled themselves on the edifice of preponderant

power.⁴⁰ It was that lesson learned regarding destroying jihadi armies on the ground that led to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ statement at West Point, specifically: “Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.”⁴¹

Trying to militarily crush these revolutionaries—most of whom see themselves as fighting a just war to overturn an unjust social order—produces quite the opposite results than what we intended.

This notion of defeating the idea of a religiously-sanctioned war by defeating the faithful who are enacting it altogether misses another key point: Militarily defeating a particular Sunni revolutionary organization in a local area and driving its foot soldiers back home does not defeat the cause or *casus belli*. Why? Because in the place they left and in the homelands to where they are returning, the very conditions that gave rise to their revolution and just war persist. In other words, politically-aggrieved minds that are sensitive to social justice do not look at a battlefield defeat here or there by Western powers and their allies as delegitimizing their underlying notion of social injustice that catalyzed their obedience to the Islamic injunction of just war on behalf of the oppressed. Trying to militarily crush these revolutionaries—most of whom see themselves as fighting a just war to overturn an unjust social order—produces quite the opposite results than what we intended. The videos of occupation and “collateral damage” by the U.S. military proliferate on YouTube; the dead and wounded are lionized as *shaheeds*, thereby creating the cultural structure for still more militancy and broader forms of resistance. Such action broadens the grievance structure, and what was the struggle by a vanguard few militants is broadened to a much wider swath of the *umma*, and the idea of struggle that was once only violent is broadened to what is now the other many (nearly forty) forms of anti-Western jihad, or “global Islamic resistance,” as conceptualized by so many contemporary Islamist ideologues.⁴²

b. “Change the Whole System”

This next strategy element moves from the mere task of destroying jihadis on the ground to a breathtakingly harder task of changing the social order. In General Flynn’s words, instead of “turning it over to the locals and accepting more ‘Islamic republics,’” we must “change the whole system as we used to do” (p. 139).

Nevertheless, here the general moves on without elaborating, and leaves us wondering about the clause, “as we used to do.” Is he referring to the U.S.-engineered coup in Iran in 1953 that deposed a democratically-elected leader and installed a U.S. client dictator? Of course, that mode of changing the system had significant blowback; the Shah’s corrupt, nepotistic regime brutally wielded its Israeli-trained secret police as it sought to de-Islamize the broader traditional Islamic culture, leading to a distinctly Islamic revolution.

Recent failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have taken the wind out of the military-centric kind of interventionism enacted to date, and have produced something of a strategic pause.

On the one hand, this part of the playbook that imagines a militarily-produced revolution of a social order is not only technically not practical; it is politically not feasible. Recent failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have taken the wind out of the military-centric kind of interventionism enacted to date, and have produced something of a strategic pause. Signified as the “Obama Doctrine” by liberal institutions from *The Atlantic* to *The Washington Post*, and by conservative institutions from *Commentary* to *The National Review*, we might think of it as a Hippocratic-like axiom of foreign policy of “First do no harm”—or, in President Obama’s words, “Don’t do stupid sh!t.”⁴³ As the most knowledgeable experts on the region are concluding, macro-level military interventionism by a foreign military force cannot stop the micro-level conflict occurring in the back alleys where the occupying force cannot live.⁴⁴ At the height of the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad in 2006 and 2007, for instance, 160,000 occupying U.S. troops could not stop the bloodshed in a country of only 20 million.

Second, Flynn’s strategic notion that “as least we can bring order” (p. 140) reflects the main regime security strategy of every authoritarian regime in existence; it is the main security master narrative that the Arab lobby pays for in Washington and broadcasts through state-run media. Thus, after 60 years of post-colonial foreign policy centered on order, it is not surprising that, in the 8th annual ASDA’s A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey of 16 countries (2016), it was not the lack of order that youth were frustrated with; it was the “lack of jobs and opportunities.”⁴⁵ Yet, that kind of scrutiny which focuses not on regime change but on regime reform, which would address this prevailing youth grievance structure, is a much under-resourced element of our national power, and one that General Flynn nowhere alludes to.

3. WEAKEN OR TOPPLE REGIMES THAT SUPPORT RADICAL ISLAM

The third of General Flynn’s four strategic elements is captured near the end of the book under the heading “Attacking the Enemy Alliance” (p. 171). Here, the author frames Russia and Iran as “the two most active and powerful members of the enemy alliance” which are supporting “radical Islam” (p. 171). This threat frame, of course, is anachronistic, hearkening back to the Cold War and to the post-1979 Iranian Revolution security era, when those states did support low-level terrorism. By maintaining that threat paradigm, the general and the Washington Playbook broadly erase the prevailing contemporary professional consensus that the main state support for the “radical Islamists” like al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Boko Haram, and now ISIS is primarily the long-term traditional U.S. allies that have received tens of billions of dollars in U.S. aid since 9/11—mainly the Salafist and Islamist Gulf State regimes and institutions, or Pakistan’s military and intelligence arms, or even longtime NATO member Turkey.⁴⁶ That dominant hostile myth obscures from view the fact that the more global kind of jihadism is manufactured, exported, and carefully managed as allies of convenience by various Sunni regimes from Algeria to the heavily Saudi-backed authoritarian regimes in Yemen, Egypt, and Pakistan. These extremists become highly useful in a kind of “double game” that each of these authoritarian regimes plays to garner U.S. counterterrorism or military aid. Instead of fighting the extremists which they created and carefully manage, of course, these corrupt governments use the bulk of this security assistance for the very kinds of internal regime security strategies that created support for militancy and revolution among their subjects in the first place—producing anti-Americanism in the process.⁴⁷

Carefully shaped by the highly influential Arab and Israeli lobbies that fund so many prominent foreign policy think tanks in Washington, this part of the playbook frames Iran as something of a Shiite ISIS. General Flynn likens life for “the unfortunate residents of [ISIS’s] ‘caliphate,’” for example, with that of “the oppressed citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran”—describing them both as “a totalitarian state under the dictates of the most rigid version of Sharia” (p. 159). However, like his civilizational clash narrative, all security professionals with a broader Middle East portfolio know that it cannot be supported by any grounded investigation; it does not correspond to actual experience of the vast majority of Iranians. We agree that the populist revolution which enabled Shia Islamists to consolidate power in 1979 has clearly become much less idealistic and more like the Arab authoritarian regimes that *The Field of Fight* somehow passes over in silence—corrupt, oppressive deep states of several thousand *nomenklatura*-like elite, tied

not merely by religious ideology but by a more clientelistic financial and intermarriage structure with much looser ideological ties.

Yet, there is a vast segment of literature—including documentaries and thousands of YouTube videos by people of all walks of life who visit Iran as tourists—that problematize this security myth. This vast world of literature attests to the stark differences between life in even a more moderate Sunni state and life in the Islamic Republic of Iran.⁴⁸ *France 24*'s recent post-sanctions documentary, for instance, showed a vibrant life in Iran and captured the perspective of an Iranian rock star who recently moved back from New York. "Iran is like New York," he said; "there's a creative buzz about it."⁴⁹ This comports with all that Iranian-American filmmaker, journalist, frequent well-connected Iran traveler, and author of three books critical of Iran's political system, Hooman Majd, has written. In a 2008 talk at the New America Foundation in Washington, Majd observed, "There is a certain amount of freedom in Iran; there are certain restrictions in Iran. But generally people don't wake up every morning and think, 'O my God, I live under tyranny.'" "That's not the case," he added. "There is a lot of movement and change."⁵⁰ Middle East security professional Vali Nasr adds to this corrective: "No other country in the Muslim world is so rife with intellectual fervor and cultural experimentation at all levels of society...in no place in the Muslim world is modernity and its various cultural, political, and economic instruments examined as seriously and thoroughly as in Iran."⁵¹ In his conflation of ISIS and Iran, the former intelligence chief overlooks the fact that there have been more translations of German philosopher Immanuel Kant into Persian the past decade than into any other language, and that in the areas of mathematics and physics—especially string theory—Iranian scientists rank among the best in the world.⁵² Clearly, much of the security myth is less a function of pure objective description of a threat than it is a performative function of identity politics—of creating a useful enemy for political purposes.

A related and just as worn part of the playbook conflates these nationalist resistance movements that Iran supports with more extremist militants that the Gulf states and Pakistan created and nurtured. Obscuring these important distinctions, General Flynn aggregates them all together, describing our being under attack—in his words—by "al Qaeda, Hezbollah, ISIS and countless other terrorist groups" (p. 76). This move of exclusion which over-constructs the Iranian threat also omits the fact that—outside of its borders and the Shia-majority area of Iraq during the U.S. occupation⁵³—most of its lethal actions were set in the context of supporting local nationalist resistance movements that emerged in response to Israel's invasion and occupation of their homeland, and all three of which view the more radical Salafists or "takfiris" as their archenemies.⁵⁴ In

Hezbollah's case, credible scholars view it much less a terrorist organization than a nationalist resistance—a national guard—for the de facto state of fractured, confessional Lebanon's Shia south. We all know that the group emerged when Israel—in response to repeated low-level attacks on the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) by the non-state actor Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—invaded and annexed much of its territory in 1982. Moreover, we know that this invasion included Israeli-backed violent sectarianism in the form of predominantly Christian militia—part of the Phalange movement—which perpetrated the shocking Sabra and Shatila massacre of Palestinians earlier displaced by Israel, and otherwise resulted in what official estimates put at 19,000 dead and 30,000 wounded in just the southern half of this small state.⁵⁵

General Flynn fails to mention that Iran and its semi-autonomous actor, Hezbollah, have together killed approximately 509 people over a span of 35 years—about fifteen per year on average.⁵⁶ Far more Americans have been killed by friendly fire, suicide, and other self-inflicted battlefield accidents than have been killed by Iran and its allies.

The hostile myth that aggregates Iran-supported nationalist Shia militias like Hezbollah with the Saudi-supported global Islamist revolutionaries like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram also requires erasure of the *nature* and *degree* of threat posed. General Flynn, for example, fails to mention that Iran and its semi-autonomous actor, Hezbollah, have together killed approximately 509 people over a span of 35 years—about fifteen per year on average.⁵⁶ Far more Americans have been killed by friendly fire, suicide, and other self-inflicted battlefield accidents than have been killed by Iran and its allies.⁵⁷ Iran now provides a modicum of support for the Taliban insurgency, along with Pakistan, but carefully manages this to keep Afghanistan from becoming a pro-Western state that the U.S. could use as a proxy for military purposes to contain and threaten Iran. Iran did wage a low intensity conflict against the U.S. in Iraq, aiding Shia nationalist movements in the task of removing U.S. hegemony inside of Iraq and providing them nominal assistance of shaped penetrators and 240mm rockets, along with training by the IRGC and Hezbollah. However, outside of that, since 9/11—most of that time under the harsh Western-imposed sanctions—Iran retaliated only symbolically, with three to four non-lethal attacks.⁵⁸ These deaths, we all realize, are a drop in the bucket compared to an estimated 200,000 deaths and other

destruction wreaked by Sunni militants in individual terrorist attacks alone during this time.⁵⁹ Moreover, we have not yet begun to calculate the human cost to Muslims worldwide by state-supported Salafism.

Finally, this part of the playbook's so-called security knowledge—the regime of truth about the world of threats—obscures the strategic opportunities. By continuing to center Iran as an existential threat and conflate it with Sunni extremism, the script blinds us to how—in the words of Baltasar Gracian—"a wise man gets more use from his enemies than a fool from his friends."⁶⁰ The script blinds us to the fact that it is Iran and Shiite nationalist resistance militias in Iraq and Lebanon which are the main regional bulwark protecting Israelis and Arabs broadly against the really dangerous revolutionaries who have carved out a Salafist proto-state in the predominantly Sunni bastions of Syria and Iraq.⁶¹

Recalling our axiom of disaggregation, the Shiite militias in Iraq are not in any way a monolith, with great tensions between the Iran-allied Badr organization and the League of the Righteous militias, and the more Iraq-centric and Sadrist movement's Peace Brigades.⁶² While some formed in nationalist opposition to the U.S. occupation, their main rise was in response to Iraq's need for a national guard when ISIS swept Mosul and threatened Baghdad and the Shiite holy sites, after the entirety of the U.S.-trained Iraqi Army threw off its weapons and uniforms and fled. Every Iraqi Shiite and Sunni commander on the front lines against ISIS described Iran as the sole reason for their success. It was Iran and its resistance militia Hezbollah which provided these militias with the training and even the ammunition that saved Iraq from the *blitzkrieg*-like advance of the ISIS army.⁶³ In the words of one BBC reporter, "In the battle against ISIS, the US and Iraq are dependent on Iran."

From this realization, many cooler heads are embracing a more pragmatic approach. In the words of Ramzy Mardini, a former State Department official and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, we are "coming to the realization that Shiite militias are a necessary evil in the fight against ISIS."⁶⁴ That means Iran is also the key hidden agent behind the demise of ISIS. Still, that notion is not part of the Washington Playbook because it erodes the well-scripted move that has carefully deflected criticism of the Likud-led Israeli occupation and the anachronistic Arab monarchies by embellishing the Iranian threat.

What would it mean if we tore that one page from the playbook and began to disaggregate Iran and its Shia nationalist resistance movements from the rest of the growing world of U.S. enemies? It is true that Iran's clerical regime and its revolutionary protectorate, the

IRGC, comprise a corrupt authoritarian Islamist regime just like our other long-time Arab and Pakistani "allies" in the region, and that this regime is still highly anti-American. Yet, as we have long understood, it is often the case that the dyads in a so-called intractable conflict *need* the other as a threatening enemy to secure its own political identity—to construct the political self, and to shore up its tenuous legitimacy at home.⁶⁵ This, of course, is the case with the Iranian regime and the IRGC. Understanding this, we might break with the tired script that plays to the hardliners' more ideology-based legitimacy. In other words, we might enact a more pragmatist approach of refusing them the enemy that Iran's older revolutionary hardliner faction needs, and create instead a new historical trend of well-strategized successive acts of good-will directed toward Iran's 60 million youth—building their human security quotient. We might add to this a strategy of quiet cooperation with the more reformist elements of the regime, working toward common security goals. Most of all, we might remove the fuel upon which Iran's more revolutionary hardliners exist—the inflationary rhetoric that has characterized our security discourse since well before President Bush's "axis of evil" speech.

A classic example of an ongoing failure in this strategic principle of pragmatism is our scripted support for Saudi Arabia as it has wreaked uninterrupted destruction of nearly all the remaining infrastructure in the desperately poor and youth-bulging northern Yemen. There the al-Saud are using the latest U.S.-provided cluster bombs, logistics, and intelligence to obliterate the human security infrastructure of the entire northern part of Yemen, which is occupied by the so-called Iranian-backed Houthis—a rebel movement that is resisting the injustice of decades of a U.S.- and Saudi-backed corrupt deep state in Sana'a.⁶⁶ The world looks on in silent bewilderment, as if the Gulf State monarchies simply needed to destroy something nominally Shia to gain back legitimacy lost while the Shia coalition is destroying the largely Wahhabist ISIS. Yet, unlike ISIS, the Houthis and the broader 40 percent of Yemen's nominally Shiite population that is Zaydi had quietly ruled and existed there for a millennium—a threat to *no one*—and more lately functioned as the main force of containment of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.⁶⁷ Thus, by our complicity with Saudi Arabia to perpetuate the grand myth of Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula, we have effectively removed an enemy on paper—the nominally-Shia Houthis—that was in practice the most effective containment bulwark against our far more threatening common enemy. In our unreflexive compliance with the playbook's gaze on "THE IRANIAN THREAT!" therefore, we have been unable to seize the strategic opportunities that entail getting more use from our so-called enemies, and have instead blindly followed the foolishness of our so-called friends.

4. CREATE NEW GLOBAL ALLIANCES

This final element of General Flynn's four-part strategy is outlined only briefly in *The Field of Fight's* conclusion, under the subheading "Assembling our Forces" (p. 176). In that effort, he says, "we should start with strengthening our relationships with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. In a kind of post-script, he adds that "we will also want to undo the severe damage that has been done to our relationship with the Saudis..." (p. 178).

This, of course, is not in any way new; our uncritical alliance with all four of these countries is at the very heart of the Washington Playbook. Hence, it comes as yet another surprise when Flynn classifies our four main and longtime allies in the Middle East under the heading of "creating new" ones.

Second, this strategy element erases from view the fact that all three of these Arab regimes and Pakistan—the recipients of a vast amount of U.S. aid and military support—are rapidly becoming unstable. In all three cases in which the U.S. protects the Sunni authoritarian regime with the most aid, there is the most anti-Americanism. Those with a favorable view of the U.S. constitute only 14 percent in Jordan, 16 percent in Egypt, and 11 percent in Pakistan. These parts of the populace are no doubt the haves—the regime insiders, who benefit most from the aid. However, these numbers are hardly a base for an effective alliance.⁶⁸ Moreover, uncritically supporting these deep states with military aid risks remaking the mistake of 1979 when the U.S. supported the brutal regime of the Shah, rather than the more democratic aspirations of the oppressed Iranians who rose up in revolution against that regime, and against the regime's superpower protectorate.

Already, Egypt has more than 41,000 political prisoners behind bars, with systematic disappearances of many activists reminiscent of Argentina's "dirty war."

We might analyze this final strategic element by taking the case of Egypt, where there is much to suggest that a public partnership with this regime—like our earlier one with the Shah's regime—would be a strategic mistake. Politically—after three decades of a former corrupt authoritarian puppet of an underlying deep state—there is no coherent state political culture or ideology that functions to glue the nation into the kind of conceptual unity and unity of effort necessary for any real, peaceful political progress. The "state" political system has been a military-dominant deep state that confidently watched as its figurehead was toppled

by a broad coalition. Egypt's first democracy was led by Islamists, who won in a landslide victory. When that government failed to improve the lives of post-revolutionary Egyptians—partly from Islamist zeal, and partly from decades of institutional and cultural starvation, and other economic structures—the old guard retook control in a coup, as it always knew it would. That deep state regime is kleptocratic—an unholy alliance of well-armed military officers and well-connected business elites. The Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) itself controls much of Egypt's valuable land and about one third of the Egyptian economy.⁶⁹ The income from this opaque economic activity is not of the "trickle down" type; it remains within the clientelistic system—ever deepening the divide between the haves and have-nots.⁷⁰ This inequality is not hidden, but out in the open, with upscale neighborhoods abutting sprawling *favela*-like slums,⁷¹ creating the kind of mass emotional structure—resentment, or relative deprivation—that has long been known to be the chief source of revolutions.⁷² The regime itself is growing, and to maintain its own internal coherence must continue not only to direct all investment to its own economic and political security—the status quo—but put down rising dissent with increasing crimes against the broader populace. Already, Egypt has more than 41,000 political prisoners behind bars, with systematic disappearances of many activists reminiscent of Argentina's "dirty war."⁷³

Economically, the main employer is a bloated and corrupt bureaucracy, while the only other engines—the tourism industry, which accounts for 11 percent of GDP, and the Suez Canal—are in decline. Dependency on the purchase of imported primary and intermediate goods has left the manufacturing sectors in contraction as foreign exchange shortages have forced local manufacturers to idle plants. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is stagnant because of the uncertainty and, despite the \$24 billion in financial aid provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates since 2013 to demobilize the Islamist democrats, the national debt is climbing at ten percent a year and accelerating.⁷⁴ Inflation is galloping at 14 percent across the board, and higher among food staples in short supply—in the past year, lentils, wheat, vegetable oil, and rice rose as much as 20, 30, 50 and 60 percent⁷⁵—with half of the populace scraping by in food insecurity at less than \$2 a day. The population of over 90 million is growing at over two percent, and is expected to double to 160 million by 2050. Already, each year, Egypt is producing two million more mouths to feed, and 800,000 more young men looking for jobs, with current levels of youth unemployment already at a staggering 30 percent.⁷⁶

What makes the plight of tomorrow's Egyptians different than that of today's Zimbabweans is this: Zimbabweans have sufficient water and land to feed themselves. However,

95 percent of Egyptian life is alongside the Nile, and 90 percent of this river's watershed is in the highlands of Ethiopia, before passing through eleven other countries before Egypt. Increasingly drought-ridden due to climate change, Ethiopia is enacting a survival strategy of harnessing more of its rain for its own unpredictable weather, and is building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project to—as Egypt did with its Aswan Dam—capture the flooding when it occurs and hold it for the certain drought to come. This, of course, means still less and less water for a Nile that is already a shadow of its former depth and width as it enters Egypt. Any recent photo or video of the Nile shows high banks that were formerly filled by water, and exhibits farmers from the Nubians on into Cairo expressing the situation not in terms of crisis future, but in terms of crisis present. Each person requires 1,000 cubic meters of water to survive at the water scarcity level (compared to seven times that much for the world average). There are 90 million people in Egypt, thus requiring 90 *billion* cubic meters of water to survive. However, the current agreement signed during British rule was that Egypt would get 55.5 billion cubic meters of the Nile, thus already leaving Egypt with a 30 billion cubic meter shortfall. That agreement is in shambles as the population booms in the twelve Nile countries to the South are forcing their need to retain the water that falls on their land.⁷⁷ Already Egypt is the world's largest importer of cereal, importing 20 million tons of wheat annually.⁷⁸ Thus, just from this one issue of water, Egypt is on track for a 160-million person humanitarian disaster and regional war with its southern neighbors.

Thus, this fourth strategy element that continues uncritical U.S. military aid to these autocratic regimes not only repeats the mistake that we made in supporting the Shah's regime, but also fails to address the far more threatening elements of the political-economy. Obviously, it is these political-economic crises and not extremism more narrowly that will soon be viewed as the far greater threat. When just one large state of 160 million fails, we will be longing for the good old days, when we had only "radical Islam" to keep us up at night.

CONCLUSION: CONSTRUCTING A NEW PLAYBOOK

In unreflexively reaching for these anachronistic security scripts—what some are referring to as the Washington Playbook—we make several strategic blunders: First, we needlessly expand the universe of our enemies by creating new ones; second, we misplace our focus onto lesser and even useful "enemies"; third, we uncritically continue to support our so-called "friends," whose actions are the most threatening; and, fourth, we otherwise fail to see the strategic opportunities that could make us more secure. Every one of General Flynn's four pillars to counter violent

extremism—all enacting anachronistic and highly politically-interested security scripts—functions to *increase* radicalization in the fourth of the world that is Muslim, rather than reduce it.

Every one of General Flynn's four pillars to counter violent extremism—all enacting anachronistic and highly politically-interested security scripts—functions to increase radicalization in the fourth of the world that is Muslim, rather than reduce it.

Clearly, we cannot become more secure by doing the same things over and over again that have led to this catastrophic environment of insecurity. Thus, what other strategic opportunity presents itself to actually reduce radicalization in Muslim communities? Here, we might first consider a new security paradigm—a new strategic culture, if you will—one that we have already introduced: *moral competition*. By moral competition, we more specifically mean rescripting the U.S. identity in both *discourse* and *practice* to the extent that we—the U.S. government and its people—come to be seen as the champions of human security in the communities of young Muslims most at risk of radicalization. The central aim of this strategic culture is to seize the mantle of legitimacy from the militant revolutionaries—effectively taking their place as the agent most sincere and most effective in removing the expanding sources of injustice and grievances in their communities that have led to radicalization.

First, this strategic culture of moral competition means constructing a new public diplomacy campaign—a super-empowered bully pulpit—that effectively steals the megaphone from the militants and from the secretly anti-American regimes who use anti-Americanism as a security strategy. This strategy element's goal is to more loudly champion the causes of *the people*—not the regimes—and to show what all we are working toward, how we are listening to the people to best do it, and what we are accomplishing. To be clear, this more discursive part of the approach shifts our focus from the regimes to the people under them. It shifts from our role as a superpower protectorate of authoritarian regimes to a super-champion of the causes of those most vulnerable in those countries—the dispossessed who dwell outside of those clientelistic, deep state patronage systems. This discursive or public diplomacy pillar, therefore, saturates the virtual battlefield with a *strategic plan* for *each segment* of *each country* where there are young Muslims at greatest risk of radicalization. It communicates this plan, and how it was created with the credible input of the "street."

Second, to fund this new strategy of moral competition, it means abandoning our scripted reach for the hammer of the military and military aid—the hard and soft forms of military interventionism. It means using the windfall of resources to lead a global coalition with standing political and economic institutions that are charged solely with working with political and civil society agents in each locale to enact the aforementioned *well-publicized strategic plan* for *each segment of each country* where there are young Muslims at greatest risk of radicalization. We should recall the main containment perspective of Cold War strategist George F. Kennan—to apply “long-term,” “patient,” “firm,” and “vigilant” counterforce at each of “the sources.”⁷⁹ This part of the strategic plan would apply a Kennan-like firm counterforce on all of the sources of extremism, at every point of opportunity—rallying the carrots of public and private resources and the sticks of quiet but steered diplomacy—to force incremental measures to improve the parts of the human security equation most salient for the literature’s models on radicalization.⁸⁰ The key point is this: The coordinated investment that those strategic plans direct must fall *outside* of the regimes’ clientelistic apparatus of power, and in the neighborhoods where grievances are greatest. The regimes, of course, will support this plan, since they want to demobilize all revolutionary challengers, and thus protect the goose that is laying their golden egg.

Those who imagine this strategy to be too hard or costly should only look to how much more complex and hard are any number of the many major space-related or defense-related achievements. Just one of them—the vastly complex strategic deterrent Trident system of vastly complex nuclear propulsion submarines and nuclear weaponized inter-continental ballistic missiles, along with their support structure and elite cadre of engineers and operators and operating doctrine—is far more complex and costly than the strategy we are talking about.

Two key strategic plans, obviously, will be for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—the regimes that the playbook has constructed as our “allies,” yet which have been for decades the world’s undisputed leaders of state-sponsored extremism and terrorism. Their legitimacy crisis and geostrategic rivalry over the past three decades with their politically-useful enemies—Iran and India—have created far more extremists than the world’s militaries together could reasonably remove from the battlefield.⁸¹ For these two countries, a special set of carrots and sticks is warranted, but here also lies the low-hanging fruit in finally turning the tide against violent extremism. The internal threat of extremism to the regimes of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are growing, and the Washington Playbook’s scripted offerings only further destabilize these countries by supporting the regimes and neglecting the human security in the broader populace.

Of course, in what promises to be an increasingly constrained resource environment, we cannot create the expectation that the much-needed revolution in human security in Muslim communities will quickly emerge. Nevertheless, our constant discourse and unrelenting, modest progress in enacting the elements of these strategic plans for the most vulnerable segments of these communities—along with a lexicon of mutual respect for all elements of their identity—will effectively induce much more cooperation of the corrupt deep states again, which to this point have been the chief source of their young peoples’ deprivations and radicalization. Official scorecards for each country can function as the carrot and the stick to broadcast how the regime is supporting or hindering that country’s strategic plan. Again, incentivizing these regimes to shift much more of their limited resources onto that segment of the populace typically outside of their patronage will be the most significant factor in demobilizing the utopian militant movements that have sought to address the unjust social order.

This three-part strategic framework is a real strategic opportunity.

This rescripted strategic culture of moral competition will finally shift our focus from merely “hacking at the branches evil,”—in Thoreau’s words—onto “chopping at its roots.” However, the necessary but insufficient chore of hacking at the branches must continue; we must continue the more tactical “whack-a-mole” approach of killing and capturing the elements that are truly threatening the homeland. Here as well we cannot take the playbook’s standard “destroy the jihadi armies” approach. In our rescripting, this “branch” part of our strategy must cohere or dovetail with our main “roots” approach. This means a much leaner military component that operates off-camera at night, or in training and equipping support to the local forces. Again, by removing the highly inflammatory structure of preponderant foreign power from the view of the average young Muslim, we will have removed the most proximate and powerful human emotion and religious triggers for defensive just war that our military-centric strategy to date has inflamed.⁸²

All three of these strategic components—the two new ones focused on the roots and the greatly revised old one focused on the branches—promise to work synergistically to reduce the current temperature of fear, resentment, and hostility, and decrease the current social-structural components of human insecurity, all of which have been fueling militant revolutionary movements. This three-part strategic framework is a real strategic opportunity. Yet, to enact such a plan of containment based upon moral competition—one that measures up, in Kennan’s words

again, to our “own best traditions”—we must first create the much-needed epistemological break with the prevailing security “common sense”; we must break with the Washington Playbook.

NOTES

¹ See, for example, Mitchell Bard, *The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance that Undermines America's Interests in the Middle East* (New York: Harper, 2010); and John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

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Social Media's Potential in Intelligence Collection

by Sofia Charania

OVERVIEW

This article discusses the benefits and challenges that social media poses to intelligence collectors within the context of counterterrorism. On one hand, social media can provide insight on the broader goals of terrorist organizations, their targets, and their research interests. It can also be helpful in gauging public opinion, particularly public dissatisfaction, which can be used to anticipate some of the conditions that may give rise to terrorist activity. On the other hand, with nearly a billion web pages in existence, social media exacerbates collectors' existing challenge of distinguishing signals from noise as they sift through Open Source Intelligence. It can also provide new avenues for discreet communication between members of terrorist organizations, and can serve as a source of disinformation. Overall, social media is likely to be more helpful than harmful for analysts if our agencies invest in designing predictive models that filter through relevant metadata to anticipate attacks before they occur, and if they invest in designing programs that can frustrate terrorist organizations' effective use of social media platforms.

INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of Six Degrees and AOL Instant Messenger in 1997,¹ social media has become increasingly important, reforming marketing approaches,² interpersonal anticipating and addressing terrorism. I argue that some aspects of social media have made the potential payoff from using the Internet greater, while other aspects have made the challenges it presents more problematic. However, I conclude that using the provided policy recommendations can mitigate the challenges, making social media more helpful than harmful to analysts. Specifically, I propose that the analysis of information available via social media deserves more funding, much of which should be allocated toward the development of predictive models.

BACKGROUND

The importance of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)—intelligence gathered from publicly available sources—has increased in recent years, especially with the popularity that the Internet has gained since the early 2000s. Although OSINT is not limited to the Internet, that particular medium houses an ever-increasing volume of information. The emergence of Internet-based social media, in particular, has complicated the use of OSINT. Social media in this article will encompass “all online applications that spontaneously and interactively connect Internet users, through searchable directories (Facebook, LinkedIn), text- or audio-based blogs (WordPress, BlogTalkRadio), microblogs (Twitter, Tumblr), video-sharing (YouTube, DailyMotion), collaborative tools (GoogleDocs), and wikis (Twiki, SharePoint).”³

BENEFITS OF THE INTERNET

This section entails a very brief discussion of the benefits of Open Source Intelligence, and particularly the Internet, compared to other intelligence-gathering disciplines. By investing more heavily in OSINT analysis, the Intelligence Community (IC) can more effectively counter threats to national security. Given the accessibility of OSINT, more resources can be allocated toward collection, linguistic translation,⁴ and analysis of OSINT Internet data for effective use in countering threats.

Quantity of Information

OSINT provides collectors with much of the information they need.⁵ In fact, according to Robert David Steele, a former CIA case officer, “80 percent of the mission-critical information that the intelligence community needs is publicly available.”⁶ With over a billion Internet users since 2008, and one billion websites in 2014,⁷ it is no wonder that much of this public information is available through the Internet. It can be published online in blogs, media broadcasts, “grey literature” (information obtained from expert channels like academia),⁸ and other forms.

Low Cost

A second benefit that the Internet offers to intelligence analysts is its ease of access and low cost. Analysts are able to view an immense amount of information online from anywhere in the world, for virtually no charge beyond that of their Internet connection. In comparison, about 70% of the U.S. intelligence budget is spent on technical collection and private contractors.

Low Risk

A third benefit to using OSINT is the low risk it poses to analysts, especially compared to other intelligence-gathering disciplines. The emergence of the Internet as a medium of OSINT has increased the quantity of information available to collectors without even needing to utilize a human asset. OSINT can be collected by ethical and legal means, without risking exposure of sensitive assets.

SOCIAL MEDIA'S ROLE

Social media augments the benefits discussed above, and can be leveraged for counterterrorism objectives. This includes both addressing existing terror threats and anticipating conditions that may give rise to terrorist activity.

Makes Posting Information Easier

Social media acts as an avenue by which basically anyone can post information online with ease. Social networking sites are extremely user-friendly and the most popular ones are almost always free. Prior to the explosion of social media, particularly blogging and micro-blogging, posting information on a webpage was time-consuming and required more digital expertise than it does today. In sum, social media makes sharing information with the public easier than ever before.

Today, social media is the fastest real-time source of information available,⁹ because of the ease with which anyone can post updates. Of course, media broadcasts by news agencies occur extremely quickly today, but social media is distinctive because it allows individuals with unique information to share with the public directly. The use of Twitter during the recent terrorist attacks in Paris demonstrates the speed with which information is shared via social media online, and also demonstrates an example of individuals (witnesses and hostages, in this case) sharing with the outside world information to which only they were privy. For example, one hostage posted to Facebook, "Please come help us! They are shooting people one by one! First floor, quick!"¹⁰ [Editor's Note:

Donald Trump has turned Twitter into a political sensation, and a controversial one at that. He routinely uses "Tweets" to bypass the news media and communicate his views directly to the public.]

In the context of counterterrorism, the ease by which the average individual can post to social media also provides something that analysts can leverage. Terrorist organizations cannot control everything their members do on the web. Regarding ISIS, Aymen Al-Tamimi, a fellow at the Middle East Forum who has closely followed Syrian militant groups, states, "It's clear who's managing the official accounts, it's centralized management, but then there are fan-boys, and no one has any control over what they do."¹¹ In 2014 ISIS leadership demanded that members turn off location services on their mobile devices so as not to reveal their location, but many members still had location enabled on some of their recent Tweets, leaking location data.¹² "A significant number of accounts provided reliable GPS coordinates in ISIS territories,"¹³ according to research conducted by the Brookings Institution. ISIS leadership also banned iPhones around the same time due to similar security concerns, but around a third of ISIS supporters' tweets came from iPhones, and little change was noted after the decree,¹⁷ reinforcing the point that, although ISIS may try to control its supporters, it is hard to regulate what supporters and members do online. Analysts can leverage the small leaks that result from non-compliant members or supporters on the web, with location data being one of the most useful types of leaks. ISIS members often share mundane information about their daily lives (much like the majority of social media users), for example, sharing a Tweet about enjoying a Snickers bar: "I know I should thank Allah a lot for the various blessings that are here. Never imagined I would eat a Snickers here=D."¹⁶

Analysts can learn about the daily life and attitudes of ISIS members (and members of other digitally active terrorist organizations) via the information they post frivolously or casually. From these types of posts, analysts can develop an understanding of the organization's operating structure and of members' perspectives to counter terrorist organizations' activities more effectively.

The following case study is an example of analysts successfully leveraging a "leak" by a non-compliant ISIS member on Twitter, which is an important channel of propaganda dissemination for the organization.¹⁴

Recently, an ISIS member posted a selfie to Twitter bragging about the "command and control capabilities for Daesh," serving as an example of information carelessly made public. Air Force General "Hawk" Carlisle was able to use this information, particularly the location services associated with the posting, to

the U.S.'s advantage. After the location was vetted and confirmed, an airstrike was launched and the ISIS building was taken out,¹⁵ demonstrating how that piece of location data was used as actionable intelligence.

Provides Insight on Broader Goals of Terrorist Organizations

Social media furthers the benefits provided by the Internet by allowing analysts to monitor crises and track terrorist groups. Analysts can utilize social media to learn about terrorist organizations' strategy and targets, about their research interests, and about the terror network as a whole. I argue that this information can be leveraged in predicting attacks and countering terrorist efforts, which will be discussed within the context of ISIS. Much of the information gathered from social media may not be immediately actionable (though some of it certainly is), but it can help analysts conduct reconnaissance and may become actionable in the future.

1. Strategy

The insights gained from analyzing terrorist social media tactics can translate to a deeper understanding of the organization's on-the-ground tactics as well. By studying the tactics that ISIS uses online and focusing on those that are most successful, analysts can better understand how the organization works and develop informed expectations about its future tactics, both of which are critical to defeating it.

From ISIS social media use, analysts can identify specific tactics that the group favors, which likely transcend the virtual world. For example:

- a. ISIS uses notions of empowerment to attract vulnerable individuals via social media outlets. The story of Alex, a young female convert to Islam, is a perfect example.¹⁶ A lonely young woman who struggles with "lack of maturity and poor judgment" due to fetal alcohol syndrome, Alex is the type of at-risk youth that terrorist organizations like ISIS target. Members communicate with potential recruits like Alex via social media platforms such as Facebook and promise the reward of having a purpose in life, fighting for a just cause, etc.,¹⁷ which is often exactly what these disenfranchised individuals are searching for.
- b. ISIS brands its organization strategically and specifically for its various audiences on social media. To the West, it aims to appear powerful and ruthless, while to the residents of Iraq and the

Levant it brands itself as a philanthropic defender of Islam. For example, ISIS Tweets aimed at the U.S. are usually threatening, such as "You are our goals anywhere."¹⁸ Video propaganda aimed at the East, however, includes videos of members distributing food and relief items.¹⁹ The philanthropic image ISIS seeks to portray to the Middle East via its social media strategies can inform analysts about how the organization acquires support in its homeland in real life. This information can be used to inform U.S. overseas strategies to work toward minimizing support for such organizations.

2. Targets

Terrorist organizations utilize social media to recruit new members, spread propaganda, and embolden current members. Analysts can use this information to learn about these organizations' broader strategies in order to counter them more effectively. Terrorist language on social media can be used to infer who potential targets may be. For example, Jihadi websites described the Bataclan Theatre in Paris as being pro-Israel.²⁰ Although it is unclear whether Jihadi social media also reflected this belief about the Bataclan, analysts can monitor social media sites to scan for similar information, which would inform them about likely targets. This information can be used to increase security where attacks are most likely.

3. Terror Network

Social media also allows collectors to monitor relationships between individuals via networks like Facebook and Twitter. According to Daniel Byman, a professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Jeremy Shapiro, a fellow in the Brookings foreign policy program, a common problem for analysts is "detecting a terrorist before he acts." They also state that Facebook friends or Twitter followers of Syrian militants could be potential terrorists²¹ and, at the very least, this information can guide analysts in determining whom to monitor online.

4. Research Interests

Social media provides a source of information that analysts can exploit with data-crunching tools to predict major attacks. After the November 13, 2015, attacks in France, analysts at Predata subsequently scraped metadata from many web pages and built a model that successfully warned of the attacks. The webpages from which data were scraped include YouTube, a social media site. The model took into account the activity (page views, number of participants, etc.) on web pages relevant to terrorism and it showed a spike in activity in these pages that exceeded the threshold

for sounding an alarm within the model, which indicates that there is strong likelihood of an attack. This model was used to predict correctly (and retroactively) eight of the last 12 terrorist attacks in France.²² Using information gathered from social media sites such as YouTube can indicate to analysts which webpages are receiving unexpected increases in activity. This can signal the need for alertness and further investigation regarding terrorist activity.

Gauging Public Opinion

Social media also furthers the benefits provided by the Internet by allowing analysts to monitor and gauge public opinion, which aids in predicting uprisings. This is relevant to the counterterrorism cause because it allows analysts to understand and foresee political instability, which is one of the conditions that may give rise to an increase in terrorist activity.²³

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Social media essentially serves as a crowd-sourced form of information.¹⁴ Analysts can compare the posts of millions of social media users to understand the general attitudes regarding different events and political groups. With only 11.8% of Twitter users having “protected” or “private” accounts,² and around 50% of Facebook users using “private” accounts, analysts are able to view the majority of posts on leading social networking sites even without violating any user privacy rights. Analysts can compare posts from each social networking site to determine the number of people who either support or oppose certain ideas (and they can extrapolate from these statistics to estimate about larger populations), in a way that would not be allowed for by the Internet without social media sites.

The following case study on the Arab Spring demonstrates that posts made on social media platforms reflect public opinion extensively. This can be helpful to analysts when there is evidence of public discontent with the political, economic, or social system, since these factors may contribute to an environment conducive to terrorist activity.³ Knowledge of public opinion gained from social media sites can help analysts develop more informed expectations for the future.

Starting in 2010, social networking media was used to mobilize grassroots protest movements, beginning in Tunisia, and subsequent waves of

discontent and revolution followed, touching Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and other Arab states. Social media was used as a tool for coordinating anti-government protests, and for spreading information about those protests to the world at large.⁴ The degree to which “online social networks reflected and channeled popular discontent during the Arab Spring” in the form of online postings caught the attention of intelligence officials and shocked them.⁵ It was around this time that the U.S. government began developing a framework for “culling intelligence from social media networks.”³²

However, despite the numerous individual posts indicating dissatisfaction with the political situation, the U.S. and its allies still seemed surprised by the Arab Spring uprisings.⁶ The lack of preparation for the uprisings indicates that the U.S. Intelligence Community was unable to effectively integrate the information from these individual posts to determine large-scale trends in attitude. However, models now exist that can assist analysts in determining such trends. The public opinion reflected by social media can be used to predict mass uprisings in a similar way to the web-scraping technique described earlier. Models that examine the “tone” of posts regarding the political, social, or economic situation on social media by using “sentiment mining” can indicate long-term trends that point to dissatisfaction and risk of uprising.⁷ This approach can be used to spot signs of trouble and inform the IC and policymakers how best to satisfy the needs and wants of the public so as to avoid situations of political, social, or economic instability, which are considered favorable conditions for terrorist activity.⁸ Essentially, social media can be used to anticipate some of the conditions that may give rise to terrorist activity, alerting analysts and policymakers to adjust their strategies accordingly.

CHALLENGES POSED BY THE INTERNET

This section briefly discusses a few challenges associated with OSINT, and particularly the Internet, as a source of intelligence.

Distinguishing Signals from Noise

A primary challenge of using OSINT is the immense amount of information available. While this can be a benefit for analysts, it often serves as a challenge as well, since it exacerbates the ever-present issue of filtering the signals from the noise. OSINT is probably the collection discipline that faces the greatest dilemma of filtering, and the advent of the Internet has only exacerbated this issue.

Hard to Assess Truth of Information

A further dilemma that the Internet poses is the difficulty of ascertaining the truth of information found via this collection method. It is not possible to control the information that people can put out into the global web; anyone can make a webpage from anywhere in the world.

Easy for Adversaries to go Under the Radar

Another issue with the Internet is the ease with which militant and terrorist groups can go offline completely. Militant groups are more aware than ever of “how large their digital footprint”¹⁰ is, and are careful about their online activity. Going offline completely is attainable for terrorist organizations (though not likely since it would frustrate their recruitment potential), preventing analysts from leveraging leaks like location data.

CHALLENGES POSED BY SOCIAL MEDIA

Social media makes the challenges posed by the Internet as a source of OSINT even more problematic. However, these challenges can be mitigated, as discussed in the conclusion of this article.

Exacerbates the Problem of Signals to Noise

With so many social networking sites, and so many individuals on each of these sites, social media certainly adds to the dilemma of sifting through all of the information available. The user counts on Facebook have surpassed one billion,¹ and Twitter user counts average 307 million.² In this way, social media compounds the existing issue of information overload that intelligence agencies face. It is incredibly time-consuming, and also expensive, to filter through the wealth of information available. As Chris Pallaris states, “the promises made by technology vendors, no matter how sincere, can not replace the enormous analytical effort that the wealth of OSINT requires from human beings.”¹⁰

Source of Disinformation for Intelligence Analysts

Not only can adversaries choose to go offline and cut off collectors from gathering information online, but they can also mislead intelligence agencies by what they put on social media. “Bots” and apps have been used as part of propaganda techniques for a long time. Bots are algorithms, or automated programs, which act in social media networks.¹ They can search for keywords and post replies or comments with the messages they seek to promote, and they look like a real user to outsiders.³⁸ Bots can be used to influence public opinion by spamming the news feed, thus influencing what is “trending.” For example, governments used “bots” during

the Arab Spring movement to spam the live feed with Tweets, so that messages sent by activists were “pushed lower on the page and out of sight by an automated system.”³⁸ ISIS uses bots and apps to “disseminate ISIS propaganda at a pace and volume that enables their wider distribution.”¹⁸

Case Study of Disinformation via Social Media

Terrorist groups often use social media as a means of spreading propaganda and attracting potential recruits. ISIS is especially active on social media, notably Twitter. There were almost 18,000 accounts related to the ISIS network in January 2015.¹ Additionally, ISIS and al Qaeda use “bots” on social media to show support for their cause.⁴⁵ 421 ISIS-supporting bots were identified out of 18,500 accounts studied.¹⁸ These bots “amplify apparent support” for ISIS on Twitter and other social media sites by promoting ISIS content.¹⁸ They may do this by “liking,” “sharing,” or leaving positive comments on pro-ISIS posts. This can mislead analysts into believing that there is more support for the organization than there truly is, which frustrates their ability to develop informed estimates and expectations for the future.

New Avenues for Deception in Communication

Social media makes the mission of intelligence analysts more difficult by providing new avenues for members of terrorist organizations to communicate with one another without detection by the law enforcement or intelligence communities. For example, ISIS utilizes the secure mobile messaging app Telegram, which offers a “secret chat” option with encrypted messages. The group’s call for an attack on Saudi and Emirati forces in Aden appeared on Telegram prior to the incident on December 6, 2015.¹ Additionally, terrorist organization members can communicate via gaming platforms like Sony’s PlayStation 4. Members can send messages through the PlayStation Network gaming service or voice chat through these games.² Members can also form messages within the games—for example, by spelling out words and sentences with bullets on a wall—which other players online can see.³ It is difficult for analysts to monitor so many systems, and communication modes like the latter example of forming messages within games would be nearly impossible to track.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the use of social media has increased tremendously within the last decade among the general public as well as by terrorist organizations. In the coming years, social media is expected to become increasingly important, as constant connectivity to the

Internet will become the norm. Access to the Internet via mobile devices has surpassed access to the Internet via desktop computers. Products like the Google Glass and the new Tesla Model S (which has a dashboard with touch-screen browser) are expected to dominate the markets. Social media is also becoming more important as a marketing tool, and this is expected to continue as well.⁴

At present, only 1% of the intelligence budget is allocated toward handling Open Source Intelligence. More resources should go into tracking and analyzing the information available via social media because it expands the capabilities of using OSINT greatly, and because exploiting the social media activity of terrorist organizations and members can help to predict and counter their activities.

Our agencies should invest specifically in designing predictive models that filter through relevant metadata to anticipate major attacks and mass uprisings. Additionally, they should invest in programs and “bots” that can frustrate terrorist organizations’ ability to recruit new members, because technological fixes like this can yield greater returns than increasing the number of human analysts working with OSINT alone. This may be done by injecting “noise” or disruption into social media streams, for example. Agencies should also increase the number of analysts monitoring social media and OSINT in general, since human analysis is necessary even with data-crunching tools.

Analysts should also be prepared to ensure that new technologies such as gaming systems do not slip under the radar when it comes to monitoring Internet activity of U.S. adversaries.

Many policymakers have urged social media companies to block ISIS and other terrorist organization accounts.⁵ I recommend against using tech giants to intervene digitally because terrorist organizations are likely to improvise new methods of recruitment and propaganda distribution that are even more difficult for us to monitor than existing ones. Government officials should be especially cognizant of information they post on social media platforms, as anything derogatory or offensive may be reappropriated into propaganda and used to aid in recruitment.

Given the low cost of obtaining information from the Internet, any investment in OSINT (and specifically social media) capabilities would go toward analysis and analytical tools rather than collection. This can ensure that the information on social media is leveraged to its fullest potential to aid in thwarting terrorist activities.

NOTES

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⁸ Gibson, S.D. (July 2007). *Open Source Intelligence: A Contemporary Intelligence Lifeline* (doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from phibetajota.net.

⁹ Omand, David, Jamie Bartlett, and Carl Miller. “Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT).” *Intelligence and National Security*, 2012, 802.

¹⁰ Byrne, Brian Patrick. “‘They Are Shooting People One By One’ – Inside Paris Concert Hall.” *Vocativ*. November 13, 2015. Accessed December 5, 2015. <http://www.vocativ.com/news/250374/theyre-shooting-people-paris-hostages-post-cries-for-help/>. This example demonstrates that social media can be useful to law enforcement in the midst of or in the aftermath of an attack, not only to intelligence analysts. On November 13, 2015, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks led by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) occurred in Paris. These consisted of suicide bombings and mass shootings. The deadliest attack was at the Bataclan Theatre, where hostages were taken and 89 individuals were killed at the theatre, and a total of 129 individuals in all of the attacks. Throughout the attack, individuals Tweeted updates about the situation, posted videos of real-time events, and pleaded for help. Police and authorities were able to “build up a picture of the situation on the ground in real-time” from these postings. As hostages, these individuals were in a unique position to share information with the outside world that was only accessible to them.

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Urban Situational Understanding via Open-Source Data

by Dr. Lucy A. Whalley, Dr. David A. Krooks, and Carey L. Baxter


INTRODUCTION

First among the Army's current warfighter challenges is to "Develop Situational Understanding,"¹ and there is widespread interest in employing open-source data to further its development. The data that support the understanding necessary for operational planning and execution are those that reveal the spatiality of local-level human activities in the social and physical environments that they create. Data at this spatial scale are often called "micro-data" in academic literature. This article examines the extent to which remotely available, open-source data can be used for developing an understanding of micro-level, urban situations to address a sociocultural question of interest to the military.

One such question is how to determine the effectiveness of governance, which is understood to involve "...establishing rules and procedures for political decision making; strengthening public sector management, administrative institutions, and practices; providing public services in an effective and transparent manner; and providing civil administration that supports lawful private activity and enterprise."² Understanding the effectiveness of governance is relevant to Army goals that address knowledge of the adversary³; engagement with foreign governments, their military, and their population⁴; and building partner capacity.⁵ In this article, we use provision of potable water as an indicator of the effectiveness of governance, and we explore the opportunities and constraints presented by open-source data as we try to develop relevant micro-level information to support a more grounded assessment of the sociocultural dynamics in the operational environment.

We begin our investigation in the style of social science inquiry by asking a research question and then defining and searching for data appropriate to answer that question. Our case study approach serves as an example of how to use open-source data to develop knowledge about a complex urban environment, in this instance Dhaka, Bangladesh, a so-called "mega-city." Our case study is the area under the jurisdiction of the Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage

Authority (DWASA). The DWASA's function is to construct, operate, improve, and maintain the infrastructure necessary for supplying potable water, treating and disposing of domestic sewerage and industrial wastes, and providing drainage facilities in its service area.⁶ We focus on determining the capacity of the DWASA to provide potable water to its service area, which encompasses the dense urbanized portion of Dhaka City (see Figure 1').



**Figure 1: DWASA Coverage Area,
in Dhaka City, Bangladesh**

Since we limited ourselves to open-source data, we reasoned that relevant information would come from two areas of inquiry:

- (1) Distribution of water infrastructure; and
- (2) Access to water infrastructure.

Determining the distribution of water infrastructure controlled by the government involves addressing two questions:

- (1) Which water infrastructure falls under the responsibility of the government? That is, which water infrastructure is financed, constructed, maintained, and managed under the auspices of the government?
- (2) What is the service area of the water infrastructure for which the government is responsible?

Determining which sectors of the population have access to water infrastructure provided by a government involves:

- (1) Delineating the distribution of water infrastructure as described above, and
- (2) Characterizing which sectors of the population are served by that infrastructure and which are not.

Differential access to the provision of infrastructure by a government is evident worldwide, particularly in nations that are challenged to fund its development. In the following sections, we discuss open sources of data relevant to addressing our problem and how we used those sources to characterize both distribution of and access to water infrastructure within the DWASA service area.

DISTRIBUTION OF WATER INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DWASA

Water Infrastructure Under the Responsibility of the DWASA

To understand the distribution of water infrastructure within the responsibility of the DWASA, we must distinguish infrastructure that is controlled by the DWASA from infrastructure that is not under its control. First, we obtained information on the DWASA's provision of potable water from websites affiliated with the government of Bangladesh and reports produced by the U.S. government, plus international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The DWASA was established in 1963 as a government organization, but now operates as a fee-for-service special authority sanctioned by the government of Bangladesh. The DWASA in its current form has a jurisdiction of more than 360 square kilometers and serves a population of approximately 12.5 million.⁸ Its service area is comprised

of 11 geographic zones, a total of 10 in Dhaka City and one in Narayanganj (which we do not consider further here). These geographic zones have their own governing bodies, and each zone has a central office, which conducts engineering operations and revenue collection.⁹

The goal is for the special authorities to be self-sustaining, ideally with the revenue generated by fees. Other sources of funding for WASAs are loans and grants from the government and donors.¹⁰ There are a number of examples of the receipt of funding by the DWASA from technical assistance grants and loans that are provided under a partnership between the Bangladeshi government and donors. We were unable to determine the role of the government in the processing and management of funds from these sources, although revenue sharing between donors or lenders and the government of Bangladesh is reported. For example, Dhaka's Saidabad water treatment plant, which was completed in 2013, was financed 90% by the Danish International Development Assistance (Danida) and 10% by the government of Bangladesh.¹¹ The World Bank and the Bangladeshi government supported the DWASA's improvement of storm water drainage and the sewerage network and wastewater treatment plant.¹² The Asian Development Bank and the Bangladeshi government funded the DWASA's efforts to reduce the amount of loss due to non-revenue water by instituting more efficient administrative and financial management, training staff, and developing a five-year business plan.¹³ In Dhaka City, "[t]he source of 87% supplied [*sic*] water is deep tube-well and the rest are [*sic*] collected from surface and shallow water bodies."¹⁴ The DWASA uses both deep tube wells and surface water as sources for the potable water it distributes via taps.¹⁵ There are also numerous privately-dug tube wells, which are outside the jurisdiction of the DWASA. The DWASA chlorinates the water extracted from the aquifer via deep tube wells,¹⁶ and there is also evidence that it chlorinates surface water at its surface-water treatment plants (SWTPs).¹⁷

Definitions

Various types of water-delivery infrastructure are common in developing countries. Unfortunately, however, the supporting documentation for two key sources of data, the 2011 Population and Housing Census, provided by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics,¹⁸ and the U.S. Agency for International Development's *Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey* (DHS),¹⁹ also of 2011, provides no explicit definitions of the infrastructure terms they use. The Bangladesh census distinguishes between taps and tube wells, and the DHS survey draws much finer distinctions among means of potable water delivery: water piped into a dwelling, water piped to yard or plot,

public taps, tube wells or boreholes, protected dug wells, unprotected dug wells, protected springs, river/dam/lake/pond/stream/canal/irrigation channels, rainwater, tanker truck, cart with small tank, bottled water, and other.²⁰

Ownership of Taps, Lines, and Wells

In 2006 pictorial illustrations were developed for the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme in order to support national household surveys in training their interviewers. These illustrations depict the various categories in the above list.²¹ The drawings related to taps (W1 and W2) show underground pipes going to taps in a dwelling from larger connections (mains) and to a tap outside a dwelling. Our assumption is that the mains are DWASA pipes. Thus, taps, when contrasted with other means of delivery, are understood to mean connections to DWASA water. Even though standpipes are depicted (W3) with taps, they do not show connections to mains (or to anything else, for that matter). In the WHO/UNICEF drawings, a tubewell/borehole terminates in a hand pump. An additional source mentions that automated pumps are also used to extract water from tube wells/boreholes.²² From this information it is unclear whether public taps/standpipes are connected to DWASA mains or to tube wells that are owned either by the DWASA or private entities.

The mere presence of non-main water lines does not always mean those lines are owned by the DWASA. A 2012 report on the state of water service delivery in Dhaka City²³ aligns the DWASA with piped water supply, but tube wells connected to water lines that terminate in households are also mentioned. Neither ownership of those tube wells nor of the water lines connected to them is addressed by the source.

Surface Water

The small portion of water provided by DWASA that is drawn from surface water is said to be treated at four plants.²⁴ We were able to confirm the names and locations of only two of these plants: Saidabad Surface-Water Treatment Plant (SWTP), which draws water from the Sitalakhya River;²⁵ and Chandnighat SWTP, which draws from the Buriganga River.²⁶ We could not determine either the names or the locations of the remaining two. One can assume that the treated water produced by DWASA SWTPs is delivered to taps via DWASA lines ultimately connect to the SWTPs. The DWASA would be interested in recouping the cost of water treatment and infrastructure through metering, which would be possible only if water were distributed by means of taps.

Based on the sources available to us, we cannot determine with certainty that the term “tap water” covers only water provided by the DWASA, or that the term “tube wells” refers only to private wells. Questions regarding ownership of taps, water lines, or tube wells cannot be adequately addressed with the open-source data available to us. However, we can conclude for Dhaka City that *most* of the taps are associated with DWASA water lines.

SERVICE AREA FOR GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE

Geographic Scale for Our Analysis

In order to delineate a service area, we have to be able to correlate data on water infrastructure with administrative boundaries that can be represented in a geographic information system (GIS) by shape files. The sampling units for both the Bangladesh Census and the DHS survey are delineated in terms of shape files, which can be integrated with other GIS layers that define administrative boundaries, such as those for sub-districts or the DWASA coverage area.

Household-level analysis, the most desirable form of analysis for creating operationally relevant sociocultural information, proved impossible.

We investigated two sources of quantifiable data that had the potential for use in mapping the service area for potable water infrastructure provided by the DWASA: the 2011 Population and Housing Census, provided by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, and the DHS survey, also from 2011. Both the Bangladesh Census and the DHS survey have characteristics that social scientists value: (1) the original data are available at a sub-national level; (2) the sampling methodology is published, which enables users of the survey data to assess the representativeness of the sample; (3) the surveys were carried out using standards intended to ensure the reliability of their data; and (4) each was conducted fairly recently. Regardless, neither the national census nor DHS makes household-level data (e.g., names of individuals, household addresses, and individual answers to questions in the household questionnaire) available to the public. Therefore, household-level analysis, the most desirable form of analysis for creating operationally relevant sociocultural information, proved impossible.

We investigated the sampling design of each survey to determine the geographic scale at which we could responsibly represent its data. For the Bangladesh Census, data can be obtained by census enumeration area for the sub-district level and for the ward level (i.e., one administrative level below the sub-district). However, we were unable to use the ward-level information because accurate data on ward boundaries are not available. Within each census enumeration area, which we can locate to the sub-district level, information is obtained for all of the households. For the DHS survey,²⁷ the sample was designed to be nationally representative of the urban and rural population residing in non-institutional dwellings. The DHS sampling scheme used the enumeration areas of the Bangladesh Census to derive a two-stage stratified sample of households. This procedure yielded a systematic sample of 30 households (on average) per enumeration area across both urban and rural areas for each of seven administrative divisions of Bangladesh. As a result, 18,000 residential households across the entire country of Bangladesh were selected to be interviewed as part of the DHS survey. Its data are aggregated to the sample cluster, which can be geo-located by sub-district.²⁸

Geographic Distribution of Water Infrastructure

To examine the distribution of tap water by sub-district in the DWASA coverage area, we are limited to using data from the Bangladesh Census. As mentioned above, the DHS survey does not include all of the sub-districts within Dhaka City; furthermore, only a small number of households was sampled within the sub-districts that the survey did cover. In contrast, the Bangladesh Census provides information on all the households within a sub-district for all sub-districts in Dhaka City. From the 2011 Bangladesh Census data viewed by sub-district, then, we see that the distribution of tap water varies from 60% to 70%, with one instance of 90-100% having tap water. Most of the sub-districts in the DWASA area have 70-80% to 80-90% distribution of tap water. The geographical spread of these percentages of the distribution of tap water by sub-district within the DWASA service area can be viewed in the choropleth map (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Census Data: Primary Water Source – Tap

DIFFERENTIAL ACCESS TO WATER INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DWASA

We learned from our research on the operation of the DWASA²⁹ that access to water infrastructure might well not be distributed equally. A survey of 1,600 Dhaka City residents, both in slums³⁰ and non-slum areas, published in 2012, revealed that considerable differences in access to water existed between slums and other areas in the city.³¹ According to this BRAC University study, 97 percent of the households in areas outside of slums use piped water as drinking water, whereas only 34 percent of households within slums have access to piped drinking water. Some of the remaining slum dwellers use water piped from a water line connected to a tube well; others draw water from boreholes using hand- or motor-operated pumps; still others obtain water from public taps or from surface water sources.

The author of the BRAC University study remarks that water lines in a slum that tap into a tube well may constitute an illegal source of water. In slums, water lines are run from DWASA tube wells via a network of service providers, some of whom are often closely linked with either the gatekeepers in the DWASA or slum owners or both.³²

Not only is access to potable water distributed unequally between slums and non-slums, but slum residents themselves actually exercise various options for obtaining potable water. Some of these are outside the formal control of the DWASA. Differential access to potable water by slum residents also extends to the quality of the water and the regularity with which water is supplied.³³

Three reports³⁴ by or about NGOs operating in Bangladesh provide an additional view regarding the provision of potable water by the DWASA to slum dwellers. It is estimated that over three million people live in the 5,000 slums interspersed around Dhaka City.³⁵ All three of these reports document a collaboration, facilitated by a Bangladeshi NGO, Dustha Shastha Kendra (DSK), between community-based organizations and the DWASA that has been able to improve the access of slum dwellers to the water supply. From the WaterAid website, we learned:

- For nearly one-third of the slum clusters (31.6%) where tube wells were available, a single tube well might be shared by 11 to 20 households.
- As much as 30% of slum households depend on unofficial DWASA-based water sources, most of which are illegally operated.

A SUB-DISTRICT-LEVEL CASE STUDY OF DIFFERENTIAL ACCESS: GULSHAN

To investigate what more can be learned about access at a scale below the sub-district, we created and compared maps of potable water infrastructure and slum areas and examined imagery for one sub-district, namely Gulshan, near the center of the DWASA. For the distribution of slum settlements in the DWASA service area, GIS shape files of Dhaka slum areas were obtained from Gruebner et al.,³⁶ who used very high-resolution satellite imagery processed in ArcGIS 10, combined with ground-verified data and Google Earth to identify slums. Their shape files were then compared to Bangladeshi slum maps generated during a 2005 collaboration among the Centre for Urban Studies, the National Institute of Population Research and Training, and MEASURE Evaluation (funded by USAID and the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief).³⁷ The two sources demonstrated a high degree of correlation in the size and shape of slum areas in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The shape files made available by Gruebner et al. were used for analysis because they include data through 2010. As evidenced in Figure 3, the slums are interspersed among middle- to upper-class residential areas, and commercial and industrial areas.




Figure 3: Slums in Gulshan Sub-District

We cannot get a complete picture of the differential access to potable water across the DWASA service area using DHS data because of the limitations in coverage mentioned above. However, by mapping water piped into the dwelling vs. water piped into the yard/plot vs. water delivered via a public tap or standpipe from the DHS household questionnaire, and capturing the location of slums within one sub-district that DHS actually covered, we can get a better idea of the potential for differential access to piped water.

To demonstrate and visualize differential access to potable water within the Gulshan sub-district, we also employed maps developed on the basis of DWASA data that were publicly available when we began this work.³⁸ The relevant DWASA maps were downloaded from the website, imported into GIS, and geo-referenced using the Bangladesh Transverse Mercator coordinates provided with each map. Geo-referencing was verified through comparison with road network shape files and visual landmarks on aerial imagery. Approximately two-thirds of the Gulshan sub-district was covered by DWASA maps. In what follows, we contrast two distinct slum areas within Gulshan (Karail [also transliterated “Korail”] and Shahjadpur) one with another.

The census data for the Gulshan sub-district show that 70% to 80% of the population has tap water. That is to say, the residents have available to them water from DWASA pipes (whether via a tap in the dwelling or outside it, or via a public standpipe). The census data for private tube wells show that 0% to 10% are served in this way. More detailed maps of infrastructure show that the people who live in Karail proper³⁹ are served neither by piped water nor by tube wells (Figure 4).⁴⁰




Figure 4: Karail Slum in Gulshan Sub-District

A report on a proposed Asian Development Bank project suggests that the DWASA endeavors to improve access to potable water in the informal settlements of Karail.⁴¹ In the mixed area of Shahjadpur on the southern periphery of the thin strip of the Gulshan sub-district to the east of Gulshan Lake, the picture is again different. Here, although the census data give the analyst a homogeneous view of the sub-district, the more detailed map that captures DWASA data (Figure 5) shows a completely different picture. In Shahjadpur, both the slum and the non-slum areas are served by piped water, and there are no tube wells at all.



Figure 5: Southern Shahjadpur Slum in Gulshan Sub-District

These contrasts in level of service are completely obscured by both the census and the DHS data at the sub-district level. Yet, even at the finer scale allowed by the DWASA data, it is impossible to tell the exact nature and precise location of the infrastructure that is available.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

As a result of our exploration of open-source data on potable water infrastructure in Dhaka, we determined that one can begin to learn about the effectiveness of governance based on the distribution of and differential access to potable water. However, there were limits on what can be learned from these data.

As a result of our exploration of open-source data on potable water infrastructure in Dhaka, we determined that one can begin to learn about the effectiveness of governance based on the distribution of and differential access to potable water.

With reference to the question regarding responsibility for water infrastructure: due to the uncertainty in the use of the term “taps,” we cannot be absolutely certain that the respondents to the census were referring only to taps provided by the DWASA. We discovered from our investigation of various reports that taps might also be provided by private individuals or organizations, sometimes illegally.

With reference to the question regarding service area: since household-level data are not publicly available from either the Bangladesh Census or the DHS survey, we had to represent data at the sub-district level. With the quantifiable and spatially-referenced data from the Bangladesh Census and the DWASA, we were able to characterize areas served by taps to the sub-district level. However, we can only infer that most of these taps are owned by the DWASA. The DWASA would have the means to provide this infrastructure, particularly for areas outside of slums. Although the DHS survey also has information on the distribution of taps by sub-district, we were not able to use these data to address the question regarding service area. This was primarily due to the fact that the DHS survey was administered to only two-thirds of the sub-districts in Dhaka City. Therefore, we had incomplete representation of all the sub-districts in the DWASA's area of responsibility.

With reference to the access question: even though access to tap water does not appear dramatically inadequate when viewed at the level of the sub-district, investigation at a more granular scale reveals heterogeneity in access to water provided by the DWASA between slums and other areas of Dhaka City. One can ascertain from the results of the slum mapping project where slums are located and that they are interspersed among non-slum areas in a patchwork pattern throughout the urban landscape. Numerous reports describe to what extent slums are under-served by water infrastructure that is officially provided by the DWASA. Knowing where slums are located, we can infer from these reports that DWASA coverage is likely to be less in these areas. However, we cannot accurately quantify and map this decrease in coverage by slum area based on the open-source data.

To illustrate how spatial data can be used to gather more detailed evidence for the differential access to water services, we investigated the case of Gulshan sub-district. Using the spatial data provided by Gruebner et al. (footnote 38) on the locations of slums within the DWASA service area, we developed accurate maps that make it possible to relate the location of slums to the presence of water lines (which are connected to taps) and tube wells. Based on a close examination of these spatial data, we see considerable differences in access to tap water and tube wells even between slum areas. Nevertheless, due to the lack of terminological clarity, we cannot know with absolute certainty who owns the taps and tube wells or how tube wells are connected to taps.

Our investigation of the literature by U.S., international, and nongovernmental organizations on the water situation in Dhaka revealed that unequal access to

potable water between slums and other areas of the city is an issue for the DWASA. Despite the record number of new water hook-ups established,⁴² the DWASA's challenge to provide equitable access to its water remains great. Indeed, the continually increasing urban population exacerbates the problem because it creates ever more users, many (if not most) of them in slums.

Given the emphasis that the Department of Defense places on remote analysis via open-source data, it is important to know the extent to which open-source data can be useful for characterizing the situation on the ground.

Given the emphasis that the Department of Defense places on remote analysis via open-source data, it is important to know the extent to which open-source data can be useful for characterizing the situation on the ground. Clearly, no single source of open-source data is likely to provide complete answers to complicated questions, such as how access to potable water might vary among or even within areas of a city, and how this access might change over time. One needs to be able to reason on the basis of a wide range of evidence relevant to the problem in order to assess the opportunities and constraints the data present.

Our work with Bangladesh Census and DHS data suggests that some level of aggregation above an individual address is as close as one can reasonably hope to get to "local" using remotely obtained open-source data. What that level is will vary by topic and operational environment. Nevertheless, rich, reliable micro-level data will likely not be accessible absent "boots on the ground," either to perform data collection or to obtain data from organizations located in the partner nation.

Clearly, remote analysis is no replacement for on-site data collection and proper scientific analysis of the resulting data. However, remote analysis can provide insight into the nature of the situation and can point to what needs to be investigated further in order to achieve a more nuanced sociocultural understanding of the situational dynamics. Remote analysis can also suggest possible paths to follow in pursuit of additional relevant, helpful data.

NOTES

¹ <http://www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/army-warfighting-challenges.aspx> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

² Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07, *Stability*, August 2012, para 2-49. [Available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_07.pdf. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

³ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-2-1, *U.S. Army Functional Concept for Intelligence*, 2010, para B-2g. [Available at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-2-1.pdf>. Last accessed 21 April 2016].

⁴ According to TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5, *U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement*, 2014, paras 1-5a and 3-3a, challenges that may be encountered by future Army forces “include those involving security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and critical government functions.” [Available at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-8-5.pdf>. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

⁵ See ADRP 3-07, *Stability*, para 1-43.

⁶ <http://dwaso.org.bd/about-dhaka-wasa/> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

⁷ The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Ellen Hartman (ERDC/CERL) in the production of the figures.

⁸ <http://dwaso.org.bd/about-dhaka-wasa/> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

⁹ <http://dwaso.org.bd/about-dhaka-wasa/> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

¹⁰ Munawwar Alam, “Bangladesh – The Case of Dhaka.” In *Municipal Infrastructure Financing: Innovative Practices from Developing Countries*, Munawwar Alam, ed. No. 2. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 74.

¹¹ <http://mth.com/Projects/Civil-works/Water-supply-and-water-treatment/Water-treatment-plant-in-Bangladesh.aspx> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

¹² <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P093988/dhaka-water-supply-sanitation-project?lang=en> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

¹³ <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/42173-013-ban-dc.pdf> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

¹⁴ http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=WASA_Dhaka [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

¹⁵ Taqsem A. Khan. n.d. “Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority: Progress and Challenges,” p. 5. [Available at <http://dwaso.org.bd/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Dhaka-WASA-Article-for-BOOK.pdf>. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

¹⁶ In 2010, ORG and ICRA, in association with Sodev Consult, produced a draft operations manual for DWASA as part of ADB’s Dhaka Water Supply Sector Development project. The draft of Volume 1, “Water Pumping Station Details,” indicates that disinfection using bleaching powder (which contains chlorine) or chlorine gas is considered standard in the operation of deep tube wells (12-13). [Available at <http://dwaso.org.bd/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Operation-Manual-Water-Pumping-Station-Vol-1.pdf>. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

¹⁷ See anonymous, “WASA uses chlorine to treat water flouting court rule,” *Dhaka Mirror*, June 25, 2011. <http://www.dhakamirror.com/other-headlines/wasa-uses-chlorine-to-treat-water-flouting-court-rule/>. [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

¹⁸ Bangladesh Census data tables are available online at <http://www.bbs.gov.bd/PageWebMenuContent.aspx?MenuKey=333>. [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

¹⁹ National Institute of Population Research and Training, Mitra and Associates, MEASURE DHS, 2013. *Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 2011*. Dhaka, Bangladesh and Calverton, MD. [Available at <http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR265/FR265.pdf>. Hyperlinks to this document can be opened only occasionally; cut and paste the link instead. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

²⁰ WHO/UNICEF, *Core Questions on Drinking-water and Sanitation for Household Surveys*, Geneva: WHO/UNICEF, 8. [Available at http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/oms_brochure_core_questionsfinal24608.pdf. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

²¹ Rod Shaw, *Preparation of Pictorial Illustrations on Access to Water Supply and Sanitation Facilities for Use in National Household Surveys*, Final report (revised), Loughborough, Leicestershire, UK: Water, Engineering and Development Centre, 2005. [Available at http://www.childinfo.org/files/JMP_Pictorials_for_Water_and_Sanitation.pdf. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

²² Syeda Salina Aziz, *State of Service Delivery in Dhaka City: An Overview of Drinking Water Supply* (Policy Note), Dhaka: BRAC University Institute of Governance Studies, 2012, 1-2. [Available at <http://bigd.bracu.ac.bd/images/policypapers/8.State%20of%20Service%20Delivery%20in%20Dhaka%20City.pdf>. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁴ For example, Banglapedia’s entry for “WASA, Dhaka.” http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=WASA_Dhaka [Page was last updated 7 July 2014 and last accessed 24 February 2016]. It suggests there are four.

²⁵ DWASA et al., *Dhaka Environmentally Sustainable Water Supply Project Roadshow Brochure*. Dhaka: DWASA, 2014, 1. [Available at <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/79167/42173-012-ban-dpta-01.pdf>. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

²⁶ <http://wikimapia.org/15265149/Chandnighat-Water-Treatment-Plant>.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁸ The DHS survey (*ibid.*) provides a convenient characterization of the administrative structure of Bangladesh writ large: “Bangladesh has seven administrative divisions: Barisal, Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna, Rajshahi, Rangpur, and Sylhet. Each division is subdivided into zilas (districts), and each zila into upazilas (subdistricts). Each urban area in an upazila is divided into wards, and into mohallas within a ward. A rural area in the upazila is divided into union parishads (UP) and mouzas within a UP. These divisions allow the country as a whole to be easily separated into rural and urban areas.”

²⁹ E.g., Khandker Zakir Hossain and Shafiul Azam Ahmed, “Non-conventional public-private partnerships for water supply to urban slums,” *Urban Water Journal*, 2014, 1-11; A.F.M. Aziz Uddin and Mohammed Abdul Baten, *Water Supply of Dhaka City: Murky Future*. Unnayan Onneshan-The Innovators, 2011; WaterAid, n.d., *WaterAid Bangladesh Contribution to Submission on Urbanisation and Water*. [The WaterAid document is available at <http://www.wateraid.org/google-search?query=contribution+to+submission+on+urbanisation>. *Murky Future* is available at <http://www.unnayan.org/>

[documents/RightsParticipation/water_supply_dhaka.pdf](#). Each was last accessed 24 February 2016].

³⁰ For a definition of “slum,” see Centre for Urban Studies (CUS), National Institute of Population Research and Training (NIPORT) MEASURE Evaluation, *Slums of Urban Bangladesh: Mapping and Census, 2005*. Dhaka, Bangladesh and Chapel Hill, NC: CUS, 2006, 11 [Available at <http://www.cpc.unc.edu/measure/resources/publications/tr-06-35>. Last accessed 24 February 2016].

³¹ Aziz, 1-2.

³² See footnote 2 in Aziz.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

³⁴ Hossain and Ahmed, 2014; Uddin and Baten, 2011; WaterAid, n.d.

³⁵ Hossain and Ahmed, 2014.

³⁶ Gruebner, Oliver, Jonathan Sachs, Anika Nockert, Michael Frings, Mobarak Hossain Khan, Tobia Lakes, and Patrick Hostert, 2014, “Mapping the Slums of Dhaka from 2006 to 2010,” *Dataset Papers in Science 2014*. [Available at <http://www.hindawi.com/journals/dpis/2014/172182/abs/>; last accessed 24 February 2016].

³⁷ <http://www.cpc.unc.edu/measure/our-work/gis/bangladesh-slum-maps> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

³⁸ DWASA formerly provided digital maps in portable document format for much of their coverage area at <http://dwasa.org.bd/wasa-map/>; that website has since been modified, and the digital maps appear to be available there no longer. All that remains is a map of DWASA’s service area. [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

³⁹ One single DWASA pipe appears to extend into the portion of the Karail slum that is separated from the main body of the slum by Banani Lake.

⁴⁰ Two DWASA maps have been knit together to form Figure 4; combining them resulted in the slight misalignment evident in the figure.

⁴¹ Asian Development Bank Project: Dhaka Water Supply Network Improvement, Project Number 47254-003, approval date 26 May 2016. Described at <http://www.adb.org/projects/47254-003/main> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

⁴² The DWASA was put on the short list to receive a 2011 Global Water Award in the category of Water Performance Initiative of the Year for signing up 300,000 new connections in a year. See <https://www.globalwaterintel.com/global-water-intelligence-magazine/12/2/uncategorized/2011-global-water-awards-water-performance-initiative-year> [Last accessed 24 February 2016].

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Rethinking Intelligence Studies:

A Post-9/11 Community of Practice Pedagogical Strategy

by Dr. Dennis A. (Wes) Westbrooks II

OVERVIEW

In 2006 the Director of National Intelligence called for a *community of practice* (CoP) approach as a way to deepen knowledge and expertise on global issues and problem sets and the creation of a National Intelligence University (NIU) to synergize the effort.¹ This proclamation essentially paved the way for the integration of communities of practice into higher education intelligence studies. Lea asserted, “Higher education is in a state of change,” and suggested CoPs as a new way of understanding student learning.² This research demonstrated the importance of intelligence studies. Furthermore, it demonstrated a connection to the literature and theories related to communities of practice.

INTRODUCTION

Higher education has historically struggled with intelligence studies.^{3,4} Intelligence as an activity has existed since 1790 in the United States⁵ but, in academics, intelligence is still an emerging discipline.⁶ Intelligence studies in higher education have been characterized as “an academic experiment in progress.”⁷ As a relatively new discipline, intelligence studies course offerings and content have received little consideration and the approaches to studying and teaching intelligence studies have received even less attention.⁸ Intelligence education came under intense scrutiny after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. It became a national issue when Congress mandated that Intelligence Community education be improved.⁹

BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2001, the perception was that the entire national intelligence apparatus of the United States Intelligence Community (IC) failed.¹⁰ Real or perceived intelligence failures usually call for increased accountability in IC education.¹¹ Congress immediately called for reforms and changes to how the IC carried out intelligence.¹² Subsequently, after the ensuing unsubstantiated claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), there was additional scrutiny and

further Congressional mandates. Congress asked whether the education of America’s intelligence professionals adequately prepared them for the post-Cold War era.^{13,14}

Congress asked whether the education of America’s intelligence professionals adequately prepared them for the post-Cold War era.

The purpose of this article is to explore faculty members’ views of integrating community of practice pedagogical strategies and their efficacy as a learning approach to advance higher education intelligence studies. Little is known about intelligence studies in higher education and even less about higher education intelligence studies integrating community of practice pedagogical strategies.¹⁵ Fully exploring the benefits of a pedagogical strategy used to study and teach intelligence studies may improve intelligence education and the IC’s ability to combat future challenges and threats.¹⁶

METHODOLOGY

This research used a qualitative phenomenological approach with an exploratory research design to examine faculty members’ views of intelligence studies, communities of practice, and learning approaches. This article specifically seeks to explore studying and teaching higher education intelligence studies and the use of communities of practice as a pedagogical strategy to improve Intelligence Community employees’ education. The researcher used a semi-structured focus group coupled with in-person follow-up interviews to add an additional layer of depth to the study.

Phase one of this exploratory research design involved a focus group with selected faculty members who taught core courses in the daytime, evening, or weekend programs in the National Capital Region to gather faculty members’ collective experiences about pedagogical strategies, learning processes, and communities of practice. Phase two consisted of a review of publicly available documents (e.g.,

Middle States Commission on Higher Education Standards for Accreditation and Requirements of Affiliation Handbook and the National Intelligence University's Strategic Plan) to understand higher education intelligence studies.

SAMPLE

The setting for the study is the National Intelligence University, a federally chartered higher education and research institution created by Congress in 1962. For the purposes of this study, the Washington, DC, National Capital Region has been expanded to include the academic centers at the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Quantico. There are also two locations located outside the National Capital Region in Florida and the United Kingdom. NIU has 196 employees, of which 139 are faculty members.¹⁷

The sample for the research consisted of four faculty members from the National Intelligence University with diverse backgrounds and experiences with NIU students in the National Capital Region. Participants in the study were federal employees who were serving during the academic year used during the research, and had served as a faculty member for at least one year. Purposeful sampling ensured selected faculty members were representative of the Intelligence Community. This resulted in four of the 17 agencies in the IC being represented: the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the National Security Agency (NSA).

COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE AS A LEARNING APPROACH IN HIGHER EDUCATION

It has been contended that four conventional learning approaches are used as pedagogical strategies to teach intelligence studies with the emphasis being on the instructor: (1) political-policymaking—focuses on the politics of intelligence and how policy shapes intelligence; (2) functional—emphasizes the intelligence agencies' and practitioners' role in intelligence, as well as the capabilities and technology used for intelligence gathering; (3) structural-organizational—examines the inner workings and interagency relationships inside the Intelligence Community; and (4) historical—takes a case study approach or charts chronological periods using memoirs or archival data.¹⁸ A prominent intelligence studies scholar further posited that, in addition to the conventional teaching methods of readings, lecture, and discussion, occasionally the use of different approaches can assist in the studying and teaching of intelligence studies.¹⁹

Lea's assertion that "higher education is in a state of change" and suggestion that CoPs might be a new way of understanding student learning give emphasis to a pedagogical strategy that takes a student-centered approach with the instructor's role being more of a facilitator.²⁰ Over the last 25 years, higher education has begun integrating communities of practice.^{21,22,23} Additionally, the term "communities of practice" has become pervasive in the higher education literature.²⁴

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework derived from various theories that support communities of practice. These include Situated Learning Theory, Social Cognitive Theory, and Constructivist Learning Theory. These three theories working in unison directly feed into communities of practice and relate to the three components of a CoP, which are *domain*, *community*, and *practice* as illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Theoretical Framework.

Situated Learning Theory

Situated Learning Theory is the overarching theory for this study and is the theoretical base for communities of practice. Lave and Wenger argued that "learning should not be viewed as simply the transmission of abstract and decontextualized knowledge from one individual to another, but a social process whereby knowledge is co-constructed."²⁵ The social aspect is paramount to the research. Lave and Wenger further emphasized that such learning is situated in a specific *domain* and embedded within a particular social and physical environment.²⁶ In this study, the specific domain is intelligence. The social and physical environment comes in the form of students from the U. S. Intelligence Community attending the National Intelligence University.

Social Cognitive Theory

Social Cognitive Theory focuses on the learning that occurs within a social *community*. There are five core concepts related to the social-cognitive framework. These core concepts are observational learning/modeling, outcome expectations, self-efficacy, goal-setting, and self-regulation. This research will focus on observational learning/modeling. This particular core concept suggests that learning occurs through observation.²⁷ The theory suggests that students are able to learn by observing and collaborating with other intelligence professionals participating in university programs. Bandura opined that effective modeling imparts strategies and guidelines for dealing with unique experiences and situations.²⁸

Constructivist Learning Theory

In Constructivist Learning Theory, Bruner suggested that learning is an active, constructive process.^{29,30} The idea that learners construct new ideas or concepts based upon current or past knowledge is the premise. Bruner later incorporated the social and cultural aspects of learning into this theoretical framework. Bruner's expansion made room for the idea that students are not a blank slate but bring past social experiences and cultural factors to a learning environment. In a social environment, Constructivist Learning Theory allows students to share their knowledge of a particular *practice* and understanding of the subject matter based on their experiences with others.^{31,32}

FINDINGS

The following research questions guided this study:

1. How do faculty members integrate communities of practice pedagogical strategies into higher education intelligence studies?

Discovery of the first conclusion based on focus group interviews revealed a plethora of community of practice pedagogical strategies. The researcher realizes the use of community of practice pedagogical strategies may not in and of themselves be the single reason for the advancement of intelligence studies in higher education. The researcher also acknowledges this approach may not be fully transferable to institutions that do not have NIU's unique mission, diverse student body, and ability to conduct classified coursework and research. However, follow-up interviews with faculty did reveal data that support current literature as well as perceptions and beliefs that validated the theoretical framework guiding this study. Situated Learning Theory contends that learning should be "situated" in context and have real-world application.

The majority of participants suggested connecting courses with real-world application as a key pedagogical strategy in higher education intelligence studies. By exploring the viewpoints and functions of different organizations and case studies, the courses resembled what an intelligence professional may encounter in the field, which is paramount. The transfer of knowledge is maximized when what is to be learned is embedded in the setting in which the learning is to be applied.³³ By successfully connecting real-world activities to classroom activities and scenarios, learning can take place.

Participants indicated that teaching approaches which offer students opportunities to learn from other students is important. Moreover, participants acknowledged some students were current practitioners in the field of study and their contributions further reinforced course content and materials. Traditional learning approaches have tended to focus on explicit knowledge or codified knowledge, often gleaned from outdated print sources with less emphasis on tacit knowledge.³⁴ The research suggests that, because the participants were faculty members, they understand the importance of bringing students' tacit knowledge to the forefront. The transference of tacit knowledge held by students who are practitioners is usually more dynamic and on the cutting edge.³⁵ The inherent strength of this approach is a balanced learning experience using explicit and tacit knowledge to create knowledge.³⁶

2. What are faculty members' recommendations for integrating community of practice pedagogical strategies in the future?

The second conclusion suggests the importance of collaboration using different strategies and tools. Collaboration is a fundamental component of higher education intelligence studies. Faculty members stressed the importance of collaboration using group projects, collaborative space such as laboratory settings (cyber lab), and the incorporation of interactive games and simulations. Collectively, these strategies and tools may be the most practical and efficient method of helping intelligence studies students co-construct knowledge. In Constructivist Learning Theory, Bruner suggested that learning is an active, constructive process.^{37,38} Multiple studies suggest students learn better in collaborative group settings than they do individually.³⁹

Participants recognized how important group projects are to building on existing knowledge; however, the participants were experienced faculty members and

used them in different ways. Participants used group projects to explore groupthink. Collaboration allows students to gain a deeper appreciation of other students and learn new topics. When working together as a group, students are able to co-construct knowledge.⁴⁰ An added benefit is interagency collaboration among the students. The two combined embody the essence of communities of practice. Therefore, the research supports the use of group projects as a meaningful community of practice pedagogical strategy in the future.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study surfaced new findings on the integration of community of practice pedagogical strategies into higher education intelligence studies. First, the faculty's use of pedagogical strategies promotes the transference of tacit knowledge to advance higher education intelligence strategies. The pedagogical strategies introduced in the study serve as an alternative to traditional strategies, which primarily focus on explicit knowledge. Professional growth and development opportunities to learn innovative pedagogical strategies and techniques would further enhance the effort. Second, intelligence studies programs could become even more innovative in their approach to collaborative learning by collaborating on a larger scale with other higher education intelligence studies programs. This may prove difficult in some areas due to the use of classified material by some universities but a worthwhile endeavor nonetheless.

CONCLUSION

Findings concluded that the Director of National Intelligence's establishment of a National Intelligence University and integration of communities of practice pedagogical strategies have yielded encouraging results. Access to other students who share an analogous outlook in the field of study but still bring their individual perspectives on how to approach a problem is one of the strongest aspects of communities of practice. The faculty appears supported by senior-level administrators through the University's strategic plan, which underscores the importance of recruiting a diverse student body from around the Intelligence Community. The ability of higher education to prepare intelligence studies students successfully has global implications. The research further reinforced the importance of higher education and its role in keeping America safe.

NOTES

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Organized Crime Intelligence Management and a Model Proposal

by Gokhan Kuloglu
National Police of Turkey

OVERVIEW

Law enforcement intelligence units have been struggling with large-scale, trans-border organized crime organizations for some time now. In today's world, the problem caused by organized crime has gone beyond national and local boundaries. It has become a global challenge. Intelligence is crucial to cope with organized crime and that is why organized crime intelligence operations must be handled in a very well-organized and standardized manner. In this article, the management structure of organized crime intelligence operations is examined. For this purpose, organized crime intelligence operations, which are conducted by Turkish Law Enforcement Intelligence Units, have been taken as a sample and a literature review has been conducted in the first part. Later, I try to expose the roles and importance of the concepts of "organized crime," "intelligence," and "management" for an organized crime intelligence operation. A standard organized crime intelligence operation model which can also be performed by all police organized crime intelligence units is proposed in the last part of the article.

INTRODUCTION

Today, intelligence is undoubtedly considered one of the primary elements in the effective and proactive fight against all criminal activities. It has also become a crucial tool for law enforcement units in tackling organized criminal activities. In reality, it can be said that engaging in organized crime is almost impossible without performing intelligence tactics and techniques. Today's large-scale organized crime organizations have their own hierarchical structure, tough rules, and specific methods for rewards and punishment. They have abruptly changing structures, and they are using more sophisticated methods and techniques supplied from new communications and information technologies. They are involved in a very wide range of crimes from drug or arms smuggling to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons trading. Although their motivations are different, the relationship between organized criminal groups and terrorist organizations has become one of the most challenging matters for law enforcement units, because organized criminals can provide logistic support to the terrorists, such as forged documents and smuggled weapons.¹ Keeping up with this kind of trans-border

and more sophisticated organized criminal activities forces law enforcement intelligence units to formulate a more robust, flexible, and standard intelligence operational management structure. That is why the management structure of organized crime intelligence operations must be handled in a collective, systematic, and standard manner more effectively than ever.

Organized crime intelligence operations mostly encompass long, challenging, high-cost, and sometimes dangerous activities. In Turkey, when law enforcement intelligence units gather raw information about any organized criminal activity, they launch an intelligence operation which aims to identify whether there is a stable, initial doubt for a further public judicial prosecution. These intelligence operations are completely outside the judicial process, and they are not geared to being a part of any judicial prosecution or collection of evidence for a court. All intelligence techniques and tactics such as wiretapping and surveillance activities are performed during these intelligence operations only for determining whether there is any initial doubt in the case of interest. These intelligence operations are being called "organized crime intelligence operations" and their aim is to prevent any organized criminal activity at the very beginning before occurring and harming innocent lives. If any intelligence which is leading to a steady, initial doubt for an organized crime is in the planning stage or being committed, the intelligence is urgently transferred to the judicial investigation units of law enforcement. Law enforcement judicial investigation units launch a further, public judicial prosecution under the command of a prosecutor. From the legal view, these organized crime intelligence operations can be accepted as "preliminary field investigations" which are performed before a public judicial investigation.

In Turkey, these intelligence operations could not have been standardized in a suitable and standard management model by this time. A flexible and standard management model can aid in making these intelligence operations complete. In this study, the structure of organized crime intelligence operation management in Turkey has been examined by focusing on the concepts of organized crime, intelligence, and management. At the end, a standard organized crime intelligence operation management model proposal has been put forward for all law enforcement organized crime intelligence units.

THE CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZED CRIME, INTELLIGENCE AND MANAGEMENT

The Concept of Organized Crime

The concept of “organized crime” was initially used by American academicians during the Prohibition Era in the United States.² Although there is no common definition of organized crime, Albanese defines it as a continuing enterprise that rationally works to make a profit through illicit activities. He underscores that exploitation of corruption of public officials to have a degree of immunity from law enforcement, and using of threat or force.³ However, according to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, an organized criminal group is “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”⁴ Another definition is offered by the U.S. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968: “organized crime means the unlawful activities of members of a highly organized, disciplined association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful activities of members of such associations.”⁵

The Council of Europe asked from the member states to apply the following four mandatory plus seven optional criteria, totaling eleven criteria for defining a criminal group as an organized crime organization.⁶ Mandatory criteria: (1) Collaboration of three or more people; (2) for a prolonged or indefinite period of time; (3) suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offenses; and (4) with the objective of pursuing profit and/or power. Optional criteria include: (5) having a specific task or role for each participant; (6) using some form of internal discipline and control; (7) using violence or other means suitable for intimidation; (8) exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, law enforcement, the administration of justice, or the economy by corruption or any other means; (9) using commercial or business-like structures; (10) engaged in money laundering; and (11) operating on an international level. The Council sees whether there are minimum characteristics; the mandatory criteria from 1 to 4 and at least two of the “optional criteria” for defining a criminal group as an organized crime organization.⁷ Actually, the main goal of an organized crime intelligence operation is to discover whether these criteria listed above are reflected by the case.

The Concept of Intelligence

Intelligence is defined by the FBI as “identified, collected, analyzed and refined information about potential threats against national security to meet the needs of policymakers.” Raw information is shaped into a finished intelligence product for decision-makers through an intelligence process.⁸ The raw information is absolutely not intelligence. For the raw information to be accepted as intelligence, it must be processed in a five-step systematic process called the intelligence cycle.⁹ The raw information is developed into finished intelligence through this intelligence cycle.¹⁰ In a democratic country, the government has two main missions, first and foremost is to prevent crimes before being committed, and to keep the citizens safe. The government has to take necessary measures for protecting its citizens from crime and criminals. Otherwise, there will be a “governmental service defect” and the government will be responsible for the victimization of its citizens’ physical and psychological losses. These losses will have to be compensated by the government, which is responsible for its citizens’ security.¹¹ Although all necessary measures have been taken, if any crime is committed against the measures being taken then this crime must be properly investigated and perpetrator(s) must be identified, arrested, and taken in front of the judge immediately. Both preventing the crimes before they occur and recognizing or arresting the perpetrator(s) after it occurs can be carried out only with strong and reliable intelligence.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The intelligence cycle is the process to transform raw information into polished intelligence for the use of policymakers.¹² Actually, the intelligence cycle is a tool to transform raw information into the final intelligence product for policymakers.¹³ The intelligence cycle consists of six steps as shown in (Figure 1): planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, and dissemination.¹⁴

Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle



Planning and Direction

At the beginning, the kind of intelligence needed to prevent the crimes, keep the nation safe and protect the country from national security or criminal threats must be identified by senior management. Besides, the objectives are set by senior management periodically or when necessary. These intelligence objectives are forwarded to the intelligence organization(s) to be gained. When an intelligence unit obtains this direction, it first checks to see what exists in the archives and then determines what intelligence needs to be collected. However, how this intelligence objective would be carried out in the field is taken into consideration. Planning and direction are the pillars of the intelligence effort, from identifying which is needed for delivering an intelligence product to senior management.¹⁵

Collection

Collection is the process of collecting information through overt or covert intelligence techniques and tactics. Internet, TV, radio, and newspapers are overt sources. On the other hand, listening devices and hidden cameras are covert intelligence modes. Satellites are also commonly used during the intelligence collection efforts in today's Space Age.¹⁶

Processing

After the intelligence has been collected from different sources, it must be processed and converted into a usable form by intelligence analysts. This can include decryption, language translation, and data reduction.¹⁷ In this stage, all information that has been acquired from archives, spies, informants, open resources, online databases, telephone intercepts, and technical surveillance activities, investigations, and field work is being processed and placed in the correct position in order to see the big picture. After processing, the intelligence would be ready for analysis and the production process.

Analysis and Production

In the analysis and production stage, all information which has been collected and processed is converted from raw information into intelligence. For this objective, reliability, validity, and relevance of this information are evaluated and weighed. All information is logically integrated, put into context, and determined how it fits together. It includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing the information, as well as preparing intelligence products. All this analysis work is performed by an expert intelligence analyst. An intelligence analyst is responsible for the comprehension and interpretation of the intelligence collected by field intelligence officers. He tries to discover the connections between seemingly unrelated pieces of information for

keeping national interests safe. If any intelligence is disseminated before being appropriately analyzed by an expert intelligence analyst, this can lead to inaccurate and groundless decisions by senior management. This is why an intelligence analyst can be accepted as a very important asset of the intelligence chain. Raw intelligence is often referred to as the "dots" by intelligence experts, or finished intelligence products which connect the dots by putting everything in context and drawing conclusions.¹⁸

Dissemination

Dissemination is the final step in the intelligence cycle, and the finished intelligence product is submitted to senior management who return the process to the beginning.¹⁹ The intelligence must be disseminated in a proper manner on time. Punctuality is very important, because if dissemination is not made in good time, the intelligence cannot be actionable as expected. Dissemination is easier and faster than ever due to today's technological improvements in computer and Internet systems. If a finished intelligence product cannot meet expectations, the intelligence cycle starts again.²⁰

The Concept of Management

Management is commonly defined as a process of leading a group of people who are sharing the same goal and working together to achieve it. This goal can only be achieved if the group keeps its behavior in a robust and positive manner. Therefore, the management authority determines how the members of this group work together and transform their efforts into action. From the institutional view, management can be accepted as a social process which leads and motivates the people to reach a specific and common objective. It consists of four basic functions: planning, organizing, leading, and controlling as shown in (Figure 2). These functions are interrelated, and they deeply affect each other. The success of one depends on the others.²¹




Figure 2: Basic Functions of Management

Mintzberg defines planning as "thinking and controlling the future, and making a decision."²² The planning includes recognizing and explaining the goals and objectives, determining the policies, arranging the necessary programs, and identifying the tools and methods which are going to be used in the future. In an

organizational process, the appropriate structure for performing the necessary activities which are needed to execute the plans is formulated, and the relationship between operations managers and workers is designed. However, the members of the organization must be motivated and encouraged to achieve the goals of the organization in a proper leading and effective communication pattern. This process is known as “directing.”²³ The final step in the management progress is “controlling,” which is a tool for determining how successful the organization is in achieving its goals, and how close it is to the achievement criteria determined by senior management at the beginning.

ORGANIZED CRIME INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Basically, operational intelligence is commonly defined as an activity of recognition, targeting, apprehension, and prevention.²⁴ Organized crime intelligence operations also have similar aims, which include the recognition and targeting of organized criminals, reaching strong initial doubt. When this happens, transferring all intelligence which has been gathered to judicial investigation units for collecting evidence and making arrests. Organized crime intelligence operations do not actually make arrests, seize illicit material, or mount judicial investigations. The main goal of these operations is to prevent organized crimes before they occur. They diminish the risk of harm to individuals and public order from organized criminal activity and improve opportunities for law enforcement intervention capabilities. Besides, they identify the proceeds of organized criminal activity and provide intelligence leading to a further public judicial prosecution.

The Concept of Organized Crime Intelligence

Organized crime intelligence is defined as “an analytical method product which evaluates the information which has been gathered from different sources, brings the relevant data together, draws the conclusion, and/or makes assumptions about organized criminal activity by using scientific methods such as problem solving or analytical techniques. The information about sophisticated crimes, criminal groups, serious crimes, and terrorists is gathered through criminal intelligence for the policymakers.”²⁵ In general, organized crime intelligence is performed to reveal the organization structure, modus operandi, revenues, and domestically and internationally legal and illegal connections of the organized crime organizations.

THE CONCEPTS OF INITIAL DOUBT, PRELIMINARY FIELD INVESTIGATION

The Concept of Initial Doubt

Criminal procedure consists of two main phases: prosecution and trial. If there is an adequately strong initial doubt in any criminal case after a preliminary field investigation, a prosecutor has to launch a public judicial prosecution. In this prosecution phase, it is investigated whether the suspect(s) committed the crime, and the case goes to trial or is dropped. If the prosecutor decides there is enough evidence to charge the accused with a crime after this prosecution process, he prepares an indictment, which includes all facts about the case to present to the court. These four steps in the process of criminal procedure is shown in (Figure 3).



Figure 3: Process of Criminal Procedure

An indictment is a formal accusation of a crime which has been reached after a judicial investigation. However, a prosecutor must have an initial doubt to launch a public judicial prosecution to discover the facts about the case. From this point of view, an initial doubt is like the key of a car; it starts the engine of a public judicial prosecution.²⁶

THE CONCEPT OF PRELIMINARY FIELD INVESTIGATION

In practice, it is not always effortless to reach a concrete and obvious “initial doubt” in every case. In some cases, there is a basic doubt which is not as strong as an initial doubt to mount a further judicial prosecution, yet it needs to be investigated. In these cases, prosecutors and law enforcement units need to conduct an investigation, which is basically called a “preliminary field investigation” to determine whether there is a concrete and obvious “initial doubt” in the case.²⁷ In a preliminary field investigation phase, there may not be a committed crime at the present moment, but there might be the danger of a probable commitment of a crime. To protect the community from the dangers, it is essentially a governmental responsibility, not a judicial one. That is why, as a part of government, the law enforcement unit that is responsible for protecting the community from the dangers must automatically start to work to bring out all the facts about this danger immediately. The organized crime intelligence operations can be accepted as a

preliminary field investigation; it is conducted to determine whether there is an “initial doubt” which is needed for a further judicial prosecution. If an organized crime intelligence unit can reach any intelligence, which is supporting “initial doubt” after its intelligence efforts, this intelligence is transferred to the law enforcement judicial investigation unit to start a further judicial prosecution under the command of a prosecutor.

A MODEL PROPOSAL FOR ORGANIZED CRIME INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

An organized crime intelligence operation is conducted to prevent an organized crime before it occurs. To prevent the organized crime from occurring, it must be preliminarily recognized and investigated. The main goal of an organized crime intelligence operation is mainly to recognize and investigate the organized crime. It is not to gather evidence, but to determine whether there is a concrete and obvious initial doubt of a suspected organized criminal activity. If a law enforcement intelligence unit can reach a concrete and obvious initial doubt, the case is transferred to a law enforcement judicial investigation unit to launch a further public judicial prosecution under the command of the prosecutor. Today, all the works and activities which are performed against today’s large and sophisticated organized criminal groups during an organized crime intelligence operation need to be reorganized in a standard management model. A standard management model approach makes these types of operations more powerful and effective, and it directly affects their achievements and productivities. For that reason, a standard management model is proposed in this work for organized crime intelligence operations as shown in Figure 4. The model consists of information gathering, making the hypothesis and operation planning, organization of the operation, running the operation, analysis and review, and dissemination stages.



Figure 4: Organized Crime Intelligence Operational Management Model

Information Gathering

The reliability and accuracy of the first information is very important, because this information is going to directly affect the rest of the operation. That is why, after gathering this information, its reliability and accuracy must be tested and analyzed by experienced and expert intelligence officers. Organized crime intelligence units would be aware of organized criminal activity generally from informants, reports and complaints, open resources (Internet, TV, newspapers, etc.), technical surveillance activities, organized crime intelligence demands from the other law enforcement units, and intelligence field investigations.

THE INFORMANTS

The informants are very important intelligence resources. They are not only for organized crime intelligence activities, but also for all varieties of crime, for providing direct intelligence from organized criminal activity. Organized crime perpetrators generally try to camouflage their illegal activities with a legal mask. Due to this legal mask, they can easily transfer the revenues gathered from illegal activities to legal areas and launder their dirty money. Besides, this mask allows their illegal activities to be recognized rather easily by law enforcement units. The direct and inside intelligence gathered by the informants makes them unique for the law enforcement intelligence units. However, organized crime organizations have very tough and cruel punishment systems to thwart leaking any indication of their criminal involvement. Hence, this results in making the recruiting of an informant from organized crime organizations very difficult; it can take months, even years.²⁸

THE REPORTS AND COMPLAINTS

Someone can report an organized criminal activity to law enforcement units through phone calls, e-mails, letters, etc. They mostly do not relinquish their personal information, because they are afraid of being a target of the organized criminals’ revenge. Although some of these reports can be false and misleading, they are mostly true and lead the law enforcement units to where the organized crime is located. Many substantial organized crime intelligence operations have been triggered by this kind of report. However, from the legal viewpoint, if the person who has suffered from this criminal activity also inquires for punishment of the perpetrators, he turns from a reporter into a complainant.

OPEN RESOURCES (INTERNET, TV, NEWSPAPERS, ETC.)

Some news or articles in the media such as Internet, TV, or newspapers can point out a suspected organized criminal activity. That is why this kind of written and visual open resource must be properly evaluated for the clues of probable organized criminal activities by organized intelligence units. These clues can be viewed only as an indication of an organized criminal activity by the well-experienced organized crime intelligence officers. For example, when the story in a local newspaper incorporates some well-known organized criminals' interest in a high-profile public procurement, this news may seem ordinary and unimportant for most, but it can be a very important clue for an organized crime intelligence unit and it must be seriously taken into consideration. Due to the fact that this can be the first step of an organized criminal activity, these open resources must be carefully monitored. That only a good organized crime intelligence officer's eye can catch this news as an early symptom should be kept in mind.

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

Sometimes the organized crime intelligence units can come across the information about a suspected organized criminal activity, while they were conducting the technical surveillance on a different criminal case. This piece of information can ignite a new organized crime intelligence operation. In today's compact organized crime world, there can be different organized criminal groups which are committing the same criminal activity. The different organized crime groups can be the supplier, the customer, or the victim of each other. These criminal groups are mostly interrelated and one group can be strictly linked to another. For instance, a group which is interested in human trafficking can have close relationships with a drug smuggling group, which is using the same route for its smuggled goods. When these criminal connections and relationships have been revealed, this can be a starting point for another organized crime intelligence operation. However, these criminal groups can try to tip off each other or they can "snitch" on the others because of conflict of interest or revenge. For this purpose, the members of one group can make a phone call or send a letter informing the law enforcement unit about the other group's illegal activities. In a specific example, a criminal group which is aware of eavesdropping by a law enforcement intelligence unit intentionally conducted some conversations on the phone about the other rival groups' criminal activities. The intelligence unit must primarily determine which part of this information is true or misleading.

ORGANIZED CRIME INTELLIGENCE DEMANDS FROM OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS

In Turkey, there are special crime intelligence departments in the National Police. These special intelligence departments are the only authorized units to conduct intelligence activities before a public judicial prosecution against the organized criminal groups. That is why they must meet the intelligence needs of the other law enforcement units with a sense of urgency. Intelligence requires high specialization; very classified and clandestine techniques and methods are carried out during intelligence work. Having these specially-required intelligence abilities in all law enforcement units is nearly impossible; they must ask for help from law enforcement intelligence units. These intelligence demands from other law enforcement units sometimes mean extra work for the organized crime intelligence units. Some of these demands, especially the ones which are coming from the street-level law enforcement units, can include very much information about an organized criminal activity. If a law enforcement organized crime intelligence unit considers a demand from another law enforcement unit as serious, a new organized crime intelligence operation can be started.

INTELLIGENCE FIELD INVESTIGATIONS

The organized crime intelligence units conduct intelligence field investigations of organized criminal activities. The main goal of these intelligence field investigations is to gather information about any organized criminal activity, not to collect evidence nor make any arrestment. On the other hand, these field intelligence investigations are not only for a specific aim, but for searching the field with the proactive aims. In this type of field work, organized crime intelligence unit personnel utilize the informants and other intelligence methods and techniques. Besides, undercover special agents can be very handy, especially against very large organized crime groups. The information which is gathered through these field works is analyzed and evaluated by expert intelligence analysts and, if it is worthy to pursue, an organized crime intelligence operation can be put into effect.

Making the Hypothesis and Operations Planning

For launching an organized crime intelligence operation, the law enforcement intelligence unit must have logical reasons for pursuing their suspects. These logical reasons are enough for launching an organized crime intelligence operation, but they are not enough yet for a further public judicial prosecution. In fact, an organized crime intelligence operation aims to transform these logical reasons to an initial

doubt if it is really so. If this is not the case, the facts must be speedily revealed, and the operations team must stop working at the very beginning of the operational period. By doing so, the organized crime intelligence operations prevent the law enforcement and judicial departments from squandering public funds for a further public judicial prosecution. If the organized crime intelligence unit has collected enough logical reasons about the organized crime activity, it must make a hypothesis, just like in other crime investigations.²⁹ A hypothesis must be made by expert intelligence officers by analyzing the relevant intelligence. Later, this hypothesis would have been tested from different perspectives during the organized crime intelligence operation. If the hypothesis can be confirmed and reinforced after all this test progress, that means the operation team reached an initial doubt at the closing of the case. Otherwise, no further investigation is necessary. However, if the intelligence unit has the logical reasons, then an organized crime intelligence operation must be organized. Then the leader and other necessary personnel of the organized crime intelligence operation must be clearly assigned to their positions, and job overlap must be prevented at this point.

Organization of the Operation

After making the hypothesis and planning the operation, the operation needs to be put together according to the operations plan. While organizing the operation, the operations manager who is leading the operation needs to be identified, and job descriptions in the operation team must be clarified. However, the duties and powers must be clearly assigned to each member of the operations team separately. In this stage, the deputies who are required to substitute for an absent member must be assigned appropriately. Besides, the manager of the operation can add new expert personnel to the positions in the operations team if and when necessary. Lastly, the essentials of the coordination and communication channels for the operations team must be established.

ASSIGNING THE MANAGER OF THE OPERATION

The manager of the operation must be assigned among those who have extensive information and experience about organized crime and intelligence operations. If someone inexperienced is to be assigned to manage the operation, he or she has to be trained on organized crime intelligence and operations in detail before his/her assignment. The manager of the operation generally becomes the chief of the organized crime unit of law enforcement intelligence departments in Turkey. Therefore, the operations manager mostly has extensive information and experience in organized crime intelligence operations, since he or she has already been working in

the organized crime intelligence unit for some time. His/her deputy is responsible for the operations team while the operation manager's absence is accommodated. The manager of the organized crime intelligence operation is someone who is leading the operations team to success after a long, hard, and sometimes dangerous process. That is why a sound, trust-based, and sincere relationship between the leader and the team members is crucial for achieving success and productivity.

OPERATIONS TEAM BUILDING

Right after clarifying the operations manager, the rest of the operations team is deployed to their positions. In practice, the members of the organized crime intelligence operation team consist of the actual staff of the organized crime unit of law enforcement intelligence departments in Turkey. They are already part of the organized crime intelligence business, same as the operations manager, and they have sufficient information and experience about organized crime and intelligence operations. New personnel who are going to be assigned to these units must be prepared through a very detailed and strict organized criminal intelligence training program before their assignments. Duties and powers must be clearly assigned to each member of the operations team.

EXPERT SUPPORT TO THE TEAM IF NECESSARY

Today's organized crime organizations, which have become multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary, utilize very sophisticated methods and techniques at international levels to hide their illegal activities. They can recruit some experts in complicated computer technologies, both for making their illegal activities easier and laundering their dirty money. Hence, they try to conceal their illegal activities in different ways by taking advantage of complicated computer technologies. Traditional techniques and tactics are not sufficient to fight against this kind of organized crime, and abilities and expertise in banking, finance, accounting, computers, and other related topics can be necessary. That is why, if the operations manager deems it necessary, some expert support can be added to the operations team at any time and in any specific area. This mandatory attendance is to strengthen the operations team to be able to work on very complicated organized crime issues. Otherwise, the organized crime intelligence operations team can face the danger of not revealing all the facts about the case and the operation will not end in success.

IDENTIFYING THE ESSENTIALS OF COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS

The coordination and communications channels must be appropriately created in the operations team for each stage of an organized crime intelligence operation from the beginning to the end. The members of the operations team frequently come together and review the intelligence they have. They also establish the forward-looking perspectives of the rest of the operation. However, both formal and informal communications channels are established among the members of the operation, and all these communications channels must be kept open during the operation works. The operations members must meet if a new and sudden development occurs, because of the speedily changing nature of organized crime, and they must take new measures against these new circumstances.

Running the Operation

Having planned and organized all aspects of the organized crime intelligence operation, the operation commences. A file is opened and the operations team starts to gather information about suspected organized criminal activity. During the intelligence-gathering period, some special intelligence techniques and tactics from the physical observations to technical surveillance activities are being conducted by gaining necessary judicial permissions. During this time, the operations team tries to recognize the persons who are thought to be victimized by suspected organized criminals, and it also tries to develop an organization chart of the group. At the end of the operation, all intelligence which has been gathered by the operations team is appropriately reported to senior management.

OPENING A CASE FILE AND STARTING TO GATHER INFORMATION

The first thing after an organized crime intelligence operation has been started is to open a case file. All information and data which have been gathered during the operation are kept in this file. This makes any piece of information about the case more accessible for the team members whenever they need it. At this stage, an archival search is conducted about the targets for compiling the documents and data from old criminal records. Besides, a detailed search is made through open resources and online data banks, and field investigations are conducted regarding the targets on the other side. Photographs of the targeted persons are obtained, the vehicles which are used by the criminals are identified, and reconnaissance reports of their places, such as offices, houses, or other secret places (storages, safehavens etc.), are prepared.

Archive Searching and Collecting Information from Old Criminal Records

In preliminary field investigation work, very detailed criminal background research is conducted about the targeted persons. Additionally, their old criminal records and documents such as statements, court decisions, etc., are collected and reviewed in detail. Through this work, criminal association of the targeted persons in the past will be revealed. The continuity of the crime is one of the most important characteristics for accepting a group of criminals as an organized crime group. This kind of criminal background is not a reason for recharging these targeted people, but this information can help to connect these people in a similar criminal association in the future.

Searching Open Resources and Online Data Banks

After conducting criminal background research about targeted persons, relevant information is searched through online databanks of the state or private sector organizations. A piece of information can support whether the suspicion the organized crime intelligence officials have is accurate or not. At this point, all necessary online databanks, which belong to state or private sector organizations, must be accessible for the organized crime intelligence operations unit.

Conducting Intelligence Field Investigations about Targeted Persons

Office work and a detailed search in open resources must be performed on targeted persons before starting the intelligence field work as mentioned above. However, public domain information and images about the targets are collected in this stage. Afterward, intelligence field work is launched and the operations team starts to gather information about the targets by using intelligence techniques and tactics in the field.

Preparing the Reconnaissance Reports

In the context of an organized crime intelligence operation, the plans of all buildings such as offices, houses, storage areas, or safehouses which belong to the suspects, including entries and exits and all possible escape routes, must be obtained and worked up in detail. The reconnaissance reports are prepared for all of the places listed above. These reports are very crucial, especially for preparing any operational activity to arrest the suspects and conduct a search to find crime tools in due time. Mostly, operational plans are based on these reconnaissance reports.

CONDUCTING PHYSICAL OBSERVATION AND TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

In the course of an organized crime intelligence operation, all forms of intelligence techniques and tactics are carried into effect by meeting all legal necessities, such as physical or technical observation, and reconnaissance activities, including physical pursuits and wiretaps. Thanks to this kind of intelligence work, the organizational structure of the group, criminal associates, and new places can be revealed.

DEVELOPING NEW INFORMANTS

Developing a new informant in any organized criminal activity is much harder than the other disparate crime types, and a different specialization is necessary for this aim. In an organized intelligence operation, the operations team must instantly observe the circumstances, and it can easily get in touch with law enforcement judicial investigation units in due time. Otherwise, some dangers can occur for both the intelligence officials and the informants. Keeping the informants away from committing any crime is another very important issue for the operations team. Organized crime informants have to live together with actual and barbaric organized criminals in compliance with the nature of their job. This necessity sometimes puts them in danger of committing or being part of a crime. Sometimes, they bear witness to some heavy criminal activities performed by their real criminal fellows, and they can reluctantly be a part of this illegal activity. There is a long-standing argument on this issue. Are the informants angels or devils? Yet, the answer has not been discovered; some see the informants as a mandatory and useful tool to cope with organized crime, while others insist that the informants are a very big threat against the privacy of law-abiding citizens. According to this view they can breach confidence, and put the non-involved and innocent persons at danger in some cases. There is also a high risk that the informants could be unintentionally or intentionally part of the organized criminal activity as mentioned above.³⁰ Although all these ongoing arguments are present, the informants are still accepted as the most useful and effective intelligence resource in the fight against organized crime organizations. The role of the informants is crucial to bringing all dimensions of the criminal group activity to light, and preventing a crime from reoccurring.

RECOGNIZING THE VICTIMS

The main goal of an organized crime intelligence operation is to prevent any victimization and the organized crime from occurring. Although the law enforcement organized crime intelligence units can be aware of some of the organized criminal activities after being

committed, most victims are not willing to give any evidence regarding their victimizations to any law enforcement unit, because they are afraid of being targeted for the organized criminals' revenge. The law enforcement organized crime intelligence team must recognize the victims and later try to gather some more detailed information about their victimization. Although this is not one of their missions, operations team members can be forced to convince the victims to sacrifice evidence against the criminal activity, because they get in touch with these people and provide their confidence at the first stage. When the law enforcement officials retrieve any evidence as a statement of a victim against the organized crime group, that means they have already reached an initial doubt at the same time. In this case, the only thing remaining is revealing the organizational chart of the organized crime group.

REVEALING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME GROUP

Revealing the organizational chart of any suspected organized crime group is one of the most desirable and challenging aims of the organized crime intelligence operation. For an organized crime intelligence operation being handled as a judicial prosecution, revealing an organizational chart of the organized criminal group is very important. Collaboration of three or more people is also one of the most important determinative characteristics of any organized criminal activity, and this collaboration and existence of three or more people must be clearly revealed for making a legal accusation of organized crime before a court. Without revealing criminal collaboration of three or more people, it is impossible to make any legal accusations for the suspicious, targeted persons before a court. Besides, even if any crime is not committed yet, collaboration to commit a crime is itself a crime in most countries such as Turkey. If this criminal collaboration could be clearly revealed, this is enough for bringing these collaborators to trial before they commit a crime.

REPORT WRITING

All categories of information about organized criminal activity must be reported to senior management by the law enforcement organized crime intelligence team at the end of the operation. The report must be prepared in accordance with the scope and characteristics of the case; besides, deductions and ideas must be separately handled in different parts. In this report, from which resources all the information was gathered and what techniques and tactics have been performed must clearly be pointed out. Besides, the methods of analysis and evaluation must be explained; the facts which are supporting

the deductions and ideas of the organized crime intelligence team must be added to this report. At this point, visual tools such as charts and graphs can be used for clearly bringing out all facts of the organized criminal activity. All information must be organized in order, and chronological order can make the report more understandable and easier to explain all the facts about the case. However, a report must include not only the information leading to the guilty, but also to the innocent. Only the facts must be submitted in this final report, and private and subjective views must be minimized while reporting.

Analysis and Review

After writing the final report, including all the information which has been gathered through the organized crime intelligence operation, each piece of information must be reanalyzed and reviewed one more time before dissemination. All the operational progress must be tested step by step from the first information gathering to the report writing stage. The hypothesis made at the beginning is retested in light of all this information, and the operations team determines if the hypothesis needs to be revised. This stage is actually the most critical time of the organized crime intelligence operation. In this stage, a final decision is made by the operations team on whether it should transfer this information to the law enforcement judicial investigation unit through senior management. Otherwise, the operations team must go back to the beginning of the operational process and try to make sure that its hypothesis is true. This decision must be made by all members of the operations team together.

Dissemination

If the operations team decides that it has enough of an initial doubt for the case, the report includes all the intelligence that has been gathered and it is submitted to senior management. After getting approval of senior management, the report is transferred to the law enforcement judicial investigations unit. As soon as the law enforcement judicial unit obtains this intelligence report, the report is submitted to the prosecutor in charge, and a public judicial prosecution is launched if deemed necessary. With a public judicial prosecution, the law enforcement unit starts to collect evidence for supporting the initial doubt under the command of the prosecutor in charge. In this stage a mutual and active relationship must be constructed between the organized crime intelligence unit and the judicial investigations unit, and this relationship must be continued until the case is brought to trial at the end.

CONCLUSION

Today's transnational organized crime organizations are getting more sophisticated by using advantages from new technologies. It is absolutely one of the most challenging types of crime causing struggles for law enforcement intelligence units. A secret war between law enforcement units and organized crime organizations has been ongoing in the back streets of most of the cities around the world. Organized crime organizations learn some lessons from every operation which has been conducted against them and they try not to make the same mistakes again. We can say that they are evolving under new circumstances, and they attempt to make themselves less recognized legally and technically by law enforcement intelligence units. That is why the mission of the law enforcement organized crime intelligence units is getting heavier day by day. This heavy mission requires a more flexible and well-organized management approach by all organized crime intelligence operations. Today, reaching an initial doubt which is needed to launch a public judicial investigation on any suspected organized crime activity is harder than ever. Any public judicial investigation without obtaining a sound and reliable initial doubt is most likely to fail, and limited public funds will be wasted in this way. However, some innocent people can be wrongly targeted and victimized because of a false and misleading initial doubt. A law enforcement organized crime intelligence operation is a long-term, high-cost, and difficult effort, and requires a very well-organized, systematic, and standardized management approach. Such a standardized management approach in an organized crime intelligence operation can provide an order for the work during the operation and make the new personnel more rapidly and easily familiar with this kind of operation. A common and standard management model will also increase the productivity and effectiveness of organized crime intelligence operations.

Bringing in academicians and practitioners who are working on organized crime intelligence operations is paramount to formulate an ideal standard management model for organized crime intelligence operations, and finding new and applicable remedies to cope with the trans-border organized crime organizations. Most of the academic works in this area are naturally based on practice, and academicians and practitioners must work together. However, today there are very few academic works on the management structure of organized crime intelligence operations, and there are very few academicians who have a law enforcement organized crime intelligence background who are willing to work in this area. The main reason for this scarcity is mostly unseen burdens, which are erected by officials between the academicians and the practitioners. When an academician or a practitioner wants to work on these issues, he/she can encounter some formidable legal and organizational obstacles.

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Defense for Covert Administrative Techniques for Neutralizing American Highly Qualified Personnel

by Dr. Joshua M. Pearce

OVERVIEW

Scientists and engineers with doctorates are considered highly-qualified personnel (HQP) who improve U.S. economic efficiency and generate new products, including weapons of interest, to the Intelligence Community. HQP represent a small fraction of the population, which make them favorable targets for compromise. This study analyzes how to defend against a novel approach of covert infiltration that uses administrative techniques to neutralize HQP without recruiting them directly. The approach follows five hierarchical strategies for replacing the innovation cycle with administrative time expenditures. This approach is critically analyzed to further national security goals by providing intelligence service guidelines for defensive measures needed against this new weapon.

INTRODUCTION

Highly qualified personnel have historically garnered the interest of the Intelligence Community (IC) only when their skills were directly applicable to weapons systems (e.g., nuclear weapons scientists).¹ However, advanced training in science and engineering is an integral part of university research in order to foster innovation.² This engineering and science training contributes to the availability of a highly skilled labor force, capable of thinking critically and creating and applying knowledge for the benefit of the nation (e.g., by the creation of new technologies and industries).³ Cross-national analysis shows that the size of a nation's scientific labor force and training system has a clearly positive effect on economic development in a given country, which supports conventional theories that state training of HQP are a valuable form of human capital that improves labor force efficiency and productivity.⁴ In addition, HQP in science and engineering contribute to national competitiveness and productivity because their output (research) produces knowledge, innovation, and technical applications that improve economic efficiency and generates new products including weapons that are of interest to intelligence communities.⁵ With the average IQ of a PhD holder in the top 5% of the population⁶ and the time needed to obtain a

PhD normally over 10 years past high school, the nation has made a substantial investment in the education of these individuals and generally seeks to have the highest return based on efficient use of HQP research time to generate new knowledge.⁷

Although it is possible to imagine foreign intelligence services infiltrating and recruiting all of academia in a specific country, it would be clearly time-consuming, difficult to implement, and prohibitively expensive.

HQP trained in science and engineering and particularly those who train others (e.g., university professors) are ideally positioned to think creatively and to capitalize upon new ideas and technologies developed in a target country and elsewhere in the world in any field.⁸ These HQP, however, represent a very small number of individuals.. There are fewer than 1.5 million professors in the U.S., which represents less than 0.5% of the population,⁹ as only 5-10% of PhDs in engineering and science, respectively, generally become faculty members.¹⁰ With such a small number of individual HQP being responsible for the majority of technical innovation in a country like the U.S., competing intelligence organizations have several choices based on historical actions to neutralize them. These options historically have included both assassination¹¹ and some form of infiltration or recruitment through bribery or extortion.¹² Assassination, the moral complexities¹³ of which are left for discussion elsewhere, may be functionally practical for a few scientists in a specific sub-field of interest (e.g., biological weapons).¹⁴ However, it is impractical for the larger scientific and engineering community of the U.S. or other nations without transparent aggression being detected. Similarly, although it is possible to imagine foreign intelligence services infiltrating and recruiting all of academia in a specific country, it would be clearly time-consuming, difficult to implement, and prohibitively expensive. These reasons explain why there are no reports in the literature of a mass-scale attack on a country's HQP.

This article analyzes a new potential approach of covert infiltration to enable administrative techniques for neutralizing HQP in a country without recruiting HQP directly. Science and engineering faculty are finite resources and have finite time. In the U.S. an average academic works about 60 hours per week.¹⁵ Roughly two-thirds of that time is for teaching,¹⁵ including course preparation and advising. About a fifth of the work time for an average HQP working as a professor is spent on both research and administrative tasks.¹⁵ Therefore, to cripple the American innovation cycle an intelligence service infiltrating administrative ranks would need to shift only about 20% percent of HQP time to administration, which represents 12 hours a week per HQP. This study outlines five hierarchical strategies that could be used by foreign intelligence services to increase administrative time expenditures for targeting HQP in the areas of grant writing, purchasing, reporting, outreach, budget accounting, safety, computer security, and sensitivity training. The goal of these strategies is to utilize so much of the working time of HQP on non-productive labor that they are not able to produce any innovation of value. In addition, more advanced techniques for maximizing overhead parasitism will be explained. These approaches will be critically analyzed and discussed to provide intelligence service guidelines for defense against this new weapon to further goals of national security in the U.S.

METHODS

The methods used to transition HQP time to non-productive administrative activities are organized in five hierarchies: (1) repetition, (2) internal oversight, (3) external oversight, (4) scope, and (5) intrusion. All of these hierarchies can be integrated into existing administration practices by intelligence personnel directly or through recruited administrators (referred to hereafter as “administrative assets”), whether by direct infiltration of university systems or the government of the U.S. Subsequently, detection and defensive measures will be outlined for each activity.

Hierarchy in Repetition

Hierarchy in repetition represents a method of taking an administrative task, which may be necessary or beneficial, and increasing the time burden by increasing the cycle repetition for the HQP to counteract that benefit by reducing HQP time on productive tasks. This is illustrated in Figure 1 and can be immediately implemented for any existing administrative function by taking the existing time cycle and altering policy for the next level up the pyramid shown. There is also the potential necessity for further time degradations. For example, if faculty must already complete a self-study annually on their progress in research, teaching, and service, a compromised administrative asset can

recommend that such a self-study take place bi- or tri-annually after each semester. Once this policy is in place, and demonstrated to be successful, the self-study can be mandated monthly and so forth. At each stage, to increase the time investment it is only necessary to show a benefit from the existing practice.




Figure 1. Hierarchy in Repetition from Enemy Intelligence Perspective

Hierarchy in Oversight

In order to both foster excellence and protect against internal maleficence, academic organizations institute some form of oversight. The goal of this hierarchy (shown in Figure 2) is to increase the time investment necessary for HQP to comply with internal oversight. If this begins, for example, with an annual self-study of normal academic functions, the time investment can be extended substantially by mandating a peer review of these documents (e.g., by requiring three faculty HQP to read each self-study). Any other type of normal administrative task can be multiplied in this way. Thus, for instance, instead of a single letter of reference from an HQP being needed for graduate school, three, five, or ten can be required. The HQP time investment can be extended further not only by increasing the number of peer reviewers (e.g., 5, 10, or the entire department), but also by demanding further reporting higher up the academic hierarchy itself. As administrators are themselves some of the most valuable HQP, it is imperative from a foreign enemy’s perspective that any contributions they make to research be eliminated. This can be done in part by requiring a summary document for each one in order to rise to the next level in the hierarchy. For an example, a department head would need to read the reports from peer review and make a new summary report for the dean, and so forth.

To foster compliance, administrative assets can be instructed by foreign handlers to use potential crisis examples from either their own institution or other institutions. For example, if University A was implicated in

academic plagiarism, University B can use the negative publicity to push through a crisis policy that demands no plagiarism of any kind be tolerated on campus to ensure academic excellence. Most academic HQP will agree with this sentiment and would be expected to vote for such a policy. Then University B can implement the policy by using a highly-publicized automated plagiarism detector¹⁶ to screen all internal self-study reports and summary reports. This has the foreign benefit of forcing domestic HQP to conduct a novel (and thus more time-consuming) self-study at each interval, and it prevents those higher up the academic hierarchy from simply cutting and pasting from other reports.

In addition, this hierarchy of internal oversight can be used to slow the progress of science and engineering research in the U.S. directly by requiring approval from the next level up the academic hierarchy for as many functions as possible. Each function (e.g., purchasing of a chemical) can be systematized in form that has every possible permutation of variable for the function present to ensure maximum time expenditure by the American HQP. These permissions can be mandated by foreign administrative assets to be done in hard copy on paper with actual physical signatures on the same piece of paper to maximize the delay for any function. Again, if any such procedures are in place, administrative assets can be instructed to bump the approval process up to the next level of the hierarchy with another mandated report. In the past, such small changes would in no way raise concern or suspicion and, in fact, may even have garnered administrative awards and faster promotion for the asset,¹⁷ increasing his/her worth as a foreign intelligence asset.




Figure 2. Hierarchy in Oversight (Internal) from Enemy Intelligence Perspective

Similar to the increasing time investments that can be demanded at the institutional level, acquiring national-level government administrative assets can be used to deploy a more stringent global oversight hierarchy as shown in Figure 3. The entire hierarchy in Figure 2 is summarized on the ground floor of Figure 3. National-level rules and regulations

can use compliance for driving administrative rules up the hierarchy in Figure 2. National-level administrative foreign assets can apply the same method of using an example crisis at one institution to inflict time investments at all institutions. For example, the former President of the Parliamentary Commission for the Conflict of Interest, University Professor Desa Mlikotin-Tomic, was convicted for “trading” examination results at the Zagreb Faculty of Economics in Croatia along with 18 professors, students, and mediators.¹⁸ Again, all faculty in any nation including the U.S. would be expected to be “against” selling exam results. A national rule could be implemented to institute statistical analysis of all exams to look for potential cheating and be enforced by an external commission in each sub-discipline of science and engineering made up of a large number of faculty specialists as well as those in unrelated fields. Moreover, any time that HQP are spending on such a commission they are not working on research for the benefit of their country.




Figure 3. Hierarchy in Oversight (Global) from Enemy Intelligence Perspective

Hierarchy in Scope

Next, a hierarchy in scope can be used by administrative foreign assets as a tool to increase HQP time investment in unproductive tasks. The hierarchy in scope is shown in Figure 4. For example, it may make sense for the IT department of a university to review IT-related purchases as it will be servicing them. However, this function can be extended by creating a faculty committee on IT purchases that has a representative from each organizational unit which reports to the committee whenever purchases are planned to look for potential bulk purchase discounts or other legitimate synergies. Again, the policy appears to be productive and useful, but can result in a major HQP time investment. Similarly, the breadth of stakeholders can be expanded to larger and larger communities in order to create delays. For example, if an HQP is attempting to build an

outdoor research facility, it can be proposed to community members for their opinions (who may only be indirectly affected), or to the state government or even multinational organizations like the UN to determine global significance. Such scope extension can increase HQP time investments in non-productive tasks directly, but also the resultant delays can lead to frustration, which can further reduce American HQP productivity.¹⁹




Figure 4. Hierarchy in Scope from Enemy Intelligence Perspective

Hierarchy in Intrusion

Finally, foreign intelligence organizations can use the hierarchy of intrusion to take existing tasks and amplify the time investment necessary for the HQP. Hence, a basic report can be mandated for online training, then to onsite training. To ensure compliance, foreign administrative assets can demand on-site reviews that involve as wide a selection of HQP at a time, so that a single administrator can invest one day of time and use dozens of HQP-days to prepare and comply with site visits. An even better method of HQP time destruction from a foreign intelligence perspective is to mandate off-site training because then the travel time and the expense come out of HQP budgets.




Figure 5. Hierarchy in Intrusion from Enemy Intelligence Perspective

APPLICATIONS

The five hierarchical methods to transition HQP time to non-productive administrative activities can be applied in every area of academia. Here, areas to be evaluated include grant writing, purchasing, reporting, outreach, budget accounting, safety, computer security, and sensitivity training. These areas are necessary for academia and academic research to function and can be expected to be supported in general by academics. However, the routine procedures meant to promote a healthy academic environment will be applied by foreign administrative assets with such aggressiveness as to ensure American HQP time available for research is minimized or eliminated completely. In each case, the intelligence asset can argue that excellence and best practices demand moving up the hierarchies shown in Figures 1-5.

Grant Writing, Reviewing, and Awarding

Grant writing, although critical to the operation of research in most advanced nations including the U.S., is by default a non-productive HQP time investment. Thus, foreign intelligence assets can be advised to do everything within their administrative scope of control to increase the amount of time American HQP must dedicate to grant writing. At the national level this can begin with the formatting and length of calls for proposals (CFPs) themselves. Best practices (for HQP time waste) would involve CFPs being written to be as long and as detailed as possible as this will increase the amount of time HQP need to invest simply in reading them. The formatting and CFP standards should be changed with every CFP cycle to ensure HQP must read every individual CFP and to discourage any copying and pasting²⁰ from previous proposals. The CFP can be broken down into multiple parts with multiple file types that demand the use of closed source and expensive software to open and edit. The complication of the CFP will utilize time, but arbitrary, proprietary formatted documents and software will further reduce funding for research itself in the U.S. as any funds spent on arbitrary software are not being used for real research. Best practices also would involve demanding as much as possible up front in the draft cycle, including detailed budgets with each planned expenditure broken down by type with multiple quotes for anti-fraud documentation, detailed intellectual property (IP) agreements and conflict of interest forms, and proposed research artifacts to be shared with the general public (e.g., Microsoft PowerPoint presentations, Final Cut Pro Video Presentations, and Adobe Photoshop Posters). To increase the HQP investment, these artifacts can be further broken down into sub-groups (e.g., ages for outreach) following Figure 4.

In many countries including the U.S., grant proposals go through a system of peer review. To maximize HQP time investment, as many reviewers as possible should be requested. Normally this would be viewed as more rigorous and again garner rewards for the foreign administrative asset requesting the change. Grant applicants should be forced to review a certain number of proposals and write summaries and recommendations with a minimum word count that they would need to do without copying and pasting (again enforced by anti-plagiarism software discussed above). As many rounds of review as possible should be instituted by the foreign asset to guarantee excellence, and a committee composed of HQP should write a summary of the reviews before each successive round.

Foreign administrative assets would seek to inject as many additional factors that are not based on technical excellence as possible into the review process.

Foreign administrative assets would seek to inject as many additional factors that are not based on technical excellence as possible into the review process. In addition, HQP can be required to write on and evaluate proposals on these requirements as well. Any arbitrary factor not associated with the engineering or science will effectively dilute the quality of the proposal pool if it is used for evaluations. The logical choice for the arbitrary factor will depend on the social variables and culture of the region or the country. For example, requiring quotas based on gender, race, age, ethnicity, religion, skin color, or hair color, or other arbitrary discriminator, will ensure that some of the most qualified HQP are eliminated from consideration and funding. Similarly, using discriminators such as birthplace or affiliation with a political party as a litmus test for academic success by a foreign administrative asset can garner support from the ruling government party while also weakening the nation's scientific infrastructure. Defunding of the elite HQP in the U.S. using this technique again could lead to rewards for the foreign administrative asset if the appropriate social variable is selected.

Finally, even the award itself can be used to cannibalize HQP productivity time. The acceptance of the grant could be required to be made in person at a distance that involves traveling and involve detailed signing of complex forms for intellectual property, non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), etc.

Purchasing

With the advent of online shopping, even scientific equipment can be purchased quickly with a credit card and shipped to most labs in the world in a matter of days. Experimental HQP are reliant on high-quality equipment to make progress in their respective fields; hence, best practices for foreign intelligence assets using administrative techniques to neutralize HQP must slow down the purchasing process as much as possible. Efforts must be made to remove the simplest form of purchasing from HQP by, for example, mandating that all equipment be routed through central purchasing rather than purchased with a credit card. Examples of scientific fraud can be used to demand that oversight. For example, a famous case in the U.S involved now felon and former professor Craig Grimes, who was accused of several cases of fraud,²¹ including defrauding the National Institutes of Health and Advanced Research Projects Agency of \$3 million in federal grant monies, much of which was misappropriated for his personal use. This mandate can be strengthened using forms that must be filled out by hand and signed justifying every purchase and tying it back to specific line items inside proposals. In addition, to ensure "appropriate use of funds," multiple vendor quotes can be required for every purchase, again actually ensuring maximum HQP time invested per purchase.

There is now considerable evidence that both free and open-source software (FOSS)²² and free and open-source hardware (FOSH)²³ save research funding. Scaled collaboration made possible by open-source design results in superior design with lower associated costs due to the continuous improvement in software code, thereby making it more robust and innovative.²⁴ FOSS and FOSH design can be combined with self-replicating rapid prototyper (RepRap) 3-D printing²⁵ for distributed digital fabrication of low-cost scientific equipment.²⁶ The open sharing of digital design has reduced capital cost to an unprecedented 90-99% decrease from the cost of conventional equipment.²³ The lateral scaling of shared design has created substantial value, resulting in hundreds and even thousands of percent return on investment for science funders.²⁷ To stop these cost savings for science in the U.S., foreign intelligence assets must make every effort to deny the use of any form of open-source software or hardware. This denial can be based most easily on security concerns, which are convoluted enough to raise questions,²⁸ regardless of the evidence that open source can be used to enhance security.²⁹ Blanket restrictions on the use of any form of open-source hardware or software can be made by any of the government agencies, funders, and university administrators compromised by foreign intelligence services to slow the rate of scientific progress in the U.S.

Reporting

After a grant is awarded for scientific research, as much HQP time as possible can be relegated to reporting by foreign administrative assets in order to minimize scientific progress in the U.S. This is most easily accomplished by enhancing existing reporting requirements that are already standard among academic funding agencies using the hierarchical methods. First, for example, the repetition hierarchy can be climbed following Figure 1 by changing annual reporting requirements to monthly reports. These reports can be mandated to circulate internally first for peer review and department head or dean sign-off (following Figure 2), before being sent for external review by various committees outside the grantee's university (following Figure 3). New reports for other stakeholders could be mandated (following Figure 4), always using an incompatible format to obfuscate copy and pasting-based time-saving methods. Finally, using the strategies shown in Figure 5, progressively more intrusive reporting can be mandated along with training to do the report. Online training can involve methods to guarantee maximum time expenditure, such as long training videos with 100% pass-rate requirements on quizzes about the videos. Following this method, as much reporting as possible should be mandated by foreign assets to involve site visits with multiple HQP. Ideally, large numbers of such HQP from diverse disciplines would be involved, all of which would be required to travel to the site and fill out long and complex forms.

Outreach

Outreach to encourage STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education is already mandatory for grants from some U.S. government organizations in order to recruit future HQP. To hobble current HQP, their role in STEM recruitment can be made a requirement for all funding and expanded substantially. As mentioned above, this can occur first by expanding the scope and demand outreach materials not for one target of youth, but for every age level (Figure 4). The ideal situation from a foreign intelligence perspective would be inappropriate age groups that could not benefit the target directly from such outreach by creating more HQP. This would include not only adult and geriatric science outreach, but also that to extremely young children. Firstly, HQP can be mandated to participate in this outreach directly (e.g., by hosting learning seminars). These seminars should be scheduled by foreign administrative assets for all regions within the target country for official reasoning about "geographic equity" and "minority group equity," but actually for the main purpose of using additional travel time to further cut HQP productivity and travel costs to reduce funding available for research. Secondly, mandated outreach can take the form of summaries of HQP research and

rewriting them at each grade level (following Figure 3). The former could be made more frequent (e.g., monthly or even weekly following Figure 1), and the latter assignment can be checked using automated tools already available in proprietary text editing software such as Word Perfect, which again would lead to further drawdown on research moneys for unnecessary proprietary software.

Budget Accounting

Perhaps the most natural method to accelerate HQP time expenditures while seeming to adopt best administrative practices is in the use of aggressive budget accounting. With the use of the detailed plan of expenditures developed as part of the grant writing process, including full competing quotes for each purchase, it is possible to perform line item audits of all expenditures. Administrators will need to be hired to review and audit these expenditures, which will further drive up overhead costs and reduce spending for research in the U.S. There are numerous international examples to draw from in which faculty have misused research funds, which can be used as justification of the need for this level of due diligence. This due diligence can also be used for detailed conflicts of interest audits, where HQP would be asked to report all personal investments and all investments of their relatives. The scope of relatives can be expanded following Figure 3 (e.g., to spouses of blood relatives and their relatives). For HQP with multiple projects it can be required that they produce a time log for value accounting of each project. This is already practiced in some industries, but again using the five hierarchies can be expanded into a significant time commitment.

Finally, HQP can be responsible for developing detailed reports of any in-kind contribution they claim toward a project. To make these processes as time-consuming as possible, foreign administrative assets can require HQP to account for their activities every 15 minutes throughout their working time and assign that time to a specific budget for a specific contract. This could be accomplished, for example, with software that beeps every 15 minutes and freezes the computer screen of the HQP before they comply with filling out a multiple-part form. This strategy has two core benefits. First, it reduces the actual research time of the HQP to fill out the form. Second, and more importantly, interruptions decrease performance and efficiency, while adding to the stress and mental loads for the HQP.³⁰ Each interruption reduces the ability of the HQP to perform challenging mental tasks and deep thinking that lead to scientific and technical advancement. Foreign administrative assets can ensure that any HQP who complain about the accounting oversight can be immediately publicly audited for their entire academic career to provide a disincentive for any movement against greater time expenditures.

Safety

“Safety first” is a common slogan used in both industry and academia, and no one wants to work in an unsafe environment. Thus, a call to create an enhanced “safety culture” or “safety climate”³¹ should be met with a minimum of resistance from HQP faculty at America’s universities. Following Figure 1, routine safety audits can be mandated and increased in frequency. Such safety tours can be conducted in large groups (peer review via Figure 2) of all affected HQP (and even better from a foreign intelligence perspective—by unaffected HQP following Figure 3). In addition to on-site review, HQP can be mandated to attend a number of off-site “best practices” safety tours in industry, government labs, or other academic institutions (Figure 5). Again, travel time should be maximized to minimize available research time and research expenditures on travel. In addition, mandatory safety training can take the form of online training. This training can be arranged to maximize HQP investment by having password-protected login under the HQP name, linear lectures with video that cannot be paused (and restarted from the beginning if stopped for any reason), and online detailed quizzes to ensure that HQP are concentrating on the minutia of the videos. As one can never be too safe, this application can be a good candidate for a form of continuous improvement, which will cyclically use large amounts of HQP time on non-productive tasks.

Computer Security

There is a consistent series of news articles discussing the risk of cyber-attacks and the needs for computer security.³² There are well-established national hacking initiatives³³ used to steal research secrets. Thus, it is a reasonable administrative request to ensure computer security. One of the easiest methods of improving computer security is to ensure that unauthorized people do not gain access to the network when HQP leave their desks. This can be accomplished with auto-logoffs, which log out of a computer after a given amount of time. For optimal security the time before auto-logoff should be minimized (e.g., 10 minutes or less) on all computers including HQP desk computers and computers that run scientific equipment. This follows the goal of maximizing repetition of this auto-logging off found in Figure 1. The password rules should also be as convoluted as possible, requiring multi-authentication and change frequently in order to use up more HQP time. Fortunately, high-security password recommendations follow this protocol. As noted above, constantly needing to re-log into a computer causes interruptions, which decrease performance and efficiency but also add to stress and mental loads for the HQP. In addition, HQP can be required to register their proprietary software personally, and update it following an advanced hierarchy or repetition. Computer security can also be used as a means of justifying repeating

back-up requirements during working hours by the HQP themselves. All this will reduce active HQP research time and thus research quality and quantity of output, while at the same time improving the performance of the administrative metrics of research.

Sensitivity Training

HQP research time can be effectively reduced by mandating continuous education in areas that do not add to technical competence. These areas of investigation that are most appropriate for using in this mechanism are dependent on the culture of the target. For example, sensitivity training can be used based on race, sex, age, or class. Sensitivity training topics should be chosen that the majority of HQP agree with on principle (e.g., faculty should not be discriminated against due to age). The training can be coupled to audits of potential discrimination (e.g., age, sex, or religion-based annual surveys to ensure that there is not a non-representative population of HQP). This information can be used to shut out the best HQP from positions, weakening the nation’s talent pool (e.g., by setting up race quotas). Then, following Figure 1, both routine sensitivity audits and training can be mandated and increased in frequency. The audits will take time for HQP to complete and should be made as complicated and detailed as possible. Then the training can be performed in large groups (peer review via Figure 2) of all affected HQP (and even better by unaffected HQP following Figure 3). Committees can be arranged with mandatory representatives from each sub-group, again using valuable HQP time. Finally, using the strategies shown in Figure 5, progressively more intrusive reporting can be mandated along with training to prepare the sensitive reports themselves. Online training should involve methods to guarantee maximum time expenditure, such as long training videos with high pass-rate quizzes about the videos. As much reporting should, however, involve site visits with multiple HQP, ideally large numbers of such from diverse disciplines, all of whom must travel to the site and fill out long and complex forms to ensure they are not being discriminatory.

BEYOND TIME

New policies created by foreign administrative intelligence assets who directly use HQP time in the U.S. are the most valuable toward reaching their goal of 12 additional hours of unproductive time investment per week. However, foreign intelligence services could use other mechanisms to drive the effective overhead on research funding. If a specific finite amount of resources is dedicated to research and development by Americans, foreign intelligence would attempt to force as many of those resources as possible to be diverted to non-research-related overhead. There is already a mechanism using overhead at

most institutions in the U.S. that facilitates the transfer of research funds from productive research to administrative salaries and in some cases building depreciation.³⁴ Interestingly, in the latest Grant Proposal Guideline for the National Science Foundation, the use of *lower* overhead rates will now be considered a violation of its cost-sharing policy, thereby decreasing money used for innovation directly.³⁵ Following the hierarchical systems and target applications above can all contribute to this creation of overhead. For example, staff for research services will be needed to help assemble complicated budgets and to ensure appropriate research accounting and oversight rules are being followed. New types of administrators will be needed, all pulling salaries out of expanded overhead rates to follow the new national-level rules and to make rules and ensure compliance locally. In general, these administrators will be less educated than the HQP, who are the targets. Thus, they are paid less; consequently, to make effective use of administrative overhead reductions many more administrators are needed than HQP targets.

Using the non-violent methods outlined here, a foreign intelligence service needs to infiltrate a relatively small number of administrative ranks for the techniques to function.

The breadth of the scientific and engineering establishment in the U.S. is too large to attack using traditional techniques such as assassination. For example, in 1943 British bombers attacking German rocket-testing facilities including the V-2 decided the primary targets should be the homes of the scientists and engineers associated with the program. As a result, key HQP were killed during the raids.³⁶ Similarly, in 1944 an officer from the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) attended a lecture by German physicist Werner Heisenberg, with a kill order if he was convinced Germany was capable of an atomic bomb.³⁷ Fortunately for Heisenberg, the would-be assassin was convinced that no such bomb was imminent. These examples were from a time of officially declared war, but scientists have also been targeted outside those wartime periods. In 1980 Yahya al-Meshad, an Egyptian-born metallurgist and a member of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, was murdered in Paris while arranging a shipment of nuclear fuels from France to Iraq. This attack plus others to disrupt nuclear collaboration between France and Iraq, as well as earlier attacks on German scientists collaborating with Egypt on rockets, have been considered to be the work of Israel's Intelligence Service.³⁸

What they all share in common is a fairly small-scale focused attack on a few scientists. The new formalized methods presented here can be applied outside of an official declaration of war and can have broad, large-scale impacts on the economy of the U.S. Overall, a critical review of the techniques presented here provides results that appear to be an appropriate method for eliminating the effectiveness of HQP in the U.S. by foreign intelligence assets. In addition, they are less likely to be detected because the techniques fit well with conventional administrative practices and would be seen as a gradual administrative overreach rather than a widespread assassination plot of thousands of scientists, which would be more likely to resort in some form of retaliation or war. It should be pointed out that the application of such techniques is not new. The CIA's precursor, the OSS, made similar recommendations in the form of sabotage for citizens of a foreign country who did not agree with their government.³⁹ Using the non-violent methods outlined here, a foreign intelligence service needs to infiltrate a relatively small number of administrative ranks for the techniques to function. The techniques, if applied in aggregate, can easily shift the needed 20% percent of HQP time to administration, which would be expected to cripple the American innovation cycle.

DEFENSE AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE TECHNIQUES TO NEUTRALIZE AMERICAN HQP

Future work is needed to quantify the effectiveness of these techniques, how widespread they already are, and the counterintelligence methods needed to detect if administration has been compromised in government, business, organization, or university. However, it is hoped that simply outlining these methods can provide some defense and some basic recommendations can be made here to help protect the U.S. from these forms of administrative attacks on American HQP.

First, U.S. administrators at every level should work to maximize the amount of time HQP can spend on research by minimizing their administrative duties. Administrators can conduct a thought experiment on every rule, asking how much HQP time per year the rule will invoke, and can prioritize means to minimize this investment. As the values in the introduction made apparent, reducing HQP administrative time to zero may be able to double national research output. To do this, administrators should look closely at their organization's rules to see if they can push down the hierarchies in Figures 1-5. For example, if a faculty self-study review is currently warranted annually, can the time between reviews be expanded to two years or perhaps aligned with each promotion (e.g., 5-7 years)?

Second, administrators should attempt to isolate legitimate issues rather than insist on blanket policies that waste HQP time. For a security example, rather than auto-log off for every faculty computer every 10 minutes across the university, faculty who work on national security-related, sensitive research should have their facilities physically locked down to prevent unauthorized access to their computers.

Third, to begin to search out compromised personnel, leaders in each unit can evaluate whether administrative burdens have been increasing because of rule changes within their own organizations. In any administrative unit where such HQP time expenditures have been increasing, the administrators in charge of the rule change should be vetted carefully to ensure they have not been compromised by foreign intelligence services, and means should be identified to reverse these HQP time expenditures. Finally, national governmental organizations in particular must be vigilant to ensure they are providing clear and terse guidelines to minimize administrative overreach in smaller institutions (e.g., universities) that make up the majority of HQP time expenditures.

CONCLUSIONS

This study analyzed a new approach of covert foreign infiltration to enable administrative techniques to neutralize HQP in the U.S. without assassination or recruiting HQP directly. The five hierarchical strategies to increase administrative time expenditures for targeting HQP were applied to the areas of grant writing, purchasing, reporting, outreach, budget accounting, safety, computer security, and sensitivity training. Techniques were shown to increase the working time of HQP on non-productive labor at the expense of innovation over broad swaths of technological space, which would be expected to weaken both national security and the overall economy. By describing these techniques, foreign intelligence services will be less likely to successfully implement them. In addition, several policy recommendations were made to conserve HQP innovation time.

NOTES

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⁹ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, 2016-17 Edition, Postsecondary Teachers, on the Internet at <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/education-training-and-library/postsecondary-teachers.htm> (visited March 14, 2016).

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Intelligence and Media:

Multidimensional Effects of Publicity

by CPT Olli Teirila
Army of Finland

OVERVIEW

Media and intelligence have a complicated relationship. The effects of publicity on intelligence are multidimensional, especially in the vastly diverse domain of contemporary media. Notably, they affect the decision-makers, the public, and intelligence communities all in a different way. Compared to the informative and oversight dimensions, the educational aspect of intelligence-related reporting is currently undervalued, considering that learning the “why” and “how” of intelligence is essential to achieve realistic understanding of intelligence’s capabilities and its proper use, regardless whether it is seen as a subject, a tool, or a process. Acknowledging and understanding the possibilities and challenges of the media-intelligence relationship renders both parties better equipped to avoid pitfalls and make use of each other in the best way possible, and is likely to keep the focus of reporting on issues that matter while at the same time preventing wrongdoing by the consumers and producers of intelligence.

WHY UNDERSTANDING MEDIA MATTERS FOR INTELLIGENCE

The media-intelligence relationship has always been at least somewhat of a complicated one. After the Second World War and especially after the end of the Cold War, media reporting on intelligence matters has grown in quantity. Similarly, although at a slower pace, academic interest toward the relationship has also picked up. Intelligence-related scandals and revelations have fed both the hunger for more information and the vivid imagination of people leading to more and more coverage by media.

In the world of academic research, much has been written about both intelligence and media, though separately. There are also many studies published on the media-intelligence relationship, but in many cases the nexus has been studied from a media-centric point of view discussing, for example, how media have changed open source intelligence and so on.

In this article the focus is on media reporting on intelligence matters and the effects it can have, in other words, on the multidimensional effects of publicity on intelligence. Bottom-line questions are how intelligence can be affected by the media, and how different dimensions of intelligence can be affected?

Current media coverage of intelligence raises a multitude of questions. For example, what are the media effects: direct and indirect, the sought after and the involuntary? Is there a demand for change or reinforcement of current views and processes? The image of early 20th century mass media influence on a passive homogeneous audience is no longer valid. Today we see a non-passive audience, some of whom are choosing messages of their liking, messages that can be either reinforcing of, or contradictory to, the official narrative.

The aim of this study is to analyze how the media effects on intelligence manifest themselves in three different dimensions: the public, the decision-maker, and the intelligence communities. What are the possible effects? And how might possible changes in trends influence the effects of the future?

The 21st century has seen an unprecedented rise in and widening of new and alternative media. The social media, especially together with the arrival of “smart” phones, have moved boundaries and brought new challenges for intelligence. Collection is just one example.¹ Covering all of the new media separately and in detail is not ideal for a study of this depth and scope. For the purposes of this study, for further analysis and conclusions, different media are simplified and categorized in three groups: main media (focus on analysis, with a wider coverage of related issues), alternative media (providing alternative views, emphasis on coverage of scandals), and social media (including the blogosphere, and private and unedited media). To define the object for the effects, different dimensions of intelligence are discussed later.

It has to be noted that intelligence communities maintain different levels of cautious or calculated openness in different countries.² Naturally, this has its own impact on

media coverage and the media-intelligence relationship. In this perspective, the present study seeks to portray possibilities instead of tightly bound examples at either end.

PRESUMPTIONS – EARLIER STUDIES OF MEDIA AND INTELLIGENCE

In popular culture the Intelligence Community (hereafter designated as the IC, in upper case, if referring to a single community at the national level) is often portrayed as trying to hide its actions and information from snooping journalists, who in turn are seeking to reveal governmental wrongdoing. Naturally, this simplified view of the media-intelligence relationship is mostly incorrect and one not worth reinforcing. However, this relationship is not without its challenges.³

Intelligence and journalism are often seen as having many similarities, like for instance collecting information, analyzing it, and producing reports based on that analysis.

Secrecy inherent to the intelligence services and the public interest versus the risk of over-exposing issues of national security are both noteworthy points for the media to consider. The IC can also actively pursue influencing, in order to manipulate what is written about it. This is problematic for trust, considering the government's need to inform the people of possible risks and threats based on the intelligence it receives.⁴

There are multiple cases where the media have shown self-restraint and withheld from publishing stories or information considered to be harmful to the state, national security, or persons if released, not only in the United States but also in European countries.⁵

The [United States] government has no way to prevent the media from reporting information that it has obtained, even if it has been classified. But freedom to publish is not the same as "the people's right to know" ... The press's right to report also does not obligate the government officials to provide information, especially classified information.

Mark M. Lowenthal,
*Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*⁶

Intelligence and journalism are often seen as having many similarities, like for instance collecting information, analyzing it, and producing reports based on that analysis. Notable

differences are in the ways information is collected, the purposes for which it is done, and the nature of the consumer. Differences also lie in what kind of consequences there are for right or wrong analysis, or wrong interpretations and actions based on the given information.⁷

Intelligence and the media are both multidimensional and complex subjects of study already on their own, but even more so when their relationship is concerned. A structured analysis method is needed to avoid the biased popular view. In this study the structure is created utilizing findings from earlier studies. With the growth of media, from the earliest news sheets of ancient times to the mass media of the 20th century, the effects have also been scrutinized in the academic world. For example, in their study on "The Evolution of Media Effects Theory," W. Russell Neuman and Lauren Guggenheim take a look at the "last 50 years of communication effects research." Like with so many other issues, media effects theory trends come and go, and some of them return again.⁸

Worth noting for this study is Valkenburg and Peter's conclusion on future challenges for media-effects research:

Contemporary media-effects theories all argue that media effects are conditional—that is, they are contingent on many different non-media variables, including dispositional (e.g., temperament, mood, pre-existing beliefs), social-contextual, and developmental factors (Valkenburg & Peter, in press). If one accepts this important postulate of these theories, it is logically impossible to expect large media effects in the general population. In actual fact, large effects of media use would disconfirm most contemporary media-effects theories.⁹ Universal media effects do not exist, and if they do, they can only be small, because they are diluted across many heterogeneous media users.

In her research, Cristiana Matei has given media four intelligence-related tasks: informing the public, liaising government with citizens, helping boost government legitimacy, and providing a "learning" environment for elected officials and the public.¹⁰ Claudia Hillebrand, on the other hand, has seen the media having three supplementary roles: the transmission of information about governmental activities, legitimizing the institution, and watchdog.¹¹ Matei and Hillebrand view the media as having a central role in intelligence democratization and oversight.

Combining Matei's and Hillebrand's views, media's intelligence-related roles concern information, oversight, and education. These are useful in constructing a methodological approach to media effects. Different media concentrate on different roles, but overlap exists.

Defining intelligence itself has been a widely discussed topic. Len Scott and Peter Jackson have studied the discussion and practice of intelligence, and based on their views a three-way approach to intelligence is used in this article. Intelligence is seen as a subject, a tool, and a process. Studying media effects in all three dimensions gives a comprehensive view, one that is manageable considering the extent of this study. Intelligence as a subject means it is considered covering the information and knowledge gathered and provided by the services. Intelligence becomes a tool when the information or knowledge is being used for or guiding policy and decision-making. Intelligence can also be seen as a process, i.e., the actions covering all phases of the intelligence cycle: requirements, collection, analysis, and dissemination.¹²

Spinning Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, is one of the most significant, and one of the most quoted, collections of articles on the media-intelligence relationship. Its snapshots, a description I use knowing it might be seen as almost derogatory by some of different eras, do well to give understanding of “why intelligence needs the media, why the media needs intelligence.” Its findings, including ones concerning the similarities and differences of journalism and intelligence, the development of media-intelligence relationship over time, and government guidance of media’s publishing (the British DA Notice system, lately renamed the DSMA Notice System¹³), also provide valuable insights to the analysis behind the article here.¹⁴

Based on the research of Matei, Hillebrand, and Scott and Parker, this article studies how the media effect on intelligence can manifest itself from the point of view of the three different media roles: information, oversight, and education. This is done by analyzing how media’s three roles affect the three different definitions (subject, tool, process) given to intelligence. To conclude my findings, the following will be discussed: what does this mean for the public, for the decision-makers, and for the IC itself?

MEDIA’S ROLES AND INTELLIGENCE IN ITS DIFFERENT FORMS

How are the media’s different roles visible when the three definitions given to intelligence are concerned? Or is it all about information and the fact someone publishes it, according to or against the wishes of the IC and consumers?

Media’s effects are the most visible in its informative role. The media publishes and comments on intelligence reports and statements made by representatives of the IC or others who base their statements on intelligence.¹⁵ This enables public discussion based on intelligence and its evaluation.

The reception shows how valid the information is considered to be and how it will be used in the future. The current era of populism and populist policies amplifies the paying of attention to the public voice.

From an administrative point of view, media’s role as an oversight element is the most important. Its reports on what kind of information is gathered, and how it is collected and used, are the basis of legitimate intelligence.

Media reports on intelligence reforms are also common.¹⁶ Issues such as telecommunications surveillance are reported and discussed in different media on a regular basis. Public opinion concerning, for example, new methods of intelligence collection are formulated and enhanced largely based on information available in the media.

From an administrative point of view, media’s role as an oversight element is the most important. Its reports on what kind of information is gathered, and how it is collected and used, are the basis of legitimate intelligence. While the detailed national processes of intelligence might be, and stay, secret, intelligence as information and a tool for decision-makers should be open for public discussion. The cases of 9/11 intelligence failures, the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction issue, and the Edward Snowden files have brought up valuable policy concerns and influence issues regarding these aspects of intelligence.¹⁷

A less-discussed and at least somewhat undervalued side of intelligence-related media coverage concerns its educational value. The public, the decision-makers, and those with oversight responsibilities need to be educated on how and why intelligence works.¹⁸ The media can and should play a major role in achieving that function, whether it is through their own research or in cooperation with the IC of the nation in question. Members of the IC and military leaders attend courses where they learn about the intricacies of the production and use of intelligence, but these are largely unknown to the wider public audience. There are a lot of studies and other publications, but they might remain hidden in the vaults of colleges and universities. In the hectic contemporary daily news cycle it is certainly too much to ask for in-depth pieces on how intelligence works, but the aspect should not be lost when reporting on reforms, failures, or other significant intelligence issues. Understanding is essential for evaluation, but unfortunately it is not always present in common opinion formulation.

Information is the area where mainstream and alternative media differ the least. Relaying intelligence reports, assessments, and warnings, perhaps with a few value-laden forewords, works much the same way in mainstream news media as to individuals in the social media.

The issues of oversight, on the other hand, are treated differently. This is partly due to resources and sources available to different types of media. Mainstream media, and alternative media with exceptions, might have better contacts to actually access information useful in fulfilling their oversight role. Media channels of private individuals, in most cases, lack the sources to do this, and their audience is not wide enough for substantial effect. With access to or backing of a stronger media, one might be able to raise issues and bring them under the scrutiny of official oversight elements. This includes, for example, whistleblowers using social media as their main channel to get the word out.¹⁹

As stated before, the educational contents are likely to be overshadowed by the two other themes. The mainstream media might have space to include, for example, information boxes on how intelligence gets its requirements or who oversees this or that intelligence organization, but in alternative and social media the educational dimension easily attracts a generally inquisitive nature driven by intelligence or oversight failures. In social media, as in news in general, whoever gets in the first word has an advantage over those trying to “correct” or “counter” them. This might lead to educational, and hence informative, messages getting lost in the battle, and thus giving a slightly false impression of social media bringing up only scandals, failures, and intelligence actions in a negative fashion.

The informative reporting deals mostly with intelligence as a subject, i.e., knowledge or information. Reports, analyses, and early warnings get more publicity than intelligence as a process, such as the steps of the intelligence cycle or how intelligence can or should be used.

Oversight reporting concentrates especially on the collection of information, with an emphasis on privacy laws. The use of intelligence as a tool has garnered more oversight interest in the last ten years mainly due to the case of Iraq in 2003. These two are the principal themes of oversight reporting, in both mainstream and alternative media.

From an educational point of view, “why” and “how” are the significant questions that media should ask when intelligence is seen as a tool. Understanding the use of intelligence is essential to understanding even the smallest details of the process. This should be the main focus of educational intelligence reporting.

EFFECTS FOR THE DECISION-MAKERS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES

All these points have at least slightly different meanings for the public, the decision-makers, and the Intelligence Community. The same thing or factor might have different effects on another actor.

Starting with the decision-makers, they are probably the group for which the effects are the most easily visible. Their ideas concerning intelligence and stands on intelligence-related matters get published and documented in largely unclassified files, including by the various media. With pressure from all directions, the public, the leadership of intelligence communities, and the media, they need to act or at least show an interest toward the issues presented to them.²⁰ Naturally, due to their often legally binding oversight roles, it is also their duty to do so.

As a source of requirements for intelligence, the decision-makers are in a special position concerning intelligence reports and assessments published or commented on by the different media. Did they ask the right questions to support their decision-making? Are they giving correct directions for general areas of information collection?²¹ As stated by many researchers and former practitioners,²² the intelligence cycle does not give an accurate image of the “real” intelligence process, but it is nevertheless on the agenda of national security strategies to direct and give guidelines and requirements to the Intelligence Community.

The systems have their flaws, and especially if the decision-makers have to rely on media to educate themselves on how the national and international intelligence processes work. With the ever-rising quantity of tasks and information decision-makers face every day, it is anyway understandable that something operating mostly out-of-sight is left attracting less attention, until scandals or failures force a statement or actions.²³

From the public’s point of view, reporting on intelligence matters and their effects is a slightly more complicated issue with which to deal. Unlike sports figures, for instance, security officials in the Intelligence Community are unlikely to have their successes praised publicly. Good deeds and successful assessments and operations are expected and considered the norm. Correct assessments, unless predicting a catastrophe, are likely to go unnoticed, and therefore the publicity they might receive is of little effect.²⁴ Published oversight issues, such as failures or reforms, might raise public awareness toward intelligence, and in either case have positive legitimizing effects.²⁵ This comes close to the educational effects intelligence-related reporting might have on the public. Better understanding is essential, but harder to achieve in the fragmented field of today’s media.

There are two schools of thought when it comes to the analyst-consumer relationship that one has to consider. One emphasizes the need of interaction between the two, whereas the other seeks to keep them apart.

How can the publicity, then, affect the Intelligence Community? There are two schools of thought when it comes to the analyst-consumer relationship that one has to consider. One emphasizes the need of interaction between the two, whereas the other seeks to keep them apart.²⁶ Based on this, it is likely that some in the IC try to their best ability to remain untouched by the outside world when it concerns reporting on the Community itself. This naturally means that any reporting, be it informative, oversight, or educational, will have little if any effect on the Community. Then again, some might even be forced to react to publicity, especially the leadership of the IC who in many cases have chosen to be the public face of their respective enterprise, acting as sort of an intermediary between the public and the IC. Notably, the IC's analysis should not be, and mostly is not, affected by any pressure from the public. The need for publicly discussed themes to be subjected to study and analysis reaches the analyst indirectly, and in some cases directly, by various means, for example decision-makers, intelligence chiefs, and government press releases.

Whistleblowers notwithstanding, the effects of publicity on the IC remain largely controlled and based on decisions made by the senior authorities and heads of intelligence agencies. It has to be noted that the political decision-makers do have the authority, not least due to their oversight role, to bring changes that might be based on the effects of publicity on themselves.

WHAT NEXT? – INDICATIONS OF A CHANGE AHEAD

According to a popular saying, the only thing that is certain is change. It is also safe to assume that the relationship between the media and intelligence is constantly undergoing change, a change that will reach all the levels and dimensions discussed in this article. To arrange thoughts and analyze the possibilities of this change they can, in their simplest form, be assessed in relation to two variables: the nature of publicity and reaction to publicity (see figure below).

In the future, the media might be supportive of intelligence with a dose of constructive criticism. However, they might also choose to concentrate more on scandalous events and failures. As a reaction, or partly

by itself influencing the media's direction, the Intelligence Community might open up more than it has before, and engage in the public discussion. Or it could also withdraw within its shell and take more and more cover under the cloak of secrecy.




Figure: The variables and the four scenarios.

With transparency being a key principle in contemporary governance, it is hard to see the IC going into a total lockdown. A closed Community bolstered by minimal government communication with a questioning media would create a dangerous state of confrontation. In the age of information, this could hardly be beneficial for either party. Even though the media would hold a generally supportive approach toward intelligence, this would mean diluted interaction at best, and frustration would likely occur sooner rather than later.²⁷

Media providing constructive feedback to, and criticism of, an open-minded and at least calculatingly open IC would create a sort of best-case scenario of mutual benefits. Some steps have been taken in some parts of the world in this direction, but it is likely to remain an unattainable utopia, at least for now. One reason is the versatility of means and measures of contemporary media in its different forms.

All things considered, moderate progress²⁸ is the most likely direction for the media-intelligence relationship. In accordance with current trends, the media will keep up their slightly questioning general nature and little by little the IC will dare to take a greater role in the public discussion. Some part of the intelligence processes and information will always remain secret and hidden from the public eye and media reporting, but that does not prevent extensive coverage of intelligence-related issues, as we have already seen during the last ten years.

I would not say that the relationship is at a turning point in any way. It has enjoyed a steady evolution with multiple parallels in different parts of the world. There are some factors that can signal which way the relationship will evolve in the near future. One of them is the appearance of intelligence representatives in the media. Will the interaction with media remain a duty or privilege of the leadership and heads of the communities, including decision-makers with oversight responsibilities, or will the IC be more widely represented? Another indicator is the more frequently covered issues and topics, and their general approach toward intelligence. Will failures and scandals be the most widely reported issues or is there another general tone to the reporting? Will the social media circulate the same themes or will there be a separate dimension of public discussion compared to the mainstream media outlets? The media-intelligence relationship has also been present in academic panels at conventions concerning international relations. These seem to provide, even though not always explicitly, a nexus for academic researchers and IC practitioners. Research follows the trends, albeit a step behind, and it also acts as an indicator of possible change in the relationship.

CONCLUSIONS – A TERRIBLE UNCERTAINTY?

It has been the intention of this whole discussion to make very clear that the mass media do have important consequences for individuals, for institutions, and for society and culture. That we cannot trace very precise causal connection or make reliable predictions about the future does not nullify this conclusion.

- Denis McQuail,
“The Influence and Effects of Mass Media”²⁹

Media and intelligence, the public and the secret, have a most complicated relationship. In many cases, the restrictions reflect the guidelines and focus, but they also limit the natural evolution of contemporary governmental information sharing. Intelligence has its own particular character as a national security apparatus, some of which needs to have its secrecy upheld. Regardless, the relationship evolves, not forgetting that occasional deterioration³⁰ is only natural.

With this in mind, what can be taught of intelligence and its processes beforehand to large audiences helps to achieve realistic knowledge and understanding of intelligence’s capabilities and its proper use. This will also help to put intelligence-related reporting into perspective. All decision-makers, members of legislatures and civil servants included, dealing with local, national,

and international security issues would be a good start. They form the level at which the effects of media reporting on intelligence-related issues manifest most likely and they are the easiest to detect and observe. Scandal-seeking media will concentrate on seeing intelligence as a tool, as a form of power, easily abused for personal or non-public purposes. Notably, as discussed in securitization theory, “media is an important actor that contributes significantly to the definition of situations.”³¹ Common and deeper knowledge and understanding of intelligence are likely to keep the focus of reporting on issues that matter while at the same time preventing wrongdoing by the consumers and producers of intelligence.

Unpredictability and surprises remain the only certainty.

The media remain a pivotal element for the decision-makers and the Intelligence Community when they ponder what the public needs to know and think. Recent terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States are good examples. What is already out in the media puts pressure on the IC. The consumers have already formed an initial view on the matter based on the first piece of news they read, and the burden of proving something false is on the second-to-arrive-on-the-scene. Trust between the media and intelligence is essential for correct information with relevant emphasis to be shared with the public. Neither party can afford to undermine or underrate the relationship. Dealing with media and predicting its effects, one should remember that communications theorist and professor Denis McQuail has envisioned a diversity of effects, dividing them into planned and unplanned effects that might, or might not, occur over short and long periods of time.³² Unpredictability and surprises remain the only certainty.

Understanding media matters for intelligence for the reason of their two-way relationship, which could very well take steps toward being more interactive in the future. Acknowledging and understanding the possibilities and challenges of the relationship render both parties better equipped to avoid pitfalls and make use of each other in the best way possible.

NOTES

¹ Gregory F. Treverton & Renanah Miles, “Social Media and Intelligence,” Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at Swedish National Defence College, 2014, p. 20.

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Without a Warning: The Story of the Shoot Down of a U-2 Spy Plane During the Cuban Missile Crisis

by Col (USMC, Ret) H. Wayne Whitten

At 9:09 a.m. on Saturday, October 27, 1962, U.S. Air Force Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr., took off from McCoy AFB, FL, in a Strategic Air Command (SAC) U-2 on his sixth mission over Castro's Cuba since the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis. His targets selected by the national intelligence agencies were Soviet SA-2 SAM sites in eastern Cuba. SAMs posed the greatest threat to the high-flying U-2, but two weeks into the crisis there had been no attempts to engage the unarmed reconnaissance aircraft. Anderson's pre-flight intelligence brief indicated no change in the Cuban air defense posture.

Tragically, the intelligence briefings Maj Anderson had received were dead wrong and he was shot down without a warning by a Soviet SAM shortly before he was to exit Cuban airspace. He became the lone combat casualty of the crisis that took the U.S. to the brink of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This happened on what is now known as "Black Saturday," the day the Cold War nearly turned red hot.

Ironically, at 10:00 a.m. as Major Anderson was entering Cuban airspace, President John F. Kennedy and his ExComm (Executive Committee) senior advisors were listening to an intelligence update by the CIA Director. He reported the Soviet mid-range ballistic missile sites fully operational but made no mention of a change in the Cuban air defense posture. The ExComm meeting focused on how to respond to Soviet Union Chairman Nikita Khrushchev's latest proposal for a peaceful resolution to the crisis coming after his missile-laden ships headed to Cuba were ordered to turn around and return to port. News around 2:00 p.m. that Maj Anderson's U-2 was overdue and presumed down sent a shock wave throughout the Washington leadership. It would be well into the 4:00 p.m. ExComm meeting before confirmation would come that he had been shot down by a Soviet-manned SAM site. The grim news came from a local Cuban radio station, as there was no monitoring of Soviet air defense tracks by NSA listening posts and the U-2 was beyond the range of friendly radars. Even later, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported that telltale radar intercepts of the missile engagement were made by a Strategic Air Command (SAC) SIGINT aircraft.

An angry JFK clearly saw the shoot down as an escalation in the conflict but was puzzled as to why this had occurred at a point when all indications were that Khrushchev was seeking a diplomatic solution. Kennedy understood that a military response was required. Nevertheless, during the lengthy debate that followed, even his hawkish advisors recognized that an air strike against one or more of the SAM sites could easily escalate into a full-scale engagement, with the attendant risk of a nuclear missile being launched. It was eventually agreed that retaliation would best come with the massive air strikes now planned for the following Tuesday.

The historic record now shows that JFK saw the U-2 shoot down as a point of no return unless a quick agreement could be reached with Khrushchev. Even as the ExComm debate continued, Kennedy sent his brother Robert, the Attorney General, to meet with the Soviet ambassador and deliver an ultimatum to Khrushchev.

Khrushchev had gambled that he could secretly emplace strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba and present JFK with a *fait accompli*. Once a SAC U-2 had discovered the missile sites under construction, Khrushchev knew he would likely have to remove them, but pushed to get them operational as bargaining chips. For a week he bought time while walking a tightrope over a nuclear abyss. He then floated a face-saving solution to remove the missiles in exchange for a non-invasion pledge, later upping the ante by insisting U.S. Jupiter missiles be removed from neighboring Turkey. Unknown to JFK, Khrushchev had not authorized the shoot down of the U-2 and had to be relieved to hear that JFK had essentially agreed to his last proposal, albeit with an understanding that removal of the Jupiter missiles would not be disclosed. Knowing he had dodged a proverbial bullet, Khrushchev quickly agreed to JFK's ultimatum, knowing it was better to be "Red and not Dead." In the end, both superpower leaders realized military events were spiraling out of their control and the fate of the world was at stake.

In the days that followed, Maj Anderson's body was returned for burial in his home town of Greenville, SC, where a fitting memorial in a city park was created in his honor. Later he was posthumously awarded the first-ever

Air Force Cross. Like many of our heroes, he seemed destined to be a footnote in history even though so many questions about his shoot down remain unanswered. He and his family deserve better and the whole story of his shoot down needs to be told. *Some may ask after 54 years, “What difference does it make?” ... I say the truth always makes a difference!*

It took over forty years before we finally learned from the Russians who authorized the shoot down of Maj Anderson’s U-2 and why... answers that revealed the best kept secret of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The “who” was a lower-ranking general in charge of Soviet air defenses who gave the order after failing to reach the Soviet commander in Cuba. The “why” is frightening even after all these years. By direction, the general had brought the entire air defense radar network into full combat mode the night before and he was able to follow the track of the U-2 in real time. He watched as it entered Cuban airspace and flew across the island to the Guantanamo Naval Base environs before turning back toward the northeast coast. He knew Anderson had overflown a Soviet FKR-1 cruise missile battery that had moved overnight to an open firing position 15 miles from the huge U.S. naval base. The general correctly believed that the Americans were unaware of the deployment of cruise missiles to Cuba and realized that Anderson’s film would uncover this crucial defensive capability. The FRK-1 was capable of delivering a Hiroshima bomb-sized nuclear warhead over 100 miles that could decimate the naval base and destroy an unsuspecting invasion force.

Raul Castro, Fidel’s Minister of Defense, had personally involved himself with planning for the secret support base for the cruise missile unit in the mountains and in selecting the firing position. There is little doubt that he and his brother Fidel would have pushed the Soviets to launch them in the event of an invasion or even an air attack, which they had convinced the Soviet commander was going to happen within 24 hours! In fact, the night before, Fidel Castro had sent Khrushchev an impassioned plea to defend Cuba at all costs and even consider a preemptive nuclear attack. The Castro brothers, today still “Red but not Dead,” made no secret they were willing to be martyrs if not heroes even if it meant subjecting their people to a nuclear holocaust! [Editor’s Note: Since this manuscript was first submitted, Fidel has mercifully passed away. Raul is still alive and kicking as President, claiming he will turn over power in 2018.]

[Author’s Note: The Cubans argued to keep the cruise missiles after the ballistic missiles were removed, as they had not been discovered, but Khrushchev realized that would be foolhardy and, not trusting Castro, took them out too!]

The order to shoot down the U-2 was given to a Soviet SA-2 SAM unit near Banes on the northeast coast, as Anderson’s flight path would bring him well inside its missile kill envelope. The engagement went down in accordance with Soviet doctrine after the U-2 was first acquired by the Banes Spoon Rest long-range target acquisition radar. That radar along with others in the extensive SAM network had come online around midnight. As the U-2 neared the missile engagement envelope, it was handed off to a Fruit Set target tracking and missile control radar team which launched two missiles that would explode in close proximity to the aircraft, bringing it down with a flood of shrapnel. Khrushchev would learn about the shoot down from a Pentagon report around 6:00 p.m. and was furious as he knew that JFK would have no choice but to oblige his military leaders with some form of retaliation. Khrushchev erroneously believed Castro must have had a say in the decision to shoot down the U-2.

Even a cursory read of the Soviet side of the story raises questions about the effectiveness of U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) under the cognizance of NSA during this critical juncture of the crisis. NSA’s official post-mortem on the role the Agency played clearly recognized the failure of SIGINT to provide timely warning of the deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba. It properly credits SIGINT with a key role in tracking the Soviet military and cargo ships in support of the U.S. naval quarantine. Monitoring the buildup and operation of Soviet air defense networks by the Agency and its military sub-entities from fixed and mobile listening posts was equally stellar. The deployment of the USS Oxford, an NSA-controlled ship, off the coast of Cuba well before the crisis period proved to be one of the most valued collectors of both COMINT and ELINT.

That said, the national command authority was ill-served by NSA Headquarters (DIRNSA) as it failed to provide timely analysis, assessment, and dissemination of crucial signal intercept data relating to the Soviet air defense posture before and during the shoot down of Maj Anderson’s U-2. It had tragic—and could have had grave national—consequences.

Over the past 15 years there has been a host of previously classified documents released to the public by government agencies including NSA. They have supported exhaustive scholarly research, making the crisis one of the most written-about events in history. Unfortunately, despite the historical importance of the U-2 shoot down, there has been a paucity of first-level information released by NSA that bears on the matter, including an after-action report.

What has been verified from interviews with participants is that the USS Oxford intercepted both radar and communications nodes of the Soviet air defense network coming online and remaining operational shortly after midnight on the night of October 26-27. This correlates with the Russian accounts of a major change in the operational posture of the Soviet air defenses in Cuba, which were emplaced to protect the strategic nuclear missile sites. Widely reported is a previously secret message released by NSA that was transmitted with operational immediate precedence under a date time group of 270643Z (2:43 a.m. EST). The subject of the message was "Spoon Rest Radar Activity," and it reported intercepts of these target acquisition radars associated with three different SAM sites in western Cuba at 12:38 a.m. EST. Significantly, the radars had remained on the air for over two hours at the time the message was transmitted. The message text was not redacted, but neither the originator or the addressees were listed as it was posted to a distribution list. That all-important information is the subject of a FOIA request for which the author was advised it may take two years to receive an answer even though the basic message was released years ago!

The significance of the radar intercepts was well known by Washington principals as well as NSA analysts, because the first report of a Spoon Rest radar being tested at one of the new Cuban SAM sites was included in JFK's intelligence checklist on September 19.

Without knowledge of the addressees, it cannot be ascertained if the message was originated by the USS Oxford or by DIRNSA based on intercept reports from the ship. Typically, raw intercept data were transmitted over dedicated circuits from the listening posts. Regardless, the command center established by DIRNSA for the crisis would have had this actionable intelligence for hours before Maj Anderson took off on his fateful mission. An oral history by a former NSA command center watchstander (off duty that night) confirms that the watch team routinely communicated by secure phone with counterparts at DIA and CIA and likely would have done so in the aftermath of the shoot down with the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center. The author can find no record of any relevant interagency exchanges during the night in question, and neither CIA nor DIA situation reports from later that morning mentioned the intercepts or changes in the air defense posture.

NSA's daily intelligence summary or pertinent spot reports have not been released, but it seems unlikely the message in question and related traffic would have been discounted by watch-standers. In fact, the significance of the radar intercepts was well known by Washington principals as well as NSA analysts, because the first report of a Spoon Rest radar being tested at one of the new Cuban SAM sites was included in JFK's intelligence checklist on September 19. Given the vulnerability of the U-2 to an SA-2 SAM, this report had to weigh on the minds of the President and his advisors considering whether to order more overflights of Cuba. Just a week before the U-2 incident, the USS Oxford was ordered into port so that an admiral could personally review the tapes of another Spoon Rest intercept before it was sent off to NSA for further analysis. Moreover, the simultaneous intercepts of Russian-speaking controllers on the air defense networks with new call signs likely resulted in heavy traffic between NSA and its network of listening posts on the morning of Black Saturday.

Clearly the body of evidence available shows that NSA had actionable intelligence which could and should have been verified and relayed to decision-makers from the President on down in time to have Maj Anderson's mission canceled, especially given his primary targets were SAM sites! In the end, Anderson had a second chance to survive that day, but it too was denied him and his own SAC should shoulder that blame!

The vulnerability of the U-2 aircraft to Soviet SA-2 SAMs was brought home two years before when CIA's Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union. That ended overflights of the Soviet Union and forced the CIA to employ Taiwanese pilots as surrogates to conduct reconnaissance over China once it too had the SA-2s. The CIA then initiated a crash development program for a cockpit warning device to give U-2 pilots a heads-up that they were being tracked by a SAM radar in time for them to take evasive action. The urgency for this capability was made clear on September 9 when a Taiwanese U-2 was shot down by a Chinese SA-2 just as the risks of conducting overflights of Cuba were being debated in Washington. Sadly, the missile warning receiver, called System 12 by the CIA, had completed development and was awaiting availability of an aircraft for a final test flight just days before Anderson's mission. However, there was yet another readily available means to provide Maj Anderson that life-saving warning.

In response to the urgent need to pin down the Electronic Order of Battle in Cuba, daily ELINT collection missions were flown by SAC RB-47H and tactical reconnaissance aircraft around the periphery of Cuba. These aerial platforms had the advantage of better line-of-sight

coverage and direction-finding capabilities than the USS Oxford. Monitoring the operational status of radars at the newly constructed SA-2 SAM sites was priority one. SAC's RB-47H missions were under Operation COMMON CAUSE but, after going days without intercepting any air defense radars, the aircrews had dubbed them "Lost Cause." That changed dramatically on Black Saturday morning as the network of Soviet SAM radars came alive.

Like Maj Anderson, the crew of the first SAC RB-47H headed to the Florida Straits from Forbes AFB in Kansas that morning had no heads-up about the change in the air defense radar posture overnight. Their RB-47H arrived on station about an hour before Anderson's U-2 entered Cuban airspace and immediately the three Electronic Warfare Officers found their displays cluttered with radar returns. A couple of hours later things turned ominous as the Spoon Rest target acquisition radar emanating from the suspected SAM site at Banes was joined by a Fruit Set target tracking radar. Hearing the unmistakable rattlesnake-like buzz of the Fruit Set radar in his headset, one of the EWOs called out "Big Cigar" over the intercom, and that code word was immediately relayed to the SAC reconnaissance center via HF single side band radio.

The transfer of control of U-2 operations over Cuba from the CIA to SAC by JFK, to give the pilots the same international protections afforded the military, indirectly resulted in the loss of warnings from NSA's listening posts.

Tragically, Maj Anderson did not receive that warning; in fact, the RB-47H crew had no idea his U-2 was the target being tracked by the Fruit Set radar. Here the term "Common Cause" should have had real meaning, especially between two of SAC's own aircraft operating under the control of the same reconnaissance center. Instead, Maj Anderson was left with no vestige of a safety net that could have been easily extended to him over the airwaves. Both aircraft had compatible radios with an emergency guard channel that would not have required Anderson to even be on the same frequency to hear a code word warning transmitted in the blind by the RB-47H. The author can personally attest to that very procedure routinely being employed successfully just over two years later in Vietnam to warn countless numbers of tactical reconnaissance and attack aircrews being threatened by the same Soviet SA-2 SAMs.

Finally, the transfer of control of U-2 operations over Cuba from the CIA to SAC by JFK, to give the pilots the same international protections afforded the military, indirectly

resulted in the loss of warnings from NSA's listening posts. In the wake of the U-2 shoot down, DIRNSA claimed SAC did not keep it informed about U-2 schedules as did the CIA and consequently the agency could not provide warnings of reactions by the Soviet air defenses. Until the U-2 was shot down this issue was not raised to the attention of the JCS or SECDEF. The lack of this second means to provide a timely threat warning to Maj Anderson lies at the feet of NSA and SAC.

In summary, it appears Maj Anderson was allowed to fly into a man-made "perfect storm" as the opening event of Black Saturday and no one had his back. Many will dismiss the detailing of the failure of intelligence in his case to the fog of war and point to the lessons learned as the main takeaway. They can take comfort from knowing that the U-2 missions were suspended for a few days while warning procedures were put in place and prioritized tasking of intelligence and operational support assets were implemented. Consequently, one reported mission was aborted due to a precautionary warning but luckily there were no more attempts to shoot down a U-2 as they covered the crating and return of the missiles.

There were many, including some of Maj Anderson's fellow Cuban Missile Crisis veteran pilots, who opposed his posthumous award of the Air Force Cross when all the others received the Distinguished Flying Cross. Those who knew him well say he would have agreed. In retrospect, that is the least he is owed by his service and his country. Rest in peace, Major!

During the Cuban Missile Crisis Col W. Wayne Whitten observed military convoys heading to south Florida ports while a senior at the University of Florida awaiting graduation and commissioning in the U.S. Marine Corps. Three years later he was a Naval Flight Officer in Vietnam flying electronic warfare missions against Soviet-supplied SA-2 SAMs threatening Air Force and Navy air operations against North Vietnam. In 1970, after a tour in the PACOM Joint Reconnaissance Center, he was undergoing transition training in the EA-6A Electric Intruder when his aircraft was jumped by Cuban Air Force MiG-21s in international airspace off Havana. His pilot was able to take evasive maneuvers based on a timely threat warning that Maj Anderson was not afforded. Colonel Whitten retired in 1988 after a career in electronic warfare operations and systems acquisition. He has published two military history books, the last in 2012 titled Countdown to 13 Days and Beyond – U.S. Marine Aerial Reconnaissance Against Castro's Cuba 1960-1990. For questions or comments, the author may be contacted at hwwhitten@aol.com.



Pope Pius XII: Superb Intelligence Leader

by Dr. Kenneth C. Campbell

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this article is to diminish the antagonism of the Jewish population toward Pope Pius XII, resulting from the fact that he merely denounced the Holocaust at the beginning of World War II and remained relatively silent thereafter. Instead, he organized a massive intelligence system, a measure not widely perceived. This theme will be developed in the following sections, whereas various spies will be briefly described in paragraphs.¹

BACKGROUND OF POPE PIUS XII

Eugenio Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII, was born in Rome, Italy, in 1876 and ordained a priest in 1899. A retiring, even withdrawn, young man, he preferred being a parish priest, but in 1901 Pope Leo XIII placed him in the diplomatic corps, surprising in view of his personality and desire to remain in the parish. When French socialists became convinced that the Roman Catholic Church was part of the plot to accuse Alfred Dreyfus falsely of treason, they closed 14,000 Catholic schools and reassigned the clergy. Assigned to do a postmortem of the case, Pacelli found that French priests reported to the Vatican with accuracy on religious problems, but had failed to cultivate political sources of information.² He changed papal codes and instituted a training program for priests in the diplomatic corps, thus beginning his own career in intelligence. Pope Pius XI must have been impressed with his work, because he made Eugenio a bishop and sent him to Germany to engage in papal work. While there, Bishop Pacelli rode horses with Wilhelm Canaris, Hans Oster, and Ludwig Beck, all of whom will be described in more detail below.

When Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, Pacelli was concerned. Nevertheless, as a Cardinal he negotiated a *Concordat* with the German government on 20 July 1933, which guaranteed the rights of Catholics in that nation. Peace in Germany between church and state did not last for long, as the Nazi government began to remove crucifixes from Catholic schools and to merge Catholic and Protestant schools. When a papal document critical of the German government was widely read from pulpits, Nazi hooligans invaded the Cardinal's palace in Vienna, damaging the chapel and breaking the legs of the curate.

The question arose: Could the Church remove Hitler? Thomas Aquinas, the great Catholic theologian, stressed that an evil ruler could be removed. Jesuit theologians, being more specific, justified the assassination of such a person. In contrast, Martin Luther taught that disobedience to a ruler is a sin worse than murder. After Nazi atrocities in Poland and the arrest of hundreds of priests, Pacelli, by then Pope Pius XII, was determined to work with dissident German generals to remove Hitler, a wicked ruler.

COUP PLOTTERS BEGIN THEIR WORK

Officers of German military intelligence, the *Abwehr*, sent Josef Mueller, a Munich attorney who possessed an airplane, to the Vatican countless times with reports of Nazi attacks on the Church. He proved to be a very careful analyst who had his own network of agents. At *Abwehr* headquarters, Major General Hans Oster asked Mueller to approach the Pope with a very definite proposal. Would His Holiness contact Western powers to link them with an anti-Nazi group in Germany to ensure that Germany could obtain a fair peace? Oster led the *Abwehr* activities against the Nazis, whereas the chief of the *Abwehr*, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, maintained the appearance of compliance with Hitler's government. Pius decided he would not only be partner to the dissident German generals, but he would also get rid of Nazism by removing Hitler, a decision supported by the teachings of Thomas Aquinas and Jesuit theologians. Pius also had developed an army of spies—German Jesuits. He did not trust the Italian churchmen with intelligence matters.

Major Helmuth Groscurth, who kept *Abwehr* records, linked *Abwehr* connections with anti-Nazi generals, the Mueller missions to the Vatican, and the plans to eliminate Hitler. Mueller found that Lutheran members of the military leadership refused to participate in a plot to assassinate Hitler, citing St. Paul (*Romans* 13) and Martin Luther, who insisted on obedience to a ruler. This was in contrast to the Catholic position discussed above.

Pope Pius wanted control of the channel with London so as to make sure he could deflect from the Vatican responsibility for a coup. The British and German generals, largely Protestant, trusted the Pope, but felt a certain diffidence in relating to a project in which he played a major role. On

PROFILES IN INTELLIGENCE

8 November 1939 George Elser detonated a bomb in Munich, which narrowly missed killing Adolf Hitler. One day later the British sent two intelligence officers, Payne Best and Richard Stevens, to Venlo, a Dutch town, to meet a German officer who promised to kill Hitler. When they arrived, they were promptly arrested by the Germans. At that point, the British became dubious about plots to get rid of Hitler. The “Venlo Incident,” along with the hesitation of German Protestant generals, placed a temporary halt to the efforts to remove Hitler.

RESURGENCE

On 11 January 1939 Pope Pius told the British ambassador, D’Arcy Osborne, that German Army chiefs, whose names he kept secret, had connected with him for the removal of Hitler. The British response was positive, as Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, approved contact with the German resistance.

Pius and German military intelligence established a mode of communication with the British. Major General Hans Oster of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence agency, submitted a “yes or no” questionnaire to Josef Mueller. Mueller gave it to Pius, who discussed these problems with Osborne. The latter sent them to London for consideration. The final British conditions for talks with the German plotters were: (1) removal of Hitler; (2) rule of law in Germany; (3) no war in the West; (4) Austria remaining German; (5) other territories self-determining their future by plebiscite; (7) an armistice through the Pope.³ Although Chief of Staff General Franz Halder hesitantly accepted these conditions, the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Walther von Brauchitsch, refused to accept the document for ten days, during which prospects for action changed. Finally, Halder “lost his nerve” and Mueller could report to the Pope through the main papal aide, Father Robert Leiber, that the generals also had lost their nerve.

In the summer of 1940 Josef Mueller met with retired Colonel General Ludwig Beck and agreed that post-war Europe should have an economic union. Beck, a firm opponent of Hitler, insisted that the plans for a coup should be written down to give evidence to posterity that there was a decent Germany during this period. This would later prove disastrous when the SS found these materials in Abwehr headquarters (see below). Mueller and Beck also agreed that the plotters should temper their Catholic orientation by bringing in Protestants to the group.

A significant recruit was Protestant leader Dietrich Bonhoeffer,⁴ who visited both Switzerland and Norway, ostensibly to attend church conferences but for purposes of espionage against the Nazis. Later, when he was interrogated by the SS, he was broken for unspecified information when the SS threatened to harm his young and

attractive fiancée. However, in the autumn of 1940, Bonhoeffer was brought into the coup and protected from the Gestapo by being hidden in a Benedictine monastery in the Alps where two monks became his friends. He was part of the group which agreed that the Protestant-Catholic split had gone too far, certainly a step in the right direction.

Count Helmuth James von Moltke, a descendant of the great 19th century field marshal and heir to his mansion, was another spy for the coup plotters and hosted frequent meetings with Jesuit and lay conspirators at his vast estate in Silesia. Moltke, an attorney and a Protestant, worked in Berlin for military intelligence when he was not at his home in Silesia. His letters to his wife give the impression of a man obsessed with social contacts, but this is not true. He was in actuality recruiting for his, and later the main, resistance. Moltke was bitterly disappointed with the Protestant Church in Germany, roughly half of which was cooperating with the Nazis. Oddly enough, he was convinced that Christianity in Germany could be saved only by the German bishops and the Pope.⁵ Moltke’s visitors concentrated on prospective problems of the post-war world. The Vatican approved of the decisions of his group, the Kreisau Circle. Father Augustinus Roesch, a Jesuit, entered the coup planning as a partner of Helmuth Moltke.

The Jesuits see themselves as “soldiers of the Pope,” thus providing a secure organization for the Pope which moved the center of the resistance to Germany. On 26 May 1941 the leadership of the German Jesuits, along with the Dominicans, pledged “to endure and preserve our Catholic honor, before our consciences, before the people, before history, the Church and the Lord God.”⁶ They formed a 7-man group which they called the “Church intelligence service.” Father Roesch was considered the “driving force” of this group, determining its strategy. He even visited the *Wehrmacht* Chief of Staff, General Franz Halder. Members of the group obtained intelligence from secretaries, telephone operators, government clerks, and military officers.⁷

Pius gave “written guidance” to the committee, insisting that the Church should cooperate with the military.⁸ The latter included not only Admiral Canaris’ military intelligence organization, but also Colonel General Ludwig Beck and his followers. Pius urged unity of effort against the Nazis. His letter came just as Beck and General Henning von Tresckow⁹ called for unity of effort.

Other key members of the committee included Jesuit novice Alfred Delp and Father Lothar Koenig, secretary to Roesch. Koenig traveled at night by train, not telling anyone from where he came or to where he was going. One of his key functions was to link various resistance groups to each other. Delp drafted the group’s manifesto in which Father Roesch advocated a new government, one based on social democratic concepts rather than military-feudal viewpoints.¹⁰

PROFILES IN INTELLIGENCE

An Abwehr agent, Wilhelm Schmidhuber, supported the “ratline,” the designation for the escape route consisting of monasteries stretching from Slovakia to Italy created to get Jews out of Europe. When Schmidhuber was caught by authorities in November 1942, he freely confessed to what the Abwehr was engaged in, casting suspicion on Oster and his connection to Rome. In January 1942 the sadistic SS spy chief, Reinhard Heydrich, had met with a group of German officers in Wannsee, near Berlin, and called for the extermination of European Jews. In his 1942 Christmas message, Pope Pius, alerted by his agents, denounced this plan.

THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Colonel Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg, who due to nobility also held the title of Count, had been wounded by U.S. planes in Tunisia, resulting in the loss of one eye, his right hand, and two fingers on his left hand. He was acquainted with the successful Allied landings in France in June 1944, as well as the disintegration of the German front in the Soviet Union, which could only persuade him of Hitler’s incompetence. Stauffenberg was connected to Moltke’s Kreisau circle, another factor in his decision to kill Hitler. He was a devoted Catholic, who understood the Church’s position that unjust rulers could be assassinated. Colonel General Beck was in charge of Colonel Stauffenberg’s attack on Hitler.¹¹ On 20 July 1944 Stauffenberg’s attempt to blow up Hitler failed when someone moved the explosive device at the last minute in order to give Hitler more room to speak.

When Josef Mueller was arrested after the botched assassination attempt, Abwehr agent Paul Franken took over his connections¹² to the Vatican and briefed the clerics on the plans to remove Hitler. On 22 September the SS drilled into an Abwehr safe and found evidence of the Vatican’s part in the attempt on Hitler’s life. For example, on Vatican stationery were listed British conditions for an armistice—foremost of which was the removal of Hitler.¹³ During the investigation, the Nazis found a note in which Father Robert Leiber, a close confidant of the Pope, had noted that Pius “guaranteed a just peace in return for the elimination of Hitler.”¹⁴

NAZI TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

After the attempt on Hitler’s life, Father Delp was arrested. He was accused, quite accurately, of being part of the attempted coup. During Delp’s trial, the infamous judge Roland Freisler called him, among other things, a “rat” and condemned him to death. Before the Nazis killed Father Delp, they brutally interrogated him. First, his tormentors placed his hands in a clamp full of spikes and drove these spikes into his fingertips, but Delp refused to

reveal anything. Next, Delp’s legs were placed in tubes lined with spikes, which penetrated his skin. His torture continued for five hours, but he did not give evidence against the Pope. His executioners utilized meat hooks and a wire noose to kill Father Delp.

SUMMARY

During World War II, Pope Pius XII created an espionage system composed primarily of German Jesuits. He directed his spies to cooperate with other resistance groups in Germany, such as the Abwehr. Contrary to being soft on the Nazis and indifferent to the Holocaust, as is sometimes alleged, Pius encouraged these groups to kill Adolf Hitler.

[Editor’s Note: Almost all the high-level World War II figures mentioned in this article have been profiled at one time or another by the author earlier in this series. See other intriguing articles in previous issues of *AIJ* that tie these figures together, both for good and ill.]

NOTES

¹ This article is heavily indebted to an excellent book, *Church of Spies*, by Mark Riebling (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

² Riebling, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

⁴ A good biography of Bonhoeffer is the book *Bonhoeffer* by Eric Metaxas (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2010).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁹ Tresckow had attempted to kill Hitler in the Soviet Union. When his role in the anti-Hitler plotting was discovered, he committed suicide.

¹⁰ Riebling, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹¹ Klaua-Juergen Mueller, *Generaloberst Ludwig Beck* (Munich, Germany: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 2008), p. 506.

¹² Riebling, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

The late Dr. Kenneth J. Campbell graduated from Kenyon College and received MA degrees from Johns Hopkins University and from the University of Maryland. He subsequently completed a doctorate at the University of Maryland. His area of specialization was German military intelligence. Ken was a frequent contributor to this Journal and in particular to its historical “Profiles in Intelligence” series.



NMIA Bookshelf

PRACTISE TO DECEIVE: LEARNING CURVES OF MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNERS.

Barton Whaley.

Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, with introduction by
A. Denis Clift. 2015.
246 pages.

Reviewed by WO1 (USA) Kailah Murry, a Military Intelligence warrant officer in the Kansas Army National Guard and a staff member at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. WO1 Murry has served in multiple intelligence, psychological operations, and training and education staff positions throughout her nearly 20-year career. She holds an MA in National Security Studies from American Military University, an MA in Training and Development from Midwestern State University, and is currently a graduate student in the part-time MSSSI program at National Intelligence University.

In 1962 the Defense Intelligence School (DIS) was established upon combining the Army Strategic Intelligence School and the Naval Intelligence School. This joint school would later become the Defense Intelligence College (DIC), the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), and the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), finally becoming what we know today as the National Intelligence University (NIU). In 2002 then-JMIC was asked to create the Denial and Deception Advanced Studies Program. The author of *Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners*, Barton Whaley, would become known as “the undisputed dean of U.S. denial and deception experts” and his work would provide the most important readings (p. xxii). Whaley’s career spanned assignments in Tokyo during the Korean War to attendance at the London University School of Oriental and African Studies, with his final posting working for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Whaley’s posthumously published book is revitalizing to the denial and deception field. He is the consummate historian of denial and deception, reviewing the field across time, disciplines, and culture. The book provides 88 case studies that emphasize Whaley’s belief that deception is a mind-game which requires critical and creative thinking, as well as patience mixed with determination and stamina. Denial and deception is a difficult field to learn due to its nature of requiring practical application. One cannot truly understand denial and deception without applying it. Each case study illustrates Whaley’s beliefs and passes to the

reader lessons learned from various planners. He goes beyond simply providing great case studies; additionally, he incorporates the case studies into topics pertaining to learning to deceive, selling the commander, institutional deception planning, the planning process, social and institutional factors, cultural factors, personality factors, and selection of deception personnel.

The author takes the reader on a walk through history noting denial and deception practitioners whose names would be familiar to those with an insatiable desire to read about war. The case studies include Sun Tzu, General Odysseus (1183 BC), Gideon’s Trumpet (circa 1249 BC), Lieutenant General George Washington (1781), Major General William Sherman (1864), Winston Churchill (1914), Lieutenant Erwin Rommel (1917), Major T.E. Lawrence (1917-18), Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall (1918), Adolf Hitler (1935-38), Corps Commander Georgi A. Zhukov (1939), Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel (1941-42), General Douglas MacArthur (1950), the Bay of Pigs (1961), Mao Tse-tung (1965), President Anwar Sadat (1973), the Warrenpoint Double Ambush (1979), and the Iranian Rescue Mission (1980), just to name a few of the most recognizable individuals and events. Whaley attempts to provide information on the individual planner or planners, how the plan came about, and connections to any previous or future plans and planners mentioned in other case studies, finishing off with a possible short note on whether the plan worked or not for each case study.

Practise to Deceive has only a few shortcomings that the author acknowledges from the beginning. Whaley specifically notes some of the case studies are lacking in detail, for which he asks the reader to find more information on their own if curious. These short notifications for additional homework may have been left better on the cutting floor. For example, General Hans von Seeckt (Germany, 1919) is noted as the main architect of dissimulative camouflage during the German rearmament between World Wars I and II. Whaley briefly mentions who General Seeckt is and then states, “Full details...are available elsewhere” (p. 85). The author may have not provided details prior to the publication of this book due to his passing, in which case those who took up the final publication in his absence could have researched this individual and provided more detail fitting of the arduous work Whaley produced.

The most thought-provoking portion of *Practise to Deceive* includes the 10 general conclusions the study applies throughout the case studies. First, deception planners are first and foremost single individuals. At a quick glance this

could lead us to believe deception is planned by only one individual, but Whaley more than likely meant that each person on the team contributes his or her own experience, education, and training that is brought to bear during the course of each plan. Second, excellence in deception is autonomous of rank or branch of service; this would include both military and civilian planners. The case studies illustrate that some great planners were civilians, yet others were junior military officers who later became high-ranking officials. Whaley includes a variety of planners who demonstrate this conclusion. Third, the chief will direct a small team that is pulled together from numerous backgrounds. Fourth, planners bring a talent for deception based on any prior understanding of denial and deception, no matter how ambiguous. Fifth, planners have an acute attentiveness to the incongruities amid congruity. Sixth, some planners will learn deception from personal experience in war, through trial and error. Multiple case studies will mention planners whom Whaley tracks through time, demonstrating their trial and error, if not mainly their trial and success. Seventh, nearly all planners learn most quickly from studying the experiences of others. The book exemplifies this conclusion, putting together 88 case studies from which to learn in one book. It is one-stop learning at its finest. Eighth, planners work within a bureaucratic structure that requires them to know their friends as well as they know their enemies. Ninth, planners should be prepared to sell their plan to the commander. Finally, commanders should play an active role in planning. Each conclusion is illustrated by the totality of the case studies (pp. xiv, xv).

Overall, Whaley offers a well-written and engaging book. There are entertaining stories riddled throughout the case studies that exemplify the introduction's author, A. Denis Clift, who notes that "humor requires precisely the same manipulation of congruities and incongruities that defines deception" (p. xxiii). This book is a must read for all military tacticians, even if they do not yet fully appreciate or understand the utility of denial and deception. The book will equip the reader with lessons learned over multiple lifetimes and careers on which to fall back while planning future operations at all levels.

[Editor's Note: A. Denis Clift is President Emeritus of National Intelligence University and led the institution for 15 years (1994-2009), during which the Denial and Deception Advanced Studies Program was created and flourished. Regrettably, the D&D Certificate is no longer offered, for reasons outlined in a previous issue of *AIJ*, which focused on the theme "Denial and Deception" and liberally cited Barton Whaley in several of the articles. The British spelling of "Practise" in the book's title rather than the American English spelling "Practice" was deliberate.]

OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA.

David Kilcullen.
New York, Oxford University Press. 2013.
342 pages.

Reviewed by LTC (USAR) Christopher E. Bailey, a lawyer and faculty member at the National Intelligence University specializing in national security law, intelligence ethics, and East African security matters. He is a 1992 graduate of the McGeorge School of Law and a 2008 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has an LLM degree in National Security and U.S. Foreign Relations Law from the George Washington University School of Law, where he is currently a candidate for the SJD degree.

Out of the Mountains is a valuable contribution to the growing body of literature in future war studies. Dr. David Kilcullen provides the reader with a well-researched and interesting book that analyzes nature of the "hybrid, irregular and nested" threat in 21st century cities, offering the reader interesting case studies to include the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai, India, by members of Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT); the 1993 battle of Mogadishu, Somalia (a place he describes as a "feral city"); and the May 2010 assault on a drug kingpin and his "Shower Posse" in Kingston, Jamaica. Kilcullen develops an original analysis, advancing a theory of "competitive control" that could help national security practitioners understand the problems raised by modern, non-state armed groups in a broad range of situations. This book would be informative for intelligence professionals, academics, and members of the general public with an interest in national security studies.

Dr. Kilcullen is a capable and distinguished author with a rich range of experience in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. He has a PhD in political anthropology from the University of New South Wales. After serving for 24 years in the Australian Army, to include multiple peacekeeping and counterinsurgency assignments, he served in senior analytic positions in both the Australian and U.S. governments. He was named one of *Foreign Policy*'s Top 100 Global Thinkers in 2009. He has written two earlier best-selling books, *The Accidental Guerrilla*¹ and *Counterinsurgency*,² both of which are widely used by academics, military professionals, and policymakers worldwide. More recently, he has published *Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism*,³ a book that covers why things went "awry" in 2014 with the recent disasters in the Middle East to include the Iraq war, the rise of ISIS, the civil war in Syria with its refugee crisis, and more.

In *Out of the Mountains* Dr. Kilcullen examines the changing nature of international and non-international armed conflict, arguing that future conflict will likely involve non-state

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armed groups using asymmetric methods and operating in largely urban, littoral environments. He examines four megatrends in the international security environment, with increasing population growth, urbanization, littoralization (the existence of ever-larger cities in coastal zones), and network connectivity. In his wording, he believes that military planners will have to come “out of the mountains,” an analogy to the current operational focus in Afghanistan, and focus instead on complex, hybrid operations in urban areas. He uses an interdisciplinary approach, illustrated through multiple case studies involving major urban areas in the Middle East, South America, Africa, and Asia, to develop what he terms as a “theory of competitive control.” This theory is based upon the concept that non-state armed groups “draw their strength and freedom of action primarily from their ability to manipulate and mobilize populations, and that they do this using a spectrum of methods from coercion to persuasion, by creating a normative system that makes people feel safe through the predictability and order that it generates.”⁷⁴ This theory offers a persuasive approach that can help national security practitioners in understanding how organized armed groups compete for power; in turn, this should help practitioners design more effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns.

The nature of armed conflict in the 21st century, particularly as envisioned by Kilcullen, will raise a complex host of legal issues blurring law enforcement and military operations, with problems in applying the traditional principles of international humanitarian law involving necessity, distinction, proportionality, and precautions in the attack. How do we characterize and prioritize such discrete threats either to the *de jure* government (assuming that one exists; e.g., in a failing/failed state) or to international peace and security? What is the nature of the threat, both to the *de jure* government and to the international community? Does an armed group pose a domestic problem that should be addressed through traditional law enforcement activities, or does a problem constitute a belligerency under international humanitarian law?

The blurring of law enforcement and military operations is problematic, to say the least. Under a law enforcement (a conduct-based) paradigm, police officers will typically arrest, detain, and prosecute a person based upon probable cause that a past crime has been committed. Under a military (a status-based) paradigm, soldiers will typically target and/or detain someone based upon that person’s status as a combatant (e.g., wearing of a uniform) without regard to any prior acts committed by that person. In a typical non-international armed conflict, with a lack of uniforms or other outward indicia of combatant status, the issue becomes whether a person has “direct participation in hostilities.” Indeed, some apparently benign acts (e.g., certain preparatory or supporting acts) might constitute direct

participation, while other acts might be more ambiguous. In fact, this will likely make it difficult for governments to respond to non-state armed groups (including criminals, criminal organizations, terrorists, and “organized armed groups”) with military force and maintain requisite political legitimacy.

In other words, at some point domestic law—to the extent that it even exists in a failing/failed state—is supplanted by international humanitarian law, a legal concept that is known as *lex specialis* (the more specific law prevails over the more general). Most governments are reluctant to admit that widespread criminality/rebellion has morphed from a domestic legal problem to a non-international armed conflict. Making matters worse, police officers are trained and equipped to employ force under one legal standard, while soldiers are trained and equipped to a different standard. However, what if the future combatant does not wear a uniform and is not otherwise distinguishable from innocent civilians in a feral city? How does a government respond to a situation, avoiding either too little or too much force and maintaining political legitimacy in an increasingly networked world? This also raises important questions about whether the international community has an obligation to intervene in the internal strife within a single country to end genocide (Rwanda), ethnic cleansing (Yugoslavia), or civil war (Libya and Syria)?

Military strategists and planners have traditionally focused on conflict between sovereign nation-states employing large conventional forces; thus, military doctrine has generally eschewed a detailed examination of issues involving non-state armed groups, terrorists, and criminals operating in urban areas. In like manner, international humanitarian law is also much less developed with regard to non-international armed conflict. Here, the 1949 Geneva Conventions provide a useful example of that nation-state focus with the attendant neglect of other asymmetric threats to international peace and security. The Geneva Conventions afforded major improvements in the legal protection of victims of conflict, applying essentially to international armed conflicts—wars between sovereign nations—while providing limited protections to non-combatants in non-international armed conflict (e.g., a civil war). Eventually, the international community tried to address this gap in international law with the 1977 Additional Protocol (AP) II.⁵

AP II was designed to make international humanitarian law more complete and more universal, and to provide expanded obligations in a non-international armed conflict. Nonetheless, AP II left open many questions regarding the legal status of a range of conflicts, non-state actors and what it means to participate in hostilities. This is important because, as Dr. Kilcullen observes, international armed conflict isn’t likely to be the dominant form of war over the coming decades. Instead, we are likely to see increased

ethnic, national and religious strife in the densely populated urban areas of Africa, Asia and Europe. Thus, a government responding to increased criminality—that may or may not arise in terms of organization and intensity to an “insurgency”—will be confronted with difficult problems in characterizing the conflict and in applying appropriate force under either domestic or international law. In short, we need to start thinking now about the likely future problems involving non-state actors operating in urban environments.

The application of the traditional principles of international humanitarian law will be challenging, particularly in an urban environment and against a networked adversary able to plan and conduct “swarming” attacks, followed by rapid dispersal back into population groups, all while using modern media to gain the moral high ground in the “battle of the narrative.”⁶ The principle of necessity raises issues about the propriety of attacks on dual-use infrastructure and resources. Is it necessary to destroy certain facilities or resources, especially if the same can be temporarily impaired? The principle of distinction obliges military forces to target combatants, perhaps identified by uniforms or direct participation in hostilities, while avoiding civilian casualties.⁷ How can a commander target adversaries who purposefully blend in with population? The principle of proportionality obliges commanders, to forego attacks in which the incidental injury to persons and the collateral damage to property “would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”⁸ Here, a commander will be obliged to compete for the narrative, maintaining some level of transparency and accountability in his operations. Finally, Professor Geoffrey Corn emphasizes the importance of precautions in the attack, arguing that it should be raised in importance to a “principle.”⁹

All said, Dr. Kilcullen is an important thinker on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and the nature of modern war; in this book, he offers well-informed insights worthy of consideration by national security professionals. Clearly, modern armed conflict in an urban, littoral environment against a networked, non-state armed group that seeks sanctuary among the people, as posited by Kilcullen, will present a diverse range of political, legal, and military challenges for policy-makers, intelligence officers, military planners and the lawyers. Dr. Kilcullen’s insights, developed over the decades of experience and study, offer a useful theoretical lens in understanding modern urban conflicts involving non-state armed groups. However, we also have much work to do if we are to identify and ameliorate the conditions which raise the prospect of such conflict, much less respond to an existing one in a constructive manner.

[Reviewer’s Note: All statements of fact, analysis, or opinion are the author’s and do not reflect the official policy

or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense or any of its components, or the U.S. government.]

NOTES

¹ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

² David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

³ David Kilcullen, *Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁴ David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 114.

⁵ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force on 7 December 1978, URL: <https://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTSONline.aspx?id=1> (accessed 25 December 2014). Note: The United States is not a signatory to this protocol, although it recognizes certain aspects as customary international law.

⁶ This fight for the “narrative,” the moral high ground, is sometimes referred to as “lawfare.” It constitutes an important center of gravity in the fight against many armed groups that seek to discredit a government while gaining political legitimacy for its own cause; it is a fight that a government could lose through excessive uses of force or a lack of post-incident investigation/accountability. See Charles J. Dunlap, “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts,” remarks prepared for the Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference, 29 November 2001, URL: <http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf> (accessed 9 July 2016).

⁷ Geneva Convention Common Article 3 (1) provides that “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities” shall be treated humanely, but the phrasing in Protocol II is slightly different, directing that the civilian population “shall not be the object of attack” and that [c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection of the afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Protocol II, *supra* note 5, Article 13 (3). See also Nels Melzer, *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law*, International Committee of the Red Cross (February 2009), 34.

⁸ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), Article 51 (5)(b). While the United States is not signatory to Protocol I, it does consider this principle to be a point of customary international law, and—at a minimum—applicable to international armed conflict. Statement of Mr. Michael Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of the Law Workshop. In any case, Protocol II does not address proportionality, although the principle might be applicable as a matter of customary international law. Compare DoD Memorandum to Mr. John H. McNeill, Assistant General Counsel, “1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary International Law Implications,” 9 May 1986.

⁹ Geoffrey S. Corn, “War, Law, and Precautionary Measures: Broadening the Perspective of this Vital Risk Mitigation Principle,” 42 *Pepperdine L. Rev.* (2015) (arguing that

“[p]recautionary measures play a vital role in this balancing of interests and accordant civilian risk mitigation. International legal and policy discourse has not, however, always elevated the concept of precautionary measures to the same status as the core substantive principles that define targeting legality: distinction and proportionality”).

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***WRITE TO INFLUENCE!
PERSONAL APPRAISALS, RESUMES,
AWARDS, GRANTS, SCHOLARSHIPS,
BID PROPOSALS, WEB PAGES,
MARKETING, AND MORE.***

Carla D. Bass.
Marshall, VA. Orlean Press. 2016.
286 pages.

Reviewed by Col (USAF, Ret) Robert G. Stiegel, a faculty member at the National Intelligence University's Anthony G. Oettinger School of Science and Technology Intelligence with over 35 years in the Intelligence Community.

Colonel (USAF, Ret) Carla Bass' new book, *Write to Influence!* is the latest in a series of works she has dedicated to improving the quality of writing in formal and informal correspondence. Promoting effective writing has been a passion for Col Bass throughout her long and successful career in the Air Force. I well remember getting a copy of her first handbook, "Word Sculpting," as an Air Force junior officer in the late 1980s. Her initial focus had been to improve performance reports and award packages to help supervisors take better care of their people. This latest book brings these topics up to date, and adds guidance for a large variety of the kind of written communications that matter in today's public, private, and academic sectors.

In a world dominated by instant digital communications to include social media such as Twitter and YouTube, one might wonder whether formalized writing skills are still relevant. Carla Bass takes on this issue up front by identifying four compelling reasons why she wrote this book. First, she notes that powerful writing changes lives, by opening doors to promotions, fellowships, internships, scholarships, grants, competitive assignments, and more. Second, she shows that accurate, clear, and concise writing is the lifeblood of effective operations from private businesses and corporations through non-governmental and government organizations to the military. A particularly important observation is that new media such as the Internet actually make persuasive writing much more powerful by quickly reaching a wider audience. Third, Col Bass asserts that students, the upcoming generation in the workforce, deserve to have an opportunity to learn tools to facilitate

success in their chosen endeavors. Finally, she notes that clear, understandable and persuasive writing could be very beneficial in the scientific community for proposals on program or project funding.

Col Bass acknowledges that, while individuals use many different approaches and cognitive styles when composing communications, her intent with *Write to Influence!* is to provide tools, examples, and opportunities to practice for more effective writing. The book is based on five principles:

- (1) Make each word and second count because you have a limited opportunity to influence the reader.
- (2) Empathize with the reader by making your product easy to read, understandable, and unambiguous.
- (3) Convey the "so what" by quantifying and being specific as needed.
- (4) Avoid jargon.
- (5) Proofread to ensure quality.

The book is designed to present specific writing tools or strategies, show examples of applying them to common styles of writing, and then provide exercises for the reader to complete that apply the tools and strategies. Possible answers are provided for the exercises later in the book. Bass takes pains to note that the answers are examples of what she means, but that there is no one magic way to respond to each writing situation. I believe this structure facilitates learning by giving the reader opportunities to practice the tools and ideas as they are presented. Each part of the book builds on the previous parts to enable continuous learning and improve writing.

Part One of the book provides ten word-sculpting tools, each presented as a topical and brief description of the recommended action. Part Two focuses on "Strategies to Influence" with chapters for "setting the hook," "making the case," and "clinching the deal." This part is the heart of the author's effort to instruct on how to persuade or influence an audience. Part Three examines writing techniques and strategies tailored for writing effective resumes, email, and presentations. The fourth part provides 100 additional exercises and answers. It includes a "graduation exercise" with a solution. The final part consists of several appendices providing the answers to the exercises in the first ten chapters, discussion of the proper use of common and essential grammar, insights into the challenges of editing someone else's work, short lists of tools and common errors, as well as a list of references.

I believe that *Write to Influence!* is an excellent instructional guide to practical and effective writing for the modern government, private sector, and academic writer. Carla Bass provides realistic and useful examples of the clear, concise, and persuasive style of writing she espouses, along with

numerous exercises for writers to use for practice. She shows how effective writing is essential to success across a wide range of activities, to include smart use of new media. The book does not get bogged down in detailed grammatical rules, but rather follows its own message by keeping each topic clear and concise. I will keep it handy and recommend it as the go-to writing guide for my students.

[Editor's Note: Colonel Bass is a member of the NMIA Board of Directors.]

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DRONE WARFARE.

John Kaag & Sarah Kreps.
Cambridge, UK, Polity Press. 2014.
195 pages.

Reviewed by LTC (USAR, Ret) John Schubring, a contracted faculty member of the National Intelligence University where he teaches courses on Intelligence Ethics, Operational Capabilities, and the Near East.

The debate over the use of armed drones, more specifically remote piloted aircraft (RPAs), continues to manifest itself throughout the international world order. Such questions emerge as: When is it ethical to employ RPAs? Is there ever a time when RPA use is unethical? Does national authorization equal moral justification? In their book, John Kaag and Sarah Kreps examine the critical ethical issues that confront drone warfare. Kaag as the philosopher and Kreps as the political scientist combine their efforts to examine the essentials of drone warfare, drones and democracy, drones and international law, and the ethics of drone warfare. Hence, they engage the debate over drone warfare, especially in operational areas where war has not been officially declared.

The Essentials of Drone Warfare

As many have surreptitiously stated since 2001, 9/11 changed everything! Shortly after the Afghanistan campaign began, the U.S. commenced using RPAs with the first recorded attack in November 2001. One year later, their employment targeted and killed suspected terrorists outside of declared war zones for the first time in Yemen. Of course, since that time, RPA missions have been expanded from their infrequent occurrence under the George W. Bush administration to literally hundreds of missions under the Obama presidency. Whereas the Bush administration authorized infrequent, high-value targeting, the Obama presidency directed regular, routine application of drone strikes as a mainstay of its counterterrorism doctrine (p. 19).

Drones and Democracy

In this compelling account, the authors' reflection on drones and warfare addresses how managing conflict in a democracy requires finessing on the part of its leaders. Since the people bear the brunt of war both financially and as individual citizen soldiers, the precise, political response to conflict is that it must be kept to as publicly minimal a level as possible. Should it not be "packaged" in a manner acceptable to the populace, voters can and frequently do take out their frustration on leaders at the ballot box. The bottom line: RPAs offer politicians a politically palatable response when it comes to significantly reducing the risk to pilots, and hence overall casualties in a war effort, thus reducing the publicly demonstrable footprint. However, the foreboding shadows lingering on the horizon result in the fact that these advantages have not been lost on foreign leaders. Adversaries are watching, waiting, and listening for opportunities to apply lessons learned from armed drones and warfare against the U.S. (p. 54).

Ethics and International Law

What was the justification of the Obama administration for RPA use? Essentially, targeting of al-Qaeda leaders is legal because it was considered an act of self-defense. Kaags and Kreps closely examine that argument. Of particular interest to the authors is the White House's legal justification for RPA use. They probe further: Does this argument stand up to the tenets of international law, and does it meet the requirements of the principles of Just War theory? The authors tackle the issue of justification for RPA use head-on.

The Ethics of Drone Warfare

This section essentially addresses the issue of "dirty hands," a condition in which a politically expedient strategy involves violating certain moral or legal norms" (p. 105). These norms are especially vulnerable today in the age of asymmetric warfare, whereby decisions are made for operating in a conflict that may include the use of autonomous or semi-autonomous robots. The authors argue that political and military leaders may have to make decisions that run askew of ethical guidelines, especially as regard to Just War principles and international law. As they explain, however, having to make those decidedly difficult decisions is not an excuse for "moral messiness."

Way Ahead and Recommendations

Kaag & Kreps' *Drone Warfare* is fundamental reading for anyone who wants to grasp the basics of what is at stake in this era of RPAs. The two authors clearly and concisely provide the reader the essentials of what everyone needs to know about the basics of drone warfare. The reviewer

recommends a precise perusal of the afforded information in order to grasp the critical ethical and legal issues associated with this debate.

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AMERICA'S DREAM PALACE: MIDDLE EAST EXPERTISE AND THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE.

Osamah F. Khalil.

Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 2016.
426 pages.

Reviewed by Dr. Diana Clark Gill, author of *How We Are Changed by War: A Study of Letters and Diaries from Colonial Conflicts to Operation Iraqi Freedom*. The reviewer earned her PhD from the University of Mississippi.

It is unusual to review a book by fixating on its title. Nevertheless, the fact that Dr. Osamah F. Khalil, a Professor of History at Syracuse University and a co-founder of Al-Shabaka, a think tank on Palestinian issues, plucked the key phrase of his title from a quote by T.E. Lawrence has nagged at me from the moment I first picked up Khalil's intriguing book.

The phrase "dream palace" was coined by a British intelligence operative, diplomat, and author in the 1920s. T.E. Lawrence wrote in his highly popular memoir *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* how he had hoped his assistance in leading Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I would "make a new nation, to restore a lost influence, to give 20 million Semites the foundations on which to build an inspired dream place of their national thoughts."

This "palace" of "national thoughts," then, is Khalil's focus. Exhaustively he has compiled a century's worth of attempts by the U.S. government to explore the "national thought" inherent to what is now known as the Middle East—to explore it in order to understand its people, to understand how its resources may be harnessed and, perhaps most of all, to understand how the U.S. may be protected from its real or imagined dangers.

Fittingly, Khalil begins where Lawrence left off, at the fall of the Ottoman Empire when former territories arrived at a critical crossroads. The victors of World War I were gathering at the post-war peace conference in Versailles. Would the remnants of the Ottoman Empire be declared independent nations or be relegated to child status as European-ruled protectorates? In anticipation of such a

dilemma, the U.S. government had, two years previously, created a committee of academics, called the "Inquiry," to advise President Woodrow Wilson on this little-known region of the world.

Swayed by the Inquiry's opinion that "Muslims and Arabs are incapable of self-rule... Wilson endorsed the creation of the League of Nations Mandates over the former Ottoman territories, contradicting his earlier support for self-determination and aligning the United States with the colonial expansions of Britain and France" (pp. 10-11).

Khalil describes the Inquiry as being a "significant early attempt by the U.S. government to develop foreign area expertise." This expertise would provide the seed for future university-based area studies, some of which would then later evolve into Middle East studies. However, the Inquiry, though relatively short-lived, had set a pattern hard to shake.

Composed of scholars from elite eastern universities such as Yale, Harvard, and Princeton, this advisory group also included scholars familiar with sympathetic testimonies of missionaries who had lived among Middle Easterners. Blindly, then, it absorbed the blurred line between actual observations and preconceptions such as the "missionaries' paternalistic attitudes, which were often mixed with notions of racial and religious superiority" (p. 11).

World War II saw the Inquiry having been replaced by other specialist groups culminating in the United States' "first attempt to create a centralized intelligence agency" (p. 40). The Office of the Coordinator of Information, or COI, was established in July 1941, five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Office of Strategic Services quickly followed. Then, with the post-war emergence of the U.S. as a global superpower four years later, the OSS would be replaced by the creation of the CIA in 1947 along with the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC). Academics still provided such agencies expert knowledge, as area studies were encouraged and subsidized by a government hoping to benefit from the scholarly accumulation of data on global "hot spots." Conflicts in Korea and Vietnam would successively highlight gaps in American knowledge. They exemplified how the Cold War was pushing the U.S. to hit the ground running in dealing with Soviet incursions into undeveloped and unfamiliar countries.

Area studies changed as society changed, though, and revelations in the 1960s of a U.S. government liaison with higher education rocked college campuses already reeling from Vietnam-era protests. American academics, struggling to distance themselves from being seen as

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puppets of intelligence agencies, quickly allowed themselves to be mostly replaced by independent think tanks as the government's "go-to" source of data.

This brings the reader to roughly the book's midpoint. Khalil now abruptly widens his topic to elaborate on the U.S. government's vision, beginning in the 1950s, of remaking the Middle East in America's image. He describes how this campaign's failure to force Westernization into the area sparked rampant criticism, not of the attempt itself but rather of those who had refused the overture.

Middle Easterners were deemed irrational and hostile, based on scholarship which "reinforced the perception that the failure of the newly emerging states to adopt American-defined modernization was evidence of their long-standing pathological flaws" (p. 184). Such popular, if antiquated, social theories on Arab psychology would play out years later in the scandalous human rights abuses by the U.S. Army at Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison. Here was the final perversion of Lawrence's "inspired...national thoughts" of a contested region.

This brings us back full circle to Khalil's use of "dream palace" in his title. Implied in it is an element of imagination. Specifically, in terms of America's grasp on the "national thoughts" of the Middle East, Khalil is suggesting that such understanding is one "dream palace" which is exactly that, a dream, a shimmering edifice in the desert tricking onlookers into thinking it real.

He writes that Westerners in the 20th century were too preoccupied with reshaping the Middle East according to their own "hopes, fears, and illusions" (p. 3) to be able to

see it clearly. Similarly blinded by its collective agenda of "oil, regional...stability, and Israel" (p. 6), the U.S. government has spent decades relying on culturally-based mirages rather than on truly nonpartisan observations of the area. Even the region's name, the "Middle East," he points out, came not from any of the many ethnicities inhabiting it but rather from a U.S. Naval officer's 1902 memoir. It was the beginning, implies Khalil—the beginning of mistaking a mirror for a microscope's lens.

America's Dream Palace is an intense if disjointed journey into U.S. history. It provides valuable background on 20th century area studies and the growth of intelligence-gathering efforts, recording the American need to make sense of a corner of the globe that it obviously found very alien. Still, Khalil's underlying argument about America's agenda-heavy shortsightedness as concerns the Middle East would have read better if it was introduced earlier in the book.

In addition, the author's assertion that the U.S. has tried to "remake" the Middle East in its own image might have ironically benefited from quoting yet more of T.E. Lawrence, especially the sentences preceding his mention of a "dream palace." "All men," writes Lawrence in 1922, "dream, but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds, wake in the day to find that it was vanity; but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act on their dreams with open eyes, to make them possible" (introductory chapter, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*).



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