Cultural Intelligence and Regional Issues

The *American Intelligence Journal* (*AIJ*) is published by the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA),
a non-profit, non-political, professional association supporting American intelligence professionals and the U.S.
Intelligence Community, primarily through educational means. The Board of Directors is headed by Lieutenant General James A.
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Creek Road, Cullen, Virginia 23934. Comments, suggestions, and observations on the editorial content of the *Journal* are also
welcome. Questions concerning subscriptions, advertising, and distribution should be directed to the Production Manager at
<admin@nmia.org>.

The *American Intelligence Journal* is published semi-annually. Each issue runs 100-200 pages and is distributed to key government
officials, members of Congress and their staffs, and university professors and libraries, as well as to NMIA members, *Journal* subscrib-
ers, and contributors. Contributors include Intelligence Community leaders and professionals as well as academicians and others with
interesting and informative perspectives.

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AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL

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National Military Intelligence Association and the
International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE)
Intelligence Education and Training Workshop

November 15, 2012
Northrop Grumman, Fair Lakes
12900 Federal Systems Park Dr., Fairfax, VA 22033

KEYNOTE: Dr. Mark Lowenthal
President of the Intelligence & Security Academy, IAFIE Executive Director, and former
Assistant DCI for Analysis & Production

0800-0900 **Registration, Refreshments, and Networking**

0900-1000 **Keynote Address: Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal, Executive Director, IAFIE,**
and President, Intelligence & Security Academy

1000-1100 **Panel on Education/Training Policy and Strategic Planning**
Dr. Susan Studds, Provost, NIU (Moderator)
ODNI   OUSD(I)   DHS

1100-1115 **Break**

1115-1230 **Panel on Programs of the IC Agencies**
CIA's Kent School	DIA's JMITC, JMAS, and/or LREC
NSA's National Cryptologic School	FBI Academy or HQ Training Manager
	Marilyn Peterson IC Centers of Academic
NGA's College	Excellence

1230-1330 **No-Host Lunch**

1330-1430 **Panel on Programs of Traditional Civilian Colleges & Universities**
Georgetown University	University of Maryland
James Madison University	CDR Toni Gay, U.S. Coast Guard Academy
Mercyhurst University	Institute of World Politics

1430-1445 **Break**

1445-1545 **Panel on Programs of Non-Traditional Colleges & Universities**
AMU	Henley-Putnam University
UMUC	Capella University

1545-1630 **Panel on Programs of Professional/Private Associations Supporting Education**
Dr. Bill Spracher, NMIA/IAFIE (Moderator)
IAFIE	AFIO
NMIA	AFCEA
Kurt Marisa, FAOA	

1630-1645 **Wrap-Up, Next Steps, and Adjournment**

Register online at www.nmia.org

AGENDA SUBJECT TO CHANGE

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

The theme of this *American Intelligence Journal*, "Cultural Intelligence and Regional Issues," is a good example of how much our discipline has changed over the past ten to fifteen years. The term "Cultural Intelligence" is fairly new, so new it is hard to find an official DoD definition. You won't find it in Joint Publication 1-02 or Joint Publication 2.0. Nor will you find the term acceptably defined in any Intelligence Community documentation on the Web. Several scholarly reviews have held that the IC lacks a systematic framework for understanding what "cultural intelligence" actually means and where it fits in the discipline. According to *Webster's New Ideal Dictionary*, it can be defined as "the characteristic features of a civilization including its beliefs, its artistic and material products, and its social institutions." That works fairly well. *Wikipedia* defines it this way: "Cultural intelligence, cultural quotient or CQ, is a theory within management and organizational psychology, positing that understanding the impact of an individual's cultural background on their behavior is essential for effective business." Close but not quite right for our purposes. One of the earlier scholarly treatments defined cultural intelligence as "a person's capability to adapt to new cultural contexts" (see *Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across Cultures* by P. Christopher Earley and Soon Ang, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). Their key objective is to address the problem of why people fail to adjust to and understand new cultures. That objective gets to the crux of the recent DoD emphasis on Cultural Intelligence in support of operations—the failure to adapt.

The best working definition for Cultural Intelligence that I found came from Lieutenant Commander (USN) John P. Coles in an article he wrote, "Incorporating Cultural Intelligence into Joint Doctrine," published in the Joint Information Operations Center publication *IO Sphere*. This was his definition as an adequate one did not exist:

> Cultural intelligence can be defined as an analysis of social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or nation's history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and behaviors. It helps provide understanding as to why a people act as they do and how they think. Cultural intelligence provides a baseline for designing successful strategies to interact with foreign peoples whether they are neutrals, people of an occupied territory, or enemies.

Treatises on Cultural Intelligence are rare before 2005. Cultural Intelligence is more of a product (of analysis) than a discipline, and has developed significantly as an outgrowth of our engagements in Southeast Asia, e.g., the Human Terrain System concept or then-MG Flynn's 2010 *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. NMIA recently concluded its Fall 2012 Intelligence Symposium titled "Foreign Engagement & Global Coverage under the New Defense Strategy: FAOs, Security Cooperation and the Defense Attaché System." The symposium was all about FAOs, Languages, Attaches, Foreign Engagement, Security Cooperation, Partner Relationships, Area Knowledge, Human Terrain, and Interagency/Country Teams, all the makings of Cultural Intelligence. This was an outstanding event co-sponsored with the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Association. We hope to make many of the presentations available either on our webpage or in a future *AIJ*. LTG Michael Flynn, now Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was the keynote speaker, reflecting on "Accelerating Change – Today's Defense Intelligence Imperative."

In several recent forums LTG Flynn has emphasized the dramatic and dynamic changes the IC faces and how we need to stay ahead of them. Moreover, we have a broad range of fairly quickly moving factors that are hard to interpret in near-real time.

> The changes that have occurred in the areas of operations that we are finding ourselves in are immense. Despite the fiscal challenges that we are likely to face in the coming decade, the increases in the demand for intelligence are unprecedented right now, and I see only an increase in the demand for even more and better intelligence in the future. We really have to stress the training and education of the language and the cultural knowledge, and we really are going to have to step up our game. I think where the DIA will move toward is a greater understanding of the culture of the societal structures within these regions that we are operating in, particularly places like Africa, places like the Middle East, places like South Asia, places like Southeast Asia or the Pacific Basin, we have to have what I would call a much better fingertip feel for the environments in which we are operating within. And we will do that through presence, we will do that through a very well-trained, sophisticated, well-resourced group of intelligence professionals.

LTG Flynn addressed/recommended several efforts that are related to this *AIJ* and deserve highlighting to our membership. DIA is engaged in a Vision 2020 effort that will address implications for the Intelligence Community as it re-focuses on more strategic issues after a decade of support to tactical operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world; focuses on priorities and expectations for the IC in today's mobile and data-immersed environment;

and determines how the IC can integrate big data analysis and open source intelligence with traditional tradecraft in order to continue to evolve as true curators and purveyors of knowledge.

The Strategic Context of Joint Vision 2020 is apropos:

> *The United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with a variety of regional actors. Transportation, communications, and information technology will continue to evolve and foster expanded economic ties and awareness of international events. Our security and economic interests, as well as our political values, will provide the impetus for engagement with international partners. The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to "win" across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and international organizations* (http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/source_materials/joint_vision_2020.pdf).

LTG Flynn recommended the CJCS "Decade of War, Volume 1, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations" (http://blogs.defensenews.com/saxotech-access/pdfs/decade-of-war-lessons-learned.pdf). This reflects excellent analysis and recommendations; it should be required reading for anyone in the discipline. In the decade following 9/11, it became evident that the Cold War model which had guided foreign policy for the previous 50 years no longer fit the emerging global environment. Key changes included: A shift from U.S. hegemony toward national pluralism, the erosion of sovereignty and the impact of weak states, the empowerment of small groups or individuals, and an increasing need to fight and win in the information domain. The introduction to Lesson One, "Understanding the Environment," talks to the 10+ year focus on the tactical domain:

> *A complete understanding of the operating environment was often hindered by a focus on traditional adversary information and actions in the US approach to intelligence gathering. This focus impacted the US effectiveness in countering asymmetric and irregular threats from insurgencies and mitigating terrorist and criminal influences. Further, shortages of human intelligence (HUMINT) personnel and interpreters needed to capture critical information from the population, and lack of fusion of this intelligence with other sources, exacerbated the problem. Other intelligence capabilities and platforms proved to be valuable but in short supply, but their numbers surged in both Iraq and Afghanistan as their value was recognized. Similarly, recognizing an unmet requirement, manned expeditionary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms were developed and fielded, including Task Force Odin and Project Liberty. Units also learned to employ different kinds of ISR capabilities according to their local environment.*

> *Because the traditional intelligence effort tended to focus on enemy groups and actions, it often neglected "white" information about the population that was necessary for success in population-centric campaigns such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Local commanders needed information about ethnic and tribal identities, religion, culture, politics, and economics. Intelligence products provided information about enemy actions but were insufficient for other information needed at the local level. Furthermore, there were no pre-established priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) or other checklists or templates that could serve as first-order approximations for what units needed to know for irregular warfare. As a result, processes for obtaining information on "white" population-centric issues tended to be based on discovery learning, and were not consistently passed to follow-on units.*

LTG Flynn also recommended remarks by the CJCS Chairman, GEN (USA) Martin Dempsey, at the Joint Warfighting Conference 2012 (http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1698). I found one vignette of the Chairman to be particularly insightful: "It is telling that the first time I met someone from the State Department, I was a Lieutenant Colonel with 22 years of service. Today, you can hardly find a Lieutenant who hasn't worked with USAID, State, or Justice. And that is a very good thing."

Be sure to read COL Spracher's "From the Editor's Desk" in this *AIJ*. Bill is a FAO and brings some personal insights and perspectives to the broader topic of Cultural Intelligence. It's all about providing that "fingertip feel" that is so crucial for operational success.

The National Military Intelligence Association and Foundation held their annual National Military Intelligence Awards Banquet in May with several hundred attendees honoring the best in Military Intelligence. Nineteen of our nation's finest intelligence professionals were recognized by NMIA/NMIF and their parent organizations. Awards were given to personnel from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, the Guard and Reserves, and the national intelligence agencies. Also attending were the directors or deputies of these intelligence organizations/

units. If you want another source or insight into what is happening in today's Military Intelligence discipline, please attend next year's banquet. The individual recognition provided by these annual awards is a keystone of the Association/Foundation's charter. The accomplishments of these intelligence professionals and heroes have had an obvious and measurable impact on our nation's security. We are proud to be a part of that recognition process. This event also supports our Scholarship Program. Our next awards banquet will be on 19 May 2013; be sure to sign up on our website early (www.nmia.org).

NMIA would like to have you more active in the Association; if you live in the DC area you have the opportunity to participate in NMIA's National Capital Region Chapter. Our NMIA Chapters Chair, Cal Carnes (callandcarnes@cs.com), is leading an effort to get the chapter active again and offer a series of events of interest to our membership. Please contact Cal if you have interest and a bit of spare time; he can put you in touch with the Chapter President, Aaron Ortiz. For your planning purposes, the next NCR Chapter event will be held on 24 October at National Harbor.

Our spring 2013 National Intelligence Symposium (20-21 March 2013) provides a Community-wide overview of both substantive and resource developments and challenges impacting the intelligence mission. We are privileged to have the heads of the DoD intelligence agencies and the Service intelligence chiefs addressing how the IC will meet the dynamic demands on intelligence in the face of our country's security and budget challenges.

We are in the initial stages of planning for our Fall 2013 Symposium, likely to be held in September, which will be focused on "Identity Intelligence: The War of Identify and Counter Identity."

NMIA, in conjunction with IAFIE (International Association for Intelligence Education), is also conducting a one-day workshop on 15 November 2012 on "Intelligence Education and Training." We anticipate presentations from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, National Intelligence University, National Defense University, the IC schoolhouses, and an assortment of civilian colleges and universities which teach intelligence subjects. Dr. Mark Lowenthal will be the keynote speaker.

Joe Keefe

From the Editor's Desk…

This edition of *AIJ* focuses on a theme with which all present and former Foreign Area Officers can easily identify. "Cultural Intelligence and Regional Issues" speaks to the intersection between intelligence and foreign affairs, between warfighting in a kinetic sense and support to warfighting through diplomacy. During a May 2012 visit to the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA, Secretary of the Army John McHugh insisted that "language skills and cultural understanding are critical tools for accomplishing missions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. As the Army downsizes," McHugh continued, "soldiers with language skills will become even more critical to the force's mission success. The relevancy of this program—this entire mission—I think has never been greater… As our number and our footprint get smaller, I think we would expect those who remain behind to be more culturally aware, to be more adept at language."[1]

This priority of focus for FAOs and intelligence officers alike was echoed by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Director of DIA and NGA and also former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, during his keynote address at the most recent FAO Association annual black-tie dinner in April 2012. He asserted the main reason he accepted the invitation to speak was that he had always appreciated the tremendous contributions FAOs have made, and continue to make, to the overall U.S. intelligence effort. As a former Defense Attaché myself who was handed my diploma from the Joint Military Attaché School in 1993 by then-DIA Director Clapper, I need little convincing about the value of language capacity and foreign area expertise to both an MI soldier's career kitbag and our country's national security. Likewise, observers have often commented since 9/11 that more emphasis needs to be put on learning about the cultures and languages of the hard-to-predict next battleground, which puts a premium on HUMINT, that least sexy discipline that takes years to mature properly.

Secretary McHugh's expectation for "those who remain behind" reminds us that intelligence personnel often represent not only a significant portion of those who remain behind after a combat force departs an area of conflict, but also those who are infiltrated in at the onset of the conflict ahead of regular troops to lay the groundwork and conduct what we refer to as "intelligence preparation of the battlespace." American citizens will never forget news images of CIA and Special Forces personnel on horseback in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan in 2001, at the beginning of our nation's longest war, fought not against another nation-state but against international terrorists, or photo clips of a U.S. helicopter lifting off the roof of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, with an eclectic mix of U.S.

officials and South Vietnamese colleagues at the end of that previously longest war in 1975. Intelligence agents were likely part of the last contingent to escape that day, and some others stayed behind to continue their mission clandestinely.

The Defense Intelligence Agency just celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2011, and one of the iconic figures remembered when he passed away early that year was Army MG Homer Smith, the U.S Defense Attaché who oversaw that painful evacuation from Vietnam, along with efforts to assist orphan children and Vietnamese who had helped the U.S. government escape retribution at the hands of the new Communist regime. DIA has recently established a Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) within its Human Capital learning enterprise, which also consists of JMAS, JMITC (Joint Military Intelligence Training Center), and other elements. LREC is concentrating on developing intelligence personnel with cultural and regional expertise, while JMITC accomplishes this same goal in part through its longstanding Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program (CSITP), in which mid-level intelligence officers from all over the world come to DIA for seven weeks, mix with a cohort of U.S. intelligence students, and practice international engagement. Since 2008 I have been fortunate in being able to contribute a small part to the CSITP's 1-week National Intelligence Course by presenting a class titled "Intelligence Engagement: Valuing Cultural Differences," essentially a session on cultural intelligence in an international milieu. Similarly, at a more senior level, other foreign officers come to DIA to attend the 2-week International Intelligence Fellows Program (IIFP) at the National Intelligence University's Center for International Engagement, where they are able to explore such topics as intelligence support to combating terrorism and the role of intelligence in peace operations while rubbing shoulders with fellow students from U.S. combatant command J2s and select agencies of the IC.

The U.S. armed services now realize the importance of these special skills for their warfighters, providing a force multiplier in an era of declining budgets, personnel drawdowns, and unexpected missions around the world. For instance, in 2007 Army leadership directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G3 "to serve as executive agent in developing a service-wide solution for career continuum and pre-deployment learning about foreign cultures and languages. The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) was the response…now being implemented as an enterprise of culture and foreign language advisors (CFLAs) and training developers positioned in many TRADOC 'schoolhouses' and other training institutions to provide education in culture and language."[2] The U.S. Army

Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca, AZ, is a key gateway for this type of training. Its official publication, the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, just this spring published an edition titled "Language & Cultural Competency," which contains some excellent articles along the same lines as those included in this edition of *AIJ*. The Army is not the only service promoting such awareness. In August 2011 Defense Secretary Panetta sent a memo to all the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the COCOMs, and defense agencies stating: "Language, regional and cultural skills are enduring warfighting competencies that are critical to mission readiness in today's dynamic global environment. Our forces must have the ability to effectively communicate with and understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and local populations."[3]

In the last issue of the *Journal* you were given a preview of this issue with a provocative piece on "The Regional Knowledge System" by two professors from the U.S. Military Academy's Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, who discussed in part the establishment of West Point's Center for Languages, Cultures, and Regional Studies. COL Hummel had promised another article for this latest issue of *AIJ* titled "Intercultural Competence for Future Leaders: Addressing Cultural Knowledge and Perception at West Point," but her deployment to Afghanistan to assist its nascent military academy complicated collaboration with her co-authors. Now retired, she has passed the baton to two civilian professors who are finalizing that piece this fall for the next issue. Still, a wealth of outstanding manuscripts poured in when we announced the theme for the present issue, and I am pleased to offer them to you in the following pages.

We tried to "span the world" in this issue by encouraging submissions from every geographical region and from as many international authors as possible. As with other recent issues, China is well-represented. A Chinese graduate student here in the U.S. whom I met at a conference at National Defense University a couple of years ago, Xiuye Zhao, offers his country's perspective on the U.S. strategic position in East Asia. Almost as if written as a counterpoint, but strictly serendipitous, is an essay by Lt Col Donald Brunk of Air Combat Command on the appropriate U.S. response to China's emergence on the world scene. This article reflects a first in what we hope is a regular exchange with the FAO Association's journal *International Affairs*. I have arranged with the FAOA editor to provide him a regional-focused article from *AIJ* on occasion that can be reprinted in that organization's journal, and FAOA will reciprocate. This is just one more way professional associations with mutual interests and overlapping goals can cooperate. While on the subject of FAOA, let me announce here that this organization has just

presented the inaugural FAOA LTG Vernon A. Walters Award for the best NIU master's thesis in international affairs, area studies, foreign policy, critical language issues, FAO policy, attaché affairs, cultural intelligence, or a related topic. Named for an intelligence legend who also happened to be the first NMIA President in 1974, the award was presented at NIU's July 2012 graduation ceremony at the same time as a longstanding NMIA writing award. Our respective associations' journals offer their award winners the opportunity to have their work published. We are delighted there is a great deal of mutual admiration and collaboration between NMIA and FAOA, and this edition of *AIJ* epitomizes the sort of creative work valued by both.

Other articles in the following pages dealing with Asia include one by NIU faculty member Jim Dillard on cultural intelligence lessons learned from Vietnam and a historical treatise about the OSS's role in Korea by Bill Streifer, who also contributed an article about the OSS in Manchuria for the last issue of the *Journal*. Not to be outdone by the Chinese, we have a Russian contribution to this issue, with Boris Volodarsky revealing past KGB activities inside the U.S. His background as a former GRU and Spetsnaz (special forces) operative gives him bona fides to talk about such sensitive times in our bilateral history. Repeat *AIJ* author James McGinley of the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity examines development challenges in Afghanistan and compares them with similar efforts in Africa. East Asia expert Maj Joe Barry has turned an outstanding paper

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Submit a manuscript for consideration to the Editor
<aijeditor@nmia.org>

he wrote for the Air Command and Staff College on UN intelligence—a sensitive subject within that organization but less so than in the past—into an even better article for *AIJ*. I myself picked up on the theme of intelligence in the UN with a piece about my own time wearing a blue beret two decades ago in the remote Western Sahara, when the UN liked to talk about "culture" and the "information" function but shied away from admitting it was also in the "intelligence" business.

Africa receives a lot of attention in this issue with articles by recently retired Dutch Army MAJ Rob Sentse on his UN peacekeeping experience in Sudan, another on the seemingly never-ending conflict in Sudan by CPT Chris Collins, and one by repeat *AIJ* author Darlene Holseth on the threat posed by the terrorist group Al Shabaab in Somalia and other corners of East Africa. Moving across the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to the Middle East, Anita Rai of the UK discusses the ever-growing threat posed by Iran while SSgt Adam Furtado, recently returned from a deployment to Qatar, explores the uniqueness of that fairly tranquil oasis in the Gulf and explains what makes it different from some of its troubled neighbors also in the uncomfortable shadow of Iran. I must admit I was disappointed to have only one submission covering the part of the world I know best—Latin America—but regrettably the author's agency at the last minute pulled an incisive piece on the reemergence of the Falkland Islands controversy written by one of my NIU students. She has no clue why, but that is one of the factors with which I as editor of an unclassified private journal must grapple, i.e., authors who are government employees must have their manuscripts cleared for public release and occasionally there are hang-ups that are difficult to fathom. Consequently, you budding authors out there need to heed this warning: get your superiors on board early with your outside research and ensure you can convince them of the independent nature of writing for publication about potentially sensitive topics. In other words, this is precisely what is meant by the term "disclaimer."

We are fortunate to read in the following pages a couple of illustrious offerings that do not deal with a particular geographic region but are more universal in nature. Navy LT Danny Sheinis examines the connections between terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking. Army LT Nima Serrafan takes a creative look at using what he calls "brown teams" vice the more typical "red teams" in assessing the cultural repercussions of counterinsurgency.

Finally, as always, we are pleased to provide a smattering of articles that stray from our announced theme, with a couple harking back to a previous, highly popular issue on "Intelligence and the Rule of Law." Aspiring lawyer Allen Miller discusses Congressional oversight of the CIA and

Lee Lacy of the Army Command and General Staff College examines the WikiLeaks phenomenon in light of a similar high-visibility leak of a generation ago, the "Pentagon Papers." Moving to the education arena, Michael Landon-Murray holds forth on how certification for teaching intelligence might be accomplished, while Dusty Farned surveys, through a cultural lens, the controversial issue of ROTC returning to Ivy League campuses after an extended absence of several decades. We proudly offer another in a prolific series of World War I & II history pieces by Ken Campbell and, as usual, we present some outstanding book reviews and review essays.

In conclusion, I am confident you will find this issue of *AIJ* chock-full of illuminating essays that will whet the appetite of intelligence officers and FAOs alike (many of us qualify on both counts). Looking ahead, the second issue of the *Journal* for 2012 will focus on "Information Warfare." The two issues in 2013 will examine themes related to a past and a future NMIA event, respectively. The first will explore the theme "Intelligence/Information Support to Small Unit Operations" and the second "Intelligence Education and Training." We anticipate stimulating interest in the latter with our 1-day workshop on November 15 to be co-hosted by the local chapters of NMIA and

IAFIE (International Association for Intelligence Education), details of which are forthcoming. However, as a sneak preview, the always entertaining Dr. Mark Lowenthal has agreed to keynote the event; Mark kicked off a previous issue of *AIJ* with his provocative article on intelligence reform and transformation. Anyone interested in writing about any of the three themes above, or anything else for that matter, is encouraged to contact me or my Associate Editor, Kel McClanahan, at aijeditor@nmia.org.

Happy autumn and happy reading!

Bill Spracher

Notes
[1] Claudette Roulo, "Language Skills Critical to Mission Success," *Armed Forces News*, May 25, 2012 (accessed at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116502).
[2] Sterilla A. Smith, "From the Editor," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (PB 34-12-1), January-March 2012.
[3] Leon E. Panetta, "Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities in the Department of Defense (DoD)," memorandum to key DoD decision-makers, August 10, 2011.

National Intelligence University Commencement

The NMIA Award is presented to the student with the highest GPA in the Graduate and Baccalaureate programs**.**

Laura Viscomi of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence received the NMIA award for the NIU student with the highest GPA in the graduate program during the University's commencement ceremony on July 27, 2012. Presenting the award is NMIA board member and Awards Director, Col (USAF, Ret) Bill Arnold. Accepting on behalf of Ms. Viscomi, who was unable to attend, is Col (USAF) Doug Kiely, Associate Dean of the College of Strategic Intelligence.

Ensign Matthew Gann, U.S. Coast Guard, is presented the NMIA award for the NIU student with the highest GPA in the baccalaureate program during the University's commencement ceremony on July 27, 2012. Presenting the award is NMIA board member and Awards Director, Col (USAF, Ret) Bill Arnold. Ensign Gann was commissioned during the course of the school year.

Bolstering United Nations Intelligence:
Cultural and Structural Solutions

by Lt Col (USAF) Joseph A. Barry

The post-Cold War era has not witnessed the "end of history," but rather a period of protracted conflict and terrorism. Since 1991, intrastate violence has accounted for over 95 percent of conflict worldwide, and the United Nations (UN) has struggled to adjust to this change.[1] National-level services and counterterrorism operations have dominated the post-September 11 intelligence narrative, with little focus on UN intelligence efforts. Yet, it is the UN that continues to operate in the world's deadliest conflicts, such as the Congo, Darfur, and Lebanon. All together, the UN fields almost 121,000 personnel in 16 missions worldwide.[2] This number—as well as the $7.84 billion price tag—has increased five-fold in the past ten years.[3] Despite the enormous challenges the UN faces in securing sufficient financial and personnel contributions from its member states, now is the time to strengthen its intelligence capabilities. If the UN does not immediately embrace intelligence reform, it will not fulfill its charter commitment to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

This article examines the current state of UN intelligence in peacekeeping operations (PKO), and identifies two main areas of weakness. The first section examines cultural barriers that stigmatize intelligence collection, and recommends creating independent and openly acknowledged UN intelligence capabilities. The second section discusses structural limitations, focusing on intelligence sharing between the field and UN Headquarters in New York. In this section I advocate for a UN regional analysis center that leverages the resources of regional organizations. Such progress in cultural and structural barriers will measurably improve the quality of predictive intelligence UN leaders receive to prevent conflict and protect peacekeepers in the field.

The first step in improving UN intelligence must be to acknowledge openly the necessity of collecting intelligence. The word "intelligence" is rare to nonexistent within UN publications.[4] This issue is much larger than semantically replacing the word "intelligence" for "information." The UN enjoys a reputation of impartiality, legitimacy, and credibility that can enhance its ability to attract intelligence sources. Sources with useful information need an identifiable UN organization to approach. In *The Cloak and the Blue Beret*, Walter Dorn notes, "Many failures in the history of UN field operations might have been avoided had the UN taken a more forthright approach to intelligence and possessed a stronger mandate to gather information and improve its information gathering system."[5] Unless the UN empowers organic elements to develop their own sources and collection capabilities, it will continue to depend on the sporadic and conditional intelligence sharing of member nations.

While few doubt the value of intelligence in peacekeeping operations, the benefits of an independent UN intelligence capability may not be immediately apparent. The foremost concern is reliable and timely intelligence on force protection threats for peacekeepers in the field. The UN benefits from members states' intelligence, but the bureaucratic and technological hurdles of information sharing often slow dissemination of time-critical threat intelligence. Second, given its responsibility to broker peace agreements and verify treaty compliance, the UN needs its own means of verification. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq suffered from accusations that the U.S. controlled its intelligence. In the wake of the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) intelligence failure, critics throughout the international community accused U.S. intelligence agencies of manipulating information to justify the path to war. Whether or not this was true, the UN needs an independent means of intelligence to free itself from the agendas of any state or organization.

Editor's Note: See separate article in this issue on one particular UN mission, MINURSO, and the implications for "intelligence" activities there, by William C. Spracher.

CULTURAL BARRIERS TO UN INTELLIGENCE

There are five main cultural barriers to UN PKO intelligence collection: (1) Previous abuses by internal security services; (2) host nation sovereignty concerns; (3) mistrust among member states; (4)

peacekeepers' desire to maintain neutrality; and (5) bureaucratic hurdles. Each hurdle presents unique challenges and unique potential solutions. Combined, the five barriers undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the UN effort, which are the most valuable currencies peacekeepers have to protect the affected population.

"Intelligence" is still a dirty word in many parts of the world.

The first cultural barrier derives from the association of intelligence collection with abusive internal security services in repressive regimes. Many in the West do not realize that the majority of intelligence services throughout the world focus predominantly on internal security. Although Western nations have specialized internal security agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard), these agencies enjoy higher levels of legitimacy due in part to democratic standards of oversight and accountability.[6] In contrast, repressive internal security forces played an instrumental role in provoking the 1979 revolution in Iran and the Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, "intelligence" is still a dirty word in many parts of the world.

Sovereignty concerns are a second cultural barrier to UN intelligence. Member states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have been extremely wary of intelligence initiatives in the UN out of fear that Western states will use intelligence to interfere in their domestic affairs. Sensitivities to colonialism are understandable given the large number of PKOs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In times of crisis, political entrepreneurs and party elites find previous colonial powers as convenient targets for scapegoating. Political opportunists in the developing world are quick to brand any disagreement or controversy with the developed world as a "new campaign of colonialism." European contingents operating in these countries must be mindful of their colonial history in carrying out their actions. Even for the U.S., previous support of corrupt dictators has generated widespread mistrust of American intentions. African mistrust of U.S. motives, for example, have frustrated attempts to locate the headquarters of U.S. Africa Command on the African continent.

Rivalry and tension between member states is a third cultural barrier to UN intelligence. Adversary intelligence monitoring is an understandable barrier to cooperation. In 1992 the U.S. stymied a proposal from the European Community, Russia, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand to create the Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI) within UN Headquarters.[7] Since then, counterintelligence concerns and infighting led to the elimination of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Information and Research (I&R) Unit, and inhibited the effectiveness of the Office of Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance's Early Warning Unit.[8]

Diverse cultures and agendas within coalitions further complicate UN intelligence. Angela Gendron notes in "The Ethics of Intelligence in Peace Support Operations": "A member state's unwillingness to accept an assessment which ran contradictory to their own preferred political position can impede operational efficiency if it leads, as it did in the Bosnian conflict, to a reduction in operation and intelligence sharing between alliance partners."[9] Even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faces coordination and integration problems with unanimous consent—despite being one of the most cohesive alliances in the world. At one point during Operation ALLIED FORCE, the Netherlands prevented the coalition from targeting Slobodan Milosevic's house because of a Rembrandt painting inside.[10] NATO operations in Libya revealed similar rifts between members regarding their willingness to use military force against the Qadhafi regime.

The fourth barrier to UN intelligence stems from the desire to maintain neutrality among the belligerents. The UN cannot function without its credibility as an impartial peace broker. However, once the UN has made the difficult decision to declare a particular state or faction as hostile, peacekeepers must assume those factions will view any intelligence collection against it as acts of war. The August 2011 attack by Boko Haram on the UN headquarters in Nigeria is only the latest in an increasing list of attacks on peacekeeping operations. The 1994 targeting of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda, the 2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in Iraq, and multiple attacks in Darfur and against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon illustrate this unfortunate trend. As Lakhdar Brahimi commented after the 2007 targeting of UN buildings in Algeria, "I think the UN has been on notice that its flag is not anymore a guarantee for protection."[11]

The growing role of non-state actors in conflict resolution further complicates the status of neutrality for UN PKOs. The number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) grew exponentially from 29,000 worldwide in 1995 to over two million in the U.S. alone in 2000.[12] This rise is not without controversy. The Red Cross has received enormous criticism for providing first aid lessons to the Taliban.[13] When these organizations require security escorts and emergency evacuation support, it places a burden on the UN or a national military force to rescue them. Additionally, NGOs that rely on local security contractors

risk enriching warlords and other factions that detract from the security development of the nascent state. Nadia Schadlow sums up this problem in *There Is No Neutral*: "Neutral assistance provided in areas that bad actors control is often diverted to armed groups, which also seek to take credit for any assistance that does make it to the population."[14] The 2011-12 famine in Somalia exemplifies these concerns, with the Islamist Al Shabaab organization allowing aid organizations to operate on very selective (and inconsistent) terms, and with a fledgling government vying with former warlords for power and influence.

Editor's Note: See separate article in this issue on Al Shabaab by Darlene M. Holseth.

> ***Rivalries discourage intelligence-sharing agreements and hinder development of cross-cutting information technology architectures.***

The fifth obstacle to UN intelligence is bureaucratic and technical inefficiencies. Multiple states in a coalition often arrive with incompatible computer systems, communications networks, and encryption standards. Additionally, counterproductive policies worsen coalition intelligence cooperation. Competition among states stifles the habitual relationships necessary for integrated command and planning efforts. Rivalries discourage intelligence-sharing agreements and hinder development of cross-cutting information technology architectures. Without multinational intelligence sharing, the UN is reliant on limited (and highly conditional) bilateral exchanges with key states. Mistrust among states often leads to the situation where the most capable intelligence producers can only share intelligence under the most urgent emergencies.

When combined, these five barriers result in several common traits of UN intelligence products. First, the reports focus on tactical and perishable information similar to a U.S. Army spot report (SPOTREP). Such reports provide basic information such as the size, activity, location, and time of an event. Second, because of the incompatible systems within the PKO, the information is pushed via the lowest common denominator, i.e., over unclassified and unofficial networks, to ensure maximum dissemination. Third, intelligence processes such as collection management, collection requirements, and product dissemination are handled in an informal and ad hoc manner—by officers with varying degrees of training and competency. Despite the UN's best efforts, intelligence warning often arrives too late for peacekeepers on the ground. Ugandan Major General Francis Okello, the former force commander for the African Union Mission in Somalia, lists intelligence sharing as one of the biggest problems he encountered.[15] To date, Uganda and Burundi have lost over 250 soldiers in Somalia.[16]

REDUCING THE STIGMA OF UN INTELLIGENCE

The intelligence stigma resulting from fear of repression *should* be the easiest barrier to overcome given the UN's compatible goal with the population to prevent mass atrocities. However, the bottom-up flow of intelligence from local sources introduces its own risks and challenges. An at-risk population may not trust a UN force containing members of former imperial states, or from states that previously supported the abusive regime in power. Therefore, UN forces must have an effective strategic communications and public outreach strategy that is coordinated with its tactical activities of field patrols and civil affairs engagement. The UN should consider nominating leaders of PKOs from member states with the least historical controversy.

A second challenge for UN intelligence is protecting informants' identities. The WikiLeaks affair highlighted the concern of jeopardizing intelligence sources—not to mention their families, tribes, and villages. Yet, there are many concrete steps to protect sources. The first approach is to promote anonymous reporting mechanisms. In Iraq, coalition forces developed a telephone hotline for Baghdad residents to report crime and terrorism information anonymously.[17] With proper safeguards, online social media platforms provide another means to pass information.[18] In the judicial realm, identity protection options include hiding witness' identities in court, and allowing remote testimony via video teleconference. More complex options include witness protection programs. In the event of the worst-case scenario of a source getting killed, source handlers can provide death benefit payments for the surviving family members.

Host nation sovereignty concerns pose a multifaceted challenge to UN intelligence. The UN should not expect full or consistent cooperation from governments that are committing atrocities. The UN will enter most operations cautiously and with an escalatory policy of employing violence. Therefore, most PKOs have an initial phase with a relatively permissive environment to conduct operations and collect information. The UN must act decisively in this narrow time window to set future conditions for success— preferably without antagonizing belligerents. Neutrality cannot outweigh the UN's overall responsibility to protect—especially in conflicts where there is a clear aggressor committing the preponderance of violence.

Increasing transparency is an effective means for peacekeepers to address host nation sensitivities over sovereignty. The foundational Status Agreement between the host nation and the UN is an appropriate place to address these sensitivities. If possible, the leaders of the PKO should develop a fixed information-sharing agreement with the host nation before operations commence. Establishing rules of engagement increases trust and also delineates boundaries that, when breached, provide a feedback mechanism indicating a government has changed its willingness to cooperate. Although transparency is a valuable aspect of confidence building, spoiler parties often conduct their activities clandestinely; hence, detecting clandestine spoiling activities often requires clandestine means of collection.

Collecting intelligence in a non-obtrusive manner is another step to reduce host nation sensitivities. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is passive, plentiful, and extremely insightful. Belying the popular image of James Bond, OSINT accounts for over 90 percent of all intelligence collected worldwide.[19] OSINT media monitoring is the least controversial collection method because it does not involve secretive methods. OSINT has the added benefit of being one of the cheapest and easiest intelligence means. The vast amount of information available lends itself to the wide variety of intelligence pertinent to contemporary conflicts. Whereas clandestine sources tend to focus on adversary military forces and equipment, open sources are often better postured for multidisciplinary examinations of political, humanitarian, and socio-economic developments—information that is more relevant to internal conflicts.

> *Prior to establishing a PKO, UN leadership should invite as many member states into the planning process as possible to forge agreements on the intelligence framework.*

Tension among member states is a pervasive obstacle to all forms of UN cooperation. Although it is preferable to conduct integrated campaigns, disjointed and inefficient intelligence is better than none at all. UN leaders must accept whatever intelligence contributions participating states are willing (or able) to provide. Prior to establishing a PKO, UN leadership should invite as many member states into the planning process as possible to forge agreements on the intelligence framework. This usually requires planners to keep classification levels low to maximize intelligence sharing among coalition participants.[20]

Regional organizations offer great potential to bolster the legitimacy of PKOs in their affected regions. Regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Organization of American States (OAS) can strengthen the credibility of an operation that would otherwise appear as externally motivated. Regional organizations are relatively cohesive (although not without internal tensions) and robust—compared to the UN—in terms of financial resources. Regional organizations' direct access and keen cultural intelligence are often a better venue for addressing intraregional tension than external intervention.

The Secretary General should form a commission on strengthening UN intelligence capabilities and capacity. The commission members should include experts with direct PKO experience across the UN interagency. The meetings would provide a valuable forum to highlight the need to institutionalize UN intelligence collection and solicit states to increase their contributions. Cultural barriers will not disappear overnight, but the discussions will offer many opportunities to forge compromises to bolster UN intelligence. The UN does not have any time to lose.

TOWARD AN OPTIMAL UN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

The best way to describe the current UN intelligence construct is a pyramid with an extremely wide base of thousands of data sources, all filtering up to very few leaders at the top. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is the senior UN member in-country to whom all PKO intelligence/information ultimately flows. PKO members commonly have access to sources in the field to augment national-level intelligence from member states. They also have an entire universe of OSINT, ranging from tactical-level reporting to operational and strategic analysis by think tanks, scholars, NGOs, etc. The Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) collates situation reports and other operational information through analysis—focusing on medium- to long-term threats to the PKO's mandate.[21] The Joint Operations Center (JOC) integrates JMAC intelligence with the greater operational and logistical effort.[22] The JMAC provides leaders at UN Headquarters with a point of contact in each PKO.[23]

At UN Headquarters, the DPKO's Situation Center (SitCen) forwards reports to decision-makers. Kofi Annan founded the SitCen in 1993 during the optimistic era of the UN's peacekeeping role. Its staff of 24 personnel means that anywhere from one person to only a few on each shift are responsible for entire regions of the world.[24] The small staffs at the individual JMACs and the DPKO SitCen replicate the work performed by over a thousand personnel

in a U.S. Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) at a theater command. Tellingly, the SitCen's Operations Room has three desks—two for Africa, and *one* for the rest of the world.[25] This places a heavy burden on the SitCen to provide *predictive* intelligence, especially for transnational crises transcending a single operation or region. This is not an optimal structure to inform the UN leadership.

The SitCen's mandate illustrates the inherent structural problems of UN intelligence. One of its mission statements includes: "To facilitate communications between senior decision makers and field managers." Another mandate states: "To support field level [JOCs] and [JMACs] with technical policy guidance."[26] The other mandates include informing UN Headquarters and other regional organizations such as the AU, European Union (EU), and NATO. In other words, Headquarters-level UN analysts must reach into the tactical levels of information and simultaneously conduct liaison with operational and strategic-level entities. This is too much for a small staff to perform.

> *The regional focus of JICs has demonstrably improved intelligence support to U.S. operations.*

British and American operational (or "theater")-level intelligence organizations provide the global scope necessary to support worldwide operations—and offer an analytical model for the UN's international peacekeeping role. The British devised theater intelligence centers to manage their colonial affairs across the globe, with the goal of bringing multiple disciplines and national agencies together.[27] The U.S. developed Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) after World War II to account for its new role as the Western leader against communism. Yet, even among strong allies, there are domestic sensitivities with the word "intelligence." Revealingly, the U.S. European Command features a combined Joint *Analysis* Center (JAC) in Molesworth, UK (avoiding the word *Intelligence*). Beyond solely making a virtue out of necessity, the term "analysis center" better describes the unifying purpose behind intelligence collection: to equip leaders with awareness of the situation to make informed decisions.

The regional focus of JICs has demonstrably improved intelligence support to U.S. operations. Through much of its history, the U.S. Army and Navy conducted essentially independent wars in their assigned regions of control, and practiced relatively little intelligence sharing. Despite the statutory requirement for joint integration (codified into law through the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act), the Cold

War induced new concerns that "excessive" sharing risked compromising sensitive intelligence. By the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Central Command was not adequately equipped to handle the intelligence demands of Operation DESERT STORM, and GEN (USA) Norman Schwarzkopf brought in help from the Pentagon.[28] However, veteran CIA analyst James Marchio argues that the combined lessons learned from Korea, Vietnam, and DESERT STORM brought improved JIC support in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the no-fly zone missions over Iraq.[29]

Regional intelligence centers foster interagency and multinational cooperation, which is a prerequisite for today's multifaceted counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. In 2003 DoD launched the Remodeling Defense Intelligence (RDI) initiative to better synchronize intelligence with operations.[30] The RDI initiative reorganized JICs into Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) at each geographic and functional combatant command. This restructuring addressed a common complaint that intelligence analysts are too isolated from their customers, and often produce intelligence for "intelligence's sake," rather than to support operations or decision-making. Former Director of National Intelligence John M. ("Mike") McConnell succinctly captured the overall post-September 11 philosophy of the U.S. Intelligence Community with the motto: "From a culture of need to know to a culture of responsibility to provide."[31] These lessons learned can benefit UN intelligence efforts as well. It is not realistic for the UN to conduct theater-level intelligence *collection*, but a theater (i.e., continent-wide) *analytical* focus informing UN decision-makers on regional trends of terrorism, ethnic violence, crime, resource depletion, etc., could be a valuable means to predict and shape future peacekeeping operations.

BOOSTING UN ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

Although there are many considerations in the journey of intelligence from tactical-level collection to strategic-level dissemination, the intermediate and regional levels are key toward strengthening UN capacity. It is in the analysis, evaluation, and distribution phases where the UN continues to experience difficulties. Given the large amount of tactical information produced, the challenge is to ensure an effective filter for the intelligence entering UN Headquarters—or at least for the reports decision-makers see. As Colleen Duggan states in *UN Strategic and Operational Coordination*, "Many opportunities for early warning and the prevention of violent conflict are missed because of the UN's inability to effectively collate and analyze the information managed in different corners of the organization."[32]

Opinions differ on the quality of UN tactical intelligence. As Maj Gen Patrick Cammaert, the former Military Advisor to the UN Secretary General who hails from the Royal Netherlands Marines, mentioned, "Information gathering never has been the problem in UN Peacekeeping: our UNMOs (UN Military Observers) are top-class HUMINT people."[33] A study on UN intelligence noted, "JMACs have demonstrated that the UN is capable of producing high-quality and relevant intelligence assessments when given the necessary mandate and human resources."[34] However, André Roux, Peace Mission Planning Officer in the South African National Defence Force, notes: "The real weakness [in UN intelligence collection] still lies at the tactical level."[35] An officer with experience in UN field missions expressed to the author the opinion that the ad hoc nature of collecting, managing, and analyzing information (often dependent on an individual employee's skill, experience, and work ethic) is an even greater challenge than the international politics impacting the ability to conduct intelligence operations.[36] These differences in opinion notwithstanding, the key to proper analysis for the UN resides between the field and Headquarters.

An intermediate-level UN information center between the field and Headquarters is not a new concept. In 2000 Lakhdar Brahimi issued a groundbreaking report on UN peace and security operations. Entitled *Report on United Nations Peace Operations*, it is now commonly referred to as the "Brahimi Report." Among the many recommendations, Brahimi proposed an information-gathering and analysis body within the DPKO formed by the consolidation of functional experts throughout the Headquarters.[37] He also called for an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) with personnel throughout the UN interagency during a conflict, forming a planning and operations organization. Crucially, the IMTF would serve between the PKOs in the field and the DPKO at UN Headquarters.[38]

Although Brahimi correctly observed the need for intermediate-level analytical entities, his recommendations did not go far enough. The main problem is that the IMTF would not be a permanent body, but a collection of dispersed personnel that only meets temporarily. Secondly, it would only form during a crisis, which is a decidedly reactive posture. To truly blunt conflict before it spreads, the UN needs a permanent, regionally-focused body continually monitoring events and disseminating prioritized intelligence to decision-makers.

Building from the Brahimi Report, in July 2009 the UN DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS) released a non-paper titled *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. Acknowledging "the

scale and complexity of peacekeeping today are mismatched with existing capabilities," the authors cite the need for timely, accurate, and detailed analysis of the situation on the ground to provide early warning of emerging threats.[39] The paper makes several recommendations on pre-mission coordination of PKO-contributing states, information-sharing agreements, and the use of regional organizations to pool scarce resources and capabilities. The latter recommendation deserves more attention.

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Within the world of UN intelligence, regional organizations offer a promising venue to jumpstart the concept of an operational-level Regional Analysis Center (referred to hereafter as RAC). It may seem unrealistic to propose a regional UN intelligence center given the cultural impediments and the perennial lack of funding and manpower in the UN. The financial crisis in the West will only tighten national purse strings, and sensitivities among both the great powers and the NAM states will remain. Yet, challenging times demand creative solutions to gain efficiencies in personnel and resources. A RAC would not need a large staff to perform analytical work, and the scope of its collection could be scaled according to the dictates of the region (which would admittedly favor OSINT in most cases).

Effective humanitarian operations and management of human intelligence sources require close proximity to the conflict area. A RAC should be physically located in the region—rather than in another office at UN Headquarters in New York. The UN organizes according to five regional commissions: Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, and Western Asia. Fortunately, each of the five regions offers candidate organizations that are robust enough to host a small analytical cell. This would address a deficiency noted in the *New Partnership Agenda* that the lack of UN peacekeeping's regional representation hinders building long-term contacts, and makes expanding the pool of contributing states more difficult.[40]

Regional organizations would bypass many of the cultural stigmas affecting UN intelligence. The legitimacy of the regional organizations would further enhance the credibility of the PKO and mitigate concerns of host nation sovereignty. To reduce mistrust among participant states, these organizations would be ideal venues for the UN to negotiate the scope of collection, the extent of sharing, and the means of oversight and accountability. Such agreements, made before standing up the regional intelligence center, would go a long way toward addressing mistrust between member nations.

Collocation would be mutually beneficial for both the UN and the regional organization. From the UN perspective, a preexisting organization would reduce the cost of maintaining a separate facility. The UN could also leverage the manpower of the regional organization to reduce administrative costs. The UN DFS has proposed regional service centers to consolidate administrative and support functions, and to work with regional organizations to pool logistical resources and other strategic capabilities.[41] Bertrand Ramcharan, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has proposed "Regional Rapporteurs" from each UN Regional Commission report to the UN Security Council and the Secretary General on emerging threats to peace.[42] Taking this concept a step further, these reporteurs would be well-suited as RAC directors.

Collocation could also bolster the humanitarian response capacity of member states in that region. The 2006 *UN Global Survey of Early Warning Systems* noted, "Regional organisations are crucial to linking international capabilities to the particular needs of individual countries and in facilitating effective early warning practices among adjacent countries."[43] Africa would be an interesting case study since its sub-regional organizations including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) are more cohesive than the AU itself. A UN analytical organization looking at the entire continent would provide an opportunity to solidify the AU's interoperability with these sub-regional organizations.

> *Far from being just a passive receiver of information, the RAC could proactively and dynamically focus intelligence gathering.*

Utilizing RACs would benefit UN intelligence in three main ways. First, it would filter the uneven quality of information and intelligence reports (which is endemic to all intelligence organizations). Second, the RAC would identify security trends ranging from short-term to long-term and from micro-level to macro-level. A regional-level organization would look beyond a singular state or sub-region, and would be well postured to monitor transnational sources of conflicts. Third, far from being just a passive receiver of information, the RAC (assuming it had the authority to contact and provide feedback to source handlers and collection managers) could proactively and dynamically focus intelligence gathering.

Having discussed the challenges of collection, analysis, and the merits of a RAC, the other half of the equation is equally important: delivering relevant and timely intelligence to decision-makers. The essential issue is the two-way relationship between the JMAC and UN Headquarters in New York. The RAC would assist UN Headquarters in prioritizing intelligence collection and reporting to decision-makers. A regional UN analytical center would alleviate the intelligence burden during crisis events that can overwhelm a small headquarters staff. The other issue is the organizational shape of the RAC. Horizontal and vertical intelligence organizational structures each have their merits and drawbacks, as we will soon examine.

In conflict prevention, delivering intelligence to higher leadership requires much more than sending an e-mail, writing a report, or presenting a briefing. Barnett Rubin, a leading expert on Afghanistan who has consulted for the UN and the U.S. State Department, has likened conflict prevention to building a political movement, and not "merely identifying causes and testing policy instruments."[44] Preventive intelligence is therefore not an end, but a means within a larger advocacy campaign. Therefore, the SitCen must pare down its tactical-level information gathering, and rebalance its efforts toward informing senior-level policy. The RAC would be the optimal place to identify, prioritize, and disseminate actionable intelligence for the SitCen.

Westerners typically equate vertical organizations with bureaucracy, inefficiency, and inaction—the same traits the UN seeks to avoid. The main challenge is determining the optimal number of layers in middle management based on the nature of the organization. In *Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s*, former CIA analyst Frederick Fleitz, Jr., complains: "Rather than simplify the thicket of bureaus supporting operations in the field, the [Brahimi] report called for the creation of a new layer of bureaucracy between the field and headquarters."[45] Yet, Brahimi did not propose a new layer so much as a new organization to better manage the intermediate level between field and Headquarters. RACs would remove the redundancy of the many entities contacting—and potentially overwhelming—the field. RACs would reduce the SitCen's need to sift through numerous field reports and other tactical minutia, and allow it more time to support senior decision-makers.

Beyond matters of speed and efficiency, intelligence organizations must also consider accuracy of their reporting, oversight, and accountability. Each of these requirements necessarily slows delivery of intelligence to improve analysis and prevent improper collection or jeopardizing sources. The UN needs to examine accountability not just for actions taken, but also for actions

not taken. Feedback is critical; an intelligence organization will not improve until its leaders expect analysts to explain why they missed a key event or trend, or to identify what factors led to an inaccurate assessment.

Conversely, Western commentators normally associate horizontal organizational structures with nimbleness and flexibility. The common perception is that terrorist groups and criminal networks out-smart and out-maneuver Western security forces based on their more adaptable structure.[46] In CT and COIN operations, U.S. Special Operations Forces organize into small teams with a flat structure, with each sub-organization enjoying direct access to the overall commander. Retired GEN (USA) Stanley McChrystal, the former Joint Special Operations Task Force leader and International Security Assistance Force commander in Afghanistan, recently commented, "In bitter, bloody fights in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it became clear to me and to many others that to defeat a networked enemy we had to become a network ourselves."[47]

> *The UN cannot perform conflict prevention without timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence. Moreover, the UN cannot continue to rely on key member states to provide force protection intelligence for its increasingly complex peacekeeping missions.*

One horizontal initiative that UN PKOs, JMACs, and RACs can adopt is local early warning. Compared to vertical systems that up-channel conflict warning and wait for international pressure from the UN and major powers to restrain abusive regimes, the local early warning model directly alerts the most motivated audience: potential victims.[48] This lateral warning structure is a common feature in natural disaster response, and is only recently catching on within human conflict. In *Conflict Early Warning: Warning Who?* Caey Barrs notes, "When civilians are forewarned about potential attack or abuse, they can better prepare their own evasive protection and discreet relief."[49] Although local early warning is an operational-to-tactical-level initiative, it reduces the burden of operational-to-strategic intelligence dissemination. The key enabler would be to empower the RAC to delegate decisions and authorities on intelligence sharing to the tactical levels. There is often little time to prevent mass atrocities and genocide. In peacekeeping as in bureaucracies, the best solutions often reside at the lowest levels of management.

BOLSTERING UN INTELLIGENCE: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated, "No task is more fundamental to the United Nations than the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Prevention, in particular, must be central to all our efforts."[50] The UN cannot perform conflict prevention without timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence. Moreover, the UN cannot continue to rely on key member states to provide force protection intelligence for its increasingly complex peacekeeping missions. Effective predictive intelligence on internal conflict improves the UN's chances of addressing internal conflict before it escalates into more complicated, costly, and deadly peacekeeping missions.

To be fair, the UN has gained an enormous amount of experience in PKOs and has a lot to offer national militaries involved in similar conflicts. Many nations share the UN's struggles with bureaucracy, competing subordinate organizations, and suspicion of other states. Even strong alliances have reservations about intelligence collection. The *NATO Handbook* references intelligence only on two pages out of 536, and the alliance only selectively shares information among members.[51] National militaries and intelligence services would do well to tap into the UN's vast experience in employing diverse coalitions to tackle intrastate violence, insurgencies, and terrorism. In *Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations?* the authors note the UN's advantage "that they do not have to re-educate an already well-established intelligence community deeply rooted in a traditional intelligence culture."[52]

The cultural and structural obstacles to UN intelligence are daunting, but not insurmountable. In the final analysis, cultural barriers to intelligence will be the most difficult to overcome, and these barriers will influence any organizational structure the UN attempts to construct. As the largest voting block in the General Assembly, the NAM states will continue to view intelligence collection as a threat to their sovereignty. The best solutions will acknowledge the financial and manpower deficiencies of the UN, and emphasize its strengths in international credibility and legitimacy. Regional organizations can play a large role in overcoming these barriers, and by helping RACs filter the tremendous amount of tactical collection into focused, actionable intelligence for UN decision-makers.

Given the comparatively robust capabilities of national intelligence services, there are many lessons learned that can inform UN intelligence initiatives. Regional-level intelligence centers have served the U.S. and the UK well,

and are an effective model for the UN. The RAC concept in this paper may seem overly ambitious but it serves as a useful planning concept. The cultural, financial, and manpower problems endemic to the UN are precisely why regional organizations offer so much potential to accelerate the RAC concept. In pursuing intelligence reform, the UN must not blindly seek efficiencies at the expense of proper oversight, reporting accuracy, and accountability for results.

Although the UN must quickly embrace reform, it must conduct this reform with adequate deliberation. The WikiLeaks controversy has led some in the U.S. Congress to ask why an Army private should have access to thousands of U.S. State Department cables. Yet, the key deficiency in U.S. intelligence after 9/11 was putting the pieces of the information puzzle together through interagency coordination.[53] Bureaucrats have a remarkable ability to forget recent lessons learned when they are responding to the crisis of the day. The WikiLeaks affair remains a cautionary tale for UN intelligence efforts in source protection, striking the correct balance between collection and sharing, and enacting reforms based on reasoned analysis and long-term perspective.

Despite the enormous challenges in confronting contemporary and future conflict, the international community cannot throw its collective hands in the air because the problem seems "too hard" to solve. As Pasi Välimäki from the Finnish National Defence College in Helsinki notes, "The question of organizing intelligence within the UN will have to be solved sooner or later…as UN troops will not be able to manage new-generation missions without situation descriptions that are obtainable with the minimum of delay and integrated intelligence systems to support decision-making."[54] The sooner the UN embraces intelligence reform, the better it will fulfill its mission to protect future generations from the scourges of war.

Notes

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[16] Charles Onyango-Obbo, "Somalia is Sweet and Sour Business for Burundi, Uganda," *The East African*, March 15, 2011.
[17] Although there have been competing claims about the efficacy of the Baghdad tip line, hundreds of Baghdad residents use it each month (Sharon Weinberger, "Iraq's Terror Hot Line," *Wired*, September 7, 2007).
[18] Admittedly, online communications are a double-edged sword as witnessed by the widespread reporting of the role social media played in the Egyptian uprising that ousted Hosni Mubarak. Yet, at the same time accusations swirled that Iran aided Syria with Internet surveillance to identify protest leaders.
[19] Susanna Campbell and Patrick Meier, "Deciding to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decision-making within the United Nations," International Studies Association Conference, Chicago, IL, February 22, 2007, p. 5.
[20] The JIOC has adopted a stay-low policy (Tyler Akers, "Taking Joint Intelligence Operations to the Next Level," *Joint Force Quarterly*, December 2007).
[21] UN DPKO – Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, January 2008, p. 71.
[22] UN DPKO – Department of Field Support, *Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)*, January 2010, p. 8.
[23] An officer with experience in UN field missions informed the author that JOC and JMAC personnel are resource-challenged in most missions due to lack of standardized processes and tools to collect and analyze information gathered from disparate organizations throughout the mission, and PKO forces (those most able to act) are often left out of the information loop.
[24] Melanie Ramjoué, op. cit., p. 483.
[25] Giselle Chang, "Peacekeeping, the Agency that Never Sleeps," United Nations Association of the United States of America, August 19, 2009.

[26] United Nations Peacekeeping, 2011, available online at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/info/sitcentre.shtml (accessed February 29, 2012).

[27] Herman, op. cit., p. 164.

[28] Richard Davis, *On Target: Organizing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign Against Iraq*, Washington, DC, Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002, p. 224.

[29] James Marchio, "Support to Military Operations: The Evolution and Relevance of Joint Intelligence Centers," *Studies in Intelligence*, 2005, Vol. 49, No. 1, p. 53.

[30] Carlos Munoz, "DoD Overhauls Commands' Intel Operations," *InsideDefense.com*, April 7, 2006, available online at http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,93617,00.html (accessed February 1, 2011).

[31] Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), "United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy," February 22, 2008, p. 3.

[32] Colleen Duggan, "UN Strategic and Operational Coordination: Mechanisms for Preventing and Managing Violent Conflict," in *Conflict Prevention: Vol. 1, From Rhetoric to Reality,* ed. Albrecht Schnable and David Carment, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2004.

[33] Patrick Cammaert, *UN Peacekeeping and Intelligence – No Longer a Secret*, address to Swedish Military Academy, Stockholm, December 2004.

[34] Melanie Ramjoué, op. cit., 482.

[35] Andre Roux, op. cit., p. 23.

[36] Comments provided to the author on February 6, 2012.

[37] The proposed name for this group is EISAS: The ECPS (Executive Committee on Peace and Security) Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat.

[38] United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, August 21, 2000, p. 35.

[39] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations – Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon For UN Peacekeeping*, July 2009, p. iii.

[40] Ibid, p. 33.

[41] Ibid, pp. 35, 43.

[42] Bertrand Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the UN*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008, p. 75.

[43] International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), *Global Survey of Early Warning Systems*, 2006, p. 3.

[44] Barnett Rubin, "Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action," New York: The Century Foundation/Council on Foreign Relations, 2002, pp. 37-38.

[45] Frederick Fleitz, Jr., *Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002, pp. 86-87.

[46] Moses Naim's "Five Wars of Globalization" is a seminal think-piece on using a network response for fighting criminal and terrorist networks, *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2003, pp. 28-36.

[47] Stanley McChrystal, "It Takes a Network," *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2011.

[48] A real-world example comes from Ethiopia, where a field monitor reported on a tribal leader conducting a pre-raid ceremony blessing an attack on an adjacent pastoral tribe. Security forces arrived and forestalled the raid. Douglas Bond and Patrick Meier, "PKI for the Stakeholders," in *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries*, New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 133).

[49] Caey Barrs, "Conflict Early Warning: Warning Who?" *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance,* February 2006, p. 5.

[50] Bertrand Ramcharan, op. cit., p. xxvii.

[51] Michael Herman, "Intelligence Doctrine for International Peace Support," in *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future,* p. 162.

[52] Per Martin Norsheim-Martinsen and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations? The Evolution of UN and EU Intelligence Structures," *International Peacekeeping*, August 2011, pp. 454-467.

[53] 9/11 Commission, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States – Authorized Edition* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, July 22, 2004, paperback edition, p. 570).

[54] Pasi Välimäki, "Intelligence Peace Support Operations," National Defence College, Helsinki, Finland, 2000, p. 66.

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The African Boulevard of Broken Dreams

by MAJ (Ret) Rob Sentse, Royal Netherlands Army

Two major and interlinked issues of note include the perceived necessity to review the focus of current military engagement by both NATO and the EU, and the strategic importance of both the African Continent and the Atlantic Ocean, which are in fact interrelated and of vital importance to Europe. It is critical to increase serious investments in port facilities and services on the western seaboard of the African Continent, and in so doing to forge affiliations with the African States based on enduring historic relationships. We must deepen these relationships, with due recognition of national needs, heritage, and ambitions, and thus strengthen regional blocks of like-minded African nations. This article will try to fuel crucial discussions for unconventional and progressive approaches instead of characterizing them as "enemy thinking" or "perceived hostile acts."

> *It has already been established that the African continent has the fastest growing population in the world.*

It has already been established that the African continent has the fastest growing population in the world.[1] This boom will cause Africa to surpass both China's and India's populations by 2025, less than 15 years away. The combined populations of Asia,[2] including China and India, will still exceed Africa's.

This underlines the importance of the Indian Ocean as an economic lifeline for India[3] and China to shape the conditions for crucial logistical lifelines. The expected population boom in Asia is also the reason for China to invest in harbor facilities along the East African coastline. But did you ever have a look at how Europe and the U.S. are securing their logistical lifelines along the West African coastline? If we look out to the year 2100, globally one in three people will be of African descent despite the likelihood that fertility rates will continue to decrease. Lower rates of mortality and increasing lifespan also contribute to the growing population on this vast continent. Within the continent, the populations of the eastern, western, and central regions will grow at a faster rate than the northern and southern regions. In 2050, the populations of the eastern and western African nations are expected to exceed 650 million each.

Large population booms bring both advantages and disadvantages. Urbanization will be a key challenge in the near future as 70 percent[4] of all African urban population growth is expected to be in smaller cities and those with populations of less than half a million. This is where the real urban transition of Africa is about to take place. Therefore, smaller cities will need increasing public investment to cater to this expected growth pattern.

If anything, worldwide, urbanization[5] has been associated with expectations in terms of improved human development, rising incomes, and better living standards. However, these benefits do not come automatically. They require well-devised public policies that steer demographic growth, create healthy urban economies, and ensure equitable distribution of wealth. However, if that cannot be achieved within a realistic time span, we might see an altogether different scenario develop. As the U.S. economy is struggling, Europe and the euro face financial uncertainty while China constructs ghost cities to artificially inflate its GDP. To say that investors face a challenge is an understatement. However, there is one place that most U.S. and EU investors have never considered in their investment planning. The continent of Africa is arguably the most under-invested and under-researched economic region in the world. Too many U.S. and EU investors suffer from a myopic global outlook that rarely extends past the east or west coast except perhaps to the shores of Europe.[6]

Moreover, from a business perspective, it is China and India that especially embrace the opportunities in large, growing consumer markets. Africa is one of them.[7] The African labor force is growing. Historically, Africa has been disadvantaged because most of its people were under the age of 15 years. For example, the number of people in the workforce in Africa currently is around 55 percent compared to about 70 percent in China. This is now changing as these young populations are maturing. By the

middle of this century it is expected that between 62 and 65 percent of the African population will be part of this workforce while the percentage of China's workforce will fall well below this figure as its population ages. China is very much aware of this challenge. This changing workforce has the potential to give Africa a distinct advantage globally, but also to require governments and private sector to proactively address the need for jobs to provide sustainable livelihoods. Like many countries, this issue is already being felt by African nations requiring new innovative solutions to this growing need.

In March 2006 Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) produced a report setting out projections for potential growth in GDP in 17 leading economies over the period to 2050. These projections were updated in March 2008. In 2010 PWC[8] reviewed these projections again in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. PWC's key conclusion is that the global financial crisis has further accelerated the shift in global economic power to the emerging economies. Measured by GDP[9] in "purchasing – power – parity" (PPP[10]) terms, which adjusts for price level differences across countries, the largest E7 emerging economies seem likely to be bigger than the current G7 economies by 2020, and China seems likely to overtake the U.S. by that date. India could also overtake the U.S. by 2050 on this PPP basis.

The PWC model's assumption is that long-term trend growth is driven by the following four factors:

- Growth in the physical capital stock (capital investment net of depreciation).
- Growth in the labor force of working age (consult the 2009 UN population projections[11]).
- Total factor productivity (TFP) growth, which is measured in Technology Growth and Efficiency regarding technological progress and catching up.
- Increase in average education levels across the adult population.

As such, the PWC Report notes that India's growth trend is expected to overtake China's at some point during the next decade. However, India will only fully achieve this anticipated potential if it continues to pursue the growth-friendly economic policies of the last two decades. The PWC Report's authors argue that particular priorities should be in maintaining a prudent fiscal policy stance, further extending its openness to foreign trade and investment, significantly increased investment in transport and energy infrastructures, and improved educational standards, particularly for women and those in the rural areas of India. In this particular area of gender-related

issues, India as well as most African countries (and most Middle Eastern countries alike) share a very similar cultural challenge.

Consequently, what will the answer of the "Coalition of the Willing" look like? The question here is whether this "coalition" is "willing" to evolve its traditional military way of thinking into an interagency[12] way of acting in which the armed forces are to assist in shaping the conditions for development, economy, security and diplomacy. To achieve this, one has to develop an emphatic mindset concerning the ethics, values, norms, and cultures in the area of operations (AO) and in those areas that influence the AO directly or indirectly. For instance, the "developed" countries' perspective with regard to the African problems is quite different than the view the African world has (if one could speak about *Africans* as a generic term). The human nature and habit of perceiving worldwide problems from our own values and norms are one of the characteristics in which "we" recognize ourselves. The freedom and democracy "we" like to bring "them" is something "they" experience quite differently.

Let us have a quick scan of China's possible strategy to overcome its growing hunger for energy and labor forces. The Chinese perception on Unrestricted Warfare[13] (1999) provides remarkable insights: (page 6)

> When people begin to lean toward and rejoice in the reduced use of military force to resolve conflicts, war will be reborn in another form and in another arena, becoming an instrument of enormous power in the hands of all those who harbor intentions of controlling other countries or regions.

China is spending a significant amount of money and support in the form of infrastructure, like medical facilities in Afghanistan. The cooperation between China and Africa has grown with enormous speed (for instance, building a huge road network in Kenya). China is helping the deteriorating Greek economy (China will double its 5 billion dollar trade with Greece in the coming five years and will support the extension of key Greek harbor facilities). Cosco, a Chinese company, has a close cooperative relationship with Greece's Piraeus harbor and also shows interest in the Thessaloniki harbor. China sees these harbors as the gateway to Europe. Are the economical gateways of Italy and Turkey the next countries to be embraced by China's economic support?

We all have an opinion about China. Let us forget that opinion and have a look at China from the inside out. The symbol for China (chung) means "center." Traditionally and historically, China has never cared about what is outside its borders; in fact, the Chinese have enough to worry about domestically, although India gives them some worries…economically. Anything the Chinese government does outside of China has more to do with domestic issues than anything else. Its big issues are internal stability and the power struggle between central and local government, which is why the "Taiwan Card" is played to unify the country with a common enemy, although in reality the very same dynastic families control both countries. They are close, just not openly. In this way the Chinese government intelligently uses Europe and the U.S. like puppets on a string.

Chinese GDP is currently 50 percent property-related, which is not good. Half of the world's concrete is poured inside China. The fractional reserve ratio of the central bank is 12 percent, which is better than the U.S. ratio at 10 percent. Hence, the Chinese still can print lots of money based on that alone. This gives them a real edge when they go shopping. The side effect is inflation, which is quite high these days … because Chinese goods are being traded in U.S. dollars. Like other Asian countries, the Chinese tend to make the step to the euro as a trading currency.

Unlike many Europeans and Americans, the Chinese really do know history. For instance, the Chinese have been studying Rothschild and the history of the bank of England as a way to guide their present monetary policy. Chinese key leaders know all about gold and its value, which is why they have been "playing" the U.S. by liquidating their U.S. Treasury bond holdings, shorting the market, and then forcing physical delivery of gold and silver to China. This was the real cause of the recent U.S. diplomatic presence in Asia and why President Obama and others are so keen to show how much they want to invest in China. The U.S. and the European sphere of influence is decreasing as China buys up true value assets, from mines to production to know-how, on a truly epic scale. China, Russia, India, Brazil, and Venezuela have formed a pact to undermine the U.S. dollar as international business currency, and even now 50 percent of the oil from Saudi Arabia goes to China, which is indirectly traded in RMB (Chinese yuan) rather than the U.S. dollar.

The Chinese attitude about the world changed a while back and now the Chinese government understands that in order to maintain governance it needs to ensure economic growth. Without growth it all falls apart and the present government is finished. China has changed a great deal.

There are two distinct layers inside the Chinese government: the old guard that is rapidly falling away and the younger generation. The younger generation cares about good governance, is very well-educated, and is well-travelled. It wants the same standards as in the West and desires accountability. Based on sentiment analysis, i.e., what people are saying in electronic forums, etc., the old guard would use it to identify and eliminate opposition; the new guard would use it as a tool, not caring about individuals, and use it to stop problems before they become big by adapting policy to match public expectations. Hence, change inside China is happening everywhere.

The major area in which China could help the West is by international power-brokering. The U.S. still thinks it is the only power in the world; the reality is that no one trusts the U.S. any more after the Bush administration. Consequently, in an area like Iran, the only real player that could help is China. These are reasons enough to treat China as a serious partner and include it to stabilize Iran instead of bombing it back to the Stone Age, creating a massive load of insane terrorists.

And what about Africa? China's huge demand for Africa's commodities has created new opportunities for African governments to realize the hopes of their people (or the "elite"?) for a better life. Countries which set their house in order can position themselves to benefit, while those that do not will find their resources continuing to be simply a "curse"—with or without China, and widening the gap between poor and rich.

China has ratcheted up its manufacturing investment in Africa, where new industries are urgently needed to counter decades of deindustrialization *by neglect*. China has established investment funds to promote Chinese investment in Africa. Teams from China have visited Mauritius, South Africa, and elsewhere—scouting locations for enterprise zones and industrial districts, which would join Chinese industrial zones in Ethiopia, Zambia, and Nigeria with Chinese factories making batteries in

Mozambique, shoes in Nigeria, ethyl alcohol in Benin, and a host of other products across the continent. It would be interesting to investigate how China is handing over to Africa the lessons it learned from its own development.[14]

It seems that what may appear to be crass commercial moves are actually the result of careful thinking about mutually beneficial activities. According to the "Unrestricted Warfare" publication[15] (page 189):

> All of these things are rendering more and more obsolete the idea of confining warfare to the military domain and of using the number of casualties as a means of the intensity of a war. Warfare is now escaping from the boundaries of bloody massacre, and exhibiting a trend towards low casualties, or even none at all, and yet high intensity. This is information warfare, financial warfare, trade warfare, and other entirely new forms of war, new areas opened up in the domain of warfare. In this sense, there is now no domain which warfare cannot use, and there is almost no domain which does not have warfare's offensive pattern.

This is an astute way to illustrate how China is redefining the stovepiped idea of war into another form on the African continent, and most likely not only there.

For its part, China is merely following in the footsteps of other major global powers, which have established military bases abroad to secure their interests. There is only one kind of great power, and one kind of great power tradition. China will not be any different; power is necessarily expansionist.[16]

Chinese factories offer not only jobs—they also use production technologies that African entrepreneurs can easily adopt. Chinese firms act as catalysts and models for the African diaspora to invest their investment capital in Africa. Taiwanese and Hong Kong firms stimulated a rush of copy-cat local investment in Nigeria (see page 9 of the PWC paper and check out the forecast for Nigeria[17]) and were catalysts for the boom of local investment.

In August 2010 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao delivered a prominent speech warning that China's economy and national modernization process would be jeopardized if the country failed to undertake systemic political reform. This was an interesting statement which should be analyzed in greater detail. Would this be an opportunity for Europe and the United States to persist in seeking common ground on issues such as energy, global trade and finance, and regional security?

The former colonial powers failed to create a middle class of well-educated, conscious governmental representatives that were capable of running a country.

How about the European Union—is there one? France, Germany, and the UK seem to have their own agendas to fulfill, seeking some common ground on issues such as trade, finance, and regional security. Why should cooperation with the U.S. Africa Command[18] be enhanced?

European colonial powers gradually were forced out of Africa from the 1960s onward. They left the continent with a heritage of a corrupt upper class (the leadership or the "elite") and a generally uneducated lower class. The former colonial powers failed to create a middle class of well-educated, conscious governmental representatives that were capable of running a country.

The sole African country that shows a steadily growing economy is Botswana, recently followed by Tunisia.[19] It is interesting to briefly analyze the background of this phenomenon. At the attainment of independence, when other African nations were lost in the euphoria of what would prove to be a false start, Botswana's leadership saw beyond the dependency on international loans, donor funds, etc. The leadership took hard decisions that now yield economic returns for the benefit of the general Botswana population.

Unfortunately, the dialogue on population in Africa still focuses on the negatives of poverty and disease instead of innovative solutions that contribute to solving these problems, uplifting people, and creating strong local economies. It is not so remarkable that Africa is still self-centered because of long-lasting governance issues, poverty, civil war, and underdevelopment. The challenge here is to make African countries into independent "welfare states" with self-sufficient mechanisms to sustain themselves over time. It would be wrong, let alone impossible, to take advantage of the commitment of the international community to resolve every single crisis.

On April 5, 2011, Equatorial Guinea's President Teodoro Obiang Nguema spoke about what had been an almost 3-week-long war waged by the U.S. and its NATO allies against Libya: "I believe that the problems in Libya should be resolved in an internal fashion and not through an intervention that could appear to resemble a humanitarian intervention. We have already seen this in Iraq." He added: "Each foreigner is susceptible to proposing erroneous solutions. African problems cannot be resolved

with a European, American or Asian view."[20] Would it NOT be wise to include certain African powers instead of "us" bringing "them" stability?

We are witnessing a great wave of self-change in Northern Africa and in the Middle East, where people have come together as one to fight for what is right and overthrow oppressive, selfish regimes that for years had no consideration for their needs. And what is the common Western reaction to it all? Just pop a democracy pill...and everything will be fine. But the rhetoric surrounding the perceived "need" for democracy appears to be at odds with the reality on the ground, especially with regard to multinationals and industries operating in complicity with, and sustaining, some very brutal regimes (let alone China's "no strings attached" form of investment!).[21]

Cooperation as part of a comprehensive approach in which the UN, EU, AU, NGOs, and IOs feel committed to share is also crucial.

Rather than imposing political (and economic/social) structures, perhaps it would be more sustainable, not to mention successful, if actors worked with (but not within) the framework of existing knowledge, adapting traditions and systems that are indigenous to the environment. Knowledge is crucial, with any approach needing to be context-specific as opposed to the current, generalized "one size fits all" approach. Cooperation as part of a comprehensive approach in which the UN, EU, AU, NGOs, and IOs feel committed to share is also crucial. Therefore, how do we deal with the heritage, as mentioned earlier, of a corrupt upper class (the leadership or elite) and a generally uneducated lower class? How do we effectively create a middle class of well-educated, conscious governmental representatives that are capable of running a country?

The answer to this is not rocket science, although it needs a firm commitment from the "Coalition of the Willing." It would be beneficial if either the UN or EU deployed civil servants from crucial workplaces and from several levels of the "Coalition of the Willing's" own governmental management to work as a coach for their fellow civil servants. What is needed is a kind of a left-seat/right-seat activity in which they guide their (mostly former military)[22] colleagues through governmental processes and procedures.[23]

Nearly every approach to operations by the military,[24] NGOs, IOs, and the UN alike is self-centered and lacks the "overall picture." Unfortunately, there is still ample evidence of the lack of a comprehensive approach,[25] as every organization is driven by the stovepiped vision of the "guys in the lead" and the money of the sponsors.[26] It is even more remarkable that almost every program lacks an inclusive comprehensive psychological-social approach toward the population.

Until now there is little proof of awareness, recognition, or acknowledgment in our approaches to most African countries which exist with a traumatized population, possibly the sole common denominator that the African population shares mutually (victim, perpetrator, and spectator alike). The Western answer until now is that "we" still see "Africa" through a neo-liberal prism of our (the West's) own construction, tinged with colonial guilt— as "we" think it *should* be, rather than for what it actually *is*, motivated to some extent by altruism and national needs creating a contingent of beggars. Are you already changing your idea about the American[27] approach? Or the Western[28] approach? Or the Asian[29] approach?

Notes

[1] http://www.bitsofscience.org/population-growth-africa-cities-568/.

[2] In 2050 nearly 70 percent of the world's population will live in Asia on around 30 percent of the land mass.

[3] http://www.africa-business.com/features/india_africa.html.

[4] http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/SOAC10/SOAC-PR1-en.pdf.

[5] We need to realize that the increasing population growth, combined with ever-expanding urbanization, will have a decreasing effect on maneuver space for traditional warfare.

[6] http://www.scribd.com/doc/61188779/US-and-EU-Investors-Should-Realize-Opportunities-From-Africa.

[7] http://allafrica.com/stories/201102281008.html.

[8] http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/pdf/world-in-2050-jan-2011.pdf.

[9] GDP, or gross domestic product, is one of the primary indicators used to gauge the health of a country's economy. It represents the total currency (like euro, dollar) value of all goods and services produced over a specific time period; one can think of it as the size of the economy. Usually, GDP is expressed as a comparison to the previous quarter or year. For example, if the year-to-year GDP is up 3 percent, this is thought to mean that the economy has grown by 3 percent over the last year.

[10] PPP, purchasing power parity, is an economic technique used when attempting to determine the relative values of two currencies. It is useful because often the amount of goods a currency can purchase within two nations varies drastically, based on availability of goods, demand for the goods, and a number of other, difficult-to-determine factors. PPP solves this problem by taking some international measure and determining the cost for that measure in each of the two currencies, then comparing that amount.

[11] http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WPA2009/WPA2009_WorkingPaper.pdf.

[12] http://www.sfcg.org/Documents/CPRF/CPRF-Summary-090414.pdf.

[13] Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf.

[14] http://www.bol.com/nl/p/engelse-boeken/dragon-s-gift/1001004006438815/index.html.

[15] www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf.

[16] http://www.japanfocus.org/-Harsh_V_-Pant/3353.

[17] http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/pdf/world-in-2050-jan-2011.pdf.

[18] http://www.africom.mil/.

[19] http://www.africa-business.com/features/tunisia.html.

[20] http://www.modernghana.com/news/323903/1/from-ivory-coast-to-libya-and-beyond-the-conquest-.html.

[21] In the case of Zambia, China's support for its independence in 1964 contributed to a long-term relationship between the two nations. But to solidify their economic relations, China has turned toward trade and business, investing one billion dollars in Zambia last year. In contrast, trade between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa remains resource-heavy and low compared to nations like China. With only 3 percent of U.S. imports coming from Sub-Saharan Africa, "China has overtaken the United States as Africa's top trading partner" (Bloomberg).

[22] Have a look at Southern Sudan. The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) exists based on former military. To be frank, military personnel are not sufficiently qualified nor educated to run a country. Most African leadership consists of former military personnel.

[23] Cross-training, cross-learning, cross-teaching at several administrative levels...without trying to copy "our" democratic values onto a country that is founded on quite another culture. http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/may2006/a052506tj1.html. "Nothing is more important, Admiral Hunt said, than recognizing that success in the region requires interagency cooperation. "We need to bring all elements of national power together," he said. Working with embassy teams, reaching back to U.S. Central Command in Tampa, FL, and to federal agencies in Washington will help. The bottom line, though, is the area needs "sustained, long-term leadership from the interagency process," the admiral said.

[24] http://www.eurasiareview.com/africa-global-nato-seeks-to-recruit-50-new-military-partners-21022011/.

[25] The primary behavior we would like to influence is in urban areas. Future conflicts arise in part from the need for political freedom, power, water, food, energy, and living space.

[26] These are reasons enough for a drastic change. See http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/aldcafrica2011_en..pdf , especially the conclusion at page 121. Without the "pain" of a comprehensive approach there will be no gain.

[27] http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/may2006/a052506tj1.html http://www.africom.mil/ http://www.hoa.africom.mil/hoaFreshening/index.asp.

[28] http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/20/europe-africa-david-cameron-trade. The West's relationship with Africa is becoming "trade, rather than aid."

[29] http://businessjournalist.blogspot.com/2011/06/adb-african-development-bank-to-set-up.html.

Serving as an officer in several branches of the Royal Netherlands Army, Rob Sentse worked as a coach, intelligence analyst, project officer implementing Field Human Intelligence in the RNLA, and trainer in leadership and didactic skills. After a 38-year career he retired in September 2011. He now runs his own company in executive, personal, and team coaching and is a trainer in communicative, social, leadership, and didactic skills (www.robsentse.nl). In 2001 he worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he implemented a nationwide project to bring into contact several veterans' unions involved in local care. He built a social network consisting of the Minister of Health, mayors, psychiatrists, psychologists, and Croat/Serb/ Bosnian veterans' unions. In 2006 MAJ Sentse was deployed to the Canadian-led Regional Command HQ in Kandahar, Afghanistan, as J2 Plans. In 2008 he served as G2X for Task Force Urzugan in Tarin Kowt. In 2010 he deployed as a Military Observer for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). In 1997 he earned a bachelor's degree in social work at the Eindhoven University of Applied Sciences. His research project dealt with prevention programs against bullying, sexual intimidation, blackmail, and other types of violence for Dutch students age 12-18. The project received attention in the national media and was implemented at several Dutch schools. Rob is a member of the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NISA). The website is www.nisa-intelligence.nl. As an author of several articles about leadership and didactic skills, terrorism, and political/economic relations, his articles have been published in several magazines and newspapers.

Understanding Intractable Conflict in Sudan

by CPT (USA) Christopher M. Collins

For many intelligence professionals and U.S. soldiers, the term "social analysis" correlates to professors with long hair and theories that are hard to understand and apply to real-world scenarios. The aspect of understanding how a society operates or cultural issues that impact a nation's history can affect how an analyst understands his account or how a soldier behaves while on patrol. As a reminder of this, observers can reference how the former International Security Assistance Force J2, Army LTG Michael Flynn, stressed the importance of "white" versus "red" intelligence in his 2010 article about the role of intelligence in Afghanistan.[1] While social analysis can seem purely academic, understanding and applying basic theories can help policymakers and military leaders. Therefore, it is value added for members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Since the withdrawal of the British from Sudan on January 1, 1956, Sudan has struggled through two civil wars, the crisis in Darfur, and two fragile peace agreements. To assist in understanding why Sudan has experienced over 39 years of civil war and conflict, the theories of "social-structural" violence, emotion-based ethnic conflict, resource conflict, and the underlying causes of conflict can be applied. While each theory of conflict may help describe why conflict occurred, it is the underlying causes of conflict, identity and human needs, that have been the main factors in Sudan's troubled past.

As Sudan transitioned to independence from the UK in 1954-56, the society could have been labeled a social-structurally violent society. David G. Gill, in "Understanding and Overcoming Social-Structural Violence," defines such violence as "a mode of human relations which tends to thwart human needs and to interfere with spontaneous, healthy development."[2] Often, social-structural violence is carried out between individuals, social groups, and social classes, hindering the development of societies and the fulfillment of basic human needs. Robert O. Collins provides an early example of this in *A History of Modern Sudan* by describing how former British government positions in Sudan were replaced by members of the National Unionist Party (NUP), a process labeled Sudanization.[3] The NUP failed to include

southerners in the administration of a new Sudan and on August 18, 1955, an Army company stationed in Torit "broke ranks, rushed the arms depot, seized rifles and ammunition, and proceeded to run amok methodically killing all northerners – officers, merchants, women, and children."[4] This was the first recorded episode of violence against the NUP by those who felt marginalized and excluded from participating in the newly formed government.

Author's Note: The map of Sudan represents the geographic, ethnic, religious, and resource factors that have contributed to conflict within that nation. The areas depicted as "oil" are production blocks that are providing income for the Government of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. Oil map data were derived from the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, in "Arms, Oil, and Darfur," in Small Arms Survey No. 7, July 2007.

The racial identity in Sudan includes Arab, African, and non-Arab, the latter sometimes categorized as lazy, uncivilized, unintelligent, and prone to crime. Author Jok Madut Jok, in *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence*, highlights how race has played a vital role in Sudanization, "because those dominating the political power are included in the category Arab, the Arabs occupy the top of the ladder in the socioeconomic hierarchy and the racial hierarchy is therefore also reflected in the governing process, the control of state power and resources."[5] Prior to the Republic of South Sudan's independence in 2011, Sudan's constitution spoke of equal opportunity, but the social circumstances of non-Arabs revealed clear evidence pointing to incongruity between the equality of opportunity that people in the Nuba mountain region and southern states experienced compared to northerners in terms of everyday experience and actual access to services.[6] The reality of this division was evident as the Government of Sudan (GoS) conducted attacks on Nuba civilians, denied them access to essential goods and services including international humanitarian aid, and seized productive farm land during the second civil war.[7] Only by accepting the Islamist government's political, cultural, and religious identity were Nuba people allowed access to food and essential goods and services.[8]

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Applying the emotion-based theory of violence to the situation in Darfur may help to explain why the GoS used the Janjaweed Arab Militia to commit genocide against African tribesmen. Theorist Roger Petersen tries to explain "why any individual would go out and beat, humiliate, or discriminate against another human being" with an emotion-based approach to understanding ethnic conflict.[9] Petersen's theory describes how fear, hatred, and resentment trigger emotional responses, which facilitate action to satisfy an identified desire or concern. Rage, according to Petersen, is an emotion emanating from frustration, which often produces counterproductive actions like searching for scapegoats.[10] Based on this rage, the GoS committed genocide against the Fur people in Darfur, making them the scapegoat for the government's failures at maintaining peace and stability.

The use of government-sponsored militias has been a common practice in western Sudan since the 1980s. Author Gabriel Meyers, in *War and Faith in Sudan*, states that "as early as the 1980s, the government incited local

Arab militias to attack southern Darfur's farming communities" and that "Darfur's ethnic African tribes, in turn, formed self-defense groups, members of which coalesced into the two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)," which eventually rose against the government in February 2003.[11] After raids on the town of Bulu in February and April by the SLA, Meyers observes, "Khartoum did what it has always done in such cases: it armed irregular militias, the aptly self-described janjaweed ('evil men on horse-back') and, along with regular army troops, sent them in to crush the rebellion."[12] As their mode of operation, the janjaweed commandos would normally sweep down on a village just before dawn with one hundred raiders, kill the men, rape the women, kidnap or kill the children, burn the village, steal the livestock, and destroy the village infrastructure, thus driving the Fur from their ancestral lands.[13]

While it appears that ethnic violence in Darfur may have been the government's strategy to suppress an insurgency, historic conflict in Sudan represents a broader problem. In an interview with Gabriel Meyers, Bishop Macram Max Gassis stated that, "It's not a struggle between Arab north and African south. The conflict is now and has always been fundamentally about ethnicities: An Arab Muslim elite pitting itself against African ethnic cultures, and this throughout the country, north and south, east and west."[14] Based on Petersen's emotion-based theory, the GoS could have been motivated by fear in Darfur, afraid that militant groups like the SLA and JEM could attack government troops and resist the government's attempt to enforce shari'a law. It appears, though, that the government acted on the emotion of rage, seeing the Fur people as scapegoats of a larger problem—a ruling government that historically excluded non-Arabs and other ethnic groups throughout Sudan.

Sudan began exporting oil on the international market in 1999, but conflict over the valuable natural resource began decades earlier when the GoS, under President Numayri, tried to redraw the boundary between north and south Sudan. Robert O. Collins notes, "When Khartoum sought to redraw the boundary between North and South in July 1980 to include the oil fields and rich grazing land of the Upper Nile and the Bahr al-Ghazal in Kordofan, southern students took to the streets in protest at the flagrant violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement."[15] Theorist Michael Renner, in "The Anatomy of Resource Wars," describes how resource-related conflicts prescribe the following attributes: Violence is mostly directed against civilians; "those pursuing the wealth do not compete for the hearts and minds of the local population" and "groups living off a lucrative resource have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and, if need be, in prolonging conflict."[16]

During Sudan's second civil war (1983-2005), the government exploited the population and used oil revenue to purchase weapons and maintain power. Jok Madut Jok describes how the government destroyed villages to make way for oil exploration and used oil revenues to fight the war with impunity.[17] Government oil revenues increased by 875 percent between 1999 and 2001 and approximately 80 percent of this windfall went into the production and procurement of weapons.[18] Jok also describes how, during the second civil war, the GoS "escaped taking responsibility for the people beyond its control, concentrating the nation's resources in the hands of its narrow support bases in the capital city and other northern towns."[19] This description of the GoS matches Renner's theory that "resource royalties enable political leaders to maintain their stranglehold on power by funding a system of patronage that rewards followers and punishes opponents."[20] While it appears evident that controlling access to oil resources and wealth associated with oil exports was a major factor in the second civil war, it was a combination of factors—political, social, ethnic, religious, and economic—that contributed to the conflict in Sudan.

Historic conflict in Sudan has centered around two main themes: the struggle for identity and unmet needs.

Historic conflict in Sudan has centered around two main themes: the struggle for identity and unmet needs. Charles (Chip) Hauss, in "Addressing Underlying Causes of Conflict," states that "intractable conflicts are hard to resolve because their underlying causes are often deeply entrenched and closely interwoven."[21] Hauss references Jay Rothman's theory of identity and John Burton's theory of unmet human needs in describing the two main underlying causes of intractable conflict. When examining the history of conflict in Sudan, Robert O. Collins states that "the central issue of modern Sudan has been the quest for identity whereby African indigenous cultures can peacefully co-exist with an imported Arab culture in a Sudan dominated by neither."[22] This quest has been exasperated by political leaders like former President Ja'afar Numayri, who ended the Addis Ababa Agreement by abolishing the Southern Regional Assembly; stripped political, fiscal, and military powers from the south; and made Arabic the official language in Sudan.[23] These changes were met with strong resistance from southerners who eventually formed the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army and fought against Numayri's government forces throughout Sudan.

Although Sudan's second civil war officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, there has been recent conflict in the disputed areas of the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile State, and Adyei State, areas that border Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. Wealth and power-sharing agreements in these territories are contentious issues, and conflict is likely to continue without strong regional leadership and international assistance. As has been evident throughout Sudan's history of conflict, the rights of individual citizens, regardless of race, religion, or ethnicity, are often trampled upon by the ruling government, militaries, and militias, thus creating an atmosphere of violence and uncertainty. By applying social analysis theories, intelligence and military professionals can gain understanding and provide regional and cultural context to decision-makers, thereby enhancing the United States' ability to operate in diverse and challenging environments.

Notes

[1] Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan," paper published by the Center for a New American Security (January 2010): 12, at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf24 (accessed January 6, 2012).

[2] David Gill, "Understanding and Overcoming Social-Structural Violence," in *Contemporary Justice Review* 2, no. 1 (April): 24-34.

[3] Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 65.

[4] Ibid., 65-66.

[5] Jok Madut Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence* (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2008), 12.

[6] Ibid., 10-11.

[7] Jok, *Sudan, Race, Religion and Violence*, 107-108.

[8] Ibid., 108.

[9] Roger Petersen, "An Emotion-Based Theory of Ethnic Conflict," in *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 17.

[10] Ibid., 18.

[11] Gabriel Meyers, *War and Faith in Sudan* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), 182.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 289.

[14] Meyers, *War and Faith in Sudan*, 182.

[15] Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 123.

[16] Michael Renner, "The Anatomy of Resource Wars," in *Worldwatch Paper* #162 (October 2002): 13-14.

[17] Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence,* 17.

[18] Daniel Large, "Arms, Oil, and Darfur," *Small Arms Survey* no. 7 (July 2007): 4, endnotes 12 and 13.

[19] Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence,* 187.

[20] Renner, "The Anatomy of Resource Wars," 17.

[21] Charles (Chip) Hauss, "Addressing Underlying Causes of Conflict," in *Beyond Intractability*, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado (July 2003), at http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/addressing_underlying_causes/ (accessed January 31, 2012).
[22] Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 137-138.
[23] Ibid., 138.

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An African Country Called Afghanistan:
Development Traps in a Fragile State

by Dr. James E. McGinley

INTRODUCTION

Despite more than ten years of international assistance, by all accounts Afghanistan remains a fragile state. Life expectancy is 44 years, literacy rates are optimistically estimated by the Afghan government to be 39 and 12 percent for men and women respectively, average annual income is approximately $370, and a woman has a one-in-six chance of dying during pregnancy in the course of her life.[1] Afghanistan has been in a state of conflict since the overthrow of King Zahir Shah in 1973, ranks seventh in the *Failed States Index*, and ranks second in Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index*.[2] Systemic failures such as these, which obstruct development, were examined by Paul Collier, economics professor and Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University and former Director of the Research Development Department at the World Bank.

In his book *The Bottom Billion*, Collier examined the poorest countries of the world. Collier's emphasis was on development in Africa. Africa, he argued, suffers from a combination of four traps that block progress: the conflict trap, the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors, the natural resources trap, and the trap of bad governance in a small country.[3] The expected withdrawal of key international security forces in 2014 has placed a new sense of urgency on understanding the developmental trajectory of Afghanistan. Are there reasons for optimism? An assessment of Collier's traps in Afghanistan warns us to be cautious. Afghanistan may be closer to the failed states of Africa than the international community would like to believe.

THE CONFLICT TRAP

Collier defines the conflict trap as a pattern of violent internal challenges to government. These patterns can be prolonged, in the case of civil wars, or rapid, in the case of coup d'états. He argues that prolonged conflict can be costly, as civil wars tend to reduce economic growth by around 2.3 percent for each year they continue. However, conflicts can also impact social capital as well, leaving a country economically, intellectually, and politically poorer. Three decades of conflict have resulted in the destruction of Afghanistan's traditional elite. When it came to power in the Saur (April) Revolution in 1978, the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) set out to destroy rivals to state social control. The PDPA embarked on what has been referred to as the slaughter of the tribal aristocracy. By October 1978, 90,000 to 100,000 people were believed to have been killed, including village *mullahs* as well as secular powerbrokers.[4] Subsequently, between July 1978 and September 1979, about 100,000 Afghan refugees entered Pakistan.[5] By the beginning of 1981, approximately 3.7 million Afghan refugees had fled to Iran and Pakistan.[6] As a result of civil war, refugee numbers spiked in 1990 when there were 6.3 million Afghan refugees, with 3.3 million in Pakistan and 3 million in Iran.[7] A final wave of refugees, numbering 200,000 to 300,000, left Afghanistan during the U.S.-led invasion of October 2001.[8] Violence and successive refugee waves have reduced Afghanistan's intellectual and professional classes. In the 1980s and 1990s the majority of Afghans who migrated to the West were the country's elite from the upper and middle urban classes.[9] Subsequently, many Afghans, especially the educated, fled the Taliban's stringent interpretation of Islam, with its severe restrictions on women and education, as well as social and cultural life.[10]

A consequence of the destruction, flight, and marginalization of traditional elites was the empowerment of a new breed of power brokers within Afghanistan.[11] The conflict against the PDPA government and the Soviets stripped much of the power from traditional, secular elites. Traditional leadership in Afghanistan was decentralized. The traditional *khans* and *maliks* had limits on their ability to physically coerce the populace, relying instead on influence and patronage. However, the new elites possessed weapons and militias as a result of their role as warlords resisting Soviet occupation, not to mention fewer checks on their actions and the ability to force compliance. After the post-9/11 international intervention in Afghanistan, the new power of regional elites, the Taliban capacity for violence, weak central governance, the surge of international aid funds into Afghanistan, and failure of the

West to empower educated, secularized, modernizing elites altered the power balance again and kept most power in Afghanistan centered on personal instead of institutional power.

> *President Hamid Karzai's government is based on highly centralized patronage in which power and resources are channeled through Karzai's personal and political allies.*

In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai's government is based on highly centralized patronage in which power and resources are channeled through Karzai's personal and political allies.[12] Centralized powers of appointment give President Karzai the authority to appoint all national-level ministry heads, the Attorney General, Supreme Court members, the National Security Directorate head, provincial police chiefs, and the National Bank head, all of whom are subject to confirmation by both houses of parliament. Additionally, he appoints one-third of the *Meshrano Jirga* (Upper House of Parliament) and provincial governors, district governors, the Mayor of Kabul and all other municipalities, and the heads of a number of independent offices. In all, it is estimated that Karzai controls more than one thousand direct appointments without any parliamentary oversight. A 2011 report from the Center for American Progress concluded that dominant role played by Afghanistan's executive branch hampers the development of Afghan institutions, political opposition, and civil society.[13]

Power dynamics in Afghanistan focused on patronage networks has heightened concerns over the continuation of conflict in the form of a new civil war as international security forces withdraw. Collier points to ethnic dominance and democratic governance as factors in conflict. In Afghanistan several persistent ethnic and religious divides exist between the Pashto, Hazara, and other ethnic groups. Moreover, the beginnings of democratic governance found in the capital of Kabul are not as evident in the outlying provinces and districts where there is no history of democratic tradition and independent voice is restricted by local power brokers, warlords, and insurgents.

LANDLOCKED WITH BAD NEIGHBORS

Geography matters in development. Collier points out that landlocked isolation hinders development by eliminating access to sea trade and creates a dependency on the infrastructure of neighboring countries.

When neighbors are healthy, the negative impact of isolation is lessened. When neighbors are less developed and troubled, the negative impacts are greater. Afghanistan is landlocked and physically located between several neighboring countries and markets in Central Asia, which makes it potentially valuable as a regional transportation corridor. India and Iran lack efficient road or rail access to Central Asian markets and have jointly pursued new north-south trade routes into Central Asia.[14] The Indian government's Border Road Organization financed the reconstruction of the road link between Iran's deep seaport at Chahbahar and Afghanistan's main ring road highway system. The shortest route from India to the Central Asian republics is actually through Pakistan and Afghanistan; however, India cannot use this route given its unfriendly relations with Pakistan. Geopolitics among Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Pakistan is influenced by concerns over strategic rivals. India's interest in developing a north-south trade corridor into Central Asia is intended to break Pakistan's monopoly on Afghanistan's seaborne transit trade by providing an alternative to Pakistan's Gwadar port and its connecting national highways into Afghanistan. The development of competing seaports illustrates the India-China-Pakistan regional rivalry. The development of Iran's Chahbahar port is funded in part by India while the development of Pakistan's Gwadar port is funded by China.[15] However, like Iran, seaborne goods from Pakistan ports must still transit Afghanistan to reach markets in Central Asia.

Regional relationships are influenced by political and security concerns. To the north of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan closed its border with Tajikistan in May 2010, which included a rail blockade that halted the movement of approximately 2,000 freight cars.[16] Uzbekistan explained that the stoppage was due to congestion from increased rail traffic into Afghanistan. However, there was speculation that the closure was politically motivated and that Uzbekistan deliberately stopped the freight because it contained construction material for a hydroelectric power plant in Tajikistan that Uzbekistan opposes on the grounds it will adversely impact irrigation supporting its cotton industry. To the east, Pakistan closed the transportation route between its port at Gwadar and Afghanistan to all convoys supporting the military mission in Afghanistan in response to a November 2011 cross-border incident in which U.S. forces killed approximately 28 Pakistani soldiers.[17] Pakistan has long been known to be a sanctuary for insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan. Its stability is also threatened by domestic terrorist groups and a long-standing dispute with India over the administration of the Kashmir region. Pakistan is particularly focused on Baluch nationalist groups that operate in southwestern Pakistan but share familial and cultural ties to Baluch tribal groups in southern Afghanistan. To the west, Iran has periodically

expelled large number of Afghan refugees and maintains concern over anti-Iranian terrorist groups, such as Jundallah, which use the Iranian-Pakistani border area for sanctuary.[18] Iran has also supported the insurgency in Afghanistan as an element of its anti-U.S. foreign policy.[19]

THE NATURAL RESOURCE TRAP

The term "resource curse" refers to the paradox that the presence of natural resource wealth can inhibit development. Single commodity wealth such as oil or minerals encourage patronage and corruption and discourage the development of democratic processes which limit individual power to exploit resources for personal benefit. Afghanistan's Minister of Mines, Wahidullah Shahrani, is reportedly aware of the dangers of the resource curse and confident he can manage the growth of his country's mineral industry.[20] However, Afghanistan's undeveloped mining infrastructure and widespread government corruption will provide steep challenges.

The World Bank has estimated that 97 percent of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is related to the international military and donor community presence.

Afghanistan has untapped mineral wealth estimated to be worth as much as $3 trillion.[21] Its large-scale mineral deposits include the Aynak copper deposit, located 35 kilometers south of the capital Kabul, and the Hajigak iron ore deposit, located 130 kilometers west of Kabul. In 2008 a $2.9 billion contract was awarded to China's state-run Metallurgical Group Corporation to develop the Aynak copper mine.[22] In November 2011, a consortium of seven Indian companies led by the state-owned Steel Authority of India, Ltd., was awarded a $10.3 billion contract to exploit portions of the Hajigak iron ore deposit.[23] The World Bank has estimated that 97 percent of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is related to the international military and donor community presence.[24] Nevertheless, there has been intense speculation that Afghanistan's mineral wealth can contribute to economic development and reduce its dependency on foreign assistance.

In 2011 the Afghan government took in approximately $30 million in revenues from mining.[25] Its Ministry of Mines estimates that development projects could increase government income from mining to $1 billion within five years and up to $3.5 billion in the next 15 years. In 2008 Afghanistan's Minister of Mines optimistically stated, "In five years time Afghanistan will not need the world's aid money. In 10 years Afghanistan will be the richest country

in the region."[26] This prediction has not yet proven to be true. World Bank estimates are more conservative, but still optimistic, indicating that within seven years the economic contribution of mining in Afghanistan could potentially reach 90,000 jobs and $500 million in annual government revenue.[27] However, as of 2011, the mining sector's contribution to Afghanistan's GDP was marginal, at less than 0.3 percent.[28]

Afghanistan is critically dependent on the development of its mining industry to reduce its overwhelming dependency on foreign assistance. While domestic tax revenues in Afghanistan are projected to increase from 10 percent of GDP to 17.5 percent by 2021-2022, driven largely by planned taxes and expected mining revenues, in its November 2011 report, *Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014*, the World Bank estimated that operating expenditures will grow at almost twice the size of domestic revenues at the same time. As a result, the World Bank projects a budget deficit of $7.2 billion for Afghanistan by 2021. Mining revenue is critical to Afghanistan's financial health. The World Bank assesses a failure to develop major mines such as Anyak and Hajigak could reduce the growth of Afghanistan's GDP from its 2010 average of 9 percent to 3-4 percent.[29]

Corruption in Afghanistan can derail the development of its mineral resources. It was reported that a $30 million payment was made via Dubai to Afghanistan's Minister of Mines, Mohammad Ibrahim Adel, one month after the awarding of the $2.9 billion Aynak copper mine contract to China's Metallurgical Group Corporation.[30] In 2010 Adel was replaced as Minister of Mines by Wahidullah Shahrani, who has made a public commitment to reducing corruption. Since becoming Minister, Shahrani has reduced the ministry's staff, developed the ministry's first business plan, and submitted Afghanistan as a candidate country to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). [31] The development of improved business practices has been supported by World Bank funding grants of $30 million in 2006 and $52 million in 2011 to help Afghanistan's Ministries of Mining and Finance to improve their regulation of mineral resources.[32] However, opinions regarding Afghanistan's ability to manage its mineral resources without corruption are low. In its 2011 report, *Hajigak: The Jewel of Afghan Mines*, Integrity Watch Afghanistan stated that, while Shahrani is committed to developing good business practices in the mining industry, the government of Afghanistan lacked the capacity to stamp out endemic corruption and "will not be able to ensure that Hajigak is well managed and, ultimately, beneficial for the future of the country."[33]

BAD GOVERNANCE

In Afghanistan, the process of government reform has included the ratification of a new Constitution, a Presidential election, and the election of the *Wolesi Jirga* (Lower House of Parliament).[34] However, as Collier points out, bad government can be persistent because not everybody loses from it. Corruption has been described as endemic in Afghanistan and it has a direct influence on economic well-being. According to the Transparency International's *Corruption Perception Index,* in 2010 Afghanistan was assessed as the second most corrupt country in the world, tied with Myanmar and just behind war-torn Somalia.[35] In addition, in 2010 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that Afghans paid $2.5 billion in bribes over the previous year. One Afghan out of two had to pay at least one bribe to a public official. This amounted to an average of $158 paid per capita. Since Afghanistan has an annual GDP per capita of just $425, corruption creates "a crippling tax on people who are already among the world's poorest."[36]

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The Afghan people hold uniformly negative public opinions regarding corruption. In 2010 a national poll by the Asia Foundation found that the majority of Afghans think that corruption is a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of government.[37] Survey respondents identified corruption as the third biggest problem facing Afghanistan (behind lack of security and unemployment) and is the second biggest reason for pessimism (between lack of security and bad government) on the part of those who felt Afghanistan is moving in the wrong direction.[38] Corruption, real and perceived, may act to undermine the legitimacy of governance in Afghanistan. Corruption, especially among police forces, may act to erode or retard the development of a social contract between the populace and the government since it can establish a predatory relationship. High levels of corruption may poison relations between communities and the state and lead to an alternative dependence on local, customary security, judicial, and governance structures.[39]

The World Bank assesses that weak legislative and judicial oversight creates a substantial opportunity for government officials to engage in corrupt financial decision-making in

the execution of the government budget or to divert government revenues.[40] In September 2011, Norway froze $36 million in Afghan aid over a scandal at Kabul Bank involving the embezzlement of funds through false loans.[41] In a 2010 Congressional report on the U.S. logistics route from Pakistan into Afghanistan, the private security provider for convoys complained that it had to pay $1,000-10,000 in monthly bribes to nearly every Afghan governor, police chief, and local military unit whose territory the convoy passed.[42] Between 2007 and 2009, more than $3 billion in cash was declared at customs and openly flown out of Kabul International Airport. However, the sum of declared money may actually be higher. Reportedly, one courier alone carried $2.3 billion between the second half of 2008 and the end of 2009. It is believed that some of the funds, if not most, were siphoned from Western aid projects and U.S., European, and NATO contracts to provide security, supplies, and reconstruction work for coalition forces in Afghanistan.[43]

Studies suggest that violent conflict and political instability are associated with increased capital flight since they increase risks in the domestic environment and reduce expected returns on assets.[44] Historical studies of capital flight of countries engaged in civil war indicate that the share of private wealth held overseas rises from 9 percent before the war to 20 percent by its end and persists at conflict's end, rising to 26 percent by the end of the first decade of peace.[45] Capital flight can be dramatic during periods of high uncertainty such as regime change. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran experienced an 865 percent increase in capital flight.[46] Studies estimate that the flight of capital from Iran shortly before and after the revolution was in the range of $30-40 billion.[47] In Syria, instability resulting from popular pressure for political change as a result of the Arab Spring movement resulted in the flight of $3-5 billion between March and November 2011.[48] In late 2009, Afghanistan experienced a period of uncertainty in anticipation of a U.S. decision on its strategy in Afghanistan. Reportedly, millions of dollars left the country on a weekly basis as Afghans with wealth shifted financial assets outside the country in expectation of instability and possible civil war.[49]

CONCLUSION

The international community has made an immense investment of manpower and finances in the development of Afghanistan. In 2011 the Brookings Institution estimated that foreign military troops in Afghanistan totaled over 137,000.[50] Between 2001 and 2011, it is estimated that the United States had spent as much as $444 billion overall supporting military, assistance, and diplomatic operations in Afghanistan.[51] Whether these efforts will yield a positive result is not yet known. There is a concern that Afghanistan will fail to

sustain the advances of the last ten years. Based on many years of studying development in Africa, Paul Collier advises that development in the poorest nations of the world cannot be imposed from without; instead, it must come from within. Hence, the burden lies with Afghanistan to take charge of its future, but it is a future laden with challenges. Like the lesser developed countries of Africa, Afghanistan too faces systemic challenges—traps it must overcome. Afghanistan is at a crossroads. Unfortunately, an examination of Collier's four developmental traps shows that its conditions and inclinations are indicative of even greater future dangers. Yet, Collier is careful to point out that development traps are not determinant, i.e., that no country is destined to a future of poverty and strife, although the opportunity for change may be closing.

Notes

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[7] "Afghanistan and the United Nations," *UN News Centre*, no date.
[8] Margesson, 2007.
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[10] Mohmand, 2011.
[11] Wegener, 2007.
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The OSS in Korea:

Operation Eagle

by Bill Streifer

At the time I was in charge of the cryptography section in Kunming HQ and I got to see all high level radio traffic for all of China... I was very well informed about what was going on everywhere in China. When Eagle got chased out of Korea we all laughed and said that Col. Bird had fouled up again.

- Dr. John W. Brunner

BLACKLIST was General Douglas MacArthur's basic outline plan for the occupation of Japan once hostilities during World War II had ended. It called for the disarmament and demobilization of enemy forces, the establishment of a military government, the preservation of law and order, and the apprehension of Japanese war criminals. It also called for the recovery, relief, and repatriation of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees "without delay."[1] By war's end, 32,400 men remained interned in POW camps in Japan and Korea[2] (which had been under Japanese control since 1910). The American public, however, was unaware of the neglect, maltreatment, and abuse the prisoners had suffered at the hands of the Japanese. Nor were they aware that 30 percent of American POWs had already died in captivity.[3] And yet, according to a February 1945 article in *The New York Times*, the "Japanese are not invariably cruel to their prisoners."[4]

Although POW rescue work was the purview of the War Department, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)— "America's first intelligence agency"[5] and the forerunner of the CIA—was invited to join the effort, providing cover for intelligence operations in those areas. In January 1945, U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius informed the Director of the OSS, Major General William J. Donovan, of the State Department's effort to learn what was happening to American prisoners inside Japanese POW and internment camps.[6] In March, Colonel Richard Heppner, the Chief of the OSS in China under Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer, ordered the establishment of a new OSS field unit to be based in Hsian, northern China. One thousand miles west of Keijo (now Seoul), Korea, Hsian

became the most important base for penetration into north and northeastern China as well as Manchuria and Korea, Japan's so-called "inner zone." The following day, Major Gustav Kraus, who was asked to head the new base, left for Hsian with 46 OSS agents.[7] Each OSS "mercy mission" had a different area of operation, and each was named for a bird: Magpie, Duck, Flamingo, Cardinal, Sparrow, Quail, Pigeon, and Raven.[8]

The area of operations for the Eagle mission—named for the bird that symbolized America—was Keijo/Seoul, the future capital of South Korea. Operation Eagle was conducted in accordance with an agreement reached in October 1944 between the OSS and Korean General Lee Bum-suk of the Korean Restoration Army.[9] On April 1, 1945, a meeting was held between Captain Clyde B. Sargent (later the OSS Eagle field commander) and General Lee Bum-suk at a small Tientsin (also known as Tianjin) restaurant in Chungking, China. The bulk of the conversation concerned the "reciprocal advantages" of Korean-American occupation in the war against Japan. Sargent, who had expressed his hope that such cooperation would have the support of all Korean leaders and groups, was invited to visit a Korean colony 12 kilometers north of Chungking along with a delegation from the Korean Provisional Government in exile. At that meeting, Sargent met President Kim Ku, Chairman of the Korean Provisional Government.[10] According to Sargent's aide-mémoire:

> President Kim entered the room, dressed in an attractive, plain Chinese gown, for which he apologized on excuse that he had not been well and was resting. In spite of his 70 years, which he showed completely in both appearance and manner, he bore himself with dignity and composure tempered by modesty and gentleness that seemed incompatible with the patriotic assassin and terrorist of 25 years ago.[11]

The interview consisted largely of "mild indulgences by both sides in exchange of conversational courtesies."[12] President Kim expressed his appreciation for American interest and his intention to cooperate fully by making

Korean personnel available, including the 37 Korean men who recently arrived from Fuyang in Anhui Province,[13] nearly 600 miles north-northeast of Chungking. Sargent then emphasized the value to both the Allies in general and the Koreans in particular that can result from Korean-American cooperation. Sargent later said he was "greatly impressed" by the soldiers from Anhui, calling them "intelligent, alert, and keen." Many of the men, Sargent was told, were college graduates and spoke very passable English.[14] Later, Sargent suggested to General Lee Bum-suk that the entire group participate in the training program for the Eagle Project.[15] The men were later assigned to either the intelligence squad or the communications squad and trained by OSS officers to perform a number of skills including map reading, wireless communications, intelligence gathering, intelligence communications, special skills for guerrilla activities, explosives, scaling cliffs, and marksmanship.[16]

On August 1, the Hsian and Chungking field units in Manchuria were redesignated the OSS Central and South Base Commands, and an OSS Northeastern Command was activated. Then, effective August 16, the three Base Commands were deactivated and reactivated as the Hsian, Chungking, and Korean Base Commands under Major Robert B. Moore, Major Gustav J. Kraus, and Lieutenant Colonel Willis H. Bird, respectively.[17]

The sudden end of World War II on August 15 caught the OSS by surprise. In a message from Heppner to Donovan, "Although we have been caught with our pants down, we will do our best to pull them up in time." Consequently, Wedemeyer immediately issued a "comprehensive directive" to various special agencies under his control to locate and evacuate POWs.[18] Upon receipt of news that President Truman had accepted the unconditional surrender of Japan, Operation Eagle departed Hsian on August 16 at 4:30 a.m. for Keijo aboard a C-47 cargo plane. Lieutenant Colonel Willis Bird of Lansdowne, Pennsylvania, Deputy Chief of the OSS in China, was in command. In addition to 19 Americans and three Koreans, Bird also invited Harry R. Lieberman, chief news editor of the Office of War Information (OWI) – China Branch, and a photographer. According to Professor Maochun Yu, the author of *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War*, "Bird, ever publicly conscious and eager to gain fame by 'liberating' Korea single-handedly, added a Mr. Lieberman—an OWI writer—to the Eagle mission in violation of Heppner's specific orders."[19]

Official credentials of LTC (USA) Willis H. Bird, Deputy Chief of the OSS in China and Commander, Operation Eagle.

Without knowing what kind of reception it would receive upon its arrival, the OSS team was armed with revolvers, tommy-guns, and some hand grenades, "just in case trouble developed."[20] En route, the plane's radio was used to receive late news flashes. As their plane approached the Shandong Peninsula, due west of the Korean Peninsula, a radio report spoke of fighting in many areas, attacks on American aircraft carriers by Japanese kamikaze planes,[21] and the Japanese Emperor's inability to enforce his own cease-fire order.[22] After a conference with his staff and air crew, Bird ordered the pilot to return to base. While the C-47 was undergoing repairs overnight, a wing tip was accidentally damaged. In need of further repair, and unable to obtain replacement parts in Hsian, the crew left early the following morning for Chungking to obtain a replacement aircraft.[23] And at 5:45 a.m. on August 18, Operation Eagle departed Hsian airport for Korea in excellent flying weather.

At 9:15 a.m., as the C-47 approached within 500 miles of Keijo, the plane's radio operator, First Lieutenant Meredith I. Price, attempted to establish contact with the Japanese. Colonel Bird and Captain Ryong C. Hahm, Bird's Korean-American translator, began broadcasting a series of messages to announce their arrival: "American Military Mission calling airfield in Keijo, Korea… Our only mission is to provide aid and comfort to Allied prisoners of war in Korea. Will you give us landing instructions?" At 11:40 a.m., just as the C-47 crossed the Yellow Sea, the Japanese replied, "We are expecting you. We guarantee you safe landing."[24] While approaching the airfield, the Eagle mission saw "factory smokestacks and buildings unmolested by the bombs that devastated industrial facilities in Japan."[25] At 11:56 a.m., the C-47 landed and the plane was met by Lieutenant General Yoshio Kotsuki (Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in Korea), his Chief of Staff, Major General Junjiro Ihara (the commander of the airfield), and a company of 50,000 Japanese troops.[26] Lieberman later wrote:

> The Japanese at Keijo still seemed to be in the war business on a big scale and there was little to suggest that they were part of a surrendering army… On the field, platoons and machine-gun companies marched back and forth, with Japanese sergeants barking their orders. There were 50 planes, including about 20 zeroes, parked on the field, with flight patrols taking off and landing regularly. Japanese enlisted men in and about the hangars stared at the Americans with immobile expressions. In front of one barracks, a white-shirted officer was practicing executioner sweeps with his long samurai sword.[27]

The POWs who had survived captivity were generally underfed, suffered from various tropical diseases, deprived of much needed medicines and medical treatment, and suffered abuse and inhumanities at the hands of their Japanese captors and "cruel" Korean guards.

Although several of the Japanese officers spoke English, the proceedings were carried out in Japanese with Captain Hahm interpreting. Bird immediately explained the purpose of the mission and requested assistance from the Japanese in accomplishing it:

Bird: I am here at the direction of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in the China Theater, as an initial pre-Allied occupation representative to bring whatever help is needed to Allied prisoners of war to make preliminary arrangements for their future evacuation in accordance with the terms of the peace negotiations.

Ihara: Then you are not here to negotiate a surrender?

Bird: No. Our mission is purely humanitarian, to see that the prisoners are safe and to bring them what immediate help they need.[28]

Although the Japanese pledged to supply a report with the location of the POW camps, the number of Allied prisoners of war in Korea, and a breakdown by nationality, they later reneged on their promise.[29] As the discussions dragged on with "evasive statements by the Japanese,"[30] Ihara said his troops had received a "cease fire" order from Tokyo but that he had no authority to let anyone visit the prison camp. "You must wait for orders from our government," Ihara said. "And you must leave. It is not safe for you here."[31] When Bird asked to see the prisoners, the Japanese Airfield Commander's Chief of Staff assured him that "the prisoners are all safe and well and that we need have no concern for their welfare."[32] The reality, of course, was quite different. The POWs who had survived captivity were generally underfed, suffered from various tropical diseases, deprived of much needed medicines and medical treatment, and suffered abuse and inhumanities at the hands of their Japanese captors and "cruel" Korean guards:

> When the U.S. forces under the command of Major General John R. Hodge occupied southern Korea in September 1945, Lieutenant-Colonel Yuzuru Noguchi, the commandant of the Keijo POW camp,

was arrested and accused of war crimes. Two years later, Noguchi stood before the Eighth Army Military Commission at the Yokohama War Crimes Trials where he received a prison sentence of twenty-two years with hard labor for failing to discharge his duties as commander of all Korea POW camps, by permitting persons under his supervision at camps in Keijo, Konan and Jinsen to beat prisoners, [and for forcing POWs] to work while sick and abusing them in other ways.[33]

LTC Yuzuru Noguchi, Commandant, Keijo (Seoul) Japanese POW Camp, being escorted by an American MP.

When Bird asked if the members of the Eagle mission could be temporarily interned pending the formal signing of the surrender, the Japanese refused. Ihara insisted they could not remain in Keijo since they had "no official status," and the Japanese had no orders or instructions from their government regarding the Eagle mission or their position with respect to prisoners of war. "Then we will need gasoline to get back to China," Bird said. Ihara assured the C-47 crew they would provide high octane fuel for their return trip to China where Bird was to wait for "proper instructions from their government." When Colonel Bird reminded the Japanese liaison officer that swift evacuation of the POWs was covered in the preliminary surrender negotiations, the Japanese brought up two tanks and set up their "trench mortars."[34]

While the crew waited for the fuel to arrive, Colonel Shibuda and Major Hideo Uyeda, a 29-year-old "professional soldier" and a graduate of Japan's military academy, entertained the Americans with bottles of Kirin beer and a large amount of *sake*. According to Lieberman, when Uyeda asked for the name of the U.S. Air Force song, the Americans "let loose with a tumultuous chorus of *Off We Go Into the Wild Blue Yonder* led by Captain John Wagoner, Air Transport Command, as Uyeda beamed, beating time on the table with his fingers." As soon as the Americans finished, Uyeda began singing the Japanese Air Force song, *Kubasa* (Fighting Wing). When the fuel failed to arrive, the Americans were permitted to remain at the airfield overnight. The following morning at 3:00 a.m., LTC Bird sent a radio message to LTG Wedemeyer in Hsian informing him of the new developments. However, he neglected to mention the "beer, sake and Japanese songs":[35]

> Arrived safely with friendly and helpful attitude from Japanese Command. They state all prisoners of war are safe and well and no need to be concerned due to fact there are as yet no instructions from their government. Our presence embarrassing and they suggest we return China and come back later. We will stay nite and return tomorrow with gasoline they have been kind enough to provide. Would like to return on mission when formal peace is signed.[36]

Later that morning, discussions continued with further attempts to remain in Keijo, including a demand by Bird to "place our case before Governor-General Abe." The pressure of the Eagle's demands brought unpleasant responses from the Japanese. They flatly stated that Abe did not wish to see the Eagle crew, "we had no credentials and therefore no right to be in Keijo, that they had no instructions from their government, and that we would have to leave immediately." The atmosphere became tense when Bird, once again, asked for an audience with the Japanese generals and to remain in Keijo. At this point, the Eagle mission was issued an unsigned "receipt" to show that its members had been in Keijo and that they had presented their credentials to the Japanese. When Bird asked for the receipt to be signed, Uyeda "spouted out a stream of profanity and a stinging reference to 'inferior persons.'" Shortly afterward, two Japanese tanks were deployed and trench mortars were readied outside the building where the Eagle mission was housed. After the Japanese provided fuel—and with the tanks'.37 millimeter cannon and machineguns covering the Americans as they marched back to their plane[37]—Colonel Bird and his men departed Keijo at 4:20 that afternoon. According to Captain Patrick Teel, "It'll just take five minutes to make us all dead ducks." Flight Officer Edward McGee, the

C-47 pilot, later summed up the bizarre sequence of events this way: "If someone had told me two weeks ago I'd be in a set-up like this, I'd have turned him over to the loco ward. It's a dream, or else it's the sake... I'm looking forward to seeing those boys again."[38]

Since the 500 gallons of fuel provided were insufficient to return to Hsian, Operation Eagle flew instead to Wei-Hsien, where Operation Duck had already taken place. Upon arrival, messages were sent to the Japanese garrison that occupied the field and to the Chinese commander in the area, a friend of General Lee Bum-suk, Colonel Bird's Korean advisor. Radio messages were also sent to Hsian to inform them of what had transpired during their mission. While a detail of Chinese troops guarded the plane, Operation Eagle spent the night at the residence of the Chinese commander as his guests. The following day, Japanese Imperial Headquarters sent a message to General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), explaining why the Japanese had refused to permit the Eagle mission (and others) from meeting with Allied POWs:[39]

> Some officers and men of the Allied forces, without giving a previous notice, came by airplane to some places under Japanese control for the purpose of making contact with, or giving comfort to, prisoners of war or civilian internees, while the arrangements for the cessation of hostilities have not yet been formally made... Since visits of the Allied officers and men before such arrangements are made, even if notified in advance, are likely to hamper the realization of our desire to effect smoothly and satisfactorily the cessation of hostilities and surrender of arms, we earnestly request you to prevent the reoccurrence of such incidents. We have made those who came to Mukden, Keijo and Hong Kong return to their bases.[40]

LTC Bird then received instructions from OSS Headquarters to return to Keijo immediately, even if it resulted in temporary internment. Instead, Bird flew to Chungking, China, the next day to express his fear that a return to Keijo meant the execution of the Eagle members and crew.[41] When LTG Wedemeyer later heard Lieberman's report on OWI radio, he became infuriated. He believed that Bird had disgraced the armed forces because his actions—meals, drinks, and song—could "easily be construed," according to Professor Yu, "as fraternization with the Japanese troops." He was particularly "disgusted" to hear that Bird had invited Lieberman and a photographer aboard while neglecting to bring along food or medical supplies for the prisoners of war. Therefore, LTG Wedemeyer immediately ordered all POW rescue efforts in Korea be "reconstituted and

completely divorced from Eagle project," and Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff recommended sending Bird to the United States to face immediate disciplinary action.[42] "Panicked by Wedemeyer's rage," COL William P. Davis, the senior-most OSS officer in Chungking, suggested to Heppner that Bird be immediately replaced as the head of Operation Eagle. Heppner complied, instructing Davis to "take whatever steps you deem necessary to keep Bird out of contact with all OSS persons outside OSS and theatre Headquarters." Heppner then briefed Donovan on developments, urging him "take whatever steps may be necessary to protect the organization [OSS]." The following day, Donovan angrily replied: "Make sure that action [be] taken [against Bird] for violation of your orders. If necessary, send Bird home at once or, in your discretion, prefer charges."[43]

Later, without referring to the Office of Strategic Services or suggesting that the "mercy mission" to Seoul was an intelligence operation, a syndicated story in the American press described Operation Eagle, the failed OSS mission to Korea, in this way: "An Allied mercy crew which landed at Keijo, Korea in the midst of 50,000 Japanese soldiers was alternately cursed, threatened, wined and entertained before it took off again with 500 gallons of Japanese gasoline."[44]

Notes
[1]Outline Plan for BLACKLIST Operations, 3rd edition, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, August 8, 1945.
[2]"Camps in Japan Cleared: 32,400 P.O.W. Recovered," *The Advertiser* (Australia), September 25, 1945, p. 1.
[3]Peter Clemens, "Operation Cardinal: OSS in Manchuria," *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no. 4 (1998): pp. 71-106.
[4]George Axelsson, "Anti-White Wave Mounts in Japan," *The New York Times*, February 3, 1945, p. 4.
[5]"The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency," *CIA.gov*.
[6]Archimedes L. Patti, *Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America's Albatross*, University of California Press, 1980, p. 270.
[7]Maochun Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War*, Yale University Press, 1996.
[8]Ibid.
[9]Choi Zihn, "Early Korean Immigrants to America: Their Role in the Establishment of the Republic of Korea," *East Asian Review*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter 2002, pp. 43-71.
[10]Captain Sargent's aide-mémoires, April 1-3, 1945.
[11]Ibid.
[12]Ibid.
[13]Fuyang, Anhui is spelled "Foo-Yang, Anhwei" in Captain Sargent's aide-mémoire.
[14]This information was obtained from an unwanted "ghost image" off Captain Sargent's mimeograph machine, not directly from his aide-mémoire.

[15]Captain Sargent's aide-mémoires, April 1-3, 1945.
[16]"Early Korean Immigrants to America," pp. 63-64.
[17]General Order #6 (August. 1. 1945), #13 (August 17, 1945), and #14 (August 18, 1945), OSS, China.
[18]*OSS in China*, p. 231.
[19]Ibid., p. 233.
[20]Henry R. Lieberman, "Japs Bring Up Tanks and Order POW Relief Mission Out of the Country," OWI Dispatch, August 22, 1945.
[21]"Report on Mission to Korea," Headquarters, Northeast Field Command, OSS to Commanding Officer, Northeast Field Command, OSS, September 3, 1945.
[22]*OSS in China*, p. 233.
[23]"Report on Mission to Korea."
[24]"Japs Bring Up Tanks and Order POW Relief Mission Out of the Country."
[25]Ibid.
[26]Ibid.
[27]Ibid.
[28]Ibid.
[29]At the time, U.S. Army intelligence believed there were "numerous" POW camps in Korea when there were in fact only three: Keijo (Seoul) and Jinsen (Inch'on) in southern Korea, and Konan (Hungnam) in the northeast, one hundred miles from the Soviet border.
[30]"Report on Mission to Korea."
[31]"Japs Bring Up Tanks and Order POW Relief Mission Out of the Country."
[32]Ibid.
[33]Yuzuru Noguchi, Yokohama War Crimes Trials, October 14, 1947, photo and inscription.
[34]"Japs Bring Up Tanks and Order POW Relief Mission Out of the Country."
[35]Ibid.
[36]"Report on Mission to Korea."
[37]"Japs Bring Up Tanks and Order POW Relief Mission Out of the Country."
[38]Ibid.
[39]"Tokyo's Messages," *The New York Times*, August 21, 1945, p. 2.
[40]Ibid.
[41]Field Photographer Hobbs, who accompanied Bird to Chungking, developed the film taken during the Eagle mission, the first pictorial records from Korea since the war began. "Report on Mission to Korea."
[42]*OSS in China*, p. 234.
[43]Ibid., pp. 234-235.
[44]"Yank Rescue Team Cursed and Wined by Japs in Korea," *Lafayette Ledger*, October 26, 1945, p. 6.

Bill Streifer, BA, MBA, is the author of fiction and non-fiction on military and intelligence topics during World War II and the Cold War. His current book project, The Flight of the Hog Wild, *by Bill Streifer and Irek Sabitov with an introduction by Dr. Benjamin C. Garrett, Senior Scientist at the FBI's forensic WMD laboratory, concerns a possible intelligence/aerial reconnaissance mission over Soviet-held northern Korea. On August 29, 1945, an American B-29 Superfortress on a POW supply mission was shot down by Soviet fighters, an incident which some believe may have been the first military encounter of the Cold War. Bill's earlier article,* "Operation Cardinal: …'So You Must Be a Spy', " *appeared in* AIJ, *Vol. 29, No. 2, 2011.*

The KGB in Ann Arbor

by Dr. Boris Volodarsky

History is usually written by the victors. With the fall of the Berlin Wall followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the whole communist bloc, even the KGB had little doubt about who had won the fight between the two systems. However, this time the losers went on to write their history of the spy wars—and the winners didn't even notice.

In June-July 1993, the book *Deadly Illusions* by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev was published first in London and then in New York. Many voices rose to praise it. "FBI files, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act," wrote *The Seattle Times* (winner of a 2012 Pulitzer Prize), "confirmed to authors John Costello and Tsarev the authenticity and basic thrust of some KGB documents [given to them for the *Deadly Illusions* project-BV]. And Costello, a respected author and lecturer on espionage history, says former U.S. intelligence officials privately have confirmed the book's basic facts." In an interview given to the newspaper, Timothy Naftali, an intelligence historian at Harvard University's John Olin Institute, stated: "This book begins to lay the foundation for serious Cold War intelligence history." And Ruth Sinai, a journalist who interviewed Naftali for her *Seattle Times* article, added: "Costello and Tsarev think that in the process, the Russian openness puts the CIA and the British intelligence service to shame."

Who then was the subject of that work of "serious Cold War intelligence history"?

Helen Betts, former Law School registrar at the University of Michigan, remembered him as "a nondescript man of average height, always pleasant, courteous, well dressed. I knew who he was, but that's all," she said. "I was told by Dean Smith not to talk about him. He was paid out of a special account. He didn't teach but he had an office on the seventh floor of the legal Research Building."[1]

Alexander Orlov, the name under which this nondescript little man became known to the world, was the most unusual Soviet defector the United States has ever had before or after him. To begin with, his real name was not "Orlov" and he was not a defector. In July 1938, as the Spanish Civil War was steadily coming to an end, senior major of state security Lev Lazarevich Nikolsky deserted his post as NKVD station chief in Barcelona and took off on his own to live in the U.S. under various aliases. He surfaced only fifteen years later, on 6 April 1953, shortly after the death of Stalin. On that day fresh copies of *Life* magazine hit the stands with a serialization of what was considered by many as sensational revelations of Stalin's crimes written "by the former NKVD general who had been living undetected virtually under Hoover's nose for almost 15 years." Even the U.S. lawmakers took up the line and later, on his death in 1973, came to eulogize the man calling himself "Alexander Orlov" in the *Congressional Record* with his "legacy," i.e., articles and testimonies published by the United States Government Printing Office.

In 1992, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tsarev, who had been expelled from Britain for espionage, and Costello, about whose historical abilities perhaps the less I say the better, as the British professor Donald Cameron Watt put it in his review of the book, signed a lucrative contract with Century, an affiliate of Random House, to publish a sensational biography of "General Orlov" that was to reveal secrets that "the British [and, quite certainly, the U.S.] government doesn't want you to read." Real secrets? From 1953 until his death twenty years later, Nikolsky/Orlov had been interviewed by U.S. authorities and part of his material shared with the British Security Service, MI5, and the French DST. The conclusion of the MI5 officer who reviewed Orlov's product was, "I have thanked the FBI for their efforts but unless I have missed something there appears to be nothing at all of value in the report. Compared with Krivitsky, Orlov knew very little that is of interest to us."[2] The conclusion of J. Edgar Hoover's subordinates was somewhat similar, but in 2001 one of them, Orlov's last FBI minder Edward Gazur, published a book praising his late NKVD friend as a jewel among the Bureau's Soviet defectors. Three years later he arranged for the hardcover publication of Orlov's own "reminiscences." This "legacy" was warmly accepted by the readers including, surprisingly or not, many serious academics and even intelligence historians.

Back in 1962, while the Orlov file was getting dusty somewhere in the MI5 archives, the Bureau and the Agency still felt that Orlov might not be telling them all. Therefore, it was decided to place him at a university and engage him in writing, this time not about Stalin's crimes but about the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare from the point of view of Soviet intelligence doctrine. With American involvement in Vietnam growing, some thought it could be useful if "the General" shared his knowledge and experience, which might be very helpful in understanding the fighting tactics used by the Viet Cong.

Orlov was happy to comply. The University of Michigan in Ann Arbor was chosen and Allan Smith, then the dean of the UM Law School and later the acting president of the university, was contacted. "It was my one affair with intrigue," Smith confided, "and I worried about it a good deal. I remember worrying whether we really should get involved with this sort of thing."[3]

It was Edward Meader, an intelligence officer based in Detroit, who arranged for Orlov's cozy transfer to Ann Arbor. Meader was well connected here—he lived near the Smiths in Ann Arbor Hills, and his brother, Michigan Congressman George Meader, was a 1931 UM Law alumnus. Naturally, Meader was not acting on his own initiative—a CIA colleague from Washington, Morse Allen, called asking for such a favor.[4] Allen was a former officer of both Naval Intelligence and the State Department before he joined the CIA's Office of Security, whose main task was to protect Agency personnel and facilities from enemy penetration. As one author described it, Allen's job was "to show why things are not what they seem to be."[5] In 1951, two years before Orlov surfaced in the U.S., Allen was put in charge of the project, which he viewed, according to the same author, "as one that called for studying every last method the communists might use against the United States and figuring out ways to counter them."[6] Ironically, this man seems to have trusted Orlov completely.

He didn't do any teaching. The man himself was very cool, a mild sort of fellow, calm, reserved, slight—a little guy. I remember thinking he'd be a perfect spy.

Allan Smith, then the dean, recalled years later: "I was told that the CIA had an important Russian defector they wanted to place so they could continue to try to find out what he could tell them about Russian espionage. I thought hard about this and decided my justification for having Orlov here would be that he might be able to tell us something about the Russian criminal justice system at the

time of the revolution, and also he'd be willing to do a little writing. He didn't do any teaching. The man himself was very cool, a mild sort of fellow, calm, reserved, slight—a little guy. I remember thinking he'd be a perfect spy. According to Meader, the CIA didn't get much out of him, but I guess they were still hoping. He was, I guess, acting as a sort of consultant to them."[7]

The sort of "consultations" Orlov provided during the critical years of the Vietnam War can be traced through his now unclassified article in the CIA journal *Studies in Intelligence* titled "The Theory and Practice of Soviet Intelligence" (1963),[8] through his *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare* (1963),[9] and through several interviews conducted by Raymond Rocca, Deputy Chief of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, which are available thanks to Freedom of Information Act requests.

In Ann Arbor, Bev and Pat Pooley lived directly below the Orlovs in Maynard House. "We'd just come back from two years in Africa," Pat recalled, "and I was very pregnant. One day I was carrying a big load of wash into the elevator to take down to the basement to the washing machines. Mrs. Orlov was in the elevator. She took one look at me and at the basket of wash and said, 'I am going to denounce you to your husband.' She was a doctor [but in reality, less than four semesters at the 2nd Moscow Medical School] and told us quite proudly that she too had held the rank of general—I would guess on a medical staff. She was tall and stern. He was short and had twinkly blue eyes and looked like an angel…"

Pat continued, "He was proud of how he had duped the Spanish government out of their gold [another invention] and loved to recount that adventure in great detail. He told me how he used his knowledge of surreptitious methods to get out of Spain secretly, pick up his wife and daughter in France, and get all of them safely to Montreal…"[10] In reality, those "surreptitious methods" consisted of being driven by his German chauffeur and bodyguard in his service auto across the Spanish-French border, picking up his family from a luxury French hotel where they had been residing for some weeks, and making the rest of the trip to Paris by train travelling first class. Later, a sum of over $60,000 was found missing from his station's safe—an equivalent of about twenty times that today.

"Orlov and I talked about Philby," Bev Pooley recalled. "His escape to Moscow and confession that he was a long-time Soviet agent had made headlines. Orlov told me that their purpose in recruiting upper class Englishmen was really not so much for their intelligence work per se, though that was important. But through the high positions they would eventually arrive at, Moscow could put in their real agents, their professionals—people who might be hired in as chauffeurs, maids, gardeners."

"And these people," Orlov told Pooley, his blue eyes twinkling as he relished the moment, "these people are still there." Orlov also said he'd never go back to England because, as he put it, "I wouldn't last twenty-four hours there."[11] Regrettably, no one learned about those remarks until thirty years later.

A CIA reviewer of Orlov's *Handbook* wrote: "Orlov declares that the purpose of his book is to recreate an espionage handbook that he composed for the Soviets back in 1936... However, he has done no such thing... The weakest section of this book is the final chapter on guerrilla warfare; here the dated quality of Orlov's information is most clearly shown. His elementary generalizations on guerrilla activity are drawn from personal experience limited to the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars. Soviet guerrilla experience in World War II, which importantly influenced present-day guerrilla doctrine, is covered in only a page or two. Post-war guerrilla activities are not mentioned."[12]

Orlov's fantasies, and specifically his stories about the adventures of Soviet illegals ...have unfortunately been accepted and repeated not only by the authors of his KGB-sponsored biography, but also by many academic historians and authors.

Orlov's fantasies, and specifically his stories about the adventures of Soviet illegals—officers and agents who operate in the West without diplomatic cover—which make up the core of his *Handbook*, have unfortunately been accepted and repeated not only by the authors of his KGB-sponsored biography, but also by many academic historians and authors. One of the most vivid examples is the book written by William Duff, *A Time for Spies* (1999), published by the respectable Vanderbilt University Press. It is a biography of Orlov's successor in London, the Hungarian Teodor Maly. Duff, like Gazur, is a former FBI special agent who relied heavily on Orlov's writings and Tsarev's "revelations." Passed onward were their inaccuracies.

MI5 records on "Paul and Lydia Hardt," the aliases of Maly and his wife, were opened in May 2002, almost ten years after *Deadly Illusions* was published. From the documents we learn that Maly never operated, overtly or covertly, in Austria and Germany, as claimed by Costello and Tsarev, but in France, Holland, and Britain. The so-called "flying or mobile squads," which they mentioned, are Orlov's inventions. There was indeed a so-called Special Tasks group that operated from Paris, but Maly had never been a

member nor had he ever been given any such special tasks. Maly began his career as a linguist at the Special (Cipher) Department and was then transferred to the Foreign Department (INO) operating in Europe as an undercover recruiter and agent-runner. His arrival in Britain was duly noted by the authorities because MI5 had a penetration agent within the Soviet spy ring in the Woolwich Arsenal. Maly's passport in the name of "Paul Hardt," as well as that of his wife, had never been suspected,[13] contrary to what Orlov and his biographers claim.

Costello and Tsarev write about Maly: "Until the KGB archive files were released which showed Orlov's role as the original director of the Cambridge network, the assumption had been that Maly was the éminence grise. This incorrect inference had first been argued by co-author Costello in his book on the Blunt case, *Mask of Treachery*... Two years later Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, in their book *Inside the KGB*, advanced the same theory, supposedly on the authority of the latter author's recollections of his service with the First Chief Directorate. It has been established by Costello and Tsarev in conversations with Gordievsky that his failure to appreciate Orlov's true role was because neither he nor anyone else in the KGB below the highest level had seen Orlov's operational files until the summer of 1990 when the Russian author was given special access. Since it was Orlov's successor whose portrait was hung alongside Maly's in the memorial room, Gordievsky gave Maly the credit for being the mastermind behind the Cambridge network."[14] Without an explanation it is not easy to understand the final part of this clumsy quotation. Maly was indeed Nikolsky's successor (Nikolsky became "Orlov" only in September 1936) as the "illegal resident" (that is, an undercover group leader) in London, but after Nikolsky suddenly left and before Maly arrived, Philby, Maclean, and other British agents were handled by the talented recruiter, Dr. Arnold Deutsch. It is his large photo that hangs near Maly's in the KGB memorial room.

As has been revealed in Christopher Andrew's authorized history of MI5, the initial assessment was absolutely correct and it was a trio of Ignace Reif, Arnold Deutsch, and Teodor Maly who should be credited with the recruitment and running of the Cambridge, Oxford, and other Soviet espionage spy rings in Britain in 1934-37. It was Deutsch's idea to recruit the upper-class students of the leading universities who were likely to make a prominent career. Orlov's story about chauffeurs, maids, and gardeners, related to Bev Pooley, was only the play of Orlov's imagination.

Remarkably, John Costello wrote in *Deadly Illusions*, "while I have not personally met archivists of the Russian Intelligence Service whose unseen efforts have made this

book possible, I can vouch for the unique contribution that has been made." He also claimed that "Joseph Gormley and Joanna Rubira [*sic*] of the University of Michigan provided information relating to Orlov's time at the Ann Arbor campus."[15]

Looking for "Mr. Gormley" and "Mrs. Rubira" turned out to be quite an adventure: neither name was listed in the University of Michigan staff directories of the years in question. Finally, Joanna Rubiner, a publicist at UM Press, was found. "In early 1993," she recalled, "I did get calls from a guy with a British accent," quite obviously meaning Costello. And she indeed answered questions about the campus.[16] Later, she had been greatly surprised to read this in Costello's book. "On Friday, 14 November 1969, a passenger wearing a dark grey overcoat alighted from the morning Chicago train at Ann Arbor station and hailed a taxi. At the intersection of State and South University Streets the cab stopped. The man got out and joined the students hurrying to classes on the sprawling University of Michigan campus. The icy wind blasted snow flurries in from *Lake Huron*, rattling the bare branches of the trees on the sidewalk outside Lorch Hall as he entered through the glass swing doors of the *six-storey* [emphasis added in both cases] Law and Economics building. No one paid any special attention to the short figure whose coat was a bit too stylishly cut—although he conspicuously did not fit in with faculty or students. Pausing before the notice board posting the day's classes, he scanned the list then set off along the ground-floor corridor. In one of the lecture rooms, an elderly man was addressing the class of students…"[17]

As an experienced Midwesterner, Joanna Rubiner knew that Michigan weather arrives from the west, not the northeast. More glaringly, the Legal Research Building, where Orlov's office located was on the seventh [!] floor, is an entirely separate building from Lorch Hall, which is located across Tappan Street. In addition, in 1969 Lorch Hall still housed the UM School of Art. The economics department did not move in until the 1980s.[18] Rubiner had no idea where the authors of *Deadly Illusions* got their information about the proximity of Lake Huron to Ann Arbor, or how they managed to combine the Law Quad and Lorch Hall. Moreover, she certainly did not provide them with any "information relating to Orlov's time at the Ann Arbor campus."

Rubiner was born in 1969, the year the Orlovs moved to another place after an officer from the KGB New York station, Mikhail Feoktistov, who worked at the United Nations and had no travel restrictions, visited them for the first time. Surprisingly, offered the chance to return to Moscow after more than thirty years of self-exile, Orlov was tempted. At that time Oleg Kalugin, who would be promoted to head KGB foreign counterintelligence operations, was deputy head of station in Washington, DC.

He recalled in his memoirs: "Shortly afterward, I returned to Moscow on vacation and asked my superiors what had happened with the Orlov case. They said the decision on his fate had been kicked all the way up to the Politburo, whose members finally decided that the old defector wasn't worth the fuss. The Politburo said it would be foolish to treat a traitor as a hero, and he was too old and the case too stale to trick him into coming back and then put him on trial. No, our leaders said, leave him alone. And so we did, after wasting an enormous amount of time and money hunting for the Stalin-era spy."[19]

Editor's Note: I have met Kalugin on several occasions. He is affiliated with a Washington area contract firm which conducts intelligence training and organizes "spy tours" of the capital city, often with the engaging Kalugin as the experienced tour guide. The National Intelligence University has arranged a number of these tours for its students in recent years.

And what about Costello and Tsarev's description of an elderly man "addressing the class of students"? In reality, Orlov never lectured at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor where the KGB messenger found him. John Costello, a Scottish-born author, died in August 1995 on a flight from London to Miami. His *New York Times* obituary said that his books were "peopled with heroes and villains and moles, Winston Churchill and Rudolf Hess, the treasonous Cambridge cabal and one of the century's master spies, Aleksandr Orlov." Oleg Tsarev, who made so much fuss about Orlov, especially during his promotional tour in New York, passed away peacefully at home in Moscow in 2010 after a complex cancer operation. They did not live to read the true story of Orlov and the Cambridge spy ring with which "Orlov'" had absolutely nothing to do and Nikolsky very little.

Orlov's background and especially his work in Spain should have been known to the FBI from various sources and witnesses when they started to interrogate him in 1953. However, at that time, any evidence against him was only circumstantial.

Paradoxically, the life story of this "NKVD General" (there were no "generals" in the NKVD; the highest rank was "commissar") is largely an invention. Thanks to a relative of his, Nikolsky had started his career with the Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) in an accounting unit. He asked for a transfer to the foreign department because his sick daughter needed medical treatment abroad. After several unsuccessful years in France, Germany, and occasionally

Switzerland and Austria, he was suddenly moved to London where, posing as an American businessman, he indeed was formally a handler of young Philby, then unemployed, and knew about the recruitment of Maclean, Philby's fellow student, whom he assessed to be much more promising than Philby. In the autumn of 1935 Nikolsky left London and returned to Moscow where he was demoted to serve as an assistant chief at the transport department.

In September 1936 Nikolsky went to Spain as a liaison to the Republican Interior Ministry using the alias "Alexander Orlov." He was allowed to take his family with him. After the Spanish government asked Moscow to accept its gold reserve for safekeeping and as payment for arms and ammunition, Nikolsky was instructed to arrange for its safe loading on board four Soviet ships at the port of Cartagena. All went well and in January 1937 then-major of state security Nikolsky was awarded the Order of Lenin and promoted to station chief. From the declassified KGB files used by Costello and Tsarev, copies of which this author managed to obtain (together with other relevant CIA, MI5, FBI, and DST documents), it is clear that "Orlov" was not involved in any intelligence collection from the Franco side. He also had nothing to do with the guerrilla

operations of the Republican army, as claimed by his biographers. During the years of the Great Terror in Russia, Orlov was assigned a special mission in Spain called "vigilance." That involved investigating his own people, many of whom were later shot or sent to the labor camps, as well as International Brigade fighters and even Spaniards, both non-communist and communist. As a representative of Stalin's secret police, Nikolsky/Orlov was directly involved in the assassination and abduction of several prominent Trotsky supporters in Spain and France though their number should not be exaggerated.[20] Orlov's background and especially his work in Spain should have been known to the FBI from various sources and witnesses when they started to interrogate him in 1953. However, at that time, any evidence against him was only circumstantial. In April 1955 he and his wife were granted a U.S. residence permit as Alexander and Maria Orlov.

Several officials from the Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency interviewed Orlov on various occasions, and he actually disclosed most of what he knew, omitting or fudging only his personal tasks. Most importantly, though, he also decided not to mention Philby[21] (of whose later SIS career he was not aware) and

Maclean (though by the time Orlov surfaced Maclean had already been in Russia for two years and Philby had been dismissed from the service). Orlov preferred to zip his lip because he knew even a fish wouldn't get caught if he (fish) kept his mouth shut and because the incentives to lie, dissemble, and continue to deceive are so strong for all the agents and agencies engaged in that secretive business called espionage.[22]

> *[W]hen the Soviet Union collapsed and its secret service was disintegrating, it needed a hero who could be pictured as one of the century's master spies, spending much of his life in America, never betraying his agents, and successfully taking on Western intelligence services. Orlov was an ideal candidate.*

While the KGB decided to leave him alone in 1969, later, when the Soviet Union collapsed and its secret service was disintegrating, it needed a hero who could be pictured as one of the century's master spies, spending much of his life in America, never betraying his agents, and successfully taking on Western intelligence services. Orlov was an ideal candidate. As a result, *Deadly Illusions* produced an enormous impact on the Western understanding of Soviet intelligence history in general, and on the "secret" history of the Spanish Civil War in particular because intelligence historians and writers deprived of access to fresh facts and original documents tend to copy what others have written, no matter that this may be largely guesswork, misinformation, and speculation. This "serious work of Cold War history" should either be dismissed as unreliable or studied as one case of Moscow's distortion of espionage history—of which it is by no means the only example.

Author's Note: I am very grateful to John Hilton and Alfred Slote of the *Ann Arbor Observer* for their kind help in researching this article. The book *The Orlov File: The Biggest Espionage Deception of All Time* is being prepared for publication by Oxford University Press (autumn 2012).

Notes

[1] Alfred Slote, "The Spy in the Law Quad," *Ann Arbor Observer*, p. 75.
[2] Orlov's MI5 personal file PF 605.075, ORLOV, R.T. Reed's Minute Sheet, §131, 24 August 1955, TNA: KV 2/2879.
[3] Slote, "The Spy," p. 79.
[4] Ibid.
[5] See John Marks, *The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and Mind Control* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1991), p. 25.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] See *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 7, no. 2, Spring 1963. The article was unclassified thirty years later and is now accessible online.
[9] As mentioned earlier, it was first published by the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, in 1963, with two follow-up editions in 1965 and 1972.
[10] Slote, "The Spy," p. 80.
[11] Slote, "The Spy in the Law Quad," pp. 79-81.
[12] Anonymous, "Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare by Alexander Orlov," *Studies in Intelligence*, 1963, pp. A28-A29, unclassified.
[13] See TNA: KV 2/811. See also KV 2/1021, "Percy Eded Glading," vol. 1-6; KV 4/228, "Report on the Operations of F.2.C. in Connection with Russian Intelligence during War 19391945"; KV 4/227: History of the Operations of M.S. during the War 19391945, "Percy Glading"; KV 4/185–196, "Liddell Diaries."
[14] Costello and Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions*, p. 453, *n*65.
[15] Ibid, p. ix.
[16] See Slote, "The Spy in the Law Quad," p. 77.
[17] Costello and Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions*, p. 1.
[18] See Slote, "The Spy in the Law Quad," p. 77.
[19] Oleg Kalugin, *Spymaster* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), p. 109
[20] Robert Service, in his most recent history of modern Russia (*A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin*, London: Penguin Books, 2003), writes that Stalin "instructed his emissaries to conduct the same bloody terror against the Trotskyists, anarchists and others that Stalin was applying to them in the USSR. Thousands of anti-fascist fighters were arrested and executed at the behest of the Soviet functionaries" (p. 230), which is absurd. Unfortunately, this text is almost completely copied in the most recent *European International History* written by British Professor Zara Steiner. See *The Triumph of the Dark, 1933-1939* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 185.
[21] On the request of MI5, Orlov was shown an early photo of Philby and carefully asked about him, but he pretended he knew nothing about the man. By that time he had already learned from the newspapers about the defection of Anthony Burgess and Donald Maclean, and could have also found out that Philby served at the British Embassy in Washington and was recalled.
[22] Cf. John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vasiliev, *Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 541.

Dr. Boris Volodarsky was born in Russia where he received his military education and a university diploma. In 1983 Boris was drafted into the Soviet Army as a second lieutenant, where he served as a GRU Spetsnaz airborne unit commander and underwent specialized training for deep-penetration missions behind enemy lines. A captain in 1989, Boris was not deployed because by the time the training was successfully completed the Soviet Union had collapsed. Since the early 1990s, Volodarsky and his family have lived in Western Europe. Boris is the author of several books published both in the UK and the U.S. He defended his PhD thesis (with flying colors) at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He works as an independent intelligence analyst consulting leading risk management companies in London and Washington and is a regular lecturer at intelligence seminars in London and Cambridge.

Chinese Perception of the U.S. Strategic Position in East Asia:
An Analysis of Civilian and Military Perspectives

by Xiuye Zhao

INTRODUCTION

In the year 2009, the prospect for the Sino-U.S. relationship seemed to be promising, with President Obama declaring that the United States does not seek to contain China's rise and welcomes China as a strong and prosperous and successful member of the community of nations.[1] The notions of "G2" and "Chimerica" raised people's expectations of this important bilateral relationship and implied a friendly and cooperative future of the two countries. However, the international community was soon disillusioned by the reality. Despite warm attitudes from both sides, the Sino-U.S. relationship experienced major fluctuations and setbacks in the year 2010. Unsolved issues between China and the United States and its Asian allies dragged the bilateral relationship into a downward spiral. The increasing U.S. engagement in East Asia has aroused the attention and triggered debates among both civilian scholars and military analysts. Focusing on different dimensions of the bilateral relationship, civilian scholars and military analysts have offered different perceptions of the U.S. strategic position in East Asia. This article aims to reveal the major commonalities and differences between civilian and military perspectives by analyzing major civilian and military academic journals and official newspapers.

BACKGROUND

China's Assertiveness

The year 2010 was characterized by many Western observers as a year of "Chinese assertiveness."[2] Although the Sino-U.S. relationship during the Obama administration seemed to have a warm beginning after President Obama's visit to China in November 2009, it did not take long for this highly delicate relationship to deteriorate. In 2010 controversial issues between China and the United States as well as China's Asian neighbors triggered fierce response from the Chinese government. China retaliated against the United States furiously for its $6.3 billion arm sales to Taiwan in January 2010 by suspending military exchanges and threatening to sanction the concerned American corporations.[3] In September 2010, the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry not only condemned Japan's detention of the Chinese captain who allegedly rammed his vessel into a Japanese Coast Guard ship but also demanded apology and compensation from Japan after the captain was released.[4] The Chinese government has declared arm sales to Taiwan and territorial disputes such as those related to Senkaku/Diaoyu Island and the South China Sea as issues concerning its "core interest," implying China's rigid stance on these issues. In recent years, China has become increasingly assertive in defining as well as defending its so-called "core interest," which is non-negotiable in nature.[5] Reinforcing this tendency, reference to the term "core interest" in *People's Daily* skyrocketed in 2010 to 325 times compared to zero in 2000.[6]

China also demonstrated its assertiveness by not complying with the United States in major regional and international affairs. In March 2010, despite U.S. pressure, China refused to condemn North Korea for its alleged attack on the South Korean naval vessel *Cheonan*. Again in November of that year, China declined to condemn North Korea for its shelling of a South Korean island. Chinese and U.S. negotiators also clashed in the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference before coming to agreement on the document that became the Copenhagen Accord.[7] In the eyes of Western observers and leaders, backed by its remarkable track record for growth, a furious and assertive China is emerging. However, China's assertiveness also provided the United States with perfect justification for deepening engagement with East Asian countries to hedge against the alleged "China threat."

U.S. Engagement

East Asia is home to many of the most dynamic economies of today's world. With the rise of China and the relative decline of the Western world since the financial crisis, East Asia is becoming an increasingly influential part of the world. Although geographically far from East Asia, the United States has traditionally been a key player in the region with a tremendous amount of

impact at stake as well. However, the role of the United States in East Asia has been withering recently due to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq plus the financial crisis. The trend toward regionalization in East Asia without U.S. domination was alarming when Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama proposed his vision of "East Asian Community" without the United States in 2009.[8] Since his inauguration, President Obama has placed a high priority on Asian affairs, with a special focus on East Asia, where the United States has key alliances and potential competitors. During his trip to Asia in 2009, Obama declared that the United States is a Pacific country, and it is his mission to "renew American leadership and pursue a new era of engagement" in the region.[9] For the first time in history, in February 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Asia in her very first trip abroad after taking office. Responding to China's assertiveness in 2010, the United States first declared explicitly that Senkaku Island has been administered by Japan and thus is protected by the United States under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.[10] In July 2010, Secretary Clinton declared that the United States has a national interest in the South China Sea during a press briefing in Hanoi.[11] Another incident that sparked tension between China and the United States took place in July 2010 when the United States declared its plan for military drills with South Korean forces in the Yellow Sea to deter further aggressions from North Korea.

> *Increasing American involvement in the region is likely to provoke further assertiveness from China, complicating the highly sophisticated Sino-U.S. relationship.*

Chinese and U.S. national interests clashed in these incidents and the relationship between the two countries plunged dramatically during 2010. Nevertheless, with the United States shifting its strategic priority back to Asia, its engagement in the region is bound to intensify in the foreseeable future. Increasing American involvement in the region is likely to provoke further assertiveness from China, complicating the highly sophisticated Sino-U.S. relationship. Hence, it is of crucial importance to examine how U.S. engagement is perceived by Chinese decision-makers.

ANALYSIS

Overview

The major fluctuations in Sino-U.S. relations in 2010 triggered debates among Chinese intellectuals about the nature of this bilateral relationship and the U.S.

strategic position in East Asia. Scholars from various civilian think tanks have proposed different visions and explanations for the future of Sino-U.S. relations and the frictions that occurred in 2010 by analyzing the issue from various dimensions. On the one hand, focusing primarily on the bilateral and regional dimension of the relationship, realists argue that China and the United States have fundamental conflicts in global power competition and that U.S. engagement in East Asia is considered to be containment of China's rise. On the other hand, liberals, with a focus on the global dimension of the relationship, argue that China and the United States have common interests in global issues such as counter-proliferation, climate change, and antiterrorism. They believe the relationship should not be hindered by bilateral disputes. The rest of the scholars believe the Sino-U.S. relationship can be constructed through positive interactions of the two countries in multilateral frameworks.

Chinese military analysts are generally less comfortable with U.S. military presence in East Asia and have demonstrated a lack of trust regarding its intent. Most, if not all, military analysts are realists with a concentration on the bilateral and regional dimensions of the Sino-U.S. relationship. Strategic and military encirclement is used by military analysts as an equivalence of containment theory articulated by civilian scholars. "Hawks" in the military labeled U.S. foreign policy in 2009 as "neo-imperialism," causing tensions and confrontations in the international community.

The following section of the article summaries the commonalities and contrasts the differences between civilian scholars and military analysts by incorporating international relations theories.

THE CIVILIAN SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

The trend of U.S. strategic adjustment can be characterized as "retreat from the west and advance towards the east" (*Xitui Dongjin*).[12] The fundamental factor driving U.S. global strategic adjustment is the relative decline of its national power and its importance in East Asia. The major consensus among Chinese scholars is that the United States has been swamped by two regional wars in the Middle East, which is not only a strain on U.S. hard power but also damages its soft power worldwide. Unilateralism pursued by the previous Bush administration can no longer be sustained given the stagnation of the U.S. economy.[13] On the other side of the coin, the growing importance of Asia, and especially the rise of China both as a regional power and an influential global player, has become an undeniable fact. Yuan Peng, the director of America Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations,

concludes that the international environment is experiencing fundamental change with the decline of the West and the rise of new powers.[14] Under this consensus, civilian scholars can be classified into several schools of thought regarding the prospect of increasing U.S. engagement in East Asia.

> *Realism is one of the major theories used by Chinese scholars to analyze the Sino-U.S. relationship.*

Hawks – the Realists

Realism is one of the major theories used by Chinese scholars to analyze the Sino-U.S. relationship. Realist scholars are Chinese students of John Mearsheimer, an eminent professor at the University of Chicago, focusing on the need of states to seek power and become hegemons. International politics is believed by realists to be a zero-sum game with a focus on relative gains and losses. Chinese realists are pessimists about Sino-U.S. relations; they see a structural conflict between China and the United States, with China being the revisionist state trying to restore its past glory and the United States the existing hegemon trying to preserve the status quo.[15] Also, they share the notion of containment theory, which regards U.S. engagement in East Asia as a containment measure to forestall the rise of China.[16] East Asian politics is perceived by realists to be a zero-sum struggle of power and influence between the United States and its allies vis-à-vis China.

Closer scrutiny into Chinese realist scholars reveals the subtle differences among their theories. The first group of scholars includes critics of the U.S. "Cold War Thinking" habit. Liu Jianping of China Communication University describes U.S. involvement in East Asia as "destructive," exploiting the unsolved issues among East Asian countries to establish a "new imperial order" in the region with the United States being at the top of the hierarchy.[17] U.S. engagement in the region is aimed at keeping East Asia divided and forestalling the regionalization process to maintain U.S. hegemony. Nevertheless, the recent regional trend t toward integration without U.S. domination has alerted the United States, and the fundamental conflict in East Asia has become the pursuit of regionalization vis-à-vis U.S. domination to keep the region divided.[18] Echoing Liu's concern, Fang Changping of Renmin University claims that an increasingly integrated East Asia is against U.S. interests whether or not the United States is involved in the process.[19] Moreover, Li Jinming of Xiamen University argues that alleged freedom of navigation in the

South China Sea has never been a problem, yet the United States is taking advantage of the dispute to internationalize the issue and appeal to ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members in order to retain its domination in the region.[20] According to these scholars, the United States is paranoid about a regionalized East Asia which could be rallied under China's enduring economic development. Hence, U.S. involvement in the region aims to keep the region divided and to curb China's regional influence.

Both Zhou Yunheng of Renmin University and Huang Fengzhi of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations claim that the United States views China as a threat, according to "Cold War Thinking." Zhou believes that the United States is likely to strengthen its Asian alliances to contain China's maritime interests. China's future development can be easily jeopardized once the United States and its allies have gained control of China's access to the ocean and essentially its energy supply and foreign markets.[21] Huang regards the gravest threat to China's peaceful rise as the hegemonic policies pursued by the United States.[22] Preserving the hegemonic status of the United States is regarded as its core interest; therefore, the U.S. is likely to exploit every chance to increase the cost of China's rise.[23] In conclusion, these scholars believe the United States, struggling to maintain its hegemonic status in East Asia, should be held accountable for the deterioration of the bilateral relationship in the year 2010.

> *Given the competing nature of the bilateral relationship, globalization and economic interdependence between the two countries have precluded the possibility of Cold War-style power competition.*

Given the competing nature of the bilateral relationship, globalization and economic interdependence between the two countries have precluded the possibility of Cold War-style power competition. Although Chinese realist scholars share basic realist assumptions regarding the nature of Sino-U.S. relations, unlike orthodox realists, a number of them highlight the possibility of cooperation between the two powers. Nonetheless, realist scholars have nuanced important differences in the purposes of cooperation.

Yan Xuetong, a well-known Chinese realist scholar, claims that fluctuations in the Sino-U.S. relationship are caused by the notion of "fake friend," a seemingly close and friendly relationship portrayed by both governments. When comparing the Sino-U.S. relationship to the Soviet-U.S.

relationship during the Cold War, Yan argues that although the relationships are different in most aspects the power competition between the two countries is essentially the same.[24] China is a rising power challenging existing U.S. hegemony and structural conflict between the two powers is unavoidable. Both China and the United States should define each other explicitly as competitors to avoid miscalculation and overly high expectations of each other. According to Yan, it was the discrepancy between the reality and the perception of the Sino-U.S. relationship that created fluctuations in the past year. Despite the conflicting nature of the Sino-U.S. relationship, Yan believes there is still room for cooperation, which does not have to be based on common interest. Yan classifies cooperation into positive and negative (or preventive) categories. Positive cooperation aims to make the pie bigger and has to be based on common interests, while preventive cooperation can be based on conflicting interests to prevent open confrontation. Hence, only when China and the United States have explicitly defined each other as competitors, and identified the areas where the two countries have conflicting interests, can the bilateral relationship become stabilized.[25]

Like Yan Xuetong, Li Dongyi of Renmin University has expressed deep suspicion of U.S. intentions in the East Asia regionalization process in his article in the journal *Foreign Affairs Review*. Li claims that preserving the U.S. dominant position in East Asia and preventing the rise of China have become the paramount objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the region.[26] The United States perceives the rise of China and its influence as damaging to U.S. interests in the region. Therefore, Li believes the United States is likely to intensify its engagement through strengthening its bilateral relationships with major regional allies to contain China's rise. Although it is naïve to ignore U.S. benefits to, and influence in, the region, it is not in China's interest to incorporate the United States into East Asian regional frameworks. Li claims that U.S. national interests are neither in accordance with China nor with other countries in the region. He differs from Yan by emphasizing positive cooperation in areas involving "low politics" affairs, where the United States and China have more common interest. Li believes interactions between China and the United States in "low politics" areas will gradually reshape the outdated U.S. version of regional affairs with the United States being No. 1.[27] Fueled by China's enduring and sturdy growth since the financial crisis, the statement implicitly declares China's newly established influence in the region and implies that the United States should accept this reality and act accordingly.

While sharing the same realist assumption about the nature of the Sino-U.S. relationship, Wang Fan of China Foreign Affairs University offers another concept of cooperation between China and the United States. Wang argues that so-called "oppressive cooperation" is the tactic the United States has employed to alter China's development trajectory. Oppressive cooperation is based on the assumption that cooperation between China and the United States is asymmetric, with the United States in an advantageous position.[28] Since economic interdependence has ruled out the option of isolationism and the rise of China has become a given fact, it is in the interest of the United States to integrate China into the Western-dominated international community. Through cooperation and interaction in an international system dominated by the West, the United States can both offer incentives and impose punishment on China to achieve the ultimate goal of shaping China's development trajectory in ways that will benefit the United States.[29] Nevertheless, the long-term consequence of oppressive cooperation is yet to be determined since China is likely to be equipped with an increasing amount of counter-strike capacity based on its outstanding growth.[30]

On the one hand, the future of the bilateral relationship, according to the realists, is mostly driven by zero-sum competition. On the other hand, pragmatic cooperation is also regarded as a tactic to stabilize the relationship as well as to showcase China's regional influence.

Although the above scholars all share the same assumption of the nature of the Sino-U.S. relationship, they embrace the notion of cooperation with different implications. In all of the above cases, cooperation is driven by a realistic rationale. On the one hand, the future of the bilateral relationship, according to the realists, is mostly driven by zero-sum competition. On the other hand, pragmatic cooperation is also regarded as a tactic to stabilize the relationship as well as to showcase China's regional influence. While Yan's version of preventive cooperation serves to stabilize the competing bilateral relationship, Li's version of cooperation is more offensive in nature, based on the underlying assumption that China is rising while the West is in decline. Wang claims that Sino-U.S. cooperation is a tactic employed by the United States to alter China's development trajectory and contain China's ambition.

Pigeons – the Liberals and Constructivists

Compared with realist scholars, liberals and constructivists deny the structural conflict between China and the United States. They are cautious in

avoiding Mearsheimer's notion of a power-seeking logic in international relations. In the eyes of liberal scholars, international politics is a non-zero-sum game where states can cooperate based on common interest to achieve a win-win situation. Also, they reject the notion of characterizing the Sino-U.S. relationship as a competition between the No. 1 and No. 2 powers in the world and maintain that cooperation should be the hallmark of the Sino-U.S. relationship.[31] Liberals in general focus more on the global dimension of the bilateral relationship, claiming that cooperation between the two powerful and influential countries will benefit not only those two countries themselves but also the entire international community. Constructivists, on the other hand, believe the bilateral relationship has yet to be defined and can be constructed based on interaction. Hence, interaction, communication, and mutual understanding are regarded by constructivists as crucial in building a healthy and constructive Sino-U.S. relationship.

Liberal scholars such as Yuan Peng from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations believe that cooperation on global issues outweighs disputes between China and the United States. Yuan first points out that the fluctuations between China and the United States in 2010 occurred during an unconventional period. It was not an election year either in China or in the United States; nonetheless, the relationship fluctuated despite friendly rhetoric offered by both leaderships.[32] Yuan attributes the unexpected fluctuations to the realist logic of power competition between the No. 1 and No. 2 powers. Yuan maintains that Mearsheimer's "Cold War" vision of international politics is no longer sufficient in understanding the dynamics of a highly globalized world where interdependence among countries and economies is at its highest point in history.[33] Hence, the Sino-U.S. relationship should "grasp the big and ignore the small" (*zhua da fang xiao*).

The primary focus of the relationship should be placed on global issues where both countries have a common interest. While bilateral disputes still exist between the two countries, they should be tabled for the sake of global common interests.[34] Yang Jiemian, director of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, comes to the same conclusion after analyzing the relationship from three dimensions. On the global dimension, cooperation in the fields of energy security, climate change, antiterrorism, and counter-proliferation serves the common interest of both countries. On the regional dimension, the U.S. strategic position needs to be further clarified through interaction. The bilateral level is where most disputes exist. However, the bilateral relationship should not be hindered by bilateral disputes, but rather be encouraged by global common interest. Cooperation can be cultivated through

common interests on global issues and should be modeled for settling regional and bilateral disputes.[35]

> *While sharing rejection of the non-zero-sum nature of power struggle and embracing the benefits of cooperation between China and the United States, liberal scholars differ in their views regarding the U.S. role in East Asia.*

While sharing rejection of the non-zero-sum nature of power struggle and embracing the benefits of cooperation between China and the United States, liberal scholars differ in their views regarding the U.S. role in East Asia. Qi Huaigao of Fudan University sees East Asian politics as a unipolar system with the United States being the global superpower. Having accepted that fact, China should seek "soft" ways to balance U.S. influence instead of doing it with "hard power."[36] On the one hand, excluding the United States from Asian affairs is unrealistic. On the other hand, U.S. integration in East Asia should be viewed positively by China, which can benefit from further economic interdependence. In terms of the security issue, U.S. involvement in the region should also be welcomed since it is regarded by most Asian countries as a safeguard against potential Chinese aggression and therefore reduces neighbors' suspicion of China.[37] Wang Honggang of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations argues that containing China's development is not the priority for U.S. engagement in Asia, and China can benefit from cooperation with the United States in global governance.[38] Therefore, the United States should not be solely perceived as a threat or a competitor in the region. According to Wang, China should not be overly sensitive and hostile toward U.S. engagement in the region. Increasing U.S. engagement in East Asia is regarded by Wang as a strategy adjustment to maintain U.S. global leadership.[39] Wang believes that the U.S. attempt to seek domination in East Asia is not necessarily incompatible with China's national interest as long as both sides respect each other's "core interests."[40] A United States exerting positive and constructive influence in East Asia is beneficial for China's development and should be welcomed. As long as the core interests of both countries are protected, none of the disputes is unsolvable.[41] Hence, the task for both countries is to identify core interests for both sides as well as areas of common interest to cultivate mutual trust for future cooperation.

However, scholars such as Wu Xinbo of Fudan University claim that the United States should view itself as an equal participant in Asian affairs instead of a dictator.[42] The

United States should accept China's rising influence in the region and cooperate with China on issues involving common interests. Wu's argument also has a constructivist perspective. Wu believes that conceptions of the world and East Asia politics mold national interest, which in turn determines behaviors. Therefore, it is crucial for both China and the United States to have mutually accepted conceptions to construct a productive and healthy bilateral relationship.[43]

> *Constructivists would prescribe that China and the United States must constantly engage with each other to cultivate an accurate mutual understanding.*

Constructivist scholars share the rejection of zero-sum power struggle as the liberal scholars do, but their perception of U.S. engagement in East Asia is "it all depends." Constructivist scholars such as Da Wei of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations believe China's perception of U.S. engagement in Asia can be constructed and vice versa.[44] Therefore, constructivist scholars emphasize the importance of interaction. The worst thing that can happen to this bilateral relationship is to "delink."[45] From a constructivist point of view, the fluctuations in 2010 were caused by U.S. confusion about the definition of China's status. According to Wang Honggang, the United States understands clearly what China is not (an enemy), but it is not clear about what China is (a competitor or ally).[46] The obscure and ambivalent understanding of China's status is responsible for the conflicting policies pursued by the United States.[47] Therefore, constructivists would prescribe that China and the United States must constantly engage with each other to cultivate an accurate mutual understanding.

THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

Compared to civilian scholars, Chinese military analysts appear to be more homogeneous, focusing on the regional and bilateral dimension of the Sino-U.S. relationship with a realist perspective. Military analysts share most of their assumptions with civilian realist scholars, arguing that the United States is the existing hegemon striving to preserve the status quo. Their main argument is the containment or strategic encirclement theory. U.S. involvement in Asian affairs is regarded as a tactic to build a "Great Wall" to contain China's rise. Backed by China's enduring economic development, military analysts claim that it is natural for China to build up its military to protect its increasing national interests. The United States should accept the fact of China's rise

rather than being a counterproductive force on China's periphery. A number of military analysts even label U.S. engagement in the Middle East as "neo-imperialism," threatening global peace and development. Compared to civilian "hawk" scholars, military analysts can be characterized as "super hawks," with a deeper suspicion about U.S. conspiracy in the region and some advocating a unilateral and revisionist policy.

U.S. Conspiracy

As the ancient Chinese military strategist Tsunzi once said, understanding your opponent is the premise for future victory. Military analysts such as Xia Zhengnan of the Chinese Academy of Military Science analyze U.S. engagement in Asia by studying U.S. grand strategy. According to Xia, the United States is pursuing a selective engagement proposed by Robert Art.[48] Xia claims that, according to Art, it is in the U.S. interest to prevent any major Eurasian power from emerging.[49] However, Xia believes that, although China's rise will not present a fundamental challenge to U.S. hegemony for at least twenty years, U.S. engagement in East Asia will nonetheless hinder China's development.[50] According to Xia, the U.S. intention to contain the rise of China and Russia through its alliance with Asian countries is "known to all" (*tian xia jie zhi*). The "Taiwan Relations Act" of 1979 is also regarded as a string that the United States can pull to obstruct China's reunification process.[51] Moreover, Zhang Shude of the Chinese Academy of Military Science labels U.S. foreign policy and engagement as "neo-imperialism," which is responsible for current instability in the international system.[52]

The 9/11 incident was a catalyst for U.S. foreign policy transition from isolationism to engagement. It justified preemptive strikes against other countries for the sake of the security of the United States. The concept of "antiterrorism" is utilized by U.S. leadership as an excuse for intervention and unilateralism. Hence, the United States has become increasingly audacious in proclaiming its national interest and taking unilateral actions to expand its power and influence.[53] However, Zhao Jingfang, a professor at the National Defense University, predicts that the perpetual pursuit of hegemony can eventually lead to the collapse of the U.S. global strategy. Zhao claims that unilateralism and military expansion cannot be sustained and are subject to a diminishing rate of return.[54]

Under this conceptual framework, other military analysts have expressed concern and resentment against U.S. engagement in Asia. Ye Jianjun from the PLA University of International Relations expresses deep concern about the U.S.'s $12.8 billion restoration of its military base on Guam in 2010, claiming it to be a new step toward the

containment of China's rise.[55] The United States also overestimates China's military capacity intentionally to justify its increasing engagement in East Asia. The Anti-Access Area Denial technique of the Chinese military, argues Ye, has been considerably and intentionally misinterpreted by the Americans in order to strengthen U.S. regional alliances and lobby for more resources for its East Asia engagement operations.[56]

Dai Xu, a Chinese Air Force colonel, known as the "hawk" even among the "hawkish" military analysts, claims that the United States is establishing a "C"-shaped encirclement of China.[57] The U.S. maritime encirclement starts from Japan and extends to Taiwan, the South China Sea, and all the way down to Australia, while the continental encirclement starts from India and extends to Central Asia and all the away up to Mongolia.[58] Hence, the United States has formed a concrete and powerful net containing China's development, especially the development of Chinese naval forces. The United States is also intensifying its engagement with other peripheral countries such as Burma, which used to be in China's "sphere of influence." According to Dai, the United States views China as a challenge to its hegemonic status and will exploit every chance to choke China's development by forming new alliances and strengthening existing ones with countries peripheral to China.[59]

The above analysts share the common belief that the United States is constantly pursuing its goal of sustaining global hegemony and views China as a threat to its status. Hence, they believe it is in the U.S. interest to contain China's regional influence and ambition. However, they differ slightly in terms of the scale of encirclement. Ye focuses on maritime containment in the Western Pacific while Dai sees a diffuse "C"-shaped encirclement.

The *PLA Daily* and the *China National Defense Newspaper* are also followers of the containment theory. Both newspapers are official outlets of China's mainstream military policy. The *China National Defense Newspaper* calls U.S. engagement in the South China Sea as "spilling oil on fire" (*huo shang jiao you*), implying the destructive nature of U.S. engagement.[60] The article claims that the United States is exploiting the conflicts China has with its neighbors to persuade the ASEAN countries to join the process of containing China's rise.[61]

The Revisionists

The revisionist group refers to the military analysts who believe that China's rise has constituted a fundamental change in the power structure of East Asia and that the traditional perception of the West toward China's military strength and strategy should be revised. It is justifiable for China to return to the global stage as an influential player as it used to be for the last 2,000 years, and there should be nothing to worry about. The United States and other large Western powers (*lie qiang*)[62] should discard their entrenched contempt toward the Chinese military and distance themselves from prejudice against the Chinese nation.

Xu Guangyu, a retired general from the General Staff Department of the PLA, claims that the Western powers are used to dealing with a weak China that is incapable of protecting its interests. As China's economy develops, so do its interests and its ability to protect these interests. Some countries, implying the United States and its allies, are trying to contain China within their own comfort zone. The essence of the conflict between China and the United States is containment and counter-containment. Although conflicts should primarily be dealt with through diplomatic measures, China should not be shy in demonstrating its capacity to control its claimed territory.[63] The Western powers will not be comfortable with China's rightful assertiveness, but that is because they are used to dealing with a weak China.[64] In accordance with Xu's argument, Fan Jinfa, the captain of the *Shenzhen Destroyer*, also advocates a proactive strategy to deal with regional disputes. Fan claims that diplomatic measures are not enough; China should not refrain from taking proactive and unilateral actions to protect its rights in its own claimed territory. Proactive measures are multi-dimensional, including both military and civilian actions. In the case of the South China Sea issue, Fan argues that China should fully utilize the natural resources of the South China Sea regardless of sovereignty disputes.[65] Furthermore, an article titled "China Should Not Be Shy of Using Aircraft Carrier to Defend its Territory" appeared in the *PLA Daily* on August 11, 2011.[66] The article argues that China's aircraft carrier is not something built for fun or self-appreciation; it is a weapon built to defeat potential enemies and back up China's territorial claims. The article was soon taken off the Internet and the print version of the *PLA Daily*; nonetheless, it triggered a tremendous amount of astonishment among observers of China's military. To sum up, the revisionists in the military are the most offensive segment of the community. They not only share a realistic assumption of the U.S. presence in East Asia but also prescribe their solution of proactive countermeasures.

IMPLICATIONS

Shared by both civilian scholars and military analysts is the common belief of the decline of the West vis-à-vis China in the wake of the financial crisis. Although there is a divide between realist and liberal scholars, the basis for liberal cooperation is long-term and abstract, while the sources for realist competition or even

conflict are acute. Therefore, the dominant depiction of the bilateral relationship between China and the United States has been a power struggle between the No. 1 and No. 2 in the world.

Looking forward, considering the importance of the bilateral relationship between China and the United States, it is vitally important to understand the implications of Chinese perceptions of the U.S. strategic position in East Asia. Based on their optimistic estimate of China's rise of power vis-à-vis the United States after the financial crisis, together with the U.S. strategy of its pivotal role in Asia, Chinese leaders and scholars are becoming increasingly distrustful of the United States. China's distrust toward the United States is manifested both domestically and through its external relations with the United States and China's neighbors. With a leadership transition in both countries in 2012, the Sino-U.S. relationship is at a delicate turning point.

The Sino-U.S. relationship in the near future can be characterized as deepening economic interdependence with increasing frictions on China's periphery.

The Sino-U.S. relationship in the near future can be characterized as deepening economic interdependence with increasing frictions on China's periphery. On the one hand, the positive elements in the bilateral relationship will be coming from the economic arena, with China transforming its economic development pattern from one of export and investment orientation to one that emphasizes domestic consumption more. China's transformation of its economic development model is likely to benefit the United States by increasing U.S. exports to China. On the other hand, there is not likely to be much incentive for political change. Due to the distrust of Western development model resulting from China's relative success in the financial crisis and the decline of the West, Chinese leaders believe the Chinese model provides an alternative to Western democracies.[67] The high unemployment rate, social unrest, and political impasse in the United States during the recession are interpreted by Chinese scholars and leaders that the Western model is failing to meet new demands and challenges.

In the security arena, distrust is likely to deteriorate the most based on Chinese perceptions of U.S. engagement in East Asia. Beijing is not likely to decelerate its military modernization based on both the "historic mission" of the potential possibility of unifying with Taiwan by force and the "new historic mission" of protecting China's extending national interests and energy routes.[68] As China's national interest expands, so will its willingness to protect it. The main source of friction is likely to come from China's continuous military modernization combined with its opaqueness and lack of transparency. China's assertiveness in settling territorial disputes with its neighbors is likely to increase bolstered by its beefed-up naval and air forces. Since the Obama administration has identified the Asia-Pacific region as its top priority in foreign policy and declared the pivotal role of the United States in East Asia, Sino-U.S. relations are highly likely to experience both deepening interdependence and increasing frictions in the coming years.

Notes
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An Appropriate Response to China's Rise

by Lt Col (USAF) Donald Brunk

In January 2012 the President and Secretary of Defense announced that the United States will "rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region" as part of a new defense strategy. This comes as more than a decade's worth of combat operations in the Middle East slowly winds down. Furthermore, while the U.S. has expended vast resources since 9/11 and now faces significant financial challenges, China's power has been rising. This changing situation leads to many important questions. Can China actually surpass the U.S. in terms of relative power? What would China do if it did? What are the potential points of friction with China? Finally, and probably most important, will China function as a "status quo" power, or a "revisionist" power?

> *We can expect harmony between the U.S. and China when interests align and conflict when they do not.*

Some pundits warn that China is secretly plotting to destroy the U.S., while others argue China is not dangerous and that the U.S. should soften its position toward China to prevent an unnecessary arms race. Neither of these two extremes is correct. The former smacks of neo-McCarthyism that sees evil intent behind every Chinese action, while the latter is naive, expecting benevolence when there are no grounds for such belief. Instead, those wondering how China will behave in the future should embrace the fact that states inherently look after their own self-interest above all else (à la the Realist theory of international relations, or IR) and, consequently, China will follow suit. That means we can expect harmony between the U.S. and China when interests align and conflict when they do not. Realism also helps bring clarity to Chinese behavior that sometimes falls in line with current international norms, while at other times moves contrary to them. Before discussing IR theory, though, it is important first to address some of the questions posed above.

CHINA: THE NEXT WORLD POWER?

China has certainly seen stunning growth for the past three decades. So impressive is its development that two strategic alarms have been sounded—one relating to China's hard power (military might) and the other to its soft power (ability to influence). The alarm over hard power warns that China will one day overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy. When it does, China will have more resources to devote toward defense objectives, thus making it an even more powerful rival to the U.S. that may even be able to surpass this nation in terms of military might. If China did become the world's premier superpower, this event would constitute a monumental shift in the world balance of power. The second alarm warns that, if China can demonstrate it is a better role model for Third World economies to emulate than Western democracy (due to recent economic performance), then Western nations will have a harder time pursuing their foreign policy goals as their ideas are seen in a less positive light. This would possibly mark the beginning of the end for liberal democracy's primacy in world affairs, especially if struggling infant democracies switched to a more centrally managed form of government. Furthermore, assuming Democratic Peace Theory is correct, then the chances for state-on-state conflict would also rise. Democratic Peace Theory arises from the observation that democracies do not fight one another and, hence, the more democracies there are, the less likely conflict will be. Fortunately for those who are concerned about China's power, it is not a foregone conclusion that China's increasing soft power or hard power will create unmanageable security risks.

China's economic and military growth has been truly stunning, but a dose of reality is needed in addition to healthy concern. China may not actually pass the U.S. in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It will if the trend lines continue, but China also has some negative trends working against it that may alter that outcome. Domestic inflationary pressure has been mounting for years. Rising food prices may increase internal stability problems which are already a significant concern for the Communist Party. Additionally, wage increases, combined with the decreased

demand for Chinese exports due to the global economic downturn, will certainly cut into profit margins and the growth of China's overall economy. As the saying goes, past performance does not guarantee future returns. China's population is also aging significantly, which will impact its economic output in the long run. A recent RAND study (*Dusk, Dawn, and High Noon: Demographic Trends Forecast Next Phases, for China, India, and the United States*) argues that, if China does not pass the U.S. economically by 2050, its demographic changes may prevent that from ever occurring at all.

> ***Even if China's GDP did surpass the U.S.'s by 2050, it is not clear if, when, or where China would challenge the U.S. militarily.***

Even if China's GDP did surpass the U.S.'s by 2050, it is not clear if, when, or where China would challenge the U.S. militarily. The U.S. is projected to be able to maintain significant conventional deterrence capabilities for many years (even with the current fiscal austerity) which would make the use of military force a dangerous course of action for China. Furthermore, geopolitical changes may alter certain classic areas of tension. Taiwan can be considered as one example. Although the military build-up across from Taiwan continues, the cross-strait dynamic has also changed as trade and other exchanges have increased since the Kuomintang came back to power in Taiwan in 2008. If the relationship continues in a positive direction, then China may not want to take the island by force, even if it could, because the cost-benefit analysis continues to change over time. Furthermore, reaching beyond the realm of the known to predict definitive distant futures is dangerous. It can lead to an overreaction in the near term and thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nevertheless, the U.S. military should track China's military developments and have a plan to deter China from using those capabilities in an aggressive manner. In the event deterrence fails and U.S. interests are at stake, then the U.S. must also be prepared to defeat those capabilities.

In addition to improving its military capabilities, China is also increasing its soft power. This will certainly improve China's global influence, but the greater concern is that Chinese authoritarian capitalism might provide a viable alternative to democracy for developing states. A legitimate alternative to democracy could precipitate a rollback of the democratization process that has taken place since the end of the Cold War. This is a significant concern, though, only if the sole path to long-term U.S. national security is the continued spread of democracy, which is not the case. History demonstrates that democracy

promotion is not a panacea and it may not even secure U.S. national security interests since democratic processes sometimes yield unpredictable results. For example, democratic elections brought Hitler to power in 1933 and Hamas to power in the Gaza strip, neither of which aligned well with U.S. security concerns. Democratization processes have also failed to produce stability in Iraq, leaving its long-term alignment with U.S. interests in question. Furthermore, the U.S. has several staunch allies that are not democratic, and some that only became democratic over the long term (e.g., South Korea). In summary, although promoting liberal democracy remains a solid long-term strategy, a slowing or reversal of the democratization movement does not necessarily equate to an immediate national security risk, assuming the U.S. can continue building partnerships based on mutual interests. In *Deferring Democracy*, Catharin Dalpino argues there are times when the best thing for democracy in the long run is to defer democracy in the short run.

THE BIG RISK

China's growing power warrants vigilance, but the biggest concern is whether or not China will be a status quo or revisionist power. The current international system is one where nation-states have primacy over multinational, commercial, and non-governmental entities; where bilateral and multilateral negotiations are the primary means for dealing with crises and differences in policies; where global trade is seen as beneficial to economic growth and society as a whole; and where international institutions and treaties define the norms of behavior and taboos that states generally follow. An attempt by China to alter this system significantly rather than seeking to sustain it would have global implications.

The importance of the international system is often underappreciated, but it provides important stability, as well as predictability regarding state action. Given those benefits, would China seek to alter that system significantly if it reaches a position of regional hegemony? Would it launch wars of conquest violating the territorial sovereignty of its neighbors to resurrect some sort of ancient Middle Kingdom? Would it begin breaking with the accepted international norms of behavior and embrace the taboos? Even if China did become the lone superpower in place of the U.S., it is not clear if it would follow such a radically different course of action, and there are several indications that it would not. China's behavior thus far does not reflect that of a revisionist state. It is not like Nazi Germany on a great conquest for *lebensraum* (living space); it is not the USSR exporting international communism; and it is not even modern-day Iran or North Korea, which are pariah states bucking the international system. China also enjoys

a special position within the current system. As a sovereign state and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it sits at the pinnacle of that system. It is an influential member of many of the world's key international institutions, wields considerable influence in affairs around the globe, and is integral to negotiations on global issues, like the Six Party Talks on North Korea. Any effort by China to alter that system radically would put its current status, and all the benefits that entails, at considerable risk. Indeed, since the days of Deng Xiaoping, China has far taken a more pragmatic approach than the Soviets of yesteryear or the Iranians of today. Furthermore, China partners with foreign governments based on mutual self-interest rather than on ideological grounds. Naturally, this current pragmatic path could change as China's power grows, but there are few indicators to that effect at this time.

China's relatively restrained behavior and acceptance of today's international system lead to two hypotheses on what it will do with additional power and how other states ought to respond. The first one suggests that, since China's rise has taken place by leveraging the benefits of the existing international system, it also has strong incentive to ensure that system continues. From this perspective there is little to be greatly concerned about when discussing China and matters of security. A less rosy alternative is that China will take a Machiavellian approach: it will follow the

norms of internationally accepted behavior as long as they meet its needs, but will violate those norms when it is in China's best interest, and when it has enough power to get away with those violations. The first hypothesis fits within the scope of the IR theory of Neoliberal-Institutionalism, while the latter is shaped by the realist theory of IR.

BACK TO REALITY

I will not debate the merits of the various IR theories here, due to space and because several other authors have covered that ground many times over. However, I will say that, as a grand theory for explaining IR, I find Realism the most compelling due to its parsimony and broad application. That said, contributions from other systems of thought are worth understanding, especially for explaining situations that seem to run contrary to Realist thinking. With that bias in mind, here are the facts that are basic to a Realist discussion of China and what can therefore be expected from that nation. China is a growing power—both militarily and economically. It is strong externally and able to fend off external invasion (who wants another land war in Asia?). However, it is weak internally, with domestic troubles including economic fragility, ethnic strife, and lingering border issues. China has also demonstrated an ability to wield influence around the globe, but still lacks the ability to project significant

hard power. China is pragmatic and will deal with almost anyone. Finally, its foreign policy is not constrained by things like human rights concerns as Western democracies often are.

> *As a growing power with internal weakness, China can be expected to bristle when other states try to influence its domestic issues.*

Realism would therefore dictate that China simply seek its own self-interest, namely security. Indeed, its foreign policy has reflected *realpolitik* instead of being principle-based. As a growing power with internal weakness, China can be expected to bristle when other states try to influence its domestic issues. It can also be expected that it will be protective of the power it has gained and will attempt to consolidate that power in the long run. In the Asia-Pacific region, it will seek to gain friends and allies to counterbalance the influence of the U.S. Globally, China perceives that inequities arose from the uni-polar system since the end of the Cold War, and hence will work to return to a multi-polar system where it can have more influence. In many cases it will do this by leveraging its current position in key international institutions (UN, IMF, WTO, etc.). China will behave as a responsible world power when beneficial but, when necessary, it will take advantage of, and manipulate, the international system to achieve its foreign policy ends. Nevertheless, it will not seek to overthrow that system.

SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN

Beyond accepting the pragmatic Realist prescription of how China may behave in general, it is also beneficial to understand specific issues that may evoke strong responses. Outside the traditional regional flashpoints (Taiwan, North Korea, South China Sea), three areas stand out as potential sources of confrontation with Western powers. First are issues over sovereignty. Although China generally works within the international system, it has consistently resisted international trends that infringe upon its perception of national sovereignty. These include regional self-determination (e.g., Kosovo and Montenegro), humanitarian intervention, and the recent external support by some Western and Middle East countries for opposition groups during the Arab Awakening. Chinese leadership views these actions as threatening to the concept of national sovereignty and is strongly resistant to any international effort that may set further precedent in that direction. Some of this position is certainly attributable to a lack of confidence in its own internal stability.

The second area of potential conflict is over economics and resources. Several aspects of China's economic development are of concern to Western powers. As a growing power, China needs resource markets to feed its expanding economy, which has led to a quest for natural resources. Similar to the years just prior to World War II, this has led to a growing international economic battle for access to resources (energy and rare-earth metals are currently two important examples). China has slowly developed a neo-mercantilist policy by building a network of raw material suppliers (many times to the exclusion of other nations), controlling its currency to promote a positive balance of trade, and acquiring vast foreign reserves. Furthermore, in some cases China has also exported massive numbers of weapons in exchange for access to resources. These weapons have actually fueled conflict in parts of the Third World. Access to resources, fair trade policies, and weapons proliferation could form a nexus of tension between China and the West as unresolved economic issues can be linked to other issues creating a storm of colliding events. When linked to broader issues, these economic problems may even serve as a catalyst for more drastic responses than would be expected if handled separately.

When looking at economic issues, it is also important to take into consideration China's domestic conditions. Since the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party is largely tied to its long-term economic performance, it is not likely to passively accept any action by Western powers that would directly jeopardize that position. Moreover, even if the West was careful in handling these matters, China may use the international economics for its own domestic objectives if it needs to create a crisis to divert public attention away from internal challenges.

> *Long-standing animosity toward the U.S. by some of China's neighbors is fading.*

The final area for potential conflict is the changing strategic positions in the region. The U.S. is building its power base by establishing closer partnerships with other regional states at the same time that China's power is growing. The significance of this changing strategic dynamic cannot be overstated. For the second half of the 20th century the strategic situation between the U.S. and China was relatively static. The U.S. had a huge lead in terms of military might and, although the U.S. had close partnership with many of China's neighbors, there were also some that were unfriendly toward the U.S., which gave China space to maneuver. Today, regional cooperation is changing in favor of the U.S. Long-standing animosity toward the U.S. by some of China's neighbors is fading. For example, U.S.-Vietnamese relations

have improved considerably since the end of the Cold War, and even a traditional Chinese ally, Burma (Myanmar), is turning toward the U.S. as evidenced by Secretary Clinton's recent visit there. As a result of these U.S. moves, China today feels increasingly surrounded. At the same time, though, China is closing the military gap, particularly on the technology front. This dynamic is likely to color most negotiations and developments in the region. Furthermore, as long as the relative strategic positions of the two powers remain in flux, the potential for strategic miscalculations will also rise.

NEXT STEP FOR IR GURUS, CHINA FOLLOWERS, ETC.

So what is next? What should we be studying in light of the growing importance of Asia and the Pacific? We should start by taking all the books on counterinsurgency, terrorism, jihadism, Islamism, and that Arabic dictionary (which you never fully got around to reading anyway) and put them back on the shelf. We will certainly need those again, but now it is time to dust off some old school books on IR theory. It is time to start looking at concepts of deterrence (preventing action), compellance (compelling action), balance of power, balance of threat, game theory, and the various subsets of Realism. Just as we all learned about the differences between Shias, Sunnis, Wahhabists, Salafists, and Alawites, it is now time to start looking at the differences between balance of power and balance of threat, and between pursuit of power (à la Hans Morgenthau) and pursuit of security (à la Kenneth Waltz). We must also look at how the Cold War ended and the importance of soft power in bringing about democracy

in Eastern Europe, plus the lessons that holds for our foreign policy and public diplomacy in Asia.

Next, it is time to start studying Asia and its complex mosaic of ancient cultures. We also must not let emotion or fears of a Chinese conspiracy cloud our judgment. If China is as self-serving and pragmatic as it seems (Realism expects this from all states), then it will be far more rational than terrorists who blow themselves up in the name of Allah. Finally, we must approach this study with the utmost seriousness because there is even more at stake. The loss of life can reach the millions when two great powers find themselves locked in armed conflict.

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Cultural Intelligence and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam, 1967-1971

by Lt Col (USAF, Ret) James E. Dillard

In 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson, seeking to build popular support for the South Vietnamese government while aggressively working to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure, called for winning "the other war"—a war of pacification…a war for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people. Within two years the United States implemented the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program, which integrated military operations and development activities under a single chain of command. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, and the Department of State collaborated on infrastructure, economic, and agricultural development; refugee resettlement; psychological operations; and police and public administration training.[1]

The United States learned hard lessons through the implementation of CORDS due to a combination of two things: a poor understanding of the local Vietnamese population and the prosecution of an unconventional war largely by conventional means. However, even though CORDS was complicated by the Phoenix program, a controversial and often misunderstood counterinsurgency initiative, it did deliver credible results in a remarkably brief time. CORDS programs accelerated rural pacification and strategic hamlet projects because they were designed, developed, and implemented with keen insights into the "hearts and minds" of local populations.[2] The legacy of Johnson's "other war" provides important lessons for today's military as it undertakes counterinsurgency operations in similarly difficult circumstances. As before, our military leaders need sound cultural intelligence to inform and guide their decision-making.

> *Cultural intelligence is not new, although the art and science of cultural intelligence collection and analysis often appear new to each succeeding generation of intelligence professionals.*

WHAT IS SOCIO-CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE?

Cultural intelligence is not new, although the art and science of cultural intelligence collection and analysis often appear new to each succeeding generation of intelligence professionals. The socio-cultural intelligence discipline continues to feature three basic elements: collection of sociological and cultural data on a specific country, population, culture, or religion; leveraging that information through actionable intelligence analysis provided to key decision-makers; and then applying a variety of theories, methods, models, and perspectives originating from sociology and anthropology. Socio-cultural intelligence thus seeks to enhance knowledge, interpretation, evaluation, and application of acquired intelligence on a target state or non-state actor so that behavioral differences within a foreign culture can be compared and contrasted to our own. Why has a particular culture undertaken an identified pattern of behavior, and how is that behavior driven by perceptions, beliefs, customs, ideology, and religious influences? These are the crucial questions for cultural intelligence analysis in any age and any region.[3]

As the United States escalated its military involvement in Vietnam during the mid-1960s, Pentagon and State Department officials sought to understand the significance of cultural and ideological disparities between our culture and the tribal and familial affiliations of the Vietnamese in cities and hamlets. CORDS used the knowledge gained through this kind of information on Vietnamese nationalists and communists to produce an effective national security program that also had the ability to co-opt local populations.[4]

Just as the United States is discovering in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and Iran, the intelligence professionals who were best able to make sense of the Viet Cong insurgency during the Vietnam War relied on socio-cultural intelligence, in league with more traditional means of data collection and analysis. Cultural intelligence can be leveraged by sociologists, anthropologists, intelligence analysts, and military commanders to enhance the

military's ability to communicate and build cultural bridges to the local civilian population. CORDS shed light on how such cultural bridge-building could be done efficiently and effectively by a host of civilian and military advisors.

IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF CORDS

CORDS partnered civilian entities with the U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV). The program established the position of Deputy to the Commander MACV for CORDS and filled the position with a senior civilian. Similar partnerships existed at subordinate commands across the country. CORDS addressed the principal impediment to integrated interagency action—lack of unity of effort—and four basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare: the primacy of civil power, the use of minimum force, the need for firm and timely action, and the need for cooperation between civil and military authorities.[5]

CORDS-enabled nation-building and pacification efforts prevented effective Viet Cong recruiting efforts.

Between 1967 and 1971, CORDS contributed to the defeat of the Viet Cong by influencing the decline of popular support for the communist insurgency, pacifying rural Vietnamese provinces, and strengthening South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces. Post-Tet Offensive U.S. counterattacks, coupled with CORDS initiatives, made it difficult for the Viet Cong to reassert itself. Indeed, CORDS-enabled nation-building and pacification efforts prevented effective Viet Cong recruiting efforts. In Kien Hoa province in the Mekong Delta— birthplace of the National Liberation Front—Viet Cong strength fell from more than 12,000 insurgents in 1967 to 9,000 in 1968 and to less than 2,000 by 1971.[6]

A number of Washington officials gave the CORDS program rave reviews, including Thomas Thayer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis in Southeast Asia, who said "there was widespread evidence and agreement that the government of Vietnam exercised a predominant influence over the vast majority of the South Vietnamese people."[7] Raymond Davis, a U.S. Army NCO assigned to the CORDS program, gave this first-hand assessment in July 1971: "CORDS, a thorn in the side of the Viet Cong, has been frequently denounced by the VC. Some officials in Saigon believe the program's progress since 1967 might have been a factor in North Vietnam's decision to launch major military operations in 1968 to halt joint pacification efforts in rural areas."[8]

HOW CORDS WAS DIFFERENT

The CORDS approach followed years of unsuccessful attempts to achieve unity of effort through mere interagency coordination. In the early 1960s, as America's involvement in Indochina deepened, no one agency in the government possessed the capability to oversee and discipline the entire, multi-pillared pacification mission. In its early stages of political and military engagement in Vietnam during the John F. Kennedy administration, U.S. national security officials did not provide the clear guidance and strong leadership needed to galvanize unity of effort through interagency processes. Key agencies lacked the organizational structure, authority, and incentives to adapt to quickly changing circumstances as the Viet Cong insurgency gained momentum. A Country Team approach, whereby each agency remained responsible to its Washington headquarters, failed to responsibly inform policy directives at home or effectively deal with the Viet Cong insurgency's increasing size and influence. Although the Country Team structure was modified when GEN (USA, Ret) Maxwell Taylor became Ambassador to Vietnam, President Johnson left military matters in the hands of GEN William Westmoreland. While Taylor transformed the Country Team concept into a Mission Council structure in an effort to obtain greater unity of effort, each agency continued to retain separate responsibility for its operations. As a result, interagency coordination suffered. As "The Pentagon Papers" would describe years later, "Each agency had its own ideas on what had to be done, its own communications channels with Washington, and its own personnel and administrative structure."[9] Agencies received conflicting and overlapping guidance from Saigon and Washington.

To better coordinate interagency nation-building efforts in Vietnam, Robert W. Komer, Special Assistant to the President, argued for creation of the Office of Civil Operations in Saigon. Komer's personal and vigorous intervention, responsible for perhaps the most remarkable example of American institutional innovation during the war, earned him the nickname "the Blowtorch." Komer eventually placed civil operations directors at regional and provincial levels, coordinating civilian pacification efforts by the CIA, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, and USAID. The military took parallel steps in 1966 to centralize its pacification efforts, emphasizing the roles of military advisory units assigned to territorial security sectors distinct from regular Vietnamese Army areas of responsibility. Meanwhile, Komer, seeing that both civilian and military initiatives still were falling short of pacification objectives and failing to defeat the insurgency, insisted that Vietnam needed a robust coordinating authority to direct a unified, integrated civil-military structure. Soon a consensus developed among the

President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that unifying the civilian and military pacification initiatives was essential to operational success. President Johnson convened a meeting on Guam in March 1967 that gave a green light to Komer's initiative. In May 1967, in accordance with National Security Action Memorandum 362, "Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)," Komer pulled together all U.S. civilian and military pacification programs into CORDS under MACV control.[10]

IMPACT OF CORDS ON UNITY OF EFFORT

CORDS addressed the crucial impediment of lack of unity of effort by partnering civilian and military entities. To sustain unity of effort throughout Vietnam, CORDS created unified civil-military advisory teams down to the district level—eventually encompassing 250 districts and 44 provinces. At its peak, military personnel comprised 85 percent of personnel assigned to CORDS (6,500 military to 1,100 civilian). CORDS was tailored for success in an environment such as Vietnam. No conventional organizations had the requisite political, military, and socio-cultural intelligence capabilities to deal with counterinsurgency imperatives. CORDS brilliantly filled the gap. This de facto subordination of pacification efforts to military control was unprecedented, but placement of the pacification programs under military command and control became necessary because the military controlled the resources needed to restore security in the countryside. Westmoreland accepted the "unprecedented grafting of a civilian/military hybrid onto his command" and supported Komer's dealings with the MACV staff—even when military advisors opposed civilian-led strategic planning and policy initiatives.[11]

EXAMPLES OF CORDS EFFORTS: CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE AT WORK

Under CORDS sponsorship, the U.S. Army created a People's Self-Defense Force, and Army commanders turned to wider use of small-unit patrols conducted with ARVN units. By April 1968, much of the Viet Cong infrastructure was left destroyed or exposed following the Tet uprising. The pacification of the Quang Dien District of Thua Thien Province in I Corps northwest of Hue by 1/502nd Infantry of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division is an example of the new strategy at work. In April this operation defeated the enemy main force units and rooted out the Viet Cong infrastructure in the villages. Instead of using indiscriminate airpower and artillery assets, the U.S./GVN commanders relied on intelligence gathered by Regional and Popular Forces.

Enough of the Viet Cong infrastructure was soon destroyed to convince many of the insurgents to surrender. By November the entire Quang Dien District had been pacified.[12]

> *Poor intelligence and improper operational planning resulted in a system of metrics that rewarded quick successes in relatively safe regions and tended to ignore or understate recurring indications of deep-seated problems in more troublesome areas in the South Vietnamese countryside.*

A less successful example of CORDS was the effort to establish security prior to implementing regional development programs. This effort was a top priority, and pacification was intertwined with the success of military operations. The most pressing security issue related to pacification was attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure in the rural areas of South Vietnam. Nevertheless, while CORDS made herculean efforts to enhance security in the south—even helping increase the Vietnamese national police force from 75,000 in 1967 to 114,000 by the end of 1971—it neglected some towns and rural areas determined already to be "secure." In this example, poor intelligence and improper operational planning resulted in a system of metrics that rewarded quick successes in relatively safe regions and tended to ignore or understate recurring indications of deep-seated problems in more troublesome areas in the South Vietnamese countryside. By failing to heed the imperative of establishing internal security as the top priority, CORDS' early successes in economic and rural development programs could not be sustained. Safety, stable governance, the rule of law, viable economic development projects, and fulfillment of basic needs and services for the local population remained insurmountable obstacles to CORDS' sustained mission success; isolated, anecdotal "feel-good" stories could not change that tragic calculus.[13]

CRITICISMS OF CORDS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Intractable security problems aside, CORDS also came under heated criticism in some quarters owing largely to its limited duration and scope. Komer believes its failure to have greater effect on the outcome of U.S. military operations in Vietnam resulted from years of policy paralysis—a case of too little, too late with the integration of sophisticated cultural intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures. Planning and execution of

large-unit, conventional-forces maneuver warfare against North Vietnamese regular forces dominated parallel efforts at rural pacification against a stubborn Viet Cong insurgency in the South.[14] A former CORDS analyst, remembering the failure of the counterinsurgency program to address the ineffectiveness of the corrupt South Vietnamese regime, stated: "CORDS was a great program and a good model—with one caveat. Under the Hamlet Evaluation System, we collected lots of data indicating the security of the regions and provinces but nowhere did we find any evidence or indication of popular support of the (Republic of Vietnam) government."[15] His perspective implies that future CORDS-like approaches must include host government legitimacy as a key objective of any viable counterinsurgency campaign. Komer agrees, claiming that for too many years senior U.S. policymakers overlooked the inept leadership of South Vietnam's military and political leaders.[16]

John Nagl, author of *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, concludes that the organizational structure and culture of the U.S. Army during the Vietnam era precluded the evolution of a sophisticated counterinsurgency learning process that would have led to sustained successes and ultimate victory in the war against Ho Chi Minh's communist forces. Even GEN (USA) Andrew Goodpaster, who Nagl believes understood the war far better than most senior U.S. Army officers, persisted in choosing military solutions to difficult political problems of building local support for the government.[17] Henry A. Kissinger, soon to become President Richard M. Nixon's national security advisor, criticized General Westmoreland's attrition strategy in a *Foreign Affairs* article in January 1969:

> We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their main forces the way a bullfighter uses his cape—to keep us lunging into areas of marginal political importance.[18]

By the spring of 1969—in the wake of a turbulent year that witnessed the Tet offensive, the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, and a bruising Presidential campaign, the American people were no longer willing to accept the casualties and endless commitment of U.S. forces required by such a strategy. Kissinger argued that it was time for the Army "to adopt a strategy which is plausible because it reduces casualties. It should concentrate on the protection of the population, thereby

undermining communist political assets. We should continue to strengthen the Vietnamese army to permit a gradual withdrawal of some American forces."[19] GEN (USA) Creighton Abrams began to implement a so-called "Vietnamization strategy" in 1969, but he ran head-on into the organizational structure and culture of the U.S. Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including Army Chief of Staff GEN Harold K. Johnson. Johnson had earlier emphatically stated: "We still must maintain the basic position that the Army is a *fighting* force and that our success is measured in terms of the leaders' or commanders' ability to command U.S. troops effectively. I had to start from that basic position and I could not erode it in any way."[20]

Author Brian Jenkins quotes an unnamed U.S. Army officer as saying: "I'll be damned if I permit the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war."[21] The Army's own doctrinal rigidity thus prevented senior officers from understanding the nature of the war and making the necessary changes in strategy and tactics to apply its power more intelligently, more effectively, and more economically. Saigon's fall on April 30, 1975—25 years to the day after President Harry S Truman first authorized military assistance to Indochina—was in large measure a legacy of the U.S. Army's inability to transform itself in the face of an obstinate insurgency.[22]

POSITIVE LESSONS LEARNED FROM CORDS: SOCIO-CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE

One thing CORDS got right was to emphasize language and culture training as an integral part of its military and civilian personnel program. While ethnocentrism and racial bias did create tensions in the working relations between CORDS operatives and indigenous Vietnamese personnel, the program made great strides in attempting to overcome mirror-imaging and a steep learning curve regarding Southeast Asian languages, values, and cultural underpinnings. All CORDS workers in Vietnam came from the military or a civilian agency and received common training at the Vietnam Training Center at the Foreign Service Institute located in Arlington, Virginia. CORDS advisors received Vietnamese language training; an orientation on Vietnamese history, religions, politics, and economic development; and a socio-cultural intelligence course in Vietnamese culture.[23]

With capable and motivated personnel and an innovative strategy leveraging cultural intelligence, CORDS complemented allied security operations. By denying villages and hamlets to the Viet Cong, civil-military operations enabled the U.S. Army and the Army of the

Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) military forces to concentrate on North Vietnamese conventional forces. CORDS also fostered creation of an organized People's Self-Defense Force composed of local inhabitants who could defend their villages. Moreover, CORDS advisors were able to leverage a grassroots political support network and, as a matter of routine, helped with community development projects.[24] Regional Force units, the equivalent of federalized U.S. Army National Guard troops, deployed throughout the country to deny sanctuary to North Vietnamese Army units or known Viet Cong sympathizers.[25] CORDS affected political and economic progress by enhancing local protection and area security—keys to effective nation-building. Other major CORDS achievements between 1967 and 1971 were the revival of a functioning rural administration; land reform programs; and a host of health and human services improvements, including greater access to medicine, education, and refugee care. CORDS officials also facilitated the rebuilding of roads and waterways destroyed by years of war.[26]

OVERALL IMPACT OF CORDS: FORCING THE ENEMY INTO A COSTLY CONVENTIONAL WAR

By 1970 CORDS had contributed to the departure of nearly 300,000 foreign troops and helped prevent South Vietnamese capitulation even in the face of intensified pressure by the North. Programs designed to degrade and destroy the Viet Cong achieved great success. An enhanced security situation, along with increased peasant ownership of property and steadily improving economic conditions, dampened communist appeal in much of the countryside of South Vietnam and actually led to a surge in defections within the ranks of the Viet Cong insurgents.[27] The Viet Cong insurgency which had battled the MACV during Tet in 1968 was, by most accounts, virtually eliminated by Christmas 1971.[28]

CORDS' successful pacification program played a major role in Ho Chi Minh's decision to rely on conventional means to defeat South Vietnam. With the help of U.S. ground forces and air and logistics support, South Vietnamese troops were able to repulse the 1972 communist ground offensive. William Colby, a senior CORDS advisor to GEN Creighton Abrams and later CIA Director, remarked: "The attack of 1972 and the final attack of 1975 were pure North Vietnamese military attacks. There were no guerrillas in those operations because in the interim our program actually won the guerrilla war by winning the guerrilla to the (Republic of Vietnam) government. They were all on the government side."[29]

The Viet Cong shared Colby's viewpoint. A Viet Cong official, who out of frustration and dejection surrendered to CORDS-supported Regional and Popular Forces in 1971, reported that recruiting became nearly impossible in his region after the CORDS pacification program reached full capacity in 1969.[30] Another Viet Cong wrote in his journal: "If we are winning while the enemy is being defeated, why have we encountered increasing difficulties? Last year we could attack United States forces. This year we find it difficult to attack even puppet forces. We failed to win the support of the people and keep them from moving back to enemy-controlled areas. We are exhausted."[31]

In the end, Hanoi's conventional forces, not the insurgents, defeated the South Vietnamese troops and captured Saigon in April 1975.

U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker insisted that pacification of the South Vietnamese countryside, an "essential and integral part of the war," had succeeded by 1971. Ambassador Bunker and other observers noted that CORDS ensured unity of effort among both military and civilian entities because it unified command.[32] Evidence suggests that one the reasons Hanoi launched a major offensive in 1972 was to offset the progress South Vietnam had made in pacification by eliminating much of the Viet Cong threat.[33] In the long run, of course, those gains proved illusory. Although the South Vietnamese, with U.S. advisors and massive air support, blunted the North's 1972 invasion, U.S. forces soon withdrew after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. In the end, Hanoi's conventional forces, not the insurgents, defeated the South Vietnamese troops and captured Saigon in April 1975.

Insurgencies, however, are complex affairs that defy earnest attempts at seeking a common denominator. The counterinsurgent's strategy will depend on how he is organized and how he chooses to fight. The enemy remains a dynamic and fluid target set, and every situation will differ from the next. Security forces must be prepared to use armed force to keep the enemy away from the population. To conclude that large-scale operations play little or no role in counterinsurgency efforts is a mistake. The big-unit war of 1965 and 1966 robbed the communists of a quick victory in Vietnam and allowed a weak government in Saigon some breathing space in which to begin pacifying the countryside. Without the security generated by large maneuver units, pacification often cannot succeed. At the same time, government forces must

target the insurgents' ability to live and operate freely. Given enough time, insurgents will try to create a clandestine political structure to replace the government's presence in the villages. Such an infrastructure is the basis of guerrilla control. Counterinsurgency operations, therefore, must specifically target the insurgent infrastructure to win the war. These twin objectives— providing security for the people and targeting the insurgent infrastructure—form the basis of a credible government campaign to win hearts and minds. Nothing can be accomplished—no land reform, no new schools, no new health care programs, no robust agricultural assistance—without first establishing some semblance of security.

COMPARING EFFORTS IN VIETNAM WITH COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

While ultimately falling short of being a game-changer in Indochina, CORDS does offer a good example of how to establish a chain of command incorporating civilian and military agencies into a focused organizational structure. Like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and the defunct Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, both of which tried to combine and coordinate civilian and military agencies, CORDS program managers quickly realized the need to address both warfighting objectives and nation-building initiatives. CORDS advisors, for the most part, simply did it better.[34]

Within CORDS were dozens of programs designed to enhance South Vietnamese influence in the countryside. Security remained paramount. A root cause of pacification's success between 1967 and 1971 was its ability to counter the insurgents' grip on the people in rural villages and hamlets. Military operations were orchestrated to keep enemy main battle forces and guerrillas as far from the population as possible. This was especially important in the countryside, where Viet Cong cadre sought to form a communist shadow government to supplant the Saigon regime's influence. When Hanoi formed the Viet Cong movement in 1960, the National Liberation Front cadre were known as the building blocks of Ho Chi Minh's revolution—the mechanism by which the communists could spread their presence throughout South Vietnam. The cadre did not wear military uniforms, but they were as crucial to the armed liberation struggle as any guerrilla carrying an AK-47. By early 1967, between 70,000 and 100,000 Viet Cong cadre were believed to be operating in South Vietnam. Virtually every village had a cell made up of a Communist Party secretary, a finance and supply unit, and information and culture sections to recruit (and intimidate) the local population.[35]

The communists consolidated their influence by using a carrot-and-stick approach. The Viet Cong provided medical treatment, education, swift justice, and heavy doses of revolutionary propaganda—all backed by gruesome threats from Viet Cong guerrillas. The Viet Cong waged an effective terror campaign targeting village officials and others in a position of authority to win villagers over to the revolution. Meanwhile, the inept South Vietnamese government rarely could sustain a presence in the villages and lacked an effective armed force to provide necessary security. By 1965 the Viet Cong had become a center of gravity, and their influence was continuing to rise.[36]

Ostensibly controlled by the Saigon government, Phoenix was funded and administered by the CIA.

THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

Two years later, in July 1967, the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was created as a clearinghouse for information on the Viet Cong, but the intelligence seldom proved useful or timely. In December 1967 ICEX was given a new emphasis and renamed Phoenix. The focus now was clearly to attack and destroy Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam. Ostensibly controlled by the Saigon government, Phoenix was funded and administered by the CIA. As CORDS expanded the U.S. advisory role across the board, Phoenix benefitted. Within three years, Phoenix advisors numbered 704 throughout South Vietnam, but they confronted daunting challenges.[37]

For the Phoenix program, the 1968 Tet Offensive proved to be pivotal. The pacification program was put on hold as the allies sought to keep the communists from overrunning entire cities. The Tet Offensive reinforced the notion that the Viet Cong were crucial to the insurgency. Covert cadres paved the way for the guerrillas and ensured that supplies and replacements could sustain the North Vietnamese offensive. Phoenix was rising by summer 1968, and as the enemy offensive wavered the allies launched the Accelerated Pacification Campaign to capitalize on post-Tet communist vulnerabilities. Phoenix now emphasized four objectives: decentralization of the old ICEX command and control structure to facilitate more effective intelligence gathering and interrogations; establishment of dossiers on Viet Cong suspects to target, capture, convert, or kill "known" Viet Cong; institution of rules by which suspected Viet Cong could be tried and imprisoned; and emphasis on using local police and militia groups rather than the South Vietnamese military as the program's key operational arm.[38]

Between 1968 and 1972 the Phoenix program neutralized 81,740 Viet Cong. An estimated 26,369 were killed. Critics of the CIA and the Phoenix program have charged that it was tantamount to an assassination bureau; it was not. Abuses did occur. U.S. advisors had great difficulty policing the torture of Viet Cong prisoners by U.S. military and South Vietnamese personnel. Most Phoenix advisors strongly preferred the capture of Viet Cong so that useful and actionable intelligence could be gathered through interrogations. Colby himself asserted: "Our training emphasizes the desirability of obtaining these target individuals alive and using intelligent and lawful methods of interrogation to obtain the truth of what they know about other aspects of the Viet Cong infrastructure."[39]

Despite the horrors associated with the Phoenix program, and the subsequent criticism of the CIA role in those horrors, Phoenix helped sever links between the population and the Communist Party cadre—a major blow to the Viet Cong's recruitment efforts in South Vietnam. Hundreds of high-ranking Viet Cong leaders had been forced to move to safe areas where they lost much of their ability to influence revolutionary sentiment in the countryside.[40]

Without the Phoenix program, CORDS pacification efforts would have likely fared far worse. Communist accounts of the war bear this out, according to Stanley Karnow, author of *Vietnam: A History*. He quotes the North Vietnamese deputy commander in South Vietnam, General Tran Do, as saying that Phoenix was "extremely destructive."[41] Former Viet Cong Minister of Justice Truong Nhu Tang wrote in his memoirs that "Phoenix was dangerously effective" and that, in Hau Nghia Province west of Saigon, "the Front Infrastructure was virtually eliminated."[42] Nguyen Co Thach, who became Vietnam's Foreign Minister after the war, claimed the communists "had many weaknesses in the South because of Phoenix."[43]

In Vietnam, the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies faced an insurgency that emphasized political and military options in equal measure. Before the Tet Offensive eventually weakened the communists sufficiently to allow concentration on maneuver force warfare and pacification, the allies found it difficult to decisively engage the popular front infrastructure in the South. Yet, between 1968 and 1970 the Phoenix program made significant, if halting, progress against Viet Cong assets.

WHAT IF? THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZING EARLY

If a robust counterinsurgency campaign could have begun to chip away at Viet Cong resistance as early as 1961, it is possible that the allies might have had an easier time diminishing Ho Chi Minh's influence in the South.[44] Would the outcome of the war have been different? That is entirely another matter, and speculation along such lines seems pointless. The Tet Offensive, the watershed event of 1968 that seemed to change everything on the ground in Vietnam and at home in America, gave the communists a huge political and psychological victory. Tet dramatically contradicted optimistic claims by President Johnson and GEN Westmoreland that the war was all but won. The communists continued to find military victories illusory, but Tet gave them a definitive propaganda and public relations triumph that reverberated globally. The American public and many of the nation's leaders began to betray our lack of capacity and patience for waging protracted war—sociological and cultural traits that Ho Chi Minh early on sought to exploit in his quest for national independence.

> *Since an insurgency thrives only when it can sustain a presence among the population, it is vital to separate the insurgents from the local population as a first step in a viable COIN plan.*

LESSONS LEARNED FROM VIETNAM

So what were the lessons learned from counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam between 1967 and 1971? First, unity of effort is imperative. A unified command structure combining military and pacification efforts is essential. Once CORDS and Phoenix became part of the military chain of command, progress became evident. Second, since an insurgency thrives only when it can sustain a presence among the population, it is vital to separate the insurgents from the local population as a first step in a viable COIN plan. Third, the counterinsurgency's anti-infrastructure plan must be transparent to the indigenous population so they can understand the government's intentions and behavior. Fourth, winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous people involves mutual trust and loyalty. Finally, and above all, American troops and their leaders must never forget that the host nation is responsible for maintaining security and establishing viable institutions that satisfy the people's needs.[45]

CORDS, complemented by Phoenix, left a legacy of success amid the tragedy that was the Vietnam War. Over time, American civilian and military advisors improved their counterinsurgency practices in Vietnam, which resulted in viable combined and interagency efforts. Careful study of crucial elements of these counterinsurgency programs can build a template for future COIN operations in other regions of the world.

Notes

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[2] Diana Sorrentino, "Socio-Cultural Intelligence," *BRG Research and Intelligence Group Journal*, Spring 2011, p. 3.

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[15] Coffey, pp. 32-33.

[16] Coffey, p. 32.

[17] John A. Nagl, *Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 170-171.

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[24] Davis, p. 34.

[25] Coffey, p. 30.

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[27] Coffey, p. 30.

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[34] Andrade and Willbanks, pp. 11-12.

[35] Andrade and Willbanks, pp. 17-18.

[36] Andrade and Willbanks, pp. 17-18.

[37] The Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was established by MACV Directive 381-41. See "Military Intelligence: Coordination and Exploitation for Attack on the VC Infrastructure," July 9, 1967, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, DC. For a detailed study of ICEX, see Ralph W. Johnson, "Phoenix/Phung Hoang: A Study of Wartime Intelligence Management" (PhD dissertation, The American University, 1985).

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The Links Between Human Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorism

by LT (USNR) Daniel Sheinis

Despite the Emancipation Proclamation and the prevalence of domestic and international labor laws, modern-day slavery—also known as trafficking in persons (TIP), human trafficking, or forced labor—has become a thriving industry in the 21st century. According to the U.S. Department of State's 2010 *Trafficking in Persons Report* (*2010 TIP Report*), there are 12.3 million adults and children enslaved worldwide; other estimates say there are 27 million. Human trafficking affects nearly every nation on the planet, although its criminalization and prosecution vary widely.[1]

> *Human trafficking is the fastest growing illicit activity in the world, and is the second most profitable crime, along with weapons trafficking; drug trafficking is the most profitable.*

Human trafficking is the fastest growing illicit activity in the world, and is the second most profitable crime, along with weapons trafficking; drug trafficking is the most profitable.[2] Its high profits and low risk naturally make it attractive to organized crime groups, but also to some for whom human trafficking is their only criminal enterprise.[3] The International Labor Organization (ILO) reports that profits from human trafficking are nearly 32 billion USD annually.[4]

The economics of slavery have changed considerably since the height of the African slave trade. Perhaps the most stark contrast is price: in the 19th century it cost the modern day- equivalent of 40,000 USD to buy an African slave, but today it costs less than 100 USD to buy a trafficked victim.[5] The affordability of trafficking victims has opened the modern slave market to a much broader range of people than was possible during the transatlantic slave trade. It also allows for a paradigm shift, where the traffickers view their victims as wholly expendable when compared to 19th century slave owners who viewed their slaves as business investments.

Between 14,500 and 17,500 individuals are trafficked into the United States each year.[6] These foreign victims, including children, suffer more from economic exploitation than they do from commercial sexual exploitation, mostly in domestic servitude, agriculture, and manufacturing. Source countries for foreign victims include Thailand, Mexico, and the Philippines. In contrast, U.S. citizens are trafficked domestically more often for commercial sexual exploitation than for economic exploitation.[7]

The cornerstone of U.S. efforts to defeat human trafficking is the *Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000* (*TVPA*). One of the critical aspects of *TVPA* is a shift in the concepts of commercial sexual exploitation for victims and perpetrators. The *TVPA* states that, "sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age," is a severe form of trafficking in persons.[8] Legally speaking, then, all minor prostitutes—and all prostitutes who are forced to work for a pimp—qualify as trafficking victims. In practice, though, this distinction is often not made and trafficking victims are still treated as criminals, therefore not being granted the protections guaranteed by *TVPA*.[9]

The second part of the severe forms of trafficking in persons definition is "the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery."[10] According to this definition, any pimp who coerces women into commercial sexual exploitation is a trafficker; the same is true for any pimp who uses minors. However, a pimp who only arranges appointments for prostitutes, but who does not obligate them to perform sexual services, is not a trafficker. Consequently, all traffickers who engage in commercial sexual exploitation are pimps, though not all pimps are traffickers.

The *TVPA*, signed into law on October 28, 2000, was a monumental accomplishment in the U.S. fight against TIP, and its subsequent reauthorizations have given law enforcement even more tools with which to combat TIP.

For instance, the *William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008* extends the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to include trafficking offenses committed by U.S. citizens in any country.[11] This extra-jurisdictional authority means that men who travel to foreign countries where it may be legal, or at least permissible, to have sex with children or prostitutes can be charged, convicted, and sentenced for violating U.S. law.[12] Similarly, the U.S. military has implemented a "zero tolerance" policy regarding the solicitation of prostitutes; service members will be prosecuted, regardless of where the offense occurred.[13]

The *TVPA* also created the U.S. Department of State's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/ TIP).[14] This office is an interagency task force that leads the U.S. government's fight against human trafficking. In addition to producing the annual *Trafficking in Persons* report, G/TIP also provides grants to organizations that conduct "evidence-based research," which offers effective strategies to combat TIP.[15]

There are important differences between trafficking and smuggling, though they are closely related.

Throughout human trafficking literature, the terms "trafficking in persons" and "human trafficking" are consistently used interchangeably with "human smuggling." There are important differences between trafficking and smuggling, though they are closely related. Human smuggling is the act of transporting a person illegally across international borders, either clandestinely (through an underground tunnel, for example) or through the use of fraudulent documents.[16] An important feature of human smuggling is that the person being smuggled has agreed to the transport, and likely sought out the services of smugglers, contracting them at a price. For instance, someone who wishes to enter a country illegally for the purpose of finding employment may hire a smuggler.

Human trafficking victims, on the other hand, do not agree to the transport. On the contrary, they are forced, coerced, and deceived; they are enslaved and exploited, and kept under the strict control of their traffickers. Ironically, whereas smuggling must involve the crossing of an international border, many trafficking victims suffer in their home countries, even in their hometowns. [17]

Even though the term "trafficking in persons" sounds like a crime that is strictly about moving people from one place to another, the above definition states clearly that TIP encompasses the recruitment, transport, harboring, and exploitation of trafficking victims; hence, the term is misleading. In fact, TIP literature refers more to the enslavement of trafficking victims than it does to their movements. This point can be difficult to reconcile when one considers that other types of trafficking, such as drug and weapons trafficking, are also referred to as drug and weapons smuggling. In these cases the merchandise being trafficked is inanimate and never has a choice, which makes the distinction irrelevant. Thus, while the confusion between human trafficking and human smuggling is understandable, misuse of these terms can easily further the confusion and degrade the perceived TIP effects and characteristics.

"Organized crime" is a term that also means different things to different people. The United Nations (UN) defines an organized criminal group as a group of three or more people that exists for a period of time for the purpose of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses in order to gain financial or other material benefits.[18] This definition is necessarily broad and allows member nations to cast wide nets when applying the *United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto*. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses an even broader definition, stating that organized crime is ". . . any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities."[19]

James Finckenauer, the former director of the International Center at the U.S. Department of Justice's National Institute for Justice and a recognized expert on organized crime, has a much narrower perspective. Mr. Finckenauer says that true organized crime has three components: criminal monopoly, violence, and corruption.[20] These traits allow the group to ". . .monopol[ize] control of criminal enterprises—by their ability to dominate the criminal underworld."[21] This monopolization is what separates organized crime from crimes that are organized, which is how Mr. Finckenauer might characterize the UN's and FBI's definitions. One result of the broader definitions is that they give credibility to small-time criminals who, when described as "organized crime figures," are perceived to have more influence than they actually do.[22] The use of these broad definitions may also make certain problems seem much more prevalent than they are, since the term "organized crime" connotes that a wide-reaching and sophisticated criminal network is involved.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES

An overwhelming majority of human trafficking cases investigated in the United States are commercial sexual exploitation cases. Sixty-three percent of the sex trafficking victims were U.S. citizens; almost one-third were minors. [23] The *2010 TIP Report* (the first report to include the United States in its rankings) corroborates these statistics, and states that less than 20 percent of adult foreign human trafficking victims in the United States, and slightly less than half of the child victims, were trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.[24]

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In addition to prostitution, pornography is a very profitable industry in the United States, especially child pornography. Videos of children being raped and tortured are cheap to make, thanks to modern technology, and can be sold for large profits. Similarly, pornographic magazines can be produced for as little as 50 cents each and sold for as much as $10. Since the live sex industry in the United States is more conservative than it is in Bangkok, pornographers offer the next best thing: live video feeds of girls being sexually abused that are transmitted over the Internet. [25]

In regard to domestic minor sex trafficking (DMST), there seems to be an endless supply of victims. One report states that there are between 450,000 and 2.8 million children who have either run away or been "thrown" away, and that a significant percentage of them will be sexually exploited. A good indicator of that likelihood is the statistic that ". . .at least 70[percent] of women involved in prostitution were introduced into the commercial sex industry before reaching 18 years of age." [26] The average age at which a child is introduced to commercial sexual exploitation is between 11 and 14 years.[27]

Recruitment and control of sex trafficking victims in the United States are consistent with other regions and forms of trafficking, namely deceit in job advertisements and coercion for the former, and possession of travel documents, physical abuse, and threats for the latter. One noted difference is that victims in the United States may be forced initially to perform in pornographic photographs or films; the traffickers then use degrading images of the victim as leverage to get them to become prostitutes.[28]

THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS

The term "crime-terror nexus" implies that both a criminal and a terrorist organization are cooperating with each other in the furtherance of their respective goals. However, that implication leaves out the possibility that either type of organization can evolve and develop its own organic capacity to conduct operations outside the scope of its normal activities; both views are accurate. For example, terrorists seek cooperation with organized crime groups to gain access to their smuggling routes, and organized crime groups enlist terrorists to conduct operations that the crime group is not able to perform.[29] There are also terrorist cells that commit crimes to finance their operations. In each of these cases, criminals and terrorists either work together or appropriate the methods and activities of the other in order to achieve their goals. This cross-pollination of tactics is the crime-terror nexus.

The crime-terror nexus is not a new development, but rather a necessary component of organizations that operate outside of, and in direct competition with, society's laws and customs. Whether it is a substantial group, such as al-Qaida, or an inspired lone wolf, these groups and individuals already tend toward antisocial behavior. Willem H.J. Martens finds that individuals who become terrorists share certain characteristics with people afflicted with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), such as a narcissistic attitude, an intolerance of criticism, a belief in superiority of their own belief system, an indifference to other people's belief systems, an ability to justify their violent behavior, and moral disengagement by dehumanizing their victims.[30] Thus, it is not such a stretch for someone who actively seeks to overthrow a government—or several of them—to commit a crime to finance their cause. In fact, recent history reflects numerous examples of this, such as the Stern Gang in Israel in the 1940s, the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany in the 1970s, the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States in the 1970s, and the Aryan Republican Army in the United States in the 1990s.[31]

Organized crime and terrorism exist together in different manifestations. In some circumstances they are bound in relationships between groups; in others, the term "organized crime" refers to a method of finance rather than a group. Tamara Makarenko devised a "crime-terror continuum" that seeks to explain the convergence of organized crime groups and terrorist groups. The continuum represents the progression of organized crime groups and terrorists toward each other as they try to maintain their organizations. Makarenko placed organized

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crime groups at one end of the continuum, terrorists at the other, and marked points of convergence in the center. Between the ends and the center are stages she calls "alliances," where criminals and terrorists work together, and "operational motivations," where entities develop their own organic capabilities. In each of those scenarios the entities are still focused on their core mission and engage in the other activities purely as a means to an end. When entities lose that focus and ". . . simultaneously exhibi[t] criminal and terrorist characteristics," they have achieved convergence.[32]

[T]he different motivations of criminals and terrorists—profits for criminals and ideology for terrorists—will prevent full convergence.

Ryan Clarke and Stuart Lee, in their rebuttal to Makarenko's continuum, propose that many groups do not begin neatly at one end of the spectrum, but they begin in the middle, in the "convergence" zone while they try to establish themselves. They also argue that both types of groups will likely spend time in convergence due to operational demands. For instance, terrorist groups will engage in criminal activities to finance their operations, and criminal groups will employ terrorist tactics—or hire terrorists—in order to intimidate rivals and expand operations. However, the different motivations of criminals and terrorists—profits for criminals and ideology for terrorists—will prevent full convergence.[33] Others go so far as to say that those different motivations will prevent organized crime groups and terrorists from forming long-term, or permanent, alliances.[34]

Terrorists need money for operations and infrastructure. The amount of money needed depends on certain fundamental considerations, such as the individual's or group's operational goals and their political and ideological goals. Of course, groups like Hezbollah and al-Qaida that have substantial media, training, and outreach elements will require more financing than an independent cell of four to five members who wish to conduct operations, but not create or sustain an entire organization. To take it a step farther, an inspired individual ("lone wolf") can conduct an attack for the price of a gun and bullets.

Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army psychiatrist, walked into the Soldier Readiness Processing Center at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009, with at least two handguns. He shouted, "Allahu Akbar!"—which means,

"God is great!" in Arabic—and opened fire.[35] From late 2008 until the time of the attack, MAJ Hasan exchanged electronic mail messages with known terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, some of which discussed the justification for a Muslim-American soldier to kill fellow soldiers.[36] The attack killed 13 people and wounded 32 others.

The end of the Cold War virtually eliminated state sponsorship of terrorists. Terrorism by proxy was used as a foreign policy instrument to influence adversaries or retaliate against them. States hired terrorists to conduct attacks on their behalf in order to strike a target but keep their involvement concealed. The terrorists did not necessarily subscribe to the state's ideology—such as the Japanese Red Army, a Marxist-Leninist group that conducted numerous attacks against U.S. targets for Libya in response to the U.S. military strikes against Tripoli in 1986; they simply performed a task for a fee. As Bruce Hoffman explains, this terrorism-for-hire arrangement afforded the terrorists great freedom in the scale of their attacks because they did not have to worry about alienating a local support base that might suddenly withhold funds in light of a particularly gruesome attack.[37] However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end to its quintessential struggle against the United States and Western Europe left terrorist groups and Soviet allies alike without their primary financier.[38]

After 9/11, the international community restricted the flow of capital from charities and businesses believed to support terrorism, which tightened the financial noose even more.[39] The UN reported that as of January 2006 over 93.4 million USD had been frozen in 34 countries under the al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime.[40] In light of these actions, it is logical that terrorists, with their antisocial predispositions, gravitate to crime to fill their financial gaps.

The common operational characteristics of criminal groups and terrorists make complementary, if symbiotic, relationships possible that can be very beneficial to both parties. A good example of these relationships is Hezbollah working with Mexican drug cartels to smuggle weapons, money, and personnel into the United States.[41] The cartel has an existing and proven capability to move goods across the border undetected. Rather than try to create its own network, which would take time and money to establish and might be viewed by Mexican cartels as unwanted competition, Hezbollah works with the cartels. For Hezbollah it is a good proposition: it gets its materials and people into the United States with a minimal expenditure of manpower and resources.

Hezbollah is not the only beneficiary in this relationship. There is evidence that Hezbollah and the cartel have

engaged in knowledge sharing, possibly to include Hezbollah's extensive expertise in tunneling. As Mark Spicer says, "[t]he problems caused by the Cartels. . .pales when compared to the possibilities of terrorist units deploying into the USA through Cartel controlled tunnels and drug routes. . .in order to carry out attacks against U.S. citizens." [42] This type of criminal-terrorist cooperation poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeland from armed, terrorist-trained drug runners and from the terrorists themselves.

Another example is the Taliban providing protection to an Afghanistan- and Pakistan-based international heroin trafficking group in exchange for money. The traffickers moved the drugs to the United States, sold them, and laundered the proceeds through front companies. The laundered money was then used to provide financial support to the Taliban, which in return protected opium fields, laboratories, transportation routes, and personnel.[43]

The Medellin Cartel/ELN relationship illustrates that crime-terror relationships occur purely for the mutual benefit of the organizations involved, and can transcend—even if temporarily—an organization's standard operational protocol.

Finally, the Medellin drug cartel in Colombia hired the National Liberation Army (ELN) to conduct car bombings.[44] The cartel had neither the materials nor the expertise to launch these attacks, whereas ELN, a terrorist organization, had both. This partnership represented a shift in ideology for the Medellin Cartel, which throughout the 1980s purposely avoided alliances with ELN and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) because the *status quo* of the state was important to the cartel's operations.[45] However, as the decade ended and the Colombian government began to pursue drug cartels more aggressively, the Medellin Cartel also became more aggressive. In addition to the ELN car bombings, the cartel hired out other terrorist attacks, to include the assassination of a presidential candidate in 1989 and likely the bombing of public buildings and a national airline flight while in transit.[46] Regardless of why the Medellin Cartel shunned the ELN and the FARC initially, when the situation suited, the cartel adapted its tactics to engage with them. Like Hezbollah, the Medellin Cartel was able to leverage a crime-terror alliance to expand its methods of operation

and to extend its influence. The Medellin Cartel/ELN relationship illustrates that crime-terror relationships occur purely for the mutual benefit of the organizations involved, and can transcend—even if temporarily—an organization's standard operational protocol.

The decision for an organization to shift its operational considerations, as the Medellin Cartel did, is no longer made solely by organizational leadership. The post-9/11 environment has caused decentralization in terrorist organizations, a "flattening" of the organizations' hierarchy, wherein each cell assumes more autonomy in its planning and financial responsibilities. There has also been a crackdown on transnational organized crime that has the same effect. Thus, it may be more common for low- and mid-level cells to coordinate efforts. Left to their own devices, cells on both sides are prone to develop alliances that normally would not be tolerated. For instance, "cash-strapped" transnational organized crime cells ". . .are willing to conduct any crime in order to stay afloat. . .[to] include operations previously 'out of bounds'. . .including smuggling weapons of mass destruction, creating fraudulent documents for terrorists, or smuggling terrorist personnel."[47] Chris Dishman describes the collusion between mid-level criminal and terrorist cells that operate in this decentralized zone as a "leaderless nexus." Both cells operate independently, somewhat selfishly, and potentially at odds with the larger organizations' ideals and protocols.[48]

Despite the common characteristics which criminals and terrorists share, the alliances they make will be temporary in nature. The inherent and divergent interests of criminals and terrorists will prevent the creation of a ground-breaking super criminal-terrorist alliance. Criminals seek financial gain in a predictable environment where they can exploit corrupt officials; this environment depends on political stability, if not stagnation. They also prefer to work behind the scenes, away from the glare and scrutiny of the media.[49] In contrast, terrorists seek political power by destabilizing the current regime. The *status quo* is the foundation of their grievance; thus, the greater the instability, the more it feeds their rhetoric. Finally, in their asymmetric quest for power, terrorists employ the media deftly, by manipulating international public media and through their own propaganda distribution networks.[50]

Consequently, the trend for crime-terror nexuses in regard to terrorists is toward an organic capability. In addition to the divergent interests previously mentioned, sometimes it just does not make sense to form an alliance. Small cells, for instance, typically seek only enough money for their next operation. Since their financial needs are temporary, these "ephemeral-sporadic" groups do not need continuous revenue streams, and are likely to plan and conduct

criminal activities that do not require a great deal of sophistication, and only as necessary. Due to the simplistic nature of the crime, the cell can execute it without assistance and support from established crime groups. In fact, for this type of operation an alliance brings a risk of detection, and betrayal by outsiders, that far outweighs the benefit of any assistance it may offer. Similarly, if an attack is successful, the resultant visibility and attention paid to the allied crime group will be disproportionate to the proceeds of such a small crime.[51]

Indeed, many terrorist groups have already developed substantial organic criminal elements, to the point where they have become so prolific in their criminal activities that it is considered impossible to determine where one ends and the other begins. An excellent illustration of this evolution is the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), the most prominent terrorist group in Turkey that has also become one of the primary narcotics distributors for Europe. The PKK is reported to play an important role in the transportation of narcotics from the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) and southwest Asia through Turkey to the rest of Europe; it also receives "tax" revenues from drug traffickers and refiners. When one considers that an estimated 80 percent of Golden Crescent drugs is trafficked to Europe through Turkey, the financial impact for the PKK is substantial.[52] However, drug trafficking is only one element of the PKK's narcotics business: it is involved in all phases of the narcotics trade, from production to street-level distribution.[53] Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK's leader, acknowledged the group's dependence on drug trafficking when he expressed that it is the most profitable transnational organized crime in which the PKK is involved; another member claimed the "taxes" are the group's most important revenue source.[54]

The PKK is also reported to be involved in human smuggling and international arms smuggling. The group smuggles refugees from northern Iraq to Italy, and previously supplied arms to other Kurdish terrorist groups and to the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.[55] While the funds earned from these activities all support the PKK's terrorist aims and operations, their scope and sophistication show that they have become of equal importance to the overall welfare of the group. This development seems to indicate that the PKK is on its way to becoming a criminal organization first, and a terrorist organization second.

TRAFFICKERS, SMUGGLERS, AND TERRORISTS

The illegal movement of hundreds of thousands of trafficking victims each year across international borders represents a significant security threat. This threat is compounded exponentially when one considers

that traffickers are just as happy to transport terrorists as they are slaves. Once the capability exists to move people from one point to another, the subtleties that qualify the nature of their transit become moot. A person who is being sold for forced labor requires the same logistical support to be transported as a terrorist operative; they are simply different varieties of the same product to the trafficker, who only wants to make money.[56]

Hezbollah moves people into the United States through its alliances with Mexican drug cartels. These terrorists are not necessarily coming from the Middle East, though; Hezbollah has long had a presence in South America's tri-border area, where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet, also known as the Triple Frontier.

As previously discussed, Hezbollah moves people into the United States through its alliances with Mexican drug cartels. These terrorists are not necessarily coming from the Middle East, though; Hezbollah has long had a presence in South America's tri-border area, where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet, also known as the Triple Frontier.[57] It is believed that Hezbollah planned and launched two attacks from the Triple Frontier against targets in Buenos Aires, Argentina; the first was against the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and the second was against a Jewish-Argentine community center in 1994.[58] It stands to reason, then, that Hezbollah has the ability to plan and launch an attack within the United States since its established infrastructure in South America, and effective relationships in Mexico, enable it to successfully move operatives into the United States. Only slightly more frightening is the fact that the operatives, who speak Spanish, can also travel from Brazil through Mexico to the United States posing as tourists.[59]

Reports of human smuggling rings in Mexico that are run by Arabs and specialize in the movement of Middle Easterners into the United States further underscore the challenge to U.S. national security. The presence of these rings becomes even more menacing when one considers that in 2005 the Mexican Secretary of Governance (Interior) stated that there were ". . . a number of international terrorist cells active in Mexico, including ETA, FARC, and Islamic groups."[60] Based on smuggling operations in other areas, the collusion of human

smugglers in Mexico with terrorists is highly likely, and represents a tangible security threat to the United States.

Human smuggling along the southern U.S. border has become so lucrative (and is inherently less risky than smuggling drugs and guns) that some drug cartels have switched to dealing in people. This switch in commodities has quickly increased the sophistication in how the human smugglers—known as "coyotes"—operate, and has instigated heated rivalries. Some coyotes, of course, still smuggle drugs and guns.[61]

U.S. street gangs are also involved in human trafficking and smuggling, in addition to drug and weapons trafficking.

Perhaps even more troubling is that U.S. street gangs are also involved in human trafficking and smuggling, in addition to drug and weapons trafficking. The FBI's National Gang Intelligence Center states, "U.S.-based gang members illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border for the expressed purpose of smuggling illicit drugs and illegal aliens from Mexico into the United States."[62] The illegal aliens consist of sex trafficking victims and gang members.[63]

Smuggling gang members into the United States is arguably as detrimental as smuggling terrorists. John P. Sullivan describes a three-generation continuum of gang evolution wherein the first generation is a typical street gang concerned with turf and committing "opportunistic" crimes, and the second generation is "entrepreneurial and drug-centered." Third-generation gangs have evolved political aims and may be mercenary in nature, or have their own socio-political agenda.[64]

According to Sullivan's theory, numerous U.S. gangs reside squarely in the second generation. These circumstances present serious challenges to federal and local law enforcement agencies: the violence that accompanies the illicit drug business; the effects of the drugs themselves; the illegal movement of people across the border and their subsequent exploitation, or their illicit activities; and the myriad other laws that are broken. These second-generation gangs threaten U.S. citizens' human security, compromise U.S. borders, and present external threats. Even so, those threats increase exponentially when gangs hire themselves out to terrorists—as when members of Chicago's El Rukn gang conspired to conduct terrorist attacks as a "mercenary proxy" for Libya.[65]

The El Rukn street gang was founded in the 1960s on Chicago's south side, and eventually expanded into Minneapolis, Milwaukee, and Detroit.[66] The group tried to conceal its activities by presenting itself as a Muslim-based organization, and was aligned with the Nation of Islam and its founder, Louis Farrakhan.[67] According to FBI documents, the gang was involved in drug trafficking, gambling, prostitution, extortion, and murder. The El Rukn gang was suspected of committing "hundreds of murders" throughout its years of operation, and a former gang member who became an informant for the FBI reported that he suspected a Chicago Police Department member provided protection for the gang.[68]

In the mid-1980s, several El Rukn members were discovered to be in Libya, negotiating an attacks-for-cash deal. Jeff Fort, El Rukn's leader, spoke directly with Libyan leaders and ultimately made an agreement with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to conduct terrorist attacks in the United States, on behalf of Libya, for 2.5 million USD. An undercover operation conducted by the FBI resulted in the sale of two inert light antitank weapons that were subsequently found in a weapons cache hidden in the basement of the gang's safehouse. At the time of the FBI's intervention, no money had yet been paid, nor had any attacks occurred.[69]

The El Rukn gang case is an excellent example of the threats posed by second-generation gangs, as they progress along Sullivan's continuum. El Rukn was extensively involved in numerous illicit activities, to include prostitution and murder, and possibly police corruption. Although the gang tried to cloak its operations under religious auspices (Islam), its deal to conduct attacks for Libya appears to be borne not from any ideological rhetoric but rather from its violent tendencies, antisocial disposition and, like other traffickers, its greed.

More recently, in January 2011, the last of 14 members of New York's Gambino organized crime family of La Cosa Nostra (Gambino family) pleaded guilty to a variety of charges, which included sex trafficking, narcotics trafficking, extortion, racketeering, and murder.[70] The Gambino family, one of the five major organized crime families based in New York City, is a much more substantial organization than El Rukn ever was. In contrast, though, the Gambino family is not likely to evolve, as Sullivan's street gangs did, into a group that directly challenges the state either as a proxy or in furtherance of its own ideological agenda. As previously mentioned, organized crime groups depend on, and require, a large degree of political stability in order to operate.[71]

However, while large crime organizations may not care to overthrow the government or attack the general populace, the Gambino family's guilty pleas illustrate the grave threats that these groups pose to society. When one considers the scope and breadth of these activities, even those conducted just by the five crime families in New York City, the overall impact they have on domestic national security—security from within—is staggering. The ability of organized crime groups to conduct these activities may depend upon political stability, but only inasmuch as that stability provides them opportunities to subvert it.

THE WAY AHEAD

Research shows that traffickers are usually involved in more than one illicit activity, such as money laundering and drug trafficking.[72] Thus, it is important for analysts and investigators to recognize that there may be another dimension—a crime-terror nexus—to the crime they observe. "Ask the next question," advises a former U.S. Treasury Department special agent.[73] In other words, law enforcement officials should not be content with just the discovery of a crime, rather they should be curious about the purpose of the crime to determine what the criminal's motivation is. It is important to remember that Spanish officials did not consider one of the Madrid train bombers to be in a terrorist cell due to his drug trafficking activities.[74]

Clearly, not every drug trafficker is a terrorist, but this example is an indicator that better awareness of the interplay of trafficking with other crimes and activities is critical to national security.

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Al Shabaab – Is It the New Al-Qaeda?

by Darlene M. Holseth

This article explores whether the Al Shabaab terrorist organization is the newest threat to U.S. national security, and might even be a greater threat to the U.S. homeland than Al-Qaeda. The Al Shabaab terrorist organization is a relatively large Islamic extremist organization indigenous to Somalia, which has conducted significant, violent attacks throughout Somalia and elsewhere on the continent of Africa. Al Shabaab's stated goal is to create a land of Sharia law for its people in Somalia.

This article utilizes a set of RAND Corporation hypothesis scenarios to assess the following research question: Would Al Shabaab risk a U.S. invasion of Somalia by conducting a terrorist attack in the U.S.?

The history of Somalia shows decades of internal strife, the majority of it based on cultural and geographic clans fighting each other for supremacy. After the hijacking of the *Maersk Alabama* cargo ship, the problem of Somali pirates and their ties to the Al Shabaab terrorist organization received considerable media attention around the globe. Addressing the Al Shabaab threat resulted in much international discussion and action by the United Nations. Some suggest the Somali government should be provided weapons and training to fight these threats internally and to stop the activities within its borders, thus keeping the threat internal to Somalia. Somalia is a country in humanitarian crisis; therefore, some believe addressing the basic needs of the Somali people would greatly assist in identifying and defeating the terrorist threat posed by Al Shabaab. This article utilizes a set of RAND Corporation hypothesis scenarios to assess the following research question: Would Al Shabaab risk a U.S. invasion of Somalia by conducting a terrorist attack in the U.S.?

To verify the result of the RAND hypotheses analysis, Al Shabaab is further assessed regarding its history, opportunity, capability, and intent to attack the U.S. homeland.

HISTORY OF SOMALIA

Somalia is located on the east coast of Africa, which is commonly referred to as the "Horn of Africa." Somalia has an estimated population of 9.9 million people with 99.9 percent of them practicing Muslims.[1] During the 19th and 20th centuries, Somalia was occupied by the British and Italians, obtaining independence from outside rule in 1960. Since independence was achieved, there have been several Somali factions/clans/tribes fighting for supremacy of the country. Some of these clans have used extremely violent methods to obtain their objectives. After a two-year Somalia National Reconciliation Conference hosted by Kenya in 2004, Somalia entered into a transitional mode of leadership, ruled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The revolving-door politics brought the country fourteen separate governments from 1991 to 2010.[2]

Somalia lacks any natural resources, which results in a poor economic outlook for the country. Approximately 60 percent of Somalis are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists who raise cattle, camels, sheep, and goats. Around 25 percent of Somalis are settled farmers who reside in southern Somalia and the remainder, between 15 and 20 percent, is urban. The country is composed of clans that distrust outsiders, including other Muslim countries. The Somali people rely heavily on international assistance, much of it from the U.S. Beginning in spring 2011, Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa experienced what some have called the worst drought in 60 years. Massive crop failure and a drastic rise in food prices, coupled with the security situation in Al Shabaab-controlled areas of south and central Somalia, led the UN to declare famine in six areas (later reduced to three after massive humanitarian assistance). To date, 3.7 million Somalis are in need of emergency assistance and 250,000 are in danger of dying. This famine has forced thousands into already overstretched refugee camps in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, while others have fled to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab continues to deny international aid to the most affected communities. The U.S., the UN, and international humanitarian agencies

are working to address both the immediate needs of the Somali people and a more permanent solution to prevent future similar crises in Somalia.

In October 2011, faced with what it perceived as an untenable threat to its security and economy as a result of high-profile incidents involving the kidnapping and murder of European tourists, Kenya sent military forces into Somalia to push back Al Shabaab. They remain in southern Somalia at this time. In December 2011, Ethiopia sent military forces into Somalia which captured the Al Shabaab-held town of Beledweyne. They too remain in Somalia.[3] In February 2011, the TFG unilaterally extended its mandate by three years, from August 2011 to August 2014, without consultation with the international community, which almost unanimously opposed this action. To resolve the political impasse surrounding the unilateral extension of its mandate, in June 2011 the TFG agreed to limit its mandate extension to 12 months as part of the Kampala Accord. This agreement consigned the TFG to finish its transitional tasks and set up a permanent government by August 2012. As of January 2012, the U.S. government had obligated over $338 million to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with equipment, logistical support, and peacekeeping training.

The TFG has control over several thousand Army soldiers. In addition, there are TFG-allied groups that range from hundreds to thousands of people controlled by the militias. Some of these militia groups have older armored vehicles and other heavy weapons, and most militias have small arms. The inability of the TFG to maintain control of the porous borders allows people to enter or exit the country without a visa and, once inside, enjoy an almost complete lack of any law enforcement authority.

Somalia has been ravaged by war for decades, with no law except force or violence. Various clans, warlords, and drug cartels have used their militias to terrorize citizens through intimidation.

From 2007 to 2009, more than 15,000 civilians were killed due to internal struggles with an estimated 1.1 million displaced Somalis.[4] Somalia has been ravaged by war for decades, with no law except force or violence. Various clans, warlords, and drug cartels have used their militias to terrorize citizens through intimidation. This environment breeds violence, disenchantment, and radical ideas. War and poverty for some Somalis is all they know; thus they are accustomed to deprivation and desensitized to violence. With this type of situation, young men are easily

brainwashed to believe the only way out of poverty is through violence and joining groups in which they have a sense of belonging and power.

For about two decades, rival clans and warlords carved out territory and defended their acquisitions, thus opening the door for Islamic extremist groups to thrive. When President Sharif approved the continuance of the AMISOM troops to stay in Somalia and train Somali security forces, it was done without the approval of his constituency. This approval to grant AMISOM a continued presence angered nationalists, creating additional condemnation and propaganda for the more hard-line Islamists and resulting in furthering terrorist actions and recruitment.

Since the early 1990s, 14 Somali peace conferences have been held in an effort to bring the fighting in Somalia to an end. The TFG is in a somewhat perilous state with continuous terrorist actions targeting Somali representatives on a regular basis. Factional violence in Mogadishu erupted in 2006, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing many more. The surge was between militia units loyal to the Islamic Courts and a self-proclaimed anti-terrorism coalition. The violence received international media attention, mainly due to the belief that the U.S. backed the antiterrorism coalition.

As identified in a report in *USA Today*, there are currently an estimated 87,000 displaced Somalis legally in the U.S.[5] Most of these people come from U.S.-sponsored refugee resettlement programs. However, in 2008 the U.S. State Department suspended the family reunification program for refugees. The number of Somali immigrants dipped to as low as 4,000 in 2009 admitted into the U.S. by refugee programs. Since the legal refugee doors are closing, Somalis now try to enter the U.S. through other means such as seeking asylum.

The U.S. no longer occupies an embassy in Somalia. Diplomatic dialogue between the U.S. and Somalia is conducted through the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Somalia remains a country in crisis that allows for the growth of lawless activities, providing a foothold for terrorists and pirates.

AL SHABAAB

The U.S. designated Al Shabaab a foreign terrorist organization in 2008. It controls large areas of southern and central Somalia. This land-grab has resulted in one of the largest territories from which radical jihadists can operate since the Taliban hosted Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The stated goal of the Al Shabaab group is to institute *Sharia* law (Islamic religious law) for all of Somalia. Al Shabaab desires a legal framework in which

public and private aspects of life are regulated in accordance with a very strict compliance to Islam, similar to the control the Taliban previously held in Afghanistan. U.S. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) told the Senate that "the prospect that U.S. citizens are being trained at al-Qaeda camps [in Somalia] deepens our concern and emphasizes the need to understand the nature of the evolving dangers."[6]

> *Al Shabaab is believed to have established a loose affiliation with the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization sometime in the 1990s.*

Al Shabaab is believed to have established a loose affiliation with the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization sometime in the 1990s. This alliance was publicized through a videotape released by East Africa Al-Qaeda operative Saleh Al-Nabhan, who invited foreigners to travel to Somalia for training.[7] Usama bin Laden described Al Shabaab as "one of the most important armies in the Mujahid Islamic battalion." In addition, a recording in February 2009 by bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, devoted the bulk of his message to praising Al Shabaab in Somalia, calling its activities "a step on the path of the victory of Islam."

It is estimated the Al Shabaab terrorist organization is composed of several thousand members, mostly from the Hawiye clan. Many reports state Al-Qaeda receives safe haven in Somalia with little thought of repercussions. Speculation exists that Al Shabaab leadership trained and fought with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.[8] The Al Shabaab organization is a disparate group of armed extremist militia fighters, many not adhering to the jihadist ideology of their leaders, even though their main goal is to create a Taliban-style Islamic state in Somalia. To achieve their end goal, they regularly employ executions, beatings, torture, and suicide bombings. Al Shabaab forces routinely assassinate opponents and government officials, creating considerable risk for the latter.

Some experts believe targeted measures such as sanctions or assassination of the most extreme elements of Al Shabaab could pave the way for moderate leaders to emerge. Others believe this would backfire and only increase anti-Western violence. Pundits consider the best solution to the Al Shabaab problem is a Somali-led solution, perhaps through a coalition of internal Somali forces.

TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

On October 29, 2008, international awareness of Somali terrorism increased after suicide terrorists detonated five vehicle bombs targeting UN, Ethiopian diplomatic, and government offices in Somalia. The Al Shabaab organization has threatened agencies and expelled U.S. humanitarian aid from southern Somalia. It has have engaged in remote-controlled roadside bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations. In addition, it is strongly believed that Al Shabaab harbors terrorist fugitives who were involved in the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. To date, the TFG has been ineffective in stemming the flow of terrorist activity from this group.

> *U.S. officials fear that trained Somali-Americans could return to the U.S. to plot terrorist attacks.*

Al Shabaab recruitment within the U.S. has increased. Approximately 20 men departed the U.S. from Minnesota between December 2007 and October 2009 to join Al Shabaab, all but one of Somali descent. Perhaps one of the most famous members is Abu Mansour Al-Amriki, known as "the American," who appeared in a jihadist video in May 2008. In 2010 the Justice Department indicted 14 Somali immigrants, at least seven of whom are American citizens, for supporting "a deadly pipeline" by routing money and fighters to Al Shabaab in Somalia.[9] Some of these individuals supported Al Shabaab from the U.S. and others went to Somalia to join the terrorist group. These men hail from Somali communities in California, Alabama, and Minnesota. In November 2010, three California men from San Diego were charged with aiding Somali terrorists.[10] Also in November 2010, three men were accused of providing funding to Al Shabaab; one is from Minnesota, one is from Missouri, and one is missing.[11] U.S. officials fear that trained Somali-Americans could return to the U.S. to plot terrorist attacks. In fact, the first American suicide bomber, Shirwa Ahmed, killed as many as 30 people in northern Somalia by detonating a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. The Federal Bureau of Investigation Director, Robert Mueller, stated that Shirwa was radicalized in Minnesota.[12]

In July 2010, Al Shabaab conducted its first international terrorist attack in Uganda.[13] The group claimed it was retaliation for the Ugandans deploying forces into Somalia. Sheik Ali Mohamud Rage took responsibility for the Uganda attacks on behalf of Al Shabaab, stating, "We warned Uganda not to deploy troops to Somalia; they ignored us… "We warned them to stop massacring our

people, and they ignored that. The explosions in Kampala were only a minor message to them... We will target them everywhere if Uganda does not withdraw from our land."

The U.S. has conducted "targeted killings" or air strikes on senior Al-Qaeda leaders within Somalia since 2007. Under President George W. Bush's administration, the U.S. used Tomahawk missiles to conduct targeted attacks. However, under President Barrack Obama's administration the U.S. is using commando operations to limit civilian casualties. As recently as January 2012, a U.S. drone strike killed Bilal Al-Berjawi, an Al-Qaeda official of Lebanese origin fighting alongside insurgents in Somalia.[14] Al-Berjawi is at least the fourth senior Al- Qaeda-linked Al Shabaab leader killed in the last four years. Also included was a Somali soldier shot dead at a checkpoint. In 2009 U.S. soldiers killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in a helicopter raid. In addition, in 2008 a U.S. airstrike killed reputed Al-Qaeda commander Aden Hashi Ayro and over 20 civilians.

Al Shabaab is undoubtedly interested in the Somali diaspora for fundraising and as a source of potential suicide bombers. In addition, the East Africa cell of Al-Qaeda has established a foothold in Somalia; it provides advice and foreign fighters to Al Shabaab. Al-Qaeda has used Somalia as a location to hide some of its members. However, it is not as conducive for hiding people as Pakistan, due to Somalia's flat terrain and barren landscape.

ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY

The RAND Corporation puts forth four hypotheses to explain how Al-Qaeda might advance its goals utilizing four hypothetical scenarios: *coercion*, *damage*, *rally*, and *franchise*.[15] This methodology assesses the targeting priorities of terrorists, which are presumed to have overarching goals and use terrorism to further their goals and objectives. As Al-Qaeda and Al Shabaab have similar goals, creating an Islamic state, the scenario application can be attributable to either organization. This article changes the terrorist organization used by RAND, as it was applied to Al-Qaeda, to Al Shabaab to determine whether an attack on the U.S. homeland would advance Al Shabaab's objectives.

The *coercion* hypothesis speculates that Al Shabaab believes the only way to obtain an Islamic state in Somalia, its announced goal, would be to coerce the U.S. and its allies to leave the Muslim world in general, and Somalia in particular. This scenario requires Al Shabaab to believe that the U.S. would stop intervening in Somali affairs if the human cost to Americans was too high. As identified in the history of Somalia, the U.S. and its allies do not currently have a presence in Somalia. Al Shabaab attacks to date have been directed at furthering its stated goal, i.e.,

to have a *Sharia* law-based society in Somalia. Its attacks have been limited to those actively participating in or with the TFG, or entities helping the TFG, which are in direct contravention of Al Shabaab's own goals. It has not attacked entities based upon Western influence in other locales. This motivation would rapidly change if the U.S. were to take a more aggressive role in Somalia or if Al Shabaab felt it was losing significant ground as a result of U.S. interference. Based on Al Shabaab's recent tactics and distrust of other nations, including Islamic ones, it does not appear it would be interested in attacking the U.S. based on the *coercion* hypothesis.

The *damage* hypothesis suggests Al Shabaab might want to reduce the ability of the U.S. to intervene in the Islamic world, or in its fight for an Islamic state for Somalia. It might want to target areas that would inflict a large amount of damage on the economic foundations of U.S. military, political, and commercial power. As with the coercion hypothesis identified above, the U.S. does not have a substantial stake in Somalia at this time. Although the U.S. supports the TFG, it has not yet done so with military forces in-country and has typically limited its strikes to targeting Al-Qaeda operatives. Al Shabaab would likely change its position if the U.S. national strategy became more prominent in Somalia, or if the U.S. implements targeting of Al Shabaab rather than Al-Qaeda in Somalia. Based on the evidence that there has been considerable recruitment within the U.S. by Somali extremists, a change in U.S. policy would quickly raise the threat to the U.S., making this a viable strategy for Al Shabaab.

The *rally* hypothesis assumes Al Shabaab's belief that to create an Islamic caliphate it needs international radicalization of Islam. Its broadening membership would overthrow existing governments and eliminate the U.S. presence from its representatives' countries. The theory posits that the targets and attacks would inspire Muslims to join the jihad against the West. Al Shabaab's current goal of instituting *Sharia* law is intended for Somalia only, and its current attack mode is geared solely toward furthering its stated cause. With a singular purpose and all activities to date being directed toward that purpose, exclusive to Somalia, the *rally* hypothesis is not likely to occur.

The *franchise* hypothesis puts forth the theory that Al Shabaab's possible affiliation with another group, such as Al-Qaeda, could provide motivation to carry out attacks on its own or at the direction of the other group to further their mutual cause. Al-Qaeda has expressed support for its brothers in Al Shabaab and in turn Al Shabaab has provided safe haven and training for Al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia. An alliance between the two organizations exists, although they have not melded into one organization. As long as each terrorist organization

remains an individual group, focused on its own limited objectives, it will look out for its own best interests. Unlike Al-Qaeda, which is a worldwide terrorist organization with global objectives, most of the Al Shabaab organization is geographically contained and its greatest concerns are specific objectives related only to Somalia. At this time, it is not in Al Shabaab's best interest to conduct an attack on the U.S. homeland, which would force the U.S. to respond with direct action against the group.

RESULTS VERIFICATION

The RAND hypothetical scenarios result in a very low probability that Al Shabaab would undertake an attack on the U.S. homeland if the current U.S. lack of active engagement on Somali soil continues. To verify these conclusions, the information obtained for this article is analyzed using the methodology in which a terrorist group is assessed based on its history, opportunity, capability, and intent to commit an attack.

Al Shabaab uses low-technology attack methods such as suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings, and assassinations. All of its attacks have occurred on the continent of Africa.

History – The history of the Al Shabaab terrorist organization reflects that its attacks have been directed against imminent threat entities. Al Shabaab uses low-technology attack methods such as suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings, and assassinations. All of its attacks have occurred on the continent of Africa. Attacks by Al Shabaab have not been directed toward either distant adversaries or those that are not directly involved with the fight for an Islamic state in Somalia. Although there is ample evidence the group has conducted fundraising and recruitment on a global scale, to date its objectives have been directed toward its stated goal and contained. The history of the Al Shabaab organization does not support an attack on the U.S. homeland; therefore this factor is not currently present.

Opportunity – Al Shabaab has shown a successful ability to obtain recruits from its U.S./Somali diaspora. If even one-tenth of one percent of the Somali diaspora were recruited by the Al Shabaab organization, that would equate to 87 Somalis in the U.S. who could be used to further its cause. In addition, the low-tech methods of attack currently in use by Al Shabaab allow for extreme mobility. It is highly unlikely Al Shabaab operatives could obtain military-grade explosive material in the U.S., which is what they have

experience using in Somalia. However, due to the U.S. free market society, Al Shabaab could obtain off-the-shelf explosive materials, such as those used by Timothy McVeigh in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Based on the large number of Somalis who have immigrated to the U.S., the successful recruitment of Somali-Americans, and the free market society of the U.S., the opportunity for Al Shabaab to conduct an attack inside the U.S. is present.

Capability – The Internet has opened up an information highway that provides great benefit to the U.S., but can easily be used against this country. The Internet hosts websites and documents with instructions to make pipe bombs and other explosive devices readily available to anyone with a computer and Internet connection. Although Al Shabaab uses military explosive materials in its arsenal of attack methods in Somalia, the ability to obtain these materials in the U.S., though not military-grade, is still present. Should Al Shabaab decide to continue using low-tech methods, and it is likely it would as they have proven to be very effective, it could easily modify its selection of explosives in the U.S. to those legally purchased. Based upon the openness of U.S. society, easy accessibility of information regarding "how to" build bombs on the Internet and elsewhere, coupled with the successful recruitment of Somali-Americans to its cause, the capability for Al Shabaab to conduct an attack in the U.S. is present.

Intent – Al Shabaab has made no direct threats against the U.S. Although there is a tenuous connection between Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, it is likely more a connection of convenience regarding what they can do for each other. Al Shabaab propaganda is geared toward establishing an Islamic state in Somalia, not toward attacking the U.S. or those not directly participating in its struggle. Al Shabaab is clear in its goals, and the U.S. has made considerable effort to identify the Al Shabaab issue as an internal Somali matter. Although it could quickly change should the U.S. engage more forcefully in Somalia, at this time the intent of Al Shabaab to perpetrate an attack on the U.S. homeland is not present.

The analysis above shows that the elements of history and intent are not present in assessing Al Shabaab's likelihood of attacking the U.S. homeland. This means a low probability for attack unless the U.S. alters its policy regarding Somalia.

CONCLUSION

Based on the RAND hypotheses and results verification, it does not appear Al Shabaab is a threat to the U.S. homeland at this time. A change in U.S. policy regarding support provided to the Somali

government or active engagement in Somalia itself ("boots on the ground"), should result in a reassessment of this position. Law enforcement, security, and intelligence professionals need to be vigilant for the possibility of an attack by a sleeper cell in the U.S.; it is likely at least some of the 87,000 Somalis living here have hidden agendas. Al Shabaab does not want its members to be interrogated by U.S. law enforcement and also does not want to lose its support base by attacking the U.S. homeland. Thus far, the U.S. has made it very clear that the conflict in Somalia is not a war between the U.S. and Al Shabaab; it is an internal struggle.

It is widely believed that Al Shabaab is harboring Al-Qaeda fugitives. Therefore, an argument could be made that it is a U.S. and international problem which should be addressed directly, perhaps with military action. However, the U.S. has lost some support from its partners over the years since the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, sometimes being considered more of a hard-fisted ally which does not work well with others. For now, the U.S. seems content with supporting the TFG in addressing this difficult area and giving it an opportunity to be a partner in global peace, rather than exerting U.S. muscle and alienating more partners in the international community.

Should Somalia end up with a secure government, a stable economy, and the ability to provide for the basic needs of its people, this would likely go a long way in addressing and stemming the flow of terrorist activities and recruitment. Much of this can be accomplished in diplomatic venues and through international support to the Somali people. The U.S. must keep in mind that the Somali people do not welcome outside influence; their position must be considered and honored to address the terrorism issues in Somalia effectively.

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Can the West Dismantle the Deadliest Weapon Iran Has in Its Armory?

by Anita Rai

I can quote any number of experts who believe that enforcing significant sanctions against Iran's oil exports is bound to cause significant difficulties for Tehran to carry on with its "normal" businesses, as it were. Experts, however, also agree that the amount of pressure built up by a broad-based international alliance has not delivered desired or expected results so far. Kenneth Katzman, in a 2012 Congressional Research Service report for Congress, mentions the Obama administration "also perceives that the legitimacy and popularity of Iran's regime is in decline, although not to the point where the regime's grip on power is threatened."

> *The Iranian regime is showing some signs of weakening but no more than a few hairline cracks at the periphery.*

True, the Iranian regime is showing some signs of weakening but no more than a few hairline cracks at the periphery. *Khums*-empowered "mullahcracy" and the batons at its payroll are determined to sustain it at all cost. Should the regime falter and even fall, Iran would lose its strategic ascendancy in the region vital for the fulfilment of the fantasy of the father of Iran's Islamist Revolution, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, who in the newly formed Islamist state became the all-in-all: the supreme leader, by declaring himself to be *Wali-e-Faqih*[1] (the Chief Jurist) and *Marja-e-taqleed* of all Shias.[2] A *marja* is the highest juridical authority in mainstream Shiism and his rulings (*fatwas*) are binding upon those who do his *taqleed* (the literal meaning of *taqleed* is blind adherence). Practically, it signifies accepting and trusting the rulings of a *marja*. One who does *taqleed* of a *marja* is a *muqallid*.

Wilayat-e-faqih,[3] *marja-e-taqleed*, and *khums* have come together to prepare the deadliest weapon in the armament of Iranian terrorism. No sanction against the Islamic Republic, however strict, will work with adequate effectiveness because there still is no sanction against this most deadly of Iran's exports. To put sanctions against this commodity, the governments in the West have to recognize it. In order to do so they need to know it and everything

about it as well as they can. It is too late now to stop it from reaching our shores. During the last three decades, this Khomeinist "bomb" has found innumerable shelters within the West's mainland and heartland.

The system that aids and boosts this idiosyncratically Khomeinist weapon is remarkably well established all over the world, but enjoys particular organization and success in the U.S., Canada, Europe, and Australia. It is so expertly run that no government/intelligence/law enforcement agency or department is adequately aware of the enormity of its machinery, its functioning, and its implications. The years of extensive research I have done include seeing the revelation of facts, the magnitude of which can only be disregarded at the peril of the free world. Law enforcement agencies and counterterrorism officials in the West still do not have enough intelligence on the nature and network of the resident clerics, on the appointment of scholars by the office of the supreme leader for visiting Shia religious centers all over the world, and on how big the role of religious finance is in the culture of modern Shia politics.

For ten years now, people in the West have been hearing "Shia" and "Sunni" in political discourse, particularly in the context of the war the Western coalition is fighting against terrorism. Yet, many do not know the core differences and how they transpired. Before acquainting the reader with the dynamics of this very real threat in our very midst, it is therefore important the reader learn the basic facts of the history of Shia-Sunni reality, the organic difference between them, and the extant difference between Khomeini's interpretation of Shia Islam and the original proposition of Shia ethos.

The sea of difference between the Shia and the Sunni surged about a millennium and a half ago with the death of the Prophet of Islam. A coup of the first order was staged at *Saqifa Banu Saida*, which overthrew the authority of the family of Prophet Muhammad and grabbed power for what it was. *Saqifa* in Arabic generally implies a place under a shed of some sort. Not far from the Prophet's place, this shack belonged to the clan of Saida. Interestingly, this shed had a reputation for providing shelter to shady people who often gathered here to plan, pillage, loot, and hatch

dodgy deals. Things took a dourly sour turn when those whom mainstream Islamic history reckons as Muhammad's foremost companions rejected his will and "elected" one from their ring as the first Caliph despite the Prophet's explicit appointment of Ali as his successor. At the oasis of Ghadir, in the presence of their Prophet, Muslims had pledged allegiance to Ali as their Leader, but "politically minded individuals chose to ignore this fact and pursue the leadership of the Muslim community for…personal and selfish reasons. They held a hurried gathering at Saqifa. This was a pre-planned political contrivance to deprive Ali…of his rightful position."[4]

> With Ali absent from the scene – he was doing his duty as a good Muslim and close relative by washing Muhammad's corpse – the strongman Umar pressured and manipulated the assembled believers into approving his crony Abu Bakr for the newly created post of caliph. He then used force to quell the opposition of Ali's supporters to this high-handed maneuver, going so far as to employ physical violence against Fatima, Ali's wife and Muhammad's daughter, in an attempt to extract the oath of allegiance from her and from her husband.[5]

Fatima said, *"By God! I have never ever seen such a day! People have gone to attend the most evil meeting, have left their Prophet's body unburied, and usurped our rights!"*[6] Al-Bahili Dinawari, a Sunni scholar, writes that when Abu Bakr learned that some of those who were opposed to his claim to Caliphate had assembled in Ali's house he sent Umar to bring them to him. Fatima, who was pregnant, "received severe injuries when Umar bin al-Khattab attacked her home in an attempt to forcibly take Ali."[7] With Fatima at her door, Umar set the door on fire. Umar pressed her with as much force as possible between the door and the adjacent wall. Thus jammed between the door and the wall, Fatima broke her ribs. This ruptured her lungs. She suffered severe internal hemorrhage and lost her baby. Soon, she also lost her grip on life.

Fatima told her husband, *"Do not allow any one of them or their associates to offer funeral prayers for me. Bury me at night, when people are asleep."* Just as he had stolen the Caliphate from Ali, the first Caliph of the Muslims stole *Fade* from Fatima. *Fade* was an orchard the Prophet had officially gifted to his daughter as spelled out in a deed all signed and sealed by him. While Abu Bark called Fatima a "liar" and refused to admit the witness given by Ali, Umar bin Khattab, the Caliph next in line, tore up the deed in shreds and spat on it.

Those who supported Ali and believed that Islam's leadership rightfully belonged to him and his descendants came to be known as *Shia-e-Ali* (followers of Ali), and those who supported Abu Bakr in usurping the Caliphate and believed he was right in doing so are known as Sunnis. Ali told the Muslims that he does not need their allegiance: "By God, from what I have experienced and witnessed with Fatima, I do not want any Muslim to be under any obligation to pay his/her allegiance to me." And Ali had never asked the Muslims for allegiance.

Peaceful Muslims, refusing to pay taxes to Abu Bakr, genuine renegades, and non-Muslim Arabs were all declared apostates by Abu Bakr. He waged wars against them until most submitted to him and the Qurayshite Arabs, who were the elite of his administration. Wilfred Madelung says that by Abu Bakr's sweeping changes in Prophetic policies, the Caliph of the Muslims was no more required to be the "religious leader of the umma…but the ruler of all Arabs, commanding their obedience in the name of Islam… Umar, a man deeply committed to the expansion of the authority of Islam by force…readily saw the benefits"[8] of Arab expansionism: the strategy of whipping up manic religious hysteria to stoke the fire of greed had set in with the orders of the first Caliph.

> The year after the death of the Prophet, the stage was set for a full-dress invasion of neighbouring lands… the martial spirit of the tribes, to whom raids were a sort of national sports from time immemorial could not but assert itself in some form after Islam.[9]

The second Caliph, Umar, who favored the Umayyad family, especially the sons of the Prophet's bitterest enemy, Abu Sufyan, did everything in his power to place the members of this clan in each and every position of authority. Umayyad's clutch on power tightened. When marching his men off to conquer foreign lands, Umar's instruction to the commanders as:

> Summon the people to God; those who respond to your call, accept it from them, (this is to say, accept their conversion as genuine and refrain from fighting them) but those who refuse must pay the poll tax out of humiliation and lowliness. If they refuse this, it is the sword without leniency.[10]

The Caliphal expeditions to plunder the city of Thana situated on the western coast of India failed. In 637, modern-day Iraq was raided and taken, followed by the invasion of Jordan and Palestine in 638. Persia proved very tough to crack. After the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Persians in the Battle of the Bridge, Uthman, who succeeded Umar as Caliph, advised him to send a man who has the required martial experience, art, knowledge, and understanding to command the invasion of Persia. Umar asked him to give a precise name. Uthman said, "Ali." The Caliph told Uthman to go to Ali and present him with command of the eastern front, adding, "See whether he accepts it or not."

S.M. Hasan writes that Ali refused. Ali believed that the wars of conquest

> had nothing to do with the faith itself. The teachers who went out to "educate" the Zoroastrians of the east and the Christians of the north and northwest had themselves to learn and learn a lot. Some of the conquerors of the most coveted throne used camphor thinking it to be salt, and when the dish proved to be tasteless (even revolting) they exchanged the camphor "sack" for a second-hand shirt! Others sold a ruby for a thousand dirhams and, when blamed, pointed out that they did not know how to count beyond that figure! ... And then, these were but common soldiers. True, they would have been regarded as such but, alas, the war was waged in the name of religion! …To Ali, as it seems to us in the light of his actions, the Arabian Peninsula had to teach itself before it could teach the world! … the energies of the "first" Muslims should have been devoted to educating the masses, at home.[11]

In 640 Umar managed to take Persia. His *mujahideen*[12] sacked the city of Ctesiphon. The Great Fire Temple was desecrated and palaces were looted and burned. Most horrific, though, was the burning of libraries in Ray, Isfahan, Ecbatana, Pasargadae, Persepolis, Jundishapur, Nisa, and Khorassan. Thousands of records and valuable books—the product of generations of Persian intellectuals and scholars—were lost, some in fire and some in the waters of the Euphrates.

Egypt was conquered in the same year. Approximately 700,000 scrolls—works of mathematics, science, and philosophy, some dating back thousands of years—were distributed to the public baths of Alexandria. Ibn al-Kifti recorded that these scrolls took more than six months to burn out. R. Homayoun Farrokh says that, in regard to the material present in the libraries of Egypt and Persia, Umar told his commanders,

> If their content is in accordance with the book of Allah, we may do without them, for in that case the book of Allah more than suffices. If on the other hand, they contain matter not in accordance with the book of Allah, there can be no need to preserve them. Proceed then and destroy them.[13]

After the death of Umar, his close associate Uthman bin Affan became the third Caliph of the Muslims. The third Caliph "entrusted the governorship of all big cities to the young and inexperienced lads of Bani Umayyah. These persons were neither educated nor good natured."[14] The first Caliphs were Companions of the Prophet who had come to power according to no rule.[15] After the death of Uthman, a huge crowd of disillusioned and angry people, who had come to Medina from all corners of the Muslim empire, literally hoisted Ali on their shoulders, carried him to the mosque, and declared him as their new Caliph by officially paying their allegiance to him.

When Umar became Caliph, he announced, "Two religions will not co-exist in the land of the Arabs." The Caliphal decree threw Christians and Jews out of their homes in Hijaz. When the people selected Ali as the fourth Caliph, in an epistle he instructed his governors:

> Amongst the citizens there are two kinds of people: those from the same religion as yours who are your brothers in religion and those from other religions who are your equal in creation (as human beings).

After four and a half years of rule that saw no respite from relentless conspiracies and armed conflicts between Muslims, the poisoned blade of an assassin's dagger took his life in a mosque where he was prostrated in prayer. His death brought an end to the reformation.

> After his death, Islam was never the same. Ali had… an outstanding reputation for justice, but the Umayyad dynasty that followed him was increasingly worldly, inegalitarian and autocratic… Malcontents who called themselves the Shia-i-Ali (Ali's partisans) developed a piety of protest, refused to accept the Umayyad caliphs, and regarded Ali's descendants as the true leaders of the Muslim community.[16]

With the massacre of Karbala and the bestial treatment of the family of Fatima by the political establishment before and after, the Shia-Sunni split became sure and sound.

In 680 Yazid, the first Umayyad Caliph, asked Hussain, the second son of Fatima and Ali, to give his and his family's allegiance to him. Hussain rebuked Yazid that he would do so under no circumstances whatsoever. The Prophet's grandson was killed and beheaded by the army of the first Umayyad Caliph in the plains of Karbala, Iraq, along with his family and friends. With the massacre of Karbala and the bestial treatment of the family of Fatima by the political establishment before and after, the Shia-Sunni split became sure and sound.

The Shia faith established its fundaments in mourning the suffering of Fatima and her family, condemning the oppressors, and forever dissociating from them and their party. Its ethos revolves around the ethics taught by the Prophet and the twelve Imams from his progeny, with the twelfth yet to reappear from occultation. Shia ethos reflects an orthodox condition that the Shias have traditionally been at peace with everyone except the enemies of the

Prophet's progeny who remain without the remotest form of remorse. For 1,400 years, piety, charity, mutual tolerance, and resistance to tyranny have continued to be the essentials of the Shiite faith. Things changed, however. When an elderly cleric from Iran's dusty outback of Khomein and his cronies arrived on the scene of Shia activism in Iran, things started to change in a big way, totally unprecedented in the history of the Shias.

Shia history has never produced any scholar or jurist who has overreached his jurisdiction to the extent of bringing in the clergy to power. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini changed that. Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qasim al-Khoei, the chief Shia jurist from Najaf (Iraq) very strongly opposed Khomeini's innovation of *vilayat-e-faqih* [Guardianship of the Muslim Jurist] and cautioned him against his ill-conceived and ill-advised designs in matters of religion. To his acute consternation, Khomeini established his obstinacy in the form of a governing system in which the Shias await the advent of the Twelfth Imam, if in Iran they are to be ruled by a select group of clerics, and if outside they are to be guided in every matter by this same group. Transgressing all scope and parameters set in place by the twelve Imams, Khomeini stated that any ideal, idea, person, intention, and aspiration unauthorized by *vilayat-e-faqih* is neither Islamic nor legitimate. By 1979, the Supreme Council comprised of Khomeinist clerics, with Khomeini as the Chief Jurist, supreme leader, and *Marja-e-taqleed*, had Iran by her neck. The propagation machinery sounding from Tehran resounded within thousands of worldwide centers with the Ayatollah's stern message: "All those who oppose the *wali-e-faqih* and *vilayat-e-faqih* are enemies of Allah, deserving of His Wrath."

The sensational turn of events in Iran was interpreted by Shias everywhere as a testament to the freedom, right, and dignity of Shia Muslims.

The sensational turn of events in Iran was interpreted by Shias everywhere as a testament to the freedom, right, and dignity of Shia Muslims. The Shias reckoned that, despite fierce oppression and opposition throughout Muslim history, they were finally in town. This sudden illusion of a radical victory of truth and good over falsehood and evil was so strong and staggering that, for the politically marginalized Shia minority, it was no less than a messianic miracle, a sign from God. However, the awakening was too abrupt and too incredible. For as long and as far back as they could remember, they had been the underdogs of the Muslim *ummah*. Amid the upheaval of 1979, the Shias, in a state of disoriented awakening, made as good an effort as they could at that time to seize their moment.

Shia Muslims fortunate enough to live, study, work, and earn in the West enjoy rights and quality of life their counterparts in Iran and the rest of the Muslim world can only dream of. The majority of them are in obedient awe of the late Ayatollah, who has become the forever face of a Revolution that seemed to have toppled a corrupt monarchy and installed an austere but fair code of governance with the most righteous men in Iran at the helm of their ark of survival and salvation!

In 2012 most Shia minds are in paralysis, with *vilayat-e-faqih*–the most outrageous innovation in Shia theology ever. Shias refuse to face the fact that what Ayatollah Khomeini did was not bring into power the Shia philosophy and ethics as propounded by their Twelve Imams, but had in reality yoked the Shia faith under a "revolting" form of Islam all made by himself, with some inspiring tips from Sayid Qutb and Maulana Maududi, the master chefs of modern Islamism. This explains why adherents of a faith, which from the outset had values of tolerance and peaceful coexistence at its core, during the past four decades have become more and more aggressive as advocates of anti-Semitism and anti-West sentiments, and why their popular leaders are "campaigning" to "wipe Israel off the face of the earth." This also explains the bonding we see today between the Khomeinists, the followers of Muslim Brotherhood, and that of *Jamaat-e-Islami*. Shia religious schools or *madrassa* in Iran and elsewhere, that are under the direct patronage of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have in their core syllabus works of Qutb and Maududi, translated by the supreme leader for the benefit and evolution of mad militant minds.

Despite all logical and factual bearings and the opinion of a very small number of their scholars, mainstream Shias absolutely insist upon revering, propagating, and supporting morally, "bodily," and financially Khomeini's deviant interpretation of Shia Islam that ever since usurping power in 1979 is dictating the fate of the traditions and ethics of Shias. They are by now in the habit of equating Khomeini's legacy and his successor's (Ali Khamenei) regime with "Shia revival." Their *ulama* (clerics) are asking them to refrain from supporting the Western secular powers and remain firm in their faith of "the guardianship and guidance of the jurists." Even when the Ayatollahs are fighting each other in their political hotbeds, their representative clerics tell their congregations to interpret these confrontations as expressions of Western interference and guile to derail the Revolution.

For the last 40 years, eight out of every ten Shia centers in the West have been appointing Tehran-enrolled clerics as resident preachers/clerics/scholars. Iranian religious schools and seminaries (*howza*) are providing these centers

with a regular stream of scholars throughout the year. Their numbers swell during Islamic holy months. On these occasions, the scholars receive specific briefings regarding the nature and content of the sermons and speeches they are to deliver in these centers, from high-placed clerics in the *khums* hierarchy. Every year, cenrtes in the West invite clerics who can coach their congregations in the way of Ayatollah Khomeini, and fire them up with his zeal for jihad against the Zionist world and adoration for terrorist organizations like the *Hezbollah*.

Like Hitler, Ayatollah Khomeini meant every word he said and wrote.

Like Hitler, Ayatollah Khomeini meant every word he said and wrote. He has drugged the Shia community with the compulsive obsession that occupied his mind in terrifying totality for as long as he lived: to lead the Muslims in giving a final beating to the Jews and Christians and conquer Jerusalem, which houses the Al-Aqsa.

Al-Aqsa in Jerusalem is not as sparkling a star in the sphere of Shia holy sites as it is in the list of holy sites for Sunnis. Al-Aqsa has always lagged far behind in the intensity of spiritual passions that Karbala and Najaf stir within the hearts of devout Shias, until one man and his madness changed that in the late 1970s. For the first time ever in the history of Shia discourse and its religio-political paradigm, the "Dome of the Rock" became the prize of jihad. Khomeini declared the Palestinian cause to be sacred for all Muslims. In a corrosive collision with millennium-old traditions of piety, he thrust the place conquered, seized, and Islamized by the second Caliph Umar bin Khattab (the most revered hero in Sunni tradition and history, and one of the most hated figures in Shia tradition) into the premises of Shiite psyche, constant in passionate engagement with sacred history and space. Were the Shia-Sunni united army to seize Jerusalem, it would be the triumph of Khomeini's *divine* politics; Shias would finally emerge as undisputed victors of Islam and their right to lead the *ummah* would be soundly settled. Khomeini would at last get "due recognition" as the only leader of the Muslim world in the truest sense of the word. It would be plain for all to see that it was the genius and legacy of Khomeini that had accomplished what the Sunni world led by Saudi Arabia had dismally failed to do. This *fatah* (victory) would also affirm that it took a non-Arab jurist (*faqih*) leadership and its exalted political vision powered by divinely endowed authority (*wilayat*) to reconquer the city in which sits the site that for Sunnis ranks third in holiness after Mecca and Medina.

To convert this dream into reality, followers of Ali will have to ignore 1,400 years of ongoing oppression, humiliation, slaughter, and injustice at the hands of the enemies of Ali (first three Caliphs of Muslims, Umayyad Caliphs, and Abbasid Caliphs) and their loyalists (the hardline Sunnis of the four leading Sunni schools of thought, namely Salafis and Wahhabis). To realize the Ayatollah's dream, Shias will have to restrain from condemning the founding fathers of terrorism in Islam and, against their collective historical consciousness, associate with the enemies of Ali. If Shias, preaches the Khomeinist, want to get rid of their status as the underdog and obtain the certificate of "Shias are Muslims after all" from the Sunni majority, which has called them *kafir* (infidel) and *raafzi* (heretic) and treated them abominably, then Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor Ayatollah Khamenei have shown the way. The Shias must dilute and downplay the reality of their plight at the hands of the Muslims and pitch the sum of all hatred and anger against a much more convenient and relatively newfound enemy, the West. Blame for all wrongdoing and deprivations must be directed toward the West. This will canalize the scalding enmity between the two sects into a populist caustic culture of vilifying the free world. For all that has ever been wrong within themselves and between them ever since the Prophet of Islam died, both sects can now freely accuse and attack the free world as much as they want and that too at the moment and momentum of their choice and convenience.

The Khomeini school of Islam has succeeded to an enormous extent in drafting and instituting a new model for Shiite mourning assemblies (*majlis*) and worship ceremonies. The turbans tailored by Tehran have wrought in a 180-degree change in posture of religion and "politics" of prayer. This new model is in action in most Shia centers in the West. The *majlis* is now used much more for hate-filled rhetoric and aggressive anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. Why else would those who have gathered to remember and mourn the victims of Karbala, and condemn and curse their killers, burn American and Israeli flags on these occasions? Shia preachers are going so far as to say that Yazid was fooled into slaughtering the Prophet's family by Jews and Christians; i.e., the massacre of Karbala was a Judeo-Christian conspiracy to weaken the power and unity of Muslims! I have heard more than one mullah preach this. It comes as no surprise that centers which provide a platform for these clerics are natural allies of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and indulge in such morbid propagation to appease their Sunni "brethren." For example, after the FBI severed its outreach program with CAIR, without a doubt a front office for Muslim terrorists, CAIR and other prominent Islamist organizations in the U.S. released a counterstatement signed by Sunni organizations, saying they have also decided to cut their ties with the FBI in which they were

helping the Bureau reach out to the Muslim community. Imam Sayed Moustafa Al-Qazwini, the head of the Shia Islamic Educational Center of Orange County (IEC) in the U.S., rushed to be one of the first signatories, in affirmation of Shia-Sunni unity. In collusion with Muslim Brotherhood-run organizations in North America, Shia centers have matured into hot hubs of pro-Sharia, anti-Semitic, and anti-U.S. activities. The clerics here are abiding by a comprehensive guideline finalized by Ayatollah Khamenei's office that has mastered the craft of optimizing the influence *Maraje*[17] enjoy with the Shias. That which is pouring life into the Khomeinist terror network and oiling the wheels of *vilayat-e-faqih* is k*hums*.

Khums *in Arabic means one-fifth. According to Shia jurisprudence,* **khums** *is a compulsory tax that constitutes one-fifth or 20 percent of the surplus of a Shia individual's and/or the family's total annual income.*

What is *khums*? *Khums* in Arabic means one-fifth. According to Shia jurisprudence, *khums* is a compulsory tax that constitutes one-fifth or 20 percent of the surplus of a Shia individual's and/or the family's total annual income. Every year, it should be given "religiously" to whichever *Marja-e-taqleed* this person and/or his/her family follows. The only exception is when a household's total income and needs are equal. Shiite traditions say that *khums* was originally meant for the following causes:

(1) *Sihm al-Imam*: the infallible Imam from the Prophet's progeny.
(2) The poor, the destitute, the orphans, the widows, the stranded and lost travelers, the mentally and physically disabled, and the old. Also for humanitarian and natural crises.
(3) Education and upbringing of underprivileged students, theological scholasticism, and research.

Shiite ulama (religious scholars), those accepted and acknowledged by mainstream Shias, have unanimously given this directive to the Shias: as long as the Twelfth Imam from the progeny of Fatima and Ali continues to be in occultation, his rightful share (the share intended for the Prophet's progeny) must be collected and used as the Imam wills. These clerics have convinced their target audience that only *Maraje-e-taqleed* have exclusive access to the awaited Imam. Therefore, who better to understand the will of the Imam, in precise detail, than these most excellent among Allah's current creatures? In light of this,

the *khums* payer believes one needs to hand over the Twelfth Imam's share to one's *marja* of choice, to be used in ways he sees fit and thereby authorizes.

Without the written permission issued by the office of the particular *marja* bearing his peculiar stamp, notwithstanding a genuine charity a Shia wishes to start or support, he or she cannot raise even a cent from the community. This all-important document is called *Ijaza*. Without the *Ijaza* in his/her possession, a Shia is not entitled to ask for *khums* from the community. This is the reason: The clergy has counselled the *khums* payer that he/she must pay this money to the representative of his/her *marja*. This man is called the *wakil*[18] of the *marja*. Today, every *marja* has a hierarchy of *wakil* in every continent, region, country, state, city, and center. The *wakil* is a man directly appointed by the *marja* to take up the responsibility of collecting *khums* from the total number of *muqallids* for that particular *marja*. *Wakils* of the *maraje* run full-fledged offices for their respective bosses. Every *wakil* is allocated an area from which to collect *khums*. In collecting this tax, the *wakil* chooses a number of local agents from local Shia congregations. Every such agent receives a commission of 17.5 percent to as much as 30-40 percent on the total amount he/she brings in. The commission is negotiated on the basis of the amount of total *khums* collected by an individual agent, the number of *khums* payers each agent has managed to sign up, and how close an agent is to the *wakil*, as a member of his family or a friend.

The *khums* thus collected and deposited in the *wakil's* office is used as per the decision of the *wakil*. He keeps a share for himself and his family, a little more for his numerous projects, and the remaining goes to the *marja*. Money laundering has come in very handy. *Khums* is given and received in checks, cash, wired transfers, gifts, gold, jewelry, etc.

In the early 1980s, the center for religious education in Qom, Iran, whose popularity rose with that of Khomeini's, hosted more than 15,000 clerics and students from within and outside Iran. This huge seminary by the name of *Howza Ilmiya* was run by *khums* alone. Annual cost for the upkeep of this population in the beginning of the 1980s was $14,880,000. Devout Khomeinists made further contributions in the shape of a variety of student credits, grants, gifts, awards, rewards, endowment funds, and incentives. Thirty-three years later, size, capacity, and the number of malevolent mullahs and militant students in this seminary have swollen manifold and so has the amount of *khums* flowing into *Howza Ilmiya*. Students graduating from *howzas* like this are appointed as resident *alims* (scholars) in the centers in the West and work as preachers and prayer leaders.

Wakils of the Grand Ayatollah Sistani also work in similar lines in the centers endorsed by him. Two of the Ayatollah's sons-in-law and other "very close" relations are in charge of collecting *khums* from his *muqallids*. With the Ayatollah's increasing age and failing health, the Sistani bloc at present is troubled with the prospect of succession, a crisis they fear will be upon them soon. As his advisors and agents are busy gaining as much influence on as many of his followers as they can, and the family keeps busy in private politicking, the Ayatollah is keeping his silence on this matter. This is a telling sign that as of now Sistani either has not made a choice or, if he has a personal favorite in mind, he is in not in a mood to make it public. Authority of a *marja* is measured by the number of *muqallids* under his guardianship. With the issue of his successor not settled, senior clerics in Sistani's office are anxious that, with the death of their *marja*, they would lose their annual harvest from the fertile fields of *khums*. Prominent clerics from Sistani's camp are now often seen attending religious services and functions at Khomeinist centers where *wakil*s under Ayatollah Sistani lure the congregations with his *Ijaza*. The Khomeinists now have another very willing source of *Ijaza* for them to raise extra *khums* and make hefty commissions. Sayyid Murtaza Kashmiri, a son-in-law of Ayatollah Sistani, has appointed his brother Sayyid M. Baqir Kashmiri as his representative in the U.S. This *wakil* is the director of the organization called I.M.A.M. in California. In 2007 he issued a Sistani-authorized *Ijaza* to the Khomeinist mosque in New Jersey, called *Masjid-e-Ali*. It is run by a religious body called the Muslim Foundation, Inc. (MFI). How the business of *khums* is done between a *marja*, his *wakil*, and an *Ijaza*-holder, in this case a religious center, is depicted in this link: http://www.masjid-e-ali.com/documents/Ijaza%20Ayatullah%20Seestani.pdf.

MFI received a donation of $230,000 from the Alavi Foundation in January 2006. In 2009 federal prosecutors filed a civil complaint that led to the confiscation of four Iranian mosques and a Fifth Avenue skyscraper named the Piaget Building. This building is owned by the Iranian government and is managed by the Alavi Foundation. It is believed that for quite some time the Alavi Foundation has been playing a substantial part in Tehran's terror-finance businesses. *Masjid-e-Ali* and numerous other Shiite religious centers in the West are pivotal places which are actively encouraging, propagating, and backing Khomeini's culture of terrorism. These centers provide entry only to hard-core Khomeinist clerics. Syed Aftab Haider Rizvi is one of these clerics whom the MFI invited in November 2011. He came to recite *majlis* (give lectures) in the Islamic holy month of Muharram. Over a period of ten days, he gave lectures in Urdu and also delivered lectures in English for the youth.

Syed Aftab Haider Rizvi is originally from Pakistan. After graduating from University of Karachi he moved to Qom, Iran, where he studied in *Howza Ilmiya* for 11 years. He was sent to South Africa to establish an "Islamic Center" there with the sole focus on recruiting Khomeini sympathizers, and deepening anti-American and anti-Semitic feelings. The center AFOSA (*Ahlul Bait Foundation of South Africa*) is headed by him. In 2008 he was invited by the SABA Islamic Center of California, which has Nabi Raza Abidi, a hard-nosed Khomeinist, as its resident scholar. Syed Aftab Haider Rizvi is the *wakil* of the following *maraje* in South Africa. He collects *khums* for all of them, and his responsibility is not affected by any ayatollah dropping dead. Unless and until the office of the late cleric is unhappy with him, the *wakil* continues with his trade.

(1) Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Tehran, Iran).
(2) Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani (Najaf, Iraq).
(3) Grand Ayatollah Fadlallah (Lebanon, "Godfather of Hezbollah," now dead).
(4) Grand Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi (Qom, Iran).
(5) Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani (Qom, Iran, now dead).

In his message titled "Muslims of the World Must Stand against Zionist Conspiracy to Destroy Masjid al-Aqsa," the late Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani stated:

> Masjid al-Aqsa, the first *Qibla* of Muslims is in danger of being destroyed by Zionists… The real danger becomes tangible when we take notice of the intention of America and Zionism to gain hegemony over Muslim countries and eliminate Islam…

With clerics and *wakils* like Syed Aftab Haider Rizvi, and *maraje* like Lankarani, Shia centers have perfected a most effective, most non-transparent, and most discreet method of raising, sharing, and spending *khums*. By his own admission Syed Aftab Haider Rizvi is a *khums* specialist who can give many lectures on this subject. In a four-part lecture he gave at AFOSA, he described and upheld the salient role played by *khums* in jihad.

Whenever a scholar is invited by Shia religious or charitable organizations, he/she is invited to many private parties, fundraisers and dinners, youth programs, and *dars* (religious lessons) sessions. The cleric gets ample opportunities to introduce himself to the entire community, make reliable contacts, and generate *khums*. These close gatherings where everyone knows everyone provide safe havens for Khomeinist clerics, where they have the audience in rapt attention wrapped around their fingers. These settings facilitate the clerics cultivating at great depths a long-term following that has great means to enrich the *maraje*, expand the *khums* base, and enlarge its potential. In

these closed meetings, the cleric and his congregation can have really open discussions and exchange ideas on how to better maintain as high-valued an item as the "bomb" of anticipatory apocalyptic Islam.

Ever since Hassan Nasrallah of Hizbollah was appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei as his *wakil* in Lebanon in 1995, the massive financial power of *khums* and other religious donations from the Lebanese *muqallids* of Khamenei worldwide has been reaching Hizbollah directly, and not via Khamenei, which was the case before Nasrallah's appointment. Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek, one of Hizbollah's most senior leaders and a direct link between Khamenei and Hizbollah, also has the Ayatollah's permission to collect *khums*. A. Nizar Hamzeh writes in *Hizballah: Islamic Charity in Lebanon*:

> Although Hizballah does not disclose *khoms* figures, Sayyid Nasrallah stresses that "the funds are big, important, and they are spent on jihad, educational, social and cultural affairs." By all accounts, Hizballah's *khoms* funds are big. Indeed, most of the funds come from private foundations and charitable organizations under the control of the clerical elite, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei…[19]

Zaki Baqri, a Shia scholar from south India, has been preaching Khomeinism ever since he arrived in Toronto 33 years ago. After he finished giving a talk in the home of Dr. Asad Sadiq in New Jersey, a dedicated Khomeinist in his own right, a 16-year-old asked Baqri, "Maulana, how can we follow the path of Imam Khomeini?" Baqri replied, "Be as brave and pious as a Hizbollah mujahid; donate as much money as you can for Hizbollah. More the money we donate for Hizbollah, greater the suffering of the Zionists and the infidels."

Out in the open, one will always find these clerics who are either citizens of a Western country or visitors with desires for further visits or, even better, permanent residences. They emphatically say it is their mission to promote peace and interfaith understanding, because their religion is one of peace and universal brotherhood.

Notes

[1] Singular: *faqih*. A Muslim jurist. Plural: *fuqaha*.
[2] In this article we are only concerned with the Twelver Shias, those who after Prophet Muhammad follow the twelve infallible Imams from the progeny of Prophet Muhammad.
[3] A jurist's government..
[4] Laurence Galian, *The Sun at Midnight: The Revealed Mysteries of the Ahlul Bayt Sufis* (Farmingdale, NY: Quiddity, Inc., 2003), chapter titled "The Commander of the Faithful."
[5] Ze'ev Maghen, *O Ali, O Husayn! An Ancient Shi'ite Paradigm Haunts Today's Islamic Republic*, BESA Center Perspectives Papers, July 12, 2009, No. 85.
[6] *Awaalim al-Uloom*, al-Bahraani, Vol. 11; *Biharal Anwaar*, Vol. 28.
[7] Laurence Galian, *The Sun at Midnight: The Revealed Mysteries of the Ahlul Bayt Sufis* (Farmingdale, NY: Quiddity, Inc., 2003), chapter titled "Ar Radhia."
[8] *The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 1.
[9] Phillip K. Hitti, *History of Syria* (New York, Macmillan, 1951).
[10] Tabari, *The History of al-Tabari, "The Battle of Qadissiyah and the Conquest of Syria and Palestine,"* trans. by Yohanan Friedman (New York, State University of New York Press, 1992), Vol. 12, p. 167.
[11] S.M. Waris Hasan, *Essays on the Life and Times of Ali ibn Abi Talib*, Alseraat (LondonK: Muhammadi Trust, 1991), Vol. 1, No. 1, chapter titled "The Introduction."
[12] Muslims, usually men, who take part in jihad.
[13] R. Homayoun Farrokh, *The Short History of Libraries in Iran* (in Persian: *Taarikhcheh-e Ketaabkhaaneh dar Iran*) (Tehran, Iran, 1967).
[14] George Jordac, *The Voice of Human Justice* (Karachi, Pakistan: Islamic Seminary Publications, 1987), chapter titled "Ruler is one of the people."
[15] Maurice Gaudefroy Demombynes, *Muslim Institutions*, transl. from the French by John P. Macgregor, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1950).
[16] *The Guardian*, London, May 8, 2003.
[17] Singular: *marja*; plural, *maraje.*
[18] Advocating representative.
[19] *Understanding Islamic Charities*, ed. Jon B. Alterman & Karin von Hippel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Significant Issues Series, 2007, Vol. 29, No. 7.

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A Look at Qatar's Rise to Power:
Using Cultural Intelligence as Our Guide

by SSgt (USAF) Adam Furtado

Qatar is a small, enigmatic state in the Arabian Gulf that has spent the better part of the last two decades attempting to make its mark on the world stage. As a leader in the international energy landscape, Qatar has parlayed its economic success with a recent foray into foreign policy. Without the political influence and history of other global leaders, Qatar has had to highlight its value in other ways. Qatari officials have proven to be successful domestic and international investors and have shown an aptitude for third-party conflict resolution.

Even more interesting than trying to figure out Qatar's place in the global puzzle is seeing how its people have reflected its government. Native Qataris are a small in-group who are mostly well off but have no family history of wealth. The influx of affluence has been rapid and widespread, and the cultural development of the country has failed to follow suit at the same pace. The country's capital of Doha boasts gaudy skyscrapers akin to the skylines of other wealthy South Asian cities like Dubai and Singapore. However, as one gets close to "downtown," what is immediately noticeable is the vast emptiness between all of the buildings. Even with the constant construction and development, there are large lots of empty space throughout the city.

The Emir has put a premium on making Doha the cultural capital of the Middle East, but nobody let the residents in on the secret. He has flown in world-class chefs and art curators, only to have the lavish restaurants and art museums stand empty. Aside from the *souqs*, historic open-air markets operating for a few hours a day, downtown is hardly bustling with activity. The traffic throughout Doha rivals any major American city, but it remains unclear where everybody is going.[1]

There is an eerie feeling of hollowness to Doha as if at some point in the future someone will raise the curtain and Qatar's gig will be up. From the outside, Doha looks to be on the cusp of international prominence, and with Qatar's increasing development it may very well be. However, from inside the country it is hard to see. The surprising selection of Qatar to host the 2022 World Cup is another example of the country's effort to become relevant, yet it remains to be seen if its leaders will be able to maintain appearances when tens of thousands of people come rushing into the city for the first time. On the other hand, time may be just what Doha and the rest of Qatar need. Since things have happened so rapidly, it is possible that time will take its course and Qatar will eventually develop its own culture.

> *The connection among the culture of Qatar, its people, and its government is an important one when considering* **cultural intelligence.**

The connection among the culture of Qatar, its people, and its government is an important one when considering *cultural intelligence*. The Center of Advanced Defense Studies defines cultural intelligence as that which is established by understanding the cultural awareness of a country.[2] One of the foremost leaders in the study of cultural intelligence, Brooks Peterson, breaks down cultural intelligence cultivation into five scales that can pinpoint the type of culture with which a country identifies.[3] All groups of people fall somewhere on each of these scales, providing an organized view of a cultural intelligence assessment.

The first scale that Peterson identifies, *equality vs. hierarchy,* is one that compares the governance and social structure of a people. When looking at the first scale, one must first decide if he/she is looking at Qatar from an international perspective or in relation to its other Middle Eastern counterparts, as this will affect the outcome dramatically. The *direct vs. indirect* scale is a determination of the communicative characteristics of the group. Are the people willing to say how they feel, or are they more apt to tell people what they want to hear in an effort to avoid confrontation? The third scale, *individual vs. group orientation,* delves into in- and out-group dynamics and assesses whether people think as individuals or are more concerned with the progress of their entire group. In this scale, we see a large difference between

Western countries and those in the Middle East. Fourth, the *task vs. relationship* scale discusses the attempted outcome of decisions. It investigates whether success in a particular situation outweighs the benefits of cultivating a relationship with one's counterpart at the expense of that particular task. Finally, the last scale is the *risk vs. caution* scale, which identifies the aggressiveness, conservatism, and willingness to take chances that a country exhibits. This scale is where Qatar breaks away from its Middle Eastern equivalents. The use of Peterson's scale is a valuable tool in organizing the cultural intelligence available to a particular country.

EQUALITY VS. HIERARCHY SCALE

While it would come as no surprise where Qatar would fall on the equality vs. hierarchy scale internationally, it is fairly progressive in a regional sense. With Saudi Arabia being the only country with which it shares a border, coming off as progressive is not a very impressive feat comparatively. However, Qatar has made strides to become a standard-bearer in the region on issues of equality. Providing equal treatment to citizens when one's government is set up as a constitutional, hereditary monarchy is a difficult task for an Emir who is in a perpetual battle to maintain credibility as a leader in the Muslim world and his country as a relevant state internationally.

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani is a pragmatic leader with great intentions for his nation. He came into power in a bloodless coup over his father in 1996 and has since been on a personal mission to cement Qatar's role in the world.[4] While the foundation of that role is in the country's vast supply of energy resources, the Emir has thrown his hat into the political arena as well in recent years. Al Thani has successfully navigated his country to an impractical point of civic contentment while maintaining a stranglehold on the political process. Despite multiple promises to the contrary, Qataris have yet to be given the right to vote in a meaningful election of any kind,[5] but they do not seem to mind.

In early 2011, as uprisings worked their way throughout the Middle East, Qatar's people remained silent. It was not as if they did not have avenues to be heard (Qatar has Internet access and is home to the news network *Al Jazeera*); they just did not see the need. A Facebook group was created for a Qatari "Day of Rage" but nobody showed up.[4] The native Qataris, numbering just 225,000, receive an enormous number of benefits from their government: a stipend, free land, and interest-free loans, for starters.[6] When the Arab Spring reached Bahrain, Qatar's geographical cousin to the north, the government in Doha increased the stipend paid to the Qatari people to suppress

any thoughts of revolution. Who can blame them for not wanting change? This is hardly an oppressed people, comparatively speaking.

Even though the rest of the Middle East views Qatar as a progressive Muslim state, egalitarianism is not a term that best describes the country. Qataris fall firmly into their societal roles and rarely depart from them. Still employing a loose form of *shariah* law, gender discrimination is still par for the course. Though progress for women's rights has been steady, led by the Emir's second wife, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al-Missnad, men still hold extreme advantages. Women have limited opportunities to serve in leadership roles, except for those at the top of the hierarchical structure. For example, Sheikah Mozah is the Chairperson of the Qatar Foundation and has been a leader in education reform in the country. This has led to the development of Education City, a group of American universities that have set up campuses in Qatar. Traditional Muslim garb is still the norm[7] and women are rarely seen driving, though they can with the permission of the men in their family.

The Qatari social structure does not leave much room for flexibility. There are distinct avenues to success and they are laid out from an early age.

The Qatari social structure does not leave much room for flexibility. There are distinct avenues to success and they are laid out from an early age. Qataris are well taken care of by the government and are expected (and expect) to serve in leadership roles in all sectors as they come of age. It is not abnormal for Qatari men to study in the United States and return upon receiving their degree to a high-level position in the government or private sector.[8] Due to this process of grooming Qataris for leadership, a process the Emir calls "Qatarization," it has been increasingly difficult for companies to fill low- and mid-level positions with Qatari nationals. Out of the 1.75 million people who reside in Qatar, only 225,000 are native Qataris—less than 8 percent—the rest being third country nationals.[6] The influx of expatriates is due to the inordinate number of well-paying jobs that Qataris will not fill. This trend is likely to continue as Qatar has the largest migration growth in the world, which led to it also having the highest population growth rate in the world.[9]

The United States Embassy in Qatar, as an example, is one of the only embassies in the world that does not employ a single host nation employee. It has had to fill regional economic and political expert positions with workers from

Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and other Arab countries.[10] The low-paying positions are filled by skilled and unskilled laborers, mostly from Southeast Asian nations. The constant construction projects in Doha in preparation for the 2022 World Cup are being completed by mostly Nepalese, Filipino, and Indian laborers who are sponsored for a few years and are forced to live in appalling conditions in labor camps outside the city. Many of the camps are reported to have no access to running water and limited hygiene or food supplies.[11] The skilled labor living situation "is the worst part about this country," according to one U.S. diplomat.[12] Neither these laborers nor third country nationals are afforded any right to vote or play a role in any democratic process even if they have been naturalized, which is rarely allowed. This is a major reason that the "people of Qatar" are considered especially content. The largest majority of residents is not represented in any of these statistics.

When the Japanese invented the artificial pearl, Qatar's economy crashed in a dramatic fashion in the 1930s. It was not until energy resources were finally cultivated in the country that Qatar started to have a viable economy. The rapid growth has led to a sense of entitlement among the native population that has been handed wealth and property for decades. Over 10 percent of native Qataris are millionaires (in USD), the third highest millionaire density rate in the world.[9] The Emir has had to answer critics on the viability of sustaining this type of growth and style of government. Qatar's propensity for domestic and international investing has both raised its economic profile and ensured its viability for the foreseeable future. To the Emir's credit, human rights violations notwithstanding, he has put Qatar in an enviable position.

DIRECT VS. INDIRECT SCALE

An important indication of culture revolves around human interaction and communicative traits. Peterson's *direct vs. indirect* scale "relates to the way people communicate and interact with one another." Though the Middle East has become increasingly compartmentalized, cultural communicative characteristics do not seem to vary much throughout. The Arab culture is one of discretion, respect, and avoidance. Qataris, even more so than most in the region, are very reclusive. Hugh Eakin noted in his article "The Strange Power of Qatar" that he was never invited into a Qatari home in all his time in the country,[4] which is very uncharacteristic of the culture. This separatism is a deleterious result of Qatarization.

Respecting authority, status, and elders remains a big part of the culture in Qatar. All communication is centered on respect, whether in intra- or inter-cultural situations. A party from another culture is much more apt to get what it sets out for if it understands and respects the Qataris' culture. Visitors can just as quickly squander opportunities if unaware of tradition and cultural traits.

Conflict is necessary for change and Qatar has been the standard-bearer in international conflict resolution.

Where Qatar breaks away from its regional counterparts is in its directness in regard to negotiation and conflict resolution. In the Arab culture, it is customary to avoid confrontation and take a passive approach to conflict. Qatar has broken this mold in its willingness to confront conflict and seek resolutions around the region. Conflict is necessary for change and Qatar has been the standard-bearer in international conflict resolution.

With hydrocarbon money pouring into Qatar, the country is set economically for the foreseeable future. The Emir has turned his focus to mediation and conflict resolution in an effort to build political influence. Qatar's first major foray playing the third-party role was with Lebanon in an effort to avoid civil war in 2008. All Lebanese political factions were invited to Doha by the Emir to conduct talks. On May 21, the parties came to an accord, which became known as the Doha Agreement and ended 18 months of civil strife.[13] This was the first great mediation success for Qatar.

With the experience gained with Lebanon, Qatar and Al Thani offered their services in other conflicts. Qatar hosted peace talks in Doha between Sudanese rebel groups and the Sudan government in an effort to end the crisis in Darfur.[13] While a peace agreement was not signed, the basic parameters of the deal were agreed upon and later put into effect. Since then, the conflict renewed, but getting the two parties to the table for talks in the first place represented a solid foundation for future peace talks.

More recently, since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Qatar has had different reactions to crises around the region. In a surprisingly assertive move, Qatar offered monetary support,[14] military aircraft, and special forces personnel to the Libyan rebels in the effort to overthrow Moammar Gadhafi. It played such a large part in the revolution that the Qatari flag hung in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi after it was announced that Gadhafi was killed.

Qataris had the opposite reaction to the uprising in Bahrain, where they supported the reigning monarchy and offered no support to the Bahraini people. They have also

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made multiple attempts to negotiate, via the Gulf Cooperation Council, with Syrian oppressor Bashar Al Assad. The GCC and Al Assad have come to agreements on multiple occasions but Al Assad has backed out at the eleventh hour each time.[15] When asked if it would get involved with the election controversies in Iran, Qatar said it was better not to get involved because it was an "internal matter."[15] Qatar certainly knows how to pick its spots.

This willingness to intervene is out of character for Middle Eastern states. While there is an element of hypocrisy and self-interest factored in, overall Qatar has to be given credit for playing peacemaker, or at least peace facilitator. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) stated, "Qatar...can't continue to be an American ally on Monday that sends money to Hamas on Tuesday." This active form of neutrality will inevitably lead to biases, though Qatar has avoided committing to any sides so far. "We are a peace loving nation; our aim is always to live in peace and do away with conflict...We do not take any sides in conflicts," claimed Al Thani.[16] Peterson writes that a country more apt for a *direct* approach will "engage in conflict when necessary" and that seems to fit Qatar's profile even if it does seem out of character in the Arab world.

INDIVIDUAL VS. GROUP ORIENTATION SCALE

Though status is highly important to Qataris, they very much identify within groups rather than with individualistic tendencies. When asked why Qataris felt no motivation to stand up to their government as the uprisings spread in 2011, a U.S. diplomat told me that all Qataris want "is to feel important."[12] This need for international credibility is a direct reflection of the Emir. All decisions that are made are to benefit Qatar as a whole. The individualistic nature of the West is not applicable.

When success comes, it will come to all Qataris. The government has ensured that all decisions are made for "future generations." Qataris are not just investing for their own futures or those of their immediate families, but for the future of the country. This line of thinking is a bit easier to put into practice in a country roughly the size of Connecticut. Qatari group dynamics are interesting in that they strive for success in groups, but the groups are so closed off that each takes on an individualistic quality about it.

Peterson describes the *individual vs. group orientation* scale as the "degree of importance that people give to being part of a group." Qataris could fall anywhere across this scale depending on what size group is being discussed. Qataris individually are group-oriented people. Those small in-groups, however, are closed off to outsiders and

they think "individually" for themselves. In the big picture, Qatar seeks credibility on the world stage and wishes to be a big part of the international community but is unwilling to latch on to firm alliances. Qatar and the Emir are extremely selective with their associations.

TASK VS. RELATIONSHIP

Peterson's *task vs. relationship* scale fits well with the group dynamic scale as it also discusses the mentality of people when making decisions. With its newfound success, Qatar has developed into a forward-thinking country. This long-term approach to geopolitics and diplomacy puts an added emphasis on relationship building as opposed to a task-based approach. Most of the Middle East's relationships are forged from a historical perspective; Qatar does not have a rich history to reach back to, but is determined to create those relationships now.

The Emir has decided that a firm "neutral" stance is what is needed to keep Qatar thriving.

With the Emir's focus on the "future generations" of his country, he has put added pressure on himself to ensure safety and viability. This focus is evident when considering the current ties that Qatar maintains with the United States and Iran. Qatar knows that a defense relationship with the U.S. is essential to maintaining order and ensuring the security of its borders. On the other end of the spectrum, an economic relationship with Iran is critical since the two countries share the North Gas Fields from which Qatar's world-leading supply of Liquid Natural Gas comes.[9] If Qatar were a task-focused culture, it would have chosen a side in the current debate over Iran's nuclear program and harmed either the security or economic vitality of the country. The Emir has decided that a firm "neutral" stance is what is needed to keep Qatar thriving.

Aside from relationships being important from a business sense, the Muslim culture places a high priority on loyalty. The Emir expects members of his cabinet to remain loyal to him and he returns the favor. Qataris are not out to make the "quick buck" if the cost is the loss of relationships that were developed with loyalty and trust. Whether that is due to contentment and a lack of further personal ambition or legitimate loyalty to the group's goals is unclear, but it is very rare to see a Qatari look out for himself over others.

Qatar unremittingly seeks to maintain the proper image of a peace-loving country that tiptoes the line of neutrality without misstep.

This emphasis on relationship building and maintenance goes a long way toward gaining the international credibility that Qatar so desperately wants to achieve. This incessant desire to be a key cog in global affairs leads to Qatar's insecurity regarding its reputation. Qatar unremittingly seeks to maintain the proper image of a peace-loving country that tiptoes the line of neutrality without misstep. When asked about a negative investment he made, the Emir answered, "The main thing we are defending is our reputation."[16]

RISK VS. CAUTION

Traditionally, Middle Eastern countries are extremely conservative and risk-averse economically and politically. From an economic standpoint, Qatar is willing to take calculated risks for long-term benefits. Its leaders have a very deliberate plan and are focused on preparing the country for the future. During the rapid rise, Qatar was more willing to take on investment opportunities that could be termed "risky," but as the nation's wealth accumulates Qatar is starting to become more cautious. That is not to say the leaders have gotten any less aggressive with pursuing investment opportunities, but they are thinking about sustainment of their brand rather than quick capital growth.

Politically and culturally, Qatar has been willing to break the mold in many respects. Its willingness to embrace change has led to its becoming a powerful counterweight to the oppressor regimes in the region. Qatar has balanced the need for maintaining Islamic traditions while still being a progressive country with a willingness to advance even if it is looked down upon by its neighbors. It showed this willingness with the advent of *Al Jazeera*, with diplomatic ties to the United States and other Western powers, and with its courageous leap into the most difficult of conflicts and struggle for a resolution in Darfur and Lebanon.

While *risk* or *caution* may not be the best terms to describe Qatar's gumption, according to the definitions that Peterson laid out Qatar once again would fall toward the middle of the scale. Qataris are cautious in that they "collect considerable information before making a decision" but risky in their willingness to "try and innovate ways of doing things."[3] Qatar is in a class of its own in relation to the rest of the Middle East. The only border it shares is with Saudi Arabia, for example. For years, Qatar has been seen as a nation under the ruling thumb of its large, conservative neighbor, but has recently made certain that this perception is rectified. Qatar's ability and drive to seek advancement will keep it on the forefront even as the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East changes.

Peterson's cultural intelligence scales give us a glimpse into who the Qatari people really are. While they are inscrutably difficult to assess, they are a direct reflection of their leadership. Qatar, like its people, is still figuring out how to adapt to its newfound success and notoriety. Qatar seems unwilling to make a firm decision on whether or not to throw its full arsenal of support behind one decision or the other and seems content with playing an aggressively neutral role in the region. It is unclear of its motivations beyond peace and prosperity. Former United States Ambassador to Qatar Joseph LeBron said of the country: "I think of it as Qatar occupying a space in the middle of the ideological spectrum in the Islamic world, with the goal of having doors open to it across that ideological spectrum."[15]

It is Qatar's responsibility to protect its people and look out for their best interests. The Emir has done as good a job of securing his people's future as any world leader in recent history. Qatar wants to package itself as a neutral, third-party conflict resolver that loves peace and has no ulterior motives, but its recent foreign policy decisions have critics questioning its intentions. Qatar has no doubt showed that

it is capable of getting good results from impossible situations and it should be commended for its mediation work in the region. Nevertheless, Qatar is a country that has its own interests at heart—just like all the other countries from which it claims to be different.

Notes

[1] Deployed to Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, December 2011-June 2012.
[2] "Cultural Intelligence and the United States Military," Defense Concepts Series, Center for Advanced Defense Studies, July 2006.
[3] Brooks Peterson, *Cultural Intelligence: A Guide For Working With People of Other Cultures*, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2004.
[4] Hugh Eakin, "The Strange Power of Qatar," *The New York Times*, October 2011.
[5] Qataris (including women) have been able to vote for the Central Municipal Council. However, the council is generally powerless.
[6] "Qatar," Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), February 2012.
[7] One will see Muslim women in Qatar in all types of clothing, but with the high number of immigrants it is hard to say how conservative the Qatari women are dressing.
[8] "Private sector" is mostly state-owned.
[9] "Qatar," CIA *World Fact Bo*ok, 2012.
[10] I interned at U.S. Embassy Doha, Qatar, from February to May 2012.
[11] Evan Maher, "Qatar Country Report on Human Rights," United States Embassy Doha, Qatar, 2012.
[12] Personal interview with State Department representative.
[13] Mehran Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy," *The Middle East Journal*, 2011.
[14] Qatar gave the Libyan rebels over $100 million, more than a dozen Mirage fighter jets, and "hundreds" of special forces troops.
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[16] Martin Dickson and Roula Khalaf, "Interview: Qatar's Sheikh Hamad," *Financial Times*, October 2010.

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From Red Team to Brown Team:
Cultural Repercussions for Counterinsurgency

by 1LT (USA) Nima Sarrafan and Maya Cameron

As military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz wrote, "war is merely a continuation of politics by other means,"[1] or more simply failed politics yield war. Yet failed wars also revert to politics. The cyclical relationship of politics and war exists during insurgencies in which states do not exist or project their authority inconsistently. This lack of national authority can undermine security and development enabling insurgents and terrorists to thrive. In these scenarios, de facto power may fall to representatives of larger groups such as local leaders, warlords, clergy, organized crime, and/or other opportunistic actors. Developed nations attempting to stabilize failing states encounter great difficulty. Not only does a failing state include myriad groups but each group is unique in power, decision-making, and opaque motivation: the foundation for this complexity is culture. If counterinsurgencies rely on a mixture of war and politics between groups, and politics is founded on culture, then analyzing and predicting cultural implications can provide a powerful tool during operations. Military Intelligence Support Operations (MISO), Civil Affairs (CA), and Military Intelligence (MI) are military branches that emphasize cultural knowledge but none go beyond conventional analysis to predict the impact of operations.

An "advanced analysis that addresses behavior of groups and the cultural framework of group decisions"[2] is required but lacking in counterinsurgency intelligence support. In this article, the proposed solution is Brown Team, which is an analytic framework developed to predict and advise decision-makers of counterinsurgency cultural implications. While Brown Team clearly has functional applications to the battlefield, there is no overarching methodology to organize this practical solution: Its relevance is either ignored, marginally understood, or incorrectly utilized, slowing the change from results into frontline application.[3]

Before exploring Brown Team it is necessary to understand its predecessor – Red Team. Red Team is a useful and often utilized analytic technique. It reveals risks, uncovers vulnerabilities, and anticipates unexpected adversarial actions. Over the preceding decades, Red Team has evolved into a well-organized system that strategists and tacticians employ to develop mitigation techniques.[4]

Slowly, Red Team members recognized that conflicts are not confined to two opposing forces on empty, neutral terrain; they occur in a world of discordant political interests among diverse human populations. Red Team has burgeoned to include numerous counterparts.[5] The following describes these offshoots:

Red Team:	Opposing Force
Blue Team:	Friendly Force or Allies
White Team:	Scenario Controllers
Green Team:	External Actors to the Area of Operation
Brown Team:	Local Populations/Group

Brown Team is a four-tiered framework including Cultural Capability, Group Modeling, Prediction and Implications, and Collective Commons (see Figure 1). All four tiers will be discussed individually in the following sections.


Figure 1: Brown Team Conceptual Framework

CULTURAL CAPABILITY

The foundation for Brown Team is cultural capability, which is a combination of cultural competency (knowledge) and alternative analysis (tradecraft). Cultural competency is the integration of human knowledge, beliefs, and behaviors that stem from symbolic

thought and social learning over time.[6] Cultural competency is the "dos" and "don'ts": etiquette, expectations, and the overall rules of a particular society.[7] It is what binds individuals together over generations as a collective and this binding occurs on a psychological, emotional, and physical level.[8] Cultural competency can be learned through research or experience; both spending time in the library or in people's homes contribute to competency. This level of knowledge can be acquired through simple means (e.g., PowerPoint presentations and manuals) and therefore makes up a bulk of military cultural understanding. Cultural competency is the knowledge about individual cultures that is analyzed.

Two analytic lenses filter knowledge: conventional and alternative. Conventional intelligence analysis compiles information to affirm preexisting notions. The Army utilizes conventional analysis such as Most Probable Course of Action (MPCOA), Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA), Timelines, Pattern-wheels, Association Matrix, and Link Diagrams. Unfortunately, conventional analysis is susceptible to biases and assumptions.[9] For instance, there was a preexisting notion that Iraqi insurgents would not use women as suicide bombers because female combatants would bring shame to Islamic masculinity.[10] This dangerous cultural presupposition weakened coalition checkpoint security; guards overlooked female Iraqi insurgent threats.

A further disadvantage of conventional analysis is that precision and accuracy are rarely differentiated.

A further disadvantage of conventional analysis is that precision and accuracy are rarely differentiated. Precision and accuracy are used ambiguously/interchangeably without consideration for what impact the words have on inferences and decision-makers. Precision is hitting the target area consistently, but not the target point. Accuracy is hitting the target point consistently (see Figure 2[11]). The irony with precision and accuracy in the analytic sense is that Brown Team seeks greater precision and accuracy through uncertain terms and numbers. When measuring human thoughts and deciphering correlations, it is important that a level of flexibility be available. Conventional analysis artificially seeks precise and accurate terms or numbers that can be easily compiled and analyzed, leaving the decision-maker with half-truths to draw inferences. By "demanding a false precision from an analysis process that is itself incorrectly modeled on a common misunderstanding of the methods of science,"[12] conventional analysis cannot understand the operational environment effectively.

Figure.2

Another potential shortcoming of conventional analysis is mistaking probability for possibility. Unifying Somalia under one government in 2007 using Ugandan African Union forces and the Transitional Federal Government was a possibility, but the probability was very low.[13] In 2012 the African Union extended its mandate and continues the fight against Al-Shabaab militants. Meanwhile, the Transitional Federal Government has remained weak and ineffective throughout the majority of Somalia. Substantial financial and political resources utilized in supporting African Union forces were all deemed provident courses of action. The conventional analysts tasked with these topics were likely caught in the possibility versus probability dilemma. Conventional analysis sometimes uses these terms interchangeably to either suit a decision-maker's needs or simply by mistake. Misusing these terms causes modeling failures, placing assets and resources at risk.

These failures can be avoided by adopting Alternative Analysis Techniques, which already exist and are well established.[14] This analysis compiles information to question preexisting notions. Alternative analysis includes but is not limited to: key assumption checks, argument mapping, structured brainstorming, devil's advocacy, contingency analysis, high-impact/low-probability analysis, linchpin analysis, signpost/trigger identification, and scenario development. All of these are structured "outside-the-box" techniques aimed at discovering assumptions. For instance, an argument map is a visual representation of an argument that plainly delineates reasoning. An argument box and arrow system depicts propositions and relationships. Mapping helps find both "pro" and "contra" points to the argument because the relationships are clearly drawn out. The purpose of these techniques in Brown

Team is to understand culture and avoid biases. Cultural competency and alternative analysis together create Brown Team's cultural capability.

GROUP MODELING

The second tier of Brown Team is group modeling, a complex web of internal/external group interactions. A group is defined as "individuals that experience the same membership relation with a commonly accepted framework, real or abstract."[15] The U.S. Army has a culture unit known as a Human Terrain Team designed primarily to advise military commanders on cultural nuances. These teams are made up of academics who are not trained analysts and do not conduct scientific research in-country. They use flash polls, focus groups, media monitoring, nodal analysis, and structured/semi-structured interviews to determine the human terrain. Nodal analysis and media monitoring skew perspectives; organizations' nodes and media output do not necessarily represent the population's thoughts. Flash polls are also poor measures because they force correspondents to simplify answers when their true opinions are complex. Focus groups and interviews elicit anecdotal information, which may be useful but insufficient to inform military operations.

Although its name might be deceptive, Fuzzy Logic more precisely and accurately depicts human thought.

Anecdotal information gathering and conventional empirical research may be easier—but not better—ways to capture a population's ideas. Brown Team is designed to evaluate and comprehend human complexity. In 1973 Dr. Lotfi Zadeh developed a scientific system known as "Fuzzy Logic," which can be used to understand human thought. This systematic approach measures information that is complex, imprecise, uncertain, and/or vague.[16] Although its name might be deceptive, Fuzzy Logic more precisely and accurately depicts human thought. Human thought is often reduced to dichotomous responses or opposite extremes of a continuum; for example, former President George W. Bush declared, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."[17] This "black and white" thinking is appropriate in certain contexts; e.g., a tribal leader's wife is either pregnant or not pregnant. This is a true dichotomy. Human beliefs, however, are various shades of gray.

An excellent philosophical example of Fuzzy Logic is Theseus' Ship.[18] The paradox begins with a ship captained by the Greek mariner Theseus. As he sails the Aegean Sea,

over the years parts of the ship must slowly be replaced to maintain good working condition. After one plank is replaced, most would agree that the ship is still the original ship. After a second plank is replaced, most would still agree the ship is original. How many planks does it take before the ship is a different ship? It shows how incremental change results in a wide range of beliefs regarding a concept. Obviously, at some point a sufficient number of planks were replaced to constitute a new ship. There is no definitive answer on which plank reaches the different ship threshold. Each person has a different idea about what constitutes a different ship. If person A thinks the first plank replaced makes it a different ship, person B the last plank, and person C some range in between, these responses are non-standardized. This example illustrates the nuances of human thought; human thought is rarely dichotomous. Fuzzy Logic is capable of measuring these degrees of complexity such as different "ship-ness."

The military has not yet adopted Fuzzy Logic to measure human thought. There are a number of factors that may be responsible. First, this level of cultural understanding was not required. For instance, during the 1991 Gulf campaigns Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, cultural understanding was not necessary to achieve victory. Between 1991 and 2001, military spending was cut and operations continued to focus on conventional warfare. Another factor might be that the Fuzzy Logic field is esoteric and had not previously been available to the military. These skill sets are usually found in academia or other civilian sectors. Without these resources, the military was unaware of the potential for cultural capability or group modeling. And finally, the "soft" sciences have difficulty proving value added to military decision-makers who have limited budgets and are accountable in spending reports. It is easier to see the effects of a missile than shifting "hearts and minds." Overcoming these issues could allow the military to move past conventional models and toward predicting group interactions.

A more sophisticated way to measure human thought is an interval scale. For example, in a survey measuring local hostility to coalition forces, individuals may be asked to choose one response ranging from 1 (not at all hostile) to 7 (very hostile). Interval scales force respondents to select the truest single number; they choose the closest approximation of their opinions from the provided set of responses. The artificial response standardization makes for precise—but not accurate—data. While these scales are more refined than dichotomies, they lack the flexibility of Fuzzy Logic.

Fuzzy Logic measures gradations or degrees to which an individual belongs to/accepts a concept (see Figure 3). Individuals may select one number or a range of numbers

that best depicts their thoughts about coalition forces. Fuzzy Logic responses can also use linguistic or pictorial scales such as Mosby's Pain Rating Scale commonly seen at hospitals. These scales may capture human thought more effectively in certain populations such as children, illiterate people, and sensory-disabled individuals. Linguistic terms must be differentiated and gradual; for instance, participants can respond "Good", "Acceptable", "Slightly Acceptable", "Bad", "Very Bad", or any range therein. Numeric, linguistic, or pictorial scales facilitate data acquisition by providing nuanced responses. Psycho-social research has utilized Fuzzy Logic to study self-identification, social networking, alliance building, state instability, and insurgent rivalries.

For mapping and predicting group dynamics, both primary and secondary sources can generate data. Fuzzy Logic empirical research utilizes specially devised surveys. Primary sources include local inhabitants, hereafter called participants, from whom Brown Team directly collects information. In failing states this type of research may be too slow or too dangerous initially or during spikes in violence. In such instances, secondary sources may generate the desired information. Secondary sources are culturally capable subject matter experts including academics, intelligence assets, analysts, and finally Brown

Team itself. Whether or not local populations are accessible, Brown Team's predictive group modeling can continue to inform decision-makers.

A group model is only as robust as the raw data from which it is derived; therefore, Brown Team's priority is to elicit precise and accurate information. It is essential to note that Fuzzy Logic measures degrees of consensus rather than averages.[19] This type of group modeling affords participants more freedom but also places greater responsibility on the Brown Team to evaluate the information. For example, Brown Team may be tasked to measure tacit support for insurgents in a village. A linguistic scale of "not at all", "some", or "completely" could be used. Answers would be collected in single responses or ranges such as "not at all" or "some" to "completely," respectively. When the participants' data are modeled, results could show that the degree of consensus for insurgent support might be 68 percent at the "some" response. This indicates the majority of the population can shift its support, which is important to leverage in support of the coalition forces.

A numeric example is deciphering how much opium production the population believes is for personal use. This type of information will help focus coalition antidrug policy


Figure 3. Graph A depicts responses on a standardized scale. Graph B illustrated overlapping, fuzzy scale responses.

and actions against exporters rather than all opium growers. A numeric scale of 1 gram to 2,000 grams per year allows participants to gauge how much is considered personal use production. Lethal doses of opium calculated on a yearly basis amount to 720 grams per year. Group Modeling might find a degree of consensus that 1 to 670 grams of opium production is considered personal use. Therefore, the majority of the population can agree that producers above this range are exporters and should be treated as such based on coalition policy.

It is vital that decision-makers view Brown Team's group modeling as a system of scientifically informed probabilities.

Pictorial examples are relatively easy to use and also require strong statistical proof that they are effective tools for measuring the degree of consensus. The Mosby Pain Scale found at hospitals represents degrees of pain by facial expression. At one extreme is a smiley face while the other has a crying face. The Kwikpoint Afghan Visual Guide used by the U.S. Army also features this scale. Participants are free to indicate one face or a range of faces that accurately and precisely depicts their pain level. It is vital that decision-makers view Brown Team's group modeling as a system of scientifically informed probabilities. The results show actual degrees of human thought.

Group modeling is the heart of Brown Team. The interwoven analytic, empirical, and modeling results reveal a system of relationships—a fabric from which informed decisions can be made. This unique ability sets Brown Team apart from any other organization or military branch. With Brown Team's ability to measure degrees of human thought and inform decision-makers, it has the flexibility to minimize rivalries, develop allies, and neutralize destabilizing external forces in an uncertain operational environment.

PREDICTION AND IMPLICATIONS

By utilizing Cultural Capability and Group Modeling, Brown Team can develop predictions. As stated earlier, group modeling does not make predictions but instead describes relationships among populations. To determine which variables predict a given outcome, statistical regressions can be performed. Previous research indicates that regressions may be performed on Fuzzy data sets such as nuanced human thought.[20] These statistical procedures determine the predictive capabilities of one or more independent variables on a dependent, or outcome, variable. In the previous example, the dependent

variable was village support for insurgents. Independent variables tested might include family size, annual income, and accessibility of weapons. Results of statistical regressions might show annual income strongly predicts insurgent support whereas family size and weapon accessibility are not significant predictors. These findings indicate that villagers with greater annual income are less likely to support the insurgents and they should not be the focus of coalition forces in the village.

The relationship between annual income and insurgent support is now established but one further step is required. Correlation is not causality. Because it is impossible to experiment with isolated villages, alter their annual income, and create insurgents, the next step looks at discovering causality using non-empirical research. Anecdotal information or interviews might be useful in sanity-checking the regressions and pinpoint the type of questions Brown Team should ask to discover causality. The reason underlying fewer wealthy villagers supporting insurgents may be a coerced tax imposed on the wealthy or insurgents using wealthy homes as safe houses. Causal relations can be found only by on-the-ground research, i.e., soldiers or researchers going to wealthy families to find out their issue with insurgent activity.

Prediction, which is the heart of Brown Team, can be accurately and precisely conducted using regression analysis.

Regression analysis as a predictor helps to identify target population subsets like the wealthy villagers where coalition forces should emphasize more. Once causal relationships are established, decision-makers have a thorough understanding of the situation, as human thought, prediction of key variables, and finally the real-life issues facing the population. Prediction, which is the heart of Brown Team, can be accurately and precisely conducted using regression analysis.

COLLECTIVE COMMONS

Brown Team is another tool available to decision-makers; it can effectively work together with MISO, CA, and MI. The dividends of Brown Team enrich the aforementioned organizations for human terrain mapping and influence. Ideally, these synergies would cross institutional boundaries and individual organizations would incorporate Brown Team. For the U.S. Army Red Teams, the HUMINT collectors, MI analysts, CA operators, and the coalition information operations (IO) campaign in counterinsurgency operations,

Brown Team inclusion is essential to generate sophisticated analyses within a complex cultural system. Brown Team can propel other military branches beyond reactive analysis to predictive analysis. If the listed organizations were to incorporate Brown Team, then the products (e.g., analysis and predictions) can be used in a collective commons, which is a common property and open access resource. Organizations would be free to add or remove relevant information for their operations. With time, the collective commons would be full of regional, cultural, and tactical tools for counterinsurgency. This is not the same as lessons learned because Brown Teams and other branches would be adding to a database, making analysis faster and richer. The collective commons can:

1 Expand synergies among Brown Team, MISO, CA, MI, and other organizations.
2 Create a group of experts dedicated to delineating interactions between soldiers and civilians as well as different civilian groups.
3 Explain motivation to "win hearts and minds" within different populations.
4 Group model for long-term predictions about internal/external human thoughts.

5 Provide a more thorough view of external actors (Green Team) on the Brown, Red, and Blue Teams.
6 Disseminate predictions about potential implications and take advantage of opportunities at the secondary and tertiary levels.

The collective commons is the pinnacle of Brown Team and provides a cultural foundation for concluding war.

While all organizations maintain operational databases, Brown Team should be the central depository because its analysis and modeling are most robust and in-depth cultural understanding should be available to all branches. The collective commons is the pinnacle of Brown Team and provides a cultural foundation for concluding war.

Shrewdly concluding wars via politics in uncertain operational environments requires a thorough understanding of the relationships involved and developing

tools to understand those relationships. Brown Team is a cultural analytic tool based on cultural capability, group modeling, prediction and implications, and collective commons. It can predict the impact of regional operations and the response of the local inhabitants. There is an increased demand for advanced analysis that addresses group behavior and the cultural framework surrounding group decisions.[21] Brown Team can fulfill the growing need that COIN operations can no longer ignore.

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Ms. Maya Cameron earned BA degrees in music, French language, and literature in 2006 from Southern Methodist University. She received an MM in piano pedagogy from Texas Christian University in 2009. She pursued a second graduate degree at TCU, an MS in kinesiology and performance psychology, in an effort to expand the scientific knowledge base for musicians. Her primary research interest is performance anxiety. Ms. Cameron has been a featured presenter at various universities and professional organizations in the U.S. She currently resides in North Carolina, where she is an active clinician, instructor, and performance enhancement consultant.

Seeking Cultural Intelligence in the Desert's Shifting Sands While Keeping Peace Along the Berm

by COL (USA, Ret) William C. Spracher

SUMMARY

It is practically a given nowadays that intelligence is a vital element in the conduct of effective peace operations. However, that has not always been the case. Traditionally, the United Nations has been wary, if not downright paranoid, about the collection and processing of intelligence compromising its role as an objective and impartial arbiter of international conflict. Information sharing has always been performed in UN missions, but in a constrained fashion that emphasizes openness and transparency while downplaying any sort of "national business" that might be perceived to give advantage to one side of the conflict over the other. This caution about intelligence has political overtones too and, in a UN mission where the political objectives have been difficult to achieve while the military aspects have been successful, any information-gathering operations naturally become politicized. This article offers the perspective of a former U.S. peacekeeper required to keep his military intelligence expertise muted in the interest of pursuing a political goal that ultimately proved elusive. Serving on a small UN observer mission in Western Sahara was a rewarding experience, but one that was unnecessarily difficult and at times frustrating. Lessons learned from that short tour two decades ago are applicable to future peace efforts, especially in light of recent fast-paced events in North Africa which are contributing to the fragility and instability of the region.

INTRODUCTION

In early 1992, I veered sharply from my career as an Army intelligence officer and Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for Latin America to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Northwest Africa, a continent to which I had never traveled before or since. I spent six months as the commander of the 30-man U.S. contingent of United Nations military observers (UNMOs) to the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known as MINURSO from the acronym constructed by its French or Spanish titles (e.g., in Spanish, *Misión de las Naciones Unidas para el Referendum en la Sahara Occidental*). That was my "night job," so to speak, my day job serving as Military Advisor to the Force Commander of MINURSO, at first a Canadian major general and upon his departure a Peruvian major general who moved up from deputy to be interim commander. Subsequent to my departure and later that of the Peruvian, a Finnish lieutenant general stepped in. Force Commanders are hired as individuals under contract, not tied to their national affiliations. In the case of MINURSO, it proved difficult finding a quick replacement for the Canadian, who had organized the mission from the very start and had personally orchestrated all the administrative and logistical arrangements at UN Headquarters (UNHQ) in New York City.

Despite the notoriety of the long-festering conflict that spurred the establishment of MINURSO, and the involvement of a handful of European countries, the existence of this relatively small UN mission was not well known internationally at the time and probably is even less so today, though it has continued to maintain the peace in that sparsely populated area for two decades. MINURSO can justifiably be considered a "well-kept secret." Because it is comprised mainly of individual UNMOs (hailing from 26 countries at the time I was there), and not battalion- or brigade-sized units conducting large-scale peace operations that tend to produce highly publicized casualties, it garners little international attention. Yet, MINURSO is notable as the first truly post-Cold War UN mission, in that it was the first time in the international organization's history that all five permanent members of the UN Security Council provided military representatives to a PKO at the same time.[1] Always in the past, political and military rivalries had prevented the United States, the Soviet Union, and China from agreeing to participate simultaneously if one or more of the others had decided to join.

To put it more bluntly, UNPKO involvement had heretofore been unduly politicized. That is not to say that the UN has overcome politicization entirely, just that in 1991 its members were able to put politics aside in the interest of coming together to try to facilitate a political solution to a long-standing regional problem. The relative altruism of the 1990s was short-lived, however. We are again witnessing Russian and Chinese intransigence over U.S.

and other Western efforts to levy UN sanctions on an oppressive Syrian regime that is murdering innocent civilians on a daily basis in an attempt to remain in power.

Of course, the Soviet Union did not last long after deciding to send troops to Western Sahara. The so-called Commonwealth of Independent States soon supplanted the USSR, and many of the soldiers which had been sent by Moscow suddenly had new allegiances and some faced uncertainty and unemployment upon returning home. Several with whom I came in contact queried me on whether I could help them get a permanent job with the UN at the end of their tours, during which they were enjoying a healthy stipend of $110 per day, an unheard of amount back in mother Russia.

There have always been obstacles to intelligence playing a key role in UNPKO.

The purpose of this article is to explore some of the challenges of providing intelligence support to MINURSO, in the hope of gleaning some lessons learned that can be applied to the PKO process in general. There have always been obstacles to intelligence playing a key role in UNPKO, some of which have been mollified over the years, as I was delighted to learn while involved in an iteration of the International Intelligence Fellows Program (IIFP) hosted by the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) in Washington. The theme of that March 2008 IIFP was "Perspectives on Multinational Intelligence Cooperation for Peace Operations," and I was privileged not only to participate as a plenary session moderator and small group discussion facilitator but also to be the editor of the written proceedings.[2] As former editor for NDIC's Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, I am often asked to provide such support to the College's Center for International Engagement, which organizes the IIFP.

Similarly, I am able to capitalize on intelligence lessons learned by teaching a class to international officers participating in the Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program (CSITP) at the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC), which like NIU falls under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). For the CSITP, on a quarterly basis I teach a class titled "Intelligence Engagement: Valuing Cultural Differences." The CSITP and the IIFP are the only programs at DIA offered to intelligence officers of foreign countries. In both cases, I have used my UN experience as an intelligence officer to develop case studies and illustrative examples of the challenges in providing intelligence support to peace operations. Invariably, a few of the students have UNPKO experience too, particularly in the IIFP where the

uniformed "Intelligence Fellows" are more senior and have more years of active duty service than do the lower-ranking intelligence officers in the CSITP (there are also civilians in both groups). A not uncommon pattern is for a junior officer from a country to attend the CSITP, then return home to get more advanced field intelligence experience, sometimes deploying with a UN or other category PKO, and a few years later return to DIA to attend the IIFP.

THE POLITICAL PANORAMA

A UNPKO, despite involving military forces and equipment, is ultimately a political mission, in that its purpose is to help resolve a political dispute. For a UN mission to be introduced, both parties to a conflict must agree to allow the UN to intervene and both must cooperate with UN civilian and military elements to make the mission a success. UN personnel are constantly reminded that they must adhere to the watchwords of the organization, which are to be "objective and impartial." Yet, it is difficult for a UN peacekeeper to remain completely objective and impartial when one party to the conflict is not as cooperative with UN officials as is the other.

In the case of MINURSO, the party that the U.S. government has long considered one of its most reliable and moderate Arab allies—Morocco—only reluctantly allowed the UN to enter what it considered its southern-most province, the territory of Western Sahara. It was hoping that, once a referendum was held to determine the future of the territory, shored up by the military protection and stability provided by MINURSO's Military Force, the outcome would legitimize in a *de jure* manner the reality Morocco had forged *de facto*, i.e., that Western Sahara would become a full-fledged, integral part of that nation.

On the other side is the POLISARIO (*Frente Político Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y Río de Oro*). This is predominantly a group of Bedouins legitimized by the formation of a political entity known as the Sahrawi (Saharan) Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which had been formally recognized by a number of nations around the world, most of them generally socialist and supportive of insurgent groups fighting for their independence. SADR officials had set up a government in exile, not located anywhere in the two-fifths of the Western Sahara landmass where POLISARIO forces were fighting but far away near the small city of Tindouf in remote western Algeria. MINURSO maintained a liaison office in Tindouf to cooperate with Algerian forces in that area and to maintain communications with SADR leadership in its tent encampment in the desert.

During several visits with the SADR President, who spoke fluent English, Spanish, French, and Arabic, and other POLISARIO leaders, I quickly concluded they were much more cooperative with the UN than were their Moroccan counterparts. The POLISARIO wanted the UN to help resolve the dispute, figuring that was its only chance for success because it would never be able to defeat the Moroccans militarily. POLISARIO officials also were extremely friendly toward the U.S. personnel with whom they came in contact, knowing that pleasing the sole remaining superpower in the world following the end of the Cold War was a potential pathway to achieving the legitimacy and credibility on the world stage they had long sought.

Consequently, while MINURSO, and particularly U.S., peacekeepers were treated royally by the POLISARIO, they were viewed with ambivalence, and at times outright disdain, by the Moroccans. The latter, though they would never admit it, routinely "bugged" MINURSO officials' hotel rooms in Laayoune, the territory's dusty capital city, and rifled through their belongings when they were absent from their rooms. The Moroccans also conducted such perfidious schemes as trucking in fake "Bedouins" from the southern areas of Morocco proper and setting them up in tent cities outside Laayoune, purporting they were returning Western Sahara settlers who were eligible to vote in the referendum on the future of the territory. Ironically, the Moroccans would not allow MINURSO officials to visit these camps and talk with the inhabitants, which is a blatant violation of UN rules that demand both sides to the conflict provide unimpeded access to all areas.

More recently, in October 2011, a group of Saharan protesters set up an encampment in a small town 15 kilometers southeast of Laayoune, with the intention of making socio-economic demands on the Moroccan authorities. The varying number of protesters is believed to have reached over 15,000 at one point. Yet, MINURSO was unable to monitor the situation in the large camp of over 6,000 tents because Moroccan authorities impeded its access. Attempted military patrols and visits by UN security and police personnel were prevented or stopped on several occasions. The Moroccans' argument was that the UN mission should not interact directly with the population on what was considered a purely internal, social matter. Subsequently, Moroccan security elements forcefully disbanded the encampment in November, allegedly resulting in significant destruction of personal property and several unverified casualties. In addition, violence erupted in the coastal city of Dakhla on September 25, 2011, when a peaceful demonstration of Western Saharans was attacked by Moroccan civilians, backed by security forces. The official Moroccan account of the episode differed greatly. As tensions mounted, the UN Special Representative for

Western Sahara visited Dakhla and met with a range of officials and tribal leaders, followed by the temporary deployment of a political affairs officer to the area in November to assess the situation.[3]

Serving in MINURSO was, for the average American military person unconcerned with international politics, a truly schizophrenic experience.

Returning to the situation in 1992, the result was U.S. peacekeepers having to appear to be objective and impartial when one party was cooperative and wanted them to be there while the other party barely tolerated them and wished they would go home. Paradoxically, the U.S. peacekeepers' superiors in Washington continued to stick to their traditional mindset, i.e., that the Moroccans were the "good guys" supportive of U.S. activities in the Middle East and elsewhere while the POLISARIO were the "bad guys" allied with radical, destabilizing elements around the world which attempt to topple the regimes of long-standing U.S. allies. Serving in MINURSO was, for the average American military person unconcerned with international politics, a truly schizophrenic experience.

Not only was it difficult for the U.S. representatives to maintain their objectivity, for the representatives from the other Security Council members it was complicated for other reasons. The limbo status of Western Sahara reflected the political failure of post-colonialism. The historical parent of Western Sahara—Spain—had dropped the ball when it came to preparing the former Spanish Sahara (originally called *Río de Oro*, or River of Gold) for independence. When the dispute heated up in the early 1970s (though it had simmered for decades) over what status the phosphates-rich territory should have after Spain gave it up, Morocco and Mauritania laid claim to huge swaths of the territory. Morocco displayed by its highly publicized and symbolic "Green March" in 1975 that it deemed itself the rightful ruler of the territory, claiming centuries-long historical and ethnic ties, bolstered by a partially favorable decision from the International Court of Justice that same year. Spain had essentially left the territory in 1976 and washed its hands of it, leaving it up to the other parties to fight it out. Mauritania, much less powerful and populous than Morocco, remained in the fray for a few years but pulled out and renounced all claims in 1979 due to its inability to sustain warfighting financially.

Spain's treatment of that portion of its colonial legacy differed greatly from its claim to two small territories it holds on to even to this day along the northern coast of

Morocco on the Mediterranean Sea—Ceuta and Melilla. The status of those two enclaves in the midst of Moroccan soil contrasts with the British territory of Gibraltar across the sea effectively surrounded on all sides by Spain.[4] Spain would like the UK to relinquish Gibraltar but sees no parallel in Morocco's desire for Spain to relinquish Ceuta and Melilla. I discussed this paradox in an article I wrote nearly three decades ago at the time Spain was being considered for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[5] Bottom line is Spain could have prevented the bloodshed and the festering wound of Western Sahara had it done its part in preparing its former colony for independence and used its standing as a respected European nation to mediate the claims to the territory by Morocco and Mauritania, both former French dependencies. Spain was in a better condition to wield its influence 2-3 decades ago than it is now, as it is one of the "Eurozone" states along the Mediterranean undergoing economic crisis. Its respect in the community is flagging presently.

> *[A]ll five of the Security Council members, which also had the largest contingents of UNMOs in the MINURSO Military Force, had hang-ups that affected their ability to be totally objective and impartial.*

Not only Spain, which understandably has never participated in MINURSO, though it did send a delegation to visit and assess the political-military situation during my tenure there, but other European nations have had difficulty in playing an objective role in resolving the Western Sahara dispute. None of the five powers represented on the Security Council was viewed by the parties to the conflict as completely impartial. The UK had its Gibraltar hang-up; France was the former colonial parent of Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria; Russia had its long-standing reputation as a perpetrator and supporter of socialist independence movements; and China was viewed as yet another autocratic and sometimes abusive power which also had little PKO experience at the time. In addition, China has a credibility problem regarding its handling of Tibet. It could be argued that all five of the Security Council members, which also had the largest contingents of UNMOs in the MINURSO Military Force, had hang-ups that affected their ability to be totally objective and impartial.

Further complicating the political texture of the mission was the fact that, during my tenure, there was no single civilian chief of mission. The titular head was the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, a

Pakistani, who was rarely on-site and only visited occasionally. The man who ran the civilian side of the mission on a daily basis was the Chief Administrative Officer, an Algerian, viewed with suspicion by most of the other MINURSO officials as being at best ineffective and aloof, and at worst incompetent and downright corrupt. The official at UNHQ in New York to whom the Force Commander answered was the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, at first the British veteran Marrick Goulding, who was succeeded by Kofi Annan, the soft-spoken man from Ghana who was later to rise to Secretary General. The Secretary General during my stint with MINURSO was the Egyptian bureaucrat Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Another indicator of the political inadequacy of MINURSO was the fact that a UN Police Force, deemed crucial for enforcing the law and preventing violence during a future referendum and its prior identification process, existed solely on paper. For a while, a Chief of Police from Uruguay who had been appointed was on site, but he had no force to lead. Because the politics of implementing an actual referendum, or even setting the terms of reference for one, were so slow to develop, nobody had even attempted to organize a Police Force or arrange for countries participating in the mission to send police personnel. Essentially, the only aspect of MINURSO that seemed to work well was the Military Force, which performed its job with conviction in keeping the peace while the political fits and starts continued. It is worthwhile again to review the name of the mission, which emphasizes a "referendum." For two decades, however, that goal has proven elusive. Though militarily successful, MINURSO has been singularly unsuccessful politically.[6]

THE MILITARY PANORAMA

The Military Force of MINURSO has been in place since the initial contingents of staff and UNMOs were deployed to Western Sahara in September 1991 as a result of Security Council Resolution 690, dated April 29, 1991. This was nearly three full years after the parties to the conflict, by then only Morocco and the POLISARIO, had agreed to a ceasefire on August 30, 1988, to go into effect in September 1991. During that tense interim period, fighting had broken out again. The indefinite time between the implementation of the ceasefire and the final results of the referendum was called the "transitional period," and no one expected it to continue nearly as long as it has.

The stark symbol of the military standoff in Western Sahara is the approximately 1,200-mile-long "Berm" that splits the territory from northeast to southwest and extends even further along the boundaries of Morocco with Algeria

to the north and Morocco with Mauritania to the south. Built by Morocco out of sand, wood, concrete, steel, and any other fortifiable material available in differing sections of the desert, for years it has been occupied by about four-fifths of the Moroccan Army. Morocco occupies the 60 percent of the territory west of the Berm and no one really occupies the sparsely populated 40 percent of the territory to the east where scattered POLISARIO elements hold sway.

MINURSO at the time I was assigned there operated ten teamsites, five on the Moroccan side of the Berm and five on the POLISARIO side. The mission oversaw these widely dispersed sites utilizing three sector headquarters. The Northern Sector was headed by a French colonel, the Central Sector by a Russian colonel, and the Southern Sector by a Chinese colonel. The other two Security Council members, the UK and the U.S., had contingents headed by colonels too, the former's senior officer serving as the Force's Chief of Operations and the latter's serving as the Military Advisor to the Force Commander (yours truly). A Canadian colonel headed the Liaison Office in Tindouf, Algeria, which as mentioned previously maintained contact with the POLISARIO leadership. There was some limited rotation of senior officers in these posts, usually for personal convenience reasons and not for the purpose of making the mission more productive. The

national contingents these senior personnel headed were normally deployed for a period of six months, but there was some variance depending on the country and its national policy on overseas deployments.

This distribution of senior officers reflected what was referred to as "national balance," which UNHQ insisted upon in its international missions. The same was true of the teamsite leaders, all lieutenant colonels or their equivalent, who were chosen not based on their leadership skills or military acumen but solely according to their rank and national origin. The result was, as might be expected, less than comparable quality across all portions of the mission. There were totally incompetent teamsite leaders and similarly inefficient directors of staff sections at Mission HQ in Laayoune whose deputies (often from NATO countries) actually did most of the real military work and ran the show. Furthermore, some national contingents were participating in their first-ever UN military missions (e.g., Peru, though it had participated in the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai, which is not under MFO auspices), and hence had little experience and expertise in peacekeeping.

Logistical resources were summoned by the UN wherever they were available at the cheapest price. Air support assets of the mission were all castoffs of the old Soviet/

Warsaw Pact empire. There were two AN-26 utility transport aircraft (roughly equivalent to a U.S. C-130) still bearing Romanian colors and insignia and flown by Romanian contract pilots, four Mi-8/17 "HIP" helicopters flown by Russian contract pilots (allegedly civilians, but nearly all had previous military aviation experience, some of them in the abortive occupation of Afghanistan), and one fixed-wing Yak-40 passenger aircraft for VIPs still sporting Czechoslovakian colors and flown by Czech contract pilots (the division of the country into the Czech and Slovakian Republics was ongoing at the time). Although the aircraft were not particularly sophisticated by U.S./NATO standards, they were rugged and performed well in the desert sand and wind. Nevertheless, safety and security standards maintained by the aircrews were fairly sloppy. It was only due to the managerial expertise of the Chief Air Support Officer, a Canadian of Ukrainian descent, and his Canadian logistical team that the disparate patchwork of airframes held together and functioned as well as it did.

THE MARGINALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence was seriously and deliberately downplayed within MINURSO, if not outright marginalized. In fact, the word "intelligence" itself was hardly ever used. The equivalent of a unit intelligence section (called S2, G2, or J2 within the U.S. Army/joint commands with which I was familiar) was a very small office of about 3-4 personnel headed by a major from a West African nation with the title of Chief Information Officer. The CIO was responsible for overall security of sensitive documents and for the evaluation of spot reports covering violations of the peace agreement. More than anything else, his office correlated statistics.

To state that intelligence support to the overall PKO mission was cautious is an understatement. Even though UNMOs during their patrols were required to report

Figure. Map of Western Sahara
Source: UN Secretary General's Report

violations by both sides to the conflict, their reports were not considered "intelligence" per se. It was not a case of one side being observed cheating on the regulations, which would make the other side look better. It was merely a case of incident reporting, a tally of discrepancies that was used later by MINURSO officials to chastise the high-ranking officials of both sides. There was little, if any, effort to conduct any sort of strategic analysis of trends and patterns or to try to fit what was transpiring on the ground into any overall international framework. Intelligence was essentially an *ad hoc* enterprise, and no one wanted to be accused of collecting information on anyone else in this "gentleman's enterprise."

UNMOs of most participating countries were given some limited pre-deployment training on what to expect upon arriving in-theater. For us U.S. types, there was some sketchy instruction on the political, economic, social, and demographic characteristics of the region in which we were to operate (could be considered "cultural intelligence" in current parlance), but nothing that would allow us to know how to collect, analyze, and disseminate the "information" we would be collecting. Personally, I had the advantage of having studied the Western Sahara dispute as a case study during an international law course taken in graduate school about 15 years earlier, and thus knew the history and the players. However, the majority of the members of my contingent, representing the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, were totally new to the issue and the area, having merely volunteered for UNPKO duty with little advanced preparation.

Once on-site, UNHQ tried to shut us off from national intelligence sources that might allow us to do our jobs more effectively. For instance, UNHQ issued an INMARSAT satellite telephone (considered fairly high-tech in 1992) to the mission, but we senior officials were prohibited from using it to call anyone in our national capitals for the purpose of supplementing our informational base or getting perspectives on what was going on elsewhere in the region. UN officials frequently lectured us on the distinction between conducting UN business and "national business," and the latter was strictly off limits. Because of the dearth of attention being paid to our mission and coverage by the media, the only newspaper that was available and seemed to cover the mission even sporadically was *Le Monde* out of Paris. Of course, this PKO stint occurred before the proliferation of personal computers and access to the Internet.

There were quite a few so-called "national visits" in which senior officials from the defense ministries of some of the larger participating countries would show up to check on the status of the mission and the health and morale of their assigned UNMOs. I recall specifically arranging such

visits for officials from Russia, France, the Netherlands, and the U.S., and there were probably others. Ironically, spending time in such "show and tell" tasks usually was considered as merely a distraction by the majority of UNMOs, who proudly appreciated their independence and "distance from the flagpole" while on assignment, and it took away from the time and effort needed to make the international mission more productive and efficient. Granted, intelligence was one of the scarce resources that could have enhanced the mission considerably had it been on anyone's radar screen and had it not been treated as such a touchy subject.

Even though I was a trained intelligence officer and could have contributed significantly to the enhancement of the informational side of the mission, I was in essence advised to "step back" and not let the U.S. military presence be perceived as too heavy-handed. Much of my advice was given in private to the Canadian and Peruvian generals, and I usually maintained a comfortable distance from the Chief Information Officer and his activities. In fact, it was strongly suggested by our supervisors in Washington (the current operations and mobilization directorate under the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans) that I not wear Military Intelligence branch brass on my desert camouflage uniform and instead wear General Staff insignia, since I would be working on the international staff of a division-level equivalent commander (2-star). I did so and probably was not recognized as an intelligence officer by the rank and file of MINURSO personnel, but no doubt the Moroccan secret police knew well my identity and affiliation based on the information I had provided upon arrival.

SITUATION AS OF MID-1992

I departed Western Sahara at the end of July 1992, at a time when the focus of the U.S. government was beginning to shift away from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, in the wake of the demise of communism, to ethno-religious unrest in the Balkans. An Islamist coup attempt in nearby Algeria also commanded some attention, as that country was in the designated "mission area" of MINURSO, as were also Morocco, Mauritania, the Canary Islands portion of Spain (used mainly for logistical support and personnel R&R), and Western Sahara itself. Soon thereafter, U.S. peacekeepers would begin to be deployed in larger numbers to tense places like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. UNPKO experience would spread rapidly throughout the U.S. armed forces, especially as entire combat units would be sent overseas under UN mandate and not just a small handful of individual military observers.

My U.S. contingent of UNMOs left the desert feeling somewhat optimistic about a political settlement and the positive role we had played in keeping the peace while the politicians negotiated (some would say they only dithered). We had succeeded in getting through six months of continual patrolling with no fatalities, except that shortly before our stint ended a U.S. Air Force major was wounded when his patrol vehicle encountered an antitank mine on the eastern side of the Berm. He received a Purple Heart for injuries sustained, mainly severe contusions and bruises, while his "patrol buddy," an Italian Army captain, nearly lost an eye to flying shrapnel. Fortunately, both survived and recovered fairly quickly. Landmines were a constant threat to MINURSO peacekeepers, as thousands had been laid over the decades, principally by the Moroccans, and wherever their emplacement was carefully planned and maps kept of their location it was of little benefit because in the desert winds and shifting sands the mines moved around easily.

Even though I returned to Washington, was debriefed by the Army ODCSOPS staff, prepared efficiency reports and award recommendations, and was congratulated on how well my contingent had conducted its under-appreciated mission, I was disturbed that these positive views were not shared by many lawmakers on Capitol Hill. I was summoned on two occasions to meet with a couple of Congressmen and staffers from several different committees who grilled me about why the U.S. was participating in such an ambiguous (and ambivalent) mission in the first place and why the political progress in resolving the dispute was glacially slow. I was surprised to learn that Congress was so unsettled about the use of U.S. troops in peacekeeping missions; no one had ever briefed us on the domestic political agenda of our own nation before or during our tour. We were sent overseas in a total vacuum as to whether our mission was supported at home, if in fact it was even widely known.

I had previously concluded that Americans were clueless about what we were up to in Northwest Africa; few even knew we were there. I quickly learned that, although Congress was not clueless, it was nonetheless ignorant in many ways and misinformed as to why the executive branch had decided UNPKO was a good thing to do. I had to explain to several pushy Congressional staffers that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines dutifully carry out the military missions assigned them by their superiors and do not question the political motives. In other words, I had to lecture them on civil-military relations, something well

within my capacity as I had taught U.S. and comparative politics at a federal service academy and had an advanced degree in international relations with a concentration in political science.

Despite Congress' misgivings about U.S. participation in MINURSO, U.S. contingents continued to be sent there for many more years, quietly doing their duty without much public exposure or fanfare. In my opinion, the U.S. impact was significant. Although not performing a leading role in terms of holding the Force Commander or Deputy Commander position, we did have the largest contingent of UNMOs at the time (Russia and China were not far behind in numbers). I am convinced the reason I was selected to be the Military Advisor to the Force Commander, rather than being given one of the sector command positions, was to keep U.S. advice and assistance "close to the flagpole" where it would be evident not only to civilian technocrats on the UN staff but also to visiting national delegations and, most important, to Moroccan and POLISARIO leaders. In addition, I was a Spanish speaker, and thus could communicate well not only with the Peruvian Deputy Force Commander/Acting Commander but also with POLISARIO representatives, while the Canadian Force Commander could deal with Moroccan officials in French.

The Canadian general, of French Canadian heritage, had tried in vain to have French designated as the official working language of the mission. However, he was overruled by UNHQ, which told him it would have to be English because that was the only way a sufficient number of countries could be recruited to send observers and staff officers. The result was a solid presence of NATO and European Union countries, which were represented by excellent English speakers who were also competent military tacticians and strategists. Even the Force Commander's executive officer, a Tunisian, fit the bill because he was a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, spoke English fluently, and was well-versed on U.S. military procedures. No doubt some of these representatives were intelligence officers, but this identity was kept under the table for the reasons outlined earlier. Interestingly, I easily found out that the Russian colonel who commanded the Central Sector, and had earlier headed the Liaison Office in Algeria, was an intelligence officer (assigned to the GRU, or Soviet armed forces main intelligence directorate). He was very loquacious and openly boasted of his exploits.

CURRENT SITUATION AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

MINURSO continues to this day, and the referendum around which the mission was designed still has yet to be held. I will not go

into all that has changed in the two decades since I first stepped foot on the desert sands in early February 1992. An update on the mission today can be found in the annual Secretary General's report.[7] The purpose of this article is to examine intelligence support to PKO; it is not to discuss politics. Reportedly, the UN has overcome some of its bias and prejudice regarding the use of intelligence and has come to realize that intelligence is a vital element in military planning and operations. That does not mean, however, that the UN trumpets its use. It is still kept somewhat behind the door, and remarks made by several experts during the March 2008 IIFP at NDIC illustrate that fact.

A former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for Europe, Ambassador Richard Kauzlarich, discussed the role of politics in resolving conflict: "When dealing with conflict resolution, the entire international community should deal with it together. Politics is one of the most important aspects of resolving conflicts and, particularly since the attacks on 9/11, conflict resolution has changed considerably."[8] Another expert, Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein, took this approach a step further: "The role of intelligence is essential, but very problematic, in a peacekeeping or stability mission. In such missions, there are no true 'intelligence people.' Even if one has qualified and trained intelligence officers on staff, intelligence is always difficult to perform in a peacekeeping mission because the host country often suspects information is being collected on them; this makes it difficult to recruit and protect sources."[9] I would interject that, in the case of MINURSO, Morocco considered itself the host country because it believed it was the rightful owner of Western Sahara, controlling three-fifths of the territory and the major population centers. Not only did Morocco feel the UN was collecting intelligence on it; Morocco was waging an active intelligence and counterintelligence campaign itself against the UN.

Michael Dziedzic, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel and former researcher at National Defense University's think tank, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, now with the U.S. Institute of Peace, asserted that "intelligence is a decisive element in peace operations, though the UN still has an unfavorable attitude toward intelligence in peacekeeping operations. The UN prefers to use the term 'analysis' instead of 'intelligence' to allay some of the bias against the concept of intelligence. The idea of analysis is more acceptable to groups within the UN that object to the employment of intelligence in peacekeeping."[10] Dziedzic goes on to state that the role of intelligence is consistently shaped by four "drivers" which fuel conflict: (1) political grievances; (2) means of violence; (3) lawless rule; and (4) the fact that "conflict pays," which is often overlooked.[11]

French Lt Col Yves Durieux, who works for the Office of Military Affairs at UNHQ, announced to the IIFP Fellows that the UN now has a Situation Center. This Center "collects information from around the world but is not a true intelligence center. It serves mainly to provide situational awareness of changing events."[12] Durieux, who has extensive PKO experience himself, suggested a list of elements needed by a mission for it to truly use "intelligence": (1) having trained personnel in G2 positions; (2) having a "common" system and common approaches; (3) having standardized structures and an overarching mission architecture; (4) in-depth production versus military personnel on a 6-month rotation; (5) military production versus political assessment; (6) strategic versus tactical/operational intelligence; (7) UN/DPKO and mission views versus troop contributing countries' priorities; (8) classification of key documents; and (9) exchange of information.[13] I dare say that MINURSO, during my time there, reflected almost none of these elements.

> *Rudner has coined a term he calls "ECPOSOC," which stands for economic, political, and social intelligence. This suggests my earlier discussion on the need for "cultural intelligence," somewhat lacking for those of us who were deployed to Western Sahara.*

One of the most widely respected intelligence scholars in the world is the Canadian Martin Rudner, who made a presentation to the IIFP on intelligence capabilities in stability operations. He observed: "The UN conducts information-gathering, i.e., intelligence, but the organization will not use the term."[14] He went on to argue that a foremost priority in a PKO is intelligence support to force protection. I could not agree more; yet, this is not the type of intelligence gathering that is controversial in UNPKO because it tends to be inward-looking, not outward-looking. He added that "the architecture for information and intelligence should be structured so that military and political elements are incorporated into the political-military assessment."[15] However, in the case of the U.S. no such assessment was ever done, at least not on my watch. Rudner insisted it is very important to sustain interoperability and commonality with coalition partners, but this was not achieved in any comprehensive manner in MINURSO. Finally, Rudner has coined a term he calls "ECPOSOC," which stands for economic, political, and social intelligence. This suggests my earlier discussion on the need for "cultural intelligence," somewhat lacking for

those of us who were deployed to Western Sahara. Of all the disciplines of intelligence, the best for finding excellence in ECPOSOC, argued Rudner, is HUMINT (human intelligence), and I could not agree more.[16]

HUMINT is what most experts have lamented has been in short supply since 9/11. The reason the U.S. and its allies were unsuccessful in locating Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders for so long is that traditional technical means of intelligence collection do not serve well in an unconventional conflict against a highly mobile enemy. Concern about al Qaeda has spread to northern and western Africa, where a dangerous offshoot known as "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM, sometimes written as AQMI) has been growing and spreading. It is believed that AQIM grew out of the insurgency in Algeria, and recent manifestations of its efforts have spread to Mauritania and Mali.[17] The latter in particular has experienced a tremendous upheaval of its government. Such unrest has the potential to set back even further a political resolution of the conflict in Western Sahara, in which Morocco has presented a plan for autonomy while the position of the POLISARIO is that the territory's final status should be decided by a referendum on self-determination that includes independence as an option.[18]

Not long ago, U.S. President Barack Obama dispatched his counterterrorism advisor John Brennan to Algeria to look into the situation in northern Africa and the potential for Islamist elements to infiltrate governments and make trouble. Evoking the question of possibly building on the persistence of extreme conflict with the image of Palestine and Western Sahara, Brennan stated that these conflicts have not been resolved due to disagreements. And these conflicts should not allow extremists to take advantage of the situation. He asserted while in Algiers, "The United States is committed to reaching mutually acceptable solutions and an environment of peace and stability."[19]

The recent conflagrations of massive anti-regime protests, first in Tunisia, next in Egypt, then in Libya, and now spreading to non-African countries such as Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and Iraq, point out the need for the U.S. to get out in front of what is going on in these volatile societies. Social networking appears to be the channel of choice for spreading the flames. In U.S. defense parlance, we would refer to this as a form of "information warfare," or at least "information operations." Washington seems to be behind in getting smart on what is really happening, who exactly is responsible, and what the end results will be. The role of intelligence is clear here. We need more of it, and we need more of the right kind of it. We will not be afforded the luxury of having twenty years to participate in a slow-moving peace process. Events are proceeding at an extremely fast pace on multiple fronts, and neither the

cautious U.S. government nor the bureaucratic United Nations is prepared to react in a decisive way. Still, the UN Security Council is aware of the seriousness of the situation in the region. A recent report observed, "In the wake of the Arab Spring and the Council's pronounced support, on the one hand for democracy in the region, and on the other hand its concerns about the destabilising [British spelling] impact of the fallout from Libya…the situation of Western Sahara has acquired a degree of urgency in the minds of some Council members."[20]

> *What we see ahead of us will put a premium on conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and intelligence, and they all have to be integrated together.*

What we see ahead of us will put a premium on conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and intelligence, and they all have to be integrated together. Unlike in Western Sahara where a good-fit prescription for intelligence support to resolve conflict has not yet been found, the rapidly emerging schisms in the region demand that intelligence take a more prominent, if not leading, role, and soon.

Notes
[1] William C. Spracher, "Peacekeeping Challenges in MINURSO," panel presentation at NDU/INSS symposium, "The United Nations and Peace Operations," Washington, DC, August 1992.
[2] William C. Spracher, ed., *Perspectives on Multinational Intelligence Cooperation for Peace Operations*, proceedings of International Intelligence Fellows Program, National Defense Intelligence College, March 2008. NDIC has since been redesignated as NIU (National Intelligence University), effective August 2011. It now has a broader mission and mandate from the Director of National Intelligence, offers more degrees/courses to a larger and more diverse student body, and supports the educational needs of the entire U.S. national Intelligence Community, plus selected international intelligence entities.
[3] United National Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,* April 5, 2012, pp. 1-2.
[4] William C. Spracher, "The Geopolitics of Gibraltar," *Military Review*, July 1983.
[5] William C. Spracher, "Spain in NATO: The Value of the Alliance's Newest Member," *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 1982.
[6] "Western Sahara Conflict: A Reversal of Power," *Morocco Board News Services*, April 16, 2010. http://www.moroccoboard.com/news/34-news-release/965..., accessed January 24, 2011. See also Frank Ruddy, former Deputy Chairman, Referendum for Western Sahara (MINURSO Peacekeeping Operation), statement given at Virginia Commonwealth University, December 1, 2005.

[7] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara*, April 5, 2012.

[8] Ambassador Richard Kauzlarich, "Conflict Resolution," in *Perspectives on Multinational Intelligence Cooperation for Peace Operations*, p. 35.

[9] Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein, "The Challenge of United Nations Missions," in *Perspectives on Multinational Intelligence Cooperation for Peace Operations*, p. 41.

[10] Michael J. Dziedzic, "The Role of Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations: Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments," in *Perspectives on Multinational Intelligence Cooperation for Peace Operations*, p. 193.

[11] Ibid., p. 194.

[12] Lt Col Yves Durieux, "UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations – Office of Military Affairs," in *Perspectives on Multinational Intelligence Cooperation for Peace Operations*, p. 256.

[13] Ibid., p. 268.

[14] Martin Rudner, "Intelligence Capabilities for Stability Operations (MOOTW)," in *Perspectives on Multinational Intelligence for Peace Operations*, p. 114.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., p. 115.

[17] Ali Haidar, "Western Sahara: The Persistency of the Conflict Aggravates the AQMI Threats," *Sahara News*, January 21, 2011. See also Ahmed Charai, "Ending Al-Qaeda in North Africa," *Hudson New York*, January 20, 2011, and Ahmed Mohamed, "Mauritanian army arrests al-Qaida suspect," *wtop.com*, Febraury 5, 2011.

[18] "Next Round of UN-Backed Western Sahara Talks Slated for Next Week," *UN News Service*, January 14, 2011.

[19] "The Senior Adviser to Obama, John Brennan in Algiers," *News on Wall*, January 17, 2011.

[20] Security Council Report – Western Sahara, April 2012, p. 2.

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Welcome Back, Harvard ROTC:
Case Study in the Complexities of Understanding Culture

by Dusty Bates Farned

INTRODUCTION

Intelligence work, by its very nature, requires a high degree of cultural understanding. Few things, besides Coca-Cola, mean the same in every region of the world. Yet, just as much as we must possess cultural intelligence of foreign adversaries (and allies), we must also know the complex cultural underpinnings of our own institutions. A great domestic example in the realm of civil-military relations was the recent repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) and the subsequent return of Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) at Harvard University.[1] As this case also illustrates, culture is not stagnant but subject to change.

OFFICIAL RETURN OF HARVARD ROTC

The year 2011 marked the end of a law banning homosexuals from openly serving in the United States military.[2] In an unusually active lame duck session at the end of 2010, the Democratic-controlled U.S. Congress, about to be replaced by a newly elected Republican majority, repealed DADT.[3] Two days shy of a 17-year existence, DADT was the result of a compromise between then-President Bill Clinton and the Department of Defense.[4] Immediately upon repeal, Harvard University announced that ROTC would be welcomed back on campus.[5]

In retrospect, it is easy to view the standoff between Harvard and the military as simply a combination of law and politics. In other words, each side merely held opposite stances on the justifications for, and the legality of, a matter of public policy. Not only has much of the media framed the standoff this way, but even Harvard's post-announcement actions seem to make this statement.[6]

However tempting it may be to construe the standoff between Harvard and the military as simply political and legal, extenuating circumstances suggest there was more at play.[7] For instance, ROTC was part of the privatization era of the 1990s, and since that time has not even been operated directly by the U.S. military.[8] Nothing is more indicative of a deeper conflict, however, than the sheer fact that Harvard ROTC was welcomed back due to the repeal of DADT, yet booted off campus due to protest of the Vietnam War.[9] While it may be easiest to describe along political terms—"liberal" academia versus "conservative" armed forces—the conflict between one of the world's most elite universities and one of the world's most elite militaries should also be remembered as cross-cultural.

BRIEF HISTORY OF 40-YEAR STANDOFF

About War

The four decades of ROTC's official absence from Harvard's campus may best be described as a "standoff" because at no point was there much negotiation between the parties. The most direct communication in years occurred only recently when Harvard University's current president, Drew Gilpin Faust, welcomed ROTC back,[10] and Admiral (USN) Mike Mullen, outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, promised in response to help ensure its return.[11] Yet, 1969 and 2011 are not the appropriate bookends to explain this standoff in terms of a cultural conflict. For that, one needs to go back much further.

On July 3, 1775, George Washington took command of the first national fighting force, the Continental Army, in Cambridge Common—a beautiful park bordered by Harvard Yard on the southeast, Harvard Law School on the northeast, and Radcliffe College (now part of Harvard) to the southwest.[12] During the Civil War, 136 Harvard men lost their lives fighting for the Union, prompting the university to dedicate a building, Memorial Hall, to their sacrifice.[13] In 1916, the same year ROTC was established by the U.S. government,[14] Harvard became one of the first universities to establish such a program, with over 1,000 students joining and subsequently parading "through Boston in a show of national 'preparedness.'"[15]

In total, about 11,000 Harvard men would serve in World War I, this time prompting the building of Memorial Chapel.[16] Countless others, men and women affiliated with Harvard, would go on to serve in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq, and smaller but

equally dangerous and deadly battlefields around the globe. In fact, no school except the service academies themselves has produced more Medal of Honor recipients than Harvard University.[17]

Yet, in the midst of unprecedented personal service, there was a 40-year standoff between two of the most powerful institutions in the world. Writing for the Harvard student newspaper in 1968, David Bruck, now a law professor at Washington and Lee University, predicted:

> Although a large-scale move by American colleges to abolish ROTC is extremely unlikely, it is possible that many colleges will adopt a policy of dissociation [sic] similar to the one approved by [Boston University] faculty this winter. This possibility arises partly from the increased sensitivity to the military presence on the campuses since the beginning of the Vietnam war. But that is not the most important factor, and even without the war it is quite conceivable that many colleges would soon be trying to reduce the official status enjoyed by ROTC on their campuses.[18]

This student article may be the first documentation that the standoff between Harvard University and the U.S. military was more than a political dispute. Still, one year later in 1969, Harvard students protesting the Vietnam War invaded University Hall and set fire to the Marine Corps classroom, prompting the administration's decision to ban ROTC.[19] When the war ended, ROTC did not return to campus.

About Gay Rights

As a sign that the war issue never entirely went away, in 2009 Faust gave each graduating ROTC cadet a copy of Michael Walzer's book *Just and Unjust Wars*.[20] However, there was a vast shift in the Harvard ROTC standoff from war policy to the policy against homosexuals in the military. Although it is not known exactly when this shift occurred, it is clear that it predated DADT.

President Bok's cautious welcoming also extended directly to recruitment efforts by the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Having been promoted to university president only two years after the violent 1969 protests, Derek Bok was instrumental in the decision to allow Harvard students to participate in the cross-town ROTC program at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).[21] President Bok's cautious welcoming also extended directly to recruitment efforts by the U.S. Intelligence Community.[22] Still, in 1990 Bok wrote to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney "to protest the policy of excluding homosexuals from the Reserve Officers Training Corps."[23] Bok was outraged at a situation where a Harvard student was dismissed from the MIT program and ordered to pay back his ROTC scholarship simply because he had said he was gay.[24] In a *Harvard Law Review* note five years earlier, which argued that "courts should recognize homosexuality as a suspect classification under the equal protection clause," reference was made to a case where "I am a lesbian" without proof of conduct was not adequate grounds for dismissal of an ROTC cadet.[25]

In 1992 a writer for the MIT student newspaper proclaimed, "Clinton's victory on Tuesday may render moot the controversy over the ban on gays in the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), a Department of Defense policy which conflicts with MIT's nondiscrimination policy."[26] Having signed up for ROTC at the University of Arkansas prior to leaving for England as a Rhodes Scholar, President Clinton had some first-hand knowledge of the program.[27] However, despite campaign promises to end sexual orientation discrimination in the military, Clinton reluctantly accepted DADT in 1993.[28]

Larry Summers, who served under President Clinton as Secretary of Treasury, became president of Harvard in 2001.[29] Not long after his arrival, Harvard's Kennedy School of Government ended a 15-year training program designed specifically for high-ranking intelligence personnel.[30] Still, as president of Harvard, Summers openly advocated for the recognition of ROTC.[31] For the first time in a long while, students were allowed to list ROTC as an activity in their yearbook, and Summers not only allowed a Harvard Yard commissioning ceremony for graduating ROTC cadets but also addressed them each May as keynote speaker.[32] The fact his tenure was cut short by faculty strife probably acknowledges two reasons why Harvard's ROTC ban was not lifted on Summers' watch. As observed by Paul Mawn, a retired naval officer and chair of the Advocates for Harvard ROTC, during "the 1970's it was the undergraduates who got everything started. Now, it's flipped. It's the tenured faculty who are very vocal."[33]

Indeed, besides shifting from the Vietnam War to Gay Rights, there was a shift in the second half of this standoff from student to faculty opposition. Between Harvard presidents Bok and Summers, there was Neil Rudenstine. Before entering academia, Rudenstine had been an Army officer who obtained his commission through the ROTC program at Princeton. When asked what he thought of the newly enacted DADT policy and its consequences for

Harvard ROTC, Rudenstine responded, "I have a view. I just think I really ought not to preempt the faculty."[34]

CHARACTERISTIC OF CULTURAL CONFLICT

Not long after the passage of DADT, Congress passed the Solomon Amendment, threatening schools which deny access to military recruiters with the loss of federal funding.[35] Before being confirmed to the Supreme Court, it should be recalled that former Harvard Law School Dean Elena Kagan faced some of her toughest questioning on this exact issue.[36] Indeed, opposition to the Solomon Amendment seems to have been strongest among the legal academy, with some even noting a cultural element beyond its "policy and politics."[37] Yet, the underlying reason for the Solomon Amendment, schools which were denying access to the military, highlights the existence of a cross-cultural conflict.

Dennis Jacobs, Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, has noted that "banishment of ROTC from campuses has a counterpart in the longstanding effective ban on recruiting in the law schools."[38] In a harsh rebuke recently delivered at Cornell Law School for what he termed the "legal elite" and their longstanding and unappreciative ways toward the military, Judge Jacobs observed:

> No doubt, many people feel strongly about the policy called "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." But the cultural alienation I am talking about long pre-dates that Clinton-era policy. It has been said that if you remember the Sixties, you weren't there. But I was there, and I can tell you. This aversion to the military became a strong current in liberal and academic feeling during the Vietnam War; since then it has not abated—or even developed. Young people who have been indoctrinated to feel revulsion for all things military have been taught to attribute that reflex to the policy on gays. As a feeling, it is no doubt sincere, and opposition to the policy is fairly argued, and unresolved. But... [t]he policy on gays in the military is an Act of Congress, and compliance by the military is required by the principle of civilian control. Hostility to the military itself on the ground of its compliance with this Act of Congress is (especially on the part of lawyers) simply ignorant.[39]

Richard Posner, the influential Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has also addressed the issue of elite law schools shunning military recruiters.[40] Posner described an amicus brief justifying this practice, and filed in the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of Harvard Law School professors, as bordering on "absurd"[41] and

"frivolous."[42] Posner also noted "the possibility that by discouraging military recruiters the schools are helping to perpetuate a conservative military culture."[43]

Whether one agrees with Judge Jacobs or Judge Posner, these views represent ones which are difficult to find in academic literature—which is exactly the point.[44] Moreover, despite framing it as being about the Vietnam War, then Gay Rights, parties on both sides of the Harvard ROTC standoff have described it as "complex"[45] and "complicated."[46] Such comments might be expected in a cross-cultural conflict, a situation often steered by biases based on both quantifiable and unquantifiable differences.

Actual Differences

Clearly there are real differences between a school and a military, but measuring those observations is much harder. Using the work of Geert Hofstede, a prominent cross-cultural expert, might provide the most promising guide.[47] Both Hofstede's indexes for High & Low Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) and High & Low Power Distance (PDI) may be used to represent individual or institutional modes of functioning.

A key question in determining tolerance for uncertainty is whether that individual or institution believes rules can be broken.

A key question in determining tolerance for uncertainty, contended Hofstede, is whether that individual or institution believes rules can be broken.[48] Other traits for High UAI include: "More emotional resistance to change... Hierarchical structures of organizations should be clear and respected... Company rules should not be broken."[49] Traits for Low UAI include: "Less emotional resistance to change... Hierarchical structures of organizations can be by-passed for pragmatic reasons... Rules may be broken for pragmatic reasons."[50]

While most organizations have a chain of command, none is probably more hierarchical or rule-adherent than an armed force. As Judge Jacobs noted, strict hierarchy exists because "military culture has evolved for reasons indispensable to its role and mission: to prevail in conflict, at risk of life."[51] Yet, while clear differences exist in Uncertainty Avoidance, the cultural difference between Harvard University and the U.S. military may be even clearer in Hofstede's Power Distance Index.[52]

Geert Hofstede defined High PDI and Low PDI as "syndromes," in part, to indicate the "undesirability" of

being at either extreme.[53] For Low PDI, Hofstede noted, "Inequality in society should be minimized."[54] For High PDI, Hofstede noted, "There should be an order of inequality in this world in which everyone has his rightful place; high and low are protected by this order."[55] Equally telling is what Hofstede contended about methods of social change. Low PDI players believe: "The way to change a social system is by redistributing power."[56] High PDI players believe: "The way to change a social system is by dethroning those in power."[57]

Although the military clearly has a higher Power Distance Index than Harvard, Hofstede never suggested either mode is inherently stronger or weaker. Both sides of the Harvard ROTC standoff, for example, included some of the most powerful parties in the world—institutional and individual. In fact, a key to understanding the conflict's present truce may be recent overlap of some of these influential parties.[58]

Perceived Differences

As much as the 40-year Harvard ROTC standoff included parties which were different, it also included parties which likely thought of themselves as even more different.[59] According to two recent Harvard alumni who participated in ROTC at MIT, for no elective credit toward their degrees and at the expense of anonymous donors, "the student handbook caution[ed] students against joining ROTC, remarking that the program is 'inconsistent with Harvard's values.'"[60] Since the early 1970s, when ROTC lost its official presence at Harvard, it has been observed that academia, particularly elite institutions, lean more greatly to the left.[61] Still, elite institutions may not be as liberal as many might assume.

Today's military is more progressive than many likely presume.

On September 11, 2008, Barack Obama, former editor-in-chief of the *Harvard Law Review*, in his campaign to become commander-in-chief of the U.S. military said that ROTC should be welcomed back.[62] The crowd at Columbia University cheered.[63] In 2009 *The Washington Times* reported a similar sentiment: "Polls conducted on campus by Advocates for Harvard ROTC show the majority of students support ROTC and also feel pride in seeing fellow students in uniform."[64] Additionally, as Judge Posner suggested while critiquing opposition to military recruiters at Harvard Law School, "[t]he vast majority of the students at the elite law schools become corporate lawyers and defend the mores and values of giant corporations. Revolutionaries they are not."[65]

In the same light, today's military is more progressive than many likely presume. For instance, it has been argued that the U.S. Supreme Court "was powerfully influenced" by an amicus brief regarding similar military policy when it decided to uphold affirmative action at the University of Michigan Law School.[66] Moreover, while three Air Force professors recently argued DADT only existed because a "culture has been created and defended by a military hierarchy increasingly out of touch with majority American culture,"[67] few lobbied harder in recent years to repeal DADT than the military itself. As reported by *The Washington Post*, repeal only "came after an exhaustive Pentagon review found that allowing gays to serve openly posed a 'low risk' of disruption and that a large majority of troops expected that it would have little or no effect on their units."[68] Indeed, with the end of DADT also comes the recognition that the U.S. military accepted homosexuals long before the overwhelming majority of American states.[69]

CONCLUSION

In the "vigorous" dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court case *Romer v. Evans*, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, it was argued that gay rights is a "cultural debate" for which the "Court has no business...."[70] At least one legal scholar vehemently agreed.[71] Yet, *United States v. Virginia*, decided the same year as *Romer* and ordering Virginia Military Institute to accept women (the last military school to do so), clearly demonstrates that even domestic conflicts may be political, legal, and cultural.[72] The fact that some at Harvard still refuse to welcome back ROTC, post-Vietnam and post-DADT, only furthers this reality.[73]

Notes

[1] Elisabeth Bumiller, *After War Room, Heading Ivy League Classroom*, N.Y. Times, 6 May 2012, A1, *available at* http://nytimes.com/2012/05/07/us/retired-military-officers-teaching-at-ivy-league-schools.html (noting "In the last year, Harvard, Yale and Columbia have invited R.O.T.C. back to campus after banning the program during Vietnam, citing the end of the military's ban on openly gay troops as the reason. The hiring of retired military officers as teachers in the Ivy League is part of the same evolution."). *See also* Jay Lindsay, *Harvard to let ROTC back on campus*, Huffington Post, 3 March 2011, http://huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/03/harvard-to-let-rotc-back-_n_831115.html (noting that while Harvard was the not the only university to ever ban ROTC, it was the first to make an "about-face" after the repeal of DADT).
[2] "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 10 U.S.C. § 654.
[3] Ed O'Keefe, *'Don't ask, don't tell' is repealed by Senate; bill awaits Obama's signing*, Wash. Post, 19 December 2010, *available at* http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/18/AR2010121801729.html.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Tracy Jan, *After 4 decades, Harvard opens door to ROTC*, Boston Globe, 21 December 2010, *available at* http://articles.boston.com/2010-12-21/news/29305139_1_rotc-students-harvard-graduate-student-army-rotc.

[6] After announcing the return of ROTC, Harvard still waited nine months until the exact day DADT became ineffective to officially welcome back the first ROTC unit. Mary Carmichael, *ROTC back at Harvard after 40 years: Navy is first branch to have privileges restored*, Boston Globe, 21 September 2011, *available at* http://articles.boston.com/2011-09-21/news/30185408_1_harvard-students-drew-faust-harvard-university-president.

[7] Nathan Harden, *Sen. Brown Bashes Harvard's ROTC Ban*, Nat'l Rev. Online (24 September 2010, 1:24 PM), http://nationalreview.com/blogs/print/247733 (concluding sarcastically: "Of course, we all know Harvard's ban has *nothing* to do with the sanctimonious anti-militarism of the liberal elite who run the place.").

[8] Laura A. Dickinson, *Public Law Values in a Privatized World*, 31 Yale J. Int'l L. 383, 392 (2006) (referencing the contract still held by Military Professional Resources Incorporated). One year prior to ROTC's privatization, another university which also disagreed with DADT used ROTC's status as a government "agency" as reason *not* to boycott it. *See* David Folkenlik, *Johns Hopkins rejects calls to disband ROTC*, Baltimore Sun, 1 June 1995, *available at* http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-06-01/news/1995152049_1_johns-hopkins-university-army-rotc-program-richardson (reporting "[s]everal trustees and officials had resisted even the prospect of kicking off campus an agency of the federal government, which annually provides Hopkins with more research dollars than any other university in the nation").

[9] Joseph Kristol and Daniel West, *Harvard and the Marines: Why not give our officers the best education?* Op/Ed, Wall St. J., 8 April 2009, *available at* http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914908909399225.html.

[10] Jan, *supra* note 5 (reporting also that President Faust's father was "a decorated World War II veteran...").

[11] Elias J. Groll, *et al.*, *Barriers Remain for ROTC Return*, Harv. Crimson, 19 November 2010, *available at* http://thecrimson.com/article/2010/11/19/rotc-military-harvard-dont/.

[12] Peter Young, George Washington's Army 3 (Osprey Publishing, 1972).

[13] Drew Gilpin Faust, *Remarks at the Harvard ROTC Commissioning Ceremony* (4 June 2008), transcript *available at* http://harvard.edu/president/remarks-harvard-rotc-commissioning-ceremony-2008.

[14] David I. Bruck, *A History of ROTC: On to Recruitment*, Harv. Crimson, 14 March 1968, *available at* http://thecrimson.com/article/1968/3/14/a-history-of-rotc-on-to/.

[15] Faust, *supra* note 13; *see also* Kristol, *supra* note 9.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Brian MacQuarrie, *For ROTC students, an awkward limbo: Cadets would welcome formal recognition by Harvard*, Boston Globe, 5 October 2010, *available at* http://boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2010/10/05/at_harvard_rotc_students_in_an_awkward_limbo/.

[18] Bruck, *supra* note 14.

[19] Kristol, *supra* note 9.

[20] Drew Gilpin Faust, *Harvard ROTC Commissioning Ceremony* (3 June 2009), transcript *available at* http://harvard.edu/president/harvard-rotc-commissioning-ceremony-2009.

[21] Derek Bok was Dean of Harvard Law School from 1968 until 1971, when he then became university president for the first time (serving in that capacity again on an interim basis between Summers and Faust). In 1973 Harvard College accepted Chuck DePriest, great-grandson of Oscar DePriest (born in Florence, AL, but moved to Chicago, IL, where he became the first black elected to Congress post-Reconstruction). DePriest wanted to participate in ROTC, but this option no longer existed for Harvard students. As told in an essay by a fellow Harvard student also denied the ability to participate in ROTC, DePriest eventually won the support of President Bok, who "quietly approved the MIT arrangement." Brian W. O'Connor, *Harvard's ROTC pioneer*, MetroWest Daily News, 12 April 2009, *available at* http://metrowestdailynews.com/opinion/x1096997451/OConnor-Harvards-ROTC-pioneer.

[22] In 1979 non-fiction author Ernest Volkman wrote an article for *Penthouse* magazine about President Bok's crusade to end intelligence recruitment at Harvard. Ernest Volkman, *"Spies on Campus,"* Penthouse (October 1979), *available at* http://theunjustmedia.com/cia/spies%20on%20campus.htm. Only a few months prior, as described in the article, Bok himself testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on this exact issue. *See* Morton S. Baratz, Derek C. Bok, & ADM Stansfield Turner, *Universities and the Intelligence Community*, 65 Academe 15 (February 1979).

[23] Tamar Lewin, *Harvard Protesting R.O.T.C. Rejection of Homosexuality*, N.Y. Times, 15 June 1990, A17, *available at* http://nytimes.com/1990/06/15/us/harvard-protesting-rotc-rejection-of-homosexuality.html.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification*, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1287 & 1295-96 (1985)(evaluating *Matthews v. Marsh*, 755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985)).

[26] Hyun Soo Kim, *ROTC Ban on Gays Faces Reversal under Clinton*, The Tech, 6 November 1992, *available at* http://tech.mit.edu/V112/N55/rotc.55n.html.

[27] *Bill Clinton's Draft Letter*, Pub. Broad. Serv., 12 February 1992, http://pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/clinton/etc/draftletter.html.

[28] Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, *A Ban By Any Other Name: Ten Years of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"* 21 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 403, 408-409 (2003-2004).

[29] Bella English, *Controversy at Harvard*, Boston Globe, 29 September 2007, *available at* http://boston.com/news/globe/living/articles/2007/09/29/controversy_at_harvard.

[30] Stephen Marrin, *Training and Educating U.S. Intelligence Analysts*, 22 Int'l J. Intel. & CounterIntelligence 131, 134 (2009), *available at* http://tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850600802486986#tabModule.

[31] English, *supra* note 29.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] *Ibid.*; *see also* http://advocatesforrotc.org/harvard.

[34] Marion B. Gammill, *Rudenstine Speaks on ROTC: President says Faculty to Review Compromise Plan in Fall*, Harv. Crimson, 30 July 1993, *available at* http://thecrimson.com/article/1993/7/30/rudenstine-speaks-on-rotc-pany-decision.

[35] 10 U.S.C. § 983.

[36] James Oliphant, *GOP turns up the heat: High court nominee Elena Kagan's first day of questioning has some tense moments*, Los Angeles Times, 30 June 2010, *available at* http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/30/nation/la-na-kagan-hearings-20100630.

[37] Elvia R. Arriola, *Democracy and Dissent: Challenging the Solomon Amendment as a Cultural Threat to Academic Freedom and Civil Rights*, 24 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 149, 151 (2005).

[38] Dennis Jacobs, *The Military and The Law Elite*, 19 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 205, 207 (2009).

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] Richard A. Posner, *A Note on Rumsfeld v. FAIR and The Legal Academy*, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[44] *See also* Nathan Glazer, *Academic Freedom in the 1990s*, 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 479, 487-88 (1996)(following a lengthy discussion of a Harvard faculty report opposing ROTC based on DADT, Glazer, a long-time Harvard professor, concluded: "Only one faculty member, Harvey Mansfield, made a lengthy and reasoned presentation in opposition to the report, and two others spoke against parts of the report. Where were the others?, one wondered.").

[45] Claire M. Guehenno, *ROTC Guard to Greet Faust*, Harv. Crimson, 11 October 2007, *available at* http://thecrimson.com/article/2007/10/11/rotc-guard-to-greet-faust-a.

[46] cjm13, *Kagan, Harvard, and ROTC*, Harv. Republican Oasis blog (11 May 2010), http://harvardrepublicans.wordpress.com/2010/05/11/kagan-harvard-and-rotc.

[47] Geert Hofstede, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED VALUES (SAGE, abridged ed., 1984).

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.

[49] *Ibid.*, p 132.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] Jacobs, *supra* note 38, p. 206.

[52] Hofstede, *supra* note 47, p. 65.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] Hofstede, *supra* note 47, p. 65.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] First, it was President Summers who went from the White House to Harvard (and then back to the White House). *Controversy at Harvard*, *supra* note 29. Next, it was President Obama, who went from Harvard to the White House. *Service Nation Presidential Forum, infra* note 62. Although they have not received much credit in the press, Summers and Obama were clearly as instrumental in finally ending the Harvard ROTC standoff as any other two individuals.

[59] *Navy ROTC Returns to Harvard*, Navy News Serv. (3 March 2011, 8:08 PM), http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=58916&page=2 (alluding to the issue of biases, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus contended: "Together, we have made a decision to enrich the experience open to Harvard's undergraduates, make the military better, and our nation stronger. Because with exposure comes understanding, and through understanding comes strength").

[60] Kristol, *supra* note 9.

[61] Glazer, *supra* note 44, p. 483.

[62] *Service Nation Presidential Forum*, Rubenstein Communications, 11 September 2008, at 88, http://servnat.3cdn.net/faa64b554678d74662_yum6bhf3w.pdf.

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] Brenda Lee Hurley, *Harvard, ROTC face off*, Wash. Times, 13 August 2009, *available at* http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/13/harvard-rotc-face-off.

[65] Posner, *supra* note 40, p. 56.

[66] Thomas H. Lee, *University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of Diversity*, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2301, 2303-04 (2004) (highlighting that in *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), former military leaders argued both the academies and ROTC programs "sought diverse student bodies because students will automatically become leaders of the armed forces upon graduation and a diverse officer corps is essential to national security").

[67] L. Michael Allsep, *et al.*, *The cultural war within: Reconciling policy change and military culture after DADT*, Armed Forces J., February 2011, *available at* http://armedforcesjournal.com/2011/02/5363912/(intriguing essay regarding the past and future of gay rights in the military).

[68] O'Keefe, *supra* note 3.

[69] *See* Charley Keyes, *Military chaplains allowed to perform same-sex marriages*, CNN (30 September 2011), http://cnn.com/primary/_s48zlS-iLuJd0NmUKI.

[70] 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996); while slow to classify the ROTC debate as such, some liberal academics have also described the debate over homosexual rights as a "cultural war." *E.g.* Nancy D. Polikoff, *Ending Marriage As We Know It,* 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 201, 228 (2003).

[71] Jeremy Rabkin, *Partisan In The Culture Wars*, 30 McGeorge L. Rev. 105 (1998).

[72] 518 U.S. 515 (1996); *see also* Daniel de Vise, *Academic Progress, a Slow Cultural Shift at 170-Year-Old VMI*, Wash. Post, 15 October 2009, *available at* http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/14/AR2009101403971.html.

[73] Samuel Coffin, *A University without a Country?* Harv. Pol. Rev. (10 April 2012, 11:09 AM), http://hpronline.org/harvard/a-university-without-a-country/.

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Understanding Legislative Oversight of the CIA

by Allen Miller

In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.

— James Madison, *Federalist* No. 51

T he virtually unlimited power of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been a chief concern for citizens and politicians alike since the Agency's creation in 1947. Many prominent leaders in the scholarly community have argued that the CIA has overstepped its founding vision by participating in operations that have been harmful to national security and international relations. However, perhaps the most puzzling phenomenon is the tenuous legislative oversight of the CIA. Many have asked where the Congressional limits are to check this very powerful agency? The answer to this question is a complex web of rationale. Congress has failed to limit the power of the CIA because of poorly designed legislative initiatives, resource shortages, political self-interests, pervasive problems with partisan politics, and sincere concerns of the effects oversight could have on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the CIA.

This article will introduce the discussion of tenuous legislative oversight with an examination of two specific examples where Congressional negligence led to CIA fiascos: Cuba in the 1960s and the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The essay will then highlight several major violations of the CIA as outlined by the Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee—dispelling several alternative causal arguments for the lack of oversight. The article will then begin discussion of the true causes for a lack of oversight with an in-depth analysis of legislative initiatives and their flaws. The lack of human and physical resources available to Congress will be the next causal mechanism outlined. This argument will be followed by an examination of the self-interest of politicians at the individual level and partisan conflict at the aggregate level. The article will then argue that the final reason why Congress has limited its oversight of the CIA is out of a genuine concern that too much

micromanagement could lower the standing of the Agency and reduce its effectiveness. It will conclude with a discussion of the steps that need to be taken to increase legislative oversight of the CIA and prevent future fiascos.

In outlining the goals of this article, it is also important to note the limitations of what is discussed. It will not, for example, make any references to other potential checks on the CIA such as the judicial branch, the executive, media, or public opinion—although it could very well be argued that these mechanisms are underutilized checks on the CIA as well. Nor will the essay argue that the CIA has always failed. In fact, there are some cases where the CIA has been an invaluable resource to the nation as a whole. The article will focus solely on the lack of legislative oversight, with the goal of providing causal mechanisms to explain this phenomenon.

There are numerous examples throughout American history where the CIA has gone beyond its scope as an intelligence agency to the detriment of U.S. national interest. The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion in southern Cuba during John F. Kennedy's presidency is one of the oft-cited examples of CIA-led endeavors that have resulted in disaster. During this unsuccessful attempt by the CIA to overthrow Fidel Castro's communist regime, CIA-backed Cuban exiles were overwhelmingly defeated by Soviet-supported Cuban forces in just three days.[1] This resulted in public humiliation for the Kennedy administration and further aggravated U.S.-Cuban relations.[2] Even more horrifying than the Bay of Pigs invasion is the often untold story of the U.S. government's Cuban Project, known as Operation Northwood.

Plans for Operation Northwood were drafted in 1962 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman Lemnitzer, in conjunction with top CIA officials. The corrupt plan included provisions to wage a secret and bloody war against U.S. citizens in order to garner support for a war against Cuba. It called for phony terrorist attacks in Washington, DC, slaying of innocent civilians, sinking of Cuban refugee vessels, and even the assassination of John Glenn—the first American to orbit earth.[3] In one section of the proposal Lemnitzer writes, "We could blow

up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo bay and blame Cuba… casualty lists in U.S. newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation."[4] The CIA was clearly capable of deception and harm. Thankfully, Operation Northwood was rejected by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, but there is little doubt that the CIA's involvement in the Cuban Project was anything short of disastrous.[5]

Amy Zegart argues that the CIA failed to adapt to the changing nature of the threat to national security in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Fast forward forty years and the fiascos produced by the CIA continue to persist. In her work "September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies," Amy Zegart argues that the CIA failed to adapt to the changing nature of the threat to national security in the aftermath of the Cold War. Zegart demonstrates that the CIA did not pay enough attention to rising Islamic fundamentalism and threats from terrorist insurgents.[6] This adaptation failure resulted in the loss of thousands of lives on September 11, 2001.

What was even more troublesome was the CIA's aggressive reaction in response to the terrorism of 9/11. First, the CIA made the incorrect claim that the Saddam Hussein-led Iraqi government owned weapons of mass destruction. Second, the detention, torture, and prison treatment of captives at the Abu Ghraib detention facility was a gross infraction of basic human rights. Third, the warrantless eavesdropping by CIA employees on the e-mails, phone conversations, and mail correspondence of citizens was a clear violation of American values.[7] 9/11 and the Cuban Project are just two examples of the many times the CIA has overstepped its bounds, producing a negative end result. These examples simply provide evidence of the continuity of CIA infractions over time.

It could be argued that Congress was unwilling to exercise its full power of oversight because it was either unaware of the CIA's violations and institutional flaws or did not have enough evidence to make a case for cracking down on the Agency and increasing oversight. It could be further argued that CIA personnel were unwilling to cooperate in Congressional investigations and fact-finding hearings— refusing to provide information to Congressional representatives. At first glance, these arguments may all seem like valid causal mechanisms for limited Congressional oversight of the CIA.

Further analysis, however, proves these arguments to be faulty. In 1975 the Rockefeller Commission, headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, published a report on the inner workings of the CIA that was made available to members of Congress. The report detailed a number of large-scale spying and privacy violations.[8] Infractions included intercepting personal mail, keeping dossiers on a large number of American citizens, infiltrating domestic dissident groups, engaging in illegal wiretapping, and improperly assisting other government agencies.[9]

The Rockefeller Commission was followed by the creation of the Church Committee, which was chaired by Senator Frank Church until 1976. The Church Committee published fourteen reports on U.S. intelligence agencies (including the CIA) and their abuses of power. These fourteen reports were considered the most extensive review of the Intelligence Community up to that time.[10] The Church Committee argued that the CIA was guilty of violating its boundaries in particular when it came to dealing with foreign leaders. The common strategy of dealing with antagonistic leaders was assassination. The committee stated that CIA assassination attempts included those against Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, the Diem brothers in Vietnam, and Fidel Castro in Cuba.[11] The evidence available, as demonstrated by these two examples, overwhelmingly points to the conclusion that not only is Congress aware of the CIA's infractions but it has also conducted heavy investigations to verify factually the validity of these infractions.

Moreover, with a few exceptions, the CIA has generally been willing to cooperate with Congress during internal investigations and when asked to disclose information. As Senator Leverett Saltonstall once stated in 1956:

> It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on the subjects which I personally, as a member of Congress, and as a citizen would rather not have.[12]

Incredibly, this sense of reluctance in overseeing one of the most influential agencies in the world is shared by many Congressional members. Understanding this uncanny sentiment and the general lack of Congressional oversight is what this article will explore.

The discussion of legislative oversight begins with a look at the CIA's founding document, the National Security Act. This Act was passed in 1947 and called for the reorganization of the military and foreign policy establishments of the U.S. government.[13] The Act created

the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Resource Board, and the Secretary of Defense.[14] The impetus for the creation of this structure was the anticipation of war. As George Marshall put it in a national radio address to the American people in 1946, "Today, though at peace, [war] trembles on the verge of becoming a probability."[15] The National Security Act was passed to protect American citizens from another Pearl Harbor by improving interservice cooperation and centralizing the gathering of analysis. The CIA was to play a pivotal role in this process as the central source of foreign intelligence.[16]

Yet, the Act's section on the CIA (403-4a) is alarmingly short and vague in its description of the responsibilities of the Agency. The Act states, "It shall be the duty of the agency…to perform other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security."[17] The vagueness of this mandate was very troubling for many of the top leaders at the time of the CIA's creation. "Intelligence" and "national security" were particularly unclear terms. In fact, President Harry Truman privately feared that such wording could allow the CIA to become similar to the Nazi Gestapo—severely restricting individual rights and endangering the democratic process.[18] Although Truman signed the Act into law, his reservations proved to be very accurate. Because of the vague and brief mandate that the CIA was accorded by the National Security Act, it has been able to exploit its directive and increase its size, budget, and scope.

Successive Congressional legislation has often attempted to crack down on the CIA, filling in loopholes in the National Security Act and attempting to reign in the Agency's power. While these legislative initiatives have had a modicum of success, they have been largely ineffective in affecting major reform of the CIA. Amendments and legislative reforms have been piecemeal and patchwork. These legislative crackdowns tend to follow closely on the heels of international fiascos or domestic crises. They tend to lead to fair amounts of public exposure of CIA blunders but do not prompt any significant steps toward attacking the root of the problem or providing a permanent fix to the Agency's tendency to overstep its bounds. Furthermore, the laws passed by Congress to check the power of the CIA are rarely enforced. Some examples of these legislative crackdowns occurred during the Watergate and Vietnam era and the Iran-Contra affair.[19]

Watergate and the Vietnam War increased the amount of pressure placed on Congress to exercise its oversight powers on the CIA during the Nixon administration. The synergy of these two events resulted in the passage of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974.[20]

This amendment prohibited the CIA from using appropriated funds for covert actions unless the President explicitly demonstrated that the action was important to national security and won the approval of no less than eight Congressional committees. These committees include the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)—which have since become Capitol Hill's primary vehicles for overseeing the CIA.[21]

Unfortunately, Hughes-Ryan was not very effective in reigning in the CIA for a number of reasons. Central to its ineffectiveness was the lack of a universally accepted, concrete definition of "covert action."[22] In fact, Congress does not have a constitutional right of operational pre-notification when it comes to covert action. Without such a right there is no real obligation for the CIA to inform Congress of all of its plans and secret operations. Hence, even though the SSCI reviews covert action on a quarterly basis, there is no way for it to know whether it is receiving the most up-to-date information or if it is receiving it in its entirety.[23]

The Iran-Contra affair provides another example of the failures of legislative oversight.

The Iran-Contra affair provides another example of the failures of legislative oversight. During this episode, senior U.S. officials within the CIA agreed to facilitate the sale of arms to Iran in order to secure the release of hostages and to fund Contras in Nicaragua. This scandal was very embarrassing for the CIA and led to a decline in Latin American support for U.S. covert operations.[24] Congress stepped in with the passage of the Cohen-Boren Bill in 1987. This bill again attempted to tighten Congressional notification of CIA-led covert action.[25]

Nevertheless, as with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, once the Iran-Contra affair had settled and faded from the public spotlight, the bill was eventually dropped and not enforced. Further action taken by Congress during the Iran-Contra affair experienced temporary success before being dropped from the extensive enforcement. The Boland and Clark Amendments were able to curtail U.S. assistance to the Contras for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government.[26] However, the constitutionality of legislative prohibitions such as these can be questioned by the President, and he retains the right to override such pieces of legislation.

Thus far we have discussed legislative attempts that have successfully been passed by Congress but poorly enforced, filled with loopholes, or easily circumvented. However, there are frequent attempts to reform or amend legislative initiatives that often do not even make it past the initial committee screenings. One such initiative was an attempt by Georgia Republican Congressman Bob Barr to have an amendment added to the 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act forcing the CIA to turn over details of a spying operation known as Echelon. Barr wanted to guarantee the privacy rights of American citizens as well as exercise Congressional oversight responsibility.[27]

In fact, large media organizations like ABC and Business Week had begun to back Barr and several other House Republicans by reporting on the invasiveness and privacy infractions of Echelon. One ABC news report was entitled, "Is Uncle Sam illicitly reading your email? Listening in on your phone calls? Scanning your faxes?"[28] However, Barr's amendment was dropped from the Intelligence Authorization Act due to arguments made by Vice President Dick Cheney and legal counsel John Yoo that such limits were too restrictive and even unconstitutional. In the early stages of the Amendment's circulation, Yoo made the argument that Constitutional guarantees evaporated in the event of terrorist attacks as the CIA's duty was to protect the nation's security.[29] As a consequence, Barr's amendment was never voted on in either the House or Senate.

The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 amended the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, reducing the number of Congressional committee approvals needed in order for the CIA to undertake a covert operation from eight to two.

Some more recent legislation passed by Congress has actually directly increased the power of the CIA and limited Congressional oversight. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 amended the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, reducing the number of Congressional committee approvals needed in order for the CIA to undertake a covert operation from eight to two. The Identities Protection Act of 1982 further aided the CIA by making it a crime to reveal the identity of intelligence agents. In 1989 the CIA Information Act exempted certain CIA operational files from being declassified.[30] All three of these pieces of legislation were specific measures that limited the legislative branch's ability to flex its oversight power.

Consequently, the lack of Congressional oversight of the CIA can be largely attributed to a failure of legislative initiatives to institutionally curtail the often free-ranging CIA. Since the passage of the vague National Security Act in 1947, Congressional amendments and reforms that were fortunate enough to make it through the bill process and become law have often been piecemeal and aimed at patching up a specific loophole or publicly exposed flaw. Some legislation is even directly targeted at protecting the CIA's power and reducing Congressional oversight. Nevertheless, there are several other explanations why Congress has failed to exercise more oversight of the CIA. We will now turn our attention to these.

One of the primary reasons why Congress is often unable to effectively check the CIA is because is simply does not have the human and physical resources to do so. In the aftermath of 9/11 many political pundits and journalists criticized Congress for not keeping up with the CIA-provided reports that al Qaeda was strengthening its networks within the U.S. prior to its shocking acts of terror. Had Congress done so, many argue that the attacks of 9/11 could have been prevented.[31] However, there is a large body of evidence pointing to the fact that the resources of the two Congressional committees, SSCI and HPSCI, are overtaxed and unduly burdened.

This concept of a shortage of resources is the subject of Mary Sturtevant's work "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: One Perspective." As a former CIA employee and current SSCI staffer, Sturtevant provides a unique perspective on the Congressional/CIA interaction front. She argues that the lack of rigid hierarchy, multiple bosses to whom staffers must report, and shifting agendas of the committees make it difficult for staffers to keep track of their individual investigations while also meeting the high standards of the Congressional members for whom they work. Staffers are also vastly outnumbered—the SSCI has 12 staff members that must review the activities of tens of thousands of agents, personnel, and programs. In addition, staffers' time is extremely limited and fragmented due to other obligations and commitments.[32]

Dana Priest further buttresses this idea that Congressional representatives' resources to oversee the CIA are extremely limited in an article in *The Washington Post*. The proposals and reports filed by the CIA to the SSCI and HPSCI are often very dense and highly technical.[33] With very little outside help, Senators and Representatives are often unwilling or unable to delve into all the details of the literature with which they are provided. In addition, the 8-year term limits that were put in place on members of the SSCI up until 2005 made understanding the CIA and all its webs of secrecy very difficult.[34] As former Senator Mike DeWine of Ohio once said, "The learning curve [on the

SSCI] is the toughest of any committee I've ever served on."[35] Term limits hindered the Senate's ability to adequately understand and effectively limit the CIA's power. Because Congress lacks the physical and human resources to effectively exert oversight of the CIA, the Agency is often left to plan operations and gather intelligence in a largely unchecked manner.

Another reason why Congress struggles to effectively check the CIA is because many Senators and House members are motivated by their own rational self-interests. Amy Zegart argues that the self-interest of politicians centers around elections and campaigns. Many of these politicians view elections as a zero-sum game. As a result, Congressional representatives always bear the interests of their voters in mind when allocating their resources and budgeting their time.[36] Unfortunately, for most Congressional representatives, oversight of the CIA takes a lot of time and effort while adding very little utility to voters back home.[37] Representatives would much rather spend their resources on a constituent project or campaign event than on conducting private investigations on the inner workings of the CIA. Politicians understand that devoting more time to constituents means more dividends in terms of votes when election season begins. And when they do participate in investigations, Congressional representatives are often rewarded more for holding hearings than for taking any sort of corrective action.[38]

William Keller also supports this notion of limited Congressional oversight as a product of political self-interest. Keller demonstrates that the U.S. is currently supporting the global transfer of weapons and technology to less developed nations via the CIA. Belligerent organizations in nations like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, and Oman now have access to arms and may even possess nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.[39] Congressional representatives had the opportunity to stop this transfer of arms and reduce the threat to national security.

The International Cooperation Act of 1991 would have placed limits on U.S. arms transfers to the Middle East. It would have also required the CIA to provide the HPSCI detailed reports on arms transfers to that region. However, the bill was rejected by the House of Representatives 262-159.[40] Keller argues that the reason why this bill failed was because CIA officials warned Congressional representatives of the massive layoffs that would occur in Congressional districts if the sale of arms to these developing nations was curtailed.[41] In other words, Congressional representatives feared that the loss of jobs or rising unemployment would negatively impact them in the mi-term elections of 1992. Thus, Congressional representatives effectively supported arms sales, such as the sale of 72 F-15E ground-attack fighter aircraft to nations like Saudi Arabia, in order to protect their constituents and avoid losing votes in the elections.[42]

For the vast majority of Congressional representatives, political self-interest takes precedence over keeping the CIA in check.

Additionally, many officials are often beholden to special interest groups, which also have a say in electoral outcomes. The arms industry provides insights as to the power of the military-industrial interest. Many companies such as McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Hughes Aerospace exerted a lot of pressure on members of the House to reject the International Cooperation Act. Congressional failure to comply could result in less funding when elections rolled around and support for other candidates.[43] As a result of the pressure placed on them by both voters and special interest groups, Congressional representatives tend to be less prone to care about the ongoing activities of the CIA. For the vast majority of Congressional representatives, political self-interest takes precedence over keeping the CIA in check.

Partisan politics and the decentralized nature of the three branches act as another causal mechanism in the overall explanation of the lack of Congressional oversight of the CIA. Unless Congress passes a bill or amendment that carries the force of law, its actions may go completely ignored. In 2002 the Congressional Joint Inquiry on the attacks of 9/11 issued 19 recommendations to the Intelligence Community to improve intelligence coordination and prevent another terrorist attack on the homeland. However, these recommendations were largely ignored by the CIA and eventually lost in the bureaucratic confusion of the three branches.[44]

Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones argues that the traditional divide between Republicans and Democrats is a particular hindrance to oversight. In the early 1980s when the CIA, under President Ronald Reagan, began to increase in size and scope, many Democrats expressed concerns. However, the Republican majority at the time fully supported almost all of Reagan's efforts to increase the power of the CIA. In fact, when Republican Senator Barry Goldwater SSCI chair he was noted as saying, "I think the CIA is going to find a very cordial reception here."[45] And by "cordial," Senator Goldwater most likely meant a limited, hands-off approach to oversight of the Agency.

Partisan politics also presents a timing problem. Bills and amendments that seek to check the power of the CIA often take a long time to pass and go into effect. The CIA is a

dynamic organization that operates quickly and often under a veil of secrecy. In contrast, Congress is slow and bureaucratic—often requiring multiple levels of legislative screening and partisan logrolling before a bill becomes law.[46]

Once making it through all the bureaucratic entanglements and partisan challenges, legislative reforms must then pass with multiple majorities in both the House and Senate. As a result, amendments and reforms are most often unsuccessful. As Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, put it, "The most powerful interest group in Washington is the status quo."[47] Even after a bill is passed, partisanship can continue to be a hindrance as both parties will often publish different reports on the bill, presenting different interpretations of its meaning and further politicizing the intelligence issue.[48]

The final causal mechanism to be discussed, and perhaps the most debatable one, is the argument that Congress refuses to exercise oversight of the CIA because it is genuinely concerned that doing so would result in a reduction of the legitimacy of the CIA and its effectiveness as an intelligence-gathering organization. Michael Reisman and James Baker argue that many members of the House and Senate, including members of the SSCI and HPSCI, believe that Congressional micromanagement could prevent the CIA from reaching its full potential and impede intelligence operations if oversight went too far. As a result, Congress is often hesitant to pass legislation that checks the CIA.[49] Jeffrey-Jones concurs with Reisman and Baker, arguing that many Congressional representatives have the perception that the CIA is the world's first democratically-sanctioned secret service. Consequently, Congress does not want to do anything to threaten its stability or ability to command respect. Doing so could harm national security and affect the safety of American lives.[50]

This argument of Congressional concern with the standing and effectiveness of the CIA is the weakest of the arguments provided in this article. Its weakness as a causal argument is largely due to a lack of any concrete evidence to support the claims made by Reisman, Baker, and Jeffrey-Jones. Anecdotal evidence in social sciences is always subject to scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is included in this essay because, if true, it would provide another compelling causal mechanism for the lack of Congressional oversight of the CIA.

This concludes the primary findings of this article. Throughout the course of the discussion, I have provided an analysis of the key causal mechanisms for the observed feeble legislative oversight of the CIA. I began the essay with an examination of two CIA fiascos: the Cuban Project

and the aftermath of 9/11. I then outlined several key violations of the CIA and dispelled some plausible explanations for the lack of Congressional oversight. The article then presented and discussed five causal mechanisms for limited legislative oversight of the CIA: (1) patchwork legislative initiatives and their flaws, (2) a shortage of resources available to Congressional representatives, (3) the rational self-interest of politicians, (4) decentralized democracy and partisan conflict, and (5) concern that legislative oversight could lower the legitimacy of the Agency and reduce its effectiveness. With this knowledge in mind, I will now conclude the article with a discussion of four clear methods for increasing legislative oversight and preventing future blunders by the CIA.

The first way Congress can increase its oversight of the CIA is to focus the attention of its legislative reforms on the root of the problem—rather than trying to patch up crevices that pop up whenever the CIA is engaged in a public fiasco. Such Congressional reform of the CIA would require a complete and in-depth analysis of the Agency and its purpose. The second way Congress can increase oversight of the CIA is by increasing the resources provided to the SSCI and HPSCI. This could include increasing the number of staffers available to members of these two committees or requiring the CIA to provide liaisons to the committees with the specific responsibility of explaining dense material and increasing dialogue between the two organizations.

A third way Congress can check the CIA is via the traditional "power of the purse," i.e., regulating the amount of money the CIA receives. This is not to say that Congress necessarily needs to cut the CIA's funding or reduce its revenue stream. However, Congress could certainly engage in demanding that the budget proposal be more specific or transparent in an effort to increase accountability. The final way Congress can exercise oversight of the CIA is by going public whenever the Agency oversteps its bounds or engages in destructive behavior. This power to take stories to the press has been under-utilized in the last half century. Public exposure and media criticism are great ways to exercise oversight and check the power of the CIA.

Public exposure and media criticism are great ways to exercise oversight and check the power of the CIA.

Though the debate over how oversight will be accomplished still rages, there is little doubt that it is necessary. In the coming years it will be critical to watch

how Congress and the CIA interact, what they quarrel over, and who prevails. For the sake of citizens of the world, let us hope that Congress exercises more oversight of the CIA.

Notes

[1] The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 2009, The Bay of Pigs, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/JFK+and+the+Bay+of+Pigs.htm (accessed November 7, 2009).

[2] Douglas Stuart, "Ministry of Fear," *International Studies Perspective*, vol. 4, issue 3, 2003, 300.

[3] James Bamford, *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency* (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 82.

[4] Ibid., 84.

[5] Ibid., 88.

[6] Amy Zegart, "September 11th and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies," *International Security*, vol. 29, 2005, 1.

[7] Denis McDonough, Mara Rudman, and Peter Rundlet, *No Mere Oversight: Congressional Oversight of Intelligence is Broken* (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2006), 1-2.

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[14] Stuart, "Ministry of Fear," 293.

[15] Ibid., 294.

[16] Ibid., 297.

[17] The Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, *The National Security Act of 1947* [Title 50. Chapter 15. Subchapter I. § 403–4a.].

[18] Stuart, "Ministry of Fear," 299.

[19] Ibid., 300.

[20] Ibid., 301.

[21] Central Intelligence Agency, 2009, A Review of Congressional Oversight, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v40i5a11p.htm (accessed November 17, 2009).

[22] Michael Reisman and James Baker, *Regulating Covert Action* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 123.

[23] Ibid., 122.

[24] Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (Binghamton, NY: Vail-Ballou Press, 1989), 241.

[25] Stuart, "Ministry of Fear," 300.

[26] Riesman and Baker, *Regulating Covert Action*, 121.

[27] James Bamford, *The Shadow Factory* (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 15.

[28] Ibid., 18.

[29] Ibid., 19.

[30] Central Intelligence Agency, 2009, A Review of Congressional Oversight, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v40i5a11p.htm (accessed November 17, 2009).

[31] Dana Priest, "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized," *The Washington Post*, April 27, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A44837-2004Apr26?language=printer (accessed November 21, 2009).

[32] Mary Sturtevant, "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: One Perspective," *American Intelligence Journal*, 1992.

[33] Priest, "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized."

[34] Sturtevant, "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: One Perspective."

[35] Priest, "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized."

[36] Zegart, "September 11th and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies," 14-15.

[37] Priest, "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized."

[38] Zegart, "September 11th and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies," 14.

[39] William Keller, *Arm in Arm: The Political Economy of Global Arms Trade* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 13.

[40] Ibid., 84-85.

[41] Ibid., 86.

[42] Ibid., 87.

[43] Ibid., 88.

[44] Zegart, "September 11th and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies," 21.

[45] Jeffrey-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 232.

[46] Zegart, "September 11th and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies," 15.

[47] Ibid., 16.

[48] Priest, "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized."

[49] Riesman and Baker, *Regulating Covert Action*, 131.

[50] Jeffrey-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 8.

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The Case Against WikiLeaks:
The Pentagon Papers Reconsidered

by Lee O. Lacy

Literally, there is no such thing as free speech. When was the last time you walked into a crowded theater and shouted "fire!" without there being an emergency? When was the last time you asserted your free speech rights after plagiarizing the latest bestseller—and got away with it? Certainly, we have the ability to act in a manner in which we think free speech and free press are exercised. But with these actions come consequences. In a free society like the United States, we hold dear the Bill of Rights, which states "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press..."[1] Taken at face value, this freedom, in a literal sense, appears to be a license to act, say or write anything. This is an anarchist's dream—to publish something like the Top Secret nuclear authentication codes and watch the world burn down—just to make a point about a world without rules. The late U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote, "…the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute…"[2] The notion there are no limits on free expression enables those who seek to challenge the status quo to act with impunity. In light of the recent actions of WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange, we must reevaluate the conventional wisdom that freedom of the press is a license to violate national security, and with it cause harm to the interests of the U.S. We must examine in detail the legal precedent established in *New York Times Co. v. United States*, aka, The Pentagon Papers.[3] The case of the Pentagon Papers as a precedent for the unauthorized publishing of classified materials is outdated and demands a new legal challenge. There is the old saying—"your rights end at the tip of my nose." WikiLeaks has effectively reached the tip of the nose—that of a sovereign entity—the United States.

Julian Assange is misguided and his arguments against official secrecy fall flat. Furthermore, he exhibits anarchist qualities, because he is bent on destroying or crippling governments like the U.S. and its institutions, namely the Intelligence Community. His actions in the unauthorized release of classified information are a ploy to gain notoriety for his website, WikiLeaks, and serve as a stage for other acts of destruction. *Time* magazine wrote, "[Assange believes in] the idea that nearly all information should be free and that confidentiality in government affairs is an affront to the governed…"[4] Assange, and those like him, seek absolute freedom to publish anything regardless of the outcome. This issue is so important it requires we apply reasonable standards of acceptable conduct, traditional in a civilized and free society. Restrictions on free speech and free press, known as prior restraint, are not new. For example, in 1979 the U.S. Department of Energy, through legal challenges, attempted to restrain *The Progressive* magazine from printing secrets related to the hydrogen bomb. No one will ever know the outcome because the government dropped its case against the magazine when it appeared the information was out in the open.[5] Prior restraint was commonplace in World War I, World War II, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, when war correspondents were restricted from printing information that might endanger troops or operations. In a 1931 ruling the Supreme Court specified, under limited circumstances, items such as wartime troop movements could be censored.[6] This ruling gives the government the option to place restrictions on the press for national security reasons.

> *Prior restraint was commonplace in World War I, World War II, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, when war correspondents were restricted from printing information that might endanger troops or operations.*

Prior restraint is an unwelcome idea to the media. WikiLeaks and Julian Assange are just as dangerous as shouting "fire!" in a crowded theater. The shouting fire scenario is often used to illustrate free speech and strikes at the heart of the case against WikiLeaks. Recently, former Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer suggested *Quran* burning may not be protected under the First Amendment.[7] Breyer made the comparison when he cited another jurist, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the landmark opinion from a 1919 free speech case. In *Schenck v. the United States*, Holmes wrote:

The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic[...The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a **clear and present danger** that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent[emphasis added].[8]

Furthermore, Holmes clarified the clear and present danger test currently used in free speech challenges:

The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree…[9]

Furthermore, in 1969 the Court, in *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, added the imminent lawless action test which clarified earlier free speech rulings. It mandated free speech did not extend to inciting a violation of the law that is both imminent and likely.[10]

Applied to WikiLeaks, there is a clear and present danger by the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

The case against WikiLeaks hinges on the two established tests of free speech: a clear and present danger and imminent lawless action.[11] These tests demonstrate the main differences between the Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks. A clear and present danger is best illustrated by the prohibition of someone falsely shouting "fire!" in a crowded public place, such as a theater or subway terminal. A reasonable, sane, and intelligent person views this as a dangerous act that causes harm to others. Furthermore, falsely shouting fire meets the imminent lawless action test because the false utterance of fire results in a violation of the law—creating an unnecessary panic and likely causing harm to other citizens. Applied to WikiLeaks, there is a clear **a**nd present danger by the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The unauthorized disclosure of classified information is dangerous to the lives of countless human sources who serve the interests of the U.S. government and its allies. Additionally, members of the military and diplomatic personnel are likely to face death or injury because of unwarranted disclosures.

Furthermore, leaks of classified information are detrimental to the intelligence collection methods the U.S. government uses and pose a danger to national security. In regard to imminent lawless action, the WikiLeaks disclosure resulted in violations of the law, namely the Espionage Act of 1917[12] and the Internal Security Act of 1950.[13] Both laws prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Not only is it against the law to publish classified information without authorization; it is illegal to possess stolen property. For this reason, media outlets which published classified information from WikiLeaks must be challenged and restrained. As a result, legal action would force the courts to revisit the Pentagon Papers and decide the WikiLeaks case based on the merits of the current issue and not by the events of 1971 that took place under different circumstances.

How did we get to this point in our society, when proprietary classified information is published without the consent of the President? The precedent for this is the *New York Times Co. v. United States*. In 1971 a Department of Defense employee named Daniel Ellsberg leaked Top Secret files regarding the Vietnam War to the *New York Times*. The *Times* decided to publish classified excerpts in June 1971. The Pentagon Papers, now declassified, were a historical study of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam spanning the Truman to the Johnson administration. Mostly the study revealed what was thought to be embarrassing policy information that cast the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in a bad light. For example, the Papers revealed the Johnson administration decided to escalate the conflict before the 1964 Presidential election, while portraying the Republican candidate, Senator Barry Goldwater, as an extremist. No secrets from the Nixon administration were revealed. Initially, "President Nixon's reaction…was that the damage fell mostly on the Johnson administration and that he should leave it alone." Later, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger convinced President Nixon to take action against the *New York Times*. Kissinger later wrote in his memoirs, "The massive hemorrhage of state secrets was bound to raise doubts about our reliability in the minds of other governments, friend or foe, and indeed about the stability of our political system."[14] Eventually, Nixon's Justice Department sought an injunction against the *Times* to prevent further excerpts. Over a two-week period in June 1971 a legal battle ensued, pitting the Nixon administration against the press. A lower federal court issued a restraining order against the *Times*. Ellsberg countered by taking the stolen material to the *Washington Post* and other major newspapers. The Justice Department sought and received injunctions against the other newspapers. Finally, the Supreme Court intervened. In a 6-3 decision, it reversed all injunctions, permitting the Pentagon Papers to be printed. Today, the decision is seen as a victory for the press, while national security ramifications are rarely mentioned.

> *WikiLeaks would, much later, cause a major crisis in the U.S. government that made the Pentagon Papers pale in comparison.*

Associate Justice William Brennan wrote a *per curiam* opinion to announce the judgment of the Court, although all nine justices published their own opinions. Brennan maintained "every restraint in this case, whatever its form, has violated the First Amendment…" Brennan felt the First Amendment permitted prior restraint in certain circumstances if the government submitted evidence to support its assertions. Brennan felt the Justice Department offered unsubstantiated proof and therefore it was legally insufficient to obtain a restraining order. Most importantly, Brennan established criteria for restraining the press when he wrote, "…The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for enforcement…"[15] The term "heavy burden" was never clarified. Did Justice Brennan leave open the door in which prior restraint might be enforced if the "heavy burden" of proof was met? What is telling about the majority opinion was that the press was *de facto* found "not guilty" but never declared "not innocent." Three justices, Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices Harry Blackmun and John Harlan, dissented. Justice Harlan wrote he was disappointed in the pace in which the case was taken through the courts. The "frenzied train of events" leading to the decision disregarded the importance of the case. He felt the lower federal courts did not have all the facts due to the hurried pace of events. Harlan wrote that the Court was pressured by the publicity surrounding the case. Most importantly, Harlan asserted the separation of powers doctrine required the courts to defer to the executive branch regarding foreign affairs. Finally, Harlan trusted neither the press nor the judiciary to make judgments on what information to release to the public. This decision was solely the province of the executive branch in relation to foreign affairs. Additionally, Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which he stated the *New York Times*' conduct was "unbelievable…[that it] would perform one of basic and simple duties of every citizen with respect to the discovery of or possession of stolen property or secret documents…" Also, Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion. He echoed the opinion of a lower court when he wrote about the lives likely to be lost if classified information were released. This "could cause great harm to the nation…the death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the great increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate…"[16] Despite these stern warnings, the press proceeded printing classified information against the wishes of the executive branch and a celebration took place at the *Washington Post*.

Little did the revelers know that WikiLeaks would, much later, cause a major crisis in the U.S. government that made the Pentagon Papers pale in comparison.

Critics of any attempt to prevent the further publication of WikiLeaks cite the precedent set by the Pentagon Papers. They contend the ruling by the Supreme Court allowing the Pentagon Papers to be published settled the argument and the press is free to publish classified material. Their entire argument rests on this ruling, but fails to recognize the differences between the two cases. The printing of the Pentagon Papers is widely considered an embarrassment to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This event was sensational news in 1971. It came at a time of great social unrest in the era of civil rights and an unpopular war in Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers was a pivotal issue as far as critics of U.S. involvement in Vietnam were concerned. Prior to this event, the press did not, with few exceptions, print classified information, much less stolen classified documents. With the benefit of hindsight, the *chutzpah* it took for the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* to print the Pentagon Papers caused more of a stir than the information the documents actually revealed. Primarily, the information revealed the two previous administrations were not telling the truth to the public. That was hardly news because only a decade earlier it was revealed during the Francis Gary Powers affair that President Eisenhower did not tell the truth about U-2 reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.[17] Later, in 2007, President Nixon's Solicitor General, Erwin Griswold, remarked, "In hindsight, it is clear to me that no harm was done by publication of the Pentagon Papers."[18] There were five principal figures in the case who potentially suffered from publication. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy were dead; Presidents Truman and Johnson were out of office; and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was still in public life, but outside of the U.S. government. As a consequence, the publishing of the Pentagon Papers had little effect on policies toward the Vietnam War. As revealed by Griswold, the position of the Nixon administration was to prevent publication and thus thwart a precedent. The argument was strictly on principle and for the protection of national security. This is where the Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks intersect.

Critics against the government's attempts to silence WikiLeaks will base their argument on the principle the First Amendment guarantees the right for the press to publish of its own choosing. This is a flawed premise because this issue is not "one size fits all." Currently, the Pentagon Papers legal ruling is a template to defeat the government every time it challenges the press on national security issues. The vast differences between the two events give credibility to the argument that classified information from WikiLeaks should not have been published and Julian Assange is criminally liable.

First, the Pentagon Papers were a study of past events and were shown not to alter the course of the Vietnam War. The Pentagon Papers were written by Department of Defense analysts and researchers from the private RAND Corporation. Information and analysis for the Pentagon Papers were taken from official sources, much like a research paper. It is unlikely human intelligence sources, which required specialized handling, were used. Additionally, the Papers likely did not reveal methods of intelligence gathering. For example, the study likely did not base its research on a human source who risked his life to pass information. Likewise, the Pentagon Papers likely did not reveal proprietary intelligence collection methods, such as the use of signals intelligence or spy tradecraft, to gather data for the study. If they had, then the Pentagon Papers saga would have been an even more explosive issue than it was. On the other hand, classified information revealed by WikiLeaks was, in part, gathered by overt human sources such as diplomats and government officials.[19] Additionally, WikiLeaks likely used collection methods, when revealed, that could cause grave harm to national security. Often overlooked is the fact these human sources have names, addresses, and employers. They have innocent family members, friends, and co-workers who face death or harm if their identities are revealed. The real human toll of the Pentagon Papers was the embarrassment of public officials. Moreover, the issue caused great consternation in the Nixon administration regarding the precedent set for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. While it was a big victory for the media, it was a terrible loss for advocates of national security and for those within the Intelligence Community. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, the information revealed by the Pentagon Papers had little detrimental effect on national security at the time. In contrast, information disclosed by WikiLeaks is a different issue. It will be years before we know the full effect of the disclosures. The repercussions of WikiLeaks are likely to be shocking given the sources of the information were either named or their identity could possibly be determined based on the information reported. Moreover, the information which was revealed seriously hurt the foreign policy direction and strategies of the U.S. It remains to be seen if intelligence operatives, whether covert or overt, and their families will be executed, imprisoned, or otherwise punished in reprisals. We only have to go back a few years when CIA traitor Aldrich Ames

revealed the identities of Russian covert operatives providing intelligence to the U.S. At least 30 agents were betrayed, some of whom were executed and others imprisoned as a result of Ames' espionage.[20] What is the death toll associated with WikiLeaks and Julian Assange? We might never know. Likewise, we have to consider the damage to national security in regard to what intelligence collection methods were revealed by WikiLeaks. The techniques, procedures, and nuances of intelligence gathering are a science unto itself. Methods and means of intelligence gathering, if disclosed, could result in our adversaries developing countermeasures to defeat it, sometimes with deadly reprisals. WikiLeaks took away this edge.

The national security interests of the U.S. protect our way of life and permit the benefits of a free society. WikiLeaks and its conspirators assail U.S. national security and ultimately impugn a free society. Laws, tradition, and the sense of self-preservation prevent us from legally shouting "fire!" in a crowded theater. Likewise, action should also be taken against those who leak classified information. Those who publish it should be held responsible. Civil libertarians, some of whom favor publishing unauthorized classified information, assert that the press is a check on government power. It raises the question: Who is the check on the press? Seldom discussed is the inherent danger of publishing raw intelligence without going through the vetting process. Experienced military analysts carefully evaluate intelligence and rate it according to the reliability of the source and their confidence in its content.[21] Uncorroborated, inaccurate, and unreliable intelligence in the hands of those not properly trained is reckless. Intelligence, not properly evaluated and corroborated, is often used to deceive, mislead, or invoke a reaction. This was a common tactic used against NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the three former warring factions following the Balkan series of conflicts.[22] The fear is WikiLeaks publications will provide information which is unevaluated or taken out of

context by a third party, who will use it for nefarious purposes. Unfortunately, supporters of WikiLeaks fail to recognize the consequences of their actions—the lives lost, the weakening of foreign policy, and the undermining of current military or diplomatic operations.

The Supreme Court was hasty in ruling in favor of the press to print the Pentagon Papers. Chief Justice Burger rightfully argued for a detailed study of the effect of allowing classified information to be published. It is likely the rushed decision was a result of the Justice Department not meeting its "heavy burden" in court. Historical analysis shows the Pentagon Papers, made public, did little to harm national security. Imagine for a moment if, in 1971, something of the magnitude of the WikiLeaks case was the issue instead of the Pentagon Papers. The result might have been different. The government probably could have met the "heavy burden" placed on it by Justice Brennan. As a result of a weak case, we are trapped with a precedent setting legal opinion that appears to be a boilerplate for the Supreme Court never to enjoin the press from publishing classified information. Every case that goes to court seeking to protect national security is hamstrung by the Pentagon Papers decision. For this reason, the *New York Times* and other newspapers should be challenged in court. This action could possibly overturn the Pentagon Papers decision or at least allow cases that meet the "heavy burden" test to be tried on the merits of the case. It seems the "heavy burden" Justice Brennan placed on the government should likewise apply to the press. The Canons of Journalism state, "The right of a newspaper to attract and hold readers is restricted by nothing but considerations of public welfare."[23] The press has an enormous responsibility to act with caution and consider the consequences of the unauthorized publishing of classified information, in the interest of public welfare. Without this balance between the right to know and the need to protect national security, we risk, unwittingly, inching closer to giving in to anarchy.

Notes
[1] U.S. Constitution, First Amendment.
[2] New York Times Co. v. United States, 402 U.S. 713 (1971).
[3] "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force [aka Pentagon Papers]," National Archives, accessed August 3, 2011, http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/.
[4] Massimo Calabresi, "The War on Secrecy," *Time*, December 13, 2010, 32.
[5] United States of America v. Progressive, Inc., Erwin Knoll, Samuel Day, Jr., and Howard Morland, 42 U.S.C. § 2280 and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1979).
[6] Near v. Minnesota (283 U.S. 697 (1931).
[7] Lucy Madison, "Stephen Breyer Questions Right to Burn Quran," *CBS News,* September 14, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20016378-503544.html.
[8] Schenck v. the United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

[9] Ibid.
[10] Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
[11] It is acknowledged both Supreme Court cases cited were free speech issues and did not directly involve freedom of the press, although those rights are covered under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
[12] Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §798.
[13] Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §783.
[14] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 100.
[15] David Rudenstine, *The Day the Presses Stopped* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 301-320.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Kenneth T. Walsh, "Presidential Lies and Deception," *U.S. News and World Report,* June 6, 2008, accessed August 3, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2008/06/06/presidential-lies-and-deceptions.
[18] Rudenstine, *The Day the Presses Stopped*, 327.
[19] "WikiLeaks Unplugged, *Los Angeles Times*, accessed August 8, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/30/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-column-wikileaks-20110130.
[20] U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, "66th MI BDE Baseline Briefing: Threat Awareness and Reporting Program," PowerPoint Presentation, undated, accessed August 8, 2011, http://www.eur.army.mil/vigilance/66th_MIB_TARP_Brief-Insider_Threat_Focus_NOV10.pptx.
[21] U.S. Army, Field Manual 2.22-3, September 2006, B-1 – B-2.
[22] This is based on the author's personal experience as a U.S. Army human intelligence operations officer in 2003.
[23] "Canons of Journalism," Superior Press Clipping Service, accessed August 3, 2011, http://www.superiorclipping.com/canons.html.

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Next Steps in the Intelligence Education Literature:
Stipulating Academic Competencies with Greater Precision and the Pursuit of Curricular Innovations

by Michael Landon-Murray

ABSTRACT

This article calls for an intelligence education literature more active and precise in developing academic competencies to apply in the design and measurement of U.S. intelligence studies programs. It is argued these competencies should not be informed solely by signals from the Intelligence Community (IC), including its Core Competency directories. Intelligence studies programs deal with serious resource constraints, need to maintain an appropriate degree of autonomy and diversity, and cannot lose sight of their core educational mission. That is not to say Core Competencies and other IC preferences should not be reflected in academic intelligence curricula at all. Rather, the most critical and teachable for academic purposes need to be identified and then incorporated effectively. Moreover, the Core Competencies do not expressly stipulate key education-based skill and knowledge sets, some of which have been found critically lacking in the IC. Intelligence scholars and educators themselves have not adequately stipulated and explored these educational facets.

Operating under the assumption that intelligence studies programs are sometimes poorly equipped to provide instruction in certain Core Competencies, and other related areas, a new curricular device is offered. This device is premised on (1) the comparative resources of the IC and academe, (2) innovations and knowledge gains in the field of intelligence education, and (3) the need for broad yet agile delivery mechanisms. This device could also be of use for more purely educational aspects. Simply, it will help fill gaps in course offerings and expand student choice. Thus, intelligence studies programs must simultaneously establish selectively closer and more autonomous positioning vis-à-vis the IC. This might prove a difficult balancing act, but one that will serve all stakeholders' interests in the longer term.

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, college and university degree offerings in intelligence studies have increased markedly (Campbell, 2011; Middleton, 2008;

Spracher, 2009). Even before this uptick, the U.S. higher education system was undoubtedly the most critical resource in the U.S. Intelligence Community's (IC) external knowledge environment. Despite this, the literature on what these programs look like, and what these programs ought to look like, has been relatively thin. That research in this area has not kept pace with the growth in intelligence programs, or with research on other factors that influence the performance of the IC, is worrisome. To date, there has been only one major study done on contemporary intelligence studies programs in the U.S. (Spracher, 2009). The International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) has undertaken multiple initiatives in this area. These initiatives, however, have not permeated the broader literature and have gone forward with little research and dialogic support in that literature. If the IC, the largest and most sophisticated in the world, is to get the most from the U.S. higher education system, more research, dialogue, and purposive action are necessary.

To make a contribution to such ends, this article will do two primary things. First, the case is made that intelligence scholars, educators, and practitioners need to work toward a distinct set of academic competencies. One critical issue pertains to the role of training and tradecraft in intelligence studies programs, which speak largely to Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Core Competencies. It is argued that a more in-depth dialogue is necessary to determine what aspects of these less conventionally educational areas should be incorporated into intelligence curricula. Moreover, it seems that contemporary intelligence departments and faculties—not to mention traditional course and curricular structures— may not be adequate to accommodate all these areas meaningfully. Thus, new curricular mechanisms will be necessary.

With that in mind, building directly on key perspectives and findings in the intelligence education literature, this article offers a new such curricular mechanism. The most important contribution of this mechanism is structural, that is, as a practical vehicle for broader and enhanced intelligence curricula. Termed the ODNI's "Academic

Intelligence Certificates," it would be completed through a set of centrally administered online modules that are also credit-bearing at participating institutions.

This mechanism provides a means by which intelligence studies programs can provide instruction in less conventional areas, like ODNI Core Competencies, and offer more diverse coursework generally. It can be used to give departments and degree programs the capacity to offer coursework in areas in which they may lack expertise, capacity, or prerogative. It would also grant the IC more control over areas of instruction it feels might benefit students during the academic phase, but are thought best left to IC instructors and approaches. Lastly, it could be used to incorporate diverse offerings of a more academic variety, perhaps with an intelligence bent. Taken together, these options will help programs fill gaps in their particular curriculum, giving students greater choice and specialized opportunities. It can also help in meshing the academic and professional development of U.S. intelligence practitioners.

[O]verly standardizing intelligence curricula, in any direction, is a dangerous thing, especially in such a dynamic and interdisciplinary field as intelligence analysis.

To be sure, the author's underlying perspective is that overly standardizing intelligence curricula, in any direction, is a dangerous thing, especially in such a dynamic and interdisciplinary field as intelligence analysis. Academic institutions and departments should be robust, vibrant places that produce diverse graduates who can bring different and even competing ideas and competencies with them into the real world (in this case, the IC). Thus, in no way is the author suggesting that an end goal should be to make intelligence studies programs uniform, though there are certainly areas where baseline foundations should be expected. To that end, intelligence studies programs must stipulate and fulfill critical educational responsibilities, cognizant of the differences between professional and academic competencies.

Perhaps the healthiest and best objective is to have broad academic competency categories that can be populated with a variety of instructional content. Some content may be more suited to students who wish to pursue political, military, or terrorism analysis, for example. Increasingly, law enforcement and competitive intelligence instruction is found in intelligence studies programs. While in some fundamental ways these facets are different than

intelligence in support of security and foreign policy, they should nonetheless be included in these efforts.

Consequently, more important than developing uniform and codified standards is ensuring that due diligence is being exercised. Critical and uniquely applicable material must not go unutilized. It should be standard practice for intelligence educators and scholars to conduct regular environmental scanning to promote responsiveness to all applicable or new theory, models, and pedagogies. For intelligence, this could extend into diverse fields like cognitive science and social psychology, and of course political science and international relations. It is unlikely that the educational practices and intelligence standards committees of IAFIE can adequately take on this responsibility autonomously. It must be accompanied by a more robust dialogue within the broader intelligence education literature.

Editor's Note: Within IAFIE, in 2010 the Educational Practices Committee spun off a sub-committee to develop basic standards for teaching intelligence courses. They are not two separate committees; one is a subset of the other. The same is true now as another sub-committee has been formed to explore the potential for certifying programs/ courses.

TOWARD ACADEMIC COMPETENCIES FOR INTELLIGENCE STUDIES PROGRAMS

The most important sector in the IC's external knowledge environment is the set of educational institutions that prepare and funnel students for careers as intelligence professionals, namely analysts of various kinds. Each year, American colleges and universities send hundreds, if not thousands, of graduates into intelligence work, be it national, sub-national, civilian, military, private sector, or law enforcement.

Many students in intelligence studies programs are in fact probably not quite sure in which part of the IC they would like to work. Intelligence career paths will also grow increasingly diverse, and many workers will change agencies and/or offices, levels of government, "accounts," and even functions. ODNI has developed an extensive set of Core Competencies for IC practitioners, some universal and some for specific job functions. Wherever intelligence students do secure employment, at least at the national level, they will soon be expected to be adept across a range of stipulated competency areas. In support of this, some uniform IC-wide training modules like "Analysis 101" have been introduced, and the National Intelligence University is also meant as a centralized source of IC professional development.

Upon entering the IC, new hires are of course expected to have a sound educational foundation, wherever they may land. However, a well-developed and varied set of academic intelligence competencies, parallel to but distinct from ODNI Core Competencies, exists only in the loosest form. A handful of authors have suggested broad prescriptive or descriptive content areas for intelligence curricula, overlapping at points with the ODNI Core Competencies. However, just like the ODNI Core Competencies, they are not exhaustive of all the skill and knowledge sets that could and should be derived from academic intelligence education. This point is fleshed out at some length in the sub-section to follow.

Spracher (2009), for example, points to the importance of including instruction in groupthink dynamics, critical thinking and cognitive processes, intelligence control and oversight, operational environment/dynamics, ethical and normative thinking in intelligence, and intelligence-policy relations. Rudner (2009) identifies three broad categories of intelligence curriculum: core, cognate, and optional courses. Within these various categories are functional and regional studies, intelligence law, institutions and process, and special issues in intelligence and security. Others, like Collier (2005), have suggested and partially explored other areas of instruction with more precision—in his case, social science methods and models—but others have not answered his call to actively identify the various social science foundations that can be useful in the intelligence realm.

Some have suggested academic intelligence curricula be designed chiefly to help meet ODNI Core Competencies (Breckenridge, 2010; Spracher, 2009). Partly because of this, the central thrust of this article is put forward in the context of these competencies. Similarly, the ODNI Core Competencies have been used in the only major study and assessment of intelligence studies programs (Spracher, 2009). Additionally, using this framework is a helpful way to address key issues of incorporating training facets into academic curricula and aids in highlighting the differing purposes of intelligence education and intelligence training.

> *[I]ntelligence analysis as a professional discipline will need to take on certain parallel aspects and approaches of the social sciences. Academe, comparatively strong in this domain, can be a unique contributor in this way.*

Further stipulating and populating academic competency categories is a necessary next step in optimizing the human resources contribution of intelligence studies programs. It will also support a more long-term and developmental perspective on the IC's workforce. Critically, a robust dialogue around academic competencies in intelligence studies programs can help inform larger efforts to design a professional intelligence analysis discipline. Corpora (2008), Collier (2005), Miller (2008), and Heuer (1999), for example, have pointed to the commonalities between intelligence analysis and social science research and the utility of applying social science methods and models in the context of intelligence analysis. Thus, intelligence analysis as a professional discipline will need to take on certain parallel aspects and approaches of the social sciences. Academe, comparatively strong in this domain, can be a unique contributor in this way.

ISSUES WITH BUILDING AND MEASURING INTELLIGENCE CURRICULA AROUND ODNI CORE COMPETENCIES

Some notable scholars have suggested intelligence studies programs should be designed chiefly around building the ODNI's Core Competencies in students. For these authors, it is seen as the most effective way to meet the IC's human resource needs. Spracher (2009) applied the most foundational ODNI Core Competencies in the first major study of contemporary intelligence studies programs in the U.S ("crosswalking" them with curricula). This aligned "what is taught in university intelligence studies curricula with the needs of the agencies hiring graduates who become the intelligence professionals of tomorrow" (p. 193). Similarly, James Breckenridge (2010) has written:

> The IC looks to academic institutions to assist with the preliminary preparation of aspiring analysts. If these institutions are to be effective, evaluation standards and measures of effectiveness, as established by the IC, should be fully integrated into academic curricula" (p. 320).

Somewhat conversely, Martin Rudner (2009) has written that the role of academic intelligence education is "…certainly not to provide training in actual intelligence tradecraft. That is something best left to the national Intelligence and Security Community itself" (p. 116). It is not exactly clear what Rudner meant in this statement, but surely he is pointing to at least some of what can be found among the ODNI Core Competencies (some of which is explicitly labeled "tradecraft"). In any case, scholarly perspective and intelligence studies programs are generally moving in the direction of combining education and training (Campbell, 2011; Breckenridge, 2010; Davies, 2006; Spracher, 2009).

The ODNI Core Competencies might currently be the most defensible standards to use in designing and measuring intelligence studies programs given the lack of differentiated and more precise academic competencies. Many Core Competencies speak to the disciplinary and cultural foundations the IC requires of its intelligence professionals. Moreover, getting started in an effective way on *some* key ODNI Core Competencies in the academic phase has distinct advantages. Students will have the opportunity to learn in a comparatively less pressurized environment, where retention is likely to be greater and foundations laid for later development. Students can begin developing disciplinary and cultural sensibilities before establishing an identity at a particular intelligence organization. In this way, students are more likely to develop an "enterprise perspective"—something of a counter to overly insular and protective organizational instincts.

However, there are myriad issues, both practical and developmental, with constructing academic intelligence curricula around ODNI Core Competencies. First, it simply seems impracticable, given constraints in space, resources, and expertise, for all ODNI Core Competencies to be incorporated into curricular designs. This is especially true if more function-specific Core Competencies like the "Analysis and Production" directory are deemed important—another issue requiring attention. It is unlikely that current intelligence studies faculties have the capacity to create academic exercises and structures that can effectively pull in the myriad and multifaceted ODNI Core Competencies. Rudner (2009) has pointed to the difficulty intelligence studies programs have had in finding qualified and experienced faculty members.

Moreover, some of these Core Competencies really cannot be meaningfully taught or operationalized for research purposes in an academic setting (like courage and conviction or innovation). Some of the Core Competencies found in the more specialized directories (like "Analysis and Production") are likely more teachable and critical than those from the generic directory. Presumably, intelligence studies programs are geared toward preparing students for analytic-centric work (which their coursework tends to suggest) as opposed to more operational facets of intelligence. Some of the more generic, cross-cutting Core Competencies are integral no doubt, but if greater value can be gained through targeting some of the more specialized directories these options need to be examined. We need to pick more closely what can and should be done and not overburden limited faculties, potentially convoluting intelligence courses and assignments.

An undue emphasis on all ODNI Core Competencies also risks the dereliction or displacement of more purely academic foundations—ones that, as Marrin (2009) points out, are necessary foundations for later training:

> In terms of intelligence analysis, the term "training" is usually associated with internal government programs intended to provide specific instruction for the implementation of job-related tasks, while the term "education" is normally associated with academic courses or programs geared to provide more conceptual and theoretical frameworks having less immediate effect on performance, but layering the foundation for improved performance over the longer term (p. 131).

Similarly, we must not constrain the healthy autonomy and diversity of IC feeder programs. A too closely mapped relationship also runs the risk of injecting into intelligence curricula some of the problematic tendencies identified in the IC, such as an overemphasis on current intelligence tasks and communication styles favoring (overly) confident appearance. There are a variety of risks in over-standardization of any kind, which would no doubt produce its own new, unintended deficiencies and pathologies in the IC.

Second, and connected to the first point, it is very likely that key stakeholders in the IC—namely human resource and analytic managers—would prefer that much instruction relating to Core Competencies be deferred to the intelligence organizations where graduates find employment. From the perspective of some of these managers, new hires may find themselves needing to unlearn and relearn certain material and methods. Rudner (2009) and Campbell (2011) have pointed to the skepticism that scholars and practitioners alike have voiced about highly specialized intelligence studies programs. Certainly the IC (and its component organizations) is better positioned to provide instruction in a number of Core Competency areas.

> *[T]he perspectives of human resource and analytic managers have been largely left out of the intelligence education literature.*

More generally, the perspectives of human resource and analytic managers have been largely left out of the intelligence education literature. Their input would be a great complement to existing studies and empirics, and is of course necessary as intelligence studies programs stipulate academic competencies and adopt professionally oriented components.

To reiterate, then, it has been argued *some* ODNI Core Competencies should be developed in students before they graduate and enter the IC. However, keeping in mind the set of constraints and issues just noted, decisions must be made about which ones, in what measure, and how. These decisions must be supported by sustained research and more inclusive dialogue. Some innovative piloting and experimentation is taking place—like Brunel University's open-source graduate exercise—that demonstrate the benefits of learning "how" and not just "that" (Davies, 2006). Learning "that" is surely the more conventional and conceptual approach, whether through the historical/case study, functional/process, structural/organizational, or political/policymaking teaching frames identified by Rudner (2009). There are many benefits to pursuing the realism-based exercise at Brunel, as opposed for example to case studies, which are predetermined and probably less engaging for students.

Members and committees of IAFIE have taken up matters of academic intelligence standards and pedagogies, as well as other important issues. However, their institutional membership remains limited and somewhat homogenous, and their dialogues and reports have not often emerged in the intelligence education literature. In 2001 the journal *Intelligence and National Security* initiated a "Teaching Intelligence" series, slated to be an annual feature. Unfortunately, it ended abruptly after that first year. In the future, IAFIE might summarize the presentations and findings of its annual conference for publication in an academic journal, thus transmitting critical research and dialogue to broader audiences; this journal is a natural fit for that.

Third, ODNI Core Competencies (especially in the more generic directories and categories) are not sufficiently explained to account for a host of educational domains that should be inculcated in the academic phase of development. This also means that when ODNI Core Competencies are used in the assessment of academic intelligence curricula, these more specific educational domains will go unexamined.

Collier (2005) asserts, for example, that students completing graduate degrees in intelligence studies need to be deeply knowledgeable in such things as regression analysis and the philosophy of social science. Others have suggested complexity theory, system effects, and ethnography as highly applicable and beneficial content for intelligence studies programs (Betts, 2007; Landon-Murray, 2011). None of these domains can be expressly found in the ODNI Core Competencies, and will thus be left out in any evaluation based solely on those Core Competencies.

Intelligence scholars have identified analytic deficiencies and shortcomings in the IC that seem attributable to a lack of the sorts of competencies Collier points to, competencies that fit naturally into academic education. Collier (2005) has observed the "lack of U.S. intelligence analysts trained in the proper development of theoretical frameworks and research hypotheses and in advanced social-science analytic methods—the basic tools needed by analysts to do their jobs properly" (p. 21). Heuer (1999) found that "theoretical insights that are available are often unknown to or at least not used by political intelligence analysts" (p. 42).

Collier notes that virtually hundreds of theoretical and methodological domains speak to the work of political and military intelligence analysts and should thus be investigated and incorporated accordingly. Yet, no concerted dialogue or research has taken place to further identify these domains and hash out their merits and applicability. In turn, intelligence curricula at both the graduate and undergraduate levels likely fail to take advantage of some really useful tool and knowledge sets. Landon-Murray (2011) in fact found that most graduate intelligence studies programs are very light on advanced social science content. If intelligence studies programs do not incorporate such competencies into their curricula, graduates will not likely pick them up once they enter their respective intelligence organizations (Collier, 2005). It is also unlikely that intelligence practitioners will develop these skills or knowledge sets intuitively or recreationally; formal instruction will generally be required.

Therefore, unless and until these domains are articulated and subjected to critical examination, they will likely not be incorporated into intelligence curricula, and intelligence practitioners will continue to be without key educational foundations. It might be in this area where the most rewarding dialogue and advances can occur. While instruction in other facets of intelligence education is critical (like regional studies, language, and critical thinking), they are more fixed in nature and already better established in academic intelligence curricula.

There is also the question of how content and competencies should be distributed across graduate and undergraduate education. Presumably, more advanced forms of intelligence analysis—like predictive and estimative analysis—require advanced competencies. Students coming from graduate programs will be expected to have broader and deeper foundations as they will be filling the more advanced positions. However, those coming into the IC directly from the undergraduate level (or without graduate education) will sooner or later fill advanced positions having missed the advanced instruction found in graduate education. Such gaps need to be addressed.

A NEW AND AGILE CURRICULAR DEVICE: ODNI ACADEMIC INTELLIGENCE CERTIFICATES

It has been argued above that some, but not all, ODNI Core Competencies should be reflected in academic intelligence curricula and competencies. However, the institutional capacity to do this across intelligence studies programs does not seem wholly adequate. Growing trends and knowledge in intelligence education have opened up opportunities for more agile, innovative instruction that can help fill instructional gaps. In this section, a new device is presented that builds on such trends and knowledge to help programs offer a greater variety of instruction. It is an option that will also help mesh academic and professional development, injecting greater flexibility and purposive sequencing.

The curricular device proposed, loosely termed "ODNI Academic Intelligence Certificates," is a means to practically, efficiently, transparently, inclusively, and systematically help intelligence studies programs (with assistance from the IC) provide instruction across the full range of domains that can be expected of them.

The curricular device proposed, loosely termed "ODNI Academic Intelligence Certificates," is a means to practically, efficiently, transparently, inclusively, and systematically help intelligence studies programs (with assistance from the IC) provide instruction across the full range of domains that can be expected of them. It takes advantage of IC infrastructure and expertise, ensures a safe degree of academic autonomy and diversity, and allows for the broader use of advanced learning instruments that have been proven effective. It would bring a diversity, flexibility, and adaptability of instruction that many schools and departments are not likely to provide on their own, given somewhat fixed resources and expertise. This device would afford intelligence studies programs the capacity to provide instruction in (1) ODNI Core Competencies they should teach to but may lack the necessary faculty and resources for, (2) areas the IC would prefer to be in more control of but sees value in early development, (3) important substantive areas that may be lacking in individual departments, or intelligence studies programs more broadly, and (4) more purely academic and social science domains.

The instruction underlying these certificates would be centrally facilitated and coordinated by the ODNI (or some surrogate body), and like the ODNI Core Competencies could take some more foundational forms and some more specialized ones. Individual modules (probably semester-long, but maybe less) could result in a particular certificate, or a series of modules could result in a certificate. The appropriate number of modules would depend on the various topical areas of instruction.

It is possible to imagine modules and certificates spanning a range of issues and topics—critical thinking, cognitive science and bias, structured analytic techniques, military and tactical intelligence, and open-source analysis, for example. This could help fill gaps in academic intelligence education and introduce a heightened level of fluidity, responsiveness, and dynamism into more static intelligence studies programs. It would also allow students to pursue interests and areas in which their particular institution may be weak.

Instruction would be delivered through online media and/or video-conferencing sessions. Instructors could be drawn from the various intelligence organizations and federal colleges and universities, as well as private research and academic institutions. Colleges and universities participating in the program could offer credit to students who complete various ODNI modules and certificates. While the federal government would have significant financial responsibility for the infrastructure necessary to facilitate this program, student tuition could be directed to help fund programmatic inputs and resources.

BUILDING FROM EXISTING RESEARCH AND RESOURCES

Rudner (2009) has observed that the proliferation of intelligence studies programs has outpaced the supply of qualified faculty. Presumably then, the ability of these programs to teach to ODNI Core Competencies and other specialized areas is also tenuous. While supply will edge closer to meeting demand, individual faculties will continue to be limited or imbalanced in terms of substantive expertise, and in turn course offerings. With this in mind, it becomes important to figure out how these constraints can be mitigated and students given broader access to diverse and critical instruction.

A venture like the one outlined here would not be cheap or simple, and a small-scale pilot project might be advisable. Nevertheless, as Rudner (2009) also points out, if purposive public investment in academic intelligence education is not made, academe will not meet the demand placed on it by the IC. An example of an existing and healthy IC-academe partnership is the set of Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) the ODNI has facilitated since 2005. As a starting point, the ODNI modules and certificates could offer instruction and test students along the same lines as the IC CAEs. The new program, however, would prove more agile than the CAEs, covering a wider array of topics.

There is another critical advantage when compared with IC CAEs and other similar programs. CAEs are rather limited in number, failing to reach into many if not most of the undergraduate and graduate programs that will produce the coming generation of U.S. intelligence professionals. Even when including other IC-academe partnerships like the Central Intelligence Agency's Officer-in-Residence program, the aggregate reach is still very limited, and almost random. Breckenridge (2010) stresses the importance of broad and systematic coordination across academic intelligence education programs, which the proposed device would go a long way in doing.

Campbell (2011) describes one of the major trends in intelligence education as the increased use of e-learning, speaking more however to instruction in the IC (for example, the National Intelligence University). A small number of universities, some of them for-profits, have begun to offer online intelligence degrees intended largely for working professionals. A broader and more flexible use of cyber media, however, has not yet taken hold. Similarly, Breckenridge (2010) notes the promise made possible through the use of automated, personalized learning platforms, generally executed through software applications. These platforms match instructional pace and approach to individual learners, yielding greater knowledge transfer. Bringing these various developments to bear in greater measure on academic intelligence education seems a most natural progression.

CONCLUSION

This article has suggested a relationship between the IC (and its cultures and stipulated core competencies) and academic intelligence curricula that is in some ways more arms-length than is espoused by others. Simultaneously, a new curricular program is suggested which would create new and closer ties between the IC and intelligence studies programs. Arriving at and then maintaining this relationship may be a difficult balancing act but, ultimately, it is in the best interest of all stakeholders. Just as intelligence studies program designers and educators must be mindful of (not) reflecting certain problematic tendencies found in the IC, they must be critically aware of the impact they have on the capacity and work of the IC (consider the lack of advanced social science competencies).

> *[I]ntelligence studies curricula should be selectively responsive to IC signals and standards, retaining a healthy degree of autonomy and diversity so that their core objectives and responsibilities are not displaced.*

Thus, intelligence studies curricula should be selectively responsive to IC signals and standards, retaining a healthy degree of autonomy and diversity so that their core objectives and responsibilities are not displaced. Academe cannot and should not teach to all ODNI Core Competencies, and intelligence scholars, educators, and practitioners need to choose more purposively which are most important and appropriate. Similarly, these stakeholders must be more active and precise in stipulating the educational and social science domains that speak to intelligence work.

By delineating the sets of academic competencies intelligence students should or can have, and continuing to adapt and adopt mechanisms to provide instruction across these domains, we can get the most out of our higher education system. No other entity in the IC's external knowledge environment is so crucial to its capacity and performance. The existing intelligence education infrastructure, across professional and pre-professional domains, already affords opportunities that can be used more broadly in academe to very positive effect. Seeking to

utilize these resources to the fullest should be an ongoing campaign, as should uncovering (and devising) new content areas for intelligence studies programs.

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Editor's Note: For an abbreviated version of this article previewed earlier, see Campbell, Stephen H., "Education Landscape in the Intelligence Community," American Intelligence Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2010.

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Otto Skorzeny:
The Most Dangerous Man in Europe

by Dr. Kenneth J. Campbell

INTRODUCTION

This article seeks to delineate the leadership qualities of Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny, a very effective leader of special forces, a characteristic which led some to refer to him as the "most dangerous man in Europe." This is not to forget that he was a Nazi thug until the end of his life in 1975, a man who worked directly for Hitler, but we can learn from his leadership skills. The identification of the attributes of successful leaders in the past can help us in the present see what is needed in the selection of intelligence leaders today. Special operations can be seen as a part of intelligence, because special operations personnel often collect intelligence behind enemy lines. In this article I shall first describe Skorzeny's early life, then his accomplishments, and finally try to identify the qualities which made him so successful.

EARLY YEARS

Otto Skorzeny was born on 12 June 1908 into a middle-class Viennese family whose name indicates Slavic forefathers. His boyhood ran through an economic depression in Austria due in part to that nation's defeat in World War I. This was the time in which Otto's father taught him the need for self-discipline and the acceptance of a Spartan life. As a young man Otto was six feet, four inches, and broadly built. At the University of Vienna he participated in dueling societies. Otto was in the *Technischen Hochschule* [technical high school] of the University where he fought 14 duels in which his face was disfigured. Skorzeny was not interested in books, but managed to get passing marks in the subjects he was required to take—math, physics, and drafting. He graduated from the university on 11 December 1931.

Skorzeny joined the Austrian Nazi Party in 1931, even though his parents were staunch opponents of this organization. When the Germans seized control of Austria in 1938 (*der Anschluss*), he was involved with the Germans in this event, according to Lieutenant General Gottlob Berger, contrary to Skorzeny's subsequent claims that he played an insignificant part in the Austrian Nazi Party until

1939.[1] Skorzeny's activity at this time in the Austrian SS and *Gestapo* impressed Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the leader of the Austrian SS, who would later become very important to him.

When war came in 1939, Austria, now part of the Reich, joined with the Germans. Despite the fact that he had built up his own business, at age 31 Skorzeny tried to join the *Luftwaffe*, but after five months he was told he was too old and tall to fly planes. At the time, Skorzeny was a non-commissioned officer (NCO) in the *Luftwaffe,* but transferred to the *Waffen* SS and quickly became a *Faehnrich*[2]. When he needed treads for his tanks and none was available through normal supply channels, Skorzeny organized "scavenger" hunts and led men at night to the warehouses of other divisions.

In 1940 he impressed his superiors by designing a ramp with which to load tanks onto ships and was consequently promoted to *Untersturmfuehrer* (Second Lieutenant). In May 1940 Skorzeny and his fellow troops raced through Holland in the German invasion of the West. In spring 1941 Skorzeny participated in the invasion of the Balkans (Yugoslavia and Greece), and when he and his troops captured 54 men and three officers in Yugoslavia he was promoted to *Obersturmfuehrer* (First Lieutenant). Shortly afterward, in June 1941, Skorzeny participated in Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union. He won an award for bravery, but was wounded in the back of his head. Not realizing the seriousness of his injury, he continued to fight until the constant headaches and a bad case of gall bladder attacks prevented him from returning to his regiment. Skorzeny was evacuated in January 1942 for specialized treatment in Germany. This time the doctors decided that he was not able to fight again, a decision that ended his days in regular military service.

THE COMMANDO BEGINS HIS DUTIES

Skorzeny was sent to Berlin in 1942 for service in the depot of the *Leibstandarte*,[3] put in charge of technical service due to his engineering background. The depot was anticlimactic after the action,

comradeship, and excitement he had experienced at the front. When the *Waffen* SS of the General Staff needed a technically trained officer who could lead a unit in special operations, here was his chance to get out of the depot.

The officer who interviewed him in early April 1943 for the job of heading special operations explained that the time had come for Germany to set up commando troops from the SS, just as the British had successfully done by that time. This new section was to be called Amt VI-S of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA). Although the *Abwehr*, German military intelligence, had a special operations group, Adolph Hitler was not satisfied with it and wanted the RSHA to undertake this function.

The function of the RSHA was to engage in irregular warfare, intelligence-gathering, criminal investigation, and monitoring of public opinion. The RSHA had been initially under the leadership of the notorious butcher Reinhard Heydrich. After his assassination, Ernst Kaltenbunner became the head of this important unit. The third section of the RSHA, Amt VI, was controlled by Walter Schellenberg, chief of SS Intelligence.[4] Amt VI-S became a special operations unit of Amt VI, established to handle sabotage and subversion, which were anathema to the military trained in the tradition of honor. Skorzeny was assigned to lead Amt VI-S and promoted to Captain (*Hauptsturmfuehrer*) on 20 April 1943. In all probability, Kaltenbrunner, remembering Skorzeny's role in the *der Anschluss*, supported Skorzeny's assignment to lead this force.

At first, Skorzeny had almost no equipment and only one company of soldiers, who had battle experience as troops in the *Wehrmacht* but almost none in special operations. He recruited an old friend from his Viennese student days, Karl Radl, now an Army captain, who would remain with him for the rest of his military life. Radl was a very capable adjutant who maneuvered around opponents in the German Army, whereas Skorzeny bellowed and threatened them.

Captain Skorzeny acquired equipment from various sources: the *Brandenburg* Infantry Battalion, the SS Parachute Battalion, etc. Soon he had the equivalent of two battalions of highly trained, enthusiastic young men. Skorzeny often selected SS personnel convicted of various offenses in the hope they would exhibit sufficient daring to be effective commandos and could do what had to be done. Skorzeny immersed himself in captured British and other commando documents, going through these with the aid of dictionaries and following their exacting methods. Learning that German counterintelligence had penetrated the Dutch resistance and thus was able to use prisoners to acquire more equipment and agents from the British

(Operation NORTH POLE), Skorzeny went to Holland to see this operation for himself and to acquire anything from the captured troops who were willing to betray the Allies.[5]

During this period Skorzeny decided that his troops must be capable of the following: Each man was expected to have a basic knowledge of rifles and artillery pieces. He had to be able to operate motorcycles, motorboats, autos, and locomotives. Many were taught foreign languages. All were taught sabotage techniques and how to use secret weapons and general assault tactics against enemy industrial centers. His requirements paralleled the strict requirements of some special forces today. Skorzeny could propose an operation for his men, but it had to be approved by Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, or Schellenberg.

In the summer of 1943 Skorzeny and his men parachuted into Iran and made contact with various tribes in order to slow down Allied supplies going to the Soviet Union. Skorzeny considered this operation to have failed due to inadequate reinforcements and supplies.

MUSSOLINI'S RESCUE

The Italian elite and the general populace deeply resented the fact that Benito Mussolini had gotten them into a war that Italy was losing. This created a crisis in the Italian leadership leading to the removal of Mussolini on 25 July 1943.[6] On 26 July Captain Skorzeny was summoned to Hitler's headquarters, the Wolf's Lair, in East Prussia. When Skorzeny entered Hitler's headquarters, he was able to describe the furnishings in minute detail, a very important ability for an intelligence officer. Hitler told him that his friend, Mussolini, had been betrayed and arrested by the king, Victor Emmanuel. Mussolini's whereabouts were unknown, but Hitler wanted his friend rescued before his captors, then carrying out secret negotiations with the Allies, could turn him over to the Americans or the British. The more Hitler spoke, the stronger Skorzeny felt the *Fuehrer*'s hold on himself, which he later described as "…quasi-hypnotic powers of persuasion…"[7] Skorzeny had the cooperation of the *Luftwaffe*, General Kurt Student's troops from the German Parachute Division, and the *Waffen* SS for this task. Skorzeny flew to Rome with 50 of his men and some parachute troops from General Student's unit.

Captain Skorzeny and his friend Radl began asking street vendors, as well as patrons of bars, restaurants, and night clubs about where "Il Duce" had been imprisoned. Despite the fact that Mussolini had been moved from one stronghold to another, he was finally sent to the island of Maddalena and placed in a hotel, the *Gran Sasso*, on a mountain peak approximately 3,000 feet above sea level and guarded by about 200 soldiers.[8] When Skorzeny

learned where Mussolini was interned, he and Radl flew over the *Gran Sasso*. Skorzeny soon spotted a meadow, a possible landing place near the hotel, but on a steep rocky slope, which he felt could be best approached by gliders and parachutists who were to combat the troops guarding Mussolini and cover his retreat with the "prize." On 27 August Skorzeny and Radl made one last personal reconnaisance of the island, discovering that the guards were sitting around drinking instead of being on the alert.[9]

Captain Skorzeny was able to get a battalion of parachutists from General Student's XI Parachute Corps and to kidnap an Italian officer, General Ferdinando Soleti, who had sent some of his own troops to the hotel, to come along in his glider. In doing so, Skorzeny hoped to prevent a fight with the Italian soldiers guarding Mussolini. Approaching the *Gran Sasso* on 12 September 1943 with twelve gliders, Skorzeny's glider somehow landed first on the steep meadow littered with boulders but caught the Italian guards by surprise. Skorzeny ran to the hotel, intimidating the Italian troops, and personally secured Mussolini without a shot being fired. He greeted Mussolini with the words: "The *Fuehrer* has sent me."[10] He then demanded that the Italian commander of *Gran Sasso* surrender, an outrageous order in view of the officer's strength, which the Italian strangely accepted. Skorzeny then disarmed the Italian troops, who did not fire for fear of hitting General Soleti. Moreover, the Italian troops, preferring rest and wine, had little inclination to fight Skorzeny's commandos and parachutists. There was a road to the valley below, but it was heavily guarded, requiring Skorzeny to fly out of this trap. Captain Skorzeny next took Mussolini to the pilot of the German *Fieseler* 156 *Storch* (Stork) light aircraft, which during the takeoff almost fell into a deep gorge approximately 3,000 feet below.

Finally they were airborne. Mussolini had been rescued and, for this venture, Skorzeny received the coveted Knight's Cross, a promotion to *Sturmbannfuehrer* (Major) of the *Waffen* SS, and the eternal gratitude of Adolf Hitler. Furthermore, Hitler was probably happy to award a medal for spectacular success to a fellow Austrian. Afterward, Skorzeny was "wined and dined" by such Nazi luminaries as *Feldmarschal* Wilhelm Keitel, Hitler's military advisor; Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop; Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels; and the *Fuehrer* himself, for whom he had now become "Hitler's commando." His fame spread quickly, since Dr. Joseph Goebbels made Skorzeny's dramatic achievement widely known.[11]

MARSHAL PETAIN IS ALMOST KIDNAPPED

According to *Abwehr* reports, Marshal Henri Phillipe Petain, head of Vichy France, was contemplating negotiations with the Free French in North Africa in order to switch sides in the conflict, as the Allies were in the ascendancy in that region. Hitler therefore ordered Major Skorzeny, then back in his headquarters in Friedenthal, to go to France with part of his force in November 1943 and to kidnap Petain. This operation was called off when Petain somehow found out the danger he was in (imprisonment or assassination) and gave up efforts to contact the Free French. On 20 December Skorzeny was ordered to return to Germany for another operation.

SKORZENY AND TITO

In his next assignment Skorzeny was ordered by Hitler to go to Yugoslavia to kill or capture Josip Broz Tito, who at the time was in command of more than 100,000 guerrillas and later became dictator of Yugoslavia.[12] Tito's forces were tying down a considerable number of German troops who were needed elsewhere. Skorzeny and an aide went to Belgrade in April 1944 and found that Tito was at Agram. Skorzeny and two of his men went to this area, infested with Tito's forces, somehow reaching Agram despite some narrow escapes in the process.[13] Before he could arrange an operation to attack Tito, a German general preempted Skorzeny, making a bomber, glider, and parachute attack on Tito's headquarters, which only forced Tito to escape and ruined Skorzeny's chances of capturing or killing his prey.

THE DANISH RESISTANCE

In 1943 Hitler's policy of draining food, gasoline, and natural resources from Denmark provoked its people into acts of massive sabotage. When the *Wehrmacht* and its security forces could not control the situation, Hitler turned to the man on whom he believed he could always rely: Otto Skorzeny. Skorzeny had returned from Yugoslavia to Berlin and on 28 December 1943 six of Skorzeny's men left Friedenthal for Copenhagen with Skorzeny soon joining them. He and his SS commandos killed a Danish publisher and a pastor, threw bombs into restaurants where resisters ate, dynamited a large movie theater, raided student groups, and bombed factories. The invasion of France by the Allies in June 1944 induced Hitler to recall Otto Skorzeny. Although war crimes trials in the post-war period failed to prove that Skorzeny led the brutal efforts to stamp out the resistance, Skorzeny admitted at Nuremberg that he was in Denmark in June 1944.

AN ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION

On 20 July 1944 German officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Klaus von Stauffenberg failed in their attempt to kill Hitler, resulting in the *Fuehrer*

beginning a bloodbath in his determination to stamp out every vestige of the military's revolt. In the ensuing confusion in Berlin, Skorzeny and some of his men tracked down conspirators, some of whom were strangled with piano wire and their bodies hung on meat hooks. Skorzeny's precise role in this violent rampage was to bring the victims to the *Gestapo* where detectives worked them over for more information.[14] Once again Hitler could rely on his commando.

THE HORTHY KIDNAPPING

When Hitler and Admiral Miklos Horthy,[15] dictator of Hungary, met in March 1944, Horthy demanded that the *Fuehrer* return the nine Hungarian divisions fighting on the Soviet front. Further, Hitler found out that the Hungarian leader had already sent a team of negotiators to Moscow to arrange peace terms, because the Soviets by this time were clearly defeating the Germans on a broad front. Moreover, Skorzeny's agents in Budapest found that the Hungarian government was sabotaging German war efforts by pillaging German supply trains which passed through this nation. Hitler made plans to occupy Hungary, sending Skorzeny ahead in September 1944 to seize the Citadel in Budapest, the center of Admiral Horthy's government on the Burgberg, a steep hill.

Hitler supplied Skorzeny with approximately 700 men for this operation—including his commandos, two paratroop companies, four companies of officer cadets, and a squadron of gliders—to seize control of Horthy and the Hungarian government. Knowing that Horthy was under the influence of his remaining son, Miklos ("Miki"),[16] Skorzeny kidnapped the young man, having him wrapped up in a rug and sent to Vienna. Obviously, this did not keep the old admiral on the German side. Despite the fact that all the roads going up to the Burgberg hill were mined and guarded by heavily armed troops, Skorzeny threw a cordon of SS troops around the hill. During the standoff he encountered a Hungarian general at the German headquarters who demanded to know German intentions in this situation. Sensing that the general was embarrassed for having to represent a government which had betrayed German forces, Skorzeny took advantage of the situation and demanded on 15 October that the mines be removed from the road leading to the Burgberg.

Later, when leading a German force of tanks and troops up to the castle, Skorzeny did not encounter mines or resistance from Hungarian troops. Utilizing the "take me to your leader" approach on a Hungarian officer, Skorzeny was able to enter Admiral Horthy's apartment, only to find that he had fled to place himself under the protection of the SS, a perfect solution for Skorzeny. Hitler next told Skorzeny to command the Citadel on a temporary basis until he took Admiral Horthy to the Hirschberg Castle in Bavaria. The Germans were able to place a pro-German at the head of Hungary who kept this nation as an ally of Germany until Hungary was overrun by the advancing Soviet Army which seized Budapest on 11 February 1945. For his achievements in the Hungarian kidnappings, Skorzeny was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel (*Obersturmbannfuehrer*).

SKORZENY AND CONNECTIONS BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

Despite the fact that Otto Skorzeny would be deeply involved in planning the attack in the Ardennes in November 1944, he was commissioned in November to establish resistance groups in the Soviet Bloc, working with General Reinhard Gehlen, Chief of German military intelligence on the Eastern Front, and SS *Sturmbannfuehrer* Dr. Erich Hengelhaupt in this project.[17]

They utilized former Soviet troops in POW camps and Vlasov followers[18] for the purpose of sabotage behind Soviet lines and to provide Germany with intelligence. Unfortunately, Soviet counterintelligence took over most of the communications of these groups and provided German intelligence officers what they wanted to believe. Of 100 of Skorzeny's agents who had been sent into the Soviet Bloc, only 15 returned, and the *Abwehr* could not tell whether or not they had been turned by the Soviets. Until the end of his life, Skorzeny did not believe that his organization had been corrupted by the Russians.[19]

SKORZENY AND THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

On 27 October 1944 Hitler summoned LTC Skorzeny to the Wolf's Lair in East Prussia to describe to him the coming attack on the Allies through the Ardennes (Operation GREIF). Hitler instructed Skorzeny to utilize his commandos in this operation to capture one or more of the bridges between Liege and Namur on the Meuse River before they could be destroyed.[20] Hitler also insisted that Skorzeny and his men wear American uniforms, adding that Skorzeny would be provided with a large group of German soldiers who were fluent in English. Skorzeny's SS commandos were also instructed to disrupt enemy forces by such methods as reversing and removing road signs. Skorzeny's force was eventually to number 3,500 men dressed in American uniforms. In his group only ten men spoke English fluently, far less than he had been led to believe and a source of failure for his operation. Hitler hoped to seize Antwerp, the major supply port of the Allies.

The German military was generally "stunned" by this decision, based on the recognition of the hopelessness of the Reich's position. Even though Skorzeny had temporarily preserved Hungary as a German ally, Romania and Bulgaria had switched sides to fight for the Soviets, Finland had broken relations with Germany, and American troops had entered Germany at Aachen. The British were already in Holland.

On 16 December 1944 the German attack commenced with a barrage of 2,000 artillery pieces along the Belgian Ardennes front.[21] The American troops of the First Army, many on R&R, were quite unprepared for this onslaught, and Skorzeny's forces were able to infiltrate enemy lines. For example, one of his units, led by Wilhelm Giel, wore U.S. military police insignia and directed traffic in a small village behind American lines, sending GIs in the wrong direction. Another of his commando units discovered both an ammunition and gasoline dump, destroying both.[22]

Word went out that "the most dangerous man in Europe" had sworn to kill General Dwight D. Eisenhower, General Omar Bradley, and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. Elements of American forces believed that Skorzeny's force had been sent to assassinate General Eisenhower, who was consequently forced by his guards to become a virtual prisoner in his own headquarters, much to his displeasure.[23] Whether or not Skorzeny planned to kill Eisenhower, or the other Allied generals, has never been reliably settled. LTC Skorzeny's commandos did spread the rumor that one of their number was posing as British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, inducing American guards to shoot out the tires of his command car and to force him into the guard shelter for four hours until a British colonel could positively identify him.[24]

On the second day of the offensive Skorzeny realized that this operation had little chance of succeeding. At the end of the Ardennes offensive, Skorzeny found from an interview with Hitler that the *Fuehrer* had little idea of Germany's desperate situation and that the end of the war was approaching. On 30 January 1945 Himmler gave Skorzeny, who by then had none of his commandos, the job of forming a bridgehead on the east side of the Oder River near Schwed. Skorzeny thereupon gathered fleeing German soldiers, sick and wounded troops, soldiers from the Hermann Goering Division, and civilians from Schwedt to hold the sacred soil of Germany.[25] Skorzeny's ragtag force held out for six days after the initial Soviet attack before they moved to the west side of the river, holding onto the bridgehead until the end of February 1945. Skorzeny was recalled to Berlin at the end of February, since the *Fuehrer* had a new assignment for him.

WEREWOLVES

Skorzeny received an order from Hitler in which he was thanked for holding out so long on the Oder and assigned to utilize his commandos to blow up a bridge on the Rhine, an operation that failed. Despite his involvement in the Ardennes operation, Skorzeny trained approximately 400 Werewolves,[26] essentially guerrillas, from October 1944 to March 1945 to go to southern Germany and Austria and remain in the mountains from which they could fight behind enemy lines. Skorzeny and his friend Radl drove around the area to be used by these Werewolves and, finding no signs of an organized defense, gave up the project.[27] Nevertheless, a few thousand *Wehrmacht* soldiers did move into the region. Learning about this, General Eisenhower sent the Third Division under the command of Major General John W. O'Daniel to move into the Berchtesgaden area to attack the Werewolves. While looking for Skorzeny, they captured approximately 2,000 *Wehrmacht* troops. Nine days after Germany surrendered to the Allies on 7 May 1945, Skorzeny turned himself in to the Americans.

SKORZENY AND THE ALLIES

Skorzeny was brought before a court at Dachau on 18 August 1947 where a COL Alfred Rosenfeld sought to convict him at a time when he heard his friend Radl testify against him. His own attorney was LTC Robert Durst, who fought hard for his client, even though he seemed initially to be hostile to Skorzeny. When confronted by the charge that his men in the Ardennes Offensive wore American uniforms, Skorzeny answered that the Allies had done the same. In support of Skorzeny, Wing Commander Forrest Yeo-Thomas of the Royal Air Force testified that on many occasions he had his men wear German uniforms.[28] LTC Durst and Skorzeny explained that World War II had brought forth a new type of warfare which the Hague Convention, from another period, had not covered. The case against him was dismissed, but Skorzeny was not released.

He was transferred to a denazification camp at which time several other countries—the Soviet Union, Denmark, and Czechoslovakia—wanted to have Skorzeny extradited for war crimes. Skorzeny applied for a job with the U.S. Historical Branch, which wanted him to write about the Mussolini rescue, but the Historical Branch refused to comply with his demands. The Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), believing that if Hitler were still alive Skorzeny would lead them to him, gave Skorzeny a leave to visit his wife and daughter in Vienna, but kept him under constant surveillance. When in 1948 the conflict with the Soviet Union became apparent, American officials realized that U.S. forces in Europe were no match for the Soviets who

had not demobilized their forces as happened in the West. Skorzeny and other Nazis—such as Hjalmar Schacht, a financial genius who knew about hidden Nazi assets; the intelligence officer MG Reinhard Gehlen, who had faced the Soviets during the war; and especially Wernher von Braun, the rocket scientist—all became invaluable sources of information. When the North Koreans attacked South Korea in 1950, it was considered by many Allied officials as a prelude to a Soviet attack on Western Europe. At this time, the Allies had only seven undermanned divisions with which to hold Germany, against which the Soviets had 22 divisions, plus the new East German Army.[29]

In 1948 both the CIC and the CIA notified Skorzeny that the decision on his extradition could be delayed for only a few weeks, giving impetus to Skorzeny's plans to escape. Since his extradition would come in only a matter of days, his escape had to be accomplished immediately. Skorzeny was then assigned to a work force which went each day into Hannover to clean up the rubble, giving him the opportunity to escape, but he did not utilize this opportunity. His associates had already established plans for his getaway. On 27 July 1948, three ex-SS officers dressed as American MPs entered the Darmstadt camp "to take the prisoner to Nuremberg." Skorzeny later claimed that the uniforms were provided by the Americans.[30]

For a while he hid out in Germany where he worked for the Gehlen intelligence organization. When the organization assigned him to Paris to gather information about the Communist Party in France, he was spotted by a press photographer, resulting in his photograph being published in *Ce Soir* on 13 February 1950. Because of the uproar in France concerning his presence, he next went to Bavaria, where another photographer outed him.[31]

POSTWAR OPERATIONS

When he left Germany, Otto Skorzeny went to Spain. During World War II, Spain had received important minerals, such as lead and tungsten, from U-Boats, with German agents then transporting them to the homeland. After the war, Skorzeny and other Germans were welcome in this nation, even those with an SS background. Skorzeny at this time was interested chiefly in acquiring a personal fortune and desirable women, helping his SS comrades, and placing former Nazis in the new West German government. This was a "tall order" for a man wanted in Germany and operating from Spain. He was rumored to be involved in Spanish sales of weapons to Egypt and, if true, this could have been a lucrative endeavor for himself.[32] Further, Skorzeny was the secret representative of VOEST, the United Austrian Iron and Steel Works, in Spain and South America. After divorcing his wife, he married Countess

Ilse von Finkenstein, a reasonably wealthy woman and niece of Hjalmar Schacht.

Skorzeny was at this time attempting to organize former SS members into an underground movement whose purpose was to resist communism and facilitate the evacuation of Western troops from Germany.[33] The Soviet menace encouraged American intelligence to cooperate with his group. The original idea for such an organization came from Martin Bormann, Hitler's private secretary, who had helped German industrialists transfer money, machine tools, and specialty steel to neutral countries for use after the war. With Bormann's disappearance and apparent death at the end of the war, Skorzeny replaced him, adding to Bormann's plan a strong emphasis on the welfare of former SS members. His organization became known as the *Odessa*, a codeword meaning the *Organization der Entlassene SS Angehorige* (Organization for the Release of Former SS Members). Part of this group's work was to operate *die Spinne* (the Spider), which maintained escape routes from Germany to Italy with safehouses every fifty miles.[34] Skorzeny sought to ensure that most of the drivers who delivered *The Stars and Stripes* were either members of, or sympathetic to, *die Spinne*, people who also delivered escaping SS members, such as Adolf Eichmann, responsible for the murder of millions of Jews.[35] According to the 66th Counterintelligence Corps, some of the leading members of *die Spinne* were Skorzeny, General Hasso von Manteuffel, an excellent commander on the Eastern front, and in Rome Monsignor Alois Hudal, Bishop of Eila, who saw as his Christian duty the saving of various people.[36] Schacht sent large amounts of funds to Skorzeny, who then decided where and how to use this money. There is a possibility that Skorzeny also obtained funds from Germans in the export-import business in Spain whom he blackmailed, threatening to reveal their Nazi pasts.[37]

Without Hitler's knowledge, Martin Bormann utilized Skorzeny during the war to ship money in armored trucks to southern Spain, where U-Boats were waiting to take these treasures to Argentina. Increasing numbers of German intelligence officers and military officers were arriving in Argentina with dictator Juan Peron's blessing, the result being a large Nazi contingent in Argentina. Skorzeny came to Argentina, perhaps in 1949, to reclaim this treasure. Peron's wife, Evita, had learned that various Germans had $800 million in bank deposits, 2,500 kilograms in gold, and 4,600 carats in diamonds and other assets in Argentina.[38] Skorzeny found that Evita was in control of this wealth, which she placed in deposits in her name in banks throughout Argentina.

Having heard about Skorzeny's rescue of Mussolini, Peron welcomed him. Skorzeny claimed that, according to reports, the only way Evita could be "softened up" was to

get into bed with her.[39] In order to obtain favor with the Perons, Skorzeny retrained the Peronista secret police, teaching them *Gestapo* tricks in order to control the extensive unrest in Argentina at the time. Afterward, these police were regarded as the most brutal in South America. Skorzeny made sure they were on constant lookout for any attempt on the lives of the Perons, apprehending in July 1947 two characters who, according to him, were planning to murder Evita, though this may have been a ruse to gain Evita's gratitude. Later she regarded Skorzeny as her hero. They went on 2- and 3-day trips to inspect government facilities, but were holed up in one of her secret locations. According to Charles Whiting, Skorzeny managed to obtain approximately $100 million of the Nazi gold from Evita, which he shipped back to Europe to finance his various fascist projects.[40] Though he may have been a great lover, it strains the imagination to believe such a story.

After Evita's death in September 1955, Peron's control of Argentina became questionable due to his desire for and flings with very young girls, a situation which very much concerned the Roman Catholic Church in Argentina. When Peron fell from power in late 1955, he escaped to Spain by way of Paraguay with the aid of former SS personnel and Skorzeny, who arranged through some of his influential friends in the Franco government for Peron to live in Madrid. Glenn B. Infield claims that Peron had to pay for this favor by giving Skorzeny "the remainder of the Bormann funds!"[41] Until the details of this money transfer are explained carefully, Infield's statement remains possible, but basically conjecture due to his lack of supporting information.

THE EGYPTIAN ADVENTURE

GEN Reinhard Gehlen and LTC Skorzeny had worked together during the war, with Skorzeny supposedly sending anti-Russian teams into the Soviet Union as far as the Urals,[42] though it is doubtful this goal could be accomplished in the tight counterintelligence state which characterized the Soviet Union.[43] After the war, Skorzeny helped to parachute teams into Albania, which were betrayed by Kim Philby, the notorious Soviet spy who was at the decision-making level of British MI6.[44] As an anti-Semite, Skorzeny was hired as military advisor to General Mohammed Naguib, who had forced King Farouk of Egypt out of power in 1952. Skorzeny brought former SS officers, such as General Oskar Dirlewanger and Colonel Adolf Eichmann, to Egypt to help train troops. GEN Gehlen recruited 200 former SS and *Wehrmacht* officers under the leadership of ex-General of Artillery Wilhelm Farnbacher.[45] The Egyptian government brought in German scientists and engineers, among them rocket scientists Paul Goercke, Wolfgang Pilz, and Hans Kleinwachter.[46] These men lived in penthouses, had sports

cars, and joined the Heliopolis Sporting Club. The Mossad, an Israeli intelligence service, saw these specialists as a threat to Israel's security and sent its agents to harass or kill them. Skorzeny provided each of the rocket scientists with Nazi-trained guards who accompanied them at all times.

In 1954 Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, an admirer of Hitler who had worked for German intelligence against the British in World War II, replaced Naguib, but this did not affect Skorzeny's position. Skorzeny trained the first Palestinian terrorists in commando techniques, which they used successfully for the most part in missions against Israel. Advising both the PLO and Al Fatah, he also smuggled automatic weapons from Belgium and Italy into Egypt.[47]

THE FINAL MISSION

When Nasser invited East German President Walter Ulbricht to visit Egypt, Bonn broke off relations with Egypt, and Infield claims this put an end to Skorzeny's activity in the country, though he does not explain how or why this should terminate Skorzeny's work there.[48] In his final years Skorzeny convinced, or bribed, German judges to postpone the trials of former SS officers and men, and in many cases he was able to keep his former compatriots out of jail. Skorzeny also helped smuggle Josef Mengele, a physician who experimented on Jewish prisoners, to Argentina.[49]

In his final years Skorzeny was plagued by pain from an operation which removed two malignant tumors from his spine, which left him able to walk but only with a shuffle. Afterward, cancer spread to the rest of his body. Skorzeny died on 7 July 1975 in bed in Madrid. Over 500 Nazis attended his funeral.

AN ASSESSMENT OF OTTO SKORZENY

Skorzeny is usually considered to have been a buccaneer, perhaps a wild man, but much to this author's surprise he was a very careful planner. Strategically, Skorzeny emphasized two elements: that of surprise and hitting the enemy at his weakest point, two basic tenets in the history of warfare, shown most clearly in the rescue of Mussolini and the kidnapping of Admiral Horthy and his remaining son. Working for the German Navy, Skorzeny discovered: "We soon found out that we were right once again in counting on the effectiveness of surprise."[50]

Skorzeny later wrote about his strategic approach, that of attacking the enemy at his most vulnerable point: "Another Allied 'heel of Achilles' was incontestably the

Suez Canal, or to be more accurate, certain of its passages."[51]   He later discovered this venture to be too dangerous due to British strength in the area. What is most impressive about Skorzeny is how he planned his operations in precise detail. For example, he wrote of the Mussolini caper: "Minutely we developed each phase of our raid, being careful to omit no detail and to foresee all eventualities. Finally our plan was completed and ready to be put into action".[52]   In describing the planning of one of his troops for a future attack, he wrote admiringly: "Young Warger had done a neat job; everything was marked with perfect precision, the distances, the gates, the sentry posts…"[53]   In planning for another assault, Skorzeny wrote: "These consisted in drawing up a detailed plan."[54]

As he planned for the Vichy operation, Skorzeny transmitted some of the following instructions, again showing his tendency to attempt to reach perfection in detail: "The purpose of this operation is to surround the city of Vichy with a cordon of troops as discretely as possible. The detachments will be posted in such a manner as to be able, at the first signal, to encircle…[55] and "With the help of Foelkersam and with minute care, I worked out in full detail the positions of our troops…"[56]

After the Vichy operation Skorzeny wrote in a scathing self-assessment: "What a fool I was, what an immeasurably stupid fool![57]   In regard to new developments Skorzeny was open to innovation, even when it sounded very different and even questionable. For example, he wanted to place pilots on the V1 and V2 missiles: "It was then that I was struck by the idea of attempting to do with these flying bombs what we had already accomplished with our Navy torpedoes. In other words, why not have a pilot steer the bomb?"[58]   Skorzeny's experiments with these V1 and V2 rockets worked out effectively most of the time, but they were prohibited by his superiors. He later stressed that these missiles should be launched from the deck of a submarine, possibly aiming for New York City, an idea compatible with Himmler's, but he was not able to persuade the Navy of the utility of this idea.[59]

Shortly after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944, Skorzeny found that Himmler had been appointed as Commandant of the Army. As a very good judge of the capabilities of other men, Skorzeny wrote: "Himmler was undoubtedly one of the *Fuehrer*'s ablest lieutenants but by the same token he was no soldier."[60]   As the Red Army under Marshal Zhukov approached Berlin, Himmler was put in charge of a force to stop this steamroller. He was simply not a general and had to be effectively removed on 16 February 1945 by General Heinz Guderian due to his military incompetence.[61]

Otto Skorzeny planned carefully, focusing on the details, vulnerabilities, and the purposes of an operation in order to avoid disaster, contrary to the American leadership which planned the Bay of Pigs operation. Strategically, he stressed surprise and hitting his enemy at his weakest point. Skorzeny practiced self-criticism, an important quality in an intelligence officer if he is to improve his performance. Skorzeny was open to innovation and, although his ideas sometimes appeared to work out well, they often proved to be defective and so were prohibited by his superiors. Otto Skorzeny was an able judge of character and capability of those in his environment. With the exception of his exploits in innovation, his life demonstrated the important qualities of an intelligence chief.

Notes
[1] Glenn B. Infield, *Skorzeny: Hitler's Commando* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 15.
[2] A *Faehnrich* is an officer-cadet who must prove that he has "the right stuff" before he can be commissioned.
[3] The *Leibstandarte* was an SS regiment for the protection of Hitler which later became a division engaged in warfare in the East under such leaders as General (later Field Marshal) Erich von Manstein.
[4] Like Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Schellenberg had initially been trained as a lawyer. The CIA has found law to be a good background for analysts, because they have been trained to know what is and what is not evidence.
[5] Infield, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[6] The Allies invaded Italy on 9 September 1943.
[7] Otto Skorzeny, *Skorzeny's Secret Missions* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1950), p. 67.
[8] Christopher Hibbert, *Mussolini* (New York: Palgrave Macmilllan, 2008), p. 228.
[9] Infield, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
[10] Heinz Hohne, *The Order of the Death's Head* (Hamburg: Sigbert Mohn Verrlag, 1966; reprint, New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), p. 617.
[11] Wilhelm Hoettel, *The Secret Front* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1953), p. 230.
[12] Infield, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
[13] Skorzeny, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
[14] William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1980), pp. 1068-69.
[15] Admiral Horthy had been an officer in the Austro-Hungarian Navy.
[16] Hoehne, *Order of the Death's Head*. The kidnapping operation was given the codename "Mouse" based on the belief that young Horthy's name was "Mickey."
[17] Heinz Hoehne, *Der Krieg im Dunkeln* (Augsburg: Bertlsmann Verlag, 1998), p. 452.
[18] General Andrei Vlasov had been a Soviet general who defected to the Germans.
[19] Hoehne, *op. cit.*, p. 455.
[20] Infield, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
[21] Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
[22] Infield, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
[23] Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[24] Infield, *op. cit*., p. 88.

[25] Infield, op. cit., pp. 102-03.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

[27] Whiting, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96.

[28] Infield, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-42.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 180-82. How Skorzeny affected the choice of drivers for *The Stars and Stripes* is another question, one that should be examined.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 181.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

[38] Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

[39] Infield, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

[40] Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

[41] Infield, *op. cit.*, 204.

[42] Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[43] John J. Dziak, *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1988).

[44] Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[45] *Ibid.*, p 115.

[46] Infield, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

[48] Infield, op. cit., p. 217.

[49] Mengele later went to Brazil and then to Paraguay, where he died.

[50] Skorzeny, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 83..

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 134-36.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[61] Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, *Himmler* (New York: G.P. Putnam' Sons, 1965), pp. 212-13.

Dr. Kenneth J. Campbell graduated from Kenyon College and received MA degrees from Johns Hopkins University and from the University of Maryland. He subsequently completed a doctorate at the University of Maryland. His area of specialization is German military intelligence. Dr. Campbell can be reached at kcamp@comcast.net. He is a frequent contributor to this Journal *and in particular to its historical "Profiles in Intelligence" series.*

In My View...

Bringing a Defector Back Under U.S. Control

by Leland C. McCaslin

My experience is that most defectors deserted because they were in trouble with the German or American authorities; very few defected due to ideological beliefs. And they usually did it at 4:30 p.m. at the start of a weekend!

An unforgettable incident occurred as one unnamed U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) defector decided to turn himself in to U.S. authorities. Security personnel at USAREUR HQ in Heidelberg did their best to bring defectors back under U.S. control without incident. These defectors could and probably did give away important U.S. information if they possessed classified data (physically or in their brains). Even the unclassified information they possessed had its value.

This particular USAREUR defector was making his way south of Germany to provide propaganda against the United States, at the direction of the foreign intelligence service that was handling him. He reconsidered on his way to meet those foreign agents; instead, he surrendered to a U.S. Embassy south of Germany. The Embassy soon called USAREUR HQ and told us they had our man. We were asked what action we wished them to take?

Here were the players in this true plot:

- *The military personnel* from the southern U.S. Embassy driving the defector north to Germany.
- *The MPs* from a unit located in southern Germany who would receive the subject at the border on German soil.
- *U.S. Army pilots* who would take the prisoner from the southern border MPs and fly him home to his unit in central Germany with their own on-board MPs.

We quickly devised a plan where the Embassy personnel would drive the subject north to West Germany, just over the border where the local southern-based MPs would take possession of him.

"But how will we know if those MPs are legitimate and are the right MPs," asked one of the Embassy personnel? I puzzled over that question and improvised. I told the MPs they should take with them a page from that day's MP Desk Blotter (which listed the who, what, and when of all arrests made that day) for a means of identification. I told the Embassy personnel the same thing. They were satisfied.

Next we studied maps and, along with flight operations personnel, located a seldom used but operational civilian airstrip near that sector of the southern border where the defector would be crossing. With all these participants involved and the Embassy personnel already driving north to Germany with the subject, phones were ringing off the hook and things were getting hectic. Meanwhile, the normal business day had ended and personnel were starting to head home.

The Keyes Building at USAREUR HQ was where the top generals had their offices – I considered it the HQ of the HQ. We then telephoned the Keyes Building, which controlled flight authorizations. We told officials there we had a real-world intelligence mission unfolding and needed a small plane or helicopter dispatched to the subject's unit to pick up MPs and then move on to that southern airstrip, receive the prisoner, and return home. They agreed; they would put the plan in operation. Everyone had their instructions. I could do no more than just sit back, monitor, and watch the clock as the wee hours of the night/morning ticked by. Had I forgotten anything?

Many hours passed; I watched AFN-TV and drank lots of black coffee. The mission was eventually a success. The subject was turned over by the U.S. Embassy personnel to the local southern MPs at the border. They drove him to the southern airstrip where the Army pilots and home unit MPs were waiting for him. There he was rearrested and flown handcuffed to his home unit. That was a tiring but an exciting evening and night. I recall he was tried by court-martial and convicted.

As the top intelligence brass met the next morning in Heidelberg at the regularly scheduled Indications & Warning Briefing (I&W Brief), my boss told the assembled group, "We have been working a problem all night. Let me brief you on it…" By then, I was home fast asleep in bed.

Leland C. McCaslin graduated from Mississippi State University in 1969 where he majored in communications, studied military science, and obtained his Army commission as a 2LT in Military Intelligence. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic course and the Counterintelligence Special Agent course. He then joined the U.S. Civil Service and served at the Pentagon from 1973 to 1976. He arrived in Germany in 1979 and actively participated in the Cold War for 16 years, retiring in 1995. At that time he was the most senior security specialist in the European theater. While overseas, Lee earned a master's degree in education from Boston University. After retiring from government service, he taught speech at several local colleges in Alabama and then worked as a contract investigator for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) with 9/11-related duties. He is now fully retired.

The author standing at the East German border along the Fulda Gap back when the Cold War was still hot.

NMIA Bookshelf

WORDS OF INTELLIGENCE: AN INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL'S LEXICON FOR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN THREATS
Jan Goldman.
Plymouth, UK, and Lanham, MD.
Scarecrow Press. 2011.

Reviewed by Daniel W. Opstal, a 2011 graduate of the National Defense Intelligence College and a policy team lead at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. He also serves as an adjunct professor at American Military University.

Jan Goldman's book *Words of Intelligence* is a useful compendium of intelligence-related terminology, especially for those in the field of intelligence education. Unlike the acronym and definition lists which are replete in government documents and websites, Dr. Goldman includes useful idiomatic, anecdotal, and factual data about many terms in his lexicon. This information, coupled with ample sourcing records, allows the reader to pursue more in-depth study of specific intelligence topics.

Goldman uses idiomatic or non-literal expressions to help define challenging intelligence-related terminology. This is especially useful for intelligence expressions that are, for lack of a better word, analytic or technical jargon. For example, he defines the "Paradox of Expertise" as "the more a person becomes an expert in a particular area...the more likely that person will miss changes that would normally be detected by those with less knowledge or experience," but goes on to use the idiom that the analyst may miss "the forest for the trees" in order to drive his point home (p. 207). A similar example is found in the definition of "creeping normalcy" using the parable of the "boiling frog." The concept is that a frog will attempt to jump out of boiling water but will not try to escape if the water is heated gradually. This metaphor helps explain the concept that a more capable adversarial military posture may be developed by incremental changes in capability over a period of time (p. 73). The implication is that these changes may be imperceptible to the intelligence analyst focused on the subject. Providing these non-literal examples allows the reader to perceive the terms from a different perspective, enhancing understanding (although non-native English speakers may have trouble with some of the non-literal expressions). Similar definitions are explained by more anecdotal evidence.

Defining the euphemistic term "exformation," seemingly referring to both the process and product of explicitly discarded information that guides the generation of true information in the mind, comes from an anecdote in a novel written by Denmark's leading science fiction writer (p. 113). Tors Norrestrander's work on consciousness helps Goldman define an important concept of understanding analytic processes as they are happening. Similarly, the term "missile gap" refers to various anecdotes fueled by 1960s U.S. political rhetoric on the growth of Soviet inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) numeric strength vice the U.S. missile count (p. 181). Goldman notes that the various services each had significantly different order of battle numbers for the USSR's ICBMs using information from Edgar Bottom's work *The Missile Gap.* The unique sources of Goldman's information should aid in the lexicon's appeal to intelligence analysts across the Community, as many of the definitions provide more depth than those found in the useful Defense Technical Information Center's *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* website (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/). Factual information is the last general category of definitions that Goldman uses, primarily in the context of relevant intelligence history.

Goldman presents a bite-size chunk of information about an event like Germany's World War II Operation BARBAROSSA in the context of a Soviet intelligence failure at the policymaker level. The USSR believed information suggesting a German surprise attack on Russia to be British counterintelligence and chose to ignore it (p. 203). These sets of definitions are challenging, because there is so much to cover in IC history and the differing functional management architectures. For example, Goldman does not do justice to the field of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) because he does not include the term as defined by the IC's GEOINT functional manager (Director, NGA) in its doctrinal Publication 1.0. This minor issue does not diminish the value of the book, however.

Writing a book on lexicon means your data are often out of date the minute they are published. That said, the value to classroom discussion and debate of a work that highlights definitions in logical context is tremendous. In an era when deep reading is quickly becoming a lost art, these teaser definitions enable a student to learn some relevant information quickly and then dive more deeply into the source material later for academic work such as term

papers. Contextualized definitions, like that of Operation BARBAROSSA above, serve as springboards for greater knowledge. The book is also a good quick reference guide for the senior analyst or policymaker who is looking for reference information on a specific topic. An example is the rarely mentioned Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS), a unique program of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention focused on applied epidemiology topics, such as understanding chronic disease threats (p. 110).

The EIS definition underscores Dr. Goldman's efforts to write his "words" for a highly complex, post-9/11 intelligence system that relies on conventional and unconventional local, national, and international sources of information. His work reflects the vast complexity that underlies the current Intelligence Community. Therefore, Goldman's book should be made a part of ongoing intelligence training efforts and serve as a reference for intelligence operations at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. There should also be some thought given to how it can continue to help guide and expand upon definitions found in online documents such as the *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* mentioned above. Goldman's creative overview of intelligence terminology makes for a handy reference in any intelligence library.

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EXPLORING INTELLIGENCE ARCHIVES: ENQUIRIES INTO THE SECRET STATE

R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott (eds.).
New York, Routledge. 2008.
352 pages.

Reviewed by Nate Jones, Freedom of Information Act Coordinator for the National Security Archive based at George Washington University.

In his introduction to this lengthy volume, Peter Jackson writes, "The practice of ignoring the role of intelligence in international politics. . . is thankfully no longer tenable." For those studying this role of intelligence, *Exploring Intelligence Archives* provides an excellent historiography of intelligence research, presents eleven specific documentary examples of how intelligence shaped international history, and serves as a trustworthy guide to the methods and pitfalls of studying documents that were once closed to the public.

Exploring Intelligence Archives begins with a gem of a historiographical essay entitled "Knowledge is Never Too Dear." The meticulously footnoted essay, written by R. Gerald Hughes and Len Scott, quotes Henry Kissinger, Otto

Von Bismarck, and Daniel Defoe—among many others—to provide "a navigational tool" for use within the study of intelligence. First, the authors survey the sources available to the public: including leaks, memoirs, press accounts, internal histories, and—yes—archives. The authors note that scholars of American intelligence often take for granted the "privileges and opportunities" of the U.S. declassification policy, which "remains the most liberal globally." Hughes and Scott make a compelling case that the study of intelligence, although it "presents particular challenges to the historian," is essential for understanding the history of the 20th and 21st centuries.

Next, the editors present eleven case studies of intelligence documents now in the public domain, spanning from British signals intelligence in 1930 to the 2004 Butler Report which investigated the intelligence that led to the Iraq War. Each document, or group of documents, is bracketed with an overview and commentary. Generally, the overview explains the document's provenance and contextualizes the document's importance in history. The commentary analyzes the document from the perspective of an intelligence historian; important insights are found in both types of analyses, which often overlap. The editors paid a supreme favor to their readers by including actual reproductions—rather than transcriptions—of documents whenever possible.

Highlighted documents from *Exploring Intelligence Archives* include the analysis of the XX (or Double Cross) Committee, which was created during the Second World War to provide disinformation to Great Britain's enemies. For this disinformation to be believed, MI5 and SIS also had to provide actual intelligence that harmed—but would not damn—Britain's war effort. This information was coined "chicken feed" and the process of how the XX Committee determined which legitimate secrets could be "sacrificed" so that disinformation would be believed is documented here. Perhaps the most successful use of disinformation in the Second World War was Operation FORTITUDE, in which Juan Pujol Garcia, a double agent for Great Britain, passed disinformation—bolstered by "chicken feed" of actual ship movements—that untruthfully reported to his German handlers that the Allies' June 1944 invasion of Normandy was merely a feint.

The documents reproduced in "The CIA and Oleg Penkovsky, 1961-63" reveal in minute detail the CIA's sources and methods—including dead drops and telephone calls about bingo—that were used to run an asset on the streets of Moscow. According to Charles Cogan, then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates pushed the Penkovsky history out of the CIA's vaults. Authors Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter Deriabin were allowed to read seventeen boxes of CIA documents while writing their

"CIA-authorized" biography titled *The Spy Who Saved the World*. However, Cogan's and Scott's analysis of the documents—which are also on the CIA's website—concludes that Penkovsky did not, in fact, play a real-time role during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Penkovsky's contribution to the crisis was "minor, but nevertheless important." He provided a manual containing a sketch of how a Soviet SS-4 missile field would be employed. This knowledge helped the CIA interpret the U-2 images and confirm that missiles were in fact on the island. The most fascinating aspect of the Penkovsky documents is the exposure of Agency sources and methods. It is curious that the CIA chose to allow their release in this particular case, but has fought tooth and nail to prevent the release of other, even older documents, such as a 1917 recipe for invisible ink.

Although it did not come from an "intelligence archive," Loch K. Johnson's previously unpublished transcript of a conversation with DCI William E. Colby provides a fascinating and candid account of a retired maven. Colby provides his insight on a range of issues including Congressional intelligence oversight ("worked out very well" despite "glitches" like Iran-Contra); HUMINT (Sometimes it can be valuable, "so you can't afford to say no"); covert action ("It would be a mistake to get rid of it. Did we overuse it? Probably in some cases"); and his views on the 1964 Nosenko incarceration, in which a suspected Soviet double agent was illegally detained and held in solitary confinement for more than three years ("What the hell happened to habeas corpus? This is pretty fundamental. For an intelligence agency to do that in this country – Jesus!").

The primary shortcoming of *Exploring Intelligence Archives* is its endpoint (although of course one must keep in mind its publication date of 2008). An analysis of the recently declassified "Torture Memos" would have been most welcome. Equally valuable would have been treatment of the WikiLeaks phenomenon and how it has (or has not) changed the collection, dissemination, and access to intelligence. And of course, readers must use caution while inspecting these documents to ensure that they are not, themselves, consuming only "chicken feed" from the secret state.

Nevertheless, *Exploring Intelligence Archives* is a terrific survey of the intelligence field. Experts and novices will learn much from reading the selected documents, the authors' expert analyses of them, and the thousands of footnotes of substantiation. And if we're lucky, the authors will build upon this foundation in a second edition or Internet appendix to cover the developments of the last four years.

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ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT TO DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY
Simon Chesterman.
New York, NY, Oxford University Press. 2011.
297 pages.

Reviewed by Erik D. Jens, a National Intelligence University faculty member specializing in intelligence collection, ethics, and law. Trained as a lawyer at the University of Michigan, he served for many years as a Russian and Persian Farsi linguist, Army NCO, commissioned officer, and civilian intelligence officer with multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is currently on a rotational assignment to the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, where he is teaching while undertaking research for a PhD.

At what point will citizens of Western democracies rebel against the trend of ever-increasing electronic and video surveillance by their elected governments? According to Simon Chesterman, the answer is, "It's too late." His new book, *One Nation Under Surveillance*, convincingly shows how ever-increasing government surveillance "has been greeted with extraordinary equanimity, perhaps characterized by an equal mix of acceptance and apathy" (p. 261). Chesterman argues that, given the battle against government *collection* has largely been lost, citizens can and should "assert more agency" by focusing on laws to limit their governments' acceptable *use* of what they collect.

The book's title, by the way, significantly underpromises: Chesterman limits himself neither to one nation nor to surveillance. *Surveillance* ranges from historical background and philosophical doctrines relating to national security and the rule of law, to the outsourcing of surveillance and other intelligence activities, to international issues affecting intelligence activities generally. Its focus, however, repeatedly returns to the national security and surveillance regimes of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Chesterton notes the irony of citizens protesting government inroads into the private sphere, while casually giving up almost all their personal data for financial and/or trivial purposes. The generations who once mailed sealed letters and "confide(d) in diaries locked with a key" are gradually giving way to today's technophiles who think nothing of blogging intimate details (or worse) for the world to see. In any case, Chesterton argues, efforts to rein

in government collection of a citizen's personal data are "doomed to failure because…governments are increasingly [required and] able to collect it, and citizens increasingly accept that they will collect it" (p. 4).

Early in *Surveillance*, Chesterman lays the groundwork for his legal analyses of surveillance laws by introducing three theories of whether sovereigns responding to national crises remain subject to the rule of law. The first theory, "business as usual," allows the sovereign no special freedoms from rule of law, regardless of the crisis at hand. Another approach, "accommodation," provides in law for "emergency powers" for the executive; Congress' September 2001 "Authorization for Use of Military Force" roughly follows this model. (Chesterman also cites the Roman Empire's legal provision for emergency dictators, who were exempt from the law but could not make new laws; that experiment led directly to a 300-year dictatorship.) Finally, there are "extra-legal measures," epitomized by Cicero's *Inter arma enim silent leges,* and more prosaically by Franklin Roosevelt's Attorney General, who wrote that "the Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President" (p. 50). (Chesterman himself seems to favor the first model, noting that postwar democracies have successfully dealt with major crises within the framework of existing laws.)

Chesterman discusses three waves of Intelligence Community reform in the United States since World War II: the National Security Act of 1947, which put the U.S. Intelligence Community on a legislative basis; the Church Committee reforms of the 1970s and 1980s; and post-9/11 reforms centered around the Patriot Act and the 2004 passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). He highlights the moral hazard to policymakers of aiming to "prevent attacks on the homeland *at any cost*"; presuming that every terror attack must be the result of an IC failure leads logically to "the dangers of unfettered national security agencies" (p. 105).

The author contrasts the U.S. Intelligence Community with its UK counterpart, which operated with almost no legislative basis until 1989. American readers may find especially useful his detailed discussion of British national security laws. Perhaps due to the UK's recent history of IRA attacks, urban crime resulting from economic troubles, and periodic threats from the mainland, Britons seem far more tolerant of government surveillance than their friends across the pond.

Chesterman distinguishes the *collection* of video and other surveillance (London being Exhibit A for ubiquitous, computer-aided video surveillance) from its vastly expanded *exploitation* made possible by data-mining techniques, linked video networks, license plate readers,

facial recognition programs, etc. Regarding high-tech collection of nearly all kinds as a *fait accompli*, he advocates a focus instead on limiting governments' permissible use of what it collects.

Surveillance's discussion of the United Nations' perennial, mostly failed efforts to create and maintain a viable intelligence organization is well worth reading. He notes the reluctance of most states to compromise their own sovereignty by supplying intelligence to the UN, excepting biased or selective "intelligence" to further their own agendas. While there are clear problems with establishing a UN intelligence *collection* capability, an *analytic* capability is less problematic. Even this, however, is a hard sell, tending to raise apoplectic, if ill-founded, warnings about a "UN CIA."

Finally, Chesterman uses Hobbes' theory of a social contact between ruler and ruled to introduce his proposed "new social contract" to govern governments' access to citizens' information. Chesterman identifies three applicable principles. Firstly, "the intelligence powers exercised must be *public*" (i.e., limits on outsourcing to contractors, and public debates and laws regarding the limits of intelligence authorities) (p. 254). Secondly, all intelligence entities must be "established by law" (p. 255). Thirdly, oversight of intelligence agencies must entail consequences for violation. Chesterman, while admitting that his proposed principles "may sound obvious, if not trite (p. 258), notes that, as abundantly documented throughout his book, even these basic minimums are too often sidestepped or flouted by the United States and the United Kingdom, among many other nations.

If the perhaps overbroad range of topics covered in this ostensibly surveillance-focused book is its worst flaw, that is faint criticism indeed. Dr. Chesterton has produced an outstandingly researched and well-argued examination of the current and near-future relationship of the Western, democratic "surveillance state" (however well-intentioned) to its citizens.

Editor's Note: Simon Chesterman is Global Professor and Director of the New York University School of Law Singapore Program, and Vice Dean (Graduate Studies) and Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law. From 2004 to 2006 he was Executive Director of NYU's Institute for International Law and Justice, of which he remains a senior fellow. He is a graduate of the University of Melbourne in Australia and, as a Rhodes Scholar, earned a PhD in international law from Oxford University.

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Review Essay

REALISM WITHOUT HYSTERIA: THREE BOOKS THAT AID IN CRITICAL TERRORISM ANALYSIS

by CDR (USN) Youssef Aboul-Enein

Commander Aboul-Enein is a Navy Medical Service Corps officer and Middle East Foreign Area Officer with over a decade of active experience at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, DC. He is also an adjunct faculty member for Middle East Counterterrorism Analysis at the National Intelligence University. He is author of *Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat* (Naval Institute Press, 2010) and *Iraq in Turmoil: Historical Perspectives of Dr. Ali al-Wardi from the Ottomans to King Feisal* (Naval Institute Press, 2012).

The business of counterterrorism requires constant reading, and British publisher Routlege provides several of the few peer-reviewed journals on terrorism. These journals include *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Critical Studies in Terrorism*; both, along with the *Jane's* journals and various reports on crime and terrorism, compose part of my reading routine. Routlege Publishers in the UK offers a collection of books under the heading "Contemporary Terrorism Studies" and a thought-provoking collection of volumes under the title "Critical Terrorism Studies." Both should be a delight for those involved in counterterrorism analysis and the constant struggle with sources.

This review essay will feature three books from these two series published by Routlege. The first, titled *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, edited by Richard Jackson, et al., was published in 2009 and is 269 pages. The book contains twelve chapters written by academics in Europe and the United States. Magnus Ranstorp of the Swedish National Defence College criticizes the state of terrorism studies that he feels disproportionately focus on al-Qaeda. He also laments the corrosive effect of what he terms "embedded expertise," and the failure to question the credentials of self-proclaimed terrorism experts. He identifies alleged scholars in the field who have lied about their credentials or have created a new resume to justify their expertise in terrorism. A chapter by Andrew Silke of the University of East London surveys articles from two peer-reviewed journals and argues quantitatively the research emphasis given to al-Qaeda, WMD, and suicide terrorism. He criticizes the field by arguing the lack of history-based research and the focus on literature-based research. Katerina Delacoura writes an excellent chapter demonstrating the impact Middle East studies have had on the critical analysis of terrorism. The volume is for the true student of counterterrorism analysis as it challenges conventional scholarship on the subject of terrorism.

Ben Sheppard of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC, takes an interdisciplinary approach to help readers understand how the public responds to terrorist attacks. His book, *The Psychology of Strategic Terrorism: Public and Government Responses to Attack*, is 243 pages and was published in 2008. It presents the hypothesis that the public is not prone to panic and that changes to mass behavior are designed to reduce the perceived risk of being a victim of terrorism. It uses data from missile attacks and terrorism to focus on mass psychological responses to violence. Sheppard combines psychology, psychiatry, international relations, risk communication, risk perception, and risk amplification to help us understand mass responses to terrorism. Five cases are featured, including Israeli civil responses to Saddam Hussein's SCUD attacks in 1991, the Tokyo sarin gas attack, 9/11, the 2011 anthrax attack, and Israel and the second intifada. Each has an initial shock phase but then the mass response settles into a routine adapting to violence, with the study revealing that terrorism as a tactic is not the most effective option for political change. His study helps governments think about responses after a terrorist attack and a narrative to help shape the mass proclivity to adapt. It is a complex and nuanced study for those with a passion for counterterrorism studies.

Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith of King's College assert that even terrorism of the nihilist variety can be seen as a method of fulfilling the ends of policy. *The Strategy of Terrorism: How it Works, and Why it Fails*, published by Routlege in 2007, is a blending of strategic theory with the study of terrorism. It helps readers use the logic of Carl von Clausewitz in assessing terrorist groups. To paraphrase Clausewitz, "War is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will." Terrorism, therefore, can be seen as a tactic like other tactics of war. It is a valuable work since it helps train the mind to take a value-neutral stance toward terrorism, which is absolutely necessary to cultivate empathy and not sympathy in intelligence analysis, thereby entering into decision cycles. It challenges the convention of terrorists as irrational actors or intellectually thinking that terrorism does not fall into other modes of tactical operations designed to effect changes in behavior and policy or to attain compliance forcibly. It is an excellent and thoughtful read designed to bring realism without hysteria in counterterrorism discourse.

These three Routlege titles are sophisticated studies in terrorism analysis and, while one may disagree with aspects of their arguments, there can be no doubt the reader will come away with a deeper perspective on the subject. They unlock the response and counter-response to terrorism, as well as the challenges this tactic has created operationally and strategically in the 21st century.

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Review Essay

HOW TO DO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: A REVIEW OF (SOME OF) THE LITERATURE

by Kristan Wheaton

Kristan Wheaton is an Assistant Professor at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies and a retired U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer.

Titles reviewed:

Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis (2nd printing). David T. Moore. Washington, DC, NDIC Press, 2007. 134 pages. Available at http://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Critical_Thinking.pdf.

Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution. David T. Moore. Washington, DC, NDIC Press, 2011. 195 pages. Available at http://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Sensemaking.pdf.

Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis. Richards J. Heuer, Jr., and Randolph L. Pherson. Washington, DC, CQ Press, 2010. 343 pages.

Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action. Sarah Miller Beebe and Randolph L. Pherson. Washington, DC, CQ Press, 2011. 241 pages.

A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis. Central Intelligence Agency, 2009. 40 pages. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf.

The Investigative Analytical Process. Irvin D. Sugg, Jr. Washington, DC, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2010. 84 pages.

An Introduction to Intelligence Research and Analysis. Jerome Clauser (revised and edited by Jan Goldman). Lanham, MD, Scarecrow Press, 2008. 234 pages.

Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices. Russell G. Swenson, ed. Washington, DC, JMIC Press, 2003. 145 pages. Available at http://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Bringing_Intelligence_About.pdf.

Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (2nd ed.). Roger George and James Bruce, eds. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2008. 352 pages.

Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security. Thomas Fingar. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2011. 192 pages.

La Boîte à Outils de l'Intelligence Économique. Christophe Deschamps and Nicolas Moinet. Paris, DUNOD, 2011. 192 pages.

Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers, and Users. Don McDowell. Lanham, MD, Scarecrow Press, 2008. 286 pages.

Books on how to do intelligence analysis (and, in particular, the ones reviewed for this essay) do not fall neatly into discrete categories. At one end, there are volumes such as David Moore's *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis* which provide context and overarching structure; at the other end lie more practical texts such as Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson's *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*. Looked at from a slightly different angle, books on analysis also run the gamut from the deeply personal *Reducing Uncertainty* by Thomas Fingar to a carefully crafted anthology such as *Analyzing Intelligence*, edited by Roger George and James Bruce. This essay, then, is not designed to be comprehensive; rather, it is designed to provide some sense of the range of what is generally available.

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David Moore's two books, his 2006 *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis* (revised in 2007) and his 2011 *Sensemaking*, should be read together. This is not because this is a series or because Moore intended for one to be the continuation of the other. Rather, it is because the two texts fit neatly together as baseline descriptions of core concepts in intelligence analysis.

In *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis*, Moore wisely does not try to make the case that improving critical thinking, by itself, is a panacea for all the ills that beset

intelligence analysis. Instead, he focuses on the idea that improving the critical thinking abilities of analysts is not only possible but also "appears capable of leading analysts to adopt personal habits of thought appropriate to the resolution of hard intelligence problems."

I found Moore's dissection of the various ways of defining critical thinking to be particularly helpful. While he settles on the work of Paul and Elder as the basis for his more nuanced reasoning, he does not come to that conclusion casually, exploring along the way several alternatives. Also of interest is Moore's understanding of the changing nature of intelligence analysis (developed in collaboration with Greg Treverton), where he succinctly lays out the differences across multiple tasks between the analyst of the 1970s, 80s, 90s, and the current analytic environment.

While most of the reviews of this book (and Moore bravely includes them as front matter) are positive, there are a few artificial quibbles. My own issue is that, while Moore more than adequately defends critical thinking skills for intelligence analysis, he provides little practical guidance for analysts seeking to improve their critical thinking skills with specific techniques. To be sure, he does point the way. Included as an appendix are the lesson plans for his course in developing practical critical thinking skills (based, it seems, largely upon his own research and such venerable texts as Morgan's *Thinker's Toolkit* and Heuer's *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*). I could not help but wish, however, that Moore had used his insightful mind and wealth of experience to filter through the fairly extensive literature on critical thinking techniques to help focus the modern analyst on those few, most important, skills.

Sensemaking, on the other hand, has a more revolutionary feel to it. Here Moore argues for not just an improvement but a fundamental change in the way analysis is done. In fact, he seems in favor of abandoning analysis entirely: "For practitioners to create intelligence knowledge—even with an acknowledged degree of uncertainty—therefore requires much more than mere 'analysis.' One alternative framework is embodied in the concept of 'sensemaking'."

I found *Sensemaking* to be even more intellectually stimulating than Moore's previous work. Here is a new idea—one of which I am admittedly not that fond—ably defended. Especially useful was Moore's discussion of so-called "wicked problems" and his skillful integration of intelligence and other literatures into that discussion. Also fascinating was Moore's examination of using multiple methods as a way of triangulating analytic results. Moreover, I found Moore's fairly detailed analysis of "rigor" as an analytic metric to be particularly intriguing (making Chapter 8 of *Sensemaking* required reading in my mind).

Make no mistake about it, though: This is tough sledding. Moore pulls no punches as he bobs and weaves his way from topics as difficult and as different as complexity theory and non-state actors. Probably too challenging for an introductory text, even many experienced professionals will likely find this book at the edges of their intellectual maps (under the hand-written note that says, "*Hic sunt dracones*").

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At the other end of the spectrum from Moore's high theory are the practical guidebooks (of which there are a growing number). Foremost of these is probably Richards Heuer and Randy Pherson's *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*. It is an enormously useful reference book and, as I travel around the country bumping, as I do, into analysts in the national security, law enforcement, and business communities, it is the book most likely to be on top of (and usually open on) an analyst's desk.

Much of its appeal comes from the extreme attention the authors and publishers paid to its accessibility. Cleanly formatted with useful tabs and a number of illustrations, the book begs to be flipped through, consulted, and read. Similar to Mercyhurst's own *Analyst's Cookbook* series, *Structured Analytic Techniques*' primary focus is a series of over 40 short "how-to's" for various intelligence analysis techniques. Each technique receives a similar treatment including sub-sections on when to use it, the value added, as well as some guidance on the details of using the method in practice.

Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques feels like a companion volume to the previous text. Part of the reason for this could be that one of the authors, Randy Pherson, helped write both. Together with lead author, Sarah Miller Beebe, Pherson has *Cases* focus on only about 20 techniques shown working with real-world facts. While the vast majority of the cases are taken from the national security realm, there are a few law enforcement-oriented cases and even one public health case included in the volume.

Each case follows a similar format. The authors begin with a narrative that tells the story of the case (such as "Is Wen Ho Lee a Spy?"), followed by a description of how an analyst might use a specific structured analytic technique (or, in some cases a bundle of structured analytic techniques) to help solve the case.

Also included in this list of how-to manuals should be the CIA's own *A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis*. This 40-page monograph does little more than introduce the 12 techniques it discusses. That said, what it does say is well-written and the price—free to download—is, to say the least, tempting. Another government publication worth examining is the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy's *The Investigative Analytical Process*. While the focus of this manual is unabashedly counterintelligence and investigative (as opposed to estimative), the text provides insights into a number of techniques not covered in previous volumes, including telephone toll analysis and flowcharting.

A final volume in this category worth mentioning is Jerome Clauser's *Intelligence Research and Analysis*. The formula here is similar in that it seeks to provide short descriptions of a number of analytic techniques. Organized by steps in a traditional version of the intelligence process, Clauser distinguishes himself by looking beyond tradecraft recipes toward more formal approaches such as game theory and Bayesian analysis. Clauser also allocates a larger percentage of his book to contextual issues, such as history and the characteristics of an intelligence researcher, than the previously mentioned volumes (though all the volumes address similar issues to one degree or another).

My beef with all of these manuals is the same. In the first place, they generally provide far too little guidance on how to actually do the method described. Argument mapping, for example, receives a scant three pages in Heuer and Pherson's book. Yet I have spoken with university professors that teach argument mapping as a full semester course who claim that the concept behind argument mapping is deceptively easy to understand but that, at the end of a good course, only 50 percent of the students can reliably build an argument map well.

In the second place, and in addition to the lack of detail, I would also appreciate a bit more filtering. All of these methods do not work equally well and most of them have not been shown to improve forecasting accuracy. Some may not work at all. For example, scenario analysis of one form or another is mentioned in all but one of the volumes, yet Philip Tetlock, in his 2005 book *Expert Political Judgment*, found through a series of controlled experiments that scenario exercises were unhelpful at best and, for a large percentage of analysts, actually counterproductive. Experimental evidence, even if discredited (and that is not the case with Tetlock's work), deserves to be, at least, mentioned if not discussed in detail.

Perhaps these criticisms are unfair. None of the authors of these books claims to be an infallible judge of analytic methods nor do they appear to intend for their books to be anything more than handy reference guides. In this respect, perhaps my criticism is just a cover story for my frustration, and my frustration is born of this simple thought: We should be further along than this.

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Frustrations, similar and not, form much of the basis for three additional volumes. While the world has changed since the first *Bringing Intelligence About* was published in 2003, many of the articles in this edited volume still resonate. Thomas Garrin's article on "Appraising Best Practices in Defense Intelligence Analysis," for example, is still interesting for its benchmarking matrix. Likewise, Steve Marrin (with whom I often disagree yet always find compelled to read) identified a number of institutional factors back in 2003 which, if left unresolved, would serve to torpedo any "initiatives to counter perceptions of analytic inadequacy"—factors which, unfortunately, still seem fresh today.

Roger George and James Bruce provide a more up-to-date survey of the "origins, obstacles and innovations" confronting the intelligence professional in their edited volume, *Analyzing Intelligence*. As with any edited volume, its strength lies in the variety and sagacity of its individual contributors, and its weakness lies with the degree to which the editors have been able to wrestle a coherent narrative out of the individual contributions. The editors here have managed to toe that narrow line, balancing, for the most part, the opinions and finely ground axes of the individual authors with a need for structure.

I found, for example, John Hedley's chapter on the "Evolution of Intelligence Analysis" to be essential reading. It seems to me that there is much to be learned from the history of analysts and analysis and that far too little attention has been paid to the potential inherent in this

kind of research. Other topics such as the relationship between the policymaker and the analyst, and the various enduring challenges of the analyst's life, have been covered before but it is nice to see an up-to-date treatment of these issues all in one place.

The final book in this section differs from the others in that it is not an edited volume. Rather, it is one of the finest analysts of the current era talking in a very personal way about what it means to be an analyst. While *Reducing Uncertainty* is written for general audiences with little that has not been said, in more academic detail at least, elsewhere, Fingar is at his best in my mind when he decides to stand up for the profession. Analysts, he says, "are excited by the challenges described in this volume and are eager to tear down, overcome or end-run impediments to doing all that they can to reduce uncertainty and protect our nation." Damn right.

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If the last three books evoked a sense of frustration, the next two provide, at least for me, some hope. One of the best indicators of the increasing level of professionalism in intelligence analysis is the degree to which the profession is crossing borders and disciplines. The growing trend of intelligence analysis as a distinct profession within the business community and overseas is exemplified by Christophe Deschamps and Nicolas Moinet's *La Boîte à Outils de l'Intelligence Économique* (*The Toolbox of Economic Intelligence*). While my French is not as good as it once was, it is encouraging—no, revitalizing—to see a chapter devoted to "la matrice des hypothèses comparées" ("the matrix of compared assumptions").

What Deschamps and Moinet's book means to the business community Australian Don McDowell's text, *Strategic Intelligence*, means (and has meant for many years) to the law enforcement community. While this text covers familiar territory to many in the national security community, McDowell's many years of teaching classes to police and others all over the world have informed the style of the book in a unique way.

More importantly, these books are really just icons which hold the place for many other books published in a wide variety of languages that seek to make sense of the profession of intelligence analysis. While many suffer from the same weaknesses and maintain the same strengths as their American counterparts, they clearly demonstrate the growing grassroots vigor of the profession of intelligence in general and of intelligence analysis in particular.

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I suppose now is the time to confess that I lied in the introduction to this essay. I said that there was no common theme, no thread, that ran through all of these books. I claimed that they simply varied too much to treat them all as a unified whole and sought to break them down into what was, at best, loose and somewhat artificial groupings.

There is a theme, though, and that theme is this: We have done well; we could and should be doing better. Intelligence is a profession but it is one that is, in effect, still bleeding people to balance their humors. Astute outside observers of intelligence have already noted this for us. A recent National Academies of Science report, *Intelligence Analysis For Tomorrow*, flatly states: "Traditionally, the IC has relied on a practice-based approach to analysis, essentially, learning from experience. This approach should now be complemented with an evidence-based approach. In particular, the IC should evaluate its current analytic methods and procedures for their compatibility with scientific knowledge about how people think and work."

To do so, however, implies that we have to understand the science first, in order to be able to point out why it is wrong or where further research needs to be done before it is useful. The Intelligence Advanced Research Project Agency's ACE project (designed to test the utility of predictive markets on realistic intelligence questions) and its SIRIUS project (which will test if game-based learning techniques can teach analysts to overcome the effects of cognitive biases) are steps in the right direction.

More needs to be done, however. How much more? Let me put it bluntly: We need to grow up and put all our cherished tradecraft to the test. As a quintessentially interdisciplinary discipline, we need to test theories and methods from the social, behavioral, and physical sciences and adapt the ones that seem promising to our unique problems. Likewise, we should not hesitate to enter into arguments with "real scientists" about the value of their pet methods when balanced against our unique needs.

Most importantly, *we* need to do this. It is *our* profession.