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THE MAGAZINE FOR INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS



Information Warfare

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The central theme of this issue of *AIJ* is “Information Warfare,” originally chosen by the NMIA board of directors a couple of years ago when one of its symposia was planned to cover that salient subject. As it turned out, the symposium did not pan out for a variety of reasons but interest in pursuing this topic in the pages of the *Journal* did. As intelligence professionals, we naturally understand the importance of “information” to our craft, but expanding what we do to “information warfare” may not automatically be in our genes. MI personnel are comfortable with collecting raw “information” and converting it into actionable “intelligence,” but using information as a weapon of war itself is another matter. That seems to be something best left to those operators schooled in PSYOP, propaganda, public diplomacy, and perhaps even covert operations. While mulling over this proposed topic at a board meeting, we argued over such fine points as whether “information operations” was a subset of “information warfare,” or perhaps the other way around, or merely two labels for the same murky concept. We never reached agreement on that, but we did agree that dedicating at least one issue of our journal to this subject—whatever it should be called—was definitely called for.

A couple of years ago, we published an issue of *AIJ* examining “Cyber Security and Operations,” a hot-button topic that always comes up in any discussion of “information warfare,” in part because our computer-dominated world blurs the distinction between such terms. As editor, I noted then that perhaps the time was not yet ripe to say something definitive about cyber policy and organization because they were still evolving and officials were reticent to say too much in an unclassified professional publication. Two issues ago we disseminated a few more cyber-related articles when we explored the related theme “Counterintelligence, Operations Security, and Information Assurance.” We continue that progression with this newest issue, which will offer yet some new perspectives on cyber.

There have been some recent developments in the news regarding cybersecurity in particular. On February 13, 2013, President Obama signed an executive order that the AP described as “the most comprehensive plan yet for confronting electronic attacks on America’s computer networks, or at least a good-faith effort amid an alarming tide in industrial espionage in the past year that experts blame mostly on China.” *The Los Angeles Times* added that “the U.S. intelligence community is preparing a National Intelligence Estimate on cyber-attacks aimed at the United States. Officials say the classified document will highlight the role of Chinese government entities in stealing American intellectual property through hacking, and will outline other cyber-threats overseas.” *Congressional Quarterly* reported that Rep. Mike Rogers, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, was already scheduled to

have his committee reintroduce its own cybersecurity legislation, claiming “we will closely review the president’s executive order once it is released, but we agree that our biggest barriers to bolster our cyber defense can be fixed only with legislation.”

Subsequently, in an op-ed for *The Financial Times*, former DNI Mike McConnell weighed in, urging the Obama administration and Congress to craft effective legislation to address cybersecurity, warning that every minute that goes by without safeguards is more time that hackers have to learn how to penetrate critical infrastructure. An article published by the liberal think tank Center for a New American Security identified that infrastructure as including power plants, financial systems, and telecommunications networks, among others. It went on to say that the information-sharing provision of the EO can have a significant impact by providing both unclassified and classified cyber threat data to critical infrastructure organizations. Further, there are provisions for the sharing of cyber threat information from government to industry. A Presidential Policy Directive issued in concurrence with the EO is titled “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.”

Despite all the flurry of activity on the cyber front, less discussed (at least in public channels) than the threat posed against our nation is what we can do to turn the tables on our adversaries and use information to our benefit, whether that be called “information warfare”, “offensive information operations”, “military information support operations” (MISO), PSYOP (the old term for MISO), propaganda, or public diplomacy. On January 14, 2013, James Farwell, a defense consultant who advises DoD and the U.S. Special Operations Command on a range of global initiatives and actions, including strategic communication, discussed his new book *Persuasion and Power: The Art of Strategic Communication* during a forum at the Institute of World Politics in Washington. To cite his publisher’s description of the book’s core argument, “the U.S. government’s approach to strategic communication has been misguided.” The author “contends that a message that is true, consistent, and persuasive is more powerful than any deception.” Of course, denial and deception is a field of study of intimate interest to intelligence practitioners (and DoD runs a long-standing D&D certificate program at NIU). Farwell’s publisher goes on to insist that “now more than ever, in the arenas of national security, diplomacy, and military operations, effective communication strategy is of paramount importance. A 24/7 television, radio, and Internet news cycle paired with an explosion in social media demands it.”

Walter Pincus, a highly respected columnist for *The Washington Post*, wrote an incisive piece on February 13 for that newspaper titled “Army is gearing up to fight the PR

war.” He observed, “Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time,” according to a new Army field manual released last month. Added to the traditional war elements—among them movement and maneuver, intelligence, and firing against an enemy—is the new “Inform and Influence Activities” (IIA). Pincus described the newest member of a commander’s staff, the G-7, whose job is for “planning, integration and synchronization of designated information-related capabilities,” according to the FM. He cited Army LTG Robert Cashen, commander of the Combined Arms Center at Ft Leavenworth, KS, who wrote in CGSC’s journal *Military Review* that Army doctrine would adopt “words” as a major war element, saying it “was validated in the crucible of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pincus reminded us that the Army, just like the other military services, has had public relations (PR) operations for decades, but mostly these have been aimed at U.S. audiences. Subsequently, “strategic communication” came to the forefront over the past decade along with “information operations,” propelled by the belief that the U.S. military has been losing the propaganda war in Afghanistan.

With such developments as a backdrop, this issue of *AIJ* offers a diverse group of articles on the topic of IW, IO, strategic communication, propaganda, cyber, and just about all the other overlapping terms mentioned above. Kicking off this issue is a remembrance piece by Dr. David Keithly of Joint Forces Staff College on the Berlin Wall a half century after this Cold War icon was erected. Some would say it was a symbol that communism had failed and that Soviet propaganda could not deter the best and brightest of East Germany from fleeing to the West. I especially was moved by this article by one of my NMIA and IAFIE colleagues as I had first passed through Checkpoint Charlie in my Army lieutenant Class A uniform back in 1972 while serving in an armored unit in West Germany, and then did not have a chance for a return visit until 2011, precisely 50 years after the Wall was built. It was a truly emotional experience for this retired MI officer of German heritage. To the rear of this issue in the “Profiles in Intelligence” section is a treatise on another German icon, but one who left an even uglier scar on that nation’s psyche, Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s propaganda minister. Here, Dr. Ken Campbell offers yet his latest biography of a figure key to the history of World War II, and in this case a sad commentary about a highly-educated man with great potential who allowed himself to be led astray by a madman and his talents to be used for ill will.

The lead feature article is by two IW/IO experts, Dr. Dan Kuehl, retired from NDU and now teaching at Mercyhurst University, and LTC (Ret) Russ Rochte, formerly of NDU and now at NIU. They offer an illustrative description of how they taught this subject together at NDU’s Information

Resources Management College, now dubbed “The iCollege.” They explain how “information power” is best taught as an integrated, collaborative effort, despite whether the students are intelligence professionals or regular military practitioners. Air Force Maj Robert Folker reminds us that the Information Age is here and IW is under way. He presents advanced and complex IT methodologies that he feels should be mastered and integrated into the intelligence process. For example, he insists remotely piloted aircraft are one example of the military’s investment in technology to improve collection. A repeat performer in the pages of *AIJ*, Dr. James Sheppard discusses deception operations and argues they have an important role to play in the global theater. He adds that building capacity to shape enemy perceptions is vital, and examines what he calls the conceptual roots of deception.

Continuing our quest to showcase more international authors, a couple of Italian Air Force officers hold forth on the use of geoprofiling in geospatial intelligence and in countering maritime piracy. Lt Col Vinicio Pelino and Capt Filipopo Maimone identify other possible applications of geoprofiling techniques for geospatial intelligence. They propose the use of clustering analysis and complex network tools that can be used in an open ocean environment. Then, Ionel Nitu of the Romanian Intelligence Service discusses the “3P”s that are critical to intelligence activity—product, process, and personnel. I met Ionel and some of his brilliant Romanian colleagues a couple of years ago when they presented a panel organized by the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) at its annual convention. Rounding out our non-U.S. contingent for this issue is Stuart Lyle of the UK, who examines whether covert action can be conducted more effectively by the military than by the IC.

Another veteran *AIJ* author, Dr. James McGinley, talks about a concept that was made popular by Professor Joe Nye of Harvard—soft power. McGinley contends that soft power is not only an economy of force action but also a cost-effective way to extend influence and endear allies. Insisting that a reexamination of how the U.S. projects power and influence across the globe is called for, he identifies soft power as a new reality of the competitive global landscape. Kailah Karl, a recent APU graduate, discusses psychological operations from a woman’s perspective based on her deployment to Afghanistan, a theater where women’s rights and proper place in society are continually under assault. Staying in that part of the world, Howard Kleinberg of UNC Wilmington argues that for the U.S.-led coalition to win in Afghanistan there is no choice but to destroy Pakistan’s controversial intelligence service, the ISI. He openly discusses what many observers have been reluctant to conclude, that the ISI routinely assists the Taliban and is complicit with that entity in masterminding the war against the U.S. and its allies.

THE EDITOR'S DESK

Yet one more repeat author, Lt Col (Ret) Jim Dillard of the NIU faculty, offers an illuminating article on the crossover of civil rights and the music industry in the midst of the Cold War when the Voice of America was viewed as one of the best-known propaganda tools of the U.S. government. Dr. Wes Regian delves into social network analysis as applied to human terrain, and Welton Chang assesses the IC's overall analytic performance. Chang's article proposes a scientific methodology to accommodate the need to evaluate the when, why, and how often analytic products make accurate or inaccurate assessments. Doctoral student Donald Patterson looks at leadership in a military intelligence context. He demonstrates how leadership among intelligence analysts and scientists is dependent upon the establishment of relationships and culture.

On the topic of culture, which was the focus of the last issue of *AIJ* ("Cultural Intelligence and Regional Issues"), Dr. Rick Wolfel and Dr. Frank Galgano, who taught together at the U.S. Military Academy, enlighten our audience as to what West Point is doing to promote intercultural competence to support non-traditional missions such as peacekeeping and stability operations. They assert that a new paradigm demands an enhanced understanding of cultural diversity, cross-cultural competence, and regional expertise. This article follows up one written by their USMA colleague, COL (now retired) Laurie Hummel two issues ago. One of the regions of the world not covered in the last issue was Latin America, but we are pleased to offer a latecomer. Meghan Harrison, a Deputy NIO at the National Intelligence Council, talks about the challenges for our close neighbor to the south, Mexico, and why the approach the U.S. took to the

counterdrug struggle in Colombia won't work for that other ally with which the U.S. maintains a "special relationship." Bridging the gap between the topics of culture and information warfare, LT Jason Gregoire of NIU conducts propaganda analysis using a case study of the Russian state. Finally, John Schwitz of DIA discusses the challenges of performing the IC's intelligence mission in a severely budget-constrained environment, a pall hanging over all our heads as we move into the uncharted waters of sequestration.

As usual, this issue of *AIJ* offers some tantalizing book reviews which will have to speak for themselves. Let me take this opportunity to highlight our next two *Journal* themes and urge you to consider submitting articles on those topics, or anything else for that matter. We will next be exploring "Intelligence/Information Support to Small Unit Operations," following up the focus of NMIA's Fall 2011 Symposium, and then "Intelligence Education and Training," the subject of our successful 1-day workshop in November 2012 hosted jointly with IAFIE. We hope you will want to join our ever-expanding stable of authors, but in the meantime thank you for being loyal readers of *your* Association's principal publication.

Stay in touch—and please give us feedback,

Bill Spracher



**Interested in publishing an article in
the *American Intelligence Journal*?**



**Submit a manuscript for consideration
to the Editor <ajjeditor@nmia.org>**

Lest We Forget: Five Decades after Construction of the Wall

by Dr. David M. Keithly

On the hot summer night of August 13, 1961, East German police and military units sealed off the 28-mile boundary between East and West Berlin with cement block and barbed wire. With this action, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) slammed shut the last escape route out of the drab police state, an artificial construct bolstered by 19 Soviet divisions.

As President John F. Kennedy noted, the Berlin Wall was an admission of failure. By 1961 the stream of refugees from East Germany had reached unprecedented levels. Between 1945 and 1960 some 3,300,000 East Germans—one-fifth of the population of the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany—had fled to the West. A majority of these refugees were young people and a sizable number consisted of professionals, technicians, engineers, teachers, and doctors who had become disillusioned with what their leaders called a “workers’ paradise.” In the first half of 1961 over 150,000 had “voted with their feet” against the GDR regime. During July alone more than 30,000 had fled. In the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “East Germany was hemorrhaging to death.”

The Wall had far-reaching effects upon the political situation in divided Germany. It extinguished the last spark of hope for German reunification for some considerable time, while stabilizing the East German regime in certain ways. Most East Germans, realizing the complete absence of an alternative, came tacitly to support the GDR, withdrew into themselves, and worked for their material prosperity. Political stabilization brought economic advancement, and East Germans took some pride in knowing that theirs was the richest of the states in the Soviet empire. The Berlin Wall steadied the East German regime, helped strengthen the GDR economically, and was instrumental in bringing the country international recognition. Prior to 1961 the very survival of the GDR, drained of its strength by the constant outflow of refugees, was doubtful. Stability fostered by strict border controls enabled the country to become a member of the United Nations and to establish diplomatic recognition with most countries.

The Berlin Wall also reflected the regime’s need to quarantine itself from the “infection” of Western ideas. The regime consistently demonstrated its refusal to adhere to the



Anxious Berliners wave to relatives and friends on the other side of the Wall.



An East German border guard conducts surveillance of the area around the Brandenburg Gate.

third “basket” of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which aimed to widen East-West contacts and to facilitate the international flow of information. Laws passed in the summer of 1979 prohibited East German writers from publishing in the West without the regime’s permission and made unofficial contact with Western journalists a criminal offense. In the autumn of 1980 the GDR raised the required exchange rate for visiting the country. Upper- and middle-level party members were forbidden to maintain contacts with Westerners. The regime’s perennial inclination to isolate itself showed that its sole interest in the Helsinki Accords was the recognition of post-World War II boundaries, not the freer exchange of ideas.

The Wall thus served as a reminder of what communism ultimately stood for in practice: first, the denial of individual freedoms and equality before the law, which are the cornerstones of Western democracy; second, the concentration of power in the hands of a party elite that disdains criticism and opposition of any kind; and third, an ideology that subordinates the individual to the state.

The popular song writer, Wolf Biermann, was expelled from East Germany in 1977 for “slandering the GDR,” although he professed to be a communist. The scientist Robert Havemann was arrested in 1978 for criticizing the East German leadership. The economist and industrial manager Rudolf Bahro was expelled in 1979 for the “crime” of publishing in the West his suggestions for improving East German economic efficiency. In blatant violation of the Helsinki Accords, the East German leadership continued to pursue a determined witch hunt against writers and intellectuals. Later, in the 1980s, the GDR regime stonewalled Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s

reforms, a process which captured the popular imagination, and whose slogans, *glasnost* and *perestroika*, became household words in the West. To the bitter end, the East German leadership remained skeptical of any reform designs as these applied to the GDR.

One should still ask: What sort of regime was it that needed to wall in its citizens in order to maintain economic and political stability? One need only gaze at pictures of the Berlin Wall for a silent but penetrating reminder of the harsh reality of communism. August 13 is an anniversary date that should never go unnoticed, least of all in the Intelligence Community.

Dr. David M. Keithly teaches at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA, and is president of the Southeast Virginia Chapter of the Fulbright Association. He has twice been a Fulbright Fellow in Europe, was a fellow of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, a scholar-in-residence at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Germany, and a legislative fellow in the parliament of the German State of Thüringen. He has an MA degree from the German University of Freiburg and a PhD from Claremont Graduate University. He did additional graduate work at the French University of Rennes. Dr. Keithly has published five books, most recently The USA and the World 2010, and numerous articles in professional journals and magazines. He is also the American editor of Civil Wars. Selected to “Outstanding Young Men of America,” he was designated a Navy National Reserve Officer of the Year in 1993. Earlier he was on the Navy physical fitness team and is now an avid senior athlete. He was named the IMA (Individual Mobilization Augmentee) Officer of the Year at DIA in 2000, and received the 2001 faculty research award at the Joint Military Intelligence College (now NIU). A retired reserve officer, he held field-grade rank in two services. He has 25 years of experience in the Intelligence Community and currently serves as Secretary-Treasurer of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE).



Teaching Integrated Information Power: The NDU-NIU Approach

by Dr. Daniel T. Kuehl and LTC (USA, Ret) Russell C. Rochte

(DoD/OSR disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.)

INTRODUCTION

From 2006 to 2012, the authors of this article conducted an experiment between their respective institutions: to see to what extent and to what benefit they could coordinate the separate curricula covering information operations and strategy at the National Defense University (NDU) and the National Intelligence University (NIU, formerly Joint Military Intelligence College, JMIC, then National Defense Intelligence, NDIC). This should not have been surprising. Dr. Dan Kuehl had been the director of the Information Operations Concentration Program at NDU since its inception in the mid-1990s, and before that as a member of the original faculty of the School of Information Warfare and Strategy (also at NDU).¹ Mr. Russ Rochte was a former Chief of Information Operations Proponency for the U.S. Army at Fort Leavenworth, KS, and had finished his career in the U.S. Army teaching information operations (IO) and information assurance (IA) alongside Dr. Kuehl at NDU from 2003 to 2005, and then retired from the military and accepted a civilian faculty position at the then-JMIC to teach in its IO concentration program.

To us both, it seemed second nature to continue the close cooperation and collaboration we had developed over several years of teaching and developing IO and to share resources and opportunities. A surprise to us both came in the discovery of how little such coordination seemed to exist between the two schools—within sight of each other across the Anacostia River in Washington, DC. Yet, both programs instructed mid-career (NIU) and senior (NDU) students, both uniformed and civilian, in the same canon of literature, the same lexicon, and the same paradigms and doctrines concerning information as an instrument of national power. We very quickly shared curricular materials, combined field trip opportunities and guest speaker engagements, and had students attending the same events around town pertaining to the common course topics. Even though this effort—

which received little attention from either institution—was strictly unofficial and based completely on the personal relationship as professionals in our field, it seems to us to represent a small vision of what might be possible in the formal professional education of both military officers and intelligence professionals. After all, Kuehl's students were senior officers and civilians attending the National War College (NWC) or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) for a master's degree in strategy; Rochte's students were mid-career intelligence professionals seeking a master's degree in strategic intelligence. All were pursuing graduate-level studies in information operations and strategy. Kuehl's students were oriented on operational art, command, and strategy; Rochte's students were oriented on strategic intelligence-related perspectives on the same topics.

Since, after a year's program of study several of the NIU graduates could expect to find themselves in assignments serving on staffs supporting operations planned or led by NDU graduates, deliberately constructing a common central curriculum to be approached from two different, though related, viewpoints seemed the right thing to do. We suggest that, wherever possible, such collaboration may make sense again in this time of declining defense budgets and realignment of DoD educational efforts to promote efficiency. What follows is a brief description of what we did.

INFORMATION POWER

As our respective students have heard in a multiplicity of lectures and seminars, we approached information power in both a doctrinal and a decidedly non-doctrinal way. Our common understanding of information as an instrument of national power, part of the DIME (Diplomatic/Informational/Military/Economic) concept of national power, was based on a definition of information power published by Dr. Kuehl and our former colleague at NDU, Dr. Bob Neilsen, in the Spring 1999 issue of *National Strategic Studies Quarterly*. Information Power is the “combination of information content and technologies used as a strategic instrument to shape fundamental political, economic, military, and cultural forces on a long-term basis

to affect the global behavior of governments, supra-governmental organizations, and societies to support national security strategies and objectives.”² This definition emphasizes the character of information power (it is *both* content and the technology that delivers it—not just the technology) and the deliberate, intentional use of the same *for the purpose of strategic national security objectives* (not just tactical, short-duration advantages).

Our further studies and developments since September 11, 2001, have caused a gentle reconsideration of information power, though in no way a rejection of the 1999 definition. Nevertheless, in parallel with the continually developing understanding of the other instruments of power and what it means to actually attain “superiority” in the information environment (akin to “air superiority” in military writings), we now also teach that information power can be described as “the relative ability to operate in and exploit the information environment.” Thus, information superiority can be understood without being explicitly and quantifiably measured—a calculation nearly impossible to perform and of little practical use even if one did so.

One should note that, while neither of these definitions has been widely accepted by the IO community or by the writers of joint and service doctrine, DoD’s latest definition of IO has moved away from the unfortunate and dysfunctional emphasis on “core competencies” to include the entire environment. While many within the several competencies—“stovepipes”—remain mired in a tech-centric network view of the information environment ignoring the human element,³ educational efforts such as those outlined in this paper have been slowly moving the IO community toward a broader and more inclusive perspective on IO. This is critical, because we think DoD has been at a distinct disadvantage in using terms of reference that narrowly define the art of the doctrinally possible...and restrict thinking only to what can be doctrinally defined. This is a limitation that our adversaries—actual and potential—do not seem to suffer.

INFORMATION POWER IN COMMAND AND STRATEGY – THE NDU APPROACH

The form of the Information Strategies Concentration Program (ISCP)—now Information Operations Concentration Program (IOCP)—remained constant through the end of academic year 2012, although the content was continually adjusted and adapted to respond to new technological, organizational, and operational developments. For its first several years, the ISCP was comprised of two required courses offered by IRMC, both within the structure of the NDU electives program from which a third course examining Information Age topics was to be included. In the

fall semester the students took a foundational course that introduced them to a key set of Information Age and Information Operations-related topics and issues, with a second semester course that expanded on these issues. Additionally, students taking the program were required to accomplish a third elective course from a menu of courses offered across NDU’s schools. The courses in that menu were constantly reviewed by Dr. Kuehl, with the connective thread being that they related in some way to Information Age issues. Thus, a National War College course on “Surprise, Deception, Warning, and War,” or an ICAF course on “Strategic Intelligence,” were among the courses that would complete the requirement for a third course.

In the early 2000s another factor was added to the mix, the desire for higher-level graduate education in IO. Although the Naval Postgraduate School continues to offer an extremely thorough MA degree in IO, its time commitment—two years—and low throughput—only a handful of students per year—led the Joint Staff, and especially the J-39 office, to look for additional ways to satisfy the need for more officers educated in IO. NDU’s ISCP seemed a natural answer: its graduates were awarded a master’s degree, they were educated at the senior/strategic level, and there was a ready-at-hand faculty and curriculum for teaching it at IRMC. The ISCP was reviewed and its content adjusted to reemphasize a set of thirteen key IO-related topics, and it was renamed the Information Operations Concentration Program, or IOCP. Its core content was centered on three key, big-ticket issues: the need to protect critical national security-related infrastructure from cyber threats, the increasing role of IO in current and future military operations, and the growing importance of strategic communication to a wide range of national security objectives. The structure of the IOCP was also adjusted. In the fall semester all students took a required “foundational” course that introduced them to the three critical topics just discussed. In the spring semester they took a course from a small and tightly-controlled menu that then explored in more depth and detail one of these three topics. Thus, a set of graduates was produced that understood information power and the information environment and how they related to and were exercised via one or more of these three topical groups, yet saw them as part of the larger strategic instrument of information power.

This would seem to be a good news story. Regrettably, what we have described is, at least for now, no longer possible. With the Joint Staff J-7 assuming direction of and control over NDU, a series of decisions was recently taken (driven in part by budgetary concerns and in part by conceptual disagreements over what was, and was not, to be included in Joint Professional Military Education, or JPME), which abruptly ended this successful program just before the start of academic year 2013. The IRMC, whose courses

were considered not to be important in JPME, was left to manage a set of courses solely concentrating on cyber management issues, while the teaching of IO and information power was assigned to the National War College. This inevitably results in a return to former, dysfunctional thinking about information power: a bifurcation into the two separate and distinct (and often competing) domains of cyber and influence (or everything not cyber). This approach runs counter to everything we both have tried to teach and do for nearly two decades.⁴ Far from capitalizing upon the focus on information power and the information environment seen in DoD's new definition of IO,⁵ the elimination of the IOCP and the absence of a graduate-level program of study based on a holistic and strategic approach to information as an element of national power will be detrimental to future national security efforts and operations.

INFORMATION POWER IN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE – THE NIU APPROACH

In a fashion similar to the NDU program, though with an admittedly smaller number of participants, the NIU's School of Science and Technology Intelligence offers, within its new Master of Science and Technology Intelligence (MSTI) degree program, a concentration in Information Operations and Cyber Intelligence which is built from a slate of elective courses. While the courses are taught within the School of S&TI, and the concentration *per se* is available only to MSTI degree students, the individual courses are open to the entire graduate student body, ensuring that all can pursue their interests in information power and cyber topics in the context of strategic intelligence at any level of classification. The aim of this concentration is to enable the intelligence professional to properly understand what information power is; how it is created, preserved, and used; and, most importantly, the ways in which strategic intelligence undergirds and enables its use by military and civilian authorities for the purpose of achieving national security objectives.

For years prior to the creation of the School of S&TI, the study of information power and intelligence had been included in the core curriculum of the long-standing Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) degree program, ensuring that all students achieved an understanding of the global information environment and U.S. government operations therein. In a move that continues to reverberate even today, the entire catalog of courses—and indeed the focus of the curriculum—was redirected (with many courses permanently removed and several wholly new ones added) in AY 2007, with the result that the information operations-related courses were removed from the core curriculum, the degree concentration dissolved, and the remaining courses reduced to elective status. After the stand-up of the School

of S&TI, however, information operations was again offered as a degree concentration (as Information Operations and Cyber Intelligence) within the MSTI degree. New courses, including several focused cyber courses and an Advanced Information Power Seminar, were added, and the entire slate of courses made available to all NIU graduate students regardless of degree program or full- or part-time status.

Synergy with the NDU IOCP was achieved and maintained in each academic year from 2006 to 2012 though deliberate coordination of the NIU IO course offerings and related content with the NDU IOCP program of instruction. Although NIU taught 10-week-long academic quarters and NDU taught 14-week-long semesters, the topics remained parallel and, to the degree possible, identical.

The IO and Cyber Intelligence concentration required one foundational course—MST 680—Information Power and National Security. This course was deliberately constructed in parallel to the fall NDU elective under the ISCP/IOCP and was similar in all respects, though taught from an intelligence perspective. Through this course, NIU students received an understanding of strategic concepts of information power and its uses as well as an appreciation for how specific portions of the IC were organized to support the requirements of the combatant commands, the National Command Authority, and the Department of State. From this foundation common to all concentrators, students then built out their concentration based upon their own interests, choosing an additional three from the slate of offered courses in both human-centric and tech-centric aspects of the information environment. Courses in foreign threats were also available.

In coordination with the IOCP's offering on Strategic Communication (SC) and Public Diplomacy (PD), the NIU program included a course on Propaganda, Persuasion, and Influence (MST 681). In this course, NIU students examined the concepts, techniques, and practices which produce influence over human audiences—the “how and why” SC and PD can work. Pursuant to their intelligence focus, the students then learned how to analyze an adversary's propagandistic communication and the target audience(s) in order to understand the techniques used, the medium employed, and the weaknesses that could then be used to counter and defeat the influence effort. Drawing from a multidisciplinary approach based on mass communication, cognitive psychology, and media studies, as well as joint and service doctrine for military information support operations (MISO, formerly PSYOP), this course gave the NIU student the skills and insights necessary to understand persuasive communications and how intelligence can support—or enable—the successful prosecution of the “War of Ideas.” Though not exactly parallel in content or coverage to the related NDU offering, MST 681 prepared the

intelligence-focused student to understand and fulfill the intelligence requirements which enable an SC or PD effort. Further, these intelligence students were enabled to analyze adversary communication content for weaknesses within, and spot opportunities to be countered or exploited by USG communications efforts.⁶

To complete a doctrinal approach to the major considerations in Information Power (i.e., military IO, plus SC and PD, plus critical information infrastructure protection), both programs offered one or more electives in “things cyber”: with NDU’s Information Resources Management College—or the “iCollege,” as it is now referred to—offering a slate of information assurance-related courses plus an elective examining infrastructure warfare, and the NIU building a slate of courses for Computer Network Operations (Attack/Exploit/Defend) for the intelligence professional. While the cross-fertilization within these courses was not as robust as with those which we directly authored and taught, there was a constant interchange of ideas, content, and opportunities—in addition to each of us (plus colleagues) frequently lecturing in the other’s courses—within the community of interest at the two institutions. Additionally, for the last two academic years, our respective provosts agreed to implement cross-enrollment between our institutions; students with the appropriate prerequisites could register for and attend for transfer credit any of the courses at the other school, ensuring a robust slate of available courses on a wide variety of national security topics investigating the phenomenon of information power.

For interested students, the IO and Cyber concentration could be rounded off by the Advanced Information Power Seminar, a capstone course which integrated all previous concentration courses by examining how the U.S. government and IC might deal with a complex, adaptive adversary (or set of adversaries) operating against U.S. interests via the global information environment. Using weekly scenarios, all of which are related to the week(s) before and developed according to the students’ previous solutions, students confronted and analyzed strategic problems in information power affecting U.S. national interests, developed intelligence support requirements and solved them, and synthesized potential solutions to strategic problem sets within which, contrary to most scenario-based exercises, U.S. government success and Blue Force victory were never presumed.⁷

BUILDING A COMMUNITY – EVEN WHEN THEY DO NOT YET RECOGNIZE IT

By ensuring that both student groups (Command & Strategy and Intelligence) were exposed to the same concepts, paradigms, lexicon, and analytic

frameworks and viewpoints, we sought to enable our respective students to actually talk to and understand each other (rather than to talk past each other) when they met in their post-NDU/NIU careers. Two examples of what can be achieved, with only a moderate effort at coordination between faculty members (and at no additional cost to either institution), are briefly described below: integrated seminars and integrated experiential learning.

One way to ensure that the two student groups came to common comprehension was to simply share lectures, especially by guest speakers of renown. Whether NIU students visited the IOCP classroom, or NDU students sat in on NIU seminars, we made certain to deconflict the academic calendars as much as possible given the differences in quarter versus semester schedules. Since the NDU electives were customarily offered in the afternoon, to the degree possible the NIU electives were offered in the morning so that NIU students might be free to join NDU students for special guest speakers. Likewise, the IOCP students were kept apprised of opportunities at NIU. Hearing not only the same presentations by the same practicing professionals from both inside and outside the government, but also engaging in the Q&A sessions, gave the participating students a sense of what the other community (Command & Strategy or Intelligence) was thinking: how each was processing the lessons and to what degree their understanding differed and why. A side benefit was simply in meeting other students (regardless of rank) studying similar topics in the other graduate program, and occasionally it would later be discovered that the NIU graduate and the NDU graduate were to serve together as leader and supporting intelligence staff officer during a follow-on assignment. Whether through serendipity or design, such graduates of our respective programs were already a step ahead.

A second very beneficial activity undertaken with the deliberate intent of mingling our students in a common learning experience was the repeated class field trips to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Propaganda exhibit. This long-running, but sadly temporary, exhibit of Nazi propaganda (“State of Deception – the Power of Nazi Propaganda”)⁸ was a powerful teaching tool for both programs. Whether in the fall or in the spring, and regardless of which specific courses were involved, the off-campus field trip to experience the propaganda exhibit (led by a very knowledgeable docent, and both preceded and followed by discussions of the exhibit with the curators and historians at the museum) was a unique opportunity to see the outcome of what each group of students had studied, in its historical context. The opportunity to see, hear, and read Nazi propaganda products (with translations), and the chance to jointly question and discuss the artifacts, the techniques, and the lessons before, during, and after the

exhibit walk-through (in light of the preparatory in-class seminar lessons for both programs), created a powerful integrated learning experience for all involved. The NDU students came away with not only an appreciation of historical uses and abuses of propaganda but also an understanding of what intelligence could (and could not) provide should they ever wrestle with similar adversarial operations. The NIU students came away with a greatly expanded comprehension of propaganda and persuasive communications, and a clear understanding of what senior leaders might require—and what, therefore, the intelligence officer should be able to anticipate—in support of U.S. government persuasive efforts in the future. This combined field trip also gave students the unique opportunity to discuss the ethics of persuasion—both with the museum scholars and with each other—and wrestle with often decidedly discomfiting conclusions drawn from a comparison of the exhibit to personal experiences of attempts at influence. The discussions held on the bus trip back to campus indicated a high degree of comprehension and processing—and suggestions of future application—which few if any seminar discussions in the classroom could have created.

OUTCOMES

While neither of us has undertaken a carefully controlled scientific survey of our respective graduates to ascertain specific trends resulting from our efforts to coordinate our separate but related curricula, we believe that, on the basis of informed observation and anecdotal evidences, we can draw two main conclusions about the effects of our combined approach to teaching information power in our respective institutions.

First, we see great benefit in ensuring that our students, whether from NDU or NIU and regardless of career aspirations, studied the same canon of literature, the same doctrines, the same perspectives, and wrestled with the same or very similar strategic problems. Achieving a common understanding and instilling a common approach seemed to us to be the main thing since many of our students would end up in a professional relationship (e.g., senior/subordinate; supporting/supported; Commander/J3 or J2) at some time in the future, and it would be of great benefit to be able to describe the problem in the same language and create solutions using similar intellectual tools. In this way, the commanders, strategists, and senior operations officers who graduated from the IOCP at NDU would understand the global information environment and its challenges (and opportunities) in a fashion, and describe them in a language which enabled, rather than frustrated, the related intelligence support effort. Likewise, the intelligence staff officers, senior analysts, and branch or section chiefs with a master's degree concentration in Information Operations and Cyber

Intelligence from NIU would share that understanding of the Global Information Environment (GIE) and of the adversaries within it, and be able to anticipate—ahead of time—the likely “big questions” to be asked by the commanders, strategists, and senior operations officers they would be supporting in the future. Equally important, they would also be cued to watch for opportunities to be brought to the attention of the operators. With the continuing efforts at “Ops-Intel Integration,” such a common educational experience—at least as it pertains to the study of information power—may prove to be invaluable to the participants of our respective programs.

Second, both our programs deliberately approached the challenges of conducting national security affairs in the Information Age from a strategic—and never tactical—perspective. Even while examining the “eaches” of a particular topic, the focus in both programs was always on the greater whole, the integration of the “eaches” into a coherent strategic understanding of both self and others operating within a common GIE... which was not exclusively “cyberspace” but included all information-related activities. Such an approach not only supported our respective institutional degree programs’ intent, but also achieved the desired effect of “education.” Training, it is said, prepares one for conditions of relative certainty (that is why the typical approach is to train a particular *task* in specific *conditions* to be performed to a certain *standard*). Education, in contrast, by examining not *what* to think or do, but *how* to think about the doing, prepares one for conditions of relative uncertainty—where the tasks required are multiple or not wholly known, the conditions fluid or not completely observable, and the standards of success not readily apparent.⁹ Our two programs educated; neither attempted to create trained IO staff officers, capability specialists, or specific-“INT” analysts. Both programs sought to produce graduates who, while expert in their chosen field, branch, or specialty, were “IO-savvy” and able to recognize, analyze, and exploit the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats resident in the GIE. To judge from the feedback from former students, we both think we have been successful in doing exactly that.

CONCLUSION

The informal and unofficial coordination and cooperation we nonetheless deliberately pursued between our respective programs created a unique learning opportunity for our students from 2006 to 2012. Whether attending NDU or NIU, graduate students engaged in the study of information power came away from our programs with a common understanding of the GIE as a warfighting environment, a common comprehension of ways to approach information-related strategic issues and activities, and a common appreciation of what the other

community (Command & Strategy or Intelligence) was thinking, was capable of, and would require should our graduates find themselves engaged in conducting national security affairs by, with, and through the information environment.

Although the opportunities described in this article were ended (for now) by the recent reorganization of the NDU educational portfolio among its constituent colleges by Joint Staff J-7 (and by Dr. Kuehl's retirement from federal civilian service), we suggest that a cooperative approach such as ours was, and may again be, a beneficial way-ahead for both NDU and NIU wherever common curricular ground can be found. In what is sure to become an extended time of declining budgets, reduced manpower, and a de-emphasis on education (already in evidence as service schools around DoD close down entire departments and reassign or let go experienced faculty), a cooperative, integrated approach to some, if not all, mid-career and senior-level formal professional education seems the only way to ensure that DoD and the IC retain all the benefits of "the war college seminar" (the exposure to different services and agencies, the cross-exchange of ideas and concepts, and the relationships with others of dissimilar experiences and career paths), even as educational opportunities shrink. Most would agree that Dwight Eisenhower was correct when he said (as it is alleged), speaking of the Command and General Staff College experience, "the Plan was nothing; Planning was everything." In other words, the value of formal education in the military art was not to be found in the specific product produced, but in the change of thinking that occurred. We would also agree.

We hope that this retrospective on what we tried to accomplish for the sake of our respective students will provoke a discussion of what might be possible in order to preserve, and even improve, the future educational experiences for military officers, DoD civilians, and IC professionals. We both recall from our prior careers as military officers that, had the Cold War turned hot, we would "fight the way we had trained." Since the close integration of operations and intelligence seems to be proving itself as a successful organizational model, we offer that perhaps the education ought to be integrated as well. This may meet with some resistance, but as Ronald Reagan (and several others) often said, "It's amazing what you can accomplish if you don't mind who gets the credit."¹⁰

Notes

¹ The SIWS was a two-year experiment, sponsored by ASD/C3I and NDU and offered by NDU's Information Resources Management College (IRMC), to explore how concepts involving what was then called "Information Warfare" could be taught in JPME at the senior/war college level. The first class of 16 students graduated in June 1995; the final class, of 32 students, in June 1996. The entire concept had faced internal opposition from

the services, among others, which in the authors' opinion demonstrated the lack of vision with which the traditional military establishment viewed—and in some cases continues to view—new and "outside the box" concepts and developments such as Information Operations. The SIWS experiment was terminated at the end of academic year 1996 and changed from a stand-alone curriculum and set of students into an electives-based program offered to students attending the National War College and what was then called the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), now the Eisenhower School. The Information Strategies Concentration Program (ISCP), as it was originally named, did reach a larger set of students but in much less depth. By the end of academic year 2012, however, more than a thousand NWC/ICAF students had completed this program, and it had attained the unofficial status of the "gold standard" for IO education at the senior professional military education (PME) level.

² Robert E. Neilson and Daniel T. Kuehl, "Evolutionary Change in Revolutionary Times: A Case for a New National Security Education Program," *National Security Strategy Quarterly* 5 (Autumn 1999): 40.

³ Joint Publication 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (August 2012), defines information superiority as "the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." This excludes the human element, even though the same dictionary defines the information environment as "the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate or act on information." The fact that DoD continues to use this definition is simply astonishing, and in our opinion demonstrates the power of entrenched bureaucratic "old think."

⁴ The obvious personal side of this is not the point here—the person hired for the NWC faculty is not only an internationally recognized expert in the field but a close friend and colleague. No opprobrium should accrue. This is, however, a criticism of the shortsighted and frankly incomprehensible J-7 decision that terminated a thriving program of long-standing success providing an education in national information power which was available nowhere else, and reduced it to disintegrated and scattered pieces—the exact antithesis of what we had taught for nearly 20 years. A fractured approach to information power will not work; worse, it can result, and in the past has, in strategic failure. That is not what JPME is about.

⁵ The former doctrinal definition of IO from JP 3-13 (2006) was "the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own." This definition, while good for personnel managers and budgeteers, was in practice very hard to operationalize. A 25 January 2011 memorandum from the Secretary of Defense realigned the IO world within DoD, including this definition: "the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own." This reflects a greater emphasis on achieving effects holistically, and approaches

the problem from a much more strategic and integrated perspective than before.

⁶ A description of these IO and Cyber courses, as well as the other concentrations in NIU's MSTI program, may be found in the National Intelligence University Catalog available at http://www.ni-u.edu/pdf/NIU_Catalog_2012.pdf.

⁷ For example, in the scenario of the spring 2012 course offering, although the students successfully defended the USG cyber environment from a purely hypothetical Iranian-Mexican cartel and its proxies, they could not prevent the loss of U.S. standing in the Middle East, military defeat in Afghanistan, or expulsion of U.S. diplomats from a majority of the countries within the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or prevent political turmoil on the home front, leading to the strategic confrontation with which the scenario ended. This 10-week-long scenario-based exercise was completely hypothetical and in no way intended to represent actual persons or events. Nevertheless, all scenario developments and actor activities (U.S. or others) were technically possible and not without precedent.

⁸ Regrettably, this exhibit, which ran from February 2009 to October 2012, has now been closed and repackaged in order to become a smaller traveling exhibit for the museum. Nevertheless, a very instructive and high-quality book based on the exhibit, and other related useful references and items, is still available through the USHMM bookshop at <http://web.ushmm.org/site/apps/ka/ec/catalog.asp?c=ftIL15PMKoG&b=2264499&en=cvKNJ3NLKbKWJdNOJaITiaOZImLZJkMZJnKXIgM6KzH&CategoryID=244687>.

⁹ This description of training versus education comes from, among other places, the 2006 *Army Strategic Plan*, and seems as good a description of the differences between the two academic exercises as we can find.

¹⁰ Attributed in various sources and in various paraphrases, to Ronald Reagan, Harry Truman, and the former president of Brigham Young University, Dallin H. Oaks, among others.

Dr. Daniel T. Kuehl retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1994 after nearly 22 years of active duty in the U.S. Air Force. He is the former Director of the Information Operations Concentration Program, a specialized curriculum on national security in the Information Age offered to selected senior students at the National Defense University. He recently retired from that position to accept an appointment to the faculty of Mercyhurst University in Erie, PA, where he teaches in the Intelligence Studies Program. As before, his courses concentrate on such issues as the information component of national power, information warfare, and public diplomacy. His publications include a wide range of academic and professional journals, and he has contributed to several books on airpower and information warfare. He is on the editorial boards of Joint Force Quarterly and the Journal of Information Warfare, is a member of the Public Diplomacy Council and the Cyber Conflict Studies Association, was a member of the Defense Science Board team that wrote the 2004 report on Strategic Communication, and contributed to a recent major DoD study on cyberspace and cyberpower. He lectures internationally on the subject of information warfare, and his current research focuses on

the relationship between the Information Age and national security.

Russell C. Rochte, Jr., retired from the U.S. Army as a Lieutenant Colonel in 2005, after more than 25 years of active duty, to become a member of the faculty of the National Intelligence University, where he teaches courses on information power, propaganda analysis, and globalization to graduate and undergraduate students from across the U.S. Intelligence Community. He also lectures several times yearly to audiences at the National Defense University, the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, VA, and by invitation at a variety of events, both in CONUS and abroad. He is a Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), holds degrees from the University of Michigan and Troy University, and is engaged in continuing postgraduate education at George Mason University in Fairfax, VA.



SAVE THE DATE



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18 May 2014

Arming the Intelligence Analyst for Information Warfare

by Maj (USAF) Robert D. Folker, Jr.

The Second Wave stress on mass collection of data by technological means has also contributed to “analysis paralysis”... [T]he analysts have been unable to keep up with the “take” and convert it into timely, useful intelligence.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler,
*War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the
21st Century* (1993)

INTELLIGENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE

“[The] Information Age presents advanced and complex information technology and methodologies to be mastered and integrated into the intelligence process.”¹ Remotely piloted aircraft are an example of the military’s investment in technology to improve collection. “The Air Force is standing up . . . its growing fleet of remotely piloted aircraft. Today, the service operates 41 combat air patrols . . . and hopes to fly 65 by the end of fiscal 2013.”² However, if the Air Force expects to continue to provide useful intelligence to strategic, operational, and tactical users, then it must invest more resources in improving its ability to conduct quality intelligence analysis as it increases its collection capacity. Specifically, the Air Force must train its intelligence analysts how to think about complex problems and to better exploit structured analytical methodologies.³ Moreover, the Air Force must invest in expert systems, “logical reasoning systems,”⁴ that assist intelligence analysts in conducting quality intelligence analysis to provide timely and accurate intelligence relevant to commanders and warfighters.

Advances in Technology and Intelligence

Today, technology changes almost instantly, and the rate of technological advance is exponential. This exponential growth in technology is principally directed by our ability to move and act on information. All future technological advancements will be made possible by the previous advances in technology and the speed at which that technology is shared.

Every additional advance in technology creates multiple possibilities for future technological progress.⁵

The most significant advances in technology, considering all the vast improvements made in the last few decades, have been in data-processing systems. Technological advances within the Air Force and the Intelligence Community have paralleled progress in the private sector, at least with respect to intelligence collection systems. So far, however, these advances have not led to significant improvements in intelligence analysis. In fact, technological advances in collection systems may be encumbering our ability to provide quality analysis to the consumer.

Understanding Technology and Intelligence

Understanding technology and the factors that drive technological progress are crucial to improving intelligence. Allocating resources without a grasp of where those resources can best be utilized is fruitless. If our ability to move and process information governs the pace of technological advance, then improving the quality of intelligence analysis (our ability to process information) will lead to multiple technological advances in other areas of intelligence. Thus, other functions of the intelligence process will also profit from an investment of resources to improve the quality of intelligence analysis.

CHALLENGES TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Information Technology

Technology disseminates information more quickly than ever before, but it has not proportionately helped people digest the information it heaps on them. As the ability to collect information has improved, the intelligence analyst’s task has become increasingly complicated. If intelligence analysts and intelligence consumers are bogged down in information, providing them more information will not help. The analyst is overloaded with information and, ironically, the sheer volume of information prevents the intelligence analyst from understanding the information. It appears that technological

advances in intelligence collection systems are compounding a fundamental problem our Intelligence Community has experienced for many years—we are collecting more data than we can possibly analyze.⁶

This underscores the need to improve intelligence analysis to keep up with collection. The military's use of precision, information-intensive weapons creates pressure on the intelligence analyst to deliver useful intelligence at faster rates. In the era of industrial warfare, fast and precise weapons demand fast and precise intelligence. The intelligence analyst can quickly become an information-bottleneck in this environment.

Information Warfare

Information Warfare raises the intelligence standards of timeliness and accuracy even higher. Tactical users will no longer be satisfied with intelligence within a few hours or minutes, accurate to within a few meters or feet. They will demand intelligence within microseconds and accurate to new levels now thought impossible. Thus, enhancing the ability to analyze information takes on heightened importance as one prepares to conduct Information Warfare.

Attaining Dominant Battlespace Knowledge,⁷ necessary for success in Information Warfare, may become an elusive goal. Adversary information systems and networks are becoming increasingly complex. Because of this increasing complexity, the intelligence analyst's effort to analyze adversary systems to support effective targeting becomes more difficult. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge demands one have an understanding of the environment, not just awareness⁸; thus, the intelligence analyst must provide quality intelligence analysis, not just raw intelligence data.

The Artful Analyst

Due to an overall lack of analytic training and human compulsion, analysts are more dependent on their intuition than the evidence when conducting analysis.⁹ Quality intelligence analysis has the appropriate mix of both intuition and methods or, in other words, art and science. Paradoxically, though, as intelligence collectors rely more on technology, intelligence analysts rely more on their intuition. Intelligence analysts lack the ability (and in some cases, the willingness) to properly exploit basic analytic methods and techniques.

With the accelerating pressures of time, intelligence analysts feel that structured analytical approaches are too cumbersome.¹⁰ They also sense that with the increased use of structured methods comes increased accountability. An excessively burdened intelligence analyst is less confident in his own ability and will not unnecessarily expose himself to criticism. Reliance

on intuition and the resistance to exploit structured analytical methodologies complicates the task of incorporating technology to assist in conducting quality intelligence analysis. It is unfortunate that at the same time the need for objective, reasoned intelligence analysis is becoming most critical, more intelligence analysts are relying on the subjective, emotional process of intuitive analysis.

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE “TECHNOLOGY GAP”¹¹

As intelligence collection systems are continually improved and take full advantage of advances in technology, intelligence analysis is stagnating. There is a technology gap between the technology available to aid intelligence analysis and the technology the Air Force is using. As the technology gap widens, the information-bottleneck tightens. If left to continue, the flow of information will halt. The smaller the information-bottleneck, the easier it is for potential enemies to exploit, and the harder it is to defend this weakness from attack.

Technology is available to assist the intelligence analyst,¹² but the Air Force and the Intelligence Community are not adequately exploiting it. Money spent to close this technology gap will return the most on the investment compared to funds spent in other areas, such as intelligence collection. If one cannot adequately process and analyze the data he/she currently collects, then spending money in other areas of intelligence, at this time, is wasteful. Given the current fiscal realities in the U.S. government, limited intelligence resources must be used efficiently. Relatively inexpensive, commercial, off-the-shelf software that uses structured methods to perform intelligence analysis already exists in the private sector and may prove to be a reliable approach to improve the quality of intelligence analysis.¹³

SOLUTIONS

To properly address the shortfall in intelligence analysis, analysts must be trained to exploit structured analytical methodologies. Furthermore, the Air Force must invest in expert systems that assist intelligence analysts in conducting and providing quality intelligence analysis to decision-makers. Lastly, supervisors need to challenge intelligence analysts to demonstrate their analytical approach(es) and make sure analysts are utilizing appropriate structured methodologies.

Analytical Methods

Currently, most Air Force intelligence analysts are not adequately trained in exploiting various structured analytical methodologies. The exceptions to this rule may be the recent graduates of the Air Force Advanced Analysis

Course offered at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.¹⁴ This course is necessary to give the intelligence analyst a comprehensive set of tools for conducting objective and thoughtful intelligence analysis. Without this type of analytical training, most intelligence analysts are left to rely on their intuition when conducting analysis. As the author explores the use of expert systems in the next section, please note that for an intelligence analyst to effectively use an expert system he/she must understand the principles and methodologies on which it is built. Thus, training deficiencies are at the root of the current intelligence analysis problem. This can be corrected by expanding the appropriate analytic course to a wider audience for much less than the cost of a new collection system.

Expert Systems

To meet the demands of Information Warfare on intelligence, analysts must take advantage of expert systems. Expert systems can assist the intelligence analyst in two ways. First, expert systems are able to correlate and fuse intelligence data, eliminating redundant reporting. “Fusing and processing information – making sense of the vast amounts of data that can be gathered – will give U.S. forces what is called Dominant Battlespace Knowledge, a wide asymmetry between what Americans and opponents know.”¹⁵ This allows the intelligence analyst to work with fewer but more reliable pieces of intelligence information. In some cases, raw intelligence data will be fed into an expert system where it will be processed and fused; then the results will be displayed directly to a decision-maker or fed directly to a weapons system, bypassing the human intelligence analyst altogether.

Second, expert systems provide a structured way for the analyst to separate the relevant components of a problem and organize the elements into a logical order for evaluation. This is necessary to enable the analyst to conduct quality intelligence analysis on a complicated problem in an objective and timely manner. *FACTIONS* and *Policon* are two dated examples of expert systems used by intelligence analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency to assist in political forecasting and analysis. Extensive testing has shown that, while both traditional and *Policon*-based political intelligence forecasts were accurate about 90 percent of the time, *Policon* provided more specific and less ambiguous intelligence.¹⁶ Although the above example provides anecdotal evidence of a member agency of the Intelligence Community using an expert system, it begs the question: What expert systems do others use? Unfortunately, the Air Force is not currently utilizing expert systems to the extent necessary to fix the intelligence analysis problem.

Action

The real danger with the problem of overloading the intelligence analyst with information is familiarity with the problem. Because the problem has been with the

Intelligence Community for so long, it has become a part of the normal operating environment. The once urgent resolve to fix the problem has been lost. The Air Force Advanced Analysis Course is a step in the right direction. Hopefully, the Air Force will not lose momentum and aggressively work to reduce the burden on the intelligence analyst.

If complacency sets in, intelligence will decrease in both timeliness and accuracy, and it may eventually become irrelevant to commanders, decision-makers, and warfighters. Even worse, an Intelligence Community unprepared for Information Warfare may slow the U.S. observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop, the widely-quoted concept developed by Air Force Colonel John Boyd, and allow the enemy to act more swiftly by comparison. The Intelligence Community has the ability to prevent this.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Information Age is here and Information Warfare is underway. If the Intelligence Community expects to remain relevant, it must make improvements in intelligence analysis. The intelligence analyst’s analytical expertise must be based on a foundation of knowing how to exploit various structured methodologies. Training intelligence analysts to better exploit these methodologies and investing in expert systems will enable the intelligence analyst to better understand the adversary, recommend actions to exploit the adversary’s weaknesses, and ensure intelligence does not become an information-bottleneck to decision-making.

Exploiting expert systems to assist in conducting intelligence analysis will not be a simple or easy fix. It will take more than new computers and new software to fix the intelligence analysis problem discussed in this article. Increasing the intelligence analyst’s use of and dependence on expert systems brings other concerns such as the reliability, security, and integration of these systems.¹⁷ Intelligence analysts cannot expect intelligence collectors to stop exploiting technology. Instead, analysts must better use technology in the form of expert systems to improve their ability to process and analyze the voluminous amount of intelligence data modern collection systems provide. Appropriate action, or lack thereof, by the Intelligence Community will determine whether its intelligence analysts will be able to successfully navigate through the new medium of information or drown in it.

(Author’s Note: Adam Pode provided much useful input for this article. Since it was completed without his direct participation due to the fact we have been out of touch with each other, I have not included him as a co-author. Nevertheless, his contribution was important and is gratefully acknowledged.)

Notes

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The Roots of Deception

by Dr. J.A. Sheppard

In what might be considered an ancient Israelite mop-up operation Jael welcomed Sisera, a battle-weary commander of the Canaanite army, into her tent. She covered him with a rug, offered him milk in a lordly dish, waited for him to fall asleep, and then promptly drove a tent peg through his head.¹ The biblical story is interesting because it suggests, on the one hand, that the concept of deception is broader than is sometimes conceived. That is to say, on at least one occasion strategic deception has been defined as “the intentional manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information to mislead an enemy.”² In the case of Jael, however, it was the absolute concealment of her Israeli sympathies that secured the outcome. On the other hand, the story is fascinating because, although Jael lied by omission and then killed her unarmed adversary, her actions were apparently justified by the wartime circumstance. That is to say, Jael most certainly violated God’s sixth commandment prohibiting killing and also the ninth commandment against lying. Yet, for her abilities to suspend moral judgment and break the laws, she was immortalized in song as “blessed.” Deceptions, even those that are sanctioned by God, always carry a germ of intrigue that can provoke adverse public reactions. The threat of asymmetric approaches to warfare, however, suggests that deception operations have an increasingly important role to play in the global theater.³ To be sure, building capacity to shape enemy perceptions is vital. With that in mind, it is perhaps useful to examine the conceptual roots of deception in order to better define its scope as it pertains to military operations.

For those who specialize in deception, musings on ancient biblical intrigue do not offer any particularly earth-shattering insights. There are, in fact, two outstanding works available to the public that have refined the art of deception almost to the point of a science. The first is Barton Whaley’s book in which he deftly described deception as consisting of three different elements. The first is diversions, which are the movements of military units that are intended to imply a main attack. The second is camouflage, which is about concealment. The third is disinformation, which is broadly conceived and related to spoken and written forms of communication.⁴ In Whaley’s system, these three elements serve as the bare bones upon which goals can be designed to manipulate and surprise an enemy. The second

noteworthy study is Joseph Caddell’s primer on deception. In his short monograph, Caddell offers a catalog of the different types of deception that is unrivaled by other works. For instance, he notes the distinctions between strategic, operational, and tactical forms of deception. The provocative aspect of his study, however, occurs when he ventures into the legal and ethical aspects of his subject. That is to say, he rightly points out that, with the exception of prohibitions against treachery and perfidy, e.g., wearing enemy colors in combat, there are few legal restrictions on deceptive behavior. By contrast, the ethical dimension of a deception boils down to either judging a deceptive activity relative to an absolute standard or considering it in light of a cost-benefit analysis. Caddell himself does not take a strong position on either count. Rather, he simply suggests that the cost-benefit analyses that must accompany any operation lend a natural affinity to ethical frameworks in which the risks and rewards are the measure for determining whether or not one *ought* to engage in deceptive practices.⁵

Suffice it to say that both Whaley and Caddell have provided thorough, albeit basic, accounts of deception. Yet, even within these excellent studies there is room both for clarification and elaboration. More specifically, since Whaley placed such a heavy emphasis on disinformation, it is worth reiterating the point that deception is about manipulating people as opposed to manipulating information. Further, although Caddell raises awareness about the ethics of deception, the truth is that such concerns are irrelevant in a military context. The reason for this is that deceptive military action pertains to safety and survival as opposed to the analysis of right and wrong behaviors. To put it another way, “staying alive” is necessarily prior to considering “how one ought to live.” Finally, since both Whaley and Caddell are so systematic in their approach to deception, it is worth underscoring the point that deception is an art and the key element of it is creativity on the part of the agent that perpetrates the falsehood. Each of these points can be brought into sharper relief simply by considering the Latin roots of words like “deception” and “creativity.” Moreover, while it is true that operational deception generally requires moving large forces, the story of Jael serves as a sufficiently simple foil for illustrating key points about deception including that of

creativity which, as will be discussed below, is not an explicit part of military doctrine.⁶

That deception is about manipulating people rather than information may appear to be a facile thought. It is useful to note, however, that the relationship of information to deception is one of ends and means. This is perhaps best illustrated by coming to grips with the term “deception” itself. It is derived from the Latin *decipere*.⁷ The Latin language is highly expressive and, not surprisingly, the term conveys a variety of meanings. To be sure, the straightforward definition for deception is “to catch and let fall.” It can also mean “to deliberately cheat or deceive.” Secondarily, it can mean to snare, mislead, or beguile. Reminiscent of Jael’s tactic, *decipere* can also mean to lull to sleep. The Latin word for *deception* becomes much more interesting, however, if it is analyzed at its roots. It is actually a combination of two words, *de* and *capio*. The former simply means “from” but *capere* has a more robust meaning. It means to take, grasp, or seize. It can also mean to adopt. In the secondary meaning, however, it can mean to take by force or by guile. Additionally, it may connote capture and it can also suggest to take in, ensnare, captivate, or charm. What is almost immediately obvious about the meanings associated with the term “deception” is that the vehicle used for doing such things is not included. This is precisely because of the limited range that one word has. For instance, one can lull an adversary to sleep with either a bowl of milk or a song. Similarly, the means for beguiling a person may be flattery, seduction, or the imposition of any false belief. The simple point is that the end in a deception is tricking people. The means for doing that are as vast as the human imagination.

As mentioned above, Barton Whaley considered disinformation to be the broadest element of deception. He was right to categorize it in this way because any signals that are exchanged constitute a type of information, which makes this particular means of deception very nebulous. Therefore, again a quick review of the Latin etymologies is helpful. The English word “information” is derived from the Latin *informare*, which simply means to sketch or give shape to something. What the meaning of the word does not convey, however, is what kind of sketching is to be done. More concretely, if one sends out information or signals to ensnare or mislead, then the information is considered to be a mechanism of deception in the Latin sense of *intelligere*, which is the mental activity of perceiving through a direct simple awareness of objects or an event. A feint retreat such as William the Conqueror’s counterattack on King Harold at the Battle of Hastings is an illustration, as the latter directly perceived the faltering division of Bretons. So too, Jael’s deception was one of *intelligere*. That is to say, she needed to create a certain perception in the mind of the commander. She needed to use her entire environment including a tent

and food in a way that combined to create a perception in the mind of her target that he had found a safe place to rest. In contrast to *intelligere*, if the information is intended to lead an adversary to make valid but unsound conclusions, the deception is said to fit more properly under the banner of *cognoscere*, which is to investigate or to learn. Black propaganda fits most neatly with this kind of knowledge, useful examples of which are apparently classified. In any case, the general point is that the disinformation in any deception relies on creating a mistaken perception, an erroneous discovery, or both.

Above, I nailed my colors to the mast by stating that once a decision has been made to engage in military deception, ethical concerns become irrelevant. This assertion is brash but the truth is that there is no ethical system that tolerates deception, a fact that holds even for approaches with the capacity for permitting actions that are detrimental to others. For instance, ethical egoism, i.e., the theory in which an act is morally right if it maximizes one’s self-interest, is perhaps one of the best candidates for justifying deceptive behavior, but the idea that an entire military unit would be guided by such an ethical principle is absurd. One obvious problem is that a group of ethical egoists would be unreliable in executing deceptions that are designed to serve a larger cause. That is to say, it is not the case that what benefits the common good always aligns with personal self-interest. Putting it concretely, if Jael had been an ethical egoist she could have decided that sneaking away while Sisera was sleeping was more advantageous to her own safety than risking an assassination attempt on behalf of the Israelites. It would be difficult indeed to know how an egoist would mete out the balance of an operation. To complicate matters, it also is not necessarily in the best interest of ethical egoists to reveal what they think. Indeed, if read from an egoistic point of view, Jael evidently saw greater gain in a debt of gratitude from Israel than one from Sisera and that is why she killed him. Yet, had the Israelis known that she would assess her options for maximal personal gain, they may have elected to work with a more reliable assassin. Suffice it to say that, while a deception may fit with the general tenor of ethical egoism, such a system of right and wrong precludes a reliable framework for guiding the people who must work together both to plan and to execute a ruse.

The way in which deception is quickly painted as immoral activity is if it is considered in light of the approach to an absolute standard to which Caddell referred. It is not possible to recount all of the various approaches to ethics in the space of an article, but Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative may serve as an adequate sample. Kant basically held that immorality consists in violating a standard that he called the “categorical imperative.” The typical formulation of that standard is to “act in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a

universal law.” This formulation is, in essence, a procedure for moral reasoning such that, if an act turns out to be self-contradictory when applied in all circumstances, then it is irrational and hence wrong. For example, Jael’s deception would be wrong because, if such behavior were universal, nobody would seek hospitality as they would know it to be a lure for something unsavory. Kant, in fact, used the act of lying to illustrate this very point. As he would have it, a person who seeks to borrow money without intending to pay it back would act in a way that is contradictory. Indeed, if such disingenuous behavior was universal then people would never lend money because they would know that they would not be repaid.⁸ Suffice it to say that the objective nature of Kant’s theory means that, on principle, a deception in a war is no more justified than one that occurs in normal daily encounters.

So far, we have established two points. First, deception is about manipulating people and as such it may require controlling all aspects of an environment in order to create a certain perception. Second, deceptive behavior and ethical systems are incompatible. This second point is troublesome for any state-backed covert operation. To be sure, basic tactics like using camouflage, sending out false communications, dropping decoys from an airplane, etc., are all normal activities for the military. At the same time, they are all activities that are designed to deliberately deceive the enemy. Similarly, data that are planted surreptitiously by an intelligence agency may have great strategic value but the incomplete or confusing nature of the information means that it is purposely misleading. Ethics complicates the picture. To be concrete, one may use radio chatter to misdirect an enemy and win a battle, which is a good outcome. Yet, by factoring ethics into the equation the value of the outcome changes and the victory becomes tainted because it involved a little bit of cheating. It is important to notice, however, that locating the concept of deception under the banner of ethics is an exercise in *invento*. It is a matter of simply finding arguments that support a position that has already been adopted, namely that deception is immoral behavior. The more intellectually honest view is simply to acknowledge that deceptive military actions are properly categorized as non-ethical because they are wrapped up in concerns for safety. That is why troops may choose to misdirect an enemy. It is why actions like spreading rumors that unseat a ruler or sending e-mail attachments with a virus that brings down a network are permissible. It is also precisely why Jael was immortalized as “Blessed.” She violated at least two of the divine commandments but her deception was a matter of eliminating a threat from the nation of Israel. Her deception was a calculated response to eliminating an ongoing menace as opposed to a matter of choosing between right and wrong.

Having argued that the intentional manipulation of people is amoral when it is done as a matter of safety, security, or well-being, what remains is to identify the essential property of any deception as one of creativity. The issue, however, is not creativity in the modern sense of the term. To be sure, in the common vernacular, creativity is nothing other than the ability to transcend traditional rules or ideas in a way that forms new rules or ideas. That kind of creativity is familiar through slogans like “thinking outside the box” or “coloring outside the lines” and is substantively different from the kind of creativity that is at the heart of a good deception. Again, the etymology of the term helps to illustrate the point. The root of “creativity” is “to create” or, in Latin, *creare*. In this usage, the term has little to do with mental dexterity. Rather, it means to beget or to cause. Thus, the difference between the modern and the original usage is substantive in that the modern meaning implies that creativity comes about by rejecting what is customary and developing something new. The older usage, however, suggests that creativity depends upon, or issues forth from, what is already available. Speaking practically, this difference is important because, if the modern sense of creativity is at play in a deception, the ruse is more apt to fail. The introduction of new and unfamiliar elements may be surprising but they are also likely to be treated by an enemy with some level of suspicion or caution. These certainly would be the wrong dispositions to cultivate as a deception has a better chance for success if the people being manipulated accept their situation uncritically. To put it concretely, Sisera approached Jael’s tent, entered it, and went to sleep precisely because she was not too clever. The surroundings appeared normal and there was nothing to suggest a threat to his safety. Even the weapon of his destruction, a mallet and tent peg, was innocuous in its context. If there was creativity at play in the modern sense of the term, it was that Jael recognized that a hammer could be used for staking things other than a tent.

It is reasonable to suppose that Jael was not trained for combat. This is relevant because, if her deception had rested completely upon her “out of the box” approach to tent pegs and hammers, it is likely that the outcome of the story would be quite different. That is to say, Sisera was an experienced military commander and probably would have killed Jael if he had caught her being creative in the modern sense of the word. The truth is that the success of Jael’s deception relied on an essentially ordered series of causes that brought forth the circumstance that would lead to his death. “Essential causation” is a technical term but the concept is easy to grasp. It amounts to co-causes from different orders combining to produce an effect that neither co-cause can create on its own. Concretely, a baseball player and a bat combine to move a ball. So too, a finger, a lever, and a firing pin combine to discharge a cartridge.

Military historians and strategists have long understood the gist of this creative element in deception by recognizing that Operation Bodyguard combined the co-causes of timing, weight, and direction to produce a mistaken conclusion about the date and location of the Normandy invasion. It is perhaps slightly ironic that one draft plan for Operation Bodyguard was called “Plan Jael.” To be sure, her story is one of essential causation as it was shelter, blanket, and milk that combined to produce a mistaken notion of safety in the mind of the target.

Although creativity is at the heart of any deception, it is not explicitly stated that way in military doctrine. For instance, Joint Publication 3-58 clearly defined deception as actions deliberately executed to mislead adversary military decision makers. The principles of deception that follow that definition, however, omit creativity. Rather, JP 3-58 offers six elements of deception that are more or less consistent with what has been described above.⁹ For instance, the first principle is focus, which involves targeting the adversary decision-maker. This aligns with the point above that a deception is about manipulating people as opposed to information. Second, the objective of the deception is to cause an adversary to take or refrain from certain actions. The foregoing discussion was perhaps a bit more precise in that the principle demands sorting between the types of knowledge, e.g., *intelligere* and *cognoscere*, that inform the adversary’s actions. Moreover, it was suggested that the type of knowledge has a direct bearing on the type of control that is exacted over the environment that enables the deception. Security is the fourth element in executing a deception and is a matter of applying need-to-know criteria to the plan just as Jael did not enlist others in her plan. Fifth, timeliness matters both in terms of providing sufficient time to portray a deception and to strike the target. Finally, deception planning must occur simultaneously with operational planning. Not much has been said about this above, but the fact that Sisera’s exhaustion from battle with the Israelites was coordinated with Jael’s attack was vital to her success.

There is not a seventh principle for creativity. Rather, JP 3-58 turns to considerations of command and control and emphasizes the importance of coordinating the combinations of certain tools: deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), operations security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction. This is appropriate as the thrust of the document is planning as opposed to describing the inner workings of deception. As a matter of clarity, it is also worth noting that the synergism among tools like deception, OPSEC, PSYOP, and EW does not constitute an essentially ordered causal series because any one of them may be sufficient on its own for routing an enemy. When used in combination, however, those tools magnify combat

power. The point can be easily illustrated through King Philip’s suppression of the Knights Templar. He initiated a deception by starting the rumor that the Knights Templar engaged in “evil practices.” The rumor was sufficient for the issuance of warrants leading to the arrest of the knights. The power of the King’s attack was then enhanced by adding torture to the sequence—an acceptable tool that led to the surfacing of evidence. The new evidence combined with confessions that swayed the public and finally enabled the King to dismantle the Order and confiscate their lands.¹⁰ By using deception, the legal system, physical abuse, and mechanisms to influence French public opinion in a stepwise fashion, the King met his objective. Yet, the causal chain of a rumor that caused arrests, which led to torture and caused confessions that ultimately justified confiscation, is not the same thing as two causes coming together in order to create a common effect. With that in mind, one may say that King Philip was both methodical and calculating but he was not creative.

King Phillip’s decision to capitalize on public confessions as a means of mass communication for swaying public opinion does suggest an important detail that is worthy of mention. Namely, creation in modern deception commonly involves the media. The truth is that the media are important in any war effort and their significance is clearly articulated in documents like the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24). Indeed, the authors of that document explain that insurgents attempt to gain public opinion by carrying out activities that both attract media attention and inspire fear in the general populace. So too, counterinsurgents are expected to stick to the truth and ensure that words and deeds match as a means of ensuring long-term credibility.¹¹ Consistency and credibility matter greatly when dealing with the media because sucking the press into a deception can otherwise erode public trust. Further, feeding false information to the media or manipulating members of the press is actually contrary to the basic notion of deception. Rather, troop movements and accurate media reports work as simultaneous co-causes that result in a mistaken impression in the mind of an adversary. That is precisely what happened during the Gulf War shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, military exercises in the Kuwaiti waters combined with press coverage in a way that caused the Iraqis to commit forces for an amphibious assault that never occurred.¹² Since deception, by definition, is about manipulating an adversarial decision-maker as opposed to information, it would be a tactical error to mislead the media. It is in protecting their credibility that a deception gains traction. At the risk of oversimplifying the matter, just as Jael’s deception depended upon a normally functioning environment so too General Schwarzkopf’s “Hail Mary” deception off the coast of Kuwait benefited from a press that functioned according to its normal standards.

There are other causes that can combine with military action to destroy an adversary. For instance, troop movements combined with a religious system—especially in highly religious societies with low literacy rates—can cause either mass hysteria or compliance. That is certainly the take home lesson from Charlemagne’s campaign, in which he quelled the Saxon insurgency by having them commit a blasphemy against their own gods through participation in Christian baptism.¹³ The truth is that military assets can combine easily with any number of co-causes to create a deception and they must do so in order to gain the advantage of surprise. Moreover, surprise is an advantage worth obtaining because, as Clausewitz noted, it is the *sine qua non* of any battle.¹⁴ With that in mind, perhaps even a grand skeptic of deception like Clausewitz would have viewed Jael’s capacity for both guile and courage as her genius for war and would have applauded her creativity in combining warm invitations of friendship with a good old-fashioned ambush.

Notes

¹ *The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha*, New York (1977), Judges: 4-5, pp. 297-300.

² C. Pumphrey and A. Echevarria, *Strategic Deception in Modern Democracies: Ethical, Legal, and Policy Challenges* Conference Brief, Strategic Studies Institute (November 2003), p. 1.

³ See for example, Defense Science Board, *Capability and Surprise*, volume II supporting papers (January 2010), p. 77. For an example of the popular reaction, see N. Shachtman, “Pentagon Report calls for Office of Strategic Deception,” *Wired* (January 26, 2010).

⁴ B. Whaley, *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War*, Artech House (2007), pp. 7-9.

⁵ J. Caddell, *Deception 101—Primer on Deception*, Strategic Studies Institute (December 2004), p. 14. Caddell’s assessment of the value of cost-benefit analysis may be misguided. As Milan Vego noted in his study, “Deception is among the least expensive military activities in terms of forces and assets. Yet, for all its proven value, it generates little enthusiasm in the U.S. military.” “Operational Deception in the Information Age,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 2002), p. 60.

⁶ See *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*, JP 3-58 (May 1996).

⁷ The Latin etymologies presented here are derived mainly from *Harper’s Latin Dictionary*, revised by C. Lewis and C. Short (New York, 1907). *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed. P.G.W. Glare (New York, 1994).

⁸ See, J.B. Schneewind, “Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant’s moral philosophy,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. P. Guyer (New York, 1992), pp. 318-325.

⁹ *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*, JP 3-58 (May 1996), Chap. 1, pp. 2-3.

¹⁰ For a brief account of Philip’s suppression of the Templars, see E.M. Hallam and J. Everard, *Capetian France 987-1328* (New York, 2001), pp. 408-412.

¹¹ U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24 (Chicago, 2007), pp. 4-5.

¹² J. Latimer, *Deception in War: The Art of the Bluff, the Value of Deceit, and the Most Thrilling Episodes of Cunning in Military*

History, from the Trojan Horse to the Gulf War (New York, 2010), pp. 296-302.

¹³ R. Collins, *Charlemagne* (Toronto, 1998), pp. 55-56.

¹⁴ C. von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York, 2004), p. 162.

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Geoprofiling for Geospatial Intelligence: A First Application to Maritime Piracy

by Vinicio Pelino and Filippo Maimone, Italian Air Force

Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth.

- Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

INTRODUCTION

Geographic profiling, or geoprofiling (GEOPROF), is a relatively recent technique in the field of criminal investigation (Rossmo, 1999). It aims to pinpoint the most likely place of residence (anchor point) of a serial offender given a minimum of at least five crimes within a certain geographic area (hunting area). The method also offers an index assessment for the spatial localization of the most likely potential subsequent criminal act (crime rank index).

Assuming that criminal acts are committed by the same offender and in the *relative* vicinity of his place of residence, two empirical hypotheses are fundamental to the method:

(1) Decay of Range:

=> The offender's range decreases proportionally to the distance from his place of residence.

(2) Assumption of a Buffer Zone:

=> The offender does not normally act in an area which is extremely close to his place of residence.

A mathematical function, or decay function, that meets these conditions is shown in **Figure 1**.




Figure 1. Example of the relationship between distance and risk of crime in geographic profiling.

The strengths of this method are:

- The tangible results achieved in several cases of real and recent-past unsolved crimes (<http://txstate.edu/gii/geographicprofiling.html>).
- The use of mathematical algorithms to structure an investigation procedure focused on specific geographic areas.

The weaknesses of this method are:

- The non-consideration of temporal events.
- The assumption that the offender is still operating in the same area.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE METHOD FOR APPLICATIONS IN THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FIELD

The new concept of asymmetric warfare and the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan with regard to attacks by insurgents against coalition forces has shown the difficulties of applying traditional military responses in dealing with such actions. The nature of the attacks, similar to common criminal acts, has consequently led Western forces to use an appropriate method of intelligence analysis and investigation to comprehend the evolution of such events (Open Source Center Analysis, 2009). GEOPROF can be used for this purpose but with suitable modifications. The numerous terrorist cells operating in various areas of a specific geographical region are to be considered, and therefore the anchor point becomes the anchor position of the insurgents' logistics base. A new technique known as Multi-Point Centrography (Zhou, Liang, Chen, 2012) allows us to broaden classical GEOPROF methods to include a multi-cluster feature of serial criminal spots.

Regarding the area of interest, the metrics for the function shown in Figure 1 are related to the breadth of the area of action and to the context of application. We classify three types of hunting areas. In a country like Afghanistan we have:

- (1) Microscopic area: the study of events within the vicinity of a town.
- (2) Mesoscopic area: the study of events within a region of the country.
- (3) Global area: the study of events throughout the country.

Regarding the metric functions, i.e., the measurement of spatial distances between events, it can be said that this parameter is fundamental in the technique. New applications borrowed from the field of complex networks (Cheng, Yubo, Jinde, Jianqan, Jurgen, 2011), like traffic networks in the field of improvised explosive devices (IED), are becoming more and more essential.

The model of geoprofiling proposed in this article is structured in the three stages described below:

- (1) Pre-processing.
- (2) Search for the anchor points.
- (3) Construction of the risk map for possible additional attacks (Hot Spots).

In the context of geospatial intelligence, GEOPROF must be considered as a mathematical technique to be used *cum grano salis* as a supporting tool to be integrated with intelligence gathering. Especially in the second and third stages above, information collected from IMINT, HUMINT, as well as Economic Intelligence (ECINT) (Shortlan, 2012), should be taken into consideration.

APPLICATION TO MARITIME PIRACY

Maritime piracy is one field for the application of these techniques. A file containing global piracy events from 2000 to 2011 (Collins, 2012) was used, and a subset of events containing the geographical positions of the attacks was analyzed. The map in **Figure 2** shows the region of the Indian Ocean where most of the attacks took place during the above-mentioned period (UNODC, 2010).





Figure 2. Left: Maritime piracy dataset for the year 2000. Above: Maritime piracy for the year 2011.

The Indian Ocean is in a unique geostrategic position of importance. Three of the world's most important choke points—the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait—are located in this area. Moreover, the Indian Ocean is the arena for two regional powers belonging to the BRICS grouping: India and China. “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century; the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters”—a statement by U.S. Rear Admiral A.T. Mahan and quoted by Commander P.K. Ghosh in his paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia and the Indian Ocean,” January 18, 2004.

A glance at these maps shows how piracy has shifted its dangerous activity from the eastern boundary of the Indian Ocean to the western boundary and its open waters. One of the fundamental aims of geospatial intelligence is to identify the logistics bases of pirates so as to secure sea lines of communications (SLOC) in one of the hottest geopolitical areas in the world. A look at the 2,433 events in this region, **Figure 3**, shows a pattern of very high density in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca. Some attacks along the rivers of China are also shown.




Figure 3. Global pattern of 2000-2011 piracy events in the Indian Ocean.

We also note some events at remarkable distances from the western area coastlines. These give us potential information regarding the type of ships and technology used in the various sectors of the Indian Ocean. A geopolitical and economic analysis might also be helpful in understanding the various methods of attacks both near and far from the coasts.

THE METHOD

Pre-Processing

In order to apply GEOPROF to the ocean properly, we used a measure of distance between the locations of the attacks on the sea. To do this, we applied a complex network technique, first putting geographical locations of attacks on a grid and then building a complex network, the nodes of which are the grid points on the sea within the hunting area. Links are defined as geographic distances between close neighbors. In **Figure 4**, the box in the first map is shown in the grid of the second. Part of the grid is then represented as a complex network—every grid point (node) has a maximum of eight neighbors:




Figure 4. From geography to complex network representation.

With this trick, we were able to find minimum paths between any two attack points and then do a cluster analysis. A first, coarse-grained analysis in **Figure 5** shows a number of four clusters centered around Somalia, the Arabian peninsula, and the coasts of India and Indonesia.





Figure 5. Clusters of piracy events on a dendrogram, and its associated geographical pattern.

The pre-processing stage is intended only to get a gross geographic partition showing active areas of events. At this stage, with the help of intelligence, it is possible to focus attention on a particular branch of the dendrogram and iterate the cluster analysis. In this article we decided to focus on the Gulf of Aden; since it provides access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal it has always been a vital route for world trade.




Figure 6. 2000-2011 piracy events occurring in the Gulf of Aden.

About 20percent of piracy events took place in the region shown in **Figure 6**. Regarding the cluster analysis, the number of events per year shown in **Figure 7** supports the idea that groups continued forming in the timeline. This is also evident by studying the dendrograms. With no other information, we follow an objective criterion that gives us a maximum number of five clusters with which to analyze the data.




Figure 7. Yearly evolution of piracy events occurring in the Gulf of Aden.

ANCHORPOINTS

In searching for anchor points, which we identify as places from which pirate boats sail to attack ships, we decided to constrain them to the coastlines and apply a minimum distance from each cluster centroid to the coast. This clearly excludes the possibility of logistics bases, like the so-called “mother ships” in the open sea. What’s more, a mother ship is a mobile logistics base; hence, a simple GEOPROF tool might prove useless. Anchor points seen in **Figure 8** show a particular hot spot in the first three years located around the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Bab el-Mandab acts as a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the [Mediterranean Sea](#), via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. GEOPROF analysis identifies it as a fixed point for piracy events for almost the entire period. Actually, as a document from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2011) reports: “...Security became a concern of foreign firms doing business in the region after a French tanker was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists in October 2002. In recent years, this region has also seen rising piracy, and Somali pirates continue to attack vessels off the northern Somali coast in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea including the Bab el-Mandab.” More recent years show an eastward displacement of the attack patterns. The Maritime Security Patrol Area was established in the summer of 2008 and, looking at the 2009 attack locations off the Somali coast to the north, a line precisely indicating the patrol area is readily observable. In recent years GEOPOROF has pinpointed Socotra Island as a probable anchor point. In support of this finding, we cite J. Peter Pham of the U.S. “Atlantic Council,” who in a recent interview (*MaritimeSecurity.Asia*, 2011)

stated: “A credible amount of evidence has emerged in recent years that Somali pirates have certainly taken advantage of jurisdictional issues to operate in and out of the Socotra archipelago with at least the tacit connivance of at least some Yemeni authorities,” adding that Socotra has been “a favorite stomping ground for pirates for centuries as both Marco Polo and the great 14th century Islamic scholar and traveller Ibn Battuta attest.”




Figure 8. Anchor points found yearly.

Finally, it is important to recall that Somalia has been designated a war zone by the insurance industry. This means that insurers require a hefty additional fee for ships traveling through Somali waters. As a result, the shipping traffic tends toward the Yemeni and Omani coasts. Specifically there are reports out of Somalia that, since the institution of the international patrol and the international corridor, pirates are using human smuggling as a cover. Large-scale smuggling of human beings between Somalia and Yemen is a huge problem, but naval ships patrolling for pirates let the ones smuggling migrants pass by unmolested. The contention is that pirates drop their migrants off on the shores of Yemen and then proceed to attack ships from there. This could explain why so many incidents seem to originate in Yemen even though the pirates themselves are overwhelmingly Somalis.

RISK MAP

The multipoint centrography technique allows us to draw the risk maps corresponding to the above set of fixed points. **Figure 9** shows them for each year during the period 2000-2011.




Figure 9. 2000-2011 risk maps for piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden. Red represents the highest risk.

The color scale represents the risk of attack, ranging from zero to one. The straightforward application of the technique on the sea clearly produces circular patterns centered on the anchor points. In order to estimate the (potential) predictive power of the method, we have compared the “scores” obtained by using these risk maps with those constructed on empirical distribution, essentially equivalent to a two-dimensional histogram (Shorak, Wellner, 1986). For this we used data from the years 2008-2010 to predict the 2011 attack locations, and the scores found (amounting to the average risks on the real 2011 attack locations) are comparable: 0.7 for GEOPROF, 0.8 for the empirical map. We emphasize that, by using empirical maps exclusively, we get no information about anchor points.




Figure 10. Comparison between 2008-2010 GEOPROF (left) and empirical (right) risk maps.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Terrorism is a serious threat to international peace and security, and maritime piracy can be considered as one of the first terrorist activities in history. The aim of this work was to show the potential usefulness of geographic profiling to geospatial intelligence. In the fight against terrorism, this technique can be considered as part of a rather recent field known as Mathematics of Intelligence (Memon, Farley, Hicks, Rosenorn, 2009, Will, 2011). To evaluate the potential of this method, we proceeded in a blind approach by applying GEOPROF to the maritime piracy dataset **with no other information included**. This choice gave us double feedback:

(1) **We were able to verify our results from information on piracy available from open source intelligence.**

Available dataset from NATO and UN organizations are useful to identify and verify, in the modeling, the existence of true hot spots of piracy activity. (In regard to our research, we found the extreme importance of the island of Socotra after merely detecting it on the risk map.)

(2) **We were able to verify the weaknesses of the technique presumably due both to the lack of information from main sources of intelligence and to an incomplete adaptation of the technique itself to the specific problem.**

Technical problems, like cluster-analysis search for anchor points and the shape of distribution functions for risk maps, could best be approached by the massive use of current intelligence: anchor-point detection needs to be verified by IMINT sources. Finally, circular-shaped distribution functions, like those used in the present work, might not be the most appropriate for a complex sea domain surrounded by islands, gulfs, etc.; functions depending on the distance from coasts could also come into play.

In the near future, by borrowing known tools from other fields of mathematics, like complex networks, it will be possible to advance these techniques in the philosophy of geoprofiling. In our opinion, once properly designed, GEOPROF will find its place within the intelligence cycle, and could become a viable aid in improving the search for, and the annihilation of, piracy.

(Authors' Note: We kindly acknowledge the support for data and information exchanged with Professor Bridget L. Coggins, Dartmouth College.)

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The Other Fifty Percent:

Psychological Operations and Women in Eastern Afghanistan

by SSG (USAR) Kailah M. Karl

INTRODUCTION

In Afghanistan, a male is the dominant figure in society. Females in the past have been relegated to a secondary position, usually homemaker, mother, wife, or a combination of the aforementioned. As combat operations under Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan come to a close under the Obama administration's plans, this female dynamic is shifting. Women are currently holding positions in society in which they had not been able to participate until the past decade. Only since OEF began have women been able to step up in society and become teachers, business owners, or politicians; however, these women on a whole are still the minority of the female population. In this changing environment, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), which is now more properly known as Military Information Support Operations (MISO), continues to largely target the male audience. As women take a greater role in supporting change in Afghanistan, this new group needs to be targeted for various operations in the country.

The most commonly read literature contains information centering on discrepancies in equality between males and females. Other literature targets women in counterinsurgency operations without specifically speaking about psychological operations as one method to counter insurgencies in Afghanistan. The literature available to date does not specifically look at whether or not women can be efficient targets through the method of PSYOP, and rarely do we get a glimpse into operations that have been conducted.

The main theory to be discussed in this article is that women have not been effectively targeted in PSYOP, specifically in Eastern Afghanistan within the province of Paktika. Other areas may have the same issues; however, this article focuses on experience on the ground in Paktika. A current major assumption is that women do not hold enough power, whether at home or in the working environment, to effect change. If women stepped up in society, whether at home or through political avenues that are now being opened to them, then they would inevitably affect the battlefield. Women account for approximately 50 percent of the

population. An unknown percentage of this population is either married to, or is family of, insurgents. Moreover, possibly an even greater percentage of the female population has witnessed innumerable actions taken by hostile entities in their villages on whom they could be reporting. If the females felt empowered to speak out or step up and stop the insurgency, then they would help operations in Afghanistan.

This article argues that DA training may need to be altered to either augment the PSYOP effort or provide proof as to why a female PSYOP detachment or company may need to be created.

Currently, the Department of the Army (DA) employs a minimal number of female psychological operations specialists in-country. This is due to the manning requirement that tactical psychological operations specialists at the team level are male, and a predominant number of PSYOP soldiers below company level are male. In order to fully understand this issue, one must understand the placement of military units on the ground. As it stands now within Army doctrine, a PSYOP Detachment usually consists of a headquarters (Officer-in-Charge, Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge, Operations NCO, and a junior PSYOP Specialist) and four teams of three PSYOP soldiers each (required by doctrine to be male) dispersed throughout the area of operations. A PSYOP Company usually works throughout an entire area. The Company contains a Headquarters element (admin, supply, operations), a Product Development Detachment, and any number of Tactical PSYOP Detachments detailed to various provinces. Within our detachment working in Paktika, 88 percent of the soldiers were male, with no females working at the team level unless requested and approved through various channels.

Other females work in the same areas as PSYOP personnel. DA has begun training Female Engagement Teams (FETs); however, based upon limited experience with FETs they are

not properly trained to conduct psychological operations, which is a by-product of the fact that they are not PSYOP specialists. The limited experience stems from the fact that few FET-qualified females were stationed within the province, and those who were qualified felt as if they were held back or not used properly. There could be cause for great concern if a FET is not working with female PSYOP members operating in the same area, but this can be mitigated through communication and information sharing. This article argues that DA training may need to be altered to either augment the PSYOP effort or provide proof as to why a female PSYOP detachment or company may need to be created, along with disbanding current FET teams in order to begin purely utilizing trained female psychological operations specialists for the duties of PSYOP and female engagement.

For the purpose of this article, psychological operations is defined as “the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.”¹

TALIBAN RULE OVER WOMEN

Before one can speak of the current affairs of women within Afghanistan, it is important to understand the recent past between women and the Taliban. The Taliban first became prominent in 1994 and took over the Afghan capital, Kabul, in 1996. The takeover followed over 20 years of civil war and political instability. The Report on the Taliban’s War Against Women² states that, prior to the rise of the Taliban, women in Afghanistan were protected under the law and increasingly afforded rights in Afghan society. Women received the right to vote in the 1920s and, as early as the 1960s, the Afghan constitution provided for equality for women. There was a mood of tolerance and openness as the country began moving toward democracy. Women were making important contributions to national development. In 1977 women comprised over 15 percent of Afghanistan’s highest legislative body. It is estimated that, by the early 1990s, 70 percent of schoolteachers, 50 percent of government workers and university students, and 40 percent of doctors in Kabul were women. Afghan women had been active in humanitarian relief organizations until the Taliban imposed severe restrictions on their ability to work. These professional women provide a pool of talent and expertise that will be needed in the reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Islam has a tradition of protecting the rights of women and children. In fact, Islam has specific provisions which define the rights of women in areas such as marriage, divorce, and property rights. The Taliban’s version of Islam is not

supported by the world’s Muslims. Although the Taliban claimed that it was acting in the best interests of women, the truth is that the Taliban regime cruelly reduced women and girls to poverty, worsened their health, and deprived them of their right to an education, and many times the right to practice their religion.³

The Taliban perpetrated egregious acts of violence against women, including rape, abduction, and forced marriage.

The assault on the status of women began immediately after the Taliban took power in Kabul. The Taliban closed the women’s university and forced nearly all women to quit their jobs, closing down an important source of talent and expertise for the country. It restricted access to medical care for women, brutally enforced a restrictive dress code, and limited the ability of women to move about the city. The Taliban perpetrated egregious acts of violence against women, including rape, abduction, and forced marriage. Some families resorted to sending their daughters to Pakistan or Iran to protect them.⁴

The long years of war and instability in Afghanistan have resulted in massive numbers of displaced persons internally and in neighboring countries. There are approximately 1.1 million internally displaced persons. An estimated 3.5 million Afghans have fled to Pakistan, 1.5 million to Iran, and hundreds of thousands more scattered throughout the border regions. Moreover, Taliban looting of humanitarian relief organizations contributed to the increased numbers seeking refuge abroad. Afghan women and children make up the overwhelming majority of the refugee population dependent on international assistance.⁵

Afghan civil society and community-based activists are working hard to begin reconstructing their society in refugee camps, in preparation for the day when they can reclaim and rebuild their own country. Women have played an important role in these efforts, both in refugee settlements and—clandestinely—within communities inside Afghanistan. These women and men, says Sima Wali, an Afghan woman who directs the non-profit organization Refugee Women in Development, “have already demonstrated remarkable leadership and ability. They are our hope for Afghanistan.”⁶

EQUALITY MAKES A COMEBACK

The Campaign for Afghan Women and Girls states, “The 2001 defeat of the Taliban liberated Afghan women and girls from the regime’s draconian decrees. The world witnessed reports of women in Mazar-e-Sharif,

Kabul, and other cities going into the streets without male relatives and discarding their *burqas*—actions that would have garnered brutal punishments under the Taliban. Some 38 percent of the women have returned to work, 35 percent of the school children are girls, universities are again open to women.”⁷

The Afghan Constitution, adopted in January 2004, includes an historic equal rights provision. However, the Constitution also states, “No law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.” This clause is open to the interpretation of the Afghan Supreme Court, whose first appointees were dominated by conservative religious men who, for example, banned women from singing on television. In 2006 President Karzai appointed several more moderate judges to the Court.⁸

Much work still needs to be done to ensure that Afghan women are included in critical policymaking roles.

The Constitution also requires the election of at least two women from each province to the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People); as a result, women comprise 25 percent of this parliamentary body. One-half of presidential appointments to the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) also must be women. Because the President appoints one-third of the members of this body, this results in women holding 12.5 percent of the seats in the House of Elders. In 2008 women comprised 27 percent of the National Assembly.⁹

At the provincial (state) level, women hold 29 percent of the Provincial Council seats—121 out of 420 seats in 2005. Women are 26 percent of all civil servants.¹⁰ Women are:

- 6 percent of the judges
- 6 percent of the prosecutors
- 6 percent of the attorneys

Although there are no women judges on the Supreme Court, the Family and Juvenile Courts are headed by women.

However, much work still needs to be done to ensure that Afghan women are included in critical policymaking roles. Although Afghan President Hamid Karzai named three women to his cabinet in January 2005, his appointments to the new 25-member cabinet in 2006 included only one woman, the Minister of Women’s Affairs.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Army Field Manual 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*, states that the purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to U.S. national objectives.¹¹ PSYOP is characteristically delivered as information for effect, used during peacetime and conflict, to inform and influence. When properly employed, PSYOP can save lives of friendly and adversary forces by reducing the adversaries’ will to fight. By lowering adversaries’ morale and reducing their efficiency, PSYOP can also discourage aggressive actions and create dissidence and disaffection within their ranks, ultimately inducing surrender.¹²

The mission of PSYOP is to influence the behavior of foreign target audiences (TAs) to support U.S. national objectives. PSYOP accomplishes this by conveying selected information and/or advising on actions that influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign audiences. Behavioral change is at the root of the PSYOP mission. Although concerned with the mental processes of the TA, it is the observable modification of TA behavior that determines the mission success of PSYOP. It is this link between influence and behavior that distinguishes PSYOP from other capabilities and activities of information operations (IO) and sets it apart as a unique core capability.¹³

The isolation and poor infrastructure in Afghanistan that have complicated the ongoing war on terrorism also make the nation an “ideal” environment for psychological warfare operations, Defense Department officials say.¹⁴ The absence of televisions or independent sources of information also makes Afghanistan conducive to psychological operations.¹⁵ Messages include calls for Taliban defections; assurances that the U.S. is intervening in Afghanistan to help its people, not to attack them; and explanations of how the Taliban and Osama bin Laden are oppressing the country and forcing a corrupt form of Islam on Afghan citizens.¹⁶

EXPERIENCE WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN PAKTIKA

The women in Paktika were a mixed group of individuals. They varied from extremely intelligent to highly sheltered, with little knowledge of much beyond their own walls. The extremely smart women knew of the war happening within their own country, and some even expressed a great desire to fight for their own nation. In the middle were women who were “street smart.” They were not educated in any fashion in a school, but knew how

to take care of a household and listened to the news coming from BBC on the radio. The final type of woman encountered in the country was highly sheltered. This type of woman only knew how to care for her own household, and when she came in contact with individuals other than her own family or husband, she was stupefied. One lady in the last category seemed to look upon American troops in awe, as if they were completely alien to her.

The first missions coming into contact with women started at a women's clinic. After securing the area, the team began conversations with women on several subjects. The group began by getting the confidence and trust of the women by simply listening to them and answering questions. Some questions were as innocuous as what the United States was like, to those asking about how females work with male soldiers and whether or not females were scared of war. The women were very enthusiastic and wanted to speak about their own lives as well, fluctuating from members of their family to what they wish they had for their country. All three types of women discussed previously were represented in the group of women at the clinic. Of course, there were many children around at the time as well. Multiple media outlets have shown soldiers handing out candy, and the group on the ground also handed out coloring books, pens, and bracelets.

Some women were very fascinating to speak with. At one point, a woman stated, "Do you think I don't want to fight for my country? Do you think I would not fight for my own daughter? To give her the right to choose her own husband or go to school?" This woman was highly intelligent and went on at length about the things she wished she could do for her country. She also had many questions. The woman was very interested in medical advances, hygiene, and cooking tips, plus education in the United States. She was clearly in what could be considered a small percentage of women who were eager to learn, knew that there was much more beyond their own village, and expressed a desire to be part of a larger role in society.

Shifting the conversation away from the basic needs and wants of the women, they began coming forth with information. The women wanted to give any amount of information they could once they trusted the team. We were able to glean atmospherics from the women, as well as other information pertaining to the movement of hostile personnel within the area.

Continued missions through the central portion of the province yielded the same results. Women continued to exhibit the characteristics as noted in the beginning of the section. Nearly all the women wanted to speak to the team about everything possible. It seemed as if they were

speaking to celebrities. Any amount of attention given to these women yielded more atmospherics and information that could be actionable.

At one point the unit began to work on getting women together in much the same manner as the men get together in village meetings. For a couple of months prior to winter setting in, the unit traveled around putting together small village meetings of women to discuss their own issues. The most successful meeting happened with the approval of one of the sub-governors at his home. His wife hosted the event with a few other women from the area. Topics of discussion included education, needs of the schools in the area, fears of hostiles within the neighborhood, and children in the area who had lost their parents. This town seemed further along than most others, and the women had an increased desire to further their culture through education.

Unfortunately, without a continued presence of female PSYOP soldiers, civil affairs, or FETs, all ideas for continued female meetings in the area died off. The decrease in missions through winter also stalled out meetings for the future. To this date, there have been no other confirmed, well-developed, concentrated activities in the area concerning women in Paktika. It is unconfirmed as to whether or not there are plans for future activities.

The largest threat and issue for female PSYOP surprisingly did not come from the country or the supported unit; it came from within PSYOP itself.

The largest threat and issue for female PSYOP surprisingly did not come from the country or the supported unit; it came from within PSYOP itself. The leadership did not support the missions the supported unit requested. Many attempts were made to block the requests entirely. At the beginning of the deployment, there was even a bet made as to whether or not the female soldiers would conduct any PSYOP missions of relevance at all. The female side of PSYOP seemed like a joke to other males as well. When this issue was brought up through the chain of command, there was no assistance and still all attempts were stalled. It seemed to have taken an act of God to be allowed out on missions that no doubt would have benefited the supported unit in the long run. However, inner unit turmoil boiled over and created a hostile working environment for all involved. In the end, the missions involving female PSYOP on a large or concentrated scale stopped completely.

SUMMARY

Currently, there is no documented female psychological operations mission ongoing in Afghanistan. Female PSYOP soldiers and FETs are used haphazardly, with little forethought as to what the exact mission should be. There is little provided for measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. This is not to say that female PSYOP members are not working in the country. There are females deployed overseas in these positions, but they do not have a defined mission or end-state.

Currently, FETs are considered by many as a new “fad” developed within the past few years, and will be abolished after OEF ends. They are supported in some high-reaching circles, but on the ground in-theater they are not supported by infantrymen or male PSYOP soldiers who feel they can do a better job. As long as this thought is prevalent in the war in Afghanistan, female PSYOP, civil affairs, or FETs will not be accepted or have as many options for work.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Use Female PSYOP Soldiers on Missions

As missions continue in the future, women will become a source of raw intelligence and atmospherics that will be of great value to military and national security strategists. FETs are not trained as well as PSYOP members in gathering atmospherics and other raw data. The last known FET training calendars had approximately a week of training, compared to two months of training for PSYOP soldiers. More female PSYOP soldiers are needed in order to conduct better in-depth surveys of the female population.

Add More Female PSYOP Soldiers to Deploying Units

Based upon personal experience, in Paktika there were only two female PSYOP soldiers for the entire province during a 2011-12 deployment. There were a couple of civil affairs females and FET members, but these females often complained of the same thing as the PSYOP females. They were rarely used on missions, and when they were used it was arbitrarily and with little follow-up. The two female PSYOP soldiers held positions in the detachment headquarters in mainly administrative positions. Although thoroughly trained in PSYOP, these females were used on the ground in missions only at the highest recommendation of the brigade they supported. The females were unsupported for these missions by their chain of command through the company level, and usually the brigade had to approach the supported division to force the PSYOP unit to comply with the request. Usually, the issue at hand was the need for the females to conduct their main duties in the

headquarters (administrative paperwork, supply issues, compiling reports for headquarters, and creating slides for update presentations) instead of supporting the fight on the ground. This situation could be averted by deploying more females with tactical detachments. Moreover, it could also be averted by deploying more females with the PSYOP companies, and pushing them into the field to work on the women in the countryside.

Retrain Female Engagement Teams in the Same Manner as PSYOP

One main issue with infantry and male PSYOP soldiers was their fear of an untrained, unskilled female working with them in the field. PSYOP training and pre-deployment requirements usually involve the training of infantry tactics and qualification on multiple weapons in use by the infantry, to include pistols, large-caliber machineguns, and grenade launchers. Female PSYOP soldiers are also trained on larger vehicles as drivers and gunners when given the opportunity. This is in stark contrast to FETs, where the training usually consists of PowerPoint slides and some hands-on activities. Infantrymen need to have the security and peace of mind knowing that the soldiers they are with can take care of themselves if something goes wrong. PSYOP females are highly trained in multiple ways compared to FETs, and this training needs to be passed on to FETs in order to make them stronger and better in the field—and more trusted.

If infantrymen knew more about the training and usefulness of the FETs and female PSYOP, then perhaps they would be more ready to accept the females on missions.

Make Female PSYOP and FET Missions Known for Acceptance

Unfortunately, there is not much known about female PSYOP soldiers and FETs within the larger infantry community, which also adds to the prejudice that females may feel working with men in the field. If infantrymen knew more about the training and usefulness of the FETs and female PSYOP, then perhaps they would be more ready to accept the females on missions. As it stands right now, usually infantrymen get introduced to a female when she comes on base and are then told to take her with them on a mission and maintain security around her for her mission. This usually infuriates some younger infantrymen who would rather be shooting terrorists than sitting around women’s meetings listening to women talk for hours on end. Nevertheless, with more training on what this means to the war strategy, it may be more accepted in the future.

These soldiers need to continue their training long after the war ends. If the FET teams are disbanded, forgotten, and just go back to their jobs as administrative assistants, mechanics, drivers, or nurses, then they will lose the edge they have gained by working in the field with the civilian populace. Female PSYOP soldiers also need to continue their training to maintain their skill sets. Females will always be a part of war, and the more the FETs and female PSYOP soldiers sustain their training and skills the more valuable they will be in the future for any further global missions. There are many other countries around the world in which female PSYOP soldiers can operate and continue their experience. Sending these individuals on temporary overseas missions, coupled with continuing education, will keep their skills fresh and ready for any situation worldwide.

CONCLUSION

Laura Luftus put it well when she said, “As the Army continues to operate in complex environments, involving extended kinetic and non-kinetic contact with indigenous populations, it is critical for the Army to understand and appreciate the capabilities and potential of indigenous women as peacemakers and peacekeepers. The Army would be well served to support indigenous women in active efforts to bring a moderate voice into the public dialogue, as well as to positively influence women so they bring a moderate voice into the private sphere.”¹⁷

The female population will not be reduced as the war comes to a close in Afghanistan. Women will begin to pick up the pieces within their homes in Paktika. Although they do not hold a great deal of power outside the home in careers that would seem traditional in the United States, the women in Paktika are raising the next generation of Afghans. The more contact the United States can make with women, the more likely it is to influence their behaviors. From small things like hygiene to turning in husbands who conduct terrorist-like actions, the women can be the key to success in the future.

Notes

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Soft Power: The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention

by Dr. James E. McGinley, Louis P. Kelley, and Laura M. Thurston Goodroe

INTRODUCTION

The anticipated U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and concerns over emerging world powers are encouraging a reexamination of how the U.S. projects power and influence across the globe. On the table is the balance of traditional kinetic military operations and non-kinetic engagement options designed to achieve policy objectives in an adaptive blend. Harnessing this hard power/soft power dichotomy is a critical element of future U.S. national security strategy. The U.S. National Military Strategy concurrently embraces military action as well as the deepening of relationships to create new opportunities for partnerships. On the one hand, soft power is seen as an economy of force action, a potentially cost-effective way to extend influence and endear allies should conflict occur. On the other hand, soft power is seen as a new reality of the competitive global landscape, necessary to respond to worldwide outreach and alliance building by peer nation-state competitors.

Foreign interventions, benign or not, shape attitudes. In addition to their charitable mission, humanitarian assistance operations are also considered to have a positive informational component, contributing to improved perceptions of the United States. The essential questions are in what direction and under what conditions do they react. Polls conducted before and after humanitarian assistance operations in Japan, Indonesia, and Pakistan offer the opportunity to assess the impact of humanitarian operations on foreign public opinion. It is proposed that U.S. humanitarian assistance operations generally have a positive impact on public attitudes toward the United States. However, attitude shifts are weaker and less permanent in countries with strongly held pre-existing negative attitudes toward the U.S., highlighting a potential conditional limit to the contribution of humanitarian assistance operations and their role as an element of soft power.

JAPAN

On March 11, 2011, a 9.0-magnitude earthquake (subsequently labeled the Great East Japan Earthquake) occurred 81 miles to the east of Sendai,


Japan.¹ Humanitarian response by the U.S. military to the earthquake and the resulting tsunami, titled Operation TOMODACHI (FRIENDSHIP), was immediate and included the deployment of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) as well as approximately 17,000 U.S. military personnel, 100 aircraft, and 14 ships from the U.S. 7th Fleet.² Beginning on March 13, the U.S. Navy contributed a carrier task force to the Japanese relief effort. Helicopters assigned to the USS RONALDREAGAN delivered approximately 30,000 emergency food rations to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, which in turn delivered the rations to Miyagi Prefecture. Afterward, the carrier task force, consisting of about 9,000 personnel, conducted search and rescue operations, as well as delivering food to flood victims in Iwate Prefecture. The U.S. Navy's salvage ship SAFEGUARD engaged in obstacle clearance operations at the ports of Hachinohe and Miyako.³

During Operation TOMODACHI, U.S. Air Force assistance included providing a diversion airfield for private aircraft at Yokota Airbase. The U.S. Air Force also opened Misawa Airbase to serve as a base of operations for international rescue teams from the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom. In addition to providing C-130 airlift for medical supplies to the Sendai Airport, the U.S. Air Force supplied Global Hawk aerial surveillance images to the Japanese government to assess the extent of the damage to earthquake-stricken areas.⁴ The U.S. Army contributed to the Air Force and Marine Corps efforts to clear and repair the Sendai Airport by removing debris and supplying kerosene. About 100 soldiers assisted the Japanese Self-Defense Force as it conducted search and rescue operations, and soldiers assisted in restoring Japanese transportation infrastructure by helping to clear rubble from the Japanese Railway's Senseki line.⁵ Overall, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) figures from April 2011 noted that the U.S. committed more than \$95 million in disaster assistance and about \$88.5 from the Department of Defense.⁶

Longitudinal surveys from the Pew Research Center show that public opinion of the U.S. was favorable before the tsunami. A 2010 poll indicated that 66 percent held a favorable view of the U.S., with the number increasing to 85 percent in a poll conducted after the earthquake and tsunami

(see Figure 1).^{7,8} Pew also reports that Japanese public opinion shifted in an area that is often a U.S. weak spot—opinions of U.S. self-interest. In 2010, 31 percent of Japanese believed that the U.S. took into account the interests of other countries; however, this increased to 51 percent in 2011.⁹ The positive climate between the U.S. and Japan may also have external, regional influences. In 2011, an annual poll on Japan-China relations indicated that about 29 percent of Chinese held a favorable opinion toward Japan. This represented a 10-point decline from the previous year, and the first drop in opinion since the poll was began in 2005, attributable, in part, to public reaction to a 2010 collision between a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese patrol boat in disputed fishing grounds.¹⁰ It should be considered that chills or residual mistrust in Japan-China relations may encourage favorable views of external allies such as the United States. It is a reminder that public opinion is not formed in isolation, but rather within the broader context of regional


Figure 1. Public opinion of U.S. in Japan



INDONESIA

On December 26, 2004, a 9.1-magnitude earthquake struck Sumatra, Indonesia, generating a massive tsunami that resulted in widespread damage. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), an estimated 227,898 people were killed and 1.7 million people displaced in 14 countries across Asia and East Africa.¹¹ The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) established Joint Task Force 536 and conducted Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE to provide humanitarian assistance to tsunami-affected countries.¹²

Figure 2. Public opinion of U.S. in Indonesia



The U.S. response included \$350 million in government donations to support aid work via the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Additionally, the U.S. contribution included around \$200 million in private donations, with \$120 million donated to the U.S. branches of the Red Cross, Oxfam, Save the Children, and other relief organizations.¹³ The ensuing operation involved over 90 NGOs and military forces from 18 nations. Although created as a traditional joint task force, JTF-536 was modified by USPACOM after other countries such as Australia, Singapore, Russia, France, and Malaysia joined in. At this point JTF-536, as a sole U.S. endeavor, became Combined Support Force (CSF)-536. Within the region, the U.S. allocated a total of \$857 million to support rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts related to the Indian Ocean tsunami.¹⁴


In Indonesia, humanitarian assistance operations led to improvements in favorable public opinion. Pew reports that favorable public opinion of the U.S. had reached a low of 15 percent in 2003 after the U.S. invasion of Iraq but increased to 38 percent in 2005 following U.S. humanitarian operations (see Figure 2). Public opinion of the U.S. in Indonesia regarding perceptions of U.S. self-interest also shifted favorably after U.S. humanitarian operations. Pew polls indicate that, in 2003, 25 percent of Indonesians believed the U.S. considered the interests of other countries. This number increased to 59 percent in 2005 following U.S. post-tsunami humanitarian intervention.¹⁵ After the delivery of aid to Indonesia boosted public opinion, the U.S. Navy established its Pacific Partnership initiative to extend and sustain the positive impact of humanitarian operations. Now in its eighth year, U.S. ships, joined by medical teams from partner nations and NGOs, spend two weeks in Asian-Pacific nations such as Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam providing assistance and bolstering the U.S. public image.¹⁶ Since improvements in public opinion tend to erode over time, initiatives like this may play an important role in efforts to reinforce and maintain gains.

PAKISTAN

Over the past 30 years, Pakistan has been both a friend and foe to the United States. In the late 1970s, the United States was providing little aid to Pakistan, outside limited humanitarian assistance. In the decade from 1980 to 1990, the U.S. increased both humanitarian aid and security assistance to half a billion and one billion dollars, respectively, in efforts to respond to regional Soviet intervention.¹⁷ When Pakistan was discovered to be concealing a nuclear weapons development program in the early 1990s, U.S. aid to Pakistan essentially ceased, and was again limited to humanitarian aid until the events of 9/11. Since 2001, the United States has furnished Pakistan approximately \$24 billion, providing assistance to coalition operations, humanitarian assistance, and direct military aid. In exchange, Pakistan has provided military support for U.S. operations in the region and cooperation on counterterrorism.¹⁸ Events such as U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan and perceived Pakistani duplicity in the harboring of Osama bin Laden have strained relationships, and the U.S.-Pakistani relationship has been fraught with latent distrust beneath a veneer of partnership.

Humanitarian operations are an apolitical option for improving U.S.-Pakistani relationships. Pakistan has experienced large-scale disasters, including a 7.6-magnitude earthquake in October 2005 and widespread flooding in the summer of 2010.¹⁹ The 2005 earthquake resulted in at least 86,000 persons killed.²⁰ According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the 2010 floods left 1,980 killed people and an estimated 14 million in need of humanitarian assistance.²¹ In 2005, U.S. military humanitarian operations included support from the 3rd Marine Logistics Group.²² In 2010, U.S. military humanitarian operations included support from the U.S. Navy's KEARSARGE Amphibious Readiness Group and the U.S. Marine Corps' 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit.²³

A day after the October 2005 disaster struck, the first of many U.S. Air Force C-17 relief flights arrived in Pakistan with more than 90,000 pounds of relief supplies and, within two days after the earthquake, the first CH-47 Chinook helicopters arrived from Afghanistan. During the peak of the relief operations, the U.S. Army had provided 21 CH-47 heavy lift helicopters, as well as several other utility helicopters, along with 10 State Department counternarcotics Huey II helicopters that had Pakistani Army officers at the controls. By the time the U.S. military had departed, over 1,200 personnel, including the staffs from two surgical field hospitals, along with 125 members of the U.S. Navy Construction Battalions "Seabees" and a contingent of the U.S. Air Force's Pararescuemen, participated in relief efforts.²⁴



According to data collected by USAID, the U.S. support included more than 5,900 relief operations flown by U.S. military and State Department-supported helicopters. With the transportation infrastructure in the region blocked by rubble, these flights delivered 14,300 tons of relief supplies and transported 19,600 people, including over 4,500 needing medical attention. More than 35,000 people received emergency medical treatment and another 20,000 were inoculated at U.S. military hospitals in Muzaffarabad and Shinkiyari, helping prevent severe outbreaks of disease.²⁵

In Pakistan, U.S. humanitarian operations have a positive, but reduced, impact on favorable public opinion. Pew polls indicate that, in 2005, 23 percent of Pakistanis held a favorable view of the U.S., with this number rising slightly to 27 percent following the U.S. humanitarian response to the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. However, favorable public opinion eroded to just 15 percent by 2007. When the U.S. responded again with humanitarian relief following Pakistan's 2010 floods, favorable opinion actually experienced a decline from 17 percent to just 11 percent the following year (see Figure 3).²⁶ It is likely that a favorable response to U.S. humanitarian aid can be overshadowed by other events such as the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden on Pakistani territory, which echoed widespread U.S. resentment in Pakistan.

Public opinion of the U.S. in Pakistan has shifted in different ways with regard to perceptions of U.S. self-interest. In 2004, according to Pew polling, 18 percent of Pakistanis believed the U.S. considered the interests of other countries. This number increased to 39 percent in 2005 after U.S. humanitarian intervention. However, by 2010 the number had declined again to just 19 percent and remained virtually unchanged at 20 percent in 2011 despite subsequent U.S. humanitarian assistance operations in response to

Pakistan's floods. In Pakistan, the distrust of American motives and widespread opposition to U.S. foreign policy may simply run too deep for humanitarian assistance operations to have a sustained, significant impact.²⁷

CONCLUSION

This brief comparative review indicates that attitudes toward the U.S. are positively impacted by humanitarian operations, although shifts are lessened and more fragile in countries with pre-existing negative public opinion. In Japan, positive increases in public opinion were preceded by favorable perceptions. Following U.S. humanitarian operations in 2005, favorable attitudes toward the U.S. in Indonesia improved (reaching 38 percent), although they did not achieve pre-Iraq war levels (61 percent).²⁸ In Pakistan the slightly positive impact of humanitarian assistance operations in 2005 was not repeated following similar operations in 2010. Overall, polls reveal limitations regarding the use of humanitarian assistance operations as an element of soft power and their impact on public opinion. These operations are most likely to have a greater positive impact in countries where pre-existing attitudes toward the U.S. are favorable, and are likely to have a weakened and less long-lasting impact in countries where attitudes toward the U.S. are negative or where the positive impacts of humanitarian operations are overshadowed by other events.

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All That Jazz: CIA, Voice of America, and Jazz Diplomacy in the Early Cold War Years, 1955-1965

by LtCol (USAF, Ret) James E. Dillard

The Cold War was a critical juncture in the 20th century, the “American Century,” and the United States refined essential elements of information warfare, including overt and covert propaganda campaigns, open-source and clandestine radio broadcasts, and soft-power diplomacy. As World War II drew to a close in 1945 with the surrender of Germany and Japan, the United States faced an uncertain future. Victory over fascism, renewed focus on the home front, and the specter of a nuclear age framed the joys and anxieties of post-war America. The lofty ideals of the war left the victors many new obligations. If, as many believed, the war had been at least in part a battle against racism, did not racial segregation and disenfranchisement belie the great sacrifices the war had wrought? The commitment to democracy had been sealed in the blood of soldiers black and white, red and brown. Democracy, under siege throughout the 1930s and early 1940s as fascist militarists threatened the balance of power, was more than a political system. It was an ideology, a set of beliefs about the nature and moral power of the nation.

What remained to be determined, as the rest of the world watched, was the way this ideological commitment to egalitarian democracy would be put into practice as the great ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was just beginning.¹ With the nuclear genie out of the bottle and the consequences of military conflict so dire, the two superpower antagonists would choose to keep their weapons of mass destruction on a tight leash; instead, they would try to wreak havoc on each other’s systems by waging a protracted information warfare campaign leveraging both overt and covert elements. A key component of modern information warfare and the propaganda battle for hearts of minds was the coordinated State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Voice of America effort to use international radio broadcasts of news and music, to include overseas jazz concerts, to devise a narrative suited to U.S. national security interests.

Meanwhile, many Americans began asking if the desire to return to normalcy would mean a renewed embrace of racial norms of segregation, disenfranchisement, and subordination—representing the legacy of two centuries of African-American slavery and another century of Jim Crow

“separate but equal” politics North and South. Or would international pressures paradoxically soon constrain and enhance civil rights reform as the Cold War dawned? As the new administration of President Harry S Truman cast Cold War politics in apocalyptic terms; as “McCarthyism” took hold in American politics, society, and culture; as the nation closed ranks against so-called “subversive” elements, civil rights groups walked a fine line, seeking to portray their reform efforts as closely aligned with the contours of American democracy—not as a challenge to it or a way to undermine it. Indeed, the early years of the Cold War would not accommodate strident criticism of colonialism. Western European colonial powers, after all, were America’s Cold War allies.²

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE COLD WAR

Only when official Washington determined it was in the U.S.’s interest to showcase its democratic ideals as a beacon of freedom, racial equality, and opportunity did civil rights advocates begin to find common cause with powerful government and business elites. In the vanguard of a concerted effort to respond to international criticism of American race relations were the U.S. State Department, the Voice of America (VOA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Truman and his able Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, turned the story of race in America into a story of the superiority of democracy over communism. The government took steps to silence alternative voices, such as Paul Robeson’s, when they challenged the official narrative of race and democracy in America.³ VOA radio broadcasts by Leonard Feather and especially Willis Conover helped lay the groundwork for the emergence of jazz ambassadors such as Duke Ellington, Louis Armstrong, and Dizzy Gillespie to bring the sounds of freedom to audiences from all over the East Bloc. With the U.S. in the throes of a political and cultural revolution putting the black freedom struggle at the center of domestic and international politics, the prominence of African-American jazz artists proved crucial to the music’s potential as a Cold War weapon of choice. High-profile concert tours allowed U.S. officials to pursue a self-conscious campaign against worldwide criticism of U.S. racial policies and laws. In doing so, the U.S. strived to build cordial relations with

emerging African and Asian post-colonial states. The glaring contradiction in this strategy was that for several years after it was adopted by Truman and his successor Dwight D. Eisenhower, the U.S. promoted black artists as goodwill ambassadors—symbols of the triumph of American democracy as a stark contrast to Soviet oppression—when America was still a Jim Crow nation. Race as a social construct operated culturally to project an image of American nationhood far more inclusive than the reality.⁴

The most effective response to foreign critics ultimately was to achieve dramatic social change at home. The Truman administration's civil rights efforts, including a sustained reliance on national security arguments in briefs before the Supreme Court that would overturn the constitutional basis for Jim Crow, culminated years later in the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* case (1954), when the Supreme Court held that school segregation—a key target of foreign criticism—violated the U.S. Constitution. *Brown* powerfully reinforced the story of race and democracy already being told in State Department propaganda and VOA radio broadcasts. Future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall's triumph in arguing the *Brown* case lent needed credibility to the notion that our democracy enabled social change and was based on principles of justice and equality.⁵

JAZZ DIPLOMACY AND VOA

In the eyes of much of the world, U.S. credibility grew immeasurably in the wake of the landmark court case. Leveraging this renewed sense of democracy's moral superiority in the Cold War ideological arena, Conover's VOA jazz show, begun in 1955 and continuing for the next three decades, became a popular instrument of American diplomacy and African-American jazz. It is tempting—and not altogether inaccurate—to claim that Conover, a mild-mannered, bespectacled white man with a deep, baritone voice made for radio, was a figure of unparalleled importance in spreading “jazz diplomacy” at the height of the Cold War.⁶ As with the contributions of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), U.S. officials and media analysts invoke the experience of VOA to suggest how “soft power” can be used to “win hearts and minds” among a worldwide audience. As an instrument of CIA covert propaganda programs and State Department public diplomacy, VOA's radio broadcasts featuring prominent African-American jazz artists played a vital role in U.S. foreign and security policy during the first three decades of the Cold War.⁷

“Propaganda,” a term with an often negative connotation in the English-speaking world (especially in the wake of Joseph Goebbels' successful Nazi propaganda campaigns during Adolf Hitler's Third Reich), took on different hues during the late 1940s as the Cold War heated up. “Information with a purpose” was how many State Department and CIA officials

described both overt and covert propaganda efforts—a central mission of U.S. foreign policy as a way to counter Soviet propaganda and “misinformation” in the contest for the minds and loyalties of men and women around the world. One 1950 Senate resolution called for “international propagation of the democratic creed through a Marshall Plan in the field of ideas.”⁸ CIA and VOA became linchpins of the new propaganda offensive; radio, its technological instrument. (Editor's Note: See separate article about Goebbels later in this issue.)

The Truman administration asserted that “the propaganda effort of the USSR, now bordering on open psychological warfare, is a major threat to U.S. foreign policy objectives” and that “a psychological offensive by the U.S. based on truth is essential if the U.S. is to succeed.”

In February 1947 the VOA began its first broadcasts into the Soviet Union, shortly before the Marshall Plan—offering aid to any country willing to renounce communism—marked a major escalation in Cold War tensions in 1948. The Berlin Blockade and the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia soon prompted enhanced international broadcasting and covert propaganda efforts. In 1950 RFE emerged in Munich, Germany, broadcasting into Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania. While VOA stepped up overt propaganda broadcasts to the East Bloc countries, CIA channeled confidential funds and policy control to RFE. By the end of the Truman administration CIA was supporting a similar effort, Radio Liberty, broadcasting directly to the people of the Soviet Union. Both RFE and RL gained the cooperation of foreign émigrés who had fled communist-controlled countries. These émigrés delivered commentaries and led discussions, using their expertise in the arts, history, and religion. CIA considered RFE and RL a vanguard in a broad counteroffensive, using overt and covert resources, to challenge and rebut Soviet broadcast propaganda. Meanwhile, VOA gained increased power and prestige in official Washington, and its budget doubled between 1946 and 1950. The Truman administration asserted that “the propaganda effort of the USSR, now bordering on open psychological warfare, is a major threat to U.S. foreign policy objectives” and that “a psychological offensive by the U.S. based on truth is essential if the U.S. is to succeed.” The role of the VOA grew exponentially, largely because “the ability of radio to surmount the man-made barriers of censorship and suppression and to speak directly to the people” made it a crucial force multiplier globally for the State Department, CIA, and U.S. national security interests.⁹

“THEY LOVE JAZZ BECAUSE THEY LOVE FREEDOM”

Central to the success of the VOA broadcasts to mass audiences in the Soviet Union, East Bloc, and Third World were the so-called “jazz ambassadors,” who entertained and educated millions. Since many of the jazz artists also happened to be African-American, they fulfilled a dual role of enhancing the American narrative of racial equality and social justice while celebrating democratic ideals of free market capitalism and freedom of expression. Among the most popular jazz musicians filling VOA’s broadcast hours were Duke Ellington, Dizzy Gillespie, and Louis Armstrong.¹⁰ U.S. officials quickly learned that jazz was more valuable than didactic programming. Conover’s show featured opening theme music from the Ellington orchestra’s signature piece—“Take the A Train” by Billy Strayhorn—followed by Conover’s salutation, “Time for jazz!” Broadcasting for one hour, seven days a week, 52 weeks a year, Conover gained enormous influence on how audiences listened to what *Time* magazine called “this valuable exportable U.S. commodity, jazz.”¹¹

Several surveys indicated that by the 1960s Conover was the second most recognized American in the Soviet Union after Richard Nixon.¹² Musicians such as Ellington, Gillespie, Woody Herman, Dave Brubeck, Stan Getz, Lionel Hampton, and Oscar Peterson became foreign language students, learning words and phrases in Czech, Polish, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian. They would use these words and phrases in taped interviews with foreign disc jockeys, and the interviews were aired along with records by the featured American jazz artists. American diplomacy and soft power had no better friends than Conover and his collection of notable jazz musicians. Their music became the quintessential universal language of a free world trying to break down barriers and influence thinking and political ideas in over 50 nations under communist domination or susceptible to its influence.¹³

While Conover shunned overt propaganda, he believed deeply in the political and cultural importance of jazz. He described jazz as “structurally parallel to the American political system,” an embodiment of American freedom. “Jazz musicians agree in advance on what the harmonic progression is going to be, in what key, how fast and how long, and within that agreement they are free to play anything they want.” For people behind the Iron Curtain, he said, “jazz represents something that is entirely different from their traditions.”¹⁴ Conover believed that people who were denied freedom in their political culture could detect a sense of freedom in jazz. He asserted, “Jazz is a cross between total discipline and total anarchy. The musicians agree on tempo, key and chord structure, but beyond this everyone is free to express himself. This is jazz. And this is

America. That’s what gives this music validity. It is a musical reflection of the way things happen in America. We are not apt to recognize this over here, but people in other countries can feel this element of freedom. They love jazz because they love freedom.”¹⁵ Claimed one jazz artist, “No one did more to end the Cold War than Willis Conover.”¹⁶ How did Conover touch so many hearts in so many faraway lands? Adam Makowicz, a world-famous jazz pianist, was 14 years old and studying classical music in Poland. One night, Makowicz recalled, “a friend brought a short-wave radio, a scarcity at the time, and a group of us congregated around it to listen to that new, enchanting, improvised music, coming from Willis’ program on the Voice of America. We were hooked! From then on, every night at 11 p.m. sharp, we were tuned to shortwave to await, with anticipation, what would follow the famous ‘Take the A Train’ theme, and the announcement *This is Music USA—Jazz Hour*. That music, open to improvisation and coming from a free country, was our hour of freedom ... it helped us to survive dark days of censorship and other oppression.”¹⁷

Jazz was widely celebrated in establishment and middle-brow circles alike as a pivotal cultural weapon of the Cold War...

Conover’s views coincided with many Cold War-era intellectuals, such as Alfred Barr, director of the Museum of Modern Art, who claimed that “modern artists’ nonconformity and love of freedom cannot be tolerated within a monolithic tyranny.” For Barr, “abstract was synonymous with democracy.”¹⁸ Yet Conover and the musicians he featured on his show knew that jazz could speak to America’s Achilles heel of racism in ways that a Mark Rothko or Jackson Pollock painting could not. Conover noted that jazz helps people “identify with America” and “corrects the fiction that America is racist.”¹⁹ Still, many of the black jazz artists had views that subtly and often not so subtly differed from Conover’s. For them, America’s democratic ideals were something to aspire to, not something already achieved. Jazz—like democracy, freedom, and civil rights—was a work in progress, unfinished and imperfect.²⁰

Even as artists and critics were promoting jazz’s status as America’s “classical” music—a term coined by Ellington—and its value to U.S. Cold War diplomacy, its newfound utility was aiding its rehabilitation in mainstream popular culture. *Billboard*, which called itself the amusement industry’s leading newsweekly, hailed jazz’s “recently acquired vestments of legitimacy and respectability.” Music critic Burt Korall wrote, “The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and the Armed Forces Radio Network have exposed

much of Europe, Asia, and Africa to the sounds of jazz. Jazz has succeeded where American diplomats have floundered. It has created a meeting ground, been something that made for a deeper understanding of the American way of life, for to be interested in jazz is to be interested in things American.”²¹ Indeed, by the mid-1950s, just as Conover’s VOA broadcasts were first becoming popular abroad, on U.S. shores—from New York to California—jazz was widely celebrated in establishment and middle-brow circles alike as a pivotal cultural weapon of the Cold War, and *Newsweek*, *Variety*, and *The New York Times* all ran major feature-length stories about jazz’s role in the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.²²

JAZZ AND THE COUNTERCULTURE OF MODERNITY

The State Department’s claim that jazz embodied a unique American freedom transcending race collided with the experiences of many of VOA’s black musicians while growing up in the Jim Crow era of racial segregation and violence, including lynch-mob justice. Other black jazz performers began to invoke what Paul Gilroy has called an African-American counterculture of modernity.²³ “Modern jazz” to these black artists connoted mobility and freedom but also meant a return to the roots of the African diaspora’s intricate rhythms and sounds. Moreover, the leftist political ideologies of a few entertainers made them persona non grata with VOA tours abroad. For example, Mary Lou Williams, a talented jazz composer and pianist who had joined the Gillespie Band for a performance of the *Zodiac Suite* at the 1957 Newport Jazz Festival, was denied a visa to join a State Department tour. Many Washington officials regarded her as too “unstable,” citing her “religious fanaticism.” Dancer and choreographer Katherine Dunham repeatedly was rejected for State Department tours partly in response to her avant garde ballet *Southland*, which critiqued the South’s history of African-American lynchings.²⁴

State Department and VOA cultural policy was often as improvised (though not as skillfully) as the solos of jazz artists. While arguments linking freedom and modern art helped promote the Museum of Modern Art and led to the display of Pollock’s canvases in U.S. embassies throughout Eastern Europe during the 1950s, conservatives in Congress frequently denounced new art forms as “subversive” and “un-American.” Such outspoken criticism of government sponsorship of the arts led to more covert efforts by the CIA in the propaganda wars. During the Cold War, the CIA provided key support for many purportedly independent artistic and intellectual projects—in tandem with VOA radio broadcasts. Far from covert, however, the VOA jazz tours remained highly visible and celebrated in the international media. Nonetheless, state sponsorship of jazz radio

programming garnered constant attacks from vocal conservatives in politics, business, and the American media. State Department officials ultimately tried to shield integrationist and modernist imagery of the jazz tours from critical audiences at home. Drawing particular criticism was Duke Ellington, whose 1940s production *Black, Brown and Beige* had challenged racial hierarchies. Ellington had also collaborated with a musical fundraiser for the Council on African Affairs, a radical anti-colonial organization.²⁵

State Department and VOA cultural policy was often as improvised (though not as skillfully) as the solos of jazz artists.

Ironically, it was precisely the absence of a coherent and effective cultural policy at the State Department that created a space for VOA’s unique alliance of artists, supporters of the arts, and liberals to project a jazz vision of America on the world stage. Whether fostering informal musical connections after hours or backstage, pursuing romantic liaisons, or expressing political opinions in interviews and while on stage, VOA’s coterie of jazz musicians gave their own personal spin on the parallels between jazz and American freedom. The State Department jazz tours illuminated connections and collisions between domestic and foreign policy agendas . . . and between race, nation, and modernism. The immediate success of concert tours by Ellington, Gillespie, Armstrong, Hampton, and dozens of other jazz artists not only testified to the newfound importance of modern jazz, but also the vociferous opposition to the tours, especially among Southern whites and conservative congressmen, indicated deep fissures within a nation only beginning to emerge from Jim Crow political, social, and cultural paradigms. In April 1956, with a Dizzy Gillespie tour under way and four months into the Montgomery bus boycott, the White Citizens Council of Alabama, formed to resist desegregation, announced its opposition to jazz. The council called jazz a “plot to mongrelize America” engineered by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). According to *Newsweek*, Asa Carter, leader of the North Alabama Citizens Council, had said that “be-bop, Rock and Roll, and all Negro music” were designed to force “Negro culture” on the South. Segregationists claimed that having the VOA send Gillespie and his kind around the world to sell overseas audiences on jazz (and to represent the nation) portended the end of the world as they knew it.²⁶

They were right.

CONTROLLING THE NARRATIVE ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND AMERICA'S DEMOCRATIC VALUES

When critics of U.S. race discrimination traveled overseas in the 1950s—before and after the Supreme Court's *Brown* ruling—they posed a powerful challenge to the U.S. government's narrative of race in America. The Eisenhower White House determined the story of progress in race relations, measured through laws and social change, could best be protected if such challenges were contained, controlled, and managed. Paul Robeson and W.E.B. DuBois, among others, discovered their ability to travel overseas was curtailed in the early 1950s. Robeson (through song) and DuBois (through political organizing) generated international interest in U.S. racial problems. DuBois had created a stir in 1947 when he signed NAACP and Civil Rights Congress petitions claiming that African-Americans "suffer from genocide as the result of the consistent, conscious, and unified policies of every branch of government."²⁷ Such controversial pronouncements often were exploited by Soviet propagandists and international media reporting. When Robeson and DuBois criticized glacial progress on desegregation and education and employment policies affecting the black community in America, the State Department confiscated their passports, effectively denying them access to an international audience.²⁸

The U.S. used a complex array of covert and overt military and diplomatic means to enhance strategic and economic interests in Berlin, Iraq, India, the Congo, Vietnam, Poland, and Latin America.

Just as the Eisenhower administration began cracking down on leftist black critics of its civil rights policies, events in Cold War hot spots created new opportunities for jazz artists to reach international audiences in new and creative ways. The first major VOA jazz tours sent Dizzy Gillespie to the Middle East in 1956, Benny Goodman to Southeast Asia in 1957, and Dave Brubeck to Poland and the Middle East in 1958—into the very teeth of global crises where U.S. and Soviet interests clashed. The U.S. used a complex array of covert and overt military and diplomatic means to enhance strategic and economic interests in Berlin, Iraq, India, the Congo, Vietnam, Poland, and Latin America.²⁹

Why did U.S. policymakers send jazz to the rescue during foreign policy crises? What was the Cold War "common sense" that made sending musicians into the preludes and

aftermaths of coups d'etat seem normal to policymakers, journalists, supporters of the arts, and the artists themselves?

The story of the early VOA-sponsored jazz tours takes us into the world of post-war internationalism and the boisterous one-upmanship of the Cold War. The masculine adventurism of the 1950s elevated covert action into a cult of counterinsurgency.³⁰ Indeed, many of the jazz tours moved in a world of espionage where the tensions between cultural exchanges and ideological belligerence were played out. Jazz pianists and trumpeters lived in close proximity to coups and proxy wars. As European colonial empires collapsed in the decades following World War II, U.S. policymakers opted not to supplant European colonialism but to assert that the United States had a legitimate right to lead the "free world." The nation pursued global economic integration through modernization and Third World development programs. The CIA became enmeshed in Middle East, Southeast Asian, and Latin American covert action initiatives, which pointedly overlooked the fact that not every nationalist leader or group had communist allegiances. The overthrow of popular leaders in Iran, Guatemala, Africa, and Indonesia depended on ethnocentric assumptions that limited Third World agency and independent-minded thinking by colonial peoples yearning for the same freedom and democratic values the CIA ostensibly was trying to protect and expand.

Fortunately for their State Department handlers, virtually all of the jazz musicians who toured abroad to spin the official narrative of racial equality and the free enterprise system's inherent superiority to Soviet oppression shared an abiding patriotism and pride in all things American. Gillespie himself often recounted how the unparalleled visibility of the Southern civil rights struggle—embodied in the Montgomery bus boycott and the peaceful marches of Martin Luther King, Jr.—brought unprecedented national and international attention to American racism and civil rights groups. For the black jazz artists like Gillespie, Armstrong, and Hampton, patriotism and democratic struggle went hand in hand. They looked upon the foreign tours as a way to combine a chance to work, promote a big band, serve one's country, meet fellow musicians around the world, and contribute to the civil rights cause. For national security professionals planning and implementing the new jazz diplomacy in tandem with broader policy goals, covert aspects of the VOA-sponsored tours remained opaque. As a result, neither the musicians nor State Department personnel directly involved in staging the music events were fully aware of the far-reaching objectives or political actions surrounding the tours. The full extent of the covert nature of many of the era's so-called diplomatic initiatives would not be known for decades, long after such actions had succeeded in undermining not only Soviet ambitions but

also incipient democratic and nationalistic agendas in a host of Third World countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.³¹

The jazz artists sometimes were not necessarily welcomed with open arms by U.S. Foreign Service personnel abroad. With government involvement in the arts anathema to many Americans, coupled with violent white resistance to the civil rights movement, musicians encountered quite a few surly segregationists among the embassy staffs. Gillespie and Brubeck often remarked that they could easily sense the political tensions and the high level of military security surrounding their every movement on foreign soil.³²

Beginning in Iran, Gillespie's inaugural tour traveled to Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece. In doing so, he and his band were navigating Eisenhower's conception of a "perimeter defense" against the Soviet Union along what later generations would call "the crescent of crisis"—from Turkey to Pakistan.

By the same token, the black artists also came in contact with hundreds of allies who seized upon the power of jazz to rescue the image of America and promote a liberal, internationalist vision in an egalitarian world. It was no accident that the first State Department jazz performance took place in Abadan, Iran—"to the smell of crude oil and the sound of gunfire from nearby Iraq"—at the heart of the former British Empire, in a country rich in that coveted Cold War commodity, oil. Three years earlier, in 1953, Iran had been the target of the first CIA-backed coup, which ousted Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed the Shah. American firms had gained entry into the Iranian oil industry and acquired big profits selling Iranian crude on the world market.³³ Over the next decade, jazz musicians would return to Iran numerous times, and the Dave Brubeck Quartet and the Duke Ellington Orchestra would even find themselves in the middle of Iraqi coups in 1958 and 1963, respectively. Beginning in Iran, Gillespie's inaugural tour traveled to Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece. In doing so, he and his band were navigating Eisenhower's conception of a "perimeter defense" against the Soviet Union along what later generations would call "the crescent of crisis"—from Turkey to Pakistan. In 1955 the U.S. had signed the Baghdad Pact, an anti-Soviet mutual defense treaty, an alliance with important new Cold War-era security partners in Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran.³⁴ Gillespie's jazz diplomacy in 1956 was adding a culturally-

charged exclamation point to the new relationships being cultivated by embassy staffs and CIA station chiefs throughout the Middle East.

Retracing Gillespie's itinerary, one can also read U.S. policymakers' anxieties about the coming Suez Crisis. As the 22-piece Gillespie Band rehearsed in New York City in March 1956 for its State Department tour, the coordinated British, French, and Israeli attack on Egypt in the Suez War of 1956 was still more than six months away.³⁵ President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, however, were deeply preoccupied with Middle East tensions. They were suspicious of the nonaligned politics of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and they feared he was falling under Soviet influence.³⁶ Dulles, the architect of Eisenhower's containment policy and later an advocate of massive retaliation in the event of a Soviet first strike, had demonstrated his contempt for nonaligned politics at the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955. A year later he declared that neutrality "has increasingly become an obsolete conception" and that it was "immoral and shortsighted."³⁷ Still, neither Eisenhower nor Dulles wished to antagonize nationalist sentiment in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa; nor did they want to be associated with British or French colonialism in the region.³⁸ Such sentiments led to U.S. defiance of its European allies when the Suez War erupted.³⁹ Sending Gillespie and his band on tour would be a "soft power" way to shore up the support of allies and persuade those on the fence to distinguish the United States from the declining European colonial powers. The U.S. also sought to rebut charges by nonaligned leaders (especially Nasser and India's Jawaharlal Nehru) that America's racism and imperial ambitions made a mockery of its claims to lead the Free World by championing democratic, free-enterprise values.⁴⁰

With his spell-binding virtuosity, arresting trumpet solos, and egalitarian sensibility, Gillespie won over huge audiences wherever he traveled—from sophisticated fans in Beirut, to habitués of the underground jazz scene in Yugoslavia, to villagers in East Pakistan who had probably never before heard jazz. So popular was Gillespie that a Pakistani newspaper editorial argued that "the language of diplomacy ought to be translated into the score for a bop trumpet."⁴¹ Observing Gillespie's crowds in Yugoslavia, the U.S. ambassador wired Washington that "Gillespie's band had made our job much easier."⁴² *The New York Times* reported from Beirut that the band's reception was "beyond expectations" and that U.S. diplomats "hope the noise stays in the walls for a long time to come."⁴³

THE BROTHERHOOD OF JAZZ

The State Department soon learned that with Gillespie they got a lot more democracy and a lot more action than they could have imagined. If U.S. diplomats had already come to appreciate the failure of didactic propagandists, Gillespie's candor must have been refreshing. "I sort of liked the idea of representing America, but I wasn't going to apologize for the racist policies of America. I know what they've done to us and I'm not going to make any excuses."⁴⁴ Deeply aware of the politics behind the tours, Gillespie never hesitated to defy State Department and local convention, promoting his own vision of America. For Gillespie and his band, the tours meant long overdue recognition from a society that had failed to acknowledge the contributions of black jazz artists. Quincy Jones, who helped with many of the band's music arrangements, said, "We were pissed off, but like the black soldiers of World War II, we kept keepin' on."⁴⁵ Overseas the band encountered patronizing ignorance on the part of embassy officials, who knew little about the history of African-Americans or jazz's contributions to America's musical legacy. Jones called some of them "alcoholics who rode around in air-conditioned limousines almost too big for the dirt roads" in places like Pakistan and Greece. Jones recalled that a cultural attaché in Athens "advised his staff not to mingle with us" and "informed his female staff that in the United States, respectable girls did not mix with black jazz musicians."⁴⁶

Gillespie, Jones, and the rest of the band's contingent suffered the insults but enthusiastically embraced the intertwined civil rights and foreign policy agendas. However obnoxious they might become, racist U.S. diplomats and embassy staffers could not derail Gillespie's personal civil rights agenda. Many people in Europe and Asia thought that black musicians had no opportunities and never mingled with white artists. When those people saw that the mixed-race Gillespie band was a cohesive and extremely talented unit, they realized that what they had been hearing and thinking was off the mark.⁴⁷ The musicians were struck by the sheer novelty of what they were doing. The State Department tours took them to exotic places that simply would not have been possible without government sponsorship. Usually playing three concerts a week while on tour, the musicians found time to meet local artists. In Ankara, Turkey, tenor saxophonist Billy Mitchell and trombonist Rod Leavitt played with Turkey's top trumpeter, Muvaffak Falay, at a local hot spot. At the next night's concert, Gillespie gave Falay an engraved cigarette case "in token of the brotherhood of jazz."⁴⁸ In Ankara, Jones met Arif Mardin, who handed him a score so impressive that later, back in the States, Jones used the arrangements on Voice of America. Jones also obtained a scholarship for Mardin at Berklee College of Music in Boston.⁴⁹

The early jazz tours' greatest value, according to many New York music critics, was the ability to portray jazz as a distinctly American idiom. Jazz was born and grew up in the United States. No other country could make such a claim on the genre. Many people in foreign lands considered jazz a new and impressive contribution to culture. Music critic Marshall Stearns wrote in his *Saturday Review* column, "Jazz is one of America's best-loved *artistic* exports."⁵⁰ For Stearns, Gillespie had not only won friends for the United States; he had succeeded in elevating the art of jazz.

Fearing that Southeast Asia would go the way of Communist China, Eisenhower and Dulles had authorized extensive covert operations in Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. Thailand remained a strategic bulwark against the spread of communism.

On December 7, 1956, Benny Goodman and his orchestra embarked on a seven-week tour of Thailand, Singapore, Malaya, Cambodia, Burma, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Japan. Fearing that Southeast Asia would go the way of Communist China, Eisenhower and Dulles had authorized extensive covert operations in Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. Thailand remained a strategic bulwark against the spread of communism. Goodman's orchestra charmed the foreign audiences, and they reciprocated with decorations and honorary titles.⁵¹

Nothing better exemplifies the infusion of diplomatic bravado into the early jazz tours than the chaotic tour of the Dave Brubeck Quartet in 1958. Brubeck was sent across the Iron Curtain into East Germany without a visa; then to Poland, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Ceylon; then finally straight into the Middle East crisis of 1958 and a coup in Iraq.⁵² On an artistic level, the reverence Brubeck felt for non-Western forms of music they encountered could be heard in their own evolving style.⁵³ In Iran the group played before local and expatriate elites in performances co-sponsored by the Iranian Oil Refinery Company and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). In July, shortly after the group left Iraq, a nationalist revolt overthrew the Iraqi monarchy and established a regime friendly to the United Arab Republic, threatening the Baghdad Pact and challenging U.S. oil interests in the Persian Gulf. Long seen as "an island in a sea of instability," Iraq had become yet another Middle East powder-keg.⁵⁴

In the early Gillespie, Goodman, and Brubeck tours from 1956 to 1958, despite logistical chaos and the backdrop of international turbulence, jazz musicians exceeded State Department expectations as ambassadors. They charmed

audiences, journalists, and embassy personnel. Their irreverence, egalitarianism, and creative brilliance as musicians achieved far more in winning friends than any sanctimonious pronouncements of U.S. superiority. For the musicians, the tours brought international cultural capital as artists and civil rights emissaries.⁵⁵

COLD WAR CRISES AND INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING'S RESPONSE

Under the direction of President Eisenhower's administration (1953-1961), all information activities, including international broadcasting, were transferred from the State Department to the new USIA. As part of this shift, broadcasting resources grew leaner and budgets smaller. As the war in Korea reached a bitter stalemate and an armistice agreement was signed to end hostilities, which had led to more than 580,000 casualties among South Korean and U.S. troops, bloody conflict erupted on the streets of Budapest, Hungary, in 1956. U.S. radio commentaries via RFE and RL may have been partly to blame. When U.S. intelligence officials gained access to the text of a historic and inflammatory speech by Nikita Khrushchev to the Communist Party Congress in which he denounced Joseph Stalin, RFE and RL rebroadcast the speech to Eastern European audiences. Within weeks mass uprisings erupted in Poland and Hungary, where thousands demanded the lifting of repressive measures linked to the Stalin regime. The Poles avoided a direct military clash with the USSR, but in Hungary over 200,000 Soviet troops and 2,500 Red Army tanks put down open rebellion against the Soviet system, creating a wave of several hundred thousand refugees.⁵⁶

RFE and RL were targets of harsh criticism by Hungarian émigrés in the aftermath of the failed rebellion. Socialist Party leader Bela Kovacs, for example, claimed that "U.S. radio misled Hungarians into believing they could count on effective U.S. aid in the event of trouble with the Soviets."⁵⁷ Hungarians, indeed, had been understandably encouraged and emboldened by the broadcast of Western press reviews and correspondent reports conveying (accurately) the widespread sympathy throughout the U.S. and Western Europe for the cause of the Hungarian rebels. European leaders fanned the flames of rebellion when RFE reported the words of Etienne de la Vallee-Poussin, chairman of the Council of Europe in Belgium, who said: "Today we are only speaking, but tomorrow we will have to act. History is marching along at increased speed. The rigidity of the Soviet system is not the same as before. Let the unity and determined attitude of the West be the answer. Only thus can we solve the essence of the question: the problem of the united, indivisible, and free Europe."⁵⁸

This was the dilemma—as relevant today as it was in Hungary in 1956—of an external communicator who accurately conveys news and information into a region beset by a political crisis but risks its misinterpretation by the audience as signifying the promise of specific outside assistance or support for a particular cause when such is not the case. Responsible journalism can thus lead to inadvertent incitement—as happened in Hungary. The Hungarian people's belief in RFE as a symbol of American power is testimony to the influence that RFE came to assume. In the end, the historical record demonstrates that the journalistic lapses of the RFE Hungarian Service, while serious, could not by themselves have inspired, provoked, or prolonged the Hungarian Revolution or caused the Soviet Union to suppress it so brutally. Nor, by any reasonable reading, could the U.S. government's policy guidance to RFE in 1956—and American and European expressions of sympathy—nurture the hopes of Hungarians for Western military intervention.⁵⁹

The Bay of Pigs fiasco, a failed CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba in April 1961 to overthrow the Castro regime, not only was an embarrassing foreign policy defeat for the new U.S. President; it was also damaging to the credibility of VOA and Radio Swan, a CIA-funded clandestine station whose sole purpose was to discredit Castro.

When John F. Kennedy became President, he hired Edward R. Murrow as the new USIA director. Murrow, a legend in radio and television news broadcasting dating back to the London Blitz in World War II, elevated international broadcasting to a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy. During the Kennedy years, VOA, RFE, and RL broadened the scope of their responsibilities and increased their budgets. The rise of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro brought East-West tensions to America's doorstep. In response, Kennedy boosted VOA's Spanish-language broadcasts to counter increasingly strident anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America. The Bay of Pigs fiasco, a failed CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba in April 1961 to overthrow the Castro regime, not only was an embarrassing foreign policy defeat for the new U.S. President; it was also damaging to the credibility of VOA and Radio Swan, a CIA-funded clandestine station whose sole purpose was to discredit Castro. A year later the Cuban Missile Crisis pitted the U.S. against the Soviet Union, and Kennedy prompted the VOA to patch together a network of commercial radio stations that flooded Cuban airwaves. With the help of RFE, VOA

clarified the U.S. position on Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, and a worldwide audience listened intently as the crisis played out in the press in October 1962.⁶⁰

Just as Americans and radio audiences around the world were taking a deep breath once the Missile Crisis was resolved, they began to hear more and more about another small country on the other side of the world, where another Cold War battleground was taking shape—Vietnam. The Cold War indeed had many faces and places, but for many African-Americans—disenfranchised and impoverished after decades of slavery and segregation—the real battleground was not on the streets of Budapest or Havana or Saigon but at home in the mean streets of Detroit, Los Angeles, Little Rock, and Birmingham.

SATCHMO

The first and only official State Department tour by Louis Armstrong, known throughout the world as “Satchmo,” almost never took place. Distressed by the Eisenhower administration’s civil rights policies and the refusal of the Justice Department to enforce court-ordered desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, Armstrong refused to become a jazz ambassador until 1960. Instead, he became involved in support of the civil rights movement’s sit-ins and freedom rides. Armstrong toured Ghana as a private citizen and was quoted as saying, “The way they are treating my people in the South, the government can go to hell.”⁶¹ He also remarked after the Little Rock school desegregation crisis, “It’s getting so bad a colored man hasn’t got any country.”⁶² For obvious reasons, both Armstrong and the State Department were initially reluctant to team up for a good will tour celebrating American jazz and the superiority of America’s way of life. Satchmo, however, was not the only American concerned about the Little Rock crisis. Secretary of State Dulles told Attorney General Herbert Brownell that he was “sick at heart” and that the violence there was “ruining our foreign policy. The effect of this in Asia and Africa will be worse for us than Hungary was for the Russians.”⁶³

While on a commercial tour of South America, Armstrong showed how critical he could be as an unofficial goodwill ambassador. According to *The New York Times*, the “almost simultaneous” appearance of U.S. Air Force stunt fliers and Louis Armstrong in Rio de Janeiro was “an unplanned coincidence.” With U.S. prestige suffering in the wake of the Sputnik launch, however, “jets and jazz are having a favorable impact, and the United States is again the talk of the day here.”⁶⁴ Issues of civil rights had been contained in the early jazz tours of Gillespie, Goodman, and Brubeck, but Armstrong’s Ghana trip and his later denunciation of Eisenhower during the 1957 Little Rock crisis illuminated the connections between domestic and foreign policy.

As State Department officials responded to charges of U.S. racism, they also were increasingly forced to respond to criticisms of escalating U.S. intervention in Africa. Since World War II, the U.S. had designs on mineral-rich Katanga Province in the Belgian Congo. So began the courtship of Satchmo to bring a positive American story to Africa. This time he accepted the challenge. When Armstrong and his band embarked on his 1960-61 tour of Africa, he, like almost all U.S. citizens, was unaware that CIA Director Allen Dulles had ordered the CIA station chief in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) to have the recently-elected prime minister of the Belgian Congo, Patrice Lumumba, assassinated. The centrality of the Congo crisis set the tone for the Armstrong tour. Looking back on his visit to Katanga Province, Armstrong liked to comment that his jazz tour had stopped a civil war so that a day-long truce called by both sides would allow people to hear him perform. He did not know at the time of his visit that Lumumba had already been arrested and was being held and tortured by U.S.-backed rebels. Lumumba would be assassinated in January 1961, while Armstrong and his band were still playing their jazz on the continent.⁶⁵

For Armstrong, like the African audiences for whom he played, freedom remained an aspiration, not an achievement. The 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, while milestones on “freedom’s road,” were not an end but a beginning. That was because Armstrong and his generation of black musicians, like their fellow African-Americans in the auto factories, steel mills, farms, hospitals, and road construction crews across the nation, had fought too hard to quit now. The struggle would go on—in the United States and around the world.

THE SENIOR STATESMAN OF JAZZ

Less than two weeks after King’s march on Washington on August 28, 1963, the Duke Ellington Orchestra left New York for Damascus, Syria, embarking on the first of many State Department tours. The tour followed on the heels of Ellington’s production of *My People*, a musical revue commemorating the 100th anniversary of Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s Birmingham campaign in May and the August march on Washington provided a dramatic political backdrop for the overseas tour. Television footage of Birmingham Police Commissioner Bull Connor’s vicious dogs and fire hoses turned on black children had shocked people around the world. The turmoil in Birmingham embarrassed the Kennedy administration and pressured him to take unprecedented action on the civil rights front, which he called “a moral crisis.”⁶⁶ The young President would soon find in the senior statesman of jazz the ideal ambassador for an important cultural exchange tour—now that the eyes of

the world were closely watching King's stewardship of the civil rights movement's passive resistance campaigns. Ellington, 64 years old when the tour began, had achieved international recognition as a composer, pianist, and bandleader. Ellington's worldliness as an international celebrity and his experience in leading a black band in Jim Crow America meant he was uniquely suited to contend with the tensions in the Cold War cultural exchange visits to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. He was not only a patriot but also a sincere believer in his country's Cold War mission of promoting the superiority of American democracy. Along with Lionel Hampton, he was one of the very few Republican jazz musicians touring for the State Department.⁶⁷

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Ellington's tour to Damascus brought his orchestra into the most tumultuous U.S.-Middle East relations since the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. The Eisenhower Doctrine had declared the need to defend the Middle East against communist aggression. Reflecting on the significance of the band's tour in Cold War hot spots, Ellington turned a *New York Herald Tribune* interview into a personal commentary on how the world viewed the progress of African-Americans' civil rights struggle back home. He also noted that his State Department handlers did not require him or his band members "to restrain ourselves in the expression of our personal, political, social or religious views. As citizens of a free country, there are no restrictions on our tongues. We are to speak as free men."⁶⁸

The assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, brought an abrupt end to Ellington's successful tour, which had also included stops in Jordan, Afghanistan, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey. Devastated by the news, Ellington stayed up late that night composing memorial music. In summing up the tour a few years later, Ellington said he hoped his audiences understood that "the music of my race is something more than the American idiom. It is the result of our transplantation to American soil, and was our reaction in the plantation days to the tyranny we endured. What we could not say openly we expressed in music. It expresses our personality." To export American culture was to export its hybrid nature, complexity, tensions, and contradictions. To

export jazz was to export, in the words of Ellington, "an American idiom with African roots."⁶⁹

COLD WAR CULTURAL LEGACIES

The goodwill ambassadors' understanding of jazz as an international music complicates the traditional characterization of jazz as "America's music," a label used by VOA's Willis Conover. Armstrong, Ellington, and Gillespie embraced the tours as opportunities to make claims on a nation that had long denied them recognition as artists, and human and civil rights as African-Americans. Yet for these musicians, jazz was never solely an expression of the nation. Jazz was an international and hybrid music combining not just African and European forms but forms that had developed out of an earlier mode of cultural exchange—through the circuitous routes of the Atlantic slave trade and the overlapping diasporas created by migrations throughout the Americas.⁷⁰

The jazz ambassadors represented America at a unique historical juncture. The Cold War, the African-American civil rights movement, and the emergence of 40 new African and Asian nations created the context in which the jazz ambassadors projected the optimism and vitality of black American culture throughout the world. Through the jazz tours and through the VOA broadcasts, the music of the jazz ambassadors reached from Kabul, Leningrad, Damascus, and Tehran to Baghdad, Bombay, Karachi, and Kinshasa. The music reached even into the prisons of apartheid. For all the contradictions of Cold War internationalism, the global freedom movements of the post-1945 years helped forge an alliance of musicians, supporters of the arts, and liberals in the State Department. These policymakers and musicians gave U.S. foreign policy an egalitarian edge. All over the world, the U.S. came to be associated with jazz, civil rights, African-American culture, and egalitarianism—not because the jazz ambassadors claimed to represent a free country, but because they identified so deeply with freedom struggles everywhere. In a fundamental way, the musicians were cultural translators who inspired the vision and shaped its contours, and they asserted their right to "play for the people."⁷¹

The story of jazz and the State Department, the CIA, and Voice of America is not the story of a nation standing apart from and unsullied by imperial power. It is the story of an America deeply implicated in the machinations and violence of global modernization: the slave trade that forced millions of Africans to voyage in chains to the Americas; the U.S. involvement in CIA-planned coups in Iran, Iraq, Guatemala, and the Belgian Congo; and the arming of military tyrannies in Egypt and Pakistan. These events established the context for the tours. The relationship between jazz and the State Department and CIA fiefdoms reveals a Janus-faced power,

at once unprecedented in its world-ordering ambitions and often too self-absorbed to understand the immediate and long-term consequences of its actions. Not only were jazz artists deployed in proximity to covert and overt military campaigns but also in the broader sense of “culture” as structures of feeling and material life. As we retrace the journeys of Armstrong and Brubeck and Ellington and Gillespie to Cold War hot spots like Iran, the Congo, and Pakistan, we also retrace the geographic patterns of those quintessential Cold War commodities, oil and uranium, along with many others critical to America’s material affluence—the wealth that was so seductive to overseas audiences.⁷²

The jazz ambassadors were not privy to the highly opaque and often covert political and economic agendas that accompanied their tours. Nor were they entirely innocent of them.

The jazz ambassadors were not privy to the highly opaque and often covert political and economic agendas that accompanied their tours. Nor were they entirely innocent of them. Nonetheless, there is no doubt what side most of the musicians were on. Cheering the masses who cheered them and donning the vestments of modern African diasporic solidarity, the jazz ambassadors sided with the forces of change and innovation, liberation and true democracy. They used the global platform their country had given them to promote the dignity of black people and their culture in the U.S. and abroad. For the State Department and official Washington, the jazz tours showed the power of music to legitimize and humanize, and to compel critics of our nation’s policies to identify with America as an ideal. Intended as a color-blind promotion of American democracy, the tours underscored the importance of African-American culture in the Cold War redefinition of America—to polish the image of American democracy and make it appear more inclusive and integrated than the reality.⁷³

The jazz ambassadors projected the opposite of arrogance and belligerence that many had come to associate with U.S. foreign policy in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, coups in Africa, and the Vietnam War. Audiences fell in love with the jazz ambassadors for all the ways they voiced their affinities with people struggling for freedom. Audiences never confused or conflated their love of jazz and American popular culture with an easy acceptance of U.S. foreign policy. They learned to hate us less because they learned to love the message that Dizzy and Satchmo offered them: We are more alike than we are different. In spite of the fear and anxiety caused by the Cold War, as Armstrong would sing in his raspy baritone, “What a Wonderful World” it is.

Author’s Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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A Labor Migrant's Handbook: A Looking-Glass into the State of Russia's Social Labor Divide

by LT (USN) Jason Greoire

Author's Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or the U.S. Government.

An examination of Russian municipal education pamphlets may offer a window to study and understand Russia's contemporary social state. In October 2012 the Russian publishing house, *Vzglyad v Budushee* (Look Into the Future), based in St. Petersburg, Russia, issued a handbook for the city's burgeoning population of foreign labor migrants for the supposed purpose of promoting practical advice specific to migrant workers on how to deal with border guards, police, and other authorities as they enter and transition to Russian society.

By mid-November 2012, the publishing house found itself under domestic and international media pressure to cease issuance of the handbook under the charge that the handbook offended migrant workers and minorities.¹ The uproar centered on the handbook's characterization of migrant workers as personified labor tools such as paint brushes, a broom, and a paint scraper while Russian people were depicted as near perfect human beings. Gleb Panfilov, deputy manager of the Russia publisher *Vzglyad v Budushee*, has publicly defended the meritorious and benevolent intent behind *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*; yet, analytical examination of the handbook's content and depictions clearly includes additional messages that directly and indirectly connote alternative, less benevolent ideas and attitudes to its viewing audiences. The question remains as

to whether or not *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* is an example of Russian state propaganda. By examining the messages within the handbook, the intended audiences, communication techniques used to shape and deliver the messages, and the intent in using an illustrative handbook to communicate its messages can be ascertained through techniques highlighted throughout academic persuasion literature.

In *Techniques of Propaganda and Persuasion*, author Magedah Shabo stipulates that to classify communications as propaganda, the communications must include all four of the following attributes: serve a persuasive function; have a sizable target audience; represent a specific group's agenda; and lastly, it must use faulty reasoning and/or emotional appeals to anchor its messaging within its target audience.⁴ This examination of *A Labor Migrant's Handbook's* persuasive intent, its multiple target audiences, subtle and complex messaging intent, and its use of Russian stereotypes, historic myths, and engrained Russian-tailored emotional and psychological human structures to sow its messages clearly classify it as propaganda under the criteria above. Nevertheless, just classifying *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* as propaganda does not allot the reader a greater understanding of the messages and techniques that distinguish it as true propaganda, nor does it help identify the audiences meant to receive the handbook's messages. To address these questions and more, Jowett and O'Donnell's ten-step plan of propaganda analysis is employed.⁵



Figure 1. (center) Gleb Panfilov of *A Look into the Future*, a St. Petersburg, Russia-based publishing house, shows covers of *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* in the Russian, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik languages in St. Petersburg, Russia.¹ (left and right) Illustrations from *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*.²

Within the ten-step plan of propaganda analysis, the first step is to identify the target audience of the propaganda messaging.

Within the ten-step plan of propaganda analysis, the first step is to identify the target audience of the propaganda messaging. *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* has two target audiences: the Russian people (specifically white ethnic Russians), and a single identity collective migrant group that predominately includes Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz migrants.⁶ The character, homogeneity, size, and dispersion of a target audience are very influential in how a propagandist chooses, shapes, and delivers its propaganda messages. In the case of *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*, the choice of two audiences has the effect of creating a two-group adversary environment of one versus the other, us versus them, highlighting often specious distinguishing attributes and qualities to further separate the groups and instill conditions on the target audiences to better receive the handbook's messaging. Additionally, the handbook's primary audience, a collective migrant group, has a messaging effect inherent in its construction. Instead of creating an audience recognizing each ethnic nationality that comprises the individual group and forming them into a collective group, this organization blurs their differences and diminishes their individualistic pride, national and ethnic character, national history, and self-identity. This too is intentional and conditions the target audiences to better receive the handbook's messaging.

The second step of the ten-step plan of propaganda analysis is the identification of the propagandist.⁷ The handbook was published by the Russian publishing house Look Into the Future in St. Petersburg, which is headed by Aleksey Hmyrov and Gleb Panfilov.⁸ Limited Internet-based research revealed no additional reference to the publishing house associating it or its leadership to past negative/controversial publishing or local/regional/national Russian government offices. While multiple Russian news media organizations reported that *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* was promoted on a St. Petersburg city government webpage for a short time and one source even claimed that the handbook was approved by the St. Petersburg Mayor's office, no further evidence of direct Russian government association was discovered extending outside of local city politics.⁹ This claimed association to the city Mayor's office, if true, complicates and significantly expands the implications of the handbook's nature, intent, and message.

An important and often overlooked step in analyzing propaganda is the necessary study of the context that

provides the stereotypes, reformative history, and myths that enable propagandists to create and shape messages that have maximum resonance with their target audiences. To gain a sense of context and understanding of the complexity and potential outcomes of the messages within the handbook, a brief examination of Russia's recent demographic crisis is warranted. Peaking in 1991 at 148,689,000, Russia's total population dropped to 141,909,000 by 2009, which represented a 4.6 percent reduction, the greatest population decrease of any developed nation during the period.¹⁰ Additional demographic stresses in Russia included a depressed average life expectancy, which dipped below 60 years, and a low female fertility rate that fell to 1.16 per woman in the late 1990s.¹¹ While in recent years these statistics have begun to improve, an aging population, high crime rate, a growing HIV epidemic, and drug addiction continue to suppress Russia's population, and thus its labor pool. In efforts to reverse these negative trends, the Russian government has employed social messaging and financial incentives to encourage the Russian people to have more children, but to little effect.¹²

To compensate for this reduced domestic labor pool, for the past two decades Russia has experienced a growing dependence on imported low-skilled labor to support its expanding economy. The great majority of low-skilled workers have been migrant laborers from the lesser developed former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. While Russia's need to attract migrant workers continues to grow, its efforts to attract migrant labor have been undermined and complicated by deeply-rooted ethnic prejudice within Russian society.




Figure 2. A graphical depiction of the number of ethnic and racially motivated killings in Russia between 2004 and 2008.¹³

With over 160 ethnicities comprising its population, the Russian Federation is one of the world's most ethnically

diverse nations; countless examples, both contemporary and historic, can be found throughout every Russian city where stereotypes, prejudice, and ethnic-inspired violence and crime are an everyday occurrence.¹⁴ Regular news stories report discrimination against the growing number of impoverished, mostly Muslim migrants in Russia who are working construction, cleaning offices, sweeping the streets, and collecting the garbage. Migrants are commonly victims of hate crimes and frequently live in miserable and destitute conditions. More than one million of Tajikistan's population of seven million live and work in Russia, and their remittance money transfers to Tajikistan represented about 50 percent of the nation's gross domestic product in 2011.¹⁵ Though hate attacks in Russia appear to have peaked in 2008 (115 people killed, nearly 500 wounded), the numbers remain high with approximately 20 people killed and 130 wounded in racially motivated crimes in 2011.¹⁶ Awareness of Russian society, its history, fears, prejudice, myths, and social dynamics are critical to gaining an understanding of the messaging in *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*.

The central persuasive elements of *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* are the messages that, in concert, weave the ideology and purpose of the handbook. *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* is comprised of subtle, sub-surface messages that span a number of different attitudes, values, and beliefs that in concert shape the ideology and reveal the underlying nature purpose of the handbook. An attitude is a learned, global evaluation of an object that influences thought and behavior.¹⁷ For example, to a Russian target audience, the fact that migrants are depicted as non-human, low-cost simple tools without clothes reinforces the attitude that workers from lesser developed nations are poor, uncultured, uncivilized, and are not socially or physically comparable to Russians. This same message also reinforces the already existing Russian attitude of cultural accomplishment, pride, and superiority.

Values are desirable end-states or behaviors that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and are ordered by relative importance.¹⁸ In the context of the migrant workers, *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* assumes social acceptance and collectivism are a social value, signaling to the migrant audiences what to do to become part of the depicted healthy, successful, and happy Russian experience. Unlike values, beliefs are specific and more cognitive than attitudes and values. Beliefs are cognitions about the world—subjective probabilities that an object has a particular attribute or that an action will lead to a particular outcome.¹⁹ The messages of *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* reinforce the belief/stereotype to the target audience (Russian people) that migrant workers are just things that perform necessary, unpleasant, and vacant jobs that Russians do not want to do and that they present no threat to Russian employment. Alternatively, to migrant

workers, the pamphlet promotes the belief that, while migrants are in Russia to provide a needed and valued service, they are not Russian and will never become professional Russians.



Figure 3. (top left) “Who can get infected?” “Anyone who doesn’t follow the safety precautions in regard to AIDS(HIV).” (bottom left) “HIV doesn’t transmit via sweat/tears, bug bites, handshakes/hugs, kissing, coughing/sneezing, and using someone else’s plates/silverware, toilet, bath tub, pool, & towels.” Illustration – “Kissing doesn’t spread HIV!” (top right) “Remember that protection from HIV infection often depends only on you.”²¹

The structure of the propaganda and how the media is used are the fifth and sixth steps, respectively, within Jowett and O’Donnell’s ten-step propaganda analysis model.²¹ The decision to express these messages through a visually focused, and illustrated, small handbook is likely not accidental. As stated previously, the medium used to convey propaganda is dictated by the social organization, social environment, and the characteristics of the target audiences. The handbook contains 50 pages and has three chapters: legal advice to labor migrants, recommendations for preventing HIV/AIDS, and other useful recommendations.²² It was issued in four languages: Russian, Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz. In persuasion, societal context matters. Russians, Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, and Tajiks are classified as high-context societies, where society has a collective, group social organization versus a low-context individual focus organization. High-context cultures in messaging are thought to respond more to non-verbal communication, with fewer words used in verbal communication, and a high sensitivity to tone, color, distance, temperature, gestures, posture, ritual, collectivism, and facial expressions.²³

A Labor Migrant's Handbook is primarily visual, and contains a large amount of physical, non-verbal communication in the caricatures’ representation including non-humans versus Russian humans, high cultured art, posture, and civilized clothes within a professionalized/

educated and developed metropolitan city with facial expressions and physical stature as a depiction of dominance. The illustrated caricature-based education pamphlet format transfers an unsuspecting innocence to the messages as well as an inexpensive medium that can easily accommodate its multilingual offering, and selective distribution to specific St. Petersburg centers, centers for HIV prophylaxis, and certain public transport stations known to have high utilization rates by migrants.²⁴ Additionally, the illustrated format, in comparison to radio, video, billboards, or photographs, allows easy manipulation of the visual and environmental characteristics that high-context societies are most sensitive to in non-verbal communication.



Figure 4. “Great Stalin is a flag of the USSR’s friendship.” Peaceful and respectful cooperation between the Russian majority and the various minorities presently living in the former Soviet republics has been important to the Russian state over the last century. (Author’s Note: Stalin’s physical position looking over the borderland minorities.²⁵)

The seventh and eighth steps in analyzing propaganda are an examination of the special techniques used to maximize the messaging effect on target audiences and how target audiences react to the persuasion techniques.²⁶ Three additional effects that persuasion scholars cite can be found in *A Labor Migrant’s Handbook’s* messaging, including distraction, accessibility, and the sleeper effect.

Distraction is a persuasion effect used to prevent message receivers from paying attention to a communication with which they disagree.²⁷ The illustrations in *A Labor Migrant’s Handbook* do not depict migrants working or living in impoverished conditions; however, the directive message of the work they are to perform is implied in their personified low-skill tool caricatures. No migrants are personified as a computer, an aircraft, or a medical device. This is also an example of accessibility, which suggests that often the more likely attitude to influence a behavior is the attitude that is most easily accessed by the receiver’s mind.²⁸

By not illustrating the migrant workers actually working on the street, the Russian people may be more open to accept them positively.

The brochure’s messaging also exhibits the sleeper effect. Within persuasion, the sleeper effect is the notion that the message’s adoption increases over time.²⁹ While countless Russians and migrants may dismiss the characterization and messages, the sleeper effect suggests that over time and with periodic exposure these messages may shape attitudes, values, beliefs and, potentially, behavior.

Persuasion research suggests several theories looking at influence, social organization, and conflict. In examining *A Labor Migrant’s Handbook’s* messages and desired responses, the Realistic Group Theory (GRCT) suggests that when two groups are in competition for scarce resources the potential success of one group threatens the well-being of the other, resulting in negative out-group attitudes.³⁰ Studies using the theory found that, as competition continued, hostilities between the groups increased, and the bias between the groups decreased only when common goals that required intergroup cooperation were introduced. Within the Russian migrant context, the two groups are Russians and the collective group of migrant workers.

Russia needs immigrants to staff critical low-skill jobs; however, Russians have strong stereotypes and prejudices, and see the migrants as a criminal, and a cultural and economic, threat. The messages within *A Labor Migrant’s Handbook* can be understood as an attempt to lower the tensions between the two groups, diluting Russian anxiety that migrants are going to take away their high-skill jobs, and diluting the fear that a migrant’s culture and society are going to follow them into Russia and somehow decrease Russian culture. This is suggested by depicting migrants as non-human, youthfully naïve, short objects, which lower the Russian group’s anxiety. Additionally, the messaging encourages the migrants to assimilate to Russian culture, be respectful, and know their place within Russia’s social hierarchy—good fences make good neighbors.

The messaging of the handbook can also be examined and analyzed factoring the Social Learning Theory (SLT), which suggests that people learn within a social context through observational learning and that social behavior (any type of behavior that we display socially) is learned primarily by observing and imitating the actions of others.³¹ Under SLT, both groups are being programmed by their perception of the illustrations, depicted behaviors, and relationships. Social Judgment Theory (SJT) suggests people perceive and evaluate an idea (message) by comparing it with their present point of view.³² If stereotypes are heavily imbued within the two groups, SJT suggests that the messages they are most likely to accept are those that are most accessible

and align with their current attitudes, values, and beliefs. Given the previously cited news reports of hate, common hate crime, and prejudice against migrant workers, the Russian and migrant groups' attitudes, values, and beliefs are likely strong, polarized, and highly accessible.

To effectively measure the impact of propaganda, audience-specific measurement methods should be identified.

The measurement of target audiences' reaction to various propaganda and persuasion techniques is difficult to gauge accurately within a short period of time from a single product such as the handbook. To effectively measure the impact of propaganda, audience-specific measurement methods should be identified. These tailored measurements should be observed over a span of time, or longitudinally, to detect changes in attitude and more importantly audience behavior.³³ For *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*, while the collective migrant audience's negative reaction suggests the messaging has thus far been ineffective, given the limited time span of one to two months, it is still too soon to determine the handbook's actual messaging effectiveness. Additionally, if *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* is only one part of a series of propaganda, its current national and international controversy and mass media publicity may over time increase the messaging effectiveness through increased exposure.

The ninth step in analyzing propaganda is to examine the effectiveness of propaganda/messaging.³⁴ In examining the messaging effectiveness of *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*, there are three fundamental communicator characteristics that need to be considered: authority, credibility, and social attractiveness. Authority, the right to proscribe behavior, emanates from a person's position in a social structure.³⁵ To be effective, the relative social position must be recognized by at least the recipient of the message. Within *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*, the messaging is presented in a way to build the relative social position so that the Russians are above the migrant laborers. This is expressed by the relative heights of the caricatures, the new and professional clothes worn by the Russians, the characterization of Russians as people and the migrants as simple tools, and the Russian professional uniforms which typically suggest collective identities and hierarchical authority structures. The handbook messages are provided credibility, the attitude toward a source of communication held at a given time by a receiver, through implied attributes of expertise, trustworthiness, and goodwill.³⁶ These attributes, as was the case in authority, are portrayed within the illustrations non-verbally and symbolically with expertise,

trustworthiness, and goodwill portrayed in professional uniforms such as a doctor's lab coat, the chosen exemplified professions (doctors are globally gifted with the belief of trustworthiness and goodwill), and the benevolent facial expressions of all Russians depicted. As authority and credibility, social attractiveness—likability, similarity to message recipients, and physical appeal—is again achieved through the depiction of healthy, attractive, successful, tall, human Russians living in a spotless, cultured, modern, wealthy, and metropolitan city.³⁷

The final step in the ten-step process to analyze propaganda is the examination of counterpropaganda.³⁸ While no specific counterpropaganda was uncovered through limited Internet-based research, a significant number of pro-migrant rights advocacy advertisements surfaced around the time of the most recent Russian presidential election. These advertisements were predominately from presidential candidates reaching out for political support, labor groups, and human rights groups which presented messaging against many of the underlying myths, beliefs, and attitudes fundamental to enabling the indirect messages of *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*. However, given these advertisements' general audience and medium of message transmission, Internet-based research did not identify evidence to suggest these advertisements diminished the messaging effectiveness of *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*.

Based on this examination of *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*, it can be classified as propaganda.³⁹ With employment of Jowett and O'Donnell's ten-step analysis of propaganda, complex and layered streams of messages that use persuasion and a symbolic process to convince others to weaken, maintain, or strengthen attitudes or behaviors regarding an issue through the transmission of a message in an atmosphere of free choice can be identified throughout *A Labor Migrant's Handbook*.⁴⁰ Through the analysis of Russia's state education pamphlets, a greater understanding of Russian contemporary society can be obtained. Russians' bias, self-appraisal, attitudes, values, beliefs, and social vulnerabilities/cracks can be revealed clearly, sometimes more directly than by those immersed within the society. In today's global consumer hyper-media environment, persuasion is everywhere and, given the significant influence persuasion has on people, today more than ever the adage *caveat emptor* or "buyer beware" remains ever prudent and relevant.

Notes

¹ Suhrob Majidov, "Tajik rights activists condemn Russian labor migrant handbook," *Tajikistan Business Newswire*, November 20, 2012, <http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/tajikistan/business/viewstory.aspx?id=13194> (accessed January 20, 2013).

² Gleb Panfilov of *A Look into the Future*, St. Petersburg, Russia. AP photo #608813632174.

- ³ *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* illustrations: (bottom left) "Remember, houses expect you to be healthy." (bottom right) "What a wonderful job they did." "Come again." "And remember my recommendations."
- ⁴ Magedah Shabo, *Techniques of Propaganda and Persuasion* (New York: Prestwick House, Inc., 2008), 5.
- ⁵ Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda & Persuasion* (London: Sage Publications, Inc., 2011), 269-287.
- ⁶ *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* (St. Petersburg, Russia: Look Into the Future, 2012), 5.
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- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Richard M. Perloff, *The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Routledge, 2012), 42.
- ¹⁸ Deirdre D. Johnston, *The Art And Science Of Persuasion* (New York: Brown & Benchmark Publishers, 1994), 226.
- ¹⁹ William Rogers, *Persuasion: Messages, Receivers, and Contexts* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 72.
- ²⁰ *A Labor Migrant's Handbook* (St. Petersburg, Russia: Look Into the Future, 2012), 33.
- ²¹ Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda & Persuasion* (London: Sage Publications, Inc., 2011), 273, 276-278.
- ²² Suhrob Majidov, "Tajik Human Rights Activists Condemn Russian Handbook for Labor Migrants," Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, November 14, 2012, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5879> (accessed January 20, 2013).
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- ³⁷ Richard M. Perloff, *The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Routledge, 2012), 158-159.
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Three Critical Factors in Intelligence Activity: Product, Process, and Personnel (The 3P Project)

by Ionel Nitu, Romanian Intelligence Service

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The term “3P” derives from the three very important categories/areas in defining a reform process of national security intelligence analysis, namely:

- Process (the analysis activity, with its entire set of methods or means, internal procedures and standards, but also with its various types of organization)
- Product (the results of the analysis activity, the products which are sent to beneficiaries/users, and the feedback or requests for information from the intelligence consumers)
- Personnel (the intelligence analyst, as well as the process of his/her selection and training)

Why these three Ps? I must confess that the idea of trying to define the analysis activity, and implicitly the main parts of reform in this important area for the activity of each intelligence service, came following some discussions I had with colleagues, experts, and intelligence analysts. I was co-author of a paper (presented at an international forum) concerning the evolution of intelligence analysis on these three categories: process, product, and personnel. Afterward, I found there is a whole literature that defines the management processes (especially in corporations) or the performance of an organization/company in the 3P logic. Hence, I will briefly approach, from a theoretical point of view, the subject of intelligence analysis reform, and I will talk about the practical component, starting from these three identified essential factors.

THEORETICAL PREMISES

Security risk dynamics after the end of the Cold War is one of the research topics in international relations, as well as in subsequent areas of security studies and intelligence analysis. Among the most well-known authors who discuss the subjects of globalization and widening the security concept are James Rosenau, Alvin Toffler,¹ Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye in the complex interdependence theories or G. John Ikenberry regarding security strategies.² The changes in the national security area were widely

treated both within organizational theories and rational choice theory (T.G. Cummings,³ L.J. Mullins⁴), as well as in international relations theories (starting from the Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow study on the Cuban Missile Crisis⁵) or in psychological studies (regarding change, e.g., C.A. Carnall, W.W. Burke⁶).

The approaches concerning the change to intelligence analysis are mostly of English origin and are limited to debates on reform of the security area and interagency cooperation. In this field, there are very famous studies such as “The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces” (DCAF Centre, Geneva) or “Kings College,” London, or “RAND Corporation,” in the U.S., as well as those on policy analysis carried out in an institutional framework (the analysis of the Parliamentary commissions post-September 11 or Gregory Treverton’s⁷ and Deborah Barger’s⁸ studies). The first scientific concerns (within the U.S. intelligence community) belong to Sherman Kent (whose name was given to the most famous research institute in this field, the Center for Intelligence Studies, CIA) and Richards Heuer, Jr.⁹

The research on intelligence analysis was started after the end of the Second World War along with the development of the analytical domain within the CIA. Gradually, but in a pronounced way in recent years (in the post-September 11 period), intelligence specialization (SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT, etc.) and technological development have led to some intelligence studies focused on special fields (secret sources, use of satellites, combating terrorism and organized crime, etc.), but have offered a less comprehensive perspective over the entire process of reform of intelligence analysis. There has been advanced research on developments in the intelligence area, which has been generated by security system reforms and assessments produced within different intelligence services in Europe and the U.S., as well as by the development of cooperation between services within NATO and the EU.

Nowadays, most of the studies concerning the intelligence area have been generated by the emergence, after the end of the Cold War, of some national intelligence communities (in the U.S., United Kingdom, etc.) having the role of harmonizing the objectives of intelligence services and

integrating the collected intelligence. These communities have been passing through a process of fundamental changes with an impact on every component structure, but they have achieved in time their own logic of institutional development which involves transformation processes differing from the individual ones of the intelligence agencies.

Other relevant sources are the professional articles published in various American and European magazines, especially those in the area of intelligence and intelligence analysis, concerning the failures and successes of intelligence services in combating the new security threats or managing the “classic” ones. The Parliamentary commissions established in recent years (especially after September 11) for assessing the activity of important intelligence services have revealed the existence of various dysfunctions which favored the appearance of “analysis failures.” In this context, the need for reforming those systems on several levels has become imperative.

In the U.S., the report of the commission which investigated the activity of intelligence services after September 11 revealed the existence of shortcomings in ensuring the flow of intelligence and mistakes in assessing the available data (minimizing/ignoring the risk or, on the contrary, exaggerating it). With respect to the reform of intelligence analysis within the Romanian intelligence community, there have not yet been studies or research dealing with this subject in a unitary and comprehensive way.

ELEMENTS THAT INVOLVE THE NECESSITY OF CHANGE

Basically, the re-conceptualization process of the intelligence paradigm was influenced by the activity of several exogenous and endogenous factors.

• Among the main internal factors inducing changes in the intelligence field there are:

(a) the major changes in legislation or national security strategies—as well as those generated by the September 11 terrorist attacks. In the last decade, many nations have updated their doctrines, policies, strategies, and legislation regarding security and intelligence and have begun reform of the security domain (including intelligence) by pursuing specific goals and purposes:

- clarifying and developing the concepts within this domain;
- unequivocally defining the elements representing the condition for national security;

- settling the general consensus on the goals and pertinent tools for ensuring or promoting national security interests;
- improving the architecture of the national intelligence system according to security challenges;

(b) relevant adjustments of institutions’ budgets as a result of the transformation of institutional priorities and personnel reduction¹⁰;

(c) beginning the major reform process after the end of the Second World War and, after that, following September 11;

(d) surfacing the need to extend cooperation (at the national and, especially, the international level);

(e) modifying the internal requirements of intelligence agencies (both pursuant to modifying national legislation and the need to adapt to new challenges);

(f) voicing the need for recruiting and guiding personnel, and modifying the organizational culture and methods and procedures;

In some cases the changes occurring within the intelligence domain have been generated by:

- leakage of classified information or discovery of targets, methods, etc., which have generated legislative investigation or public opinion pressures;
- intelligence failures (not necessarily those which become public);
- changes in the political system or certain governmental policies or decisions (including those reducing the bureaucratic system);
- the dynamics of internal relationships (cooperation protocols) or external agreements (for example, the Club of Berne implies adjustments of procedures and sometimes of structures);
- changing the services’ leadership (every new leader is tempted to impose his/her own perspective);
- institutional necessities (concerning the flexibility and reduction of bureaucracy)

• The most important exogenous determinations are posed by the complex and dynamic developments of the security environment, namely:

(a) enhancing the threat areas and multiplication of sources with high potential risk—in the context of growing the number of international actors (as a consequence of disintegration of some multinational states), growing the number of “fragile societies”/“weak states,” and assuming an international and mainly regional active role by some emerging powers. I am referring to those factors that started to shape the activity of intelligence structures:

- proliferation of actors, conflict sources, and type of force used;
- cross-border character, enhancing the scope and the impact of threats;
- technological progress caused by increasing the vulnerability of many different and disparate sources;
- prominence of unconventional forms of conflict;
- increasingly targeting violence toward the urban zone and the internal security area, duplicating social tensions generated by economic, ethnic, religious, and ideological conditions.¹¹

(b) emphasizing the globalization process—which generated, among others, the “explosion” of information (multiplication of sources of information) and enhancing the benefits of technical scientific progress, generating also the globalization of risks. We witness a diminishing of classical dichotomies, internal-external and political-military, in terms of risk development by the states. Beyond the benefits derived from the dissolution of borders and growing competitiveness as a consequence of structural changes, globalization—through phenomena that it generates—determines multiple tense situations and demands changes in the security environment.

Division and integration, internationalization and regionalization, and centralization and decentralization are several phenomena that create insecurity. Terrorism, organized crime, economic crisis, starvation, and climatic changes are global. In the current social economic conditions, unequal access to resources defines the difference between states and foments interstate conflicts. We witness an increase in natural disasters, a reduction of energy resources, and demographic growth related to decreasing water and food resources. These phenomena continue to affect global stability and security. The present situation is the consequence of “breaking down” some states following a deficiency in governance, precarious economic conditions, continued ethnic/religious conflicts, weakness of local and regional cooperation forums, technological differences, etc. According to Dolghin, the fight for energy resources dominates the geopolitics of the

21st century. The resources are “where not necessary” and in the possession of “those who do not deserve them.”¹²

The accelerated process of integration, interdependence, and communication—usually defined through globalization—appears as the greatest challenge to the national security system as well as to the states. Technical scientific progress, accelerated rhythms of IT development, and diversifying the types of information warfare have enhanced the perspectives and scope of planning by national security institutions and have imposed the necessity for strategic assessments. Transposed at a level of intelligence structures, this situation requires overcoming the intuitive forms of prevision based on suppositions, extrapolations, and heuristic exercises (requiring intuition, flair, and creativity) and developing early warning systems;

(c) the hardly predictable character of the new types of asymmetric and unconventional threats, compared to classic threats, focused on state security.

Currently, the most important challenge that the international community faces is caused by the complexity of the new types of threats. These are difficult to identify, observe, and interpret, considering that the security challenges differ from one country to another and from one social group to another. While the classic threats could be geographically localized (risk factors for the nation-state), the new asymmetric threats could probably affect any zone. To anticipate and shape the future, as well as to promote national security strategies/politics and adopt decisions with major implications at the state level, certain substantiated prognoses on a variety of domains are necessary: economic trends, from technological development and climatic change to diversification of the forms of fighting, and in particular the atypical forms of conflict such as counterterrorism).

Getting intelligence and working out national security strategies imply, over the long term, establishing challenging domains and defining objectives. In line with this aspect, utility of intelligence analysis (strategic prognosis) consists in the fact it could provide an advantage to that person who better knows the requirements of a future war, and draws the necessary conclusions for implementing them in a timely manner. In order to counteract the new types of risks and threats, intelligence services have initiated processes both to change the acting component of the intelligence activity (enhanced competencies for the intelligence services in fields such as energy security, food security, etc.) and to increase the role of the analytical component (enhancing the anticipative and preventive component) in order to improve the capability of response to these new challenges.

Increasingly, analysts have noted that security is not only a military power issue but also an issue of access to

intelligence, of understanding the critical role of complementarity between decision-making and intelligence. The focus is not on combating threats any longer, but on the activity of prevention. This requires a proportional increase in the role and real importance of the intelligence services. It should be noted that the global development of events has formed an unknown issue in the domain of study: the relationship between intelligence and security, where intelligence is the strategic resource of power;

(d) the non-operative developments (that are not necessarily related to the dynamic of risks and threats, such as technological ones, to security). IT developments are equally opportunities for modernizing services and also meeting challenges that could cause further risks and difficulties in monitoring those risks;

(e) a direct (arming a hostile neighboring country, war) or imminent (environmental, health) threat;

(f) joining regional political/military/economic organizations (e.g., NATO and EU) that impose new standards and institutionalize some forms of cooperation (which determine structural reorganization, new objectives and missions, etc.).

Usually, the changes in intelligence services are an outcome of the simultaneous action of exogenous and endogenous factors.

PRAXIOLOGICAL GUIDING MARKS TO UNDERLINE THE CHANGING IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

The reality showed that their change is mainly a reactive process that occurs when an inflection strategic point is reached, beyond which the current procedures (“business as usual”) could not efficiently work anymore.

For a real change in the intelligence field, what is necessary is an enhanced strategy of transforming a new doctrinal framework, a rapid adjusting and “continuous learning” system, and transforming the national security system in an intelligence service focused on networks (through interconnecting intelligence platforms of the component structures, disseminating them for analyzing multi-sources, and conducting joint operations).

It should be noted that, after 9/11, reform in the intelligence field in the majority of Western countries generated two significant developments:

-at the operational level, developing some intelligence “fusion” capabilities to integrate data held by different governmental bodies;
-at the strategic level, developing the national intelligence community, as well as international cooperation, in formats both bilateral and multilateral (with noticeable outcomes, explicitly mentioned for growing the common potential to prevent and counteract security risks, accommodate actionable procedures, etc.).

Among the most imperative needs for efficiently managing current and future risks is enhancing national and international cooperation.

• Within the process of changing intelligence analysis (regardless of its level of profoundness or the fact it is revolutionary or, on the contrary, evolutionary), it is very important to establish and, subsequently, monitor:

-the necessities that impose change (e.g., modification of national priorities and objectives after Romania’s joining of NATO and the UE, changing the picture of risks and threats to national security, and enhancing cooperation with Euro-Atlantic services, including other institutions in the national security system);

-the principles and objectives targeted through the process of change (e.g., defining and implementing some scientific methods for intelligence analysis and human resources management, growing institutional flexibility, increasing the quality of activity and the capacity of response to challenges as well as security opportunities, and strengthening the institutional profile);

-the achieved or foreseen outcomes, in every relevant component (structural, functional, ruling, resources management, internal, and external relationships) and the effects on that component of the intelligence process.

Intelligence reform cannot pursue anything but designing a more efficient and flexible organization, connected to the informational society, capable of rapidly reacting to security challenges and proactively following its responsibilities, open to public opinion, and functioning not only based on rules and procedures but also adopting new attitudes and mentalities.

• From a practitioner’s perspective, among the main drivers of change one could mention:

-the detailed planning of change stages and the thorough preparation of their launching;

-the consultation with organization members following the early stages of change planning together with permanent communication with

them, with the purpose of informing the members of intermediate objectives and results, as well as corrections needed;

-the acceptance and undertaking of expected decisions, as well as an exact understanding, by each member, of his/her role within the system;

-the alteration not only of objectives, tasks, structure, and organization but also of the essential features of organizational culture and mentalities, impacting both the internal environment as well as relations with the external environment.

The success of the transformation decisively depends on the people working for the intelligence agencies, on their quality, authority, and determination to take over the role of primary internal agents of change. However, success is also the result of the external agents' contribution (decision-makers, partner services, etc.), as well as that of the people involved in modeling the change (consultants or specialists).

The approach to change in the intelligence domain must have as a starting point analysis of intelligence imperatives after the Cold War and taking into account the events of 9/11, which lead to the identification of multiple deficiencies at the level of the intelligence communities. Among the deficiencies, one could mention the lack of joint standards and practices for internal and external structures, the reduced capacity to establish priorities and use of resources, the multiplicity of tasks, the complex organization and functioning of intelligence work, extreme secrecy, and the structural barriers to cooperation. We must also equally take into account the intrinsic features of the intelligence services (the conservatism, the specific hierarchy, the security agenda, etc.), as well as new requests for them, stemming from the significant shifts in the security environment, the technological boom, and customers' needs and expectations regarding the accuracy of predictions and the control of unexpected developments.

WHY 3P?

Starting with the previously mentioned considerations and the day-to-day activity assessments within an intelligence analysis department, we could consider that the three Ps are becoming crucial factors in the reform and modernization processes regarding intelligence analysis within the intelligence communities and services. The need for an integrated approach of the three factors results from the fact they cannot be analyzed separately:

-it is not feasible solely to improve the analytic process (for example, by implementing new scientific methods for analysis, creating new work methodologies, or extending cooperation with academia) in the absence of professional analysts. The improvement of the

analysis process cannot be an objective by itself if it does not reside in the augmentation of the predictive dimension as well as of the analytic products' quality; -it is not desirable to conduct human resources training exclusively, in the absence of an increase in the quality of the analysis process and without the two above-mentioned objectives to be achieved in intelligence product improvement and diversification; -an increase in the quality of the analytic products cannot be achieved, in order to meet the increasingly complex needs of diversified customers, in the absence of improving the other two factors: the analysis process and personnel.

• The First P – The Process

As long as intelligence work has as its main purpose, generally speaking, to reduce consumers' inherent and "natural" uncertainty, specific to the complex national security issues as well as their induced uncertainty (by manipulation and disinformation operations), the analysis process is mainly oriented to transform the results of intelligence work into a specific contribution to the state's and its citizens' security.

➤ From a functional perspective, intelligence analysis must have a pivotal role between national security intelligence collection and processing on the one hand, and dissemination (information) on the other.

Any explanatory model used in intelligence studies starts with the intelligence cycle. The classic cycle implies certain logic, even a linear one: request/planning – collection – processing/analysis – dissemination. Analysts and managers from different intelligence agencies with significant traditions are proposing new versions of the classic intelligence cycle where, given the informational flood, analysis is not only a part of the overall process but a necessary input to every stage of the cycle.

Therefore, in the launching stage of the intelligence process (the result of either a consumer request or the internal planning process), the analysis should contribute to the orientation of intelligence collection, the precedence of the objectives, etc. Within the collection stage, selecting the targets and risks to be monitored implies an analysis of the priorities of the state and the hierarchy of national security risks. Within the processing stage, the analysis becomes self-referential when it has the objective of assessing its own product (through a specific period, taking into account the ratio between the predictions and the effective developments, etc.). Furthermore, while disseminated to the intelligence consumers, the analysis plays a critical role regarding the shape and content of the intelligence product, the feedback assessment, the identification of ways to

consolidate the cooperation between producer (analyst) and consumer (intelligence customer), and even the development of a common language for them.

➤ From the methodological perspective, it is necessary to improve analysis processes and products by continuously adapting the structure and the working methods, in a way that the final product is obtained as rapidly as possible, at a high-quality level and efficiently (cost-benefit ratio).

In order to eliminate the situation where the intelligence analysis fails due to the limits of the analytical process, a reform of intelligence analysis should envisage:

- theoretically (re)designing the analysis domain, creating new instruments for work standardization and developing the methodology extensively (the increase in the number of research methods, including implementing new methods and techniques used by private intelligence structures—benchmarking, reengineering, risk and strategic management, competitive intelligence etc.—as well as enlarging their domain for applicability) and intensively (refining/perfecting the utilized research methods). It also could be extremely useful to import methods from other sciences, especially the social sciences, applicable to current intelligence work.

The necessity of developing a conceptual apparatus for intelligence analysis is built on the concern regarding elimination of the confusion generated by the absence of consensus on the used/operable notions and concepts in intelligence analysis;

- implementing lessons learned mechanisms, in order to allow the inventory and sharing (even in the educational process) of the factors influencing analysis work (analysis errors, limits or deficiencies determined by some other factors, such as psychological ones, the timelines, etc.);
- addressing in a cross-disciplinary manner the security problems/phenomena and elaborating multi-source analytical products;
- valuing open/public sources, taking into account that the “open society” and the flood of available information is facilitating the use of “unclassified” methods in motivating and implementing security policies;
- focusing analysis work on the development of the capacities and capabilities needed for elaborating predictive/anticipative intelligence products, in order to allow vulnerabilities identification and the countering of risks challenging national security;
- pushing for the use of intuitive-predictive techniques (opportunities analysis, reduced probability

assessment, scenario method, concurrent hypotheses analysis, conflicting decisions analysis, corresponding to strategic intelligence) in order to meet customers’ requests and needs, focused on assessing the implications and emphasizing the uncertainties.

I would support the idea regarding the need for a conceptual apparatus for intelligence analysis with Rob Johnston’s¹³ findings, who—after hundreds of interviews and multiple inputs by U.S. working teams immediately after 9/11—did not identify any standard analytical method for intelligence analysis. The author mentions that “*the most common practice is to conduct limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analysis, thus producing a bias toward confirming earlier views. [...] None of the analytic agencies knows much about the analytic techniques of the others. In all, there tends to be much more emphasis on writing and communication skills than on analytic methods. [...] Most training is on-the-job.*”¹⁴

I believe that, as the operatives have to learn human source approach and recruiting techniques, the analysts have to know and use analytical methods. Particularly important for this complex approach, although a new concept within the domestic intelligence community, is meta-analysis, which could also be called “the analysis of analysis.”

From this perspective, the concept of meta-analysis designates:

- on the one hand, the assessment—mainly in terms of efficiency—of the degree of harmonization between the methods and techniques employed during the analytical process and national security data and information to be processed with a view to developing intelligence products;
- on the other hand, the complex theoretical approach meant to identify the intimate mechanisms that define the analytical process specific to the intelligence area and to (re)configure the used conceptual and methodological instruments in order to improve analysis and prognosis by stimulating critical thinking. Johnston¹⁵ endorses the foundation of an “*Improvement Performance Infrastructure*,” able to measure the actual and ideal analytical performances, to compare them (in order to reveal the performance gaps), to intervene (with the aim of improving the analysis) and, subsequently, to measure once again the performance (to evaluate the efficacy of the interventions).

➤ From a structural point of view, the proper projection of analytical levels’ attributions is essential for setting up networks of communication between the intelligence

structures (gathering and analysis) and for establishing various efficient response mechanisms. The IT platforms have, from this perspective, a major role. They aim at facilitating the interaction (especially as far as the *task forces* are concerned), improving operability (in receiving and recognizing the value of the inputs used in developing the intelligence products) as well as in augmenting the interaction between analysis and intelligence gathering.

• The Second “P” – The Personnel

According to the “3P Project,” it is indispensable to implement a functional model of professional training (as far as intelligence analysis is concerned) having as priorities the training of:

- newly employed individuals;
- trainers (given that they will have a major role in identifying the existing training needs as well as in upgrading existing training programs).

As far as the new employees are concerned, the selection of personnel and recruitment policies are essential. After their employment, their intense and staged training is indispensable. The training has to start from the premise that “what most people know about this job is mostly false. It is the duty of the organization and its recruiters to present its correct image and to work in order to destroy the already established myths.”¹⁶

➤ From a functional perspective, the imperative of developing analytical capabilities (tactically and strategically) in order to identify the best methods for linking the existing capabilities to the priorities of national security is a fact. This is the *sine qua non* goal for the intelligence agencies, most of which have various extensive programs for training individuals involved in the activity of analysis.

Modernizing this critical component of analytical intelligence aims at identifying the needs of the analyst’s own selection and professional development, within the framework of his/her career within an analytical department. The selection methods have to shift from a passive attitude (merely publishing the educational offer and taking any resume or application into account) to an offensive one (selection on specialized websites, information campaigns regarding universities training the specialists the intelligence agencies need, taking part in job-related activities, etc.). For some posts (such as high-level ones) head-hunting companies might help.

➤ From a structural perspective, it is important to have various psychological tests (starting with the selection process) focusing on vocational aptitude. Also, professional tests (based on competences and knowledge) can support the recruitment

process. Later on, work diagnoses might be extremely helpful, focusing on the psycho-professional profile of the analyst (as well as on features for shaping future generations of analysts) and the identification of performance criteria (allowing the identification of significant elements in assuring the analysts’ efficiency as well as their activity’s evaluation criteria). Nonetheless, developing experience-exchange mechanisms (between various analytical departments and also between areas of intelligence gathering and analysis) and generalizing the positive practices might contribute toward optimizing the analytical process, broadening the analysts’ knowledge horizon, and avoiding errors as far as their shaping is concerned.

➤ From a relational perspective, it is vital to have permanent exchanges of opinion, projections, experience, etc., with similar structures within Western intelligence services as well as connections to academic research linked to national security. Keeping the analysts updated with the realities of the security context as well as the fundamental research in related fields (economics, international relations, public administration, etc.) makes possible a proper understanding of the security evolutions that must be evaluated periodically. Attending scientific conferences, seminars, and roundtables keeps analysts’ minds open, allows them to exercise initiative, and promotes a proactive attitude (in regard to their study objectives) to be creative and, at the same time, to practice a critical approach. “An analysis culture rooted in cooperation and interaction, on decisional relevance, implies automatically the development of a more subtle relationship between the various levels of the intelligence.”¹⁷

➤ From a cognitive perspective, given the inherent difficulties of processing complex information, analysts have to be encouraged to clearly separate their assumptions by deduction and to specify the degree and the source of uncertainty involved in the meta-analysis which periodically reexamines the key problems in the context. The analysts have to be stimulated to be innovative as well as rigorous, to use analytical instruments (scientifically validated), to underline the methods presenting various viewpoints, and to present (in intelligence products for decision-makers) not only the limits but also the virtues of analysis.

➤ From a managerial perspective, it is important to create an organizational medium for stimulating analysis and assuring training in intelligence-related analysis, focused on an attempt to widen the analyst’s mental model. Given that the analyst has to estimate—based on available information, his own experience, and his own psychological abilities (intuition, creativity, imagination)—the evolution tendencies of threat indicators or their emergence, there is a risk that the intelligence analysis will be limited by human mental capabilities and the burden of using “mental fixations” or “lenses.”¹⁸

The following are the reasons for which they have to be developed:

-modern policies for the selection of the intelligence analysts (used by particular services) and for stimulating performance (individual or teamwork);
-programs (as diversified as possible) for the training of analysts, by means of experience exchanges with other services, connection to trends of scientific research in expertise areas, and attending seminars and conferences, as well as promotion of individual permanent training.

Work's fulfillment is very important not only for gaining the optimal status for the performance of analysts but also for limiting the number of resignations in the intelligence agencies. For these reasons, creating an optimal working environment (based on meritocracy, ability to stimulate professional performance, and access to management positions) is a must. The non-induced resignations—also known as “deserting”¹⁹—have consequences both in maintaining the secrecy of classified information (known by the analysts) as well as in regard to finances, given the high costs needed for the specialization of this special category of personnel.²⁰

• The Third P – The Product

National security has a multidimensional character, requiring an integrated and interdisciplinary approach. Its accomplishment is possible only within the framework of the existence of suitable institutional mechanisms between the forces and the *levers* aimed at defending and promoting national interests.

Countering the actual complex threats implies the implementation of an integrated mode of response, involving political, social, diplomatic, informational, military, and other categories of elements. It requests improvement of the relationships with the beneficiaries of national security information in order to have efficient feedback, capable of (re)orienting, subsequently, the intelligence activity; strengthening of cooperation between the specialized structures within national security; and opening communication and cooperation channels between the intelligence analysts and academic scholars or researchers (having expertise that might contribute to improving the analyses and assessments).

➤ From a methodological perspective, it is becoming obvious that, in the actual context, the activity of the institutions involved in assuring the security climate has to be organized in a manner which allows analytical structures to adapt and face the new provocations (prefigured by risks and threat extension, in regard to national security).

Given that the demands to inform decision-makers are based on *actionable* intelligence (tactical analyses needed for

taking specific decision in various areas) as well as on *strategic* intelligence (as a consequence of the complex evolutions in the security domain), in the process of reforming intelligence analysis both analytical types (*tactical and strategic*) must have equal importance. The classical terminology might lead, in a first phase, to the wrong conclusions: intelligence as analytical product is *actionable* in itself. One might choose a specific course of action or, on a strategic level, might determine (given available evaluations) the advantages or disadvantages of a certain state policy, the assumed risks, and the way that specific policy has an impact on national security.

One of the unwanted effects of the relationship between the producer and the consumer of intelligence, *excessive information*, generates by default certain selection difficulties in the “news-ocean” of data which reflect correctly a certain reality. The national security reality goes progressively from the *black-and-white*, concrete reality to the area of perception, to images of reality that various actors involved in security build. In comparison to these changing realities, tactical intelligence can be an anchor, a substratum of reality, while strategic intelligence is trying to make a prediction, a transversal vision of all layers of reality. From this point of view, both are vital and reinforce each other.

The failure of analysis of information activity in foreseeing a surprise (e.g., the 9/11 attacks, the Indian nuclear test of 1998) reveals the importance to be attached to the same extent of strategic assumptions and estimates based on technical indications, and the occurrence of minimum tactical indicators which appear at random with strategic assumptions being able to point out a possible surprise.

➤ In terms of structure, analytical activity involves support management decision-taking at the leadership level, through making available to beneficiaries of products designed to substantiate the adoption and effective implementation of measures to promote national interests.

There are many forms in which information activity is conducted to inform beneficiaries, but most often this support remains, despite technological developments, on paper. There are few services (especially in the Anglo-Saxon system) which currently practice direct networking between producer (“briefer”) and consumer (state decision-makers). Some analysts believe that the consumer should be caught carefully between the moments when he is willing to listen and when he is going to take a decision. Beneficiaries have not been and will not be interested (e.g., ex-U.S. President Jimmy Carter) in the importance of intelligence products and do not rely on them. That does not necessarily mean they are good or bad politicians.

Beyond the concrete forms of development of this relationship it is important to build a real partnership based on mutual trust between producer and consumer, allowing the rapid and accurate knowledge of the needs of the consumer and capturing relevant reactions so useful for planning intelligence activities, but also understanding the strength and limits of this kind of activity. Therefore, “only through a partnership between producers and consumers, an often difficult and tortuous one which always must be validated, supported, and defended can intelligence define in an effective way those competitive advantages so much needed in strategic knowledge, that only can decide a victory or failure of the state in the security field.”²¹

➤ From a related perspective, a reform in the field of intelligence analysis needs to aim at the imperative of adapting the analytic product to consumer needs, its security agenda, and its physiological profile. The implementation of various methods such as neuro-linguistic programming or distance personality studies can be extremely useful for ensuring adequacy of the message to the beneficiary profile.

Clear standards and high exigencies must be implemented, both in ensuring the objectivity and credibility of analytical products and in editing them. These must be “two-ply” by various auditing and evaluation mechanisms of intelligence products, which can offer on a monthly basis rigorous internal perspectives about possible errors or the efficiency of the informing action.

The role of the intelligence consumer within the information cycle is very important, assuring the efficiency of the activity of national security. In this respect, one might project various typologies of settling the relationship between the producer and the consumer as well as obtaining feedback (allowing permanent adjustments of information gathering and analysis). Intelligence structures have to empathize. This means they have to *put themselves in the interlocutor’s shoes* (the consumer’s shoes), to identify their needs (justified needs, related to national security objectives and matching the legal attributions) and try to accomplish them. The empathy, the fair attitude, and the relation between the producer and the consumer (natural in democracy) suppose that the producer tries to persuade the consumer, knowing of his/her needs or supposing his/her misinterpretations or difficulties, understanding his/her legal, political and public agenda boundaries, and knowing as well the producer’s and consumer’s limits, originated in their human condition.

As a former analyst said (one of the few who had the opportunity to become later a beneficiary): “We have to understand that we all make mistakes.” We so easily admit the idea that our predecessors were wrong, and history is full of accepted errors (producers and consumers of

intelligence), but we do not except that, maybe in this moment, it is possible that someone makes mistakes (in an intelligence product) or a beneficiary does so (in adapting to certain decisions). It is possible that now (when reading these lines) an analyst is committing an understandable error or a decision-maker is assuming several things, including one that is wrong or that might generate perverse effects (unplanned) in the future.

GUIDING POINTS FOR DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL CULTURE WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN ROMANIA

One of the aims of any project for changes within the intelligence analysis domain should be the development of an analytical culture in the national intelligence community, in order to implement measures that generate added-value in the products and process of analysis, as well as enhancement of the professional training level of analysts.

The development of an analytical culture certainly needs time, given the fact that for the most part in the post-communist period the main institutional objective was to target products (intelligence activity outcomes) and not processes, much less regarding personnel. According to Treverton, analysts should become a dynamic for changing, working successively in other security agencies, employing personnel from outside, and organizing brainstorming with other personnel as routine actions, not as an exception. “They should spend time outside not in their offices, sharing assessments with other experts and verifying their agendas with decision makers.”²²

Adjusting the analytical component of the intelligence process to security environment changes requires development of an analytical culture on three levels:

-At the individual level, through reshaping the training and developing programs and attending courses/ changes of experience with other structures of the national security system, foreign services, and academic environment;

-Evaluating the potential and developing new competencies and skills of analysis that require a coherent program for career development resulting in well-shaped character at some stages of initializing, training, and permanent development;

-At the institutional (organizational) level, through reshaping current practices in the intelligence analysis domain, as well as developing an analytical culture. In this domain, a critical area is represented by developing mechanisms and assimilating the outcomes of some

processes and lessons learned that draw out the needs for change through assessing previous errors and mistakes;

-With regard to the external environment, through supporting analysts' attendance both as observers and as lecturers at activities, courses, and programs conducted by the academic and scientific community; encouraging the analysts' attendance at events with their counterparts in foreign partner services, community or Euro-Atlantic security organizations, symposia, seminars, and other forums of foreign cooperation; developing the intra-institutional cooperation through flexible mechanisms of coordination and developing tools for timely communication between analytical and operational sectors.

- Actually, "The 3 P Project" furthers, on the one hand, a permanent adjusting of intelligence analysis (on the three above-mentioned levels) in order to cope with challenges in the security risk domain and, on the other hand, to introduce scientifically confirmed tools in the analytical process (methods and techniques from other disciplines), products (adjusting the message to the beneficiary's profile and the consumers' profile too), and the personnel selection and training process.

As for the analytical managers on different levels, a subject not covered in this article, I feel they should be permanently focused on the improvement of performance from the perspective of the three key factors and they should advance from the stance of delivering analytical products to supplying knowledge. They are not leaders (heads) of departments any more, but also of knowledge. Their authority will be less and less formal and bureaucratic and increasingly anticipative and informal. They should not indicate the way to act but the way forward for the structures and personnel they lead.

They should encourage dynamic forms of organization and ensure the transition from hierarchical, rigid structures to flexible working groups, since the modern intelligence services are less hierarchical and increasingly of the "network-centric" type.²³ Any intelligence analysis manager should cease his current activity to forecast his future and to encourage other individuals to act in reaching future desirable persons.

- Any reform, adjustment plan, etc., should be developed to meet the future or "futures," since it is more and more difficult to anticipate what the future will bring. "In a world of uncertainties, the intelligence structures are not relying exclusively on the former succeeding strategies to project the future strategies."²⁴

The world is changing from an essentially (quantifiably, visibly) threatening one to one dominated by diffuse, formless, and less predictable risks and surprises (impossible to anticipate); from classical wars to cyber, economic, cognitive ones; from linear, predictable, quantifiable developments to non-linear, accidental, diffuse ones; and from symmetry to multiple asymmetries. Surprises, known in the specialty literature as "black swans," will be increasingly present in our life.

The event "black swan" has these attributes: it is an isolated case, "beyond the usual current expectations" since in the past nothing indicated the possibility for it to occur; and it has a significant impact and "retrospective (not inclusively prospective) predictability" that allow us to explain it after it is occurring.²⁵ We already face a real tsunami in the information technology domain (it is not an accident that the Romanian Intelligence Service named its strategic vision for 2011-2015 "SRI in the informational era"). Who anticipated the Wikileaks event? And the "explosion" of social networks? Facebook and Twitter enhancing their use not only in socializing but also in targeting the political arena (see the Facebook effect on young people or the "Twitter revolution" in the Republic of Moldova) will result in reshaping social theories. Who thinks that these spontaneous, unstructured, and virtual forms of association without obvious political aims, without a registered office, without leaders and political platforms, could become significant non-state actors in sociological or international relations theories? The influence of an idea or an objective posted on Facebook could be stronger than the one promoted by a state institution. The Internet is intended to replace the written media and soon the audio and video ones too.

Richard Betts states that intelligence is a domain in which failure is unavoidable, as the planning of resources and data collecting are realizable only based on current priorities and not on future ones. Automatically, the intelligence agencies focus their efforts only on current risks and not on future ones which has always led to strategic surprises.²⁶ This is the reason we should change our approach in seeing reality from many angles (perspectives). We should train our analysts better for facing future (not current) risks. We should introduce scenario analysis and simulations in intelligence analysis (several federal agencies in the U.S. use simulations with analytical scenarios) as standard procedures in current activities. The future is for the futurologists, if they can be integrated into analysts' teams and also placed among authors, film directors, and scene-setters whose opinions should be periodically asked by analysts.

- Besides, at the national security level, methods for inventorying the "futures" (probable, improbable) "futures" should be invented. Although national security is not only a responsibility of certain state institutions but also of the entire society (it is a common asset), certain domestic vulnerabilities (duplicated by probable errors or lacking

some decisions) and the development of the security environment equally influence the state, society, and the citizen. In Romania the concept of resilience is not yet operational. Resilience should be part of the country's National Defense Strategy and be transposed in modalities of post-event acting, with very clear implementing procedures, which allows an immediate intervention (any second of delay could result in multiplication of consequences).

I do not want to conclude in a pessimistic tone, but it is necessary to mention I have attended many international conferences and symposia. In those situations, at the same table there were state (governmental and parliamentary) institutions, intelligence services, NGOs, academics/scientists, and individuals from the private security sector. In Romania, this situation is difficult to imagine as a possibility. International traditions or pure vanity prompt us to work "with us and for us." We live in a suspicious, apprehensive, anxious society that is fighting the future (or, at any rate, it does not intend to shape or develop the future) and its (often unpredictable) consequences implicitly. The future is uncertain as it is a development of self-interests.

We do not determine what will be our image or our make-up 20-30 years from now (by the way, we have no significant study regarding the future image of Romania in 20-30 years), in order to plan how to influence that future through investing already in research, education, infrastructure, etc. In the political programs and security strategies of Romania, from 1990 to the present, there has been no word "future." Therefore, Romania is not thinking about or interested in this specificity. We have no courses on strategic thinking for civil servants and we have no think-tanks specializing in national security. In all probability, now is the moment for planning that infrastructure to ensure the desired future.

Notes

¹ Toffler, Alvin (1970), *Future Shock*, Random House, New York.

² Baylis, John, and Smith, Steve (2001), *The Globalisation of World Politics: An introduction to International Relations*, Oxford University Press, UK.

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Performing the Intelligence Mission Despite Large Budget Reductions

by John G. Schwitz

INTRODUCTION

The recommendations I advance regarding *governance, benchmarking, and common services* enable the focus of intelligence resources on recommendations from the 9/11 Commission Report, The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission Report, and the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.

Intelligence spending, adjusted for inflation, has increased by 122% since 1994. This increase, combined with the end of two wars and large U.S. budget deficits, presages extreme reductions in intelligence spending. I will develop the parallels of this challenge to General Colin Powell's *Base Force*, which directed defense reductions of 25% in the 1990s. The important question is, will the Intelligence Community lead or react to this adjustment?

This article examines disciplined approaches, referred to as *Intelligence Base*, to leading this transformation through reductions possibly reaching 50%. I propose commercial and government best practices and *quantify their impact on intelligence processes, outcomes, and resources* in achieving the *Intelligence Base*. Only an approach of this breadth can meet the transformed threats within the budgetary and economic constraints of the U.S.

The Commission recommendations I address include: *unity of effort, jointness, removing structural barriers*, and *governance*. The goals have been clearly stated; the reality is that *intelligence transformation* is now in our hands—those of the Intelligence Community.

A top-down approach in executing *governance, benchmarking, and common services* within the Intelligence Community has the potential to *radically reduce resources while significantly improving intelligence processes and outcomes*. Success requires rigorously adjusting resources to the changing threat. The *governance* and *benchmarking* proposed are a means to identify and *remove structural barriers*, thus enabling process improvements and enhancement of *intelligence outcomes*. *Common services* focus reduced resources on intelligence processes.

ECONOMIC REALITY




Figure 1. A Dashboard of U.S. Dominance in Intelligence Spending and U.S. Economic Vulnerability.

U.S. military spending vs. the world (chart above) [1] stands as a proxy to intelligence spending. A hefty portion of non-U.S. spending is by allies. In a speech to the Navy League, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates enumerated a few of the many extreme cases where U.S. defense dominates all other countries [2]:

- The U.S. operates 11 large carriers, all nuclear-powered. In terms of size and striking power, no other country has even one comparable ship.
- All told, the displacement of the U.S. battle fleet—a proxy for overall fleet capabilities—exceeds, by one recent estimate, at least the next 13 navies combined, of which 11 are our allies or partners.

However, the U.S. accounts for 47% of the world's military

spending with only a 21% share of GDP. U.S. military spending consumes 24% of the federal budget. The United States faces daunting economic and budgetary challenges.

Just three years ago, debt held by the public was less than \$6 trillion, or about 40% of GDP. At the end of fiscal year 2010, such debt was roughly \$9 trillion, or 62% of GDP, and by the end of 2021 it is projected to climb to \$18 trillion, or 77% of GDP [3]. 50% of this debt is held by foreigners—\$3 trillion by China [4]. The 2000-2009 U.S./China trade imbalance was -\$1.7 trillion. The near-term gap of outlays versus revenues in the projection moves from 7% in 2012 to 3% in 2014-plus [3].




Figure 2. Total Revenues and Outlays.

REALIZING RECOMMENDATIONS FROM TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMISSIONS

The unanimous conclusions from both the 9/11 and WMD Commission Reports were reached after interviewing hundreds of experts, reviewing millions of documents, and interviewing senior officials of the Clinton and Bush administrations. The conclusions called for dramatic change after identifying serious responsibility, process, and organization failures. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 was the legislative mandate for change.

Our Intelligence Community (IC) has made progress toward the Commissions' goals and the legislative mandate; however, we must accelerate the transformation mindful of new constraints. The explosive growth in intelligence spending, U.S. economic difficulties, Congressional budget constraints, and the conclusion of two wars make it timely to execute actions attaining the goals of the Commissions and the legislation.

The mandate is large, but this article focuses on the Commission recommendations on *governance, unity of effort, jointness, and removing structural barriers*. I apply innovative solutions mirroring the approaches of General Powell's *Base Force*, *corporate governance*, *corporate mergers*, and *complex processes*. I describe the essential

contributions of *governance, risk management, and balanced scorecards* (performance metrics) to success. Most importantly, the initiative and commitment of our Community can effect these changes without Congressional mandates.

Successful transformation requires bold leadership and governance enabling middle management execution. The article describes actions that nourish innovation. The template for many of these actions exists: it is corporate and process best practices.

The problem of intelligence *governance* resounds throughout the Commission reports. The WMD Commission found the IC "fragmented, loosely managed, and poorly coordinated" [5]. The 9/11 Commission Report [6] found the culture of the IC still shaped by the Cold War and called for a change to "quick, imaginative and agile responses" to transnational threats. The 9/11 Report also found that "no one was firmly in charge of managing the case and able to draw relevant intelligence from anywhere in the government." Both reports called for eliminating bureaucratic behavior and a risk-averse culture.

The article attacks bureaucracy through eliminating the bureaucratic and inward-focused behavior of agencies through *governance*. I advance the governance model of General Powell's *Base Force*. This achieved 25% reductions in defense spending in the early 1990s through aggressive out-year targets achieved through *life-cycle oversight*. Perhaps counterintuitively, therefore, I provide several models and proof that "less is more." Fewer resources can break the ability to operate independently, thereby improving outcomes.

The WMD Report strongly justified Mission Managers as the optimal approach to *unity of effort*. Mission Managers enable *unity of effort* by developing strategies and coordinating resources across the IC to focus efforts on a "priority intelligence target." With the exception of the two national-level centers (Counterterrorism Center and Counterproliferation Center), Mission Managers are minimally staffed. The WMD Commissioners believed so strongly in limiting staff at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that they specified a limit of 100 personnel for the counterproliferation mission.

The history of the military and the IC after World War II is an evolution toward *jointness*. The main goal of the National Security Act of 1947 was to unify the armed services under a civilian Secretary of Defense. The bill created the National Security Council (NSC), the Secretary of Defense [Editor's Note: initially with a different title], and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secondarily, the bill created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, foreign and

domestic intelligence were separated and the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence were left to be specified in a later bill.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 transformed the U.S. military by centralizing command and the management of officers. Senior officers must serve at least one joint duty assignment. Doctrine extends *jointness* to the intellectual, operational, organizational, and technical realms. The military's successes prompted the IC to adopt this model for senior intelligence officers. The IC has made progress on *unity of effort* and *jointness* through its two Centers, Mission Managers, and the requirements for senior intelligence officers. In the National Counterterrorism Center, or NCTC, the effort is distributed, jointly staffed, and unified within the mission.

Success requires accelerating the progress in *governance*, *unity of effort*, *jointness*, and *removing structural barriers*. Congressional budget constraints and the conclusion of two wars guarantee that these changes must occur in a period of rapidly declining budgets. I outline an innovative approach, *Intelligence Base*, drawing on General Powell's *Base Force*, practices of successful corporations, and lessons from complex processes. The innovative solutions are structured to stimulate debate, not as a refined approach. I advance the solutions in the format of *Challenge/Response*. I make the case that, despite large budget cuts necessitating reduced resources, these solutions *significantly improve intelligence processes and outcomes*, thereby enhancing national security.

GOVERNING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

"Yeah, but we're making great time!" – in reply to
"Hey Yogi, I think we're lost."

- Yogi Berra

The problem of "making great time" can be reflected in reduces to *realizing strategic plans through the budget process* and *measurement of progress toward objectives*. The proposed *Intelligence Base* achieves the first objective through *governance* and *common services*. The *Intelligence Base* achieves the second objective through *benchmarking*. Governance is a process, executed by many levels of management through examining and assuring that: (1) Execution aligns with strategic objectives; (2) operations produce value; and (3) risk is understood and managed.

The following actions achieve effective governance:

Action #1:

Challenge: Execute Strategic Objectives with Constrained Resources.

Response: Develop Top-Down Targets with Metrics for Achievement.

Top-down targets are often viewed as arbitrary and capricious; however, changing strategic objectives derived from rapidly changing threats demands a redistribution of resources. Budgets based on last year's resource spending address last year's threat profile and, hopefully, last year's strategic objectives.

The momentous events of 1989 to 1991 ended the Cold War and precipitated a drive to curtail U.S. defense spending in order to generate a "peace dividend." The events included the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, and dissolution of the Soviet Union. The START Treaty of 1991 limited nuclear weapons, freeing considerable strategic defense spending. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, anticipated the coming demand for steep budget cuts and chose to lead the process through formulating a *Base Force*. *Base Force* was a new military strategy and force structure tailored to post-Cold War threats. It set a floor for force reductions sized to respond to any resurgence of a Russian threat [7]. Powell implemented *Base Force* through out-year targets, reducing budgets by 25%.

I develop the parallel of General Powell's *Base Force* to the proposed *Intelligence Base*. Goldwater-Nichols (1986) modernized governance of DoD from a corporate board of the Service Chiefs to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. However; it was not until 1989 when Powell, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, exercised this authority by leading a 25% reduction in DoD and preserving the *Base Force*. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 grants similar governance functions, yet to be exercised, to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

The narrative of General Powell's success required convincing a resistant Secretary of Defense Cheney and the Service Chiefs through compromise and persistence. The extraordinary results are evident from the following chart:

Planned Base Force Changes to Force Structure and Manpower, FY 1990-1997			
Service and Major Forces	FY 1990	FY 1997 ^d	Change
Army			
Army divisions	28	20	-8
Active	18	12	-6
Reserve ^b	10	8	-2
Navy			
Aircraft carriers	15	12	-3
Active	13	11	-2
Reserve	2	1	-1
Battle force ships	546	451	-95
Air Force			
Tactical fighter wings	36	26	-10
Active	24	15	-9
Reserve	12	11	-1
Strategic bombers	268	180	-88
Manpower (thousands)			
Active military	2070	1626	-444
Reserve military ^c	1128	920	-208
Civilian	1073	904	-169
Total	4271	3450	-821

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

Figure 3: Achieving the Base Force [7].

Making the numbers work required focusing on large assets and programs, and significant reductions in manpower. DoD retired large assets (battle force ships and strategic bombers) and cancelled over 100 major weapon systems programs. These efforts generated estimated savings of \$82 billion from 1992 to 1997.

Base Force was executed under similar economic and threat levels as the *Intelligence Base* approach proposed. The U.S. was mired in a deep recession with soaring budget deficits and Congressional mandates for large cuts. The threat profile was elevated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Intelligence Community could choose General Powell's path and lead the reductions to assure capabilities, or react to steep reductions imposed from the outside. OMB Director Darman was pressing for large cuts in 1989 as demonstrated from the below "Pitchfork" chart.




Figure 4. OMB's Pitchfork Chart.

Successfully achieving reductions requires an approach similar to *Base Force*. I assess with high confidence that the magnitude of cuts will require a consolidated approach to collection. This is simply analogous to the painful actions taken on battle force ships and strategic bombers charted illustrated in Figure 3.

Both Patrick Neary [8] and Mark Lowenthal [9] are highly critical of the collection process. Their criticisms are supported by numerous intelligence studies calling for change. Lowenthal characterizes the collection approach to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) as a "Collection Swarm Ball" with all collection agencies converging on the few issues perceived important. I challenge the reader to cite any collection brief which disclosed success measures, analyst satisfaction surveys, or cost measures for collection. The model is fundamentally broken and free of any economic equilibrating incentives.

This takes us to the "Capabilities Trap": powerful agencies cannot be permitted to specify capabilities, thereby justifying resources. Once the capabilities are in place, they are distributed at no cost to the analyst stimulating large "Gaps in Capabilities" that refuel the cycle. A "fee for service" agreement for collection requirements would provide an equilibrating force closing the "Gaps in Capabilities" and moderating the continual growth of the capital assets.

Base Force also cancelled large procurement items and "skipped a generation" of development efforts. I assess with high confidence that these measures are required to assure the *Intelligence Base*. Leading the transformation to *Intelligence Base* demands a *shift of governance* from consolidating capabilities budgets, monitoring, and audit to active influence throughout *project life-cycles*.

Action #2:

Challenge: Improve Governance for Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution.

Response: Shift Governance from Budget Consolidation and Audit to Life-Cycle Oversight.

The primary weakness of governance practice in both the private and government sectors is the absence of prospective governance actions and resources. Resources are allocated sub-optimally according to individual agency preferences. These preferences are skewed to reinforce agency status: absolute headcount, large capital assets, and tactical intelligence on the "crisis of the moment."

Risk and program management provide effective governance throughout the life-cycle when used to shape the force structure to the threats.

I want to dispel the notion that simple measures of profitability drive successful companies while government is destined to perform bureaucratically. Novartis (\$51 billion in sales), the most successful pharmaceutical, manages through a balanced scorecard which encompasses economic value added (EVA), innovation, achievement of strategic objectives, and the development and management of people. EVA is not simple profit and loss (P&L); EVA is inversely related to the assets required to generate the P&L. This addresses the analogous problem of the collection “capabilities trap.” Success measures must be defined against the capabilities/resources required.

The IC is in the business of recognizing present and rapidly evolving future risk. In an era of steep budget cuts, effectively achieving this requires the alignment of resources to sources of risk. **Budgets must support missions which evolve according to the risk profile**, not capabilities. If this is the challenge, our Community does not even attempt the difficult job of aggregating and quantifying risk to measure the changing risk profile.

Risk management heavily influences decisions in a well-governed financial organization. The Chief Risk Officer reports to the Chief Executive Officer and the Board of Directors. Resource priorities and corporate strategies are significantly influenced by risk analytics and risk levels.

Some snapshots from J.P. Morgan Chase’s 2010 Annual Report are illustrative [11]. The charts demonstrate that decisions are heavily influenced by risk governance based on corporate risk levels (see next two figures).




Figure 5. Financial Risk Management Organization.

Risk is **measured and consolidated daily to derive total corporation risk levels**. Quantitative finance permits the sum of individual risks, allowing for correlations, into value at risk (VaR), a consolidated risk measure. The meaning of the last line of J.P. Morgan Chase’s 2010 VaR (Figure 6) is the probabilistic statement—that with 95% certainty the 1-day loss for 2010 was below \$142 million and the 1-day loss for 2009 was below \$328 million.

95% Confidence-Level VaR								
Total I&B trading VaR by risk type, credit portfolio VaR and other VaR								
As of or for the year ended December 31, (in millions)	2010			2009			At December 31, 2009	
	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Average	Minimum	Maximum	2010	2009
I&B VaR by risk type								
Fixed income	\$ 65	\$ 33	\$ 95	\$ 160	\$ 80	\$ 216	\$ 52	\$ 80
Foreign exchange	11	6	20	18	7	39	16	10
Equities	22	10	52	47	8	156	30	43
Commodities and other	16	11	32	20	11	35	13	14
Diversification benefit to I&B trading VaR	(47)(a)	NM(b)	NM(b)	(9)(a)	NM(b)	NM(b)	(34)(a)	(14)(a)
I&B trading VaR	\$ 71	\$ 40	\$ 107	\$ 154	\$ 77	\$ 236	\$ 77	\$ 93
Credit portfolio VaR	26	15	40	52	18	106	27	21
Diversification benefit to I&B trading and credit portfolio VaR	(10)(a)	NM(b)	NM(b)	(4)(a)	NM(b)	NM(b)	(5)(a)	(9)(a)
Total I&B trading and credit portfolio VaR	\$ 87	\$ 50	\$ 128	\$ 164	\$ 93	\$ 256	\$ 99	\$ 105
Money market VaR	\$ 23	\$ 8	\$ 42	\$ 57	\$ 19	\$ 151	\$ 9	\$ 28
Chief Investment Office ("CIO") VaR	61	44	80	103	71	126	54	76
Diversification benefit to total other VaR	(12)(a)	NM(b)	NM(b)	(2)(a)	NM(b)	NM(b)	(10)(a)	(13)(a)
Total other VaR	\$ 71	\$ 48	\$ 100	\$ 124	\$ 79	\$ 202	\$ 55	\$ 91
Diversification benefit to total I&B and other VaR	(5)(a)	NM(b)	NM(b)	(2)(a)	NM(b)	NM(b)	(4)(a)	(7)(a)
Total I&B and other VaR	\$ 99	\$ 66	\$ 142	\$ 206	\$ 111	\$ 228	\$ 89	\$ 122

Figure 6. J.P. Morgan Chase Risk Posture.

A significant concern to both the IC and financial firms is tail risk. Tail risk is the sudden occurrence of catastrophic events, sometimes referred to as “black swans.” Measuring tail risk requires risk measures beyond VaR. J.P. Morgan Chase uses non-statistical risk measures, stress testing scenarios, and risk identification for large exposures (“RIFLE”). The Defense Department commonly uses scenarios to simulate tail risk.

An approach, which properly addresses risk, requires the IC to: (1) **Prioritize and calibrate risk**, (2) **counter risk with missions**, (3) **align resources with missions**, (4) **manage residual risk**, and (5) **dynamically adjust to changing risk**. Capabilities-based budgeting cannot achieve these goals. Only **life-cycle oversight**, supported by risk analytics, can do so.

Figure 7 contrasts the capabilities approach against the advocated **life-cycle oversight** approach. The capabilities approach is appropriate for slowly evolving risk and static or growing budgets. However, **only the life-cycle oversight approach can align resources to risk, reallocate resources, and address large budget reductions**.

Capabilities Approach: I Got It, You won't Find It, Keep Feeding It

- Incremental Adjustments to current Capabilities
- Existing Capabilities address historical Risk
- Insensitive to Risk and Technology Changes
- Reductions through Across the Board Tasks of Percentage Reductions
- Examples: Support 2+ Major Wars. Secretary Gates 30% reduction in contractors

Life-Cycle Oversight: Money in Motion is Money in Jeopardy

- Reductions through Top-Down Target on out-year
- Build near-years consistent with out-year target
- All Money in Motion
- Resources calibrated against Risk Profile
- Explicit Understanding of Residual Risk
- Examples: General Powell's **Base Force**. This papers proposed **Intelligence Base**

Figure 7. Contrasting Capabilities vs. Life-Cycle Oversight.

THE LESSON OF COMPLEX PROCESSES – “LESS IS MORE”

What we require are people with a disciplined approach to life and an unregimented approach to problem solving.

- General (USMC) James Mattis,
former CENTCOM Commander

The process of optimizing complex processes to compress timelines, reduce resources, and improve quality yields non-intuitive results in many fields. “Less is more,” smaller teams, total life-cycle engagement, and minimal management are some of the ingredients for optimizing complex processes. I draw on examples from the complex processes of software development and systems engineering to prove these benefits. Software development is one of the most complex endeavors. A common measure of effort is multiples of a thousand lines of code adjusted by complex metrics specifying the class of application, experience of the team, and application environment among other factors.

Surprisingly, 30 years of studies find that the highest quality software is produced in the lowest time to develop. In software, high quality (low defect rates) and reduced development time go hand in hand [18]. Figure 8 measures development time against the quality measured by the percentage of defect-free code. 95% means 5% of the code has defects.




Figure 8. Software Development Time vs. Quality [18].

Beginning in the 1960s, analysis of software development revealed that the best programmers were ten times as efficient as the worst (in order of magnitude). Steve McConnell cites over seven studies confirming the fact of this order-of-magnitude difference [19]. Some of these studies confirm that this difference also holds for software development teams. Norm Augustine found this variation holds in professions such as writing, invention, and police work [20]. A vignette from McConnell reveals that on a troubled critical program Boeing replaced most of a team of 80 people with one person who brought the program in on time [19].

DoD is committed to best practice systems engineering through DoD Directive 5000.1, which mandates the use of integrated product and process development (IPPD). This process forms a lean multidisciplinary team at program initiation and maintains this team throughout the program life-cycle. This approach reduces cost and cycle time while increasing quality. The IPPD Handbook contains this figure documenting the benefits:




Figure 9. Cost Savings from IPPD vs. Serial Approach.

The preceding chart demonstrates the necessity to “solve the right problem” and catch problems early, or pay increasing consequences (costs).

Certainly, intelligence is a complex process. Therefore, some of these lessons can be applied to improve intelligence processes. A survey of intelligence analysts would find fault with the “chop chain” reviews and the sporadic appearance of all levels of management in the process. It is possible to relabel the preceding chart to characterize the intelligence failures outlined in the Commission reports. Intelligence must be coordinated, persistent, and initiated and directed properly. Benchmarking processes are an effective approach to improving both intelligence and support processes.

BENCHMARKING TO IMPROVE RESOURCE EFFECTIVENESS

Action #3: Major Innovative Solution

Challenge: Measure and Improve Performance of Intelligence and Support Functions.

Response: Benchmark Processes and Outcomes across the IC and Select Private Companies.

Benchmarking is widely used in biotechnology, consumer package goods, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and Wall

Street. Benchmarking identifies best practices against quantitative and qualitative metrics across peer companies. The measures collected are inputs, outputs, and quality attributes (results). An independent facilitator executes the study by determining measures with the participants, objectively gathering the data, producing the rankings, and distilling the causal factors. Best practices dictate measuring continual improvements against regularly conducted benchmark studies. The benefits of benchmarking are reflected in a large worldwide study [12]. These demonstrate *significantly improved outcomes coupled with performance improvements*.




Figure 10. Benefits of Benchmarking [12].

The benchmarking process (Figure 9) requires between six and nine months. Rough guidelines include: identifying comparable institutions (2-6 months); determining measures with the participants (1 month); objectively gathering the data (1-2 months); analysis, ranking, identifying causal factors, and scrubbing (2-3 months); and reviews (1 month).



Figure 11. Benchmarking Process [13].

The complexity of collecting measures increases significantly as the measures progress from input to output to quality attributes. Quality attributes are typically complex measures from weighted survey results. These are not easily standardized between companies. The complexity of the study increases from manufacturing to consumer package goods to government or services.

Best benchmarking measures make excellent performance metrics, because there is a body of evidence indicating they are attainable by peer organizations. Figure 12 below catalogues some measures/metrics by type. These measures are for presentation only. Benchmarking measures would be developed through a rigorous collaborative process across the study population.

Measure	Type (Input, Output, Quality)
Organization Layers	Input
Span of Control	Input
Analyst to Support Ratio	Input
Studies per Analyst per Period	Output
Average Quality of Studies	Quality
Overhead Rates	Input
Organization Process Maturity	Quality
FTE vs Government Ratio	Input
Assurance Organizations	Quality
Capital Planning Process	Quality
Risk Management Process	Quality

Figure 12. Performance Measures/Metrics by Type.

A spider chart measures performance against best in class. The chart is wheel-shaped with measures radiating from the center. The measures increase from the center from 1 to 5. Lower is better (1 is best in class, 5 is needs significant improvement). The best in class category measures are the bold line.




Figure 13. Spider Quality Chart [14].

Benchmarking contributes to *unity of effort* and removing *structural barriers* by identifying best practices in the Community. These best practices are then used as governance metrics to standardize and improve processes throughout the Community. *Benchmarking improves both outcomes and performance.*

A leap to *common services*, shortcutting benchmarking and metrics, is an unproven strategy subject to significant risk. Another risky shortcut is engineering brainstorming and studies. These provide limited insights into future operating and financial results. Another suspect strategy, subject to risks from politicization, is “pick-a-winner” on incomplete technical and financial criteria. The greatest risk justly accrues to organizations selecting unproven technologies for common services. *The benchmarking phase of formulating joint performance measures, examining real operational data, scrubbing results, and formulating performance comparisons reverses a mountain of misconceptions and can significantly alter initial views on organizations operating efficiencies.*

BENEFITING FROM COMMON SERVICES

Action #4: Major Innovative Solution

Challenge: Focus Limited Resources on Intelligence Resources.

Response: Implement Common Services Increasing Unity of Effort and Jointness.

Effective governance and metrics derived from Community benchmarking naturally leads to common services. These benefit the Community by efficiently providing standardized services at optimal efficiencies, thereby enabling the shift of resources from support to intelligence. The following charts examine the benefits of common services from a Johnsson Group survey conducted on 40 international companies [15].




Figure 14. Savings for Common Services [15].

Across a broad range of sectors, over 60% of the surveyed companies achieved over 15% savings from common services.




Figure 15. Benefits of Common Services.

The benefits go beyond savings. Improved efficiencies enable a rapid, agile respond to new components, software, and services. This improves outcomes and customer support.




Figure 16. Enabling Factors.

Executive support and governance (change management and standard processes) play commanding roles in success.

Evolving technology and the need to assure continuity of operations favor the movement toward common services. Rapidly improving networks and the virtualization and consolidation of servers enable this leap to “cloud architectures.” The desktop computer is also transformed into an appliance with processing and memory residing in the server. This enables mobility of the analyst independent

of location. For the IC the cloud is a common service dedicated and restricted to the IC.

An IBM study found that 85% of computing sits idle in distributed environments, and that 70% of IT budgets maintain infrastructure freeing only 30% for new capabilities [16]. This severely limits management flexibility and has transformed IT into a capital-intensive business. The cloud transforms the model from capital-intensive to a “pay as you go” operating expense model. This model significantly improves management flexibility.

Accompanying this infrastructure are large and highly specialized resources. These resources do not supply business value—they maintain infrastructure. Therefore, the cloud transfers these functions to a common service and focuses resources on intelligence applications.

Ask your infrastructure group about continuity of operations and the last time it was tested with a cutover to a backup site. Thousands of physical servers distributed over hundreds of sites with inconsistent patching compounded by the costs stated above make effective continuity of operations highly unlikely. Cloud architectures enable continuity of operations.

The IBM study found cloud deployment created hardware savings of 65% from improved hardware utilization, software savings of 27%, systems administration savings of 45%, and provisioning savings of 76% [16]. Provisioning is the security-critical operation of applying software patches and deploying secure applications.

I assess with high confidence that cloud architectures can deliver savings of 30% in two years and 50% in four years. I repeat the previous caveat, i.e., that these savings are at significant risk and may disappear if implementation circumvents the benchmarking phase.

The good news is that common services extend to accounting, finance, procurement, and human resources broadening the base of potential savings.

Action #5: Major Innovative Solution

Challenge: Reduce the Vulnerability of the IC to Disasters
Response: Implement Distributed Joint Pods Magnifying Unity of Effort and Jointness beyond the IC.

Our improvements have been limited to the IC. *However, unmet expectations from the two Commissions are unity of effort stretching beyond the Intelligence Community and quick, imaginative, and agile response to threats.* Agency infrastructure is analogous to large medieval castles with moats separating people from the influence of outside agencies, partners, and companies.

The impact of disasters must be considered in locating resources. The IC must move toward a distributed resource model and away from resources concentrated in agency fortresses. I propose the introduction of buildings housing joint pods where Community members can “hot-seat” several days a week and interact with the Community and companies. Common services providing desktop appliances enable mobile analysts.

These buildings would provide generous common and meeting space and also accommodate unclassified interactions. This approach would eliminate *structural barriers* to community interaction and enable *unity of effort* by breaking the commanding hold individual agencies have on resources.

Over the last 30 years, corporations have steadily moved resources from headquarters to the field. The IC has validated that model through the success of deploying intelligence resources with the warfighter. A goal to emulate is the 300-plus collaborators from 58 institutions across the U.S., India, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom planning and designing the \$900 million Long Baseline Neutrino Experiment [17]. This project team uses the analogy of a bee colony to model coordination and interactions. A bee colony is so highly integrated and flawlessly choreographed that it operates as a single organism.



Figure 17. The Hive [17].

CONCLUSIONS

Using the imperfect analogy of a corporate merger, common infrastructure and services are a necessary condition for integration and success. However, achieving this common fabric does not guarantee success. Processes, priorities, and

resources must be aligned to meet the shifting mission and risk posture. Failing to align processes and resources accounts for the failure of mergers and the difficulty of achieving *unity of effort* within the IC. Capabilities-based budgeting, a rapidly changing risk profile, and steep budget cuts compound the problem of alignment.

The proposed *Intelligence Base* addresses these *structural barriers* through *governance*, *benchmarking*, and *common services*. *Governance* through prospective *life-cycle oversight* provides long-term top-down targets which breaks the model of budgeting to agency preferences. These preferences are skewed to reinforce agency status—absolute headcount, large capital assets, and tactical intelligence on the “crisis of the moment.” The *life-cycle oversight* approach can align resources to risk, reallocate resources, and address large budget reductions. General Powell was successful executing *Base Force* with this approach.

The critical contribution of *benchmarking* is not related to technology. It is the discovery of processes and structural barriers which inhibit performance. Removing these barriers can *significantly improve intelligence processes and outcomes with fewer resources*. Effective governance and metrics derived from Community benchmarking naturally leads to *common services*. These benefit the Community by efficiently providing standardized services at optimal efficiencies, thereby enabling the shift of resources from support to intelligence.

In sum, I have demonstrated the effectiveness of the *Intelligence Base* in improving *governance* to remove *structural barriers* and promote *unity of effort* and *jointness*. *These actions significantly improve intelligence processes and outcomes with fewer resources*.

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The Militarization of Intelligence: Can the Military Perform Covert Action More Effectively than the Intelligence Community

by Stuart D. Lyle

For many years covert action was an uncomfortable topic. In the U.S. especially, after a number of public scandals regarding abuses of authority during such operations, it was viewed as “a controversial proposition at best.”¹ This changed, however, in the immediate post-9/11 era when the U.S. went on the offensive against terrorism. In order to prosecute the Global War on Terror (GWOT) effectively, the government and population of the U.S. recognized that more needed to be done in the “gray area” between open diplomacy and conventional military intervention. In short, there was “a renewed willingness to consider covert action as a policy option.”² In the wake of this newfound proclivity toward covert action, the 9/11 Commission report made one significant recommendation: “Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department.”³

While this recommendation applies to paramilitary operations only, it raised the question of whether the military would be better suited for other covert action activities. It is argued there is ample precedent for other facets of covert action to be moved under the purview of the Department of Defense (DoD), and some analysts contend that this is indeed already occurring. Despite this, many more will argue that DoD is not capable of performing this role as effectively as the intelligence community. John Bruce Lockhart, former Deputy Chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), believed that “[t]he essential skill of a secret service is to get things *done* secretly and *deniably*,”⁴ indicating that covert action is the *raison d’être* of the intelligence community (IC). Despite this, and an agreement by both former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld and former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet not to uphold the Commission’s recommendation, the dramatic increase in the size of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) “will likely work to further push the CIA out of paramilitary operations.”⁵

The question in the title is slightly misleading as most of the IC is under DoD direction but, as these are mostly technical intelligence agencies and as the vast majority of U.S. covert action is conducted by the CIA, then the latter will be referred to in particular. This article will thus examine the full nature of covert action and investigate whether the military

or the CIA is better suited for the role of covert action. It will be argued that the military can, in many instances, be just as effective as the CIA, if not more so. However, it will also be shown that there are significant difficulties in such an approach and that individual circumstances for each operation must be considered before deciding which would be best suited and responsible for conducting a covert action.

Rather than simply collecting and analyzing information to support policy decision-making, covert action is how the IC enacts policy.

First, what is “covert action”? “Nothing brings the intelligence community as close to the making of policy as covert action.”⁶ In simple terms it is the proactive side of intelligence. Rather than simply collecting and analyzing information to support policy decision-making, covert action is how the IC *enacts* policy. However, this has only been a small aspect of the IC’s efforts with as little as 2-3 percent of the CIA’s budget going toward it.⁷ Despite this, the general public seems mesmerized by these actions, in particular the more exciting elements, e.g., assassinations and *coup* attempts, which have come to define their perceptions of the IC, especially among critics. However, covert action is a collective term covering a plethora of very different activities from the world-changing to the relatively benign. Regardless, to qualify as “covert” the action must be conducted in such a manner as to disguise the identity of the state which carried it out, even if the actual results of the operation are widely known. Richard Aldrich described it as “operations to influence the world by unseen means – the hidden hand,”⁸ and the infant CIA referred to it as the “quiet option.”⁹ For a more detailed definition, U.S. law states that covert action is:

an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the [government] will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include...

traditional counter-intelligence...diplomatic...
military...[or] law enforcement activities.¹⁰

Therefore, much more than just paramilitary operations can be categorized as covert actions. These additional activities can include propaganda, political/economic influence (including covert diplomacy), and intelligence support. "Paramilitary operations" is also an umbrella term for such actions as assassinations, *coups*, and training foreign military/irregular forces. Despite the CIA currently being predominantly responsible for these activities, historically covert action has never been the sole preserve of the IC and certain aspects of it are carried out by various government departments depending on the period and country. For example, Cold War propaganda was a CIA task in the U.S. but a Foreign Office task in the UK.¹¹ This illustrates a precedent for non-IC-led operations. What's more, the "separate roles of the Department of Defense...and the Central Intelligence Agency...are not always clearly reflected in media accounts and at times there has been considerable operational overlap."¹² Consequently, who is better suited for these kinds of activities?

While many in the military have argued that greater oversight of the CIA than the military is necessary due to past abuses, those abuses occurred because there was no oversight and there is nothing currently in place to prevent the military from committing the same mistakes.

As mentioned earlier, the CIA has remained the institution chiefly responsible for U.S. covert action, and this was sanctioned by the former SECDEF and DCI. Most academics teaching intelligence studies would also support this decision for a number of reasons. Chiefly the "CIA's advocates contend that it is better designed to conduct covert operations because it has less bureaucracy and thus can do things faster, cheaper, and with more flexibility than the military."¹³ They also claim that not only does the military lack the same level of experience in this field, it certainly lacks the requisite training. Any decision to transfer responsibility to it would increase the strain on its various units and diminish their effectiveness in conducting their more traditional roles and responsibilities. The CIA is also believed to be more suitable simply because these operations "often require operating out of uniform."¹⁴ Soldiers, even SOF it is argued, are not accustomed to operating outside the protection of the military and the Geneva Convention. Covert actions would put them at considerably more risk, which many did not envisage when enlisting, unlike CIA personnel.

There is also an oversight issue to be confronted with any such transfer of responsibility. First, "covert operations conducted by U.S. military forces during wartime do not require a Presidential finding or Congressional notification"¹⁵ as they can be viewed as "traditional military activities," thus exempting them from the covert action legal definition. What implications that has in the case of the present, and seemingly indefinite, GWOT is unclear. CIA operations must be approved by the National Security Council and even the President, whereas DoD can work with relative autonomy in that it needs approval from the SECDEF only. This allows DoD to "conduct covert operations abroad without local governments' permission and with little or no congressional oversight or recourse."¹⁶ While many in the military have argued that greater oversight of the CIA than the military is necessary due to past abuses, those abuses occurred because there was no oversight and there is nothing currently in place to prevent the military from committing the same mistakes.

With regard to paramilitary operations, IC advocates point to the CIA's long history, and thus wealth of experience, in planning and executing them. The ability of the CIA to deploy to Afghanistan weeks before any DoD personnel is often cited as an example which illustrates the agility of the CIA over the military. The CIA created a small, dedicated cadre for these activities called the Special Activities Division (SAD), which has seen extensive deployment in theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Of the covert actions known to have been conducted by the CIA, they cover the full gamut of paramilitary activities from assassinations, *coup* attempts (most notably the Bay of Pigs invasion), training foreign militaries/irregulars (e.g., the anti-Saddam Iraqi exile force known as the "Scorpions"), and direct action (sabotage/subversion by CIA agents).¹⁷

CIA advocates believe that no military unit has the same depth or breadth of experience. It is also claimed that, as a result of the numerous intelligence officers it has posted overseas with specific local cultural and language skills, the CIA has a global network of contacts it can exploit for the purpose of covert action that the military simply cannot equal. This also gives it the edge over DoD with respect to political influence operations, including covert diplomacy, as these intelligence officers usually work out of embassies and consulates and thus understand local politics and can make contacts within local government as well. The extent and success of CIA experience in this sphere of covert action is also well known, e.g., the funding of anti-communist political parties in Italy in the 1940s.

Despite the fact that SECDEF Rumsfeld had decided against DoD acceptance of lead responsibility for paramilitary activities, he believed that in many respects the Pentagon was more than capable of fulfilling that particular role, in

addition to other covert activities. Many policies he championed were designed to make DoD the *de facto* leader in U.S. covert action, leading many to argue that the CIA should focus its efforts on “filling the gaps”¹⁸ that are created by the types of operations that DoD is unlikely or unable to conduct. Incensed by the claims of inflexibility during the Afghanistan invasion, Rumsfeld proclaimed the ultra-secretive Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as an independent, supported command and designated it the lead element in the GWOT. This gave it incredible flexibility and speed as it could plan and execute its own missions, making a repeat of the tardiness of Afghanistan unlikely. Further reducing the likelihood of a repeat performance, legislation was passed afterward allowing “SOF to directly pay and equip foreign forces or groups supporting the U.S. in combating terrorism...a crucial tool should they become involved in covert or clandestine operations.”¹⁹

Proportionately the Pentagon ... has significantly more “operators” to conduct paramilitary operations, and in the wake of 9/11 has instigated efforts to further increase the size of its SOF.

Challenging the charge that DoD is not designed for this role and is too big and bureaucratic to conduct covert action, those advocating the military’s role opine that the CIA’s SAD, while proficient, is simply too small for the global demands of the GWOT.²⁰ Proportionately the Pentagon, for example, has significantly more “operators” to conduct paramilitary operations, and in the wake of 9/11 has instigated efforts to further increase the size of its SOF. What’s more, many of the members of the SAD are former SOF soldiers and regular SOF personnel are often temporarily assigned to assist with CIA covert operations. Furthermore, from an intelligence perspective, DoD currently receives around 80 percent of the intelligence budget and, of the four highest-funded intelligence agencies, only the CIA is not under DoD control.²¹ This means the infrastructure for supporting/conducting covert actions at the direct disposal of the Pentagon includes the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the individual service intelligence branches. Further solidifying a sense of independence from the CIA, DoD created a new Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, directly responsible to the SECDEF and not to the Director of National Intelligence. This position was created in response to the belief within the Pentagon that “the CIA is not responsive enough to the military’s needs.”²²

Despite the claims that the military does not have the specific training or experience for covert actions, a look at the entirety of DoD can quickly dispel this. SOF units train specifically for the full spectrum of paramilitary activities. In particular, the quintessential mission of the U.S. Army’s Special Forces (Green Berets) is to train foreign paramilitary forces and guerrillas. They may be required to conduct this mission in hostile territory in a covert manner, as they did while training the Mujahideen in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. They even assisted the CIA in training the “Scorpions,” illustrating the limitations of the CIA and its reliance on military support. Even more secretive units such as the Army’s Delta Force or the Navy SEALs’ Development Group (DEVGRU) specialize in direct action against individual terrorist targets, e.g., the raid in 2011 that killed Osama bin Laden, and these units are even more capable of acting in the covert realm.

Furthermore, there is the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), comprising a mixture of intelligence and SOF personnel, much like the SAD but operating under DoD. It was created specifically to meet “unique military intelligence and special operations needs”²³ by combining the technical expertise of the intelligence agencies with the special operations “direct action” experience of the SOF. It has been implicated in a number of covert actions, not the least of which was the assassination in 1993 of the Colombian drug lord and head of the Medellin Cartel, Pablo Escobar. Furthermore, a less obvious element of the SOF community is the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) branch. Its primary mission is to influence the enemy through any number of means, including propaganda, misinformation, persuasion, etc., and is, therefore, more than capable of conducting the covert propaganda role. Some of these units, and the ISA in particular, are more than comfortable operating out of uniform and frequently do so, dispelling the concern that this is in any way a serious barrier to military covert action. This examination of DoD capabilities also dismisses the concern that SOF would have to “refocus” on new tasks, thus diminishing their effectiveness in traditional roles. As is evident, many covert activities are already traditional roles for these units.

It is reasonable to say that most would agree that the argument regarding lack of oversight and the risks of abuses has validity. However, there are those who also contend, often controversially, that there are occasions where there is perhaps too much regulation and that sometimes things may just need to be done without seeking permission. Covert actions by definition require considerable levels of deniability. “But deniability, although it can be very useful, is also highly problematic for democracies, since deniable policies by definition lack the kind of accountability democracy requires.”²⁴ Following the exposure of certain CIA covert actions during the Cold War, many limitations

were placed on the Agency for future covert endeavors. However, “[t]hanks to the vagueness of U.S. law governing covert action, using the military for such operations is—at least under one interpretation of the law—much easier than using the CIA.”²⁵ Certainly, policymakers have sidestepped the issue of assassination of terrorist leaders by using the “war” context post-9/11 to label them “legitimate military targets” rather than criminals, as would normally be the case with terrorists, and by using military assets such as airpower. Furthermore, the logic behind the Iran-Contra scandal was seen by some as a practical, if unpopular, solution to the Tehran hostage situation. The CIA was specifically removed from the planning of this operation for the very reason of oversight and permission issues as negotiating with Iran was so contrary to stated U.S. foreign policy. There are even those who suggest that, as a result of the negativity surrounding Congressional scrutiny of past covert action, the CIA is perhaps reticent when it comes to planning such operations for fear of further damaging the Agency.²⁶

Finally, regarding covert political influencing operations, the DoD has more experience than the CIA would care to admit and is more than adept at dealing with covert diplomacy. The military has always had a hand in U.S. foreign policymaking; one need only look at General Marshall in post-World War II Europe. Nevertheless, during the Clinton era the military was tasked with a more extensive role. Under a policy of “military engagement,” the idea was that regional “U.S. commanders hoped to create personal connections that could be used in times of crisis and to build or hold together political partnerships to serve U.S. interests”²⁷ by dealing directly with foreign militaries and government leaders. High-ranking DoD staff, including SECDEFs, travelled widely conducting personal negotiations regarding not only all aspects of U.S. foreign policy but also on inter-allied negotiations, including Indo-Pakistani tensions, the Middle East, and even discussing the AIDS crisis in Africa. Like the CIA, DoD has numerous personnel stationed overseas forging close relationships with local governments and militaries. It is estimated that, even before 9/11, U.S. SOF were operating in 125 countries.²⁸ Furthermore, many of these are organized into Military Liaison Elements (MLE) that operate out of U.S. embassies and consulates and are instructed to gather intelligence and build contacts that could be used in combating terrorism. This is a direct overlap in the responsibilities of the CIA overseas stations and challenges their assertion of supremacy in this realm of covert political influence operations. What’s more, the “image of the CIA...has been colored at home and especially abroad by what has been learned of its activities in places like Cuba, Guatemala, Iran and Chile.”²⁹ This makes the military a more “acceptable” option when engaging with those states where the CIA is unpopular.

Should the military persist in seeking a more active role in such operations, there must be amendments to the oversight legislation to reduce the likelihood of conflicting objectives, or the chance of abuses...

In conclusion, there can be little doubt that DoD is making concerted efforts to increase the size and scope of its SOF and that these units are indeed conducting what are by any definition “covert actions.” In doing so, DoD is putting itself in direct competition with the CIA over who should be responsible for such operations. The control exerted by DoD over the IC through its command of such a dominant proportion of the intelligence budget, coupled with the legislative freedom afforded to the military, gives DoD a commanding position in the political sphere. Its overall capabilities across the spectrum of covert actions and the sheer scale of the organization make it suitable for performing all U.S. covert operations without having to “out-source” for personnel like the CIA is so frequently forced to do. There are quite serious dangers with this approach, however, namely that the lack of oversight could result in controversy. Overlap in operations may also be an issue with concurrent operations conducted in the same geographical area posing the risk of compromising each other or having very different policy objectives for that particular area leading to conflicting results. Should the military persist in seeking a more active role in such operations, there must be amendments to the oversight legislation to reduce the likelihood of conflicting objectives, or the chance of abuses, without restricting DoD’s ability to conduct operations in the way that many feel the CIA has been restricted. However, as has been shown, whether the military takes a more active role or not, there is no argument that in many instances it could well perform covert action just as effectively or better than the intelligence community.

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²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²⁹ Scott, L., "Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy," p. 328.

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Intercultural Competence for Future Leaders: Addressing Cultural Knowledge and Perception at West Point

by Dr. Richard L. Wolfel, U.S. Military Academy, and Dr. Francis A. Galgano, Villanova University

For more than 200 years, the United States Military Academy (USMA) has been preparing its graduates for service to the nation. During that 200-year span, the strategic interests of the United States have changed, and so too has the focus of the Academy's general education curriculum. The most recent, and perhaps the most dramatic, change occurred after the decline of the Soviet Union. Since the early 1990s, the U.S. strategic outlook evolved from a world dominated by two superpowers to one with a far less certain outlook. This has spawned an increase in non-traditional military missions, such as peacekeeping and stability and support operations. For USMA graduates, this new paradigm demands an enhanced understanding of cultural diversity, cross-cultural competence, and regional expertise. The new strategic reality and its related non-traditional missions require our graduates to draw upon a deeper understanding of culture and successfully apply that knowledge to situations and challenges that arise as they accomplish missions required of a modern Army leader.

WHAT IS CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCE?

The idea of culture learning as an expected outcome of study abroad is not a new one. However, the idea that cultural knowledge gained abroad might translate into a measurable skill set after even a semester of immersion might be. The question arises then of how cross-culturally competent do learners become during an immersion experience? To answer this question, one first needs to understand the difference between cultural knowledge and cultural "competence."

There has been an evolution of thinking in culture education over recent years. The focus of this evolution has been a shift from cultural awareness, or cultural knowledge, a cognitive trait, to a focus on cross-cultural, or intercultural, competence, a mix of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Hammer (2004) defines intercultural competences as "the capacity to generate perceptions and adapt behavior to cultural context" (p. 2). The emphasis on perceptions and adaptation of behavior shows a change from simple

instruction on characteristics of a specific culture to a set of skills and attitudinal change that form a skill set that is transferable from one culture to another. Wood and Atkins (2006) have also raised the dualistic nature of cultural competence, focusing on the difference between specific and general knowledge and skills. The focus is on using general knowledge and skills to provide the foundation on which specific cultural knowledge can be added as need develops for travel to specific regions.

Richards (1976) has emphasized the difference between deep and formal culture. Formal culture refers to achievements of the society, including artistic and historical achievements. Deep culture, on the other hand, emphasizes the characteristics of society, or the "thoughts, beliefs, actions... concerns... values... superstitions" of the society. This differentiation between formal and deep culture allows Richards to differentiate levels of cross-cultural knowledge, moving from cross-cultural awareness, through cross-cultural understanding, to cross-cultural appreciation. To move from one level to the next requires greater training and knowledge within the culture.

Another important issue in the research is the need to clearly define cross-cultural competence (3C). Paulston (1978) emphasizes that biculturalism is a unique process in which each person internalizes certain values of each culture in order to create a unique identity for himself/herself. Such a statement has important ramifications for USMA in that cadets will begin to internalize certain elements of culture as they are immersed in a foreign environment. These elements could differ from person to person. As a result, qualitative approaches of data acquisition will be necessary in order to acquire a complete assessment of the immersion experience.

Another important component in 3C is to connect immersion programs to classroom instruction. Einbeck (2002) emphasizes the need to include orientation sessions in order to "manage culture shock." However, she does not include any reflection activities in order to allow students to reflect and personally assess their development as a result of the program. Lee (1997) emphasizes the need to add a reflective activity, specifically a portfolio, in an effort to allow the students to reflect and internalize important concepts they

learned as a result of the immersion experience. Also, portfolios provide the instructor with important documentation to support the assessment of the success of the program. This idea of pre-program preparation and post-program reflection is reinforced by the work at the Center for Advanced Research in Language Acquisition (CARLA) in its “Maximizing Study Abroad” training materials (Paige, Cohen, Kappler, Chi, & Lassegard, 2009).

Scheunpflug (1997) supports the need for preparation and debriefing in cultural awareness programs. In her program, she set a specific objective of eliminating xenophobia through cultural immersion experiences. Therefore, it is important to orient the students, before arrival in the foreign region, in order to lead them to discover important themes visible during the immersion experience. Also, it is important to debrief the students when they return to assess if they acquired the skills and knowledge deemed important by the instructor. This leads to the conclusion that any successful immersion program must contain three elements: an orientation, an immersion experience, and a debriefing. All of these elements provide opportunities for the collection of data to be used in assessment of the immersion experience.

INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE AND THE MILITARY

Intercultural (or cross-cultural) competence is the primary goal of the military when it comes to cultural knowledge. Our goal is to effectively communicate and understand enemies, allies, and cultures in which we operate in order to accomplish a mission with minimum damage to self or local populace. Selmeski (2007) has been one of the leading proponents of cross-cultural competence within larger military circles. Selmeski (2007, p. 12) begins to move toward a working definition of cross-cultural competence (3C) by first stating what it is not: i.e., simple briefings about the characteristics of an area, additional language training, more knowledge of international relations, and additional background on radical Islam. Selmeski starts to operationalize 3C through a definition that includes an “understanding of other people’s ways of thinking and acting.” This would require training that could be assessed on the cognitive domain of Bloom’s taxonomy of learning. Also, Selmeski emphasizes the need to extend assessment through the addition of the affective domain in Bloom’s taxonomy while maintaining assessment in the cognitive domain. Abbe, Gulick, and Herman (2007, p. 13) support this move as they identify attitudes and empathy as important components of 3C. They also emphasize skills including interpersonal skills and flexibility as significant predictors of effective 3C instruction. This leads to a wider definition of intercultural competence, one that extends beyond just knowledge and into other domains of learning.

The influence of scholars within the Department of Defense has influenced the evolution of military thinking about culture from traditional training about an area of operations into a more general set of skills and behaviors that work to set up success for current and future deployments. LTG William Caldwell (2008), during his time as commander of the Army Command and General Staff College, emphasized that “intercultural competence involves looking at culture as not just knowledge, but also looking at a skill set that increases intercultural competence and identifying a set of behaviors that assist a person to succeed in a cross-cultural environment.” Such a conclusion has been recently echoed by Cox (2011) in his discussion of the importance of cultural knowledge and Human Terrain Teams. According to Cox (2011, p. 26), “if the opportunity for misunderstanding is this great between people who do not share a common language, imagine how great it might become when these same individuals fail to share a common culture, religion, or worldview.” This is the crux of the importance of cultural knowledge and cross-cultural competence in modern warfare. Most modern conflicts facing the U.S. military will occur in foreign lands, in close contact with all sorts of local populations, including combatants, civilians, or some combination of the two.

The contemporary operating environment (COE) resulting from 9/11, and as demonstrated by the irregular/unconventional nature of military operations in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), shows an increase in the importance of culture, intercultural competence, language proficiency, and regional expertise as part of the education and training program for all members of the armed forces. The U.S. Army *Counterinsurgency* Field Manual (FM 3-24) has started to capture this change in military thinking and, as a result, has an extensive discussion on the role of culture in modern warfare.

FM 3-24 (2006, p. 1-1) also emphasizes the role of power in understanding insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, in that “political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.” This is a significant point because it requires a rethinking of culture as, in part, a political process, something that can be modified for political gain.

A second insight of FM 3-24 (2006, p. 1-18) is the transnational nature of insurgencies. The “glue” that holds people of different countries together in coordinated actions is the notion of identity. FM 3-24 prominently identifies extremist ethnic or religious beliefs as important sources of identity, but we can also potentially see insurgencies based on economic, territorial, environmental, or other ideologies. Our emphasis on other factors for potential insurgencies is important in order to avoid “pigeon-holing” insurgencies or other conflicts into either ethnic or religious conflicts. This

is seen too often in the world, and the case of Darfur is one example of a territorial conflict that has often been misrepresented as religious in nature.

One of the most important conclusions of FM 3-24 (2006) is the definition of “victory” in an insurgency operation. Victory is achieved when the government is viewed by the indigenous population as legitimate. This is important as it extends beyond a traditional military definition of victory and requires the military leadership to engage in issues of economic development, political development, culture, and many other issues. Tactical success can contribute to security, but guarantees nothing. As has been mentioned in numerous places, counterinsurgency is a “thinking man’s” warfare, or “the graduate level of warfare” (FM 3-24, 2006, p. 1-1).

Another key observation is the importance of the local context in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. In order for counterinsurgencies to succeed, some regional expertise is needed in order to understand the regional and localized nature of the conflict and to accurately determine and respond to local needs.

As laid out in FM 3-24, the COE has changed from the conventional Cold War nature to one of asymmetrical actions, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies. This change requires a new manner of thinking that emphasizes cultural and power structures transcending the battlefield, issues requiring an understanding of language, culture, and regional expertise. This requires a rethinking of culture and intercultural competence and how these concepts can enrich the education and training of newly commissioned officers in particular, and also contribute to the education and training of all members of the armed forces.

At the core of all discussions of language proficiency, intercultural competence, and regional expertise is the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (2005). While the first goal of the Roadmap (2005, p. 1) is to “[c]reate foundation language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components,” the remainder of the document lays out objectives for language, but remains mostly silent on culture. Since 2005, several people and organizations have offered positions on how to both define and develop cultural expertise across various agencies.

The U.S. Marine Corps (Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, 2007) has developed its own guidance for culture and intercultural competence, which identifies five operational dimensions of culture: physical environment, economic systems, social structures, political structures, and beliefs and symbols. This conception is useful as it provides a framework for explaining culture, but fails to completely explain all of the

elements of culture within a society. For example, the physical environment should not include just the natural landscape and how people harvest its resources, but also a discussion of how cultures modify landscapes in an effort to promote their identity and how modifications can project power. Wolfel (2002) looks at the movement of the Kazakhstani capital from Almaty to Astana as a geopolitical statement to the Russian minority in the north in particular and to Russia in general. By moving the capital to the north, the Kazakhstani government is identifying the territory in the north as Kazakhstani. Also, at the local level, Oluic (2008) comments on how the former antagonists in Bosnia use religious symbols to mark their territory. The two examples show the importance of landscape on the cultural identity of a region.

In addition, Salmoni and Holmes-Eber’s five dimensions fail to address the importance of language. Language is a key dimension of culture in several aspects. At the most basic level, language is the primary method of transmitting culture. Therefore, whoever controls language development strongly influences cultural development. It is no surprise that several theorists including Anderson (1991) and Gellner (1983) look to the era of industrial development for when cultural identity consolidated around the European model of the state. Industrial powers were willing to allow the state to control education and create a cohort of workers with basic literacy, numeric, and citizenship skills. The state willingly undertook this role as it was able to transmit its version of language and culture onto the population, creating dutiful citizens who accepted the status quo.

Language is also important as it provides a sense of legitimacy both for the leadership of a country and for foreigners wishing to interact with both the leadership and citizens of the country. Citizens are more likely to support leaders who speak their own language. In the case of the former Soviet Union, language laws were some of the first important pieces of legislation enacted. Therefore, any conception of culture that fails to address language is missing the primary method of legitimizing and transmitting culture.

The USMC statement on culture does identify the significance of nested identities and issues of individuals being members of multiple cultural groups. Nested identities refer to people who identify with different groups that operate at different geographic levels. For example, a person could identify with the population of a neighborhood, city, county, state, region, country, and transnational group simultaneously. This creates two problems for an outsider trying to understand the culture of a location. First, it is difficult to accurately identify the characteristics of a cultural group as the individual’s actions are often influenced by differing levels of cultural identity. Second, membership in a

shared transnational ethnic group does not necessarily lead to a sense of “imagined community,” as local identities could distort the characteristics of the individual. For example, an Italian-American probably has more in common with an Anglo-American than with an Italian. This is due to the influence of local identities interfering with the larger transnational identity of “Italian-ness.” This is problematic when we insert people as “cultural experts” based on kinship attributes as opposed to actual field training as cultural experts might lack the “on-the-ground training” necessary to successfully complete their mission.

TRADOC, as the training organization of the U.S. Army, has been a key player in the development of methods to promote intercultural competence. Its working definition of culture seems to provide a foundation for a discussion of culture in the military context. According to TRADOC, culture is “the set of distinctive features of a society or group, including, but not limited to values, beliefs and norms, that ties together members of that society or group and that drives action and behavior” (2008, p. 11). One of the key recent developments within TRADOC has been the separation of intercultural competence and regional expertise. Based on the developing body of literature, as seen in various white papers produced by the TRADOC Culture Center (Hajjar, 2007), the Army is moving in a direction of teaching culture as a generic construct, one that has certain themes that are common across various cultures. These basic themes center on the Army’s definition of culture based on the VBBN model. This is defined as the “values, beliefs, behaviors and norms that characterize a dynamic social system used by a particular group.” Hajjar (2007, p. 2) also refers to culture as a “web of meaning,” learned through enculturation. He also emphasizes that culture is arbitrary, and that “military members should make no assumptions about what a society considers right and wrong.” This forms the foundation of TRADOC’s position on culture, strongly influenced by anthropological theories of culture.

While this is a solid foundation on which a definition of culture can be developed, it fails to address two important elements. First, the spread of culture through socialization does not take into account the political structure of a region and the methods by which culture, or national identity, is used to bolster the political legitimacy of a specific government. Gellner has emphasized that not all possible cultural identities have blossomed into dominant national identities. In fact, Gellner (1983, p. 45) suggests that there is “one effective nationalism for *ten* potential ones.” This means that ninety percent of all cultural identities fail to develop. Gellner and many others explain this failure as the need to consolidate into a common national identity in order to increase industrial development. While economic on the surface, this is also a political process in which one group gains power and imposes its cultural identity on the entire

group within a region. History has seen many examples of a single group within a region gaining power and imposing its culture upon the rest of the country. The Prussians of Imperial Germany, the Magyars of Hungary, the Russians in the Soviet Union, and the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan are just a few examples of small groups with power imposing their identity on the larger society. This emphasis on competition over cultural knowledge was an important point of emphasis in a recent speech by MG (USA, Ret) Robert Scales (2008) at the TRADOC Culture Summit II. In his speech, he emphasized that modern warfare includes perception as an “operational lens.” According to Scales, “two sides are engaged in dueling narratives. Whoever comes out most believable wins.”

Hajjar and TRADOC also do not address the role of geography in the formation of cultural identity, which will play several roles in the formation of national identity. First, as noted by Smith (1991, p. 21), one of the six main attributes of an ethnic community is “an association with a specific homeland.” The emotional attachment to territory is an important source of identity for a cultural community. Often, important events are commemorated in the landscape and control over territory is a defining principle of the modern state. Therefore, in order for a culture to consider itself legitimate, it must have an association with a homeland. The word “association” is key in this context. A culture does not have to be physically occupying the homeland, as in the case of diaspora communities, or regions of irredentism or secessionism, but it must develop a case for inclusion of the territories in its homeland. When an attachment to a homeland to an increased call for sovereignty occurs, this has the potential for conflict. Within the last several decades, U.S. military actions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan have all been forced to engage with the mismatch between ethnic homelands and aspirations for sovereignty. As U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) develops and the U.S. increases interest in Sub-Saharan Africa, this disconnect between homelands and sovereignty will continue to plague U.S. operations.

The second major insight geography offers to studies of culture is how governments use space to control the population. Foucault (1980, p. 77) emphasizes that geography has an important influence on the power structures within a society. According to Foucault, “tactics and strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organisation of domains” are important tools in an evaluation of the power relationships within societies. Especially important in landscape studies is a discussion of the organization of domains. A state constructs tourist landscapes in an effort to promote its ideology. This is done through a conscious selection of sites to promote or preserve. Architecture is used by a society in an effort to

present people what they should believe for the purpose of developing an identity. This is shown to them constantly as they move throughout the city. Also, states can either destroy or disavow sites in an effort to hide themes that are not consistent in the national identity being constructed.

The USMC document also simplifies geography to a simple mapping exercise, in which the participants identify certain aspects of culture that can be mapped. These maps would be simple distributions of demography, physical geography, and social patterns, among others. The problem with this vision of geography is that it ignores the barriers and points of transition on the map. It also ignores the fourth dimension of mapping, change over time. Finally, the authors ignore the connection between several of these elements. Such a statement firmly identifies the need for geography in discussions of culture. Left to this definition, culture would be seen as a static concept that one could “pin on a map” and ignores the connections that would allow for a more robust explanation of culture and the dynamic nature of culture.

Therefore, the military needs to move in a direction where cross-cultural competence is defined, taught, and assessed in three different domains. First, academic knowledge must focus on an interdisciplinary definition of culture that focuses on both its characteristics and how cultures evolve both spatially and temporally. The second domain is affect, in which we need to emphasize the ability to use cultural knowledge to help the military think from the perspective of other cultures (empathy). This will allow for both more effective operations and more effective communications. Finally, we need to develop skills in the soldiers that will allow them to flourish in intercultural environments. Flexibility is a key skill as soldiers will need to quickly adapt to changing cultural landscapes as they move through an area of operations or change areas of operations.

The literature on cultural education and cross-cultural competence suggests that several key elements make up a successful program for promoting that competence. First, cultural education has moved beyond knowledge to include discussions of skills and attitudes. All of this—knowledge, skills and attitudes wrapped together—creates a stronger program of cultural education and promotes cross-cultural competence. Second, immersion activities are key to the success of cross-cultural competence programs. As noted by Klak and Martin (2003), these do not necessarily require travel. While there is no substitute for travel to a foreign region, increased cross-cultural competence can be achieved in a local environment using targeted educational activities, especially for the introductory levels of that competence. Third, any immersion activity should be connected to the classroom to promote maximum impact on the development of cross-cultural competence. This will allow students to see

how to apply the general skills they learned in a cross-cultural encounter to other experiences. Finally, reflective activities must be built into the experience to allow the student to process the experience and discuss with others. This helps to internalize the experience and prepare him/her for future cross-cultural encounters. At West Point, we have taken these conclusions and attempted to apply them to our programs.

ASSESSING INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE

The literature on intercultural competence suggests three key outcomes: knowledge of culture, empathy, and flexibility. These represent the three domains that are significant in intercultural competence: knowledge, affect, and skills. Therefore, any assessment program must evaluate the degree of intercultural competence based on these three domains.

Knowledge tends to be the easiest trait to assess. Working from a common definition of culture and an understanding of the processes that define and allow culture to evolve, instruction can be developed. At USMA, culture is one of the important goals of the curriculum and more cultural instruction is being inserted into the curriculum. This will allow for assessment based on curriculum alignment and individual instructor evaluation utilizing embedded indicators with the existing core courses taken by all cadets at USMA.

The cadets participating in study abroad programs more deeply engage with issues of cross-cultural competence. Therefore, they are assessed at a deeper level than other cadets at West Point. To that end, a commercially available test, the Intercultural Development Inventory (IDI), is currently the primary assessment tool being used in the study abroad program. The IDI is a 50-question, Likert-scale assessment tool that generates a profile placing the test taker on the Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS) (Bennett, 1986). Based on the DMIS, people move from a mindset where cross-cultural competence does not matter (denial), to a mindset where people see multiculturalism as a threat to their culture (defense), through a transitional phase where people believe cultural difference involves only minor differences and that, deep down, everyone has the same values (religion, humor, gender, humanity, etc.) (minimization), into a mindset where people leverage cultural difference to the benefit of themselves and their organizations (acceptance/adaptation).

Although many organizations doing business abroad use the IDI, one of the major issues with the survey has been a concern over validity and social desirability. Abbe, Gulick, and Herman (2007) have raised concerns with the IDI. Their

concerns focus on the predictive nature of the IDI. These concerns are mostly alleviated since the IDI is used at West Point as a developmental tool and not to predict success in future projects. Also, several researchers (Hammer, 2008; Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman, 2003; Paige, et al., 2003) have conducted extensive validity and social desirability studies that look across different culture groups. Hammer (2008) and Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman (2003) conclude, through confirmatory factor analysis, that the IDI is both internally valid and valid across cultural groups. Also, the factor analysis confirms that the individual results tend to cluster around the DMIS groupings at a statistically significant level. Also, in an educational setting, the IDI can be (and is being) used as a developmental tool, not a predictive tool of future success, to help coach students to achieve greater levels of cross-cultural competence. This tends to alleviate Abbe, Gulick, and Herman's concerns over the predictive nature of the IDI.

GROWTH OF THE STUDY ABROAD PROGRAM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLCRS

In response to the development of the Language Transformation Roadmap (2007), West Point significantly increased the size of the study abroad program. The program grew from four cadets going to France in 2000 to 150 cadets traveling to 10 countries by 2008. The study abroad program selected locations based on the languages taught at USMA: Arabic, French, German, Spanish, Chinese, Russian, and Portuguese.

In concert with the growth of this program, USMA also stood up an interdisciplinary center of excellence that focused on language acquisition, cross-cultural competence, and regional knowledge. The Center for Languages, Cultures, and Regional Studies (CLCRS) was established in 2007. The center was tasked with several initiatives. First, the Center is the chief proponent for language and cultural and regional knowledge assessment in the study abroad program. Assessment tools were developed in the three domains and implemented for study abroad programs (see Watson, Siska, and Wolfel, under review, for detailed results of the assessment). Second, the membership of the Center worked to develop pre-departure and reintegration programs for the cadets in the study abroad program. The pre-departure program consists of preliminary assessments for the cadets and a series of lunchtime workshops on key issues, including culture shock, cultural stress points, and development of a regional perspective.

Upon return from their study abroad experience, cadets are enrolled in a week-long seminar. The program includes assessment activities to measure growth in the three

domains. In addition to assessment, workshops and focus groups are held to discuss issues such as language maintenance, reverse culture shock, cross-cultural competence, and intercultural stress points.

CLCRS was also tasked with interfacing with the Department of Defense to consult on cultural policy for the Army and DoD. CLCRS personnel have worked with several agencies, including the 66th MI Brigade, the Second Infantry Division, AFRICOM, Special Operations Command-Africa, ISAF, and the First Cavalry Division. Partnerships have ranged from teaching seminars, to development of human terrain maps, to consulting on cultural and regional issues with divisional staffs.

CULTURE EDUCATION AT USMA: 2007-PRESENT

The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap was a catalyst for change at West Point. In addition to the increase in study abroad opportunities and the development of a research center (CLCRS), West Point started to evolve its curriculum to address the increasing need for more culture education. Most noticeably, foreign language instruction was increased to four semesters for most social science and humanities majors. In addition to this, there has been an effort to link the World History survey course to the language course by placing cadets in history courses that are related to the language they will be studying. For example, cadets who will be studying Arabic will take a world history course that emphasizes the history of Southwest Asia. This was done to build meaningful connections that language instructors can exploit in culture lessons in their classes.

Along with the academic changes, military training also evolved to include expanded cultural lessons. This is especially evident in the Cadet Leadership Development Training (CLDT) which targets rising seniors ("firsties"). In two of the three training scenarios, the combat outpost and the urban operations exercises, culture is not just a backdrop but an integral part of the training program. For example, in the combat outpost exercise, cadets interact and negotiate, in a foreign language, with role players, from a different culture, in an effort to obtain intelligence on a hostile group in the area.

The Cultural Perspective Goal Team, the chief assessor of cultural education at USMA, became a very active group as a result of the changes in cultural education at the Academy. One of the biggest issues with which the goal team struggled was figuring out a method of integrating cultural education and training across the core experience for cadets. The core experience includes the common military training for cadets in addition to the core academic courses that are

required for all cadets. In order to determine how best to integrate across the curriculum, the goal team reassessed its goal standards using the Defense Regional and Cultural Capabilities Assessment Working Group (RCCA WG) (McDonald, et al., 2008) culture standards created under the sponsorship of the Defense Language Office and the Undersecretary of Defense for Plans. This exercise was called the core experience mapping project as it looked at both academic education and military education and training. The exercise was conducted in two iterations. Initially, the goal team assessed whether or not a core experience simply had content that met each of the RCCA WG standards. As expected, every standard was met, but some standards were covered more in some courses than in others. This uneven coverage was not seen as a concern for the goal team as some of the standards were more relevant to the educational objectives of the Academy than other standards.

In the next phase, the quality of instruction was assessed using Bloom's taxonomy. Instructors were asked to provide evidence in the form of course exercises, or graded events that showed activities that supported the RCCA WG standards. These activities were then assessed on both the cognitive and affective domain of Bloom's taxonomy. As expected, most of the activities focused on the lower levels on both domains in Bloom's taxonomy. This was not considered a concern since West Point is a foundation institution that focuses exclusively on undergraduate instruction. As a result, USMA needs to focus on foundation skills that will allow officers to

successfully progress through their education and training throughout their career.

Coming off the core experience mapping project, based on the RCCA working group standards, the Cultural Perspective Goal Team concluded that a greater integration of culture across the curriculum was important to the growth of culture education at the Academy. This need for integration layers with the evolution of the Cadet Leader Development system into the West Point Leader Development system, which looks beyond cadet development into the development of all personnel at USMA. Part of this evolution was a focus on integrating across educational and developmental domains in terms of cultural education and training. One of the flagship initiatives that crossed domains is the inclusion of cross-cultural competence education in the capstone military development course, focusing on officership (MX400). The course will include two lessons focusing on cross-cultural competence theory and several practical, in-class exercises that work to infuse cross-cultural competence and culturally-based scenarios into the military development program at the Academy.

Along with the move toward greater integration has been an evolution of the cultural standards at West Point (see table below). New standards have been proposed to the Academy leadership that bring terminology in line with DoD and academic standards. The new standards focus on knowledge of one's own culture, knowledge of others' cultures in



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context, empathy, self-confidence, verbal and nonverbal communication, and transferability of cultural knowledge. This puts USMA in line with DoD and academic literature focusing on cross-cultural competence.

The changing nature of global politics has required a new type of leader, one who is a flexible thinker that can adapt to and succeed in various regions and can see how cultural identity can influence actions and reactions. This has involved a major shift toward infusing current course work and military training, showing the importance of cultural context to various aspects of education and training. This process of infusing general cultural knowledge into the curriculum produces leaders who are not experts in any one region but have the skills to succeed in varied regions and are capable of obtaining necessary information, no matter where their careers take them. Such an approach of implementing general cultural knowledge into the education and training activities is also consistent in the academic literature, where cross-cultural competence is not seen as a stand-alone field of study, but as a skill that enhances one's work in various disciplines, from business through engineering. The changes to the core curriculum, the summer military training, and the extension of the study abroad program have all been enacted with the goal in mind of creating a new leader. The experiences the cadets gain at

West Point provide the foundation for becoming flexible, adaptable leaders who can successfully operate in various regions around the world in increasingly complex situations.

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IDT: Cross Cultural Competence Rubric

Graduates use knowledge of their own and others' cultures to understand and confidently engage in cross cultural experiences.

	Below Expectation (dualistic thinking) (Denial/Defense)	Meets Expectation (Minimization)	Exceeds Expectation (Acceptance/Adaptation)
Knowledge of one's own culture	cursory knowledge of basic facts about one's own localized culture. Shows minimal awareness of one's own cultural rules and biases.	Utilizes and synthesizes knowledge of one's own culture from predominately one perspective. Identifies own cultural rules and biases.	Able to synthesize various perspectives pertaining to one's own culture. Recognizes new perspectives about one's own cultural rules and biases.
Knowledge of others' cultures in context	cursory knowledge of basic facts about another culture. Demonstrates surface understanding of the complexity of elements important to members of another culture in relation to its history, values, politics, communication styles, economy, or beliefs and practices.	Recognizes similarities among different cultures, predominately through the lens of one's own culture, in relation to the history, values, politics, communication styles, economy, geography, literature, or beliefs and practices. Begins to understand and evaluate how cultural knowledge from another culture influences their self identity and basic worldview.	Recognizes the contextual meaning of human behavior in relation to its history, values, politics, communication styles, economy, geography, literature, or beliefs and practices. Effectively evaluates knowledge from other cultures in order to create a more developed self identity and worldview.
Empathy	Views the experiences of others but does so through one's own cultural worldview.	Identifies components of other cultural perspectives but responds in all situations with own worldview. Looks for simplistic, broad universals that fail to address differences between cultures in explaining experiences of other cultures.	Recognizes intellectual and emotional dimensions of more than one worldview and sometimes uses more than one worldview in interactions. Understands and leverages cultural differences in order to understand experiences of other cultures. Can shift perspective and evaluate how other cultures view an issue. Utilize diversity as tool to benefit overall effectiveness of their organization
Self-Confidence	Recognizes the experience of others but does so through one's own cultural worldview. Demonstrates little to no desire to engage in cross culture experiences. Shows little demonstrable reflection on any engagements.	Engages in cross cultural experiences hesitantly. If prompted, shows a willingness to reflect on the experience, articulating the strengths and challenges within specific experiences to increase one's effectiveness in different contexts.	Actively seeks out and engages in cross cultural opportunities. Continuously reflects on cross cultural experiences, evaluating changes in one's own learning over time and developing improved methods of engagement.
Interaction (verbal and nonverbal)	Possesses minimal level of understanding of cultural differences in verbal and nonverbal communication; is unable to negotiate a shared understanding. Has minimal foreign language skills. Does not understand the importance of utilizing host country language skills in a cross cultural encounter. Uses inappropriate nonverbal cues. Assumes superiority of their language and nonverbal cues in communication.	Identifies some cultural differences in verbal and nonverbal communication and is aware that misunderstandings can occur based on those differences but is still unable to negotiate a shared understanding. Basic level of achievement in foreign language. Understands the importance of "polite" language skills in communication. Begins to use nonverbal cues in communication.	Recognizes and participates in cultural differences in verbal and nonverbal communication and begins to negotiate a shared understanding based on those differences. Has a high level of achievement in a foreign language. Develops an effective learning strategy to learn additional languages. Can use appropriate nonverbal cues in order to communicate.
Transfer Cultural Competence	Uses, in a basic way, skills, abilities, theories, or methodologies gained in one situation in a new context or situation. Demonstrates minimal synthesis of cultural knowledge and cross cultural competence.	Uses skills, abilities, theories, or methodologies gained in one cultural context to contribute to an understanding of problems or issues in other contexts. When prompted, can connect examples, facts, or theories from more than one cultural context or perspective.	Adapts and applies skills, abilities, theories, or methodologies gained in one cultural context to solve problems or explore issues in other contexts. Independently connects examples, facts, or theories from more than one cultural context or perspective.

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Mexico's Challenges:

Why Colombia's Solution to the Drug War Won't Work in Mexico

by Meghan Harrison

Much attention has been paid of late to the deteriorating security situation in Mexico as beheadings, kidnappings, and countless other atrocities are making headlines around the world. Numerous scholars, journalists, and pundits are drawing parallels between Mexico's increasing rural lawlessness and former President Felipe Calderón's fight against drug cartels, and that which former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe faced in 2002. While both leaders had to confront serious drug-related violence, corruption, and challenges to the authority of the state, however, the situation in Mexico remains markedly different from that of Colombia in the early 2000s, and Uribe's solution is not feasible as a template for success in Mexico. Calderón's strategy for security, institutional reform, and socioeconomic recovery shared many of the same concepts and approaches as Uribe's "Democratic Security" strategy. Nevertheless, those who argue what largely worked for Colombia should subsequently work for Mexico fail to take into account fundamental differences between the two states—the culture and history of the people, whose support is the critical factor underpinning both of these strategies, as well as the federal structure of the state and the nature of its relationship with the United States.

The threat in Colombia was undeniably greater. Uribe simultaneously faced not only violent drug cartels, but also an aggressive and experienced Marxist guerrilla army larger than any in Mexico's history, as well as several well-armed paramilitary groups. Taking advantage of a weak central government, vast ungoverned territories, large societal imbalances, and rampant corruption, these groups threatened the national security and governance of Colombia—engaging in increasingly violent attacks on one another, Colombian officials, and ordinary citizens throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. This fighting displaced approximately two million people and cut off some parts of the country from the capital,¹ compounding Colombia's problems. With a population of less than 40 million² and an estimated GDP of approximately \$94 billion³ circa 2000, in a state one-ninth the size of the U.S., Colombia had far fewer resources and less infrastructure than Mexico as well. These overwhelming odds, however, helped to unify the people in support of Uribe's efforts to build state

institutions, infrastructure, and a larger and more capable national security apparatus. Bogota's long-standing ties and positive relationship with the U.S. were also critical, as U.S. moral, financial, and technical support was key to Colombia's successful transformation from a state on the brink of collapse to one of significantly increased prosperity and security.

Previous Colombian administrations attempted to address these problems through the conduct of limited counterinsurgency campaigns and disastrous attempts to negotiate peace.⁴ The administrations of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) did make some important changes—including the improvement and expansion of military and police aviation, intelligence, increased professional training, as well as the creation of several joint task forces to combat drug trafficking and to purge scores of corrupt officers within the military and police⁵ who had ties to drug cartels and paramilitary groups.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, while these changes helped to set the stage for Uribe's later success, they were insufficient alone to achieve widespread or lasting security gains and the repeated failures left the Colombian people weary of the fighting and desperate for a new solution. It was the failure of this peace process, combined with the increasing capability of the military and the increasing frustration of the population, that led Colombians to elect Álvaro Uribe with an unprecedented 53 percent of the vote in a first-round election, a first under the 1991 Constitution.⁸

Uribe understood that a comprehensive strategy rooted in basic security was necessary to reverse the downward spiral the country had been locked in for decades. His goal was "to establish the rule of law across Colombia by strengthening security and government institutions and to develop stronger relations between the government and the people."⁹ In order to accomplish these tasks, Uribe passed a special security tax on Colombia's wealthiest citizens which allowed him to increase the military budget substantially without significantly increasing the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) he allocated to security.¹⁰ Uribe also leveraged diplomatic avenues established by his predecessors to gain closer cooperation with and additional support from the United States. With sufficient additional

resources, Uribe swelled the ranks of both the military and the police, increasing their capabilities through sheer numbers as well as through the acquisition of additional critical equipment and training.¹¹

President Uribe listened to the comments and concerns of the public and personally followed up to ensure his commanders had fulfilled the promises he made. This unprecedented step garnered a great deal of public trust...

Uribe knew that force alone was insufficient if he intended to make sustainable gains in security. Unlike previous administrations whose overemphasis on security led to abuses of power that ultimately delegitimized the government, he understood the need to gain the support of the Colombian people for his plan. He launched a massive country-wide campaign, hosting assemblies three days a week in different locations around the country to meet with local authorities and the public to explain his security plan.¹² President Uribe listened to the comments and concerns of the public and personally followed up to ensure his commanders had fulfilled the promises he made. This unprecedented step garnered a great deal of public trust, which paid dividends in the form of an unparalleled personal information network that helped Uribe maximize the efficiency of his forces as he promptly replaced commanders who failed to perform.¹³

Leveraging Colombia's improved and expanded law enforcement resources, Uribe reestablished police presence in all of Colombia's 1,102 municipalities, reoccupying and fortifying previously abandoned police stations from which they conducted counternarcotics operations and guarded against guerrilla attacks.¹⁴ Drug eradication and interdiction operations—which were overseen by the police—proved highly successful in reducing both drug trafficking and guerrilla financing in these areas,¹⁵ and provided economic gains to the local populations they employed. But Uribe recognized that lasting security and stability required an investment in considerable long-term reforms of the legal system—which at that time was one of the most corrupt, least transparent, and least efficient anywhere with one of the highest kidnapping and murder rates in the world and woefully small prosecution percentages.¹⁶

Uribe oversaw significant legal reforms including the transition from an inquisitive system to an accusatory justice system, designed to increase the efficiency, efficacy, transparency, and accountability of the legal system and reduce corruption and impunity under the law.¹⁷ U.S.

agencies provided training, equipment, and other assistance to support the new system and the increased professionalism and capability resulted in a considerable spike in prosecutions, increase in transparency,¹⁸ and improvement in the rule of law.^{19 20}

The drastic security improvements resulted in significant increases in foreign and domestic investment, and Colombian authorities used these economic gains to continue to invest in security as well as social programs, which helped to reinforce security, stability, and prosperity. "In 2002, for each peso spent on security, 3.1 pesos were invested in social programs. By 2010, this had risen to 3.7 pesos...decreasing the number of Colombians living below the poverty line from 54 to 46 percent."²¹

As these economic and security gains undermined the paramilitaries' justification for continued violence, President Uribe was able to initiate a large-scale demobilization program to demilitarize illegal fighters and reintegrate them into society.²² This process was not perfect and it left behind a portion of the fighters to continue drug trafficking full-time but, in sum, more than 31,000 fighters demobilized, significantly reducing the threat and increasing the ability of Colombian authorities to maintain the rule of law.²³

As Ian Grillo points out in *El Narco*, however, "Colombia is Colombia; Mexico is Mexico. The nations have different histories and dynamics, and their drug wars play out in different ways."²⁴ Colombia suffered through decades of violence as the guerrillas attacked the state, the paramilitaries attacked the guerrillas, and eventually the drug cartels began to co-opt and finance elements of both groups in order to enforce their monopolies. Increasing violence threatened civilians, soldiers, and officials alike. In Mexico, though, "less than ten percent of the deaths have been agents of the state, and violent acts by the cartels and gangs directed at government targets are meant as a signal ...designed to intimidate," according to Paul Kan, Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College.²⁵ In his article "The New Cocaine Cowboys" in *Foreign Affairs*, retired senior DEA and U.S. Customs official Robert Bonner states:

Ninety percent of the homicides have involved members of one drug cartel killing members of another. Some innocent bystanders have been killed, but they represent a small fraction of the total. Violence in Mexico today is nothing like the carnage that plagued Colombia in the late 1980s and 1990s. Most of the drug-related homicides have occurred in just six of Mexico's 31 states. Two decades ago, Colombia was on the verge of failure with a national homicide rate eight times higher than Mexico's current rate.²⁶

Consequently, while the violence in Mexico is frightening, it does not represent the same existential threat to the state and its people as it did in Colombia. It was the severity of that threat, combined with the failure of all other approaches, that led to the unity of public opinion and broad political mandate for Uribe and his security plan. He was able to rally the people of Colombia around the threat, explaining that the country was facing a “do-or-die scenario: either fight back, or become a narco-state,”²⁷ garnering support from both poor peasants and elites.

Mexico’s history and culture are different than Colombia’s, however, and the drug traffickers in Mexico are not viewed the same way as they (and the guerrillas) were in Colombia.

Mexico’s history and culture are different than Colombia’s, however, and the drug traffickers in Mexico are not viewed the same way as they (and the guerrillas) were in Colombia. In Mexico, the growing “narco-culture” celebrates the revolutionary spirit and history of Mexican peasants that they believe is embodied in the independent style of the drug traffickers, or “narcos.” They praise their contributions to the parts of society that they believe have been largely neglected by the state. Narcos are often viewed as benefactors to whole towns and villages, generating employment and providing money to followers²⁸; they are revered as “rebels who have the balls to beat the system,” referred to on the streets of Sinaloa as *los valientes*—“the brave ones.”²⁹

This cultural affinity for gangsters is present in both urban and rural societies in Mexico, in different forms. InSight, an academic organization devoted to analysis of organized crime in the Americas, notes:

There are two distinct branches of this narco-culture—one that plays off the traditional idea of the rebel outlaw, while the other promotes a more glamorous bling-heavy gangster image. Both present the drug trade as an attractive lifestyle choice and portray traffickers as heroes. Both have co-opted religious symbols and rituals.³⁰

Traffickers are vying against each other and the state “to win the hearts and minds of the population”³¹ as they exercise their influence primarily through music and religion, but also through fashion, architecture, literature, and cinema. “Narco-corridos”—drug ballads—are most comparable to “gangsta rap” in the U.S., though with a distinctly Mexican twist. Over the sound of accordions and modified polka rhythms, lyrics glorify the drug traffickers and tell tales of

bravado and bloodshed, often based on real people and events. Banned on the radio and decried by critics as part of the cause of increasing violence, the vast popularity of these “musical popular newspapers”³² demonstrates just how entrenched narcos are in society.³³ Ian Grillo notes:

The scene around narco-corrido balladeers illustrates the bizarre cross section of people in modern Sinaloa narcocultura. Kids from slums and poor ranches mix with private school graduates. Just as in the U.S., gangster culture has an allure that transcends class boundaries.³⁴

Furthermore, as the violence becomes more and more gruesome on the streets of Mexico, these narco-corridos are evolving to include even darker and more violent sub-genres.³⁵

Catholicism is the dominant religion in Mexico and, although the Roman Catholic Church has denounced the consumption and sale of drugs as capital sins, “narco-religion” and “narco-churches” are increasingly common, mostly due to the generous donations made by drug traffickers to their churches and communities. Sociologist Fernando González described a “subterranean ‘narco-catholic culture’ among the Tijuana clergy [in which] the clergy administered the sacraments to the [drug] bosses and their families and in turn received large donations without asking where they came from.”³⁶ The canon of the Basilica of Guadalupe suggested that more Mexicans should follow the example of kingpins who donated millions of pesos to the church,³⁷ while two other well-known priests took a Sinaloa kingpin on a tour of the Holy Land “in appreciation for [his] generosity to an orphanage in the Sinaloa state capital.”³⁸ Donations from the drug trade are so common they even have a special term—*narco limosnas* or “narco alms.”³⁹

In addition to their donations to religious organizations and activities, the most visible sign of the close relationship between the narcos and Mexican religious culture is the ubiquity of the “narco saint”—Jesús Malverde. Depicted on thousands of amulets and in dozens of shrines around the country—particularly in the poorer rural areas—as a mustachioed bandit, the so-called “narco saint” became a folk hero during the reign of dictator Porfirio Díaz (1877-1911) for allegedly stealing from the rich and giving to the poor.⁴⁰ Though there is some debate as to whether or not the story of Malverde is true, narcos and peasants alike pray to the saint and give thanks for his “miracles” by leaving tokens at his shrines.⁴¹

For some cartels, however, merely co-opting local religious customs is not enough. The La Familia Cartel indoctrinates followers and members into its own version of religion, complete with a bible written by the group’s spiritual leader, which all members are required to read.⁴²

Smaller outgrowths of narco-culture include “narco-fashions” such as bullet-proof cowboy jackets and “narco-architecture,” or ostentatious “narco-style architecture,” in home designs that include Greek-style villas complete with tiger cages. “Narco-cinema”—homemade videos featuring real people telling tales of cocaine deals, shootouts, and the like—are becoming increasingly popular, as are “narco-literature” books describing cartel life, some of which have been made into popular soap operas.⁴³

The gangster life is seen as a way to earn respect in barrios and slums where bloodshed and poverty are the norm.

The gangster life is seen as a way to earn respect in barrios and slums where bloodshed and poverty are the norm. One young girl told researchers, “Here the narcos enjoy respect because they help the people and have a great deal of power. Not even mayors help as much when someone dies or doesn’t have a job.”⁴⁴ A teenage *sicario* similarly noted that “being an assassin gave him the means [to enjoy] the consumer lifestyles of the West and gave him a sense of achievement—a feeling of ‘being somebody’ in a barrio full of nobodies.”⁴⁵

These increasingly prolific cultural phenomena are concrete examples of an arguably larger truth in Mexico today—that, while drugs and violence may be deplorable, violent drug traffickers, on the other hand, are not all bad. Public enemy number one, according to Mexican authorities, “El Chapo” Guzman, is seen more as a hero than a lawbreaker by many. He has created thousands of jobs, albeit illegal ones, and has built sidewalks, lit cemeteries, repaired churches, and paved roads. Deputy Attorney General Jose Santiago claimed that “despite the \$5 million bounty on El Chapo’s head, he remains at large, probably because of complicity by Army and law enforcement personnel.”⁴⁶

Therefore, how can Mexicans decry the violence but not the criminals? Many argue that, unlike the situation in Colombia where the state was largely a victim of the violence, in Mexico the violence is a result of government crackdowns that are disrupting what was previously a more stable business-style approach to illicit activities. They contend that Mexico under the autocratic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was rife with corruption and drug traffic flowed more or less freely, but there was minimal violence, as drug traffickers had an understanding with the politicians.⁴⁷ Many point to the elections of National Action Party (PAN) candidates Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón as the catalysts for the outbreak of violence as they refused to honor the PRI’s previous understandings with the cartels.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, even if his intransigence toward the cartels was not solely to blame for the violence, Calderón lacked the broad support of the public necessary to institute sweeping Uribe-style changes. Elected with only a 0.6 percent lead over opposition candidate Manuel López Obrador,⁴⁹ Calderón had to sneak into the Mexican Congressional chamber through the back door, rapidly get sworn into office while his deputies physically fought off leftists trying to block him from the podium, then quickly exit, flanked by police in riot gear, in order to circumvent any claims that he was not officially and legally sworn in as President.⁵⁰ With such a narrow margin and strong opposition, implementing and sustaining any costly or difficult policy was guaranteed to be a challenge.

The weakness of the Calderón government was also apparent in the ineffectiveness of the Mexican version of the Internal Revenue Service, “whose tax collections following the 2009 recession approach only twelve percent of GDP—on par with that of Haiti.”⁵¹ Without a strong tax base to raise additional money for expensive security initiatives, Calderón was forced to rely on foreign aid, the sums of which were dwarfed by the drug profits fueling the cartels and gangs his security measures were designed to fight. At approximately \$7.5 billion, Plan Colombia provided far more aid to Colombia, both in absolute and especially in relative terms, than the Mérida Initiative has provided for Mexico. Though Mérida has promised more than \$1 billion, once it has been spread out over the prescribed three years, this works out to only \$500 million per year to Mexico, whose existing federal security budget was \$25 billion.⁵² Grillo notes:

A UN drug report estimates about \$30 billion per year goes to the Mexican gangsters...accounting for some 3% of [Mexico’s] GDP. But the money constitutes a much bigger percentage in certain communities and social groups. In the slums of Juarez or the highlands of Sinaloa, the drug trafficking mafia is likely the biggest employer. By falling most heavily in poor sectors, \$30 billion has a particularly potent effect.⁵³

Finally, even with broad public support and sufficient capital to fund the kind of security overhaul Mexico needs, Calderón was still faced with significant challenges in implementation that Uribe was not. As a federal system with 31 states and thousands of municipalities, Mexico is a jurisdictional nightmare compared to Colombia. In Colombia, Uribe’s military and police forces were centrally directed by a single command structure. In Mexico, state police report to the governor; Federal District Judicial Police are controlled by the Federal District Attorney General; and the military—which typically has no mandate for law enforcement, but currently serves as the only force capable of taking on the well-trained and heavily-armed cartels—reports to the

President.⁵⁴ Moreover, that does not account for the numerous smaller law enforcement bodies that exist at the state and local levels.

Most of the funding for the Mérida Initiative has been focused at the federal level, but in Mexico, that means neglecting 90 percent of the nation's police.⁵⁵ Unlike Colombia—which had a need for significant increases in manpower—Mexico has more than enough personnel; its problem is the distribution within the territory and the issue of inadequate accountability in areas with overlapping federal, state, and municipal jurisdictions. In his article, “What We’re Getting Wrong About Mexico,” Paul Kan also notes:

With 366 officers per 100,000 people, Mexico has a better ratio of police to citizens than the U.S., U.K., France, or Italy. The problem lies in their distribution; it is uneven and causing significant gaps in law enforcement capabilities. Only 335 of Mexico's 2,000 municipalities have municipal police. Of these 335 municipalities, 87 utilize 69 percent of the resources and manpower, leaving the remaining municipalities with only 31 percent... effectively abdicating power to the cartels in those areas.⁵⁶

Furthermore, without resources dedicated to the police at all levels, it is impossible to tackle corruption, which is notoriously endemic at the municipal and state levels in Mexico.⁵⁷

Whereas Colombia has had a long tradition of close relations with the U.S., Mexico has had a love-hate relationship with the U.S., where increasing economic ties coexist with political antagonism and mistrust that date back more than a century.

In order to really solve its current problems of violence, corruption, and instability over the long term, Mexico must undertake large-scale and systemic law enforcement and legal reform. While some notable efforts along these lines are underway, they are woefully insufficient in size and scope. Even with stronger public support than Calderón's administration had, Mexican authorities will have to rely on increased foreign assistance to sufficiently improve the capacity and capability of its institutions to tackle the underlying cause of the current problems—insufficient rule of law.

Whereas Colombia has had a long tradition of close relations with the U.S., Mexico has had a love-hate relationship with the U.S., where increasing economic ties coexist with

political antagonism and mistrust that date back more than a century. Some of that may be slowly starting to change, however. Denise Dresser, a political scientist at a Mexico City University, notes:

Both Mexico's ambassador to the US and the general in charge of its defense college declared that the country needed international help to win the drug war. It was unprecedented for a high-level member of the Mexican army to say that. But the situation has gotten so bad that you're starting to see a wearing down of that reflexive, historic anti-Americanism.⁵⁸

However, it will take more than a lessening of diplomatic estrangement. In order to develop the capacity and capability to solve these problems, Mexico will need the kind of assistance that the U.S. provides to important strategic partners and close international friends. As the third-largest supplier of oil⁵⁹ and third-largest trading partner of the U.S.,⁶⁰ with an almost 2,000 mile shared border,⁶¹ it is undeniable that Mexico is of critical strategic importance to the United States.

Until he completed his term in December 2012, President Calderón continued to push for increasing security measures similar to many of those undertaken by Uribe. Nevertheless, though there are significant similarities between the situations in Colombia and Mexico, the critical factors that underpinned Uribe's success—the broad support of the people for his plan, the extensive assistance provided by the U.S., and the structural simplicity of Colombia's security apparatus—do not exist in Mexico today, and without these things Calderón's successor, Enrique Peña Nieto, will continue to struggle.

Notes

¹ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 209.

² <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Americas/Colombia.html> (accessed March 19, 2012).

³ <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=COLOMBIA> (accessed March 19, 2012).

⁴ David E. Spencer, et al., *Colombia's Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2011), xii, 39-43.

⁵ Spencer et al. *Colombia's Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010*, 26.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 45, 74, 86.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Peter DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman, and Phillip McLean, *Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colombia*, viii.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Spencer, et al., *Colombia's Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010*, 65.

¹³ Ibid., 65.
¹⁴ Ibid., 79.
¹⁵ Ibid., 80.
¹⁶ Peter DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman, and Phillip McLean. *Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colombia*, 38-42.
¹⁷ Spencer, et al., *Colombia's Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010*, 80.
¹⁸ Ibid., 90.
¹⁹ Ibid., 90.
²⁰ Peter DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman, and Phillip McLean, *Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colombia*, 49.
²¹ Spencer, et al. *Colombia's Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010*, 66.
²² Ibid., 96.
²³ Ibid., 97.
²⁴ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 209.
²⁵ Paul Kan, "What We're Getting Wrong About Mexico," *Parameters* 41, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 37-48.
²⁶ Robert Bonner, "The New Cocaine Cowboys," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 4 (July/August 2010): 35-47.
²⁷ Elizabeth Dickinson, "Fighting the Last War" *The Washington Monthly* 44, (January/February 2012): 30-37.
²⁸ Fernando Pacheco, "Narcofearance: How Has Narcoterrorism Settled in Mexico?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, (2009): 1021-1048.
²⁹ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 171.
³⁰ <http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/785-narco-culture-and-mexico%E2%80%99s-drug-gangs> (accessed March 19, 2012).
³¹ Ibid.
³² George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2011), 126.
³³ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 170-171.
³⁴ Ibid., 180.
³⁵ Ibid., 179.
³⁶ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* 123.
³⁷ Ibid., 122.
³⁸ Ibid.
³⁹ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 187.
⁴⁰ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* 125.
⁴¹ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 188-190.
⁴² Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 188.
⁴³ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* 64, 126, and Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 172-173.
⁴⁴ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* 151.
⁴⁵ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 160.
⁴⁶ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* 62-63.
⁴⁷ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 78.
⁴⁸ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 91-94.
⁴⁹ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* 268.

⁵⁰ Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 109-110.
⁵¹ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* 270.
⁵² Ian Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, 115.
⁵³ Ibid., 147.
⁵⁴ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* 141.
⁵⁵ Shannon O'Neil, "The Real War in Mexico," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 63.
⁵⁶ Paul Kan, "What We're Getting Wrong About Mexico" *Parameters* 41, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 37-48.
⁵⁷ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* 129.
⁵⁸ Anonymous, "The Americas: Turning to the Gringos for Help; Mexico, the United States, and Drug Gangs," *The Economist*, March 27, 2010.
⁵⁹ <http://www.npr.org/2012/04/11/150444802/where-does-america-get-oil-you-may-be-surprised> (accessed June 25, 2012).
⁶⁰ <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/current/balance.html> (accessed June 25, 2012).
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Getting It Right: Assessing the Intelligence Community's Analytic Performance

by Welton Chang

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

How often does the Intelligence Community “get it right”? This article describes the need to evaluate when, why, and how often analytic products make accurate or inaccurate assessments. It then proposes a specific methodology; the establishment of two organizations—one at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and another at the agency level; and several changes to institutional culture, which jointly serve to address the lack of systematic evaluation of accuracy within the IC.

INTRODUCTION

Again, how often does the United States Intelligence Community (IC) “get it right”? We simply do not know. Why cannot an enterprise with a roughly \$75 billion budget answer this question? Despite reform and oversight efforts since 9/11 and myriad commissions examining intelligence failures, the IC has not developed a way to determine when, how often, and why it makes the right or wrong assessments. As former CIA Assistant Director for Analysis and Production Mark Lowenthal points out: “[I]n the aftermath of 9/11 and Iraqi WMD, and after the promulgation of analytic standards, there still has not been closure on the key question: How good is intelligence supposed to be...?”¹

The IC needs to develop a methodology, process, and organization to evaluate the accuracy of its analytic products. This methodology should be scientifically sound, metrics-based, and both quantitative and qualitative. The accuracy of predictive intelligence products should be evaluated in the near, medium, and long term. Without assessing the Community’s performance, we are essentially stuck in “fire-and-forget mode,” unable to capitalize on lessons learned from each mistaken or correct judgment. While the IC occasionally and unsystematically evaluates analytic *trecraft* using product evaluation boards, the IC should institutionalize the evaluation of analytic *performance*. I recognize that some finished intelligence products do not make predictive assessments and some

long-term predictions may take years to evaluate, but I argue we should evaluate all products that make predictions about the future.

In the private sector, customer feedback is crucial for improving performance and customer opinions are often reflected in the growth or decline of profit. However, intelligence customers are too busy to provide frequent or in-depth feedback, and the feedback we do receive usually only describes whether a product provided new information or useful insight.² We cannot expect policymakers and also warfighters to tell us how often we get it right.³ I argue that the IC will improve its utility to policymaker and warfighter customers by creating and implementing a process to measure the accuracy of its predictive statements.

WHAT IS “GETTING IT RIGHT”?

“Getting it right” requires both predictive accuracy and sound analytic tradecraft. Did we make a predictive assessment that assigned realistic probabilities to outcomes and did we utilize consistent logic to arrive at that assessment? At first glance, evaluating whether or not someone got it right simply entails looking at how closely predictions matched events.⁴ Professor Philip Tetlock, in *Expert Political Judgment*, defines getting it right as “assigning realistic probabilities to possible outcomes.” A combination of this definition and “how close internal understanding of a situation matches the reality of that situation” forms the basis for defining what is “right.”⁵

A PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE UNRESOLVED, POSSIBLY UNANSWERABLE

At its core, getting it right is an epistemological issue: How do we know what we know and how do we know when it is right?⁶ In order to answer these questions, one must consult the philosophical tenets of positivism, exploit modern technology, and consider principles of perception and brain function.⁷ Post-modernist questions of “whose right is right?” and “how can one truly know?” are difficult to answer, and any response is usually

not capable of satisfying the most ardent critics of positivism.⁸ Although post-modernists argue that what is “right” is constructed and a matter of interpretation, science has discovered a measurable universal reality.⁹ Moreover, intelligence failures yield real consequences: planes crashed into the World Trade Towers, the U.S. military did not find WMD in Iraq, parts of the IC failed in their warning responsibility that would have stopped Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab from boarding a Detroit-bound flight, and so on. Post-modernist philosophy cannot stop the next terrorist attack, but sound inferential logic coupled with solid evidence can.

WHY ASSESSING THE IC’S PERFORMANCE IS NECESSARY

Intelligence analysis, when successful, is usually predictive. Intelligence analysis can “assess the significance of new developments,” “provide warning of dangerous situations to policymakers,” and “develop longer-term assessments of major political, military, economic, and technical trends.”¹⁰ Former Deputy Director of the CIA Richard J. Kerr goes on to emphasize that “warning remains the principal rationale for having an intelligence community.”¹¹ Any organization that conducts warning should consistently evaluate the accuracy of its predictive statements.

Although the creation of a process and organization to assess IC performance is not specifically prescribed in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has recognized that “mak[ing] accurate judgments and assessments”¹² is an implied part of “exhibit[ing] proper standards of analytic tradecraft.”¹³ Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 203 also does not lay out a way to conduct an assessment of whether or not accurate judgments were rendered.¹⁴

The development of a methodology and organization for assessing the accuracy of intelligence analysis also strengthens intelligence analysis as a discipline and the intelligence field as a profession. CIA officers Rebecca Fisher and Rob Johnston identified several shortfalls that hold intelligence analysis back from full maturity as a discipline, including falling short of the definition of a “learning organization.”¹⁵ Accuracy ultimately ties into the professionalization of the intelligence career field and its associated production processes, which are making strides toward a soundly scientific methodology.

As tradecraft evolves to mirror the rigorous process of the scientific method, the IC should examine the effectiveness of the techniques it uses to improve analysis. We have come a

long way even since 2005, when Johnston’s ethnographic study of the IC noted that “a formal system for measuring and tracking the validity or reliability of analytic methods” would be elusive so long as analysts relied on idiosyncratic, non-methodological approaches to conduct analysis.¹⁶ With more robust analytic standards in place, it is necessary to begin generating concrete data on whether or not analysis is improving as the IC implements new tradecraft methods. Without data, we cannot determine whether the IC’s focus on analytic tradecraft standards has improved our predictive accuracy.¹⁷

Data on predictive accuracy will enable us to evaluate our performance not only as a community, but as individual analysts. Analysts are not often notified when their assessments are right or wrong. Analysts should remember when and why they got it wrong so they can avoid past errors. Analysts naturally spend their time looking forward, continuing to write assessments on a constantly approaching future, leaving them with little time to look backwards to discover whether or not they were ultimately right on a judgment. IC managers should use the accuracy of an analyst’s judgments as a tool for professional development.¹⁸

There are also cognitive benefits to assessing our accuracy and recognizing errors which led to inaccuracy. Research shows that the main difference between individuals with higher or lower measures of intelligence relates to their ability to understand and learn from mistakes.¹⁹ Although scientists once believed people were born with a specific level of intelligence, we now believe it is possible to actually get smarter by learning from mistakes.²⁰ Extrapolating from this understanding, every evaluation of a discrete predictive statement, whether the statement turns out to be right or wrong, is a learning opportunity. If the statement turns out to be right, it should reinforce the importance of sound analytic tradecraft. If the statement turns out to be wrong, identification of the reasons why it was wrong—unreliability of underlying evidence, incorrect or unidentified key assumptions, and so forth—should lead to lessons learned.²¹

WHAT ARE WE EVALUATING?²²

Evaluating the accuracy of finished intelligence judgment statements should shed light on the overall accuracy of the IC’s predictions. We should evaluate every predictive product created at the strategic level, which by some estimates numbers nearly 50,000 products per year.²³ At a minimum, we should consistently evaluate assessments in flagship IC analytic products such as National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs), Defense Intelligence Digest (DID) articles, State/INR Assessments, and World Intelligence Review (WIRE) articles.²⁴ Although the IC also provides

assessments in numerous other product lines, the flagship products contain the assessments we have determined to be most important for our customers—hence, those are the products we should evaluate.

To fully evaluate the accuracy of flagship products, we should extract all assessment statements from the product. There are often multiple “key judgments” and “assessments”—some buried inside the article, some stated up front, some highlighted at the end—but all are predictions necessitating evaluation.

ESTABLISHING A BASELINE TO GIVE A DOSE OF REALISM

By having a baseline understanding of the IC’s predictive capability, a policymaker will be able to better judge the reliability of the intelligence analysis put in front of him/her. As a result, some intelligence products may be ignored—and rightly so, if the track record shows that the products and the analysts/organization that produced them are more often wrong than right. However, it will engender greater trust in production lines that generally do get it right.²⁵

To create a baseline understanding of IC accuracy, we will need to evaluate the past accuracy of IC production. We will be unable to determine how well we are performing now if we do not have an accurate understanding of how we performed in the past. Determining our accuracy before and after reform efforts will also allow us to measure our rate of improvement, such as starting around 2004 when tradecraft improvements were mandated by national-level investigations. By keeping score of when a prediction is right or wrong, we can ensure that even a strike-out will result in adjustments that help us get a hit the next time up at bat.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: HOW DO WE GET THERE FROM HERE?

The proposals in this article largely follow theories of organizational learning and knowledge management that have been studied in academia and practiced in the business sector. The proposal should be implemented at the ODNI level to maintain focus, consistency, and objectivity. Initially, the recommendations I propose could be executed as a pilot program at a single agency with minimal expenditure of funds and commitment of personnel. A full implementation of the recommendations contained herein could be accomplished with current IC personnel or by contracting out the work to an organization such as RAND or MITRE.

The following recommendations entail evaluation methodology, organizational improvement, institutionalization of lessons learned, improved analytic training, technological solutions, and growing a culture that rewards well-calibrated judgment.²⁶ Johnston recommended a performance improvement model that includes “measuring actual analytic performance to create baseline data, determining ideal analytic performance and standards, comparing actual performance with ideal performance, identifying performance gaps, creating interventions to improve analytic performance, and measuring actual analytic performance to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions.”²⁷ I argue we should operationalize Johnston’s improvement infrastructure combined with Tetlock’s previous work on judging judgment.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTIONS: TOP ACES AND HONEST ABE

Some elements of the IC are already examining whether or not analysts employed solid analytic tradecraft in their finished intelligence. Elements such as DIA’s Product Evaluation Boards and CIA’s Product Evaluation Staff perform reviews of analytic integrity and sound tradecraft.²⁸ However, this is not enough. Organizations tasked with prediction and warning should not exist without an internal mechanism to assess the accuracy of their primary outputs, and the mechanism I propose will remedy this problem.

With the amount of finished intelligence produced by the IC, evaluation for predictive accuracy will be a difficult undertaking. However, more data will yield a more accurate assessment of our predictive ability, especially in making low-probability calls. The approach can be centralized, decentralized, or a combination of the two. I believe that centralization of the process will lead to the most effective solution.²⁹

Author(s)	Years of total IC experience/ years of target experience	Office	Agency	Collaborators	Review Chain	Topic	Structured analytic techniques or alternative analyses	Time Horizon for each Key Judgment	Key Judgment and confidence score	To be filled in by ACE: Was Key Judgment right? (calibration score, discrimination score)

Table 1. Form for evaluating judgments³⁰

In order to conduct centralized analytic evaluations, Analytic Cells for Evaluation (ACEs) should be established at each of the three all-source agencies (DIA, CIA, and State/INR) with each ACE responsible for evaluating the finished intelligence products. Analysts would fill out the above table and personnel in the ACE would compile the data. If the table was not filled out prior to submission due

to time constraints, ACE personnel could go back and fill in the information. Just filling out the form would force the analyst(s) to review whether or not they assigned a realistic probability to the key judgments.

For evaluations to work, predictions need to be falsifiable. Three general components need to be present: (1) a clearly predicted event, (2) a probability of this event occurring, and (3) a time horizon for the predicted event to occur. Most assessments, as they are currently written, do have these components. A statement such as “we judge, with high confidence, that overall violence levels in Iraq will decrease over the next three months” can be proven right or wrong and can be scored.³¹

To further facilitate the measurement of accuracy, ODNI also should develop a common judgment vocabulary to be used by the all-source agencies. Expressions of certainty by CIA, DIA, and State/INR are not currently easily compared, although each organization does have an internal sliding ruler placing estimative words on the scale of uncertainty to certainty. The IC’s estimative language is already nearly ready to be quantified on a numerical scale. For example, DIA’s “What we mean when we say” scale provides seven values for likelihood words between “certainty” and “impossibility.”³²

Assessments should be scored for accuracy in calibration.³³ Calibration is defined as the extent to which predicted probabilities for an event matched the actual rate of occurrence in the real world (i.e., timing). For example, an analyst writes a product on whether or not country X will test a nuclear weapon. The analyst could predict “no” each month until the month of the actual test and then predict “yes” for that month. The analyst’s predictions would be considered perfectly calibrated.³⁴ Calibration can be scored based on the time horizon delineated in the predictive statement.³⁵

ACEs should collect metrics on the analytic performance of their agencies down to the regional and functional office level.

Assessments also should be scored for accuracy in discrimination. Discrimination is assigning realistic probabilities to the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event.³⁶ A highly discriminatory assessment, for example, would be a high-confidence assessment that country X likely possesses a nuclear weapon. When we later learn that country X does have a nuclear weapon, the analyst would be rewarded for making a call and assigning an accurate probability to the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event.

If an analyst consistently hedges, then that analyst would have a low discrimination score.

ACEs would report directly to each agency’s director of analysis. For example, DIA’s ACE would evaluate DID articles and CIA’s ACE would evaluate WIRE articles. If ACEs were created out of hide, they could be staffed on a rotational basis similar to joint duty rotations. ACEs should collect metrics on the analytic performance of their agencies down to the regional and functional office level.

I also propose the establishment of an ODNI Analytic Branch for Evaluations (ABE) to oversee the analytic evaluation process conducted by ACEs. The ODNI ABE should establish standards and a common set of criteria for evaluating products, and should keep metrics on the IC as a whole. Reports should be systematically published on analytic accuracy, trends, and how improvements can be made.




Table 2. Workflow for ACEs and ABE

THE ACE WORKFLOW

The cell should extract judgments that are made in products. These judgments would be databased and categorized by confidence level, expected duration of prediction, whether or not alternative analyses were attempted, whether structured analytic techniques were employed to arrive at judgments, and also data regarding the principal authors and those in the review chain. The database would also include (when possible) whether or not the intelligence was acted upon, the outcome if it was, and any feedback received from customers.

How would this work? DIA’s 10-person ACE receives the day’s DID articles. The ACE analysts are assigned accounts both regionally-based (geography) and functionally-based

(cross-cutting issues like proliferation). The Middle East regional analyst receives two articles to file for evaluation that day—one on events in Iraq that will take place in the next two weeks, and another on events in Syria that are expected to come to fruition within a year. Each is filed by the estimation of when it should be examined for accuracy (time horizon). All of the judgments in the article are extracted if they were not already included in the form in Table 1.³⁷ The analytic tradecraft utilized (such as alternative analyses) can be examined and annotated that day.

A month later, the ACE analyst revisits the Iraq article (this could be an automated notification from the prediction database) and finds that the article's predictions were accurate (both well-calibrated and discriminatory). The evaluation is processed, databased, and passed to the home office. The author's and the office's accuracy ratings increase. The agency ACE compiles all of the assessments as they become available and forwards them to the ODNI ABE for review and further databasing.

With 50,000 pieces of finished intelligence produced each year (of which some is assuredly duplicative),³⁸ there exists plenty of data to study. We must be careful to avoid the problems of endogeneity and selection bias in the prediction datasets in order to ensure that our inferences about judgment accuracy are scientifically sound.³⁹ ACEs must also take into account that some outcomes are easier to predict and other outcomes are more difficult to predict, by grading on a curve. The curve could be based upon comparisons of an analyst's predictive accuracy against the accuracy of other analysts looking at the same account or with similar training/biographic backgrounds.⁴⁰

Reasons for inaccurate predictions are numerous, including analytic bias, politicization of judgment, failure of imagination, lack of adequate time and resources to analyze a complex problem, lack of data, misreading data, and failure to consider all pertinent data.

Additionally, evaluating accuracy would be difficult if an analyst does not make a prediction in the first place. For instance, if a country were to test a nuclear weapon but the analyst never said that they would not, was the analyst wrong? Or what if the analyst simply stated that the country could test at any time? One possible solution would be to have analysts make regular predictions (once a week or once a month) on relevant and high-interest issues to their accounts. These predictions would be aggregated,

traceable, and public. This could stop analysts/organizations from trying to protect their accuracy rates by simply not making difficult predictions.

Judgments should be evaluated based upon whether they were right or wrong, and also why they were right or wrong. That is where the immediate tradecraft evaluation comes in. Reasons for inaccurate predictions are numerous, including analytic bias, politicization of judgment, failure of imagination, lack of adequate time and resources to analyze a complex problem, lack of data, misreading data, and failure to consider all pertinent data. ACEs should examine whether or not structured analytic techniques and alternative analyses were used and whether or not they helped the accuracy of the bottom-line assessment.

USING WHAT WE LEARN FOR TRAINING REGIMENS AND INCENTIVES

It is imperative that the ABE develops lessons learned based on the outcome of ACEs' evaluations of accuracy, and that these lessons are fed back into the analytic courses that all analysts must attend at their respective agencies.⁴¹ Why is this so important? Cognitive biases that affect analysts include reporting bias,⁴² confirmation/expectation bias, anchoring, resistance to change, attribution error bias,⁴³ loss aversion bias,⁴⁴ availability bias, mirror-imaging,⁴⁵ clientism, layering, overconfidence/unjustified certainty, seeking out consistency, being unable to change perceptions despite previously discredited information—and the list goes on.⁴⁶ Despite the fact that “review after review of adjudged intelligence failures has found cognitive bias to have been a—if not the—principal factor,”⁴⁷ we do not have a way to measure how well our current training counteracts the negative effects of cognitive biases. Not only will evaluating products let us know how well we are performing, it will also tell us how well our efforts to improve are progressing. New areas of training curricula and additional areas of emphasis should come out of the ACEs and ABE.

Lastly, an incentive structure should be devised to reward good judgment as it is discovered by the ACEs and the ABE. Whether through monetary or recognition awards, junior analysts and senior leadership alike should be motivated to seek good judgment. We also must be careful not to create disincentives for making strong judgments, and IC leadership will need to make a serious effort to change the typical IC responses to making analytic mistakes. IC leadership should acknowledge that making mistakes is possibly inevitable given our line of work, and that as long as we learn from our mistakes, they are okay. At the end of the day, we should not just reward working hard; we should also reward being right, and use the knowledge we gain about when and why we are right to become right more often.

CHANGING THE CULTURE OF THE COMMUNITY

The adage “what gets measured gets done” is particularly appropriate in the IC. The only routine IC self-measurement is output, and normally only for year-end performance appraisals. If we do not measure getting it right, then we mean to say that it either is not important enough to be measured or that we do not care whether we get it right or not. However, if we start measuring whether or not we get it right, analysts will gravitate toward practices and techniques that get them closer to the right answer because their evaluations depend on it.⁴⁸ This dovetails nicely with the idea of setting up an incentive structure that rewards accuracy. Right now our incentive structure is skewed toward output—those who write the most and the most quickly generally get bigger bonuses, more recognition, and promotions. This current incentive scheme creates a structure that supports the creation of thousands of products a year that are of questionable impact on the safety of America. Since analytic quantity does not usually correspond with analytic quality, more, in this case, is not better.

In order for ACEs and the ABE to be successful, IC culture with regard to self-critical examinations of rightness has to be changed. Cultural shifts or maintenance of the status quo can be top-down driven and often this is the case. What this means is that leadership plays a large role in defining culture, especially in a hierarchical organization like the IC (which still maintains an industrial-era model for production, with papers pushed from one editor to the next like a Ford assembly line). When leadership emphasized innovation and stated that innovation would be valued and rewarded, and those who sought to hold back innovation would be punished, there was more innovation in the IC. Likewise, if leadership wanted to emphasize “getting it right,” it could do so by putting policies in writing that would make “getting it right” important, rewarding those who “got it right” the most, and promoting the best forecasters.

COUNTERARGUMENTS AND REBUTTALS

There are numerous counterarguments to the above proposed solutions. One counterargument is that assessments of rightness are too hard to do. There is too much data to be analyzed, the judgments as currently written are too ambiguous to be analyzed in such a concrete way, events do not always lend themselves to a binary “yes or no” assessment, and the accuracy of some assessments could be ambiguous for years to come. Constructing falsifiable predictions with a common vocabulary can help address these concerns. Moreover, if an issue was important enough to write about in the first place, then it is

worth expending the energy to assess the predictions made about it. While the reasons behind why a call was right or wrong sometimes may be difficult to interpret, the prediction and outcome should not be as ambiguous. Finally, we need to be patient with regard to evaluating the effectiveness of evaluations. It may be that we are able to predict a lot of minor tactical events but always miss the long-term trends, or vice versa. Evaluations are not a fire-and-forget weapon; they need to be monitored and groomed to provide visibility on those long-term and high-impact predictions that are made or not made.

Another counterargument claims that holding analysts and supervisors accountable for analytic judgments will disincentivize making strong calls. I believe that leadership emphasis on making “strong calls” is misguided and leadership should instead focus its efforts on ensuring that analysts make “clear calls.” Strong calls generally lead to greater discrimination in the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event. However, if there simply is not enough data to support a call, a strong call will become a wrong call. Forcing unwarranted strong calls may incentivize analysts to make only patently obvious predictions. By emphasizing accuracy of calibration, analysts will be incentivized to make difficult, non-obvious, low-probability, high-impact estimates.⁴⁹

How do we ensure that we do not succumb to the temptation to make predictions on only the most obvious of calls, or make only ambiguous predictions? I believe that this can happen, but I contend that we can take steps to avoid it. This disincentive will ultimately have to be addressed by leadership and internalized by developing a culture that embraces continual self-improvement. IC leaders need to encourage and promote analysts and supervisors who make predictive calls that go beyond the patently obvious. IC leaders also need to protect analysts when policymakers demand a strong assessment even when the supporting data are too ambiguous to do so.

Lastly, we might find out that it is not possible to be predictive on the issues that really matter. We may find out that we are better off tossing a coin than making a prediction. If this is the outcome, then we need to be honest with ourselves and the policymakers we support on the efficacy of the entire prediction enterprise.⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

It is possible that, after closely examining and evaluating the accuracy of the IC’s warnings, we will not arrive at any significant conclusions about how well we are doing. It is possible that information availability bias will influence the types of predictions and assessments we are able to evaluate in the near and medium terms. It is possible that

only years after a number of predictions are made will we have enough data to evaluate IC performance with a significant degree of confidence.

But that does not mean we should not try. While the IC has been very self-critical, especially following major warning failures, the IC has not institutionalized the process for consistent, comprehensive, and ongoing self-examination of analytic accuracy. To be sure, these extensive reactive responses to IC-wide problems have led to innovations and changes that have improved the intelligence enterprise. We have identified and are addressing issues of stovepiping, lack of coordination and collaboration, politicization of analysis, and reliance on questionable evidence; however, the feedback loop is not complete. We owe it to the policymakers whom we support to be self-critical and innovative. We owe it to ourselves to be honest about actual performance. We owe it to the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who are sent into harm's way based on the intelligence assessments we provide. Finally, we owe it to the rest of the American public not to hold anything back—because their safety is the entire reason for our existence, and their tax dollars pay our salaries and fund our enterprise. Let us not forget these factors when the naysayers tell us that it cannot be done.

Notes

¹ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), p. 149. This problem was also described by Lowenthal in 2005. "At the time of this writing, the intelligence community is still learning its 'lessons.' It would appear that many of them involve managerial and review safeguards and tradecraft. But the intelligence community, unlike its military colleagues, has no institutionalized capability to learn from its mistakes, no system through which it can assess both its successes and its failures. This is not to suggest that intelligence analysis and military operations are the same, but the ability to determine how close one is to the ideal is extremely useful and worth examining as one way to transform intelligence analysis." Mark M. Lowenthal, "Intelligence Analysis: Management and Transformation Issues," in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., *Transforming U.S. Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), p. 234.

² At the strategic level, "the community receives feedback less often than it desires, and it certainly does not receive feedback in any systematic manner, for several reasons. First, few people in the policy community have the time to think about or to convey their reactions. They work from issue to issue, with little time to reflect on what went right or wrong before pushing on to the next issue. Also, few policy makers think feedback is necessary. Even when the intelligence they are receiving is not exactly what they need, they usually do not bother to inform their intelligence producers." Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), p. 64. At the tactical level, the feedback can be nearly instantaneous and authoritative, with battle damage assessments showing whether intelligence enabled air support to destroy the right building or not, or an operator on the ground calling over the radio to tell someone whether or not his/her intelligence

assessment led them to capture the right person. Even at the tactical level, however, there is no systematic process for evaluating either the accuracy of judgments or a database where these judgments are stored. Therefore, while one may have captured the right (targeted) person, this does little good in the long run if the right person was not actually a terrorist/criminal.

³ Feedback from policymakers, both positive and negative, is important (this product was what I wanted and helped me make a decision vice this product is not what I requested and is confusing), but this feedback does not track whether the intelligence assessment reflected reality. Just because a policymaker felt that a product was helpful in making a decision does not mean it was helpful in making the right choice. It could have pushed a policymaker to make or consider the wrong choices.

⁴ Alternatively, Robert Jervis defines intelligence failure as "a mismatch between the estimates and what later information reveals." I believe that this gap is not necessarily an intelligence failure as much as it is just getting it wrong, as an intelligence failure implies a major policy debacle vice the hundreds of judgments made each day by analysts across the IC. Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons From the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 2. Lowenthal differentiates between tactical surprise, which is "not of sufficient magnitude and importance to threaten national existence," and strategic surprise, although he notes that "repetitive tactical surprise"... "suggests some significant intelligence problems." Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), p. 3.

⁵ Philip E. Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 7, 16. It is important to note that Tetlock's research showed that many purported experts were no better at predicting outcomes than dart-throwing monkeys. Expertise did not necessarily translate to predictive ability and fame actually decreased predictive ability. These conclusions should trouble any aspiring career intelligence analyst looking to become a better analyst simply by working an account for a long time.

⁶ James Bruce outlined five ways of knowing, through authority, habit of thought, rationalism, empiricism, and science. Science is based upon the premise that we can use the facts we know to learn about the facts we do not know. This proposal also believes it necessary to take into account what has been defined by Dan Ariely as "predictable irrationality," ways in which human beings behave irrationally in a predictive way and also advocates for better IC education on understanding the underlying motivations and behaviors of adversaries to prevent what Robert Jervis calls the Rashomon effect. Richards Heuer, in his seminal work *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, recommends in the final pages of the publication that analysts essentially utilize the scientific method to improve the quality of their analysis. James B. Bruce, "Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence," Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), pp. 172-178. Richards J. Heuer, Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence), pp. 173-178. Dan Ariely, *Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions* (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2009), p. xxx. Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons From the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 177. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 46.

⁷ Webster's defines positivism as a theory that theology and metaphysics are earlier imperfect modes of knowledge and that positive knowledge is based on natural phenomena and their properties and relations as verified by the empirical science.

⁸ A logical endpoint of the post-modern idea that everything is constructed and that there is no agreed upon reality can be nihilism.

⁹ For an argument on how to quantify the unquantifiable, see Philip E. Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 10-24. While most social scientists agree that constructivist theories contribute important perspectives to international relations, constructivists themselves have not even established a common definition for constructivism. I believe self-critical examinations of one's assumptions and experiences, along with examinations of one's evidence informed by constructivist thought, are valuable. For a summary treatment of post-modernist and constructivist critiques in international relations theory, see Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 7-22, 259-263.

¹⁰ Richard J. Kerr, "The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950-2000," in Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), p. 36.

¹¹ Kerr, "The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950-2000," p. 51.

¹² "Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards," Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 21 June 2007, p. 4.

¹³ U.S. Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Section 1019(a), 2004.

¹⁴ While it is important to use structured analytic techniques and alternative analyses when appropriate, the feedback loop is not complete until an evaluation is made as to whether or not any of these techniques actually led to the correct judgment.

¹⁵ Fisher and Johnston utilized Peter Senge's definition of a learning organization. Senge defined learning organizations as "environments in which people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together." Rebecca Fisher and Rob Johnston, "Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?" in Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), p. 65.

¹⁶ Rob Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study* (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 18.

¹⁷ It is possible that we may find that some structured analytic techniques we teach as part of the tradecraft toolkit do not yield accurate analysis. We may not actually have a good grasp on what "solid tradecraft" is due to a lack of self-evaluation. If an analyst's "unorthodox" tradecraft produces consistently better accuracy than traditional methods, then it suggests traditional methods are flawed.

¹⁸ Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study*, p. 108.

¹⁹ Jonah Lehrer, *How We Decide* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), p. 45.

²⁰ See David Shenk, *The Genius in All of Us: Why Everything You've Been Told About Genetics, Talent, and IQ Is Wrong* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2010). See also Kruger, J.M., & Dunning, D., "Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one's own

incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77, 1999, pp. 1121-1134.

²¹ We now have a better understanding of how a person learns by studying brain chemistry (specifically dopamine receptivity). One of the most important ways learning occurs is by making mistakes and learning from those mistakes. Journalist Jonah Lehrer's discussion of this revolved around the differences between Deep Blue, the highly calculating IBM computer that ultimately defeated reigning champion Garry Kasparov in chess via brute force tactics, and TD-Gammon, a computer program designed to learn from its mistakes when playing backgammon. TD-Gammon ultimately rose to the skill level of Bill Robertie, one of the world's champion backgammon players, doing so without having to resort to developing supercomputer-like processing capability. TD-Gammon's superior performance came from its ability to learn from mistakes like a human being, vice brute force tactics that are impossible for a human being to replicate. Evaluation of analytic products will be able to reinforce good practices and discourage poor ones, with analytic improvements becoming driven by the self-sustaining and non-bureaucratic granular process of dopamine response. Jonah Lehrer, *How We Decide* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), p. 41. See also Andrew Smith, Ming Li, Sue Becker, and Shitij Kapur, "Dopamine, prediction error and associative learning: A model-based account," *Network: Computation in Neural Systems* (Taylor and Francis Group, March 2006, 17), pp. 61-84.

²² While I attempt to specifically address shortcomings in evaluating finished intelligence, I also recognize there are shortcomings in the way the IC approaches evaluating raw single-source intelligence reporting. Some single-source agencies such as NSA and NGA also make assessments based on single-source reporting. I argue that, while these assessments give all-source analysts some context with which to look at the reporting, many of these assessments turn out to be wrong because single-source agencies simply do not have all of the available information on an event. Currently, reporting evaluation does not address the ultimate rightness or wrongness of a source's information. Grading of reporting is assigned based upon factors including corroboration through reporting from other sources within or outside that discipline, if the report met the threshold of being high value because of the number of times it was viewed by analysts, if the report was cited in a finished intelligence product, or if the report provided new insight to policymakers. While some of this information may be important second-order indicators of the value of a specific report, none of them ultimately addresses the rightness or wrongness of the information contained therein. While I recognize that there are issues with the objectivity and "rightness" of the reporting building blocks that we use to make assessments in analytic finished intelligence, it is not within the scope of this article to address these issues.

²³ Dana Priest and William Arkin, "A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control," *The Washington Post*, July 19, 2010.

²⁴ This article also will not address whether the "what" of the intelligence products in question is appropriate. As outlined in "Fixing Intel," the "getting it right" concept proposed by Michael Flynn, Paul Batchelor, and Matthew Pottinger refers more to ensuring that the right information is being collected, analyzed, and produced, but not whether that information itself is true. What the proposed evaluation solutions will do is bolster and reinforce the fixes proposed by "Fixing Intel" by ensuring that analysts are making accurate key judgments which should ultimately answer the right questions posed by policymakers. Michael Flynn, Paul Batchelor, and Matthew Pottinger, "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint For Making Intelligence Relevant

in Afghanistan,” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010). Another issue that must be pointed out is the idea that of corroborated intelligence, in most cases a report from one discipline that is correlated with another report from another collection discipline. While most analysts would argue that corroboration is a strong indicator of rightness, this author wonders how often corroborated intelligence turned out to be correct.

²⁵ The field of weather forecasting provides a useful example of what the IC calls competing product lines. Many weather organizations possess their own predictive models which generate different scenarios for the weather. Knowing which organizations get it right more often than others helps people know which organizations to trust more. A company called Forecast Watch “calculates the accuracy, skill, and quality of weather forecasts. [It] collect[s] over 40,000 forecasts each day from Accuweather, the National Weather Service, MyForecast, Weather.com, and others for over 800 U.S. cities and 20 Canadian cities and compare[s] them with what actually happened.” ForecastAdvisor, “Frequently Asked Questions,” <http://www.forecastadvisor.com/docs/about/>, accessed July 24, 2010. By doing so, Forecast Watch can produce accuracy rates by organization and geographic area. This is not to say that baselining the IC’s predictive abilities will be easy. Data inputs for weather forecasting are highly accurate, obtained via a network of automated sensors, and processed by powerful computers utilizing complex weather algorithms. Indeed, weather forecasting differs from intelligence production in many ways; the weather is not actively attempting to deny and deceive weather forecasters, for instance. However, the IC can improve its ability to integrate lessons learned taking a page from the weather playbook; weather algorithms are tweaked based upon the performance of their models against what actually happened.

²⁶ Much of what follows builds on the work of Philip Tetlock and Rob Johnston. The author is greatly indebted to Professor Tetlock and Dr. Johnston as their work provided much of the background and insight necessary to develop a possible solution to a difficult problem.

²⁷ Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study*, p. 108.

²⁸ ODN’s National Intelligence Analysis and Production Board also performs some oversight and standardization functions related to analytic integrity and tradecraft.

²⁹ Alternatively, decentralizing the process could also work. For this to work all products should be posted to the Library of National Intelligence (LNI). From a software technology standpoint, each product page should include a comments and rating section where any analysts, especially those that work the target set, can comment on the soundness of the tradecraft utilized in creating the product and whether or not the product was ultimately borne out by events. An option should be included, even after an analytic product is evaluated, for others to dispute the assessment. A scraping tool could then be built to automatically aggregate the judgments that were evaluated or highlighted by users and also whether or not they were rated as being correct by users. The product metadata should also contain detailed and relevant author data, to include years of analytic intelligence experience and also the review chain for the product. Through this data, specified feedback can be given to not only the analyst(s) who wrote the product but also the analyst’s supervisory chain (usually a number of individuals). Leadership should closely monitor these evaluations for rigor and to prevent the problem referred to as “trolling,” where analysts feel empowered to write unfounded controversial comments for self-entertainment because they are behind a computer screen and not addressing the issue in person. However, it is the view of the author that, given time constraints and other

primary responsibilities, it is not possible to expect all products to be evaluated in this manner.

³⁰ Tetlock utilized a confidence scale of 0-1.0 at 0.1 increments and quantified his research subjects’ predictions using this scale. This was difficult for Tetlock but will be easier for the IC as we already have a rough scale and could refine the scale based on developing and implementing a common judgment vocabulary. Once a common vocabulary is established for judgments, key judgments with qualifiers such as “impossible” or “with certainty” can be quantified utilizing such a scale. Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* p. 45.

³¹ Designing a well-thought-out scoring method is difficult but not impossible. For an example of how weather forecasters are scored, see Glenn W. Brier, “Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability,” in James Caskey, ed., *Monthly Weather Review*, January 1950, Vol. 78, Issue 1.

³² Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* p. 45.

³³ Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* pp. 47-49.

³⁴ Calibration could also be scored in the aggregate for offices, agencies, and the entire IC. Calibration is the extent to which one’s predicted probabilities for each event match the actual rate of its occurrence in the real world. Therefore, if one says something has a 75% chance of happening, those predictions should “come true” 75% of the time. That would be perfect calibration. Any higher or lower actual rate of occurrence of one’s 75% predictions would be an error. Consequently, if one makes 100 predictions at 75% confidence, and 60 events occur, one would be off by 15%.

³⁵ This type of evaluation punishes the alarmist “Chicken Littles” who roam the IC crying wolf and only get away with this type of behavior because no one has kept score of the times when they were wrong.

³⁶ Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* pp. 51-54.

³⁷ IC leadership has pushed for all analytic products to make “strong calls” (judgments) even when data are ambiguous and incomplete. Keeping track of “calls” would discourage unfounded “calls” based on ambiguous and incomplete data. Analysts should strive to make “clear calls,” especially when justified by solid analysis of existing data, employing good tradecraft and contextual knowledge.

³⁸ Dana Priest and William Arkin, “A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control,” *The Washington Post*, July 19, 2010.

³⁹ King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, 139; 191.

⁴⁰ Tetlock identifies five challenges to developing a correspondence theory of truth to identify good judgment: challenging whether the playing fields are level, challenging whether forecasters’ “hits” have been purchased at a steep price in “false alarms,” challenging the equal weighting of hits and false alarms, challenges of scoring subjective probability forecasts, and challenging reality. Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* pp. 10-11.

Furthermore, Tetlock differentiates between easy predictions such as elections in a stable democracy versus difficult predictions.

⁴¹ A lesson is not truly “learned” until an organization institutionalizes its teachings.

⁴² Intelligence collectors can more easily collect against known gaps; thus, the information that is available to analysts makes it difficult to discover the gaps categorized as “unknown unknowns.”

⁴³ Central Intelligence Agency, Kent Center for Analytic Tradecraft, "A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis," Vol. 2, No. 2, June 2005, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Jonah Lehrer, *How We Decide* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), p. 77.

⁴⁵ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), p. 121.

⁴⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, Kent Center for Analytic Tradecraft, "A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis," Vol. 2, No. 2, June 2005, p. 2.

⁴⁷ Douglas MacEachin, "Analysis and Estimates," in *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*, Sims and Gerber, eds. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), p. 129.

⁴⁸ Psychological research indicates that satisfaction of intrinsic (internalized) motivations is a powerful incentive, sometimes as powerful or more so than extrinsic motivations such as monetary gain. I believe that the self-selection and vetting process for IC analysts has created a highly motivated population. Work conditions (such as last generation IT infrastructure) and the current set-up of extrinsic motivations, however, do not easily allow IC analysts to work to satisfy intrinsic motivations. See Clay Shirky, *Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2010).

⁴⁹ If analysts only make obvious calls (e.g., Canada will not invade the U.S. next week), then all of their predictions should have high probabilities assigned to them. If they make difficult calls, presumably they will assign lower probabilities and will not be penalized as these events rarely happen.

⁵⁰ Leonard Mlodinow, *The Drunkard's Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2008), pp. 192-195. See also Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2007).

Intelligence analysis could be improved by developing in analysts a better understanding of how randomness affects outcomes. Errors in judging the probability of an outcome arise when analysts assume a situation is more random than it actually is or believe that the situation/players involved have more control over the outcome than in reality. Mlodinow, *The Drunkard's Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives*, 11, 195.

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A Shift in Leadership Praxis: A Creative and Innovative Leadership Journey of Transformation in a Military Intelligence Context

by Donald Patterson, Jr.

There have been countless articles, studies, assessments, speeches, and projects targeted toward understanding and developing what is recognized as leadership. Traits have been identified. Characteristics have been defined. Styles have been recognized. The perception of a leader has transcended through time. Yet, after looking at the voluminous data available, collected, and analyzed regarding numerous aspects associated with leadership, it still remains an enigma of human capacity. The thoughts put forth here are not only to challenge the current perceptions of leadership and what a leader is but to bring forth an awareness that perhaps the time has come to reshape and redefine our perceptions of leadership and those who lead. This article focuses on leadership as it is understood, framed contextually in the disciplines of military intelligence, and suggestive of alternatives to leadership in such a creative pursuit. Evolution is not stagnant so why impose those same stoic concepts upon the evolution of leadership?

LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP

A leader exhibits generally accepted and distinctive human behavioral traits and characteristics commonly associated with an established cognizance of leadership praxis. Rosch and Kusel (2010) noted that leadership is one of the most observed, yet least understood, phenomena on earth; its ambiguity is perpetuated when leaders are identified without concrete evidence of what earns them the title of "leader." With this in mind, is the notion of leadership in its purest form a reality? What is the variety of factors affecting a leader and those subsequent abilities associated with leadership? Can alternative methods of leadership effectively coexist with or within the structure of conventional methods of military-associated leadership? Of the many recognized "leaders" who have been anointed by men, women, and children, do they unquestionably possess some sort of idiosyncratic adeptness that is devoid in others?

In studying leaders and the art of leadership, perhaps the time is ripe for the prodigious obligation to appraise leadership through a different frame of reference. Vanourek and Vanourek (2009) noted that we must reframe our

thinking, focusing not on the leader but on leadership as a group dynamic among empowered and engaged collaborators, together creating a culture of high performance with integrity, guided in their actions by the organization's shared values. How can alternative methods of leadership be applied in the intelligence disciplines of the military environment?

Robertson (2010) suggested that leaders' reality of their professional practice is constructed by societal and political influences, and external assistance can provide the chance to gain critical perspectives and reconstruct their view of their roles. As maintained by Henrikson (2006), there is a time and place for top-down management with a single decision-maker. That usually becomes necessary only during a crisis or when time is of the essence as the majority of decisions that confront leaders in real life allow time for the collaboration, teamwork, and consultation which lead not only to a better, more informed decision but also to buy-in from staff that will eventually be needed for subsequent implementation. Therefore, perhaps it is not so much that we look at leadership and the leader, but at the successful results of an organization.

Despite the established preconceptions of leadership, success is a matter of results that for all intents and purposes cannot be accomplished alone. Henrikson (2006) asserted that leadership is a performing art; we enact our own and the values of the organization in every decision we make and every step we take toward the future we envision. Historical evidence of the art of leadership is acknowledged as described by Platts (1994) through the teachings of Lao Tzu some 2,600 years ago:

Superior leaders are those whose existence
is merely known;
The next best are loved and honoured;
The next are respected;
And the next are ridiculed.
Those who lack belief
Will not in turn be believed.
But when the command comes from afar
And the work is done, the goal achieved,
The people say, "We did it naturally."

Therefore, the art of leadership is a balance, a balance of environment, a balance of personal attributes, a balance of organization, and a balance of goal accomplishment. Hackman and Wageman (2007) noted that this balance requires the ability to distinguish, conceptually and empirically, those circumstances in which leaders' actions are highly consequential for system performance from those in which leaders' behaviors and decisions make essentially no difference. In a study by Thornton (2011), it was evidenced that having ideas, proposals, and a vision is one thing; however, being able to describe everything in a way that is clear, inspiring, and compelling is something else and a big challenge for organizational leaders to create a message that is so clear and compelling that all employees, from the machine operator to the C-level executive, understand and see the value of the idea or vision. As Gregerman (2007) found, breakthroughs occur when we leave our comfortable confines and engage the world around us with our senses turned on full blast with a real spirit of curiosity and a readiness to notice and question everything.

LEADING CREATIVITY

Being creative involves an imaginative intelligence in the generation of ideas, but it also involves more, in particular, knowledge; a desire to think in novel ways with personality attributes such as tolerance of ambiguity, propensity to sensible risk taking, and willingness to surmount obstacles; intrinsic, task-focused motivation; and an environment that supports creativity (Sternberg, 2008). The military intelligence disciplines require leadership that can provide an opportunity for such a creative culture to exist. As found in the work of Sternberg (2008), creativity is important for leadership because it is the component whereby one generates the ideas that others will follow. The intelligence analysis discipline and, more importantly, the leaders of intelligence analysts should possess a creative nature themselves in order to properly develop such a working environment. Gregerman (2007) found that we can only do things differently if we see things differently. This premise is in stark contrast to the often rigid and static leadership model that is resident within the military community. A study by Paul, et al. (2011) suggested that stovepipes of the intelligence specialty tribes are nothing short of legendary. This legacy of legendary leadership exhorts the obligation to challenge established leadership models in the bid to achieve success, effect positive change, and create a culture committed to vision. Gregerman (2007) found that our real task is to find the right ideas and make them ours in ways that truly matter to those we serve.

The necessity for a new paradigm in quantifiable leadership practice is clearly evident through corporate failures, government inefficiencies, global economics crises, and armed conflicts. An article by Weese (2005) prescribed that

in this new environment, and despite an overlap in functions, leadership is differentiated from management and the qualities and characteristics that make for a great leader are not necessarily possessed by those who are considered excellent managers. The major difference is that leaders are prepared to lead organizations through changes in the organizational structure, strategy, and culture. However, our leader and leadership delusions persist, contributing to a plenitude of false perceptions, unattainable designs, and misled opportunities of recognition. Through practice and indoctrination, organizations fall victim to traditionalist schools of thought. Weese (2005) identified three common misunderstandings and misconceptions associated with leadership: (1) the tendency to stereotype leaders in that we believe we know what a leader looks and sounds like; (2) the misconception that leadership is monolithic in that we still give credence to the "white knight" theory of leadership where a savior suddenly appears and is granted total power and authority to lead us to the promised land; and, perhaps the most dominant reason for a continued lack of effective leadership, (3) the belief that leaders are born and not made.

Leadership within this environment is universal with respect to specific intelligence disciplines, as all the respective intelligence disciplines require a unique application of the art of leadership.

With a comprehension of the art and concept of leadership, we can now turn our attention to its practical application within the creative and innovative environment of the intelligence analyst. Leadership within this environment is universal with respect to specific intelligence disciplines, as all the respective intelligence disciplines require a unique application of the art of leadership. As Heuer (1999) found, some of CIA's best analysts developed their skills as a consequence of experiencing analytical failure early in their careers; hence, failure motivated them to be more self-conscious about how they do analysis and to sharpen their thinking process. The intelligence analysis process is not about a mechanistic, systematic, aligned set of repetitive values. The only skills we really need are an understanding of what is important to our customers, an open mind, and a sense of curiosity (Gregerman, 2007). Moreover, that sense of curiosity reflects upon the questions and the application of creative and innovative methods to successfully answer these questions regardless of whether they are simple or complicated. In addition, as mentioned previously, failure is a learning opportunity. Boehlke (2008) suggested that, indeed, previous research had established that leaders must re-frame novel, unfamiliar, and even threatening stimuli so that innovation can happen.

Leadership among intelligence analysts, scientists, and the like is dependent upon the establishment of relationship and culture. As explained by Sapienza (2005), effective leaders of scientists and analysts create an atmosphere in which professional growth and scientific innovation seem to occur naturally, getting the best out of each person and ensuring that each person feels a part of what is happening and wants to do a good job. Gregerman (2007) found that breakthroughs occur when we leave our comfortable confines and engage the world around us with our senses turned on full blast, with a real spirit of curiosity and a readiness to notice and question everything. Scientific and analytical disciplines are naturally ingrained in an inquisitive atmosphere, and it is critical that leaders of such a labor force fully accept and understand the intricacies associated with these respective disciplines. Sapienza (2005) asserted that leaders should possess the ability and capability to generate a fun and productive atmosphere in which each person can thrive in his/her own individual way, support a stimulating environment, encourage ingenuity, and be able to appreciate innovative, novel, and divergent ideas.

...analysts must absorb information with the thoroughness of historians, organize it with the skill of librarians, and disseminate it with the zeal of journalists.

Leaders are obligated and responsible to provide the necessary environment for success. All too often as Heuer (1999) found, training of intelligence analysts generally means instruction in organizational procedures, methodological techniques, or substantive topics with very little emphasis on the mental act of thinking or analyzing. Sapienza (2005) maintained that the best way to teach the individual who wants to manage science is to teach him about non-science, the psychology of people and their needs. Effective leadership is a critical responsibility among analysts, scientists, and other technical professionals. Gregerman (2007) professed that our real task is to find the right ideas and make them ours in ways that truly matter to those we serve, highlighting that the only skills we really need are an understanding of what is important to our customers, an open mind, and a sense of curiosity. This responsibility is intensified with these professionals engaging in the intelligence disciplines by virtue of the nature of their work and its immediate and long-lasting implications to national strategies.

DISCUSSION

According to Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor (2010), analysts must absorb information with the thoroughness of historians, organize it with the skill of librarians, and disseminate it with the zeal of journalists. It should be noted that while these characteristics hold truth in their own right, this list is not all-inclusive. We must not forget that the intelligence disciplines are scientifically based and therefore the analyst must also possess the inquisitiveness of a scientist. The responsibility placed upon leaders and the practical application of leadership demand guidance, culture, and ability. Heuer (1999) suggested that leaders of intelligence analysts create an organizational environment in which analytical excellence flourishes by establishing and enhancing initiatives that fall into four general categories: research, training, exposure to alternative mindsets, and guiding analytical products.

Intelligence analysts (creators) and scientists (innovators) can ill afford to be mired in a complacent and systematic method of constrained operations, comforting an existing state of affairs intent on supplying answers rather than rationalizing analysis and findings. Technological evolutions have ensured that there is no shortage of raw data for analysis. The dynamics of global societies and cultures ensure that there is no shortage in the necessity for information discovery methods. Heuer (1999) maintained that a creative analytical product shows a flair for devising imaginative or innovative—but also accurate and effective—ways of fulfilling any of the major requirements of analysis: gathering information, analyzing information, documenting evidence, and/or presenting conclusions. Tapping unusual sources of data, asking new questions, applying unusual analytic methods, and developing new types of products or new ways of fitting analysis to the needs of consumers are all examples of creative activity. Zhou (2003) asserted that compounding the inherent challenge of being creative is the fact that many organizational initiatives aim to influence or control employees to work in predetermined ways to meet specific objectives.

Leaders in today's analytically complex intelligence environment, replete with a phenomenal amount of raw data, are challenged to accept unconventional methods of analysis, creative methods of intelligence production, and innovative tactics to derive intelligent and informed decisions. Robertson (2010) maintained that leaders' perceptions have to change before we will see changes in leadership practice. We have failed to understand adequately the need to cultivate creativeness and innovation among our intelligence disciplines. Lucas (2009) asserted that, not only have we not done a good job of educating present and future military personnel about the challenges of irregular and unconventional war, we have

resisted doing so. This failure among military personnel has transcended professional disciplines to include that of the intelligence communities.

It is a well-known perception that the military can be one of the most difficult of government organizations to effect change in policy and procedures.

To work creatively in pursuit of new discoveries requires courage as well as the discipline to stand apart, to be different (Boehlke, 2008). In a contemporary study of intelligence, Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor (2010) argued that this problem or its consequences exists at every level of the U.S. intelligence hierarchy, and pivotal information is not making it to those who need it. Intelligence leaders operate in a legacy environment relying on knowledge that is already known vice instilling a culture that seeks to solve the true mystery. Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor (2010) found that it is a culture strangely oblivious to how little its analytical products, as they now exist, actually influence commanders. What will be necessary are opportunities within leadership practice that support widely distributed leadership focused on the improvement of teaching and learning. Leaders can then experience distributed leadership practice in their own development, and have opportunities to observe and participate in informal and formal leadership (Robertson, 2010).

It is a well-known perception that the military can be one of the most difficult of government organizations to effect change in policy and procedures. The current work environment is mired in its comfort zone with stiff resistance to any thought of changing from the norm, despite the detrimental effects on the organization itself. The intent of this article is to design an effective methodology that will allow for the encouragement of creative and innovative answers to complex leadership challenges that require a culture of transformative processes. While the need for other avenues is apparent, the goal of this exercise is to produce the evidence necessary to encourage a methodology that creates an atmosphere seeking change rather than the perpetuation of wallowing in comfort. In a study by Robertson (2010), learning leadership through professional partnership creates opportunities for boundary-breaking experiences across contexts, roles, and cultures that challenge leaders to rethink their ways of being and knowing in the construction of new knowledge.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Seeking new thoughts, new experiences, and new colleagues will cultivate creation.

Alternatives to seeking new ideas are not representative of existing thinking and are therefore a high-risk adventure. However, true intelligence analysis is a high-risk endeavor in and of itself. New ideas command concepts such as constructive thinking, creative thinking, design thinking, and perceptual thinking. Leading-edge activities encourage innovation, uniqueness, and the ability to solve the most complex problem. This environment must exist to cultivate analytical expertise. It is the environment of innovative thinking that is an obligation of leadership to foster.

- To encourage creativity and risk taking is a skillful developmental process.

Creativity encourages an ability to cope with ambiguities and the capability to value uniqueness. Risk is a matter of authenticity and resilience. The role of an intelligence analyst is to translate creativity and risk masterfully into a manageable and coherent framework. The leaders of such organizations must ensure such an ability exists by creating the necessary culture that incites creativity and harnesses the opportunity in risk.

- The need for relevant time and space is essential.

Intelligence analysis is a unique blend of known facts and pure discovery, a foundation for the quality of thinking and the resultant quality of decision. To precipitate such quality effectively, a leader of intelligence analysts must bestow encouragement, provide information, embrace diversity, and remain attentive. These characteristics can only thrive in an environment of proper time and space to allow for such quality in both analysis and decisions.

- Failure is an opportunity for development, progression, and maturity.

In the realm of intelligence analysis, failure is an unfortunate but inevitable reality of varying degrees. However, as an analyst, failure is a strategic opportunity to learn from the experience and provide for future success. It is a building block from which positive learning can occur. This is the purview of the analytical leader, the ability to transform failure into a positive event and to create an environment that learns vice chastises.

- Accept a foundational framework as a basis for new exploration.

The foundational conscript of intelligence analysis is the human involved in the process of analysis. It will be the nurturing, growth, maturity, and experience of the analyst that will foster new ideas, new methods, and new means of solving problems. In light of this appreciation, a leader must focus on cooperation in order to support the greatest good for all. The leader must remember the framework in which to conquer the occasional chaos and disorder that can work as means to see new possibilities. After all, short-term pain can result in long-term gain through a shared vision.

- Leadership in the background can serve as an effective method in analytical development.

Intelligence analysts are inquisitive by nature, adept at problem solving, and possess an above-average acumen. The leaders of such talent are obligated not only to create an environment that pushes the proverbial envelope but also to steer clear once objectives are clarified and the analysts are as prepared and informed as possible. This is not to say that leaders do not lead; they allow and create opportunities for others to take charge, take responsibility, and get to work. This type of leadership, consistent with a creative and innovative culture replete with problem-solving capabilities, allows for execution, personal and professional growth, and the development of future leaders.

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Formal Modeling of Heterogeneous Social Networks for Human Terrain Analytics

by Dr. J. Wesley Regian

ABSTRACT

In this informal article I lay out some initial ideas on how the Intelligence Community might collaboratively begin to develop a disciplined methodology for modeling heterogeneous social networks to support analysts in reasoning about complex problems of human terrain. I briefly describe why it is hard to reason about human terrain, in order to link the dimensions of complexity to possible modeling solutions. I describe a partial framework for modeling and reasoning about human terrain that focuses on the members, motivations, and methods of nefarious networks. Acknowledging the need for generality in the framework, I describe how it could apply to two very different human terrain test cases—Islamic fundamentalist networks and Mexican drug cartels.

INTRODUCTION

Intelligence analysis is largely a problem of figuring out what are the agendas and goals of nefarious human networks, by what methods and tactics they may pursue their agenda, what materiel they require or have available that will suffice to pursue their agenda, who are the members of the networks, and what are the roles and capabilities of these members. The better we know these facts about human networks, the better we can track, manipulate, interdict, and defeat the operations of nefarious networks. In the domain of intelligence analysis, human terrain modeling is a big part of the problem and we need to approach it in a principled way.

It is almost always networks of people that seek to carry out operations serious enough to come under the scrutiny of our intelligence apparatus. Fortunately, and especially in the cyber-space age, human networks leave evidential tracks when they form, recruit, train, plan, communicate, conduct, and then boast about their operations. We use the tracks to find them, stop them, or bring them to justice. A good analyst can infer a great deal from very scant evidence—by knowing a lot about the motivations and intentions of the human networks involved. The modeling approach I will describe is based very closely on how some of the better

analysts with whom I have worked conceptually organize their understanding of human networks generally and about specific networks under their scrutiny. I believe critical knowledge about human network intentions and behavior can be formally modeled, in general as well as specifically, so as to generate actionable inferences, intelligent decision support, and analyst training for human terrain analytics. I present these ideas as a first step, and look forward to comments, extensions, and criticism from the Intelligence Community.

SOME DEFINITIONS

In this section I establish boundaries for the domain of analytic problems under consideration here, and provide definitions for terms that may be unfamiliar to some readers. Individuals who are knowledgeable in the fields mentioned will find the definitions simplistic. They are intended to be simple, but accurate, enough to allow non-specialists to follow the discussion.

Heterogeneous Social Networks

I define heterogeneous social networks to include human networks of any size, interconnected by any means. This definition includes, but is not limited to, the governments of nation-states; military, intelligence, and law enforcement establishments of nation-states; Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) such as Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and Mexican drug cartels; and localized agencies, organizations, terrorist cells, or criminal groups. Many human networks of intelligence interest are not single networks at all, but are actually networks of networks. TCOs, for example, present particularly difficult challenges for law enforcement, military organizations, and state security forces. TCOs are distributed organizations, not centrally managed, but rather loosely organized and interconnected networks of networks with agendas and methods that vary widely.

Formal Systems and Explicit Knowledge Representation

The terms “formal” and “explicit” have special meaning in the fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Knowledge

Representation (KR). In this paper I am using the terms as follows: A formal or explicit KR model is one that is fully specified such that entities, relationships, and reasoning logic can be combined to enable machine inferences and generate logical hypotheses that can be evaluated by users for their truth value. Formal KR systems are based on assertions that can be reasoned over by machine logic to generate new assertions. It is important to note that neither the base assertions nor the machine-generated assertions require certainty. Both the base assertions and machine-proposed assertions can be probabilistically specified. One of the stark realities about intelligence analysis is that almost nothing is ever known with certainty. Thus, any formal system for intelligence analysis support must be able to represent and reason across assertions with varying levels of provenance and certainty.

Ontologies are More Than Data Models

One way to formalize knowledge for machine reasoning is to represent conceptually domain knowledge in an ontology as an entity-relationship abstraction hierarchy that reflects human-like domain knowledge organization, thus supporting human-like reasoning. The critical distinction between an ontology and a database schema is that, in an ontology, the relationships between entities are formally specified. Thus, one can write algorithms that operate over entities and relations to generate new and logically valid assertions about instances. For example, if we gather intelligence that “Bill is Ted’s brother” and “Frank is Bill’s father,” we can reason that “Frank may be Ted’s father.” Currently, the kind of KR schemes I am discussing here are often implemented as ontologies.

HUMAN TERRAIN ANALYTICS IS HARD

For the past few years I have been working to understand and enhance the skills and methods of analysts dealing with nefarious human networks including TCOs, Islamic fundamentalist networks (IFNs), and Middle Eastern insurgent/terrorist groups. The job of analysts dealing with nefarious human networks is hard because the data they must rely on to accomplish their task are massive, disparate, unreliable, and dynamic. Members of TCOs, for example, are inevitably members of many other human networks as well, some of which are covert and nefarious, some of which are public and ostensibly not nefarious. Effective modeling and reasoning about TCOs is most informed with simultaneous knowledge about all these network memberships, and the agendas of all these networks. Modeling and reasoning about this complex terrain of interacting, overlapping, cooperating, competing, shifting, and evolving networks and organizations are computationally complex and beyond the capabilities of most humans, even if they could master all of the input data.

However, modeling and reasoning about such complex systems of systems are not difficult for computers, given access to the right data, modeling approach, and reasoning algorithms.

SOFTWARE SUPPORT FOR HUMAN TERRAIN ANALYTICS

Current generation human terrain analysis software tools provide data search, storage, retrieval, and visualization capabilities to help analysts reason about human networks and network activity, share information with other analysts, and combine information from different analysts or analyses. Some analysis software tools are beginning to support more formal representation of the information stored in them (using ontologies for example), but most analysts do not have the requisite skill set nor the time required for useful data modeling. Moreover, even if an analyst has the skills and takes the time to model human terrain, current software tools do not provide sufficient machine-reasoning capabilities to capitalize fully on machine-understandable human terrain models.

We need a general modeling and reasoning approach to human terrain that analysts can apply to specific human terrain problems. A system is needed that will be able to explicitly represent and support simultaneous reasoning about any kind of human network—including military, paramilitary, political, social, tribal, familial, business, financial, and religious organizations—any kind of human network an analyst stumbles upon would need to be specifiable. In real-world human terrain, any single individual is certain to be a member of many networks, and no group of individuals is likely to share membership in all the same networks. Given what we know about networks and how analysts reason about them, human networks will need to be formally modeled not just as social networks with members but as organizations with discoverable agendas, goals, plans, and operations. Persons of interest will need to be formally modeled as having discoverable roles in various networks, and bringing diverse goals, knowledge, skills, and resources to the different roles in the various networks.

AN EXAMPLE PROBLEM SET: MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS

Many of the human terrain problems with which we are currently dealing in south Texas involve the Mexican drug cartels. TCOs operating out of Mexico are often referred to as “drug cartels” because their main source of revenue is drug trafficking. Their illicit activities, however, are not at all limited to drug trafficking, but instead are very diverse and include money laundering,

gun-running, carjacking, highway robbery, debt collection, protection rackets, assassination, murder for hire, extortion, kidnapping, and ransom. The activities of the cartels often pose a mortal danger to innocent civilians due to (1) public gun battles among cartels in competition for territory, smuggling routes, and access to weapons or precursor materiel for drug manufacture, (2) public battles between cartels and government law enforcement and/or military personnel, or (3) indiscriminate bombings and other deliberate acts to terrorize the public.

Many of the human terrain problems with which we are currently dealing in south Texas involve the Mexican drug cartels.

TCOs operating in Mexico, especially those operating in northern Mexico (near the southern U.S. border), pose an immediate and growing threat to the U.S. and its citizens. U.S. citizens have fallen victim to TCO activity including homicide, gun battles, kidnapping, carjacking, and highway robbery. Increasingly, some of these crimes are being committed not just against U.S. citizens but on U.S. soil. Moreover, a large percentage of Mexican TCO drug sales and money-laundering activities occur in U.S. territory. Preventing, solving, and prosecuting these crimes is often made more difficult due to corruption and sometimes actual participation in the crimes by Mexican government personnel including law enforcement, political, or military entities.

Effective reasoning about the full spectrum of Mexican TCO activities should capitalize on an enormous range of information types and sources, information not likely to be collected and analyzed by any single agency but rather by many different agencies and organizations, even across multiple nations (population databases, medical records, and criminal records from DEA, ICE, FBI, County Sheriffs, the Mexican National Public Security System, to name a few). Drawing from all of these sources of data is only partly a technical big data problem (big data problems are solvable). Ontologies are a proven method for bringing together diverse types and sources of information for reasoning. The more wide-ranging and relevant the data we can access about TCO activities, the better we can make inferences about the data to which we cannot get access. With regard to Mexican TCOs, we often encounter a special case of the data access problem. We are denied access to data, or even provided with fallacious data by Mexican agencies seeking to hide their own or their associates' involvement in the TCO activities. Here again, the more relevant and accurate data we can access about TCO activities, the better we can make inferences about the data to which we cannot get access and

the incomplete/incorrect data with which we are provided. It is a matter of reasoning under uncertainty. Over large information sets, the greater the ratio of correct information to false or missing information, the more valid will be our inferences.

WHAT CAN WE HELP ANALYSTS REASON ABOUT?

To make the goals of human terrain analysis more concrete, let us list some specific examples of what we would like to know. In order to understand the full spectrum of activities undertaken by drug cartels, we need to know as much as is knowable about a broad and diverse set of networks that cooperate or compete to accomplish widely variant agendas and goals. Following is a partial list of the kinds of information analysts provide to help law enforcement agencies reduce narco-violence and deny success to dangerous drug cartels by combining information relating to the full array of cartel activities and reasoning across the combined knowledge base. Analysts seek to better understand the flow of control, materiel, and money underlying the success of the cartels and thus reason more effectively about when, where, and how law enforcement agencies may interdict to deny success and reduce violence. The following list demonstrates the broad range of analysis goals, but is not intended to be complete:

- What is the leadership hierarchy for specific cartels and how do they communicate with subordinates?
- What raw materials and precursors are required to produce the drugs? What are the sources for these? How and by what routes are they smuggled to the drug producer? How are they converted to end products? How and by what route are they smuggled to distributors?
- How is the revenue collected? How and by what route is the money smuggled back to the cartel? How is the money laundered?
- Where is violence among cartels occurring? Which cartels are involved? What is the reason for the violence (e.g., eliminate rivals, gain market share, access to precursors, etc.)?
- Who is using which weapons? Where are they acquiring and how are they smuggling them?
- Which actors and which cartels are bribing, influencing, and/or infiltrating which law enforcement, customs, military, political, or other controlling entities?
- Who are the actors and what are their methods for manipulation of public opinion, fear, and terror?

- What are the geospatial locations and flow paths for weapons, materiel, product, and money?
- What are the locations and forensic details of cartel-related violent acts? Who are the victims and how are they killed? What is the motive?
- Who are the members of these networks?
- Which cartels and which actors are responsible for specific acts of violent debt collection, protection rackets, assassination, murder for hire, extortion, kidnapping, and ransom?

NEXT GENERATION SOFTWARE SUPPORT

In order to achieve a next generation software support capability for human terrain analytics, we need a conceptual framework for formal modeling of human networks and loosely organized networks of networks. Such a modeling capability would support analysts, soldiers, military planners, government decision-makers, and law enforcement personnel in making sense of Activity-Based Intelligence and developing Human Domain Awareness.

We need machine-understandable models of human networks and their agendas and goals as well as the network members and the methods, tasks, materiel, and skills they use to pursue the network agendas and accomplish their goals. Mexican drug cartel TCOs are good test cases because of the complexities involved. The cartels have specific areas of influence within Mexico, known smuggling routes to and from other countries, and large money-laundering operations in the U.S.—all of which change over time. A large percentage of Mexican TCO drug sales and money-laundering activities occur in U.S. territory and can be tracked. The complex interactions among hostile, neutral, and friendly organizations and networks are crucial to obtaining and maintaining human terrain (HT) situational awareness about the cartels in order to understand, influence, defend against, or attack these networks of networks.

MODELING HUMAN NETWORKS

Individual human networks have a distinct organizational structure with specific network member roles (leader, part supplier, precursor supplier, smuggler, enforcer, improvised explosive device maker, etc.). The actors (network members) include senior members who set agendas or goals, mid-level members who develop goals or methods, and low-level members who develop methods or perform tasks. Often the methods (or tactics) that actors choose are driven opportunistically as well as by the skill sets of members and availability of materiel. Inter- and intra-network rivalries and alliances are important and sometimes shifting;

hence, these shifting rivalries and alliances must be tracked and modeled. In the case of TCOs the shifts are often quite extreme. Two TCOs that were once allied may suddenly become rivals. An armed wing of a TCO may splinter and become a rival TCO. For this reason, provenance of information interacts with the timeliness of the information. As information gets older, reliability of the information is increasingly suspect. We need to support modeling of all these complexities of the HT—in order to drive analysis based on historical, recent, and emerging intelligence about persons and networks of interest to analysts, or more generic analysis or training about HT in a province, state, country, or region. Figure 1 depicts some proposed entities for modeling of HT networks and network membership.




Figure 1: Modeling Human Terrain Networks and Membership.

In real-world human terrain analysis situations we often know the identities and roles of some network members, do not know the identities of other network members, but still know that the roles exist and thus one problem is figuring out the identities of persons who might fill those roles. Unknown members of nefarious networks are sometimes identified by their other-network associations with known nefarious network members. Searching for human relationships across many networks simultaneously would be enabled by this modeling approach. Thus, modeling human relationships with links is pretty straightforward. Therefore, let us turn to the more difficult problem of modeling the distinctions and interrelationships among agenda, goal, method, and tasks (or operations) as referenced in the above entities. Because this is a rather thorny problem, I will begin by describing my understanding of how good analysts conceptualize the problem and then propose how we might approach computer modeling.

Conceptual Modeling of Network Agenda, Goals, Methods, and Tasks

Expert analysts can articulately characterize the agenda, goals, and methods of a network type and how those drive the goals, methods, and tasks of specific networks. These concepts and

instances seem to lie along an abstract-to-concrete dimension that goes from the agenda (overarching objectives) to actual tasks (event sequences) that are planned, in progress, or already have been accomplished in pursuit of the agenda. Thus, properties associated with the concept of Human Network should include the agenda, goals, methods, and tasks. These properties are important, as they represent what the network wants to do, is planning to do, is in the process of doing, or has already done. Analysts know that network members have different roles such as to set the agenda for the network, plan operations, provide funds or materiel for operations, execute parts of operations, and so on.

In the case of Islamic fundamentalist networks, for example, the agenda is ideological in nature; consequently, the overarching objectives of the network are driven by an ideological stance. Thus, the overarching objectives of IFNs are often to implement Sharia Law in an area, eliminate the presence of other religions, or remove foreign military presence from an area. Figure 2 shows how the agenda, goals, and methods of an Islamic fundamentalist network type drives the goals, methods, and tasks of a specific IFN.




Figure 2: Modeling Islamic Fundamentalist Networks.

Other kinds of TCOs, by contrast, may not have an ideological stance at all, but they still have an agenda. The agenda may be to overthrow a government, to seize power, or simply to make money. The goals, methods, and tasks to pursue their agendas vary widely across TCOs, and even change over time within a TCO. For example, the founder of the organization which became known as the Gulf Cartel, Juan Nepomuceno Guerra, began smuggling alcohol across the border into the United States during the Prohibition era. When Prohibition ended in 1933, he created a criminal syndicate (known as el Cartel de Matamoros) and controlled gambling houses, a car theft network, prostitution rings, and illegal smuggling. It was not until the 1970s that his nephew Juan García Ábrego inherited leadership of the organization and started focusing primarily (but not solely) on drug trafficking. Thus, over the life of the organization, the agenda has never deviated from maximizing

revenue, but the methods and specific operations goals have varied greatly. Figure 3 shows how the agenda, goals, and methods of a TCO type drive the goals, methods, and tasks of a specific Mexican drug cartel.



Figure 3: Modeling Mexican Drug Cartels.

Computer Modeling of Network Agenda, Goals, Methods, and Tasks

Here is one idea as to how we could implement computer modeling for this thorny problem. The agenda, goals, methods, and tasks pursued and undertaken by HT entities could be modeled as intentions or actions intended to produce state changes in other entities. In this context, I am not referring to state changes in the political sense but rather to state changes in the physical and social world. We know, for example, that water can exist in at least two states, liquid and solid. That fact may be expressed in IDEF5 (Integration DEFinition 5) notation as shown on the left side of Figure 3. If someone has a goal of causing some volume of water to change states from liquid to solid, he/she may introduce a process to cause such a state transition. This concept may be expressed in IDEF5 notation as shown on the right side of Figure 4.




Figure 4: States of Being and State Transitions in IDEF5.

Thus, a change of state here refers to the act of changing an entity into something different in essential characteristics.

Easily modeled example state changes are (Water à Ice), (Alive à Dead), (Unsatisfied à Satisfied), (Open à Closed). One can model these changes of state and the causes that may bring them about (e.g., reducing temperature below 32 degrees causes water to change state and become ice). For human terrain modeling, the state changes we need to model are those relevant to the agenda, goals, methods, and tasks of an organization. These could be modeled as entity state changes that might have been caused, were caused, are intended to be caused, are in the process of being caused, and so on. Such state changes might include one or more past (intended or unintended), emerging (intended or unintended), or planned (intended) state changes in entities. Figure 5 shows a hypothetical TCO planned state change expressed in IDEF5 notation. In this simple example, we hypothesize that a Gulf Cartel actor, pursuing the goal of eliminating a rival competitor, intends to murder Los Zetas leadership.




Figure 5: TCO State of Being and State Transition in IDEF5.

Table 1 illustrates the kinds of entities and the kinds of state changes we could model with regard to the agenda, goals, methods, and tasks of an Islamic fundamentalist network. The table is illustrative, not complete.

Level of Abstraction	Target Entity	State Change
Agenda	Nation/Region	(Foreign Military Present → Not Present) (Constitutional Law → Sharia Law)
Goals	Government	(Secular Rule → Theocratic Rule) (Authoritarian Rule → Democratic Rule)
Methods	Population	(Orderly → Chaotic) (Complacent → Terrorized)
	Group	(Friendly → Hostile) (Hostile → Friendly)
Tasks	Individual	(Alive → Dead) (At Large → Captured)
		(Unknown Location → Known Location) (Unknown Allegiance → Known Allegiance)

Table 1: Modeling IFN Agenda as Desired State Changes.

TCO agenda, goals, methods, and tasks will be different. Table 2 illustrates some of the kinds of entities and state changes we could model with regard to the agenda, goals, methods, and tasks of TCOs. This table is also illustrative, and not intended to be complete.

Level of Abstraction	Target Entity	State Change
Agenda	Nation/Region	(Revenue → More Revenue) (Territory → More Territory) (Oversight → No Oversight)
Goals	Government	(Police Attention → Police Ignore) (Military Attention → Military Ignore)
Methods	Population	(Orderly → Chaotic) (Complacent → Terrorized)
	Group	(Competitor → Disbanded) (Hostile → Friendly)
Tasks	Individual	(Alive → Dead) (At Large → Captured) (Unknown Location → Known Location) (Competitor Allegiance → Own Allegiance)

Table 2: Modeling TCO Agenda as Desired State Changes.

CONCLUSION

I have laid out initial ideas for a human terrain modeling approach with the goal of explicitly representing the agendas and activities of any human network an analyst may scrutinize. If we, as a community, can evolve a generalized formal modeling approach to human terrain, it will enable software technologies to (1) support analysts working on complex human terrain problems, (2) store acquired knowledge about HT, and (3) train new analysts to work on complex HT problems in general and previously modeled HT networks in specific. Human terrain analytics software systems implementing this type of modeling approach could also ameliorate the problem of institutional knowledge loss due to analyst turnover and might be used as an assessment/selection instrument for candidate analysts. I hope the ideas presented here will stimulate progress toward developing a principled, formal approach to human terrain analytics, and I look forward to discussing complementary and alternative approaches.

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To Win in Afghanistan, Destroy Pakistan's ISI

by Howard Kleinberg

STRATEGIC WARFARE THEORY: KILL THE ENEMY AT ITS ROOTS

Warfare-strategy theory holds that the further up the enemy's chain of command one aims, the greater the effect on the enemy. As noted theorist Sir Arthur Liddell-Hart points out,

In general, the nearer to the force that the (communications) cut is made, the *more immediate* the effect; the nearer to the base, the *greater* the effect.

... Thus. . . more success and more effect is to be expected from cutting his communications as far back as possible.

A further consideration is that, while a stroke close in rear of the enemy force may have more effect on the minds of the enemy troops, a stroke far back tends to have more effect on the mind of the enemy commander.¹

In line with this theory, neither attacking nor negotiating with the Taliban/Haqqani networks will in and of itself achieve a lasting peace or victory in Afghanistan; this is, ultimately, because they are not acting alone, nor are they even the masters of their own destiny. Rather, the true "brains" (and money, etc.) behind the insurgency in Afghanistan is *not* the Taliban or Haqqani themselves; it is the Pakistani military or, more specifically, Pakistan's Inter-Security Intelligence agency, or ISI.² As "the premier intelligence agency of the State of Pakistan,"³ the ISI is the eyes, ears, and nervous system linking the Pakistani military to support and mastermind these insurgent groups. Indeed, the Pakistani military, through the ISI, intends to re-conquer and rule Afghanistan through its Taliban and Haqqani proxies, just as it did in the 1990s, after the Soviets withdrew.⁴

PROOF OF THE ISI'S GUILT

The ISI is helping the Taliban in the latter's quest to reconquer and rule Afghanistan, and has been doing so since at least as far back in time as the defeat of the Soviets and their withdrawal from Afghanistan.⁵ This is because the ISI sees the Taliban as a useful ally to counter India and, in order to influence and control Afghanistan via a powerful and compliant proxy, has used it as such, in the past to terrible effect.

There is plenty of contemporary and recent evidence proving that the ISI is not merely complicit in the war against the U.S. and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan,⁶ but more, i.e., that it is masterminding the war against the U.S. For instance, the ISI is widely held responsible for the "professional hit" assassination of the Taliban's chief peace negotiator in Afghanistan in May 2012.⁷ Furthermore, the "apparent" failure of the Pakistani army border liaison to alert ISAF forces of Pakistani army forces just inside the Pakistani border with Afghanistan makes the Pakistani Army (and with it, the ISI), and *not* the U.S., responsible for the loss of 28 Pakistani Army soldiers, for which NATO has instead been wrongly burdened with the blame.⁸ This incident provided the convenient (for the Pakistani army and ISI) excuse to raise domestic outrage against the U.S., in order to justify ousting U.S. forces and shutting down resupply routes from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2011.⁹

Even within Pakistan, the ISI is commonly suspected of planning and executing the highly sophisticated, covert, military-style operation that assassinated the highly popular Pakistani Prime Ministerial candidate Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.¹⁰ Finally, there is the overwhelming proof of complicity with Al Qaeda and especially Osama bin Laden, who was, of course, found and killed by U.S. commandos while hiding in a villa deep in the heart of the Pakistani military town of Abbottabad in May 2011,¹¹ and the fact that bin Laden had been hiding there for nine years before being discovered and taken out.¹² Why, indeed, did the Pakistani Army and/or ISI keep this vital information from the U.S. and NATO for all the years that bin Laden was so comfortably "hiding" in Abbottabad, unless, of course, they were fully

complicit with Al Qaeda, and against the U.S.? Indeed, the litany of evidence validating the assertion that the ISI has been waging a covert war against the U.S.-led ISAF in Afghanistan and its allies in the region could run on for many pages, but it will be taken for granted from here onward that the point is now obvious.

Complicating the process of sorting out our enemies from our allies in the region, however, the ISI, along with its military taskmasters and the Pakistani government itself, also poses as the U.S.'s ally in the war to secure Afghanistan (as well as within Pakistan itself), a role in which it is also quietly aiding the Taliban and Waziri/Northwest Pakistan Tribes, even as it is seemingly opposing them and supporting U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the "fruits" of the ISI's labors to date include thousands of U.S., ISAF, and Afghan deaths in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) since 2001. Indeed, the classified documents leaked by WikiLeaks provide positive proof of the ISI's duplicity and destructive behavior. Arguably, even worse, the ISI also supports Al Qaeda's long-term goals of continued large-scale attacks against the U.S. itself.¹³ Hence, let there be no mistake about this: even if we are not at war with Pakistan, Pakistan's premier foreign intelligence service, the ISI, *is* at war with us, a war that ultimately directly imperils the U.S. homeland itself, and not just U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

TO WIN IN AFGHANISTAN, DESTROY THE ISI

All of these facts and pertinent theories drive, indeed force, three inescapable conclusions. The first conclusion is that major elements of the ISI, if not the entire organization, are actively organizing and/or executing clandestine combat operations against U.S. and ISAF forces, and the Afghan nation as a whole, and thus essentially are our enemies. The second conclusion is that the ISI represents a "strategic node" of enemy forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, possibly the greatest single node in-theater of the forces opposing us. The third and critical conclusion is that, because it is the insurgency's ultimate command structure, intelligence source, and funding and training resource, but is at the same time doing so entirely clandestinely, the ISI is itself a viable, critical target set, critical in the sense that eradicating the ISI will likely render the entire insurgency all but blind, deaf, and dumb, making it a much easier target to attack, destroy, demoralize, and either eliminate or defeat in making a permanent peace with, and within, Afghanistan. Thus, to achieve a full and permanent victory in Afghanistan, we are going to have to aim further up the enemy's actual chain of command; that is, we are going to have to eliminate the ISI as a threat to U.S., ISAF, and Afghan forces, as well as to Afghanistan itself.

It is important to clarify that this does not by any means imply that we should stop fighting the Taliban or Haqqani; rather, the optimal solution to winning the war in Afghanistan is to identify and target ALL the "rogue" (anti-U.S.) elements, leaders, and cells of the ISI as enemy combatants, adding them to the existing "target sets" encompassing the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Haqqani, and to attack, disrupt, disable, or destroy them all. Indeed, given their strategic significance and importance as a supposedly "friendly" state's premier intelligence agency, the ISI has operated against us with utter impunity and, worse, sometimes with and using U.S. help, for too many years. Questions of targeting methods and notification policy, if any, to the Pakistani government arise, but are secondary, and may pose more of a risk to the success of this strategy than a help.

THE TOO WEAK PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT CANNOT AND WILL NOT HELP

Another problem that amplifies the ISI's ability to formulate and execute foreign warfighting policy is that Pakistan's civilian government is weak, vulnerable to and endangered by its own military and, thus, the ISI. Indeed, "Pakistani leaders don't like to admit that parts of their government are out of control."¹⁴ Further, as noted East Asia expert Stephen Philip Cohen points out, "the state of Pakistan, the largely military-dominated entity that now possesses nuclear weapons, has a hostile relationship with most of its neighbors, and is characterized by weak and uneven economic growth, political chaos, and sectarian violence."¹⁵

BUREAUCRATIC THEORIES ALSO SUPPORT THE ISI-TARGETING MODEL

Similarly, the sub-state level of international relations (IR) theories contends, first, that there is no such thing as a state; second, that multiple bureaucracies form and control the state's decision-making process; and third, that policy is formed by intra- and inter-bureaucratic bargaining processes, and that the results are driven by the nature of each bureaucracy.¹⁶ And while the first contention is almost always an exaggeration per se, in the case of a state with a weak central government, the strongest bureaucracies existing within that weak state are bound to have an excessive, unbridled influence on national domestic and/or foreign policy, depending upon the nature of that bureaucracy. Clearly, both theory and reality are very much in agreement in the case of Pakistan, with its previously cited weak central government, alongside its very strong military and intelligence agency. What all this means is that to truly understand, and deal with, the behavior of Pakistan, we must

treat it as being dominated, i.e., determined and carried out, by the Pakistani army, and the latter's covert operations network, the ISI.

The U.S., the ISAF, and the government and people of Afghanistan are thus at war with a government-within-a-government in its neighboring state of Pakistan, with a bureaucracy that is practicing the "foreign policy" of a clandestine war against its neighbor state of Afghanistan, and against its own most important ally, the United States, and is doing so without the control, approval, or even oversight of that state's own central government. In addition, Pakistan's central government is a weak, vulnerable, fractured one that is either unwilling or, more likely, unable to impose and sustain a strong, central government not dominated by its military (or intelligence services), and therefore we cannot turn to Pakistan's central government to provide any significant help in reining in, much less stopping, the Army/ISI's clandestine war against us. Indeed, destroying the ISI as a powerful, dangerous, clandestine actor within Pakistan would also do a great service to the people and government of Pakistan, doing what the latter most needs but lacks the wherewithal to do for itself: to purge it of its more radical elements; weaken its most radical, dangerous contingents; and thus undermine the radicals' detrimental influence on Pakistani internal decision-making and political stability overall. Eradicating or undermining the ISI could also serve to deter other radical elements (such as the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau, or IB¹⁷) from continuing similarly "unsanctioned" radical "clandestine policymaking," further strengthening the hand of the largely pro-Western civilian government.

More importantly, though, targeting the ISI would "chop off the head" of the forces strengthening the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani, and Al Qaeda insurgencies, robbing them of their guidance, coordination, protection, funding, planning, training, and intelligence sources with which to counter U.S. and ISAF forces and operations, potentially "cutting the puppets' strings" to the point of debilitating them altogether. Destroying the ISI as a key anti-Western combatant organization operating against Afghanistan could prove to be a critical element of U.S. warfighting strategy hitherto missing from practice. This additional "line of approach" in the Afghanistan theater of operations could turn the tide of war around much more heavily and unalterably in our favor, with little or no additional resources committed on our part. Indeed, let there be no more "kissing up" to supposedly friendly intelligence agencies that invariably turn right around, often likely drawing on our own intelligence and funding to attack and kill U.S. and friendly troops and allies. That they kill our troops and allies using Taliban, Haqqani, or Al Qaeda "proxies" does not mitigate the scope of the ISI's responsibility, or betrayal, by one iota. Destroying the ISI would not only defeat an enemy's

"critical node/network" intelligence-cum-terrorist organization in a critical region, it would also send a message to other, similarly weakly-governed allies struggling with their own closet-Islamist impulses and/or out-of-control intelligence organizations.

THE PROPOSED AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ISI

Just as the ISI is a shadowy, clandestine organization, so too must the campaign to attack, disrupt, attrit and, ultimately, eradicate the ISI also be clandestine. This will avoid any further overt attacks on the Pakistani military itself and, thus, any overt acts of war per se against the state of Pakistan itself. After all, if the Pakistani army uses the ISI to carry out clandestinely its profane policies against us with full "plausible deniability," it would be unable to publicly protest its clandestine operations being mysteriously shut down en masse, at least not without having to disclose who its agents were and what they were doing in the midst of their own enemies.

The question then becomes one of methodology: how to strike ISI targets anywhere in Pakistan, and without Pakistani military approval, cooperation, interception, or even detection, preferably without risking our troops in such clandestine efforts. While B-2 stealth bombers could fulfill such missions, B-2s are few in number, expensive to operate and, because they operate from the continental U.S., have very low sortie rates.¹⁸ Alternatively, the Air Force could expand the ongoing UAV air strikes using Predator and Reaper drones.¹⁹ However, these platforms are non-stealthy and highly vulnerable against a sufficiently sophisticated Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) such as that possessed by the Pakistani military.²⁰

The preferred solution is to use tools currently in the U.S. military inventory that are fully capable of high-sortie-rate, extended-range strikes, in full stealth, and capable of delivering precision munitions at extended ranges; these tools are indeed currently available in the form of the Air Force's F-22 Raptors.²¹ A Raptor can currently deliver two 1,000-lb, GPS-guided JDAMs, with future upgrades to add the capability to carry up to eight of the also combat-proven 250-lb Small-Diameter Bombs (SDBs), giving the Raptors the capability to engage up to eight widely-separated targets in a single mission.^{22 23}

The counter-ISI air campaign could initially target only those ISI agents "caught in the act," e.g., passing intelligence to enemy leaders, as well as training, funding, arming, and the like. The target set could then be expanded over time to successively higher levels of ISI field leadership, up to and including the ISI's senior-most leadership. A counter-ISI air campaign would most likely start with strikes against ISI

agents and safehouses in Afghanistan proper, clearly negating any grounds for objections from Pakistan. The campaign could then be expanded to operations over the so-called Tribal Areas of Northwest Pakistan, traditionally de facto safe refuge areas for the Taliban outside of Afghanistan, and thus a logical place to seek additional, and strategically more significant, ISI targets using F-22s. (This would run in addition to, and not replace, the ongoing UAV air campaign against insurgent forces in Northwest Pakistan.)²⁴ Finally, given the effective impunity with which Raptors could operate throughout Pakistani airspace, ISI targets could be destroyed ever further into the interior of the country, even to as far as the “root” of the problem, the ISI’s headquarters in Islamabad itself, if need be.²⁵ Such an otherwise brazen attack could be carried out and then blamed on indigenous Islamist anti-government insurgents, such as has already been attempted in the recent past.²⁶

Also of note about this strategy is that it can be prosecuted both at the present time, while we have extensive forces committed in-theater, and after 2014 or so, when U.S. and ISAF ground forces supposedly will have been withdrawn. In either scenario, surgical counter-ISI strikes could be carried out primarily from the air, as well as using Special Operations forces.²⁷

One potential variant on this theme is a “decapitation” strike by F-22s (or B-2s, for that matter) against the ISI’s leadership. The goal of this variant would be to launch a shorter, quicker, more brief, and hopefully more conclusive airstrike directly against the ISI’s leadership, in the hopes of inducing “strategic paralysis” within the ISI.²⁸ This could work if, and only if, the ISI’s clandestine operations are run very centrally; that is, most or all of the ISI’s strategies and operations are guided and controlled by a relative handful of key senior ISI staff. If so, and if the ISI’s senior leadership proves to be the primary “ringleaders” orchestrating the ISI’s counter-ISAF efforts, then perhaps they, the ISI’s senior leadership, will need to be this new strategy’s first (and hopefully only) targets. However, this “decapitation” strategy has its risks, in that not only might it fail to permanently disable the ISI’s covert anti-Afghan campaign, it might also alert the Pakistani government, if not the entire world, that the ISI is being targeted. Perhaps worse, it would leave intact the ISI’s entire field network, free to continue its ongoing clandestine, anti-Afghan/U.S./ISAF campaign.

CONCLUSIONS

This article proposed that the optimal solution to winning the war in Afghanistan is to identify and target ALL the “rogue” (anti-U.S.) elements, leaders, and cells of the ISI as enemy combatants, in addition to the current “target sets” encompassing the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Haqqani to attack and destroy them all, as enemy combatants per se. Indeed, given their strategic significance and under the guise of a friendly

state’s intelligence agency, the ISI has operated against the U.S. with utter impunity and, worse, using U.S. help, for too many years. The ISI is the true threat and de facto “central command structure” of the insurgency against Afghan, U.S., and NATO forces currently engaged in Afghanistan’s defense, and as such needs to be targeted if the war in Afghanistan is to be truly won in the longer term. This campaign can and should be carried out from the air, with F-22s using extended-range, precision-guided munitions against ISI targets first in Afghanistan, the Northwest Tribal Regions, and then, as needed, in the interior of Pakistan itself. Just as the ISI’s campaign against the ISAF and Afghanistan has been clandestine and deadly, so too should the air campaign to eradicate the ISI as a threat to the ISAF also be clandestine and lethal. This campaign can be carried out at any time, both now, with ISAF ground forces engaged (and this sooner-is-better-than-later option is the preferred one), or after ISAF ground forces leave Afghanistan by 2014. However, if we leave Afghanistan without eradicating the ISI, the latter will merely re-orchestrate a second “Fall of Afghanistan” takeover by the brutally oppressive elements of the Taliban tribes.²⁹ Should questions arise as to whether or not the Pakistani government should be notified, they are moot; the answer is a firm “no,” as the Pakistani government will either oppose the campaign or, worse, leak the information to the ISI.

The ISI is much akin to Islamist Iran’s IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps).³⁰ Indeed, arguably the only practical difference between the two hostile, clandestine agencies is that the IRGC, unlike the ISI, makes no pretense of friendship with the U.S., or of its goals of attacking and destroying the West, and the U.S. in particular. In the longer term, we of the West will ultimately have to treat both hostile, deadly, clandestine intelligence-cum-terrorist organizations with the same “prejudice” as we now treat Al Qaeda, a purely terrorist organization. If we want to win in Afghanistan and “make it stick,” i.e., permanently, we are going to have to eliminate the ISI as a long-term threat to that goal. In sum, then, to win the war in Afghanistan, and to secure a lasting and stable peace there, we must take the battle to our enemy’s true roots, to the enemy’s real ringleaders and kingmakers, the ISI.

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Joseph Goebbels: Propagandist

by Dr. Kenneth J. Campbell

INTRODUCTION

The first objective of this article is to warn intelligence analysts that a person like Joseph Goebbels, a fragile, highly sensitive young man, can assume power and become a ruthless thug. Analysts should never underestimate such a person. The second objective is to caution analysts that, once in authority, this person can become a fanatic, willing to sacrifice his country, his family, and himself in the service of his leader.

GOEBBELS: THE MAN

Early Life

Paul Joseph Goebbels was born in the industrial town of Rheydt on the left bank of the Rhine River on October 29, 1897. His father, Friedrich Goebbels, worked in the local wick factory, W.H. Lennartz, and rose from office boy to foreman. The father was hard-working and thrifty, hoping his sons would move up from the industrial sector of society to the middle class. Joseph's mother, Katarina, was the daughter of a blacksmith and very close to her son Joseph, even when he joined the Nazi Party. Joseph had two older brothers, Hans and Konrad; a sister, Maria, who was twelve years younger than he; and a second sister, Elizabeth, who died when he was 18. Joseph respected his father, but his loss of faith and anger toward the Roman Catholic Church strained their relationship. Joseph attended a parochial school and then entered the *Gymnasium* in Rheydt where he completed the *Abitur*, the university entrance exam, in 1916. When World War I broke out in 1914, Joseph volunteered, but was turned down because of his club foot.¹ He then went to his room, where he refused to eat for several days.

When Joseph went to the University of Bonn in 1917, his income was uncertain, which impelled him to join the Albertus Magnus Society, a Catholic institution, and the Catholic Students Association. The Albertus Magnus Society loaned him "180 marks free of interest for four consecutive semesters,"² and he repaid it 10,000 marks in

1923 during the terrible inflation, considering the debt covered. In 1925 the Society sent him a bill for 516 Reichsmarks, which he rejected until a court forced him to pay this sum.³ At the University of Bonn he majored in literature and philosophy, but as was the custom among German students he moved from one university to another. His final university was that of Heidelberg, where he received his PhD in 1921 at the age of 24, quite an academic achievement for a financially struggling and handicapped student.

Goebbels was small, about 100 pounds, and stood only five feet tall, walking with a limp due to his club foot (or whatever cause), which exposed him to merciless teasing at school.⁴ This could only have embittered him. However, Joseph could be amiable, especially with beautiful women, with whom he had considerable success.

Postwar Germany was a difficult time for any young intellectual to get a balanced view of either society or his own personal conduct.⁵ Joseph believed that the Treaty of Versailles had made Germans slaves for perhaps fifty years, took territory from Germany, and lied in stating that Germany had caused World War I. In January 1923, when Germany fell behind in its delivery of goods, the French-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr occurred. Having had no military or athletic training, it is doubtful that Goebbels took part in the resistance to the French-Belgian intrusion. The opposition in the Ruhr to the government of the Weimar Republic probably contributed to the nationalist uprising of General Erich Ludendorff and Adolf Hitler on November 9, 1923, in Munich, which was quickly subdued, with Hitler being sentenced to prison. This was a period when the Roman Catholic Church was intensely questioned and a time when Joseph had begun to turn away from the Church, though he never removed his membership in it. He begged his father not to curse his prodigal son, indicating some familiarity with Biblical sources. In 1919 Joseph became acquainted with literature of the Left, the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which so deeply impressed him that he became a socialist. Goebbels next spent the winter semester of 1919-20 in Munich, where he was exposed to extreme right-wing sentiment, a rabidly nationalist atmosphere. He earned his

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PhD in 1921, having written his dissertation on a scholar of past romantic literature. In this period there was very little demand for a recent PhD whose dissertation was so remote from Germany's many problems.

Frustration

Joseph Goebbels intended to become a writer. In the 1920s he wrote and rewrote a novel, *Michael*, based on his hope for a national revival, but also about someone who, contrary to the author, had all of his impulses under control. This novel was initially rejected, but was published in 1928, against his wishes, by Nazi officials. In this early period his articles were rejected, a common experience for a recent but inexperienced PhD recipient. He soon had a mass of unfinished plays, and unpublished poems and novels. After these failures he went home, where his father and two brothers looked on him with suspicion, since two years after graduation he had no occupation. Goebbels was embarrassed and felt that his father and brothers were unaware of the difficulties of an intellectual in postwar Germany. They probably considered him to be a failure because at this time he did not have a profession, despite his education. However, he did find a job as a bank clerk from January to September 1923, not exactly an appropriate job for a PhD graduate from a German university. Goebbels contemplated suicide and appointed one of his brothers to settle his affairs after his death. He applied for a permanent position on the *Berliner Tageblatt* in 1924, but was rejected. At this time he read Goethe's *Faust*, the *Bible*, and Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, an influence on his political philosophy, as was the life of Christ, though this latter claim can be questioned.⁶ In 1923 he found an outlet for his desire to write—namely, his diaries, which he continued for the remainder of his life.

A Political Career Opens

In 1924 Goebbels became secretary to Franz von Wiegiershaus, *Reichstag* deputy and leader of a *Gau*, or Nazi district. Wiegiershaus was also one of the leaders who kept the Nazi Party together while Hitler was in prison. Goebbels, the poet, became a member of the Nazi Party in 1924 and contributed to Wiegiershaus' publications, in which his articles displayed the acid tongue for which he was later so well known. Having read some of the literature of the left, Goebbels was attracted to the socialism of Gregor Strasser, and even to communism.

The Nazi Party in northern Germany, which was led by Gregor Stasser and his brother Otto, sought the seizure of the factories of industrialists and the land of the aristocracy in an effort to gain the allegiance of the workers in the industrial areas, such as the Ruhr.

Introduced to Adolf Hitler by Karl Kaufmann in 1925, Goebbels began reading a signed copy of *Mein Kampf*, a book that impressed him. This is odd in view of the fact that he had been educated in a German university, but found Hitler's wandering and hate-filled narrative to be interesting and worthwhile. In 1926 Goebbels began to speak in the Rhineland, where he developed into a good orator and party organizer, quick-witted and able to handle hecklers.⁷ Consequently, he began to attract the attention of leading figures in the northern section of the Party. Goebbels, who had been teased about his handicap in school, in compensation probably saw himself destined for "great things."⁸

The position of the Nazi Party in northern Germany was anathema to Hitler, who needed contributions from industrialists and the aristocracy that supported his antagonism to communism. Hitler and Goebbels also disagreed on foreign policy. Hitler believed that Germany should seek an understanding with Great Britain and Italy—namely, that Germany should have a free hand against the Soviet Union. This would give the Germans *Lebensraum*, the space which Hitler believed they needed for a relatively large population that had been emigrating to the United States and South America. Goebbels' respect for the Soviet Union was at odds with that of Hitler. Goebbels even idealized Nikolai Lenin, one of the founders of Russian communism.

For the most part, the members of the northern sector of the Party did not look to Hitler for leadership, partly because they had not met him when he was in jail. Gregor Strasser and Joseph Goebbels led the challenge to the Party in Munich under Adolf Hitler. On February 14, 1926, Hitler summoned this pair to a meeting in Bamberg, Franconia (northern Bavaria), where he denounced their determination to seize private property and go their own way. Strasser agreed to drop his socialist demands, whereas Goebbels was enamored by Hitler.

Hitler, usually able to spot first-rate talent as well as vulnerabilities, invited Goebbels to be the principal speaker in Munich on April 8, 1926, and afterward they had dinner, an enchanting experience for Goebbels. Later, Hitler invited Goebbels to Berchtesgaden in July 1926, where they spent three weeks together walking and talking in this rural setting, a time which Goebbels shortly afterward wrote in his diary (April 19, 1926): "Adolf Hitler, I love you, because you are great and simple at the same time."⁹ As a cripple, Goebbels needed recognition and love, a feminine trait, which Hitler recognized and exploited.¹⁰ Goebbels loved Hitler "in a homoerotic sense" with these impulses barely below the surface.¹¹ In August Goebbels publicly broke with the Strassers to be part of Hitler's section of the Party. The portion of Goebbels' diary covering August 12, 1925, to

October 1926 helps us understand his character. His language was not of the university, but that of a lover.¹² Goebbels recognized that the Nazis were brutes, but felt the same impulses in himself, something he would express physically if only he was not so handicapped.¹³ Goebbels' devotion to Hitler was unconditional, lasting to the bitter end when he, his wife, and their six children spent their final days and that of the Reich with Hitler in his bunker. As a result of his conversion to Hitler, *der Fuehrer* appointed him in October 1926 as *Gauleiter* (chief) of the tiny Berlin section (*Gau*) of the Party, which was wracked with factionalism and challenged by the predominant Communist and Socialist Parties in Berlin.

Goebbels, the Gangster of Berlin

Goebbels entered this new world in 1926, where he had no one above him except Hitler. The Nazis in Berlin had been the smallest unit in the movement, a group fighting each other, thus rendering themselves ineffective. Goebbels expelled the troublemakers through his use of the SA (*Sturm Abteilung* or Storm Troopers). Goebbels called a meeting for November 5, 1926, which approximately 600 people attended, with most of them agreeing to contribute as much as 10 percent of their generally low income. Goebbels became a notorious agitator and editor of *Der Angriff* (*The Attack*), the first issue of which came out in 1927. Convinced that whoever rules the streets gets support from the masses, by January 1927 Goebbels had provoked brawls with "Red" fighters, using a small fighting force which soon had victorious fights with the communists in the streets as they utilized fists, brass knuckles, and knives. He became known for his strident speeches, confrontations with Nazi opponents, and staging of street fights and beer hall brawls with his "ferocious band of toughs."¹⁴ Most of his men were veterans of the *Frei Korps*, tough veterans of World War I and guerrillas after the war. In various meetings Goebbels poured scorn on the Reds, as well as public figures such as the deputy police chief of Berlin, Bernard Weiss. Goebbels called attention to Weiss' Jewish ancestry by calling him "Isidor," a term of scorn used by anti-Semites. His opponents referred to him as the "chief bandit Joseph Goebbels," a title which he bore as an "honorary" title.¹⁵ Goebbels exhibited the "heavily bandaged victims of street battles on stretchers beside his speaker's platform."¹⁶ The Berlin police found that this tactic increased membership in the Party, as the Nazis created instant martyrs. The communists appeared colorless when compared to such tactics as those of Goebbels. In Berlin Goebbels introduced the greeting "Heil Hitler," which was to become an important part of the Nazi movement.

On May 1, 1927, Goebbels brought Hitler to Berlin to give a speech, the first since Goebbels had become the *Gau* of Berlin. Hitler had been let out of prison on parole and could

not speak publicly until 1927. Both Hitler and Goebbels were first-rate speakers. They rehearsed their speeches prior to a meeting, although Goebbels, in contrast to Hitler, experienced little emotion as he sought to inspire the masses. Nevertheless, he was able to move an audience while speaking.¹⁷ Goebbels could assess the mood of an audience and change his approach accordingly. Goebbels' oratory was strong until the end, in contrast to that of Hitler, who had become a recluse in the latter part of the war and very seldom spoke in public.

Goebbels' violence and baiting of public officials caused an 11-month ban on the Party from May 5, 1927, until March 31, 1928. Goebbels at first refused to accept this order, going to the office of the police chief, where he threw the notice on the floor. This was a period when Goebbels was forbidden to speak in public. He got around the law by setting up a "School for Politics," where he lectured in evening classes often lasting one or two hours. Goebbels, "always thoughtful of the feelings of others," would take groups of the SA to the *Kurfuerstendamm* (Berlin's main avenue) to beat up Jews. In this period he published his weekly paper, *Der Angriff* (*The Attack*), which quickly developed "its own character,"¹⁸ giving him the opportunity to pour ridicule on the Weimar Republic and print cartoons of various politicians. The paper had a circulation of 60,000 by the time the Nazis took over Germany.¹⁹ Young people, impressed by Nazi fighters and Goebbels' vitriolic attacks on authorities, were attracted to the Nazi Party, which operated close to the legal limit and at times crossed over the line.²⁰

The Break with the Strasser Brothers

Gregor and Otto Strasser had once been supporters of Goebbels, despite Goebbels' differences with Gregor in 1926 with respect to Hitler. When their newspaper, the *Berliner Arbeiterzeitung*, published an article which related Goebbels' allegedly bad character to his club foot, it enraged him. Goebbels struck back by referring to their alleged Jewish background and creating a strong current of hatred within the membership of the Nazi Party. Hitler was perhaps the only one in the Party's leadership who did not make the slightest mention of Goebbels' handicap, one of the reasons for the strong bond which Goebbels felt for Hitler. In spite of his club foot, Goebbels achieved a reputation in Berlin for his fiery speeches, provocations of the Communists, and courage in fights in beer halls, all of which gained the Party new supporters.²¹ Goebbels had gained prominence in Berlin by defamatory campaigns against the deputy police chief, Bernhard Weiss. By the end of October 1929 the ban on Goebbels' public speaking had been lifted, giving him the opportunity to have more meetings, as well as sending his hoodlums throughout Berlin to clear the Communists from the streets.

Goebbels Creates a Martyr

When one of his thugs was killed, Goebbels created a martyr out of this person, Horst Wessel. Goebbels' violence had won the admiration and allegiance of this man, a pastor's son who "went bad." Goebbels recognized his background and ability, sending Wessel to Vienna in 1928 to study the Nazi youth movement. Wessel was a drunk, a womanizer, and lived with a prostitute. When a local thug shot and killed Wessel in January 1930 at the instigation of the Communists, Goebbels changed Wessel's life into that of a martyr, a student who wanted to give his all to society, an almost Christ-like figure. Goebbels had this nonsense set to music, which by 1933 was sung throughout Germany. The song became the official anthem of the Nazi Party.

PROPAGANDA AND ELECTIONS

Goebbels stated that "propaganda must not investigate the truth objectively—but it must present that aspect of the truth which is favorable to its own side."²² He stated that propaganda must be simple and repetitive, in simplified form despite the objectives of intellectuals.²³ Goebbels once told the press that by active propaganda he meant "to belabor the people so long until they succumb to us."²⁴ He stated that one cannot determine whether one propaganda is better than another, because propaganda is good only if it helps the Party to achieve its goals, i.e., the means to an end. Goebbels justified the use of propaganda by defining it as an art, not of lying, but of speaking to people in a language they understand.²⁵ There is some basis for accepting this view of propaganda. For example, a competent propagandist would not print an article by Charles Krauthammer in a newspaper utilized in a working class neighborhood.

Elections

In the *Reichstag* election of 1928 the Nazis polled less than two percent of the vote in Berlin and lost 100,000 votes nationally.²⁶ In April 1930 Hitler appointed Goebbels as propaganda leader of the Party. In the election of September 1930, Goebbels was in charge of the Nazi effort. Under his guidance the various messages were tailored to meet the needs and views of various audiences. If an anti-Semitic slogan was not considered appropriate to a particular audience, it was not used. The Nazis utilized "rallies, songs, brass bands, demonstrations and parades"²⁷ to acquire supporters in this election. Goebbels' headquarters sent out directives to both regional and local leaders to give them slogans and material. In 1927 banks in Germany had gone broke and unemployment rose, problems which the Nazis utilized to gain more supporters by 1930.

The Nazi vote increased from 0.8 million in the election of 1928 to 6.4 million in 1930, thus enabling the Party to have 107 deputies in the *Reichstag*.²⁸ Goebbels, the organizer of this tremendous victory of the right wing in Germany, was one of the Party's deputies to the *Reichstag*. This increase represented mainly the support of white collar workers, small businessmen—surprisingly, the professional class, a real breakthrough for the Party. The explanation for this phenomenal success is not difficult to find. Whereas the Nazi Party had been that of the lower middle class, it succeeded in winning the support of businessmen, farmers, and the industrial and mercantile middle class.²⁹ The older generation hated the Weimar Republic and so voted in support of the Nazis. The Nazis, for whatever reason, did well among women, a phenomenon that continued even when Hitler was dictator. They did well in the Protestant north, but not in the Catholic south, where the majority remained loyal to the Center Party. Hitler's approach was one which could attract Germans of all classes, as he cited the divisions of the Weimar Republic, its self-interest as a motivating principle, and its economic failure. He spoke of a united Germany which transcended social barriers, a society which many considered the Germany of Bismarck's time,³⁰ though this may represent a distortion of memories. More important for the success of the Nazi Party was the fact that by February 1932 there were over 6 million unemployed in Germany, desperate people who looked for the redemption promised by the Party. One result of the 1930 victory was an increase in Party membership.

By the end of the 1920s, Hitler was able to encapsulate his program into the following objectives: the quest for power, the destruction of Marxism, chasing Jews out of Germany, and making the Reich great. Hitler was surrounded by a group of men—Goebbels, Rudolf Hess, Heinrich Himmler, Alfred Rosenberg, Gregor Strasser, and Herman Goering—³¹ under whose leadership the Nazi Party had by 1929 become a well-organized political body.

In the Presidential election of March-April 1932, Corporal Hitler, who had not yet acquired German citizenship, was the candidate of the right, whereas Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, hero of the great Tannenberg victory of World War I (1914), represented the center and liberals. The Goebbels propaganda machine dared not insult Hindenburg, but stressed that it was time for someone who had done great service for Germany to step aside and let a younger man deal with the economic chaos of the Great Depression. At this time Goebbels pioneered the use of the radio in elections, Hitler's airplane tours of Germany, torchlight parades, and brass bands. He focused his efforts on winning the support of different groups, such as the middle class and women, a move which was reasonably successful. Hitler increased his share of the vote to 13 million despite the fact that he lost to Hindenburg.³²

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In the *Reichstag* election of November 6, 1932, the National Socialists (Nazis) lost by two million votes.³³ Even so, without the Nazis no government could be formed due to their strength in the *Reichstag*. Hindenburg appointed a friend, Franz von Papen, as Chancellor, who as military attaché had been expelled from the United States in World War I. Von Papen's cabinet was composed of men with little experience in governing, which led to his resignation on November 17, 1932. Goebbels had attacked this cabinet from the *Reichstag*. Hindenburg received Hitler, who demanded a "free hand" as Chancellor. Hindenburg feared that a dictatorship would result if Hitler had a "free hand," evidence that even in old age the Field Marshal was intuitively vigorous. No agreement could be reached.

The local elections at Lippe for the *Landtag*, a provincial body, gave the Nazis an opportunity to display their strength, despite their depleted funds and recent electoral defeat. When one of their followers, Walter Wagnitz, was killed on January 1, 1933, in a brawl with the Communists, Goebbels gave the victim a mammoth funeral with a procession of thousands of SS, SA, and Hitler Youth through Berlin and into the village of Lippe, emphasizing Nazi strength. Hitler, Goebbels, Goering, and other orators next went to the bars and homes of this small province in an attempt to get out the vote. The election occurred on January 15, 1933, at which time the Nazi Party gained 38,000 votes, almost 40 percent of the total and certainly more than the other parties.³⁴ Goebbels shouted "victory" and the mass of the German people believed him, despite the fact that the Nazi Party had not gained 50 percent of the vote. In various elections Goebbels had everything carefully planned. In an appearance, Hitler would delay his entry onto the speaker's rostrum while there would be waving of banners, shouts of "Heil," and march rhythms, and suddenly Hitler would step out in a blaze of light, often from the back of the auditorium. By this time, the crowd would be in a frenzy.³⁵

On January 30, 1933, Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor of Germany. On that evening Goebbels arranged a torchlight parade of 61,000 which began at 7 p.m. and continued past midnight. Both Hindenburg and Hitler took the salute.³⁶ Having won Hitler's admiration for his achievements in various elections, Goebbels was appointed Minister of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment on March 13, 1933.

GOEBBELS AND CULTURE

When he was appointed Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, Goebbels placed all of the arts and means of communication under his ministry, exhibiting a fanatic energy in the suppression of German culture and its replacement by the decadent Nazi

form of art. Staffing his ministry with young, educated Nazis, he organized departments to control the Church, books, films, education, the press, art, theater, and broadcasting, a move to control all aspects of cultural life. He began to eliminate Jews from cultural institutions, also attacking Communists, Social Democrats, liberals, and anyone who displayed an independent mind.³⁷ In the early days of the regime, 250 writers and professors left the country,³⁸ realizing that they were no longer free to write and teach as they wished.

The Church

Goebbels was able to seize parts of the Protestant Church, but the Catholic will to resist was undermined by negotiations for a concordat which guaranteed freedom to the Catholic Church.³⁹ On July 30 the Nazis abolished the Catholic Youth League, clearly a violation of the concordat. During the next few years, thousands of priests and nuns were arrested on trumped-up charges, Catholic publications were suppressed, and on March 14, 1937, Pope Pius XI issued an encyclical which charged the German government with violation of the concordat.⁴⁰ The Protestant clergy, obedient to Martin Luther's dictum to obey their political leaders, was subservient to the Nazi state, though there were some notable exceptions such as Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer. When the Protestant Church finally protested the anti-Christian practices of the government in May 1936, hundreds of pastors were arrested and placed in concentration camps. In 1937, 807 pastors and leading laymen were arrested, severely weakening resistance to the government.⁴¹ Hundreds more were later arrested.

Books

On May 10, 1933, German students, accompanied by the SA and SS, threw into a fire perhaps 20,000 books of Communist and Social Democratic authors, such as Sigmund Freud and Stefan Zweig. In Berlin this orgy of book burning was joined by Joseph Goebbels.⁴² This was a terrible mistake, because it smeared the reputation of the government in world opinion. Goebbels' role in this madness is odd, since he had a PhD in literature. No author could publish, no singer could broadcast, no critic could criticize, unless they had permission of the new Reich Chamber. Every writer of importance, led by Thomas Mann, left Germany.⁴³

The Press

Germany had more newspapers than Great Britain, France, and Italy combined.⁴⁴ Very soon Hitler was dictator of this unfortunate nation and began to suppress Communist and Social Democratic newspapers. Goebbels had secret meetings during which journalists were told how to handle various items in the news, sometimes being given articles

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which were to be published. The Nazis also arrested Communist and pacifist journalists. Goebbels did permit some variation from the acceptable standard.⁴⁵

Films

Goebbels' ministry controlled every aspect of this industry. Most customers stayed away from Nazi films, but flocked to the Western films that Goebbels permitted to be shown.

Education

Well-known academics were dismissed from their positions, including 20 past or future Nobel laureates, including Albert Einstein and Max Born. Over 150 physicists emigrated, which could only harm the teaching of this highly important subject in Germany.⁴⁶ However, most German professors remained in the country, hating the Weimar Republic and welcoming what they considered a return to the rigidity of the past. For example, on March 3, 1933, some 3,000 university professors signed an appeal for the German people to support Hitler, and in May of that year 700 signed an appeal in favor of Hitler.⁴⁷ What is equally disturbing is that students organized campaigns against professors antagonistic to the regime.⁴⁸

Art

Despite being rejected by the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts, Hitler considered himself to be an expert in art. He was determined to cleanse Germany of "decadent" art, removing 6,500 modern paintings from museums.⁴⁹

Theater

Jewish actors, directors, and producers were placed in concentration camps or had left Germany. However, performances of Goethe, Shakespeare, and Schiller were shown.

Broadcasts

As soon as his ministry was created, Goebbels took control of broadcasting on behalf of the state. In the first year of Nazi rule, 50 of Hitler's speeches were broadcast, which Goebbels used for propaganda to create the *Fuehrer* myth of infallibility. The result was that many people, who looked askance at the Party, had confidence in Hitler after his ascent to power in 1933.⁵⁰ Goebbels' ministry pressured manufacturers to make a cheap radio "on a vast scale,"⁵¹ which by 1935 enabled the Nazis to boast that when Hitler decided to broadcast he could have an audience of "not less than 56 million Germans."⁵² Short-wave transmitters enabled German propaganda to reach out internationally—to America, the British dominion and its colonies, the Far East,

the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. In 1945 Goebbels' ministry revealed to the German people what the Soviet troops were doing in East Prussia—such as massive rape. The headlines included such titles as "The Raving of the Soviet Beast," which were essentially true.

Speakers

Goebbels began training centers in every *Gau*, the 43 districts in Germany, where speakers were graded according to their effectiveness and then categorized. Reich speakers were active in the entirety of Germany, and the Nazi Party told them what to say.⁵³ These men memorized standardized texts and rehearsed answers.

GOEBBELS AND HALTER

Magda: A Groupie

Magda Friedlaender gave her time to the Party, a period when she and Hitler became fascinated with each other. Hitler could not marry, as he wished to preserve the image of having given up everything for Germany. Goebbels could marry Magda, and this would keep Hitler bound to himself, leading to the marriage of Goebbels and Magda on September 19, 1931. Magda had the money to own a beautiful apartment, which the Party leadership utilized as its meeting place.

Goebbels later bought a property cheaply in an expensive neighborhood. He also bought the adjoining property, whose house he used for work and to which he brought his female friends for pleasure. Magda persuaded the Secretary of State, Karl Hanke, to gather evidence for divorce proceedings. Hanke collected copies of Goebbels' love letters to Lida Baarova, an actress with whom he was actually in love.⁵⁴ The affair came to a head in the summer of 1938, a time when Hanke wanted to marry Magda, presenting her a list of Goebbels' conquests. However, Hitler forbade Goebbels' marriage to Lida Baarova and restricted his seeing her for one year, a period in which he hoped Goebbels' feelings for Baarova would diminish. Goebbels, accepting Hitler's decision, which he claimed to be based on his acceptance of duty, did not protect Baarova, who consequently returned to Czechoslovakia where she was shunned. Karl and Magda wanted to marry, but Hitler refused to permit that union. As Goebbels could no longer accuse the Catholic Church of immorality, he turned his attention to the Jews. By this time Goebbels had lost every scruple, as he referred to Jews as "parasites." Goebbels, adding to his list of undesirables, attacked intellectuals and conservatives. Magda and Goebbels were reconciled in 1939.

Krystallnacht

The Jews, cognizant of Goebbels' behavior, quickly realized that he was not part of the thugs of the Nazi Party, but a pitiful sight amid everything he unconsciously hated. They knew and publicized that Goebbels had violated his conscience⁵⁵ to gain power and become the "big" man that the former graduate student wanted to be. Goebbels avoided looking at the Jewish newspapers, because they understood and printed the part of him that he did not want to face—namely, the sensitive scholar he had once been. Goebbels depicted Jews as half-human, morally backward, and monsters to be destroyed. When as a young man he joined Hitler, Goebbels learned that the Jew was a member of an inferior race and not to be mixed with Aryan blood, because it was spiritual poison. To become the disciple of the master whom he loved, Goebbels had to believe in anti-Semitism, despite any rational reluctance to accept this nonsense. When a young Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, assassinated a German diplomat in Paris in revenge for the deportation of his family to Poland, Goebbels, with the approval of Hitler, began to organize *Krystallnacht* on November 9 to set off this orgy.⁵⁶ On November 9-10, 1938, *Krystallnacht* occurred, which involved the burning of synagogues and Jewish homes, the beating of Jews, and the taking thousands of them to concentration camps. This pogrom was supervised by Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the SD (*Sicherheitsdienst*, the intelligence branch of the SS).

GOEBBELS, HITLER, AND WAR

In 1939 Goebbels did not believe that Germany should go to war at this time, even though Hitler wanted to conquer Poland. Being at the top of the Nazi leadership, Goebbels had to know about the intentions of Great Britain and France. In the summer of 1939, Hans Fritzsche, one of Goebbels' associates, brought documents to him containing analyses of public opinion in Western countries which indicated that Great Britain and France would go to war if Germany attacked Poland. As a result of the invasion of Poland, Great Britain and France did declare war on Germany. Goebbels also understood that the German Army was far from ready to oppose other European armies. For example, on October 8, 1939, the Quartermaster General of the *Wehrmacht* informed the Chief of the General Staff, General Franz Halder, that the German Army had only enough ammunition to supply "one-third of our divisions for fourteen combat days."⁵⁷ Goebbels was very much aware of Hitler's achievements. He realized that Hitler had enlarged Germany through the *Anschluss* of Austria and the Sudetenland, wiped out unemployment, and built roads, along with factories and canals, all of which made him one of Germany's great leaders.⁵⁸ Joseph Goebbels probably felt that all of these accomplishments, evidence of Hitler's greatness, could be ignored by future historians for leading

the nation to war in spite of its lack of preparedness. Nevertheless, Goebbels supported Hitler's plans for war and began work to persuade the German people that Poland was the guilty party through attacks on German soil.

Operation Barbarossa

The horrifying experience of the German Army during the Russian winter of 1941 was a turning point for Goebbels, a time when he began to doubt the wisdom of whoever failed to provide the German Army with the proper clothing for the terrible cold of the Soviet winter. His campaign for the collection of appropriate clothing for soldiers at the front was a success. He was impressed by Hitler's decisive action during the winter disaster of 1941-42, when the *Fuehrer*, in contrast to many of his generals, insisted that the German Army should stand firmly against the hordes of Soviet troops, many from Siberia. Goebbels was no longer afraid of Goering, Himmler, or the generals who, as he saw them, were mere technicians. He therefore did not see that much of the failure of the generals was due to the constant interference from the amateur Hitler, who, for example, created the conditions which led to the disaster at Stalingrad. Hitler took over the *Wehrmacht* as Commander in Chief and divided the German Army into two operations, sending one of them south into the Ukraine and ultimately to Stalingrad. General Erich von Manstein, the great German strategist, saw the danger of encirclement of the German forces at Stalingrad,⁵⁹ in contrast to Hitler who did not have the experience or training to properly evaluate the situation.

In 1943, after the defeat at Stalingrad, only Goebbels, in contrast to Hitler, saw the military situation clearly. He was the first German politician to draw the people's attention to the gravity of the war, in contrast to Germany's military and political leaders. He sought to persuade the Germans that they were not the master race which could not be defeated, though he did not explicitly state this heresy. In late March 1942 he advocated the concept of *total war*, which involved sending as many men to the Army as possible, believing this measure could produce 50 divisions.⁶⁰ He also advocated having women working in factories, a cultural change for Germany, 60-hour shifts each week, and the closure of bars, luxury restaurants, and fashion houses. His advocacy of the total war concept failed at this time, because Martin Bormann, Hitler's closest advisor, opposed it.

The young PhD in literature, who saw Hitler as a god, now felt the absence of leadership in the war.⁶¹ In 1943 Goebbels tried to persuade Hitler that he should seek a separate peace with one of his enemies, believing that it would be easier to come to an understanding with Josef Stalin than Winston Churchill. This would, he realized, require Germany to accept Finland, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece coming within the Soviet sphere of influence. However, in the

spring of 1944 the Soviets had joined the Western powers in demanding unconditional surrender, which meant that a separate peace with the Soviet Union was by now unlikely. When the failed assassination attempt of Colonel Claus Shenk von Stauffenberg and Colonel General Ludwig Beck occurred, Goebbels was once more convinced that Hitler's mission was given to him by God, indicating that Goebbels' prior belief in the failure of leadership in Germany had evaporated and the worship of Hitler had resumed.

Goebbels had nothing but contempt for the conspirators, seeing Hitler as the genius who was above everyone and everything. Immediately after the attempted assassination, Goebbels arranged for the trials and executions to be filmed in detail so that Hitler might follow the gruesome details night by night. Goebbels arranged for these generals to be presented in ill-fitting clothes to increase their humiliation.⁶²

After the failed putsch of July 1944, Hitler appointed Goebbels as plenipotentiary with full powers to organize the total war effort. Since Goebbels was responsible only to Hitler, he introduced the 60-hour week for everyone and shut down all businesses that he did not consider important to the war effort—such as theaters, acting schools, and conservatories. The number of orchestras was reduced, and university study was stopped for all but a few working in disciplines essential to the war.⁶³ When the Allies destroyed a particular town, he brought in food, wine, hot drinks, cigarettes, etc. He encouraged those Berliners who had no professional obligations to leave the city. Further, he gave orders that the U-Bahn stations should be utilized as air raid shelters. Goebbels gained in popularity as respect for Hitler faded.

In late 1944 Goebbels, named as Plenipotentiary for Total War, obtained permission from Hitler to comb the civilian sector for men to be sent to the Soviet front, despite the problem of training them adequately for survival in this violent milieu. His appointment was triggered by the bomb plot to kill Hitler and the collapse of Army Group Center in the Soviet Union. In October 1944 Hitler requested that Goebbels provide the *Wehrmacht* with 300,000 men through his methods.⁶⁴ This measure did not counter the problem that many of these men were too old and unfit for military service, though some able-bodied men were in exempted occupations such as the armaments industry. Despite Goebbels' objections, Hitler supported the insistence of Albert Speer, Armaments Minister, who fought against the release of thousands of workers from the armaments industry to the armed forces. Goebbels also cut back on postal services; he closed theaters and a number of orchestras and publishing houses; newspapers were limited to a few pages or shut down. By the end of 1944 the million men that he had "combed out" enabled the *Wehrmacht* to replace the extraordinary losses that it had suffered.

On the eve of the Ardennes offensive of January 1945, Goebbels, often the realist, recognized the pessimism of most of the German people, principally through his aid to those who had been bombed out. During this operation he began to hint to colleagues that the Ardennes offensive could go no further, realizing that soldiers returning from the front with tales of imminent victory in the West had nourished this hope among some of the German population.⁶⁵

On the night of February 13-14, 1945, Allied bombers attacked Dresden, which destroyed German monuments, thousands of people, and homes. The first wave of these attacks dropped incendiary bombs, the heat from which drove people out of the shelters into the streets where the second wave of bombers targeted them with high explosives. Goebbels latched onto this raid for propaganda purposes, describing it as "terror bombing." Contrary to popular opinion, most of Dresden's industry was involved in war production. Most importantly, German troops going to the Eastern Front went through Dresden.⁶⁶ In response to the bombing of Dresden, Goebbels advocated the execution of the thousands of Allied prisoners captured in air raids and on the battlefield in March 1945. This is when the German leadership began discussions of "werewolves," essentially guerrillas who would operate from the mountainous area of southern Germany after the nation's defeat, subjecting the Allies to a form of warfare to which they were unaccustomed. Goebbels adopted the idea and on April 1 began issuing threats against the Allies and "defeatists" at home.⁶⁷

When Soviet forces entered East Prussia, they went on an orgy of rape and murder which Goebbels used to persuade the last doubters what they could expect if the Soviet animals grasped other areas of the Reich.⁶⁸ The German people in general were skeptical of these reports or felt that the authorities should have evacuated this area before the Soviet onslaught.

Toward the end of the war Goebbels negotiated with the railway authorities to evacuate the approximately 170,000 Berliners who had sought refuge in East Prussia from Allied bombings. Erich Koch, *Gauleiter* of East Prussia, persuaded Hitler to restrict this number to 55,000 women and children.⁶⁹ Koch recognized the coming Soviet conquest of Germany, but did show compassion to the potential victims of the Red Army in East Prussia. When Aachen fell to the Americans, Goebbels advocated a scorched earth policy in this area. In the last year of the war, Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, and Albert Speer were the center of power in Germany. In the last days of the war Goebbels read Carlyle's *History of Frederick the Great* to Hitler, a story of how at the last minute Frederick the Great was saved from opponents stronger than himself. When Magda lamented the loss of so many territories that the German Army had conquered,

PROFILES IN INTELLIGENCE

Goebbels replied: “Yes, sweetheart. We’ve had it, bled white, finished. There’s nothing to be done.”

A visit to Hitler’s bunker sent Goebbels away with flights of fantasy, a conviction that 1945 would bring about a change in Germany’s fortunes. Hitler sent for Goebbels and proposed that he and his family move into the *Fuehrer’s* bunker.⁷⁰ Goebbels was anxious to participate in the reconstruction of German cities and towns after the war, remaining an acolyte of Hitler, unwilling to make a step without the support of his leader. Joseph and Magda joined Hitler in the *Fuehrerbunker* as the Soviet Army approached Berlin, seeing Hitler as a disciple of Frederick the Great, who fulfilled his duty to the end of his life. However, once they realized that Germany would be defeated, Goebbels and Magda accepted their fate and that of their children. They were witnesses to Hitler’s marriage to Eva Braun. Rather than allow the Soviets to destroy their children, both physically and psychologically, Joseph and Magda Goebbels poisoned their six children and then committed suicide, reasoning that a world without Hitler and National Socialism would no longer be worth living in. Following the wishes of the Goebbels parents, the children’s bodies were burned outside the bunker. Before he committed suicide in the bunker, Goebbels wrote as an appendix to Hitler’s Will and Testament, dated April 29, 1945:

...we prefer to bring to an end at the side of the Fuehrer a life which for me personally has no further value unless I can use it in the service of the Fuehrer and at his side.⁷¹

GOEBBELS AND FAUST

In 1832 Johann Wolfgang Goethe finished writing *Faust*, a poem in which an elderly academic sells his soul to the devil in exchange for a resumption of his youth. Goebbels’ life story has some resemblance to this literary work, which Germans value so highly. Joseph Goebbels was a young and dissatisfied academic who sold his soul to Hitler, a man comparable to Satan. Karl Gustav Jung, a Swiss-German psychoanalyst, developed the concept of the archetype, a person who appears in every culture in every period of time. Adolf Hitler can be seen as an archetype of the devil, a creature who tried to tempt Jesus, for example, but failed.

UTILITY OF THIS ARTICLE

This article is a warning to analysts never to underestimate America’s enemies, as Goebbels, the sensitive young scholar, became a monster when he gained authority. In this position he pursued his task with fanaticism, which a foreign intelligence service should recognize and exploit.

Notes

- ¹ There is considerable doubt in reference to this disability; for example—was it the result of infantile paralysis?
- ² Viktor Reimann, *Goebbels*, trans. Stephen Wendt (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1976), p. 17.
- ³ *Ibid.*
- ⁴ Richard J. Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 204.
- ⁵ Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, *Doctor Goebbels: His Life and Death* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2010), p. 20.
- ⁶ Reimann, op. cit., p. 25.
- ⁷ Evans, op. cit., p. 205.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 204.
- ⁹ *Das Tagebuch von Joseph Goebbels 1925-26*, ed. Helmut Heiber (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags, 1961), p. 74.
- ¹⁰ Reimann, op. cit., p. 59.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 64.
- ¹⁴ Joachim C. Fest, *Hitler*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1973), p. 246.
- ¹⁵ Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 77.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 76.
- ¹⁷ Reimann, op. cit., pp. 83-86.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 88.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.
- ²⁰ Fest, op. cit., p. 275.
- ²¹ Evans, op. cit., p. 207.
- ²² Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 73.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 211.
- ²⁴ Reimann, op. cit., 194.
- ²⁵ Evans, op. cit., p. 396.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 209.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 257.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 261.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 257.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 229.
- ³² *Ibid.*, p. 281.
- ³³ Reimann, op. cit., p. 149.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.
- ³⁵ Fest, op. cit., p. 324.
- ³⁶ Evans, op. cit. p. 310.
- ³⁷ Evans, op. cit., p. 399.
- ³⁸ Fest, op. cit., p. 427.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 426.
- ⁴⁰ William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 235.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 239.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 241.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 242.
- ⁴⁴ Evans, op. cit., p.408.
- ⁴⁵ Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The German Dictatorship*, trans. by Jean Steinberg (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 255.
- ⁴⁶ Evans, op. cit., p. 423.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 425. For more on this subject, see Max Weinreich, *Hitler’s Professors* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 426.
- ⁴⁹ Shirer, op. cit., 243.
- ⁵⁰ Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 202.

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- ⁵¹ Ibid., p. 127.
⁵² Ibid.
⁵³ Ibid., p. 181.
⁵⁴ Reimann, op. cit., p.228.
⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 99.
⁵⁶ Reimann, op. cit., p. 234.
⁵⁷ Matthew Cooper, *The German Army 1933-1945* (Lanham, MD: Scarborough House, 1978), p. 180.
⁵⁸ Reimann, op. cit., p. 238.
⁵⁹ Mungo Melvin, *Manstein: Hitler's Greatest General* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), p. 289.
⁶⁰ Ian Kershaw, *The End* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), p. 25.
⁶¹ Reimann, op. cit., p. 268.
⁶² Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 257.
⁶³ Kershaw, op. cit., p. 75.
⁶⁴ Ibid.
⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 160-161.
⁶⁶ Kershaw, op. cit., p. 239.
⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 279.
⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 114.
⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 22.
⁷⁰ Fest, op. cit., p. 738.
⁷¹ Joseph Goebbels, *Final Entries 1945: The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels*, ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper, trans. Richard Barry (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1978), p. 332.

Dr. Kenneth J. Campbell graduated from Kenyon College and received MA degrees from Johns Hopkins University and from the University of Maryland. He subsequently completed a doctorate at the University of Maryland. His area of specialization is German military intelligence. Dr. Campbell can be reached at drccampbell3000@comcast.net. He is a frequent contributor to AIJ and in particular to its historical "Profiles in Intelligence" series.



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EUROPE'S ANGRY MUSLIMS: THE REVOLT OF THE SECOND GENERATION

Robert S. Leiken.

New York, Oxford University Press. 2012.

354 pages.

Reviewed by MAJ (USA) John M. Rose, an Army ILE student at Fort Belvoir, VA, and a graduate of the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC. In 2012 he also graduated from the National Intelligence University with the inaugural cohort to earn the newly accredited Master of Science and Technology Intelligence (MSTI) degree from NIU's Anthony G. Oettinger School of S&T Intelligence, named for the noted Harvard University professor who retired in 2011 after serving for many years as chairman of then-NDIC's board of visitors.

Robert Leiken's latest book, *Europe's Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation*, offers a comparative approach to examine the confluence of three dominant currents that are impacting the security environment of Europe. He defines these as "Outsiders," "Insiders," and variants of Islam within immigrant communities of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. It is a story of "terrorists and rioters, of tribes and immigrants, of fathers and sons, of alien mentors ('Outsiders') and their second generation pupils ('Insiders') and of Islam in its copious, sometimes rivalrous, manifestations."

Robert Leiken is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution as well as the Director of the Immigration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center. He is a graduate of Harvard University (BA in English and MA in History) and St. Antony's College, Oxford University (doctorate in Politics). He is a widely published academic, author, and analyst with over 40 years of experience in academia and field work.

The thesis of Leiken's book is that the children of Muslim immigrants in Europe are marginalized twice over and seeking a relevant identity. The disenfranchisement of second-generation Muslims in Europe is the product of post-World War Two immigration policies that were fashioned to build a labor force wherein assimilation was neither a consideration of the host nation nor of the first-generation Muslim immigrant. A generation later the post-migrant Muslim has little opportunity, if any, to improve his situation within his birth nation. Nor can he develop an identity that is consistent (at least in religious and socio-

economic terms) with Muslims in the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam). He is trapped in a world characterized by drug addiction, gang violence, and the prospect of an adult life of menial work such as driving taxi cabs or bagging groceries.

A dominant theme in Leiken's work is that second-generation European Muslims are estranged from the land of their forebears and at the same time second-class citizens in the nations of their birth. Leiken contends that in the face of three current socioeconomic conditions—*de jure* assimilation in France, *de facto* segregation in Germany, or multicultural identity in the UK—these disenfranchised post-immigrant Muslims are prone to reject the more accommodating faith of their parents and adopt an empowering narrative of jihad offered by "Outsiders."

Local *imams* and religious communities offer little help to assuage the cognitive dissonance of the post-migrant. The immigration policies of host nations often allow alien *imams* asylum and unfettered access to émigré communities. Leiken argues that this sets the stage for foreign-trained itinerant *imams*—the "Outsiders"—to present the post-migrant a radical new "elected Islamic selfhood."

Leiken presents readers with a set of "Guides for the Perplexed" in Part Two of his book. This section offers the religious context of his study. With precision he dissects the various manifestations of Sunni Islam which European Muslims predominantly share. He highlights the differences between the Folk, or *Sufi*, Islam which is commonly practiced by the post-migrant's parents with that of the "Outsider's" Fundamentalist Islam. He further delineates the facets of Islamism into three distinct camps: Missionary Islamism (individual appeal), Political Islamism (state appeal), and Jihadi Islamism (violent appeal against "man-made electoral politics"). The latter is further divided into revolutionary and putchist camps. The Jihadi Islamism identifies internal enemies (apostates, most notably the post-migrant's parents) and external enemies (the post-migrant's host nation). Leiken asserts this has strategic significance in that it comports with al Qaeda's newest strategic phase, "retaliatory jihad" in Europe, which is designed to discourage and deter NATO partners.

Leiken's comparative analysis of the radicalization of Europe's post-migrant Muslims in France, the UK, and Germany offers a meaningful approach for exploring a complex and challenging hemispheric problem. Perhaps Leiken's most valuable contribution is his "Guides for the Perplexed." This could be presented as a stand-alone

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At the outbreak of the war, the Turkish Army had a large cadre of infantry divisions but also had critical shortages of modern equipment and munitions. While there was increasing professionalism in the officer corps, there was also a grim determination not to be beaten again, as had occurred in the 1912-13 Balkan wars. The Turkish Fifth Army, responsible for the defense of the straits, was ably led by General Liman von Sanders. Liman assessed the terrain and identified three possible landing sites; he organized the defense by using a light forward screen and central, mobile reserves. Critically, he used his time available by conducting training exercises and improving field fortifications overlooking the likely landing sites.

The Gallipoli campaign, from the initial, poorly coordinated landings in April 1915 to the final, skillful evacuations in December 1915, was a major failure at the operational level of war. The British commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton, developed a complicated plan based upon an unreliable assessment of the enemy, forces available (to include state of training and equipment), terrain, and time. The British plan, featuring landings at seven points with two diversionary operations, broke down almost as soon as the Allied forces landed on the beaches. Typically, Allied forces failed to seize important objectives in a timely manner, allowing the Turkish forces under Liman to move strong forces to the high ground overlooking the Allied forces. In turn, the ensuing stalemate prevented General Hamilton from generating sufficient combat to break out.

The British did not expect to find a prepared defense upon landing; the Turks, however, greatly disappointed and tested the Allied forces that were sorely needed in France. The British plan featured limited attacks by split forces that had a minimal chance of success, poor communications, woefully inadequate artillery support, and hopeless casualty evacuation plans. The Turks, by contrast, put up a stout fight for the high ground. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal (later known as Kemal Ataturk) commanded the 19th Division, which was serving as the Army reserve in the critical ANZAC sector. Indeed, after the Turkish High Command hesitated to commit its reserves upon receiving multiple landings, Kemal moved promptly and seized the ground dominating the ANZAC positions. Overall, the Allied forces committed nearly 500,000 troops, suffering 205,000 casualties, while the Turkish forces committed 315,000 troops, suffering 250,000 casualties.

Peter Hart makes a significant contribution to military history, detailing the daily reality of war at the tactical level. He skillfully weaves first-hand remembrances throughout the text, often with Allied and Turkish narratives juxtaposed, that provide readers with a graphic feel for the challenges and suffering in units. He paints a vivid picture of the fog, friction, heroism, appalling sickness, and suffering, as well as

the grim determination of Allied soldiers as they struggle against a determined and skillful Turkish adversary which was well-led and well-positioned on the battlefield.

The Turkish view of the British campaign is important and often overlooked. In December 1913, like several Prussian generals before him such as Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder and Baron von der Goltz, Liman had been appointed as head of the German military mission to the Ottoman Empire. He was soon appointed as a marshal in the Turkish Army and, in that capacity, was charged with helping the Ottoman Empire modernize its Army along European lines. In 1919 he was arrested in Malta and charged with war crimes. In 1927 he published a book, later translated into English and reprinted in 2005, that he had written in captivity in Malta about his experiences before and during the war. *Five Years in Turkey* provides an important complement to *Gallipoli* and is well worth reading (see citation at beginning of review).



EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Amy B. Zegart.

Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press. 2011.
130 pages.

Reviewed by Charles Carey, an Assistant Corporation Counsel in the New York City Law Department's General Litigation Division and author of "The Benevolent Sun: Brief Travels in North Korea."

Suppose you buy a new camera. Suppose your new camera is expensive enough to warrant several staggered payments, but comes highly praised by its manufacturer. Now suppose you take your new camera outside on a cloudy day to take a few pictures only to find that its flash is non-functional and its ability to take pictures outside of direct light is effectively nil. You would (rightly) take that camera back to the box store/online outlet from whence it came and demand your money back. However, suppose that the retailer not only tells you that you are obligated to keep it but that you will be required to continue making payments on it.

You would then, according to a story told by Stanford Professor Amy B. Zegart in her recent book on intelligence oversight in the United States Congress, feel somewhat like Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) did in 2004, when he took the Senate floor to decry the single biggest line item in the

intelligence budget—a \$9.5 billion satellite program already over budget that could take pictures only during the day, in clear weather. Senator Rockefeller was decried by his political opponents and pinioned on talk radio (even though the intelligence committee voted across party lines to kill the satellite program). For his trouble, the Intelligence Community simply sidestepped him, sinking three more years into the satellite program until its voluntary cancellation by the Director of National Intelligence (as opposed to Congress) in 2007.

The tale of “the satellite program that would not die” is one damning story among many in Professor Zegart’s volume that all reach the same conclusion: Congress has failed in its mandate to oversee the Intelligence Community. Her effort functions as a compact series of discrete articles bookended by effective introductions and summaries; as she admits, Zegart has made pitches to Congressional audiences before. She notes in the preface that her book came about as the result of a 2007 invitation to testify before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) as to the failures of oversight, and the resulting volume demonstrates that she understands what it takes to get through to the people on the other side of the podium—clear, concise arguments highlighted by memorable stories and backed by impressive research.

Beginning by discussing the fundamental problem of defining what “good oversight” is, the book moves into the rich history of literature on intelligence oversight and its frustrating lack of proscriptive solutions. After a chapter authored with Julie Quinn containing an analysis of how traditional political science models identify the right root causes of electorally-minded legislators’ actions while coming to the wrong conclusions about the worth of intelligence, Zegart reaches her strongest point in discussing how weak expertise and limited budgetary authority have crippled the very legislative committees designed to prevent failure and waste in the intelligence world.

At times, Professor Zegart’s choice to seal each analysis in a neatly-capsuled chapter works against her. By the end of the book, several tropes regarding broken elements of Congressional oversight have been repeated to reinforce the same core argument. Term limits on members of the intelligence committee in the House of Representatives (HPSCI), for example, receives repeated mention as a poor idea in different chapters to reinforce different (but related) arguments. Yet, her short volume compensates by picking up speed in the final chapter, even as she refers back to points she has previously established, by interweaving narrative details from personal interviews with members of Congress and their staffs even more effectively than she did in previous segments.

The elephant in Professor Zegart’s book is the old guard of the military. Although touched on in a footnote defining the “intelligence community” as including eight separate military agencies, the internecine battle and resulting blurred line between overt and covert forces in the Obama era are cause for enormous concern in the oversight world. It would be helpful to hear Zegart comment on whether behavioral carrots in the form of intelligence oversight posts could be as lucrative as defense oversight posts to reelection prospects for members of Congress in a world where a former CIA Director runs the Department of Defense and, until recently, a lauded general ran the CIA. (Editor’s Note: This review was submitted before former CIA Director Leon Panetta turned over his SECDEF billet to former Sen. Chuck Hagel. Of course, the general officer referred to is David Petraeus, whose permanent successor at CIA is John Brennan.)

Nevertheless, Professor Zegart closes in a position of strength, offering not only a portrait of oversight in disarray but a clear sense of how it got there and what can be done to combat the entrenched interests against it. Her immediate prescriptions (consolidate budgetary power in the intelligence committees rather than in defense appropriations, eliminate term limits for the HPSCI, and strengthen the capabilities of committee staffers) are clear and easy to implement. However, she remains clear-eyed as to their limited chances of success. Intelligence oversight is the way it is for a reason. Hopefully, with more lucid and cutting works like Zegart’s, Congress can be convinced that the reason is a bad one.



LOYALTY: THE VEXING VIRTUE

Eric Felton.

New York, NY, Simon & Schuster. 2011.

273 pages.

Reviewed by Stephanie Wesley, a 2012 graduate of Georgetown Law, where she focused on immigration law and policy. She has also worked on immigration law issues in the private sector, at the Justice Department, and through Georgetown’s Center for Applied Legal Studies clinic.

In *Loyalty: The Vexing Virtue*, Eric Felton provides the reader with a philosophical tour of the deceptively simple idea of loyalty. As the title suggests, the reality is much more complicated, as loyalty carries heavy demands that not only test the virtue of the individual but also call into question whether loyalty can even properly be categorized as a virtue. By examining the concept of loyalty through the lenses of friends, family, marriage, employment, patriotism,

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and ideology, Felton forces the reader to ask what loyalty demands, what it provides and, ultimately, whether it's worth it.

The book begins in a familiar place—loyalty as a virtue. The examples are heartwarmingly familiar: the soldier going back for a fallen comrade; a sibling refusing to rat out a family member; an officer faithfully delivering a message behind enemy lines even when it costs him his life. But how far should these loyalties go? What about the soldier who covers for his fellow comrade abusing a noncombatant; the sibling who helps dispose of a body; the Nazi officer who faithfully carries out orders to commit genocide? While these examples are extreme, they highlight a problem: loyalty is not grounded in anything virtuous. It is loyalty for loyalty's sake and can just as easily serve evil as good.

Felton then goes beyond the problems posed when carrying one loyalty to an extreme that teeters on the edge, and possibly plunges head first into the realm of vice, and explores what happens when individuals attempt to navigate inevitable conflicts between loyalties: two friends who disagree; a family's disapproval of a lover; or parents split in a bitter divorce. What makes these situations so unpleasant is that there is often no action that does not betray one loyalty or the other; there is no choice without moral blame. And the problems do not stop there. We also face the pull of loyalties to abstract concepts, such as that owed to country or to a set of moral principles. A soldier may feel that his supervisor's orders "in service to the country" are not actually best for the country. A civil servant may find a policy at odds with the principles of equality or fairness. The individual who gives his loyalty to country and ideology faces the more daunting task of not only determining how far his loyalty extends but also what actions are truly loyal.

Felton's book is thoroughly researched and sourced, drawing from ancient Greece to 20th century marketing gurus, from Judas to military strategists, from Shakespeare to Nazi belt buckles. The sheer breadth of examples drives home his point about just how universal the complications of loyalty are to the human experience. While some references are familiar, many send the curious reader off to *Google*, *Wikipedia*, and beyond. Felton leads us down the rabbit hole, and the urge to track down every reference and source grows stronger the more tangled the issue becomes in the hopes that somewhere, around some corner, awaits the prize—the answer that allows us to Houdini out of the uncomfortable moral binds, the compass which will ensure that, in following our loyalties, we will never find ourselves mired in a swamp disposing of evidence to cover for a friend. Nevertheless, as Felton points out, there are no easy answers, at least not if we are being honest with ourselves.

Yet, for all the vexations that loyalty brings, Felton cannot quite find it in himself to cast it aside. Every time he peels back another layer, he reveals yet more moral quagmires, more reasons to proclaim loyalty a mass-manipulating tool of evil men, the enemy of the impartiality so prized in our modern judicial system, the nurturer of nepotism, and the root of a divisive and destructive "me and mine" attitude. However, each time the buzzing insistence comes back that, despite its failings, loyalty is necessary, because "without [loyalty] there is no real love or friendship." In fact, it is this argument that ultimately persuades Felton to conclude that "as frustrating, as vexing as the virtue may be, it's time to dust it off and give it a try."

Although Felton reaches this personal conclusion, like any exploration of such a complex and conflicted concept, the *Vexing Virtue* offers little in the way of answers for the reader. Felton ultimately finds that perhaps the best measure for loyalty is Aristotle's standard of sticking by friends except when they exhibit "excess of wickedness," or Sir Walter Scott's slightly less lenient standard of a friend who will "stand by me not only when I am in the right, but when I am a *little* in the wrong." The author, however, acknowledges that "in practice this doesn't give us any useful tool for deciding one way or another." In the end, though, perhaps that is the point: with so much at stake, the very foundation of love and friendship against the ever-present danger of sliding down a slippery slope in the service of evil, there *should not* be an easy answer. Felton leads us through various arguments, but each reader must reach his own conclusions. In sum, *Loyalty: The Vexing Virtue* may provide the best guard against turning the virtue into a vice—it prompts the reader to explore his or her own loyalties, how far they reach, what they cost, and whether they are worth it.

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NO EASY DAY: THE FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF THE MISSION THAT KILLED OSAMA BIN LADEN

Mark Owen, with Kevin Maurer.
New York, NY, Dutton. 2012.

316 pages.

Reviewed by LTC (USA) Anthony Shaffer, Senior Fellow, Center for Advanced Defense Studies (CADS), and author of *The New York Times* bestseller *Operation DARK HEART: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan—and the Path to Victory*.

Always begin with the end in mind . . . at least I always try to. So I started my review of *No Easy Day* by reading the last chapter first; spoiler alert—they get bin Laden. This memoir by “Mark Owen” includes the firsthand account of the SEAL team raid, known as Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR, into Pakistan on 11 May 2011 to kill Osama bin Laden. The account provides significant insight and details of how important this raid was to close the “first circle”—a circle that started with the botched raid to rescue the American hostages in Tehran back in 1980. One of the notable details—not remotely classified but indicative of the significance of the mission—was the use of one of the Combat Talon MC-130E aircraft that survived the failed rescue mission into Iran to bring the members of the bin Laden raid to Fort Campbell, KY, to meet with the President, dubbed Operation EAGLE CLAW . . . a fitting and satisfying detail from a personal perspective.

The strongest point of this book is the fact that (finally—and thank goodness) the *real* story of what happened on the raid is out. I am told by my friends on the inside that this is, indeed, the *authentic and accurate* story—and they are pleased that the real story is now available to the public. Keep in mind that this book is about a community which does not like publicity. With that said, it became clear to all, once the current White House started to use the hard work of the special operations community for political hay, that the story would have to be told. So, if you want the real story, here it is.

Let’s review a few points regarding the book:

First—style. It is what I would consider a nominal military memoir. Having read a few (and written one), it is typical of the genre—no surprises here. If it were “just another” memoir of a Navy SEAL (there are a half dozen or so by my count), the book would not have done well on its literary prowess or style; to quote my publisher, “the shelf is pretty full” of this sort of book. Kevin Maurer, “Owen’s” co-author, does a credible job of creating flow and balance of

information that can be dry, but the book still tends to be dry and two-dimensional.

Writing a book is always a challenge, as one has to condense years of events down to a readable form that maintains the interest of the audience. This encapsulation of time is done here, but not particularly well. I would not describe this as a “page-turner.” There are sections of the book that are very dramatic—the raid on the Bin Laden compound is as action-packed as one would expect. However, it is about 100 pages too long; the style requires plodding through a good deal of “so what?” to get to the “wow!”

Second—content and focus. While written in good detail, the detail does not reveal the heart and soul of either the SEAL community or Mr. Owen. There is lip service given to “the code”—the SEAL code of “silence” that the author most obviously violated, and violated at his own peril. Owen and his publisher chose to avoid submitting the book through DoD’s required classification review process—a choice that will probably prove to be a bad move in the long run—and a choice that likely will have significant adverse legal consequences. Let me be clear; there are details which I knew to be classified information in the book—not a lot—but enough that it is clear he should have taken the high road and had it reviewed.

Further, along this line, many of the statements made by the publisher regarding the book and its content seem not to have been true. I believe Mr. Owen would have been much better off working with his SEAL teammates and leadership to tell the story rather than going it alone. Further, I don’t believe he would have lost too much from submitting the book to the classification review process. He does not bring up any controversial policy issues, or reveal any embarrassing details of political missteps. Therefore, I believe most would have welcomed the clarity of his story.

Third—policy and history. While it is significant that the final moments of Osama bin Laden are now known, as documented in *No Easy Day*, the larger policy and intelligence processes are not discussed. This is both good and bad. It’s good in that the other units which were involved in this operation remain anonymous and, by extension, their Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). It’s bad in that other units, beyond CIA, played significant and pivotal roles in what was truly a significant “joint” undertaking that did include all elements of DoD. We no longer fight as services—we fight as a DoD team—and CIA helps on occasion (no, I am serious).

Moreover, it is noted that “Pacer,” aka Geronimo, aka bin Laden, was accustomed to hearing helicopters of the Pakistani Army fly over his compound, again revisiting what

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most now accept, i.e., that the Pakistani military and intelligence services had to know (and were okay with) bin Laden being hidden in plain sight near their version of West Point. With all this said, *No Easy Day* is one man's eyewitness testimony to one of the greatest moments in special operations history, no doubt, but it lacks the detailed back story and points of debate regarding the search for bin Laden.

While the "rules of engagement" are discussed, it is clear from my perspective that there was never any doubt that Mr. Owen and the other operators had no intention of bringing Osama back in anything other than a body bag. Notable as always is the uncommon bravery of Owen and his fellow SEALs—going into the unknown consistently and with honor—but it still would have been my preference to capture Osama and destroy the veneer of bin Laden being a holy man. Showing him to be a powerless detainee in an orange

jumpsuit would have done more to break the back of al Qaeda than simply putting lead into his corporeal body.

Final take. The book is worth reading if you want to know the specific and bloody details of Osama bin Laden's last moments on earth before he shuffled off this mortal coil to meet his maker (who, by my estimation, probably was not too happy with him), and if you want to better understand the basic dynamics of what it is like to become a SEAL. The truth, they say, will set you free, and it is clear that this story is a tale worth telling. It is one that should never have been politicized (and abused and manipulated), but one that the American public—the families of the 9/11 victims especially—deserve to know.



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